DISCUSSION
of this myth was becoming increasingly
Caste and Politics in Bengal
Sarbani Bandyopadhyay
Any attempt at understanding the
presence or absence of caste in
West Bengal today calls for a
contextualisation of the problem
by studying the history of caste
politics in pre-Independence
united Bengal. A response to
Praskanva Sinharay (“A New
Politics of Caste”, EPW, 25 August
2012) and Uday Chandra and
Kenneth Bo Nielsen (“The
Importance of Caste in Bengal”,
EPW, 3 November 2012).
I would like to thank Kushal Deb, Rowena
Robinson, D Parthasarathy, Manabi Mazumdar
and Shoma Choudhury Lahiri for their
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Sarbani Bandyopadhyay (sarbani.bandyopadhyay
@gmail.com) teaches sociology at St Xavier’s
College, Kolkata.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW DECEMBER 15, 2012
P
raskanva Sinharay has argued that
caste has never been important or
relevant category in the electoral
process in West Bengal and that the situ-
ation has now changed with the political
assertion of the Matua Mahasangha.
Chandra and Nielsen have referred to
Chatterjee’s (1997) argument that in
everyday village life and popular con-
sciousness caste remained important to
underscore their point that caste has
always been a relevant category in Bengal,
including Bengal politics. While agreeing
with much of what they argued in that
discussion I intend to point out through
this article that caste was not only rele-
vant in everyday life and “the apparently
uninstitutionalised world of what may
be called politics among the people”
(Chandra and Nielsen 2012: 59) but very
importantly in the world of institution-
alised, formal politics. My argument is that
because assertive “lower” caste politics
made its presence well felt in the domain
of formal politics, it became necessary
for the bhadralok to resist it. This article
seeks to ground the question of caste in
present-day West Bengal in the history of
caste movements and politics in late 19th
and 20th centuries of undivided Bengal.
A history of lower caste assertions in
Bengal is likely to help us locate the promi-
nence or lack of caste in Bengal today.
Hyper-Visibility of Caste
If one looks at histories and literatures of
caste mobilisations during the colonial
period in Bengal one would be obliged
to confront and rethink the alleged lack
of significance of caste in Bengal. In this
period we find a hyper-visibility of caste.
Although these movements began seek-
ing higher varna status for their respective
castes they soon began to claim special
treatment from the colonial government
arguing that their current economic and
political oppression was inseparable from
their caste oppression.1 That caste was
marginal to Bengal politics was a nation-
alist/bhadralok myth but the sustenance
vol xlvii no 50
difficult as the swadeshi movement began
to show not only a clear lack of interest of the
so-called lower castes but also their active
resistance to it (Bandyopadhyay 2011).
Around the early decades of the 20th
century Manindranath Mandal a Poundra-
kshatriya2 leader was making strenuous
efforts to build a counter-hegemony to
(brahminical) bhadralok politics and
dominance. The result was the formation
of the Bangiya Jana Sangha (BJS) (Bengal
People’s Association) in 1922, an umbrella
organisation of many oppressed castes.
Though short-lived, the BJS was an im-
portant move in the history of dalit politics
in Bengal. It seems to have crossed the
“limits” when it threatened to “launch
agitations along the lines of the Muslim
League if its demands were not met”
(M Mandal 1922: 10). It meant pursuing a
separatist agenda that could have further
jeopardised Hindu bhadralok politics.
The significance of the BJS could be
well grasped when in 1926 the All Bengal
Depressed Classes Association was formed
which supported the system of separate
electorates. However it may be more sig-
nificant in our context to note that when
a section of the All India Depressed
Classes Association led by M C Rajah was
opposing the separate electorates stand
and entered into a pact with the Hindu
Mahasabha, the Bengal Association stood
firmly by Ambedkar (Bandyopadhyay
1990: 165-66). Although fraught with
disunity3 the dalit castes and their poli-
tics had entered the forbidden stage:
that of institutionalised formal politics.
One of the planks on which these
castes claimed higher varna status was
their “authentic Hinduness” that was
shown to be clearly established in their
ritual and social practices (Ray 1916).
Attempts were made by the Congress
and Hindu organisations, like the Hindu
Mahasabha and the Hindu Mission, to
co-opt the different caste movements,
especially when their demands for high
ritual status got combined with their
efforts to seek benefits in the secular field
of politics, education and employment.
Some recent dalit activists and scholars4
think that this claim of Hindu-ness created
and in many ways weakened the caste
movements but it also could not be denied
71
DISCUSSION
that in the 19th and early 20th centuries
this provided them with the legitimate
language for mounting their challenges
against brahminical oppression.
