Statutory Construction

Case Digests
Role of Punctuation Marks in Constructing and Interpreting Statutes

US vs. Hart, 26 Phil. 149

Feliciano vs. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159
In Re Johnson, 39 Phil. 156

In the interpretation of a statute, the punctuation thereof is not seriously regarded. It is a

minor and not a decisive or controlling element in the interpretation of the statute. It is especially
true that obvious mistake in punctuation will be corrected where it is necessary to make the
statute intelligible.

Construction of a statute should be based on something more substantial than

mere punctuation.

Case: US vs. Hart, 26 Phil. 149

Facts: Defendants were charged with vagrancy under Act No. 519, which
penalized "Every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible
means of support x x x." It is to be noticed that said portion of the law is divided
into two parts: (1) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, and (2) "tramping or straying through the country without
visible means of support." It was under the first paragraph that the defendants
were prosecuted and convicted. It was proven that they had means of support.
However, the prosecution insisted that "without means of support" applied only to
"tramping or staying through the country" and not to the other part under which
the defendants were convicted, otherwise the comma after "gambling houses"
would have been omitted or else a comma after "country" would have been
inserted.

Issue: Whether or not the comma after the term "gambling houses" produced
such effect as to divide the provision into two parts, such that "without visible
means of support" would only apply to "tramping or straying through the country",
and not to the earlier clause of being "found loitering about saloons or dram
shops or gambling houses".

Held: No. The construction of a statute should be based upon something more
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an
 additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as
thus punctuated. An argument based upon punctuations alone is not conclusive
and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give
to the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or
incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as
defendant, had "visible means of support" and we think this phrase also refers to
the first part of the pertinent clause, the decision of the lower court is reversed
and defendants are acquitted. [US vs. Hart, 26 Phil. 149]

Punctuation mark may be disregarded to arrive at the natural meaning of the

words employed in a statute.

Case: Feliciano vs. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159

Facts: On November 11, 1995, the respondent-appellant Benigno Aquino, Jr.

was proclaimed elected to the position of mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four
days after proclamation, the defeated candidate Nicolas Feliciano instituted quo
warranto proceedings challenging the eligibility of the respondent on the ground
that he was not at least 23 years old at the time of the election. The lower court
declared Aquino's election illegal and enjoined him from assuming office.
Appellant brought this appeal contending that the age requirement applies only to
the assumption of office. He averred that the existence of a semicolon, converted
into a comma in the 1951 edition of the Revised Administrative Code, after the
first two requirements, prove that he need not possess the remaining
qualifications at the time of the election but at the time of the assumption of
office.

Issue: Whether or not the semicolon after the first two requirements mean that
the qualifications no longer need to be at the time of the election but at the time
of the assumption of office.

Held: No. The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks
cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to the contrary. Courts may,
therefore, disregard punctuation marks to arrive at the natural meaning of the
words employed. It is inconceivable that the lawmakers considered semi-colon
sufficient to refer to the loyalty and age requirement at the assumption of office
without words to that effect, when voting and residence conditions are expressly
required as of the time of the election. This court affirms the decision of the lower
court declaring the election of the respondent unlawful and illegal. [Feliciano vs.
Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159]
Punctuations and capitalization are aids of low degree.

Case: In Re Johnson, 39 Phil. 156

Facts: Sec. 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowed the admission to probate
here in the Philippines of wills made by foreign citizens, residents herein. It
reads: "Will made here by alien- a will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance
with law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by law of his state or country, may be proved,
allowed, recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands." The will of a citizen of the state
of Illinois, USA was presented for probate under this section. Probated and
allowed in the lower court, it was contended on appeal that this section applies
only to wills of aliens as evidenced by the fact that the epigraph of this section
speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further fact that the word
"state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. The testator not being an
alien, the section did not apply to him.

Issue: Whether or not the non-capitalization of the word “state” produced such
effect as to exclude the testator from the coverage of Sec. 635 of the Code of
Civil Procedure so as not to probate his will executed abroad.

Held: No. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids
of low degree in interpreting that language of a statute and can never control
against the intelligible meaning of the written words. The epigraph or heading of
the section is only a convenient index to the contents of the section and cannot
limit the operative words of the body. The testator being a citizen of the United
States, and therefore an alien, is covered by the above section. The will was duly
probated. [In Re Johnson, 39 Phil. 156]

Reference
Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition
Ruperto G. Martin

Submitted to ATTY. FAIRY FAITH RABAGO- AGUSTIN

Submitted by KRISTINA MARIE A. CLAVERO
October 24, 2015
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