MMDA vs Residents of Manila Bay

FACTS:

Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation,
and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically PD.. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

Respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The DENR, DPWH, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast
Guard , PNP Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly
with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment
Code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning
purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which
can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the
trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions
under existing laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.

RULING:
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial
duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act
in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available
to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion one way or the other.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on
one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While
the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in
which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its
Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating
their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate
and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty
in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a
proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.

A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not
to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid
waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation,
to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection,
and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan

G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province
of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May
7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito
Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64
hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible
expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to
maximize the utilization of its resources.

After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province
Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the
Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing
jetty port.

On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land
use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and
other applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of
public consultation meetings.

On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some
160 businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project
on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.

Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the
contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011,
BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the
Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.

The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:

a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;
b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC).

The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMB RVI
and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as
the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had “categorically addressed all the issues” raised by the
BFI in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of action due to the
failure of BFI to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.

ISSUES:

WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case?

WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?
RULING:

On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies
and to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that the rule
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable where,
among others, there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant
case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy or
where the protestant has no other recourse.

Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a
relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be
availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law” and which provides for the
issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.”

The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper
court when any government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof “unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Such proper court may be the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the
Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.

Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised that pertain to
laws and rules for environmental protection.

Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the
respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.”

On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project

The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project.

The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval of
local government units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the
Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation
with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
The absence of either of such mandatory requirements will render the project’s implementation as illegal.

Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted that such
national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause pollution and bring
about climate change, among others, such as the reclamation project in this case.

Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should “initiate public consultations
early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into
consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan”.

Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRA’s power to reclaim land in this
case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the information dissemination
conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with the
requirements under the LGC.

Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang
Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v. SEC.
ANGELO REYES, (G)
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

FACTS:
 June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
 May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-
channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the
area's underwater composition.
 January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
 March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western
Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
 Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated
December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-
46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law
prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction.
HELD:
 No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum
in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production
of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to
yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
 Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972,
before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
 Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be
preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for
that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
 Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service
contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.