To Be Hindu or Not
For at least a few castes such as the
Poundra-kshatriya and the Mali, their
entry into the Hindu Mahasabha took place
through the fascinating figure of Dingin-
dra Narayan Bhattacharyya, a Hindu
Mahasabha leader and also a Congressite.
Manindranath Mandal’s (1926) short bio-
graphical account of Bhattacharyya gives
the idea that much of the emergent elite
sections of dalit castes considered him an
“avatar” of the oppressed. Mandal (1926)
also states that Bhattacharya should have
been accorded at least the same status
as a reformer along with Vidyasagar,
Rammohan and Vivekananda but he was
not because, unlike the rest, he worked for
and amongst the untouchables and was
acerbic in his attack on the caste system.
In fact, the conservative Bangiya Brahman
Sabha called him the second “Kalapahar”.5
While, the politics of “dying Hindus” and
the closeness of these castes to the colonial
rulers did have a good deal of bearing upon
Bhattacharyya’s reformism, to be fair to
him that was not his only concern. His
reformism was not purely of this instru-
mental type and that is precisely why it
was Bhattacharyya and not U N Mukherjee
(who propagated reform of the caste sys-
tem to save the Hindus) who attracted
these castes to the Hindu Mahasabha.6
However, one would possibly not be in a
position to state that they were completely
taken-in by the Mahasabha’s politics. The
different associations, their manifestos
and movements/politics are pointers in the
direction and desire to maintain their
autonomy, their closeness to the Maha-
sabha and other Hindu organisations or
even, later, the Congress, notwithstanding.
However, by the 1930s when religious
identities were getting hardened, this
claim for a Hindu identity possibly created
problems for an autonomous dalit politics.
Most of these castes simultaneously
pressed for higher varna status and
“Depressed Classes” status from the
government. Such caste associations
petitioned and agitated for provisions for
special economic and political treatment
72
of the different dalit castes by the colonial
government. They claimed their loyalty
to the colonial government and the latter
adopted a position that was in some ways
favourable to the dalit castes. It created
considerable problems for the bhadralok
whose hegemony stood to be contested
by the very sections it despised. Since the
time of the Swadeshi movement the dalits
have made their political presence felt and
were there to stay had Bengal not been
partitioned. The bhadralok enthusiasm
behind the second partition of Bengal
begs a question. Why were those (in terms
of social location) who opposed the 1905
partition of Bengal pushing for the parti-
tioning of the province 40 years later?
To understand why caste suddenly
seemed to disappear from the political
lexicon of West Bengal one needs to study
the dynamics of partition politics in un-
divided Bengal. The electoral process in
colonial Bengal clearly shows that the
Hindu bhadralok could not come to
power in a Bengal where the Muslims were
a majority and there was a large dalit
population which, in turn, was suspicious
of caste Hindu organisations like the
Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha.
Communalisation of all conflicts, most
importantly, those that took place between
Muslims and dalits, succeeded due to
various factors and processes7. Suspicion
and lack of unity amongst dalit leaders,8
their different ideological positions as
well as the political ambitions of indi-
vidual leaders9 were amongst the reasons
that weakened dalit politics10 and also
led to their co-option into the Congress
and the Mahasabha.
Caste and Partition
Since the majority of the dalit population
resided in eastern Bengal a Partition
Plan without an exchange of population
was, for the bhadralok, one sure way out
of this political death. Indeed, Sen calls
the partition a “nationalist resolution of
the caste question” (Sen 2012: 323). Dalit
groups and activists in Bengal consider
this moment the most unfortunate in
their political history. Partition not only
kept a huge dalit population away from
West Bengal; when they fled East Pakistan
and came to West Bengal they did so as
refugees whose primary concern could
DECEMBER 15, 2012
not have been politics but survival.11
Thus even if dalits were to come in large
numbers (being dispersed over different
parts of the country which were mostly
ethnically, politically and environmen-
tally hostile12 and lacking an effective
dalit leadership) they were unlikely to
pose a threat to bhadralok order in West
Bengal. The partition thereby solved the
thorny question of caste in Bengal politics.
But it did not happen without resistance.
And the most important figure and associ-
ation that tried to actively resist the parti-
tion conspiracy was Jogendranath Mandal
and the Bengal Provincial Scheduled
Castes Federation (BPSCF) that he and
members of different scheduled castes
founded in 1943. It was a branch of
Ambedkar’s All India Scheduled Castes
Federation (AISCF). From the beginning
Jogendranath made the intention of the
BPSCF clear: to align with those who
would protect the interests of the sched-
uled castes, in particular of those who
were economically deprived.13 He argued
that in terms of economic and political in-
terests the scheduled castes and Mus-
lims14 could have an alliance, though he
did not place the Muslim middle class and
its fundamentalist section above suspi-
cion.15 He, along with the Muslim League
and Sarat Bose and Kiron Shankar Ray of
the Congress, pushed for a united Bengal
plan in the event of partition (Sen 2012;
J Mandal 2003).
The 1946 elections, the first to be held
after the Poona Pact, could be seen as a
measure of Jogendranath’s popularity.
The pact was heavily weighed against
the scheduled castes (Sen 2012). On top
of that the Congress had made all-out ef-
forts (slander and bribes included) to
defeat the BPSCF candidates, in particular
Jogendranath. In the election, Jogendra-
nath was the only scheduled caste leader
of the BPSCF who was elected to the
assembly (Sen 2012; J Mandal 2003). To
mount a further challenge to bhadralok
politics, it was Jogendranath’s concerted
attempts that saw Ambedkar elected to the
Constituent Assembly from Bengal. No one
seemed to be a greater threat to bhadralok
aspirations than Jogendranath.16
But Jogendranath was fighting a lost
battle. The British, eager to leave the coun-
try, found it expedient to leave the AISCF
vol xlvii no 50 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and BPSCF out of consultations regarding
the imminent transfer of power. These two
organisations were hampering a smooth
transfer of power. They no longer required
the support of the scheduled castes. And
when the majority of scheduled caste
opinion in Bengal was secured in favour
of partition (the 1946 “Calcutta Killings”
played its due part in taking the scheduled
castes closer to the Congress and the
Hindu Mahasabha) the demands of their
leaders for the inclusion of the scheduled
caste dominated parts of east Bengal in
the new West Bengal were discarded.17
Casteless Communists
The Communists were the loudest in
proclaiming the irrelevance of caste in the
struggles of the downtrodden. For a party
whose leaders were bhadralok18 class was
a more relevant, progressive and the only
legitimate category. For them the ques-
tion of caste was one of superstructure.
One could see an almost clear division of
labour in their organisations – “upper”
caste leaders, “lower” caste cadre, the
former theorising (a high intellectual ex-
ercise) and the latter putting them into
action.19 It is not surprising therefore,
that the dalit refugees got the worst deal
from the Left Front regime. It may be
noted here that the Left Front govern-
ment of 1977 did not include a single
scheduled caste member in its ministry,
for its need was, perhaps, not felt. Kanti
Biswas was inducted only after he and
other scheduled caste members could
convince the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) – CPI(M) to include scheduled
castes in the cabinet.20 If any regime has
secured the dominance of the bhadralok
in West Bengal, it has been the Left
Front regime, as Chandra and Nielsen
have argued well. It made illegitimate
the language of caste. In fact, the then
chief minister Jyoti Basu, in his reply to
the Mandal Commission, stated that in
West Bengal there were only two castes:
the rich and the poor (Ghosh 2001).
In the last assembly elections here
there was much hype about caste figuring
in West Bengal for the “first” time. The role
of Baroma and the Matua Mahasangha
in defeating the Left Front candidates
has also been spoken about.21 However,
the Matua Mahasangha probably does
Economic & Political Weekly EPW DECEMBER 15, 2012
not represent the organised voice of the
Namashudras. All Namashudras are not
Matuas. Some Namashudras are also anti-
Matua because they find the Matua sect to
be quite brahminical.22 Moreover, I do not
think, given the history of dalit politics
in united Bengal, this election could be
seen as one that has brought caste back
into the stage of Bengal politics from
where it was banished in 1947. Here again,
bhadralok politics played its role when the
Mahasangha split one part owing alle-
giance to the Trinamool Congress and the
other to the CPI(M). In fact one dalit organi-
sation,23 (some of its members are Matuas)
wondered if the Mahasangha had not
lost more than it gained from this political
manipulation. The structures of bhadralok
dominance are too well-fortified for one
assembly election to bring about a dent in
those structures. The new chief minister’s
assurances to put the interests of the
Matua’s on her main agenda had caused
discontent amongst another numerically
strong dalit caste: the Poundras.24 It
remains to be seen whether the different
dalit castes can form their own platform25
and create space for an independent
dalit politics here or whether they would
continue to play into bhadralok hands.
Notes
1 A point derived from 19th and 20th century
from Bengali dalit writings.
2 Since the middle of the 20th century the Poundra
caste has moved away from the claim that they
were Aryans and kshatriyas and adopted the
position that they were the moolnivasis (original
inhabitants) with a flourishing civilisation that was
destroyed by the invading Aryans (Naskar 2012).
3 Personal differences as well as the predominance
of Namashudras in the Association led to the
formation of the All Bengal Depressed Classes
Federation in 1932 which saw affiliation of other
castes. Both however campaigned for separate
electorates (Bandyopadhyay 1990: 165-72).
4 See (Naskar 2012). Dalit activists/scholars I spoke
to are D Lashkar, D Gayen, S K Ray, D K Biswas,
S Naskar and P K Mitra.
5 The (now largely mythologised) Hindu convert
to Islam who vowed to destroy Hinduism in
16th century eastern India.
6 See Mandal (1922), preface.
7 See Datta (1999) and Bandyopadhyay (2011).
8 See Bandyopadhyay (2011) for the conflict be-
tween Poundra-kshatriyas and Namashudras
over the Namashudra demand for proportional
representation and benefits; Biswas (2003) and
Usuda (1999), Jagaran (12 October 1946) and
Poundra Samachar (16 March 2012) for the con-
flict between individual dalit leaders as well as
between different dalit castes.
9 See Biswas (2003) for the race to gain an upper
hand in BPSCF.
10 Ambedkar openly acknowledged this problem,
see Biswas (2003).
11 Conversation with S K Ray, dalit activist (7 No-
vember 2012), Calcutta.
vol xlvii no 50
DISCUSSION
12 From a discussion on the Bengali dalit refugee
problem of Dalit Samanvaya Samiti, Calcutta,
October 2012.
13 The resolutions he pushed for in the assembly
as well as the steps he took as councillor and
later as minister (J Mandal 2003; Biswas 2003;
Thakur 2003).
14 Since the vast majority of landless labourers,
sharecroppers and workers were from these
sections.
15 See his statement against the partition in The
Statesman, 11 May 1947.
16 For a fuller understanding see Sen (2012).
17 Conversation with Jagadish Ch Mandal, Sep-
tember 2012, Calcutta. See also Bandyopadhyay
(2012).
18 Also pointed out by Chandra and Nielsen (2012).
19 One can refer to Nandy’s article in Anandabazar
Patrika (24 May 2011) for a comment along
these lines from a CPI(M) activist of North Bengal.
20 Interview with Kanti Biswas, 7 July 2012, Calcutta.
21 Anandabazar Patrika, 14 May 2011.
22 I came across this at a DSS meeting, in October
2012.
23 Conversation with one of its organising secre-
taries on 4 July 2012.
24 See Poundra Samachar (17 June 2011). There
has been a history of discontent between
these two castes and it continues today (see
Bandyopadhyay 2011 and Poundra Samachar,
19 September 2010; 16 March 2012).
25 In September this year the Dalit Samanvaya Samiti
organised a meet of dalit groups with the inten-
tion of creating dalit unity so that dalits could
become a viable political force in West Bengal.
REFERENCES
Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar (1990): Caste, Politics and
the Raj: Bengal 1872-1937 (Calcutta: K P Bagchi).
– (2011): Caste, Protest and Identity in Colonial
Bengal: The Namasudras of Bengal 1872-1947
(New Delhi: OUP).
Biswas, Upendranath (2003): “Jogendranath o
Ambedkar” in Chaturtha Duniya, January: 9-30.
Chandra, Uday and Kenneth Bo Nielsen (2012):
“The Importance of Caste in Bengal”, Economic
& Political Weekly, 47 (44): 59-61.
Chatterjee, Partha (1997): The Present History of
West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press).
Datta, Pradip Kumar (1999): Carving Blocs: Communal
Ideology in Twentieth Century Bengal (New Delhi:
OUP).
Ghosh, Anjan (2001): “Cast(e) Out in West Bengal”,
Seminar (508 December), New Delhi.
Mandal, Jagadish (2003): Mahapran Jogendranath
Vol 1 & 2, Chaturtha Duniya, Kolkata.
Mandal, Manindranath (1922): Bangiya Jana Sangha,
Medinipur.
– (1926): Bange Didindranarayan, Kanthi.
Naskar, Sanat (2012): Poundra Manisha, Sonarpur.
Ray, Purnachandra (1916): Arya Paundra Kshatriya
Samaj, Murshidabad.
Sen, Dwaipayan (2012): “‘No Matter How, Jogen-
dranath Had To Be Defeated’: The Scheduled
Castes Federation and the Making of Partition
in Bengal, 1945-47” in Indian Economic and
Social History Review, 49(3), 321-63.
Sinharay, Praskanva (2012): “A New Politics of Caste”,
Economic & Political Weekly, 47 (34): 26-27.
Thakur, Kapil Krishna (2003): “Bharatiya Rajnitir
Tragic Nayak” in Chaturtha Duniya, January, 82-94.
Usuda, Masayuki (1999): “Pushed towards Partition:
Jogendranath Mandal and the Constrained
Namasudra Movement” in Kotani (ed.), Caste
System, Untouchability and the Depressed (New
Delhi: Manohar).
Newspapers
Anandabazar Patrika: 14 May 2011 and 24 May 2011.
Jagaran: 12 October 1946.
Poundra Samachar: 17 June 2011, 16 March 2012,
19 September 2012.
73