A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK and the

Response of the British Authorities

By Pike Bishop

September 2010

1
 Table of Contents

I. Introduction .........................................................................................................3
II. A Bird‟s Eye View of Muslim Crime in Britain .................................................5
III. Two Rhapsodies on the Theme of Muslim Crime .............................................6
IV. A Critique of Police Priorities in the Face of Muslim Crime ........................... 15
V. Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist (by Dr.
Nicolai Sennels) .................................................................................................... 20
VI. The Dark Figure and Other Subtleties ............................................................. 24
VII. Some Pre-Emptive Responses to Predicted Objections .................................. 28
VIII. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 34

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 A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK and the Response of
the British Authorities

I. Introduction

Why we decided to produce this document

This document is an attempt to accomplish the following three objectives:

1. To draw public attention to the serious and worsening problem of Muslim crime, in the UK
specifically, and throughout Western Europe more generally.
2. To draw attention to problematic aspects of the response of the UK authorities to Muslim
crime.
3. To promote a public debate on the implications, short- and long-term, of Muslim crime for
Britain and its people.

Who we hope will read this document

We hope that any and all interested parties will read this dossier. However, we particularly hope
that people in the media, academia, the government, and the police force will engage with the
serious issues it raises.

What do we mean by ‘Muslim crime’?

Muslim crime is simply crime committed by Muslims. That said, we have a particular concern
with violent crime (up to and including terrorism), sexual crime, property crime, and organized
crime as committed by Muslims. By the word Muslim, we simply mean all people of Muslim
background and upbringing who have not explicitly renounced Islam, irrespective of how devout
they are, or how observant of the requirements of their religion. 1

Why focus on Muslim crime?

Of course, no single type of crime becomes any worse in and of itself simply by virtue of having
been committed by a Muslim. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to be concerned about Muslim
crime in its own right. These include the following:

1
The reasons for this definition will become clear later on, in Section V, which features a contribution from
Dr. Nicolai Sennels, a psychologist from Denmark. To summarise here, the psychological attributes inculcated by
Islam appear to be at least as significant in causing Muslim crime as conscious religious feeling on the part of
Muslims.

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1. Muslims appear to be overrepresented as the perpetrators of serious crime to an extent which
is far from trivial (this claim will be justified in greater detail later).
2. Terrorism and terrorism-related offences, a crime category in which Muslims manifestly
make up a massively disproportionate fraction of all convictions, impose enormous indirect
costs on millions of people for long periods of time.
3. Muslims throughout the West have pronounced and undeniable separatist, supremacist, and
subversive tendencies. This being the case, Muslim crime acquires a significance above and
beyond that which might be expected, due to the possibility of it being — and being
perceived as being — motivated by these tendencies. To rephrase, some crime is „just‟ crime,
whereas other crime will be perceived as being part of an ongoing inter-group conflict, and
therefore possess the potential to further provoke that conflict. How much Muslim crime (or
white crime, or black crime, or any crime, for that matter) is actually motivated by inter-
group conflict is, of course, an empirical question.
4. The rate of growth of the Muslim community in the UK is extremely rapid, in both absolute
and relative terms. Unusually high crime rates amongst this population therefore take on a
significance they would not otherwise have.

What qualifies us to talk about crime at all?

This document has not been produced by professional criminologists. However, it has been
produced on the basis of a belief that:

1. Citizens engaged in the civic life of their country have both a right and an obligation to
consider such key topics as crime and community cohesion.
2. Educated people of good will are perfectly well-positioned to draw some provisional
conclusions on these subjects on the basis of their own carefully-considered interpretation of
information available in the public domain.

We do not pretend to have all the answers to the questions we pose in this document. Indeed, it is
precisely those areas where data are poor, understanding limited, or interpretation difficult that
we hope will draw increased attention in the future from criminologists, police officers, and
politicians, as they attempt to address the serious problems that now afflict this country.

Given that this document is not academic in nature, we have not felt the need to include all the
sources for the facts and figures herein. The more important or contentious the claim in question,
the more likely it will be to have a source. More general information may be unsourced. Those
who are sceptical about any of our claims are invited to do their own research and make up their
own minds. Either way, we are confident that the factual claims made in this document are
accurate.

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Why do we not discuss terrorism in this document?
With apologies to the Muslim Council of Britain for the hate crime no doubt implicit in our use
of the term, Muslim terrorism has been a key public concern for so long now that we consider it
to be a fairly well-worked seam. There is little we feel we can add to the discussion on terrorism,
so we propose to largely ignore it in this document. We will reiterate, however, what we said
above about how the indirect costs of terrorism (police budget, security services budget, airport
security budgets, indirect costs through productivity losses, etc.) have not, to our knowledge,
ever been calculated with any accuracy. This research should, in our opinion, be conducted so as
to enable a better understanding of the costs of the presence of so many Muslims in our country.

II. A Bird’s Eye View of Muslim Crime in Britain

Obtaining a statistical overview of Muslim crime in the UK is very difficult, due to the extremely
low quality of the data available, and the problems involved in their interpretation. Every three
years the government releases a breakdown of criminal convictions by race. These summaries
offer a significant amount of information to the student of crime, but not, sadly, information that
is useful in a consideration of Muslim crime. As such, we must look to other sources.

As far as one can tell, there is no breakdown of crime rates or convictions by religion. This is the
first hurdle we face in trying to gain an overview of Muslim crime in a broad, statistical sense. A
breakdown for crimes such as terrorism-related offenses could undoubtedly be put together
relatively easily, but it would fail to give us any insight into any other type of crime.

Given the lack of crime rate data, the most natural step is to look at the incarceration data for
different religious groups. The Home Office figure of a Muslim prison population of 11% in
2008 is the obvious place for this discussion to start.2 Comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, and
taking the Muslim population of the country to be approximately 4% (2.4 million out of 62
million), we calculate a disproportionality of three for the Muslim population, which is to say
that three times more Muslims are in prison than we would expect given the number of Muslims
in the country.

More disturbingly, it appears that this disproportionality may grow significantly if we look at
high-security prisons. Four high-security prisons seem to have even larger Muslim populations
than one would expect from the 11% figure. HMP Whitemoor has a Muslim population of 34%,
HMP Long Lartin of 24%, HMP Full Sutton of 15%, and HMP Belmarsh of 22%. However,
HMP Frankland has a Muslim population of only 3%, and there are other high-security prisons in
the UK (HMP Strangeways, HMP Woodhill, HMP Wakefield, etc.) whose Muslim populations
we have not been able to ascertain. Taking a weighted average of these figures to reflect different
population sizes at each prison, we arrive at a figure of 18% for mid-2008.3 This figure could

2
In actual fact, this figure was for England and Wales, not the whole of the UK. However, other sources
suggest that the figure for England and Wales is now 12%, so taking 11% as our figure for the whole UK will keep
our calculations acceptably accurate.
3
Of course, this figure is liable to change. Moreover, the estimates it is based on were not all made at the
same point in time in 2008. Accordingly, it should be taken as a representative figure rather than an exact figure for
an exact moment in time. The current figure could be somewhat higher or lower.

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well go down if it were recalculated for all high-security prisons, as those for which we do not
have data include one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland, which we do not expect to have
large Muslim populations. Nonetheless, the figure is a cause for concern, meaning as it does that,
in the high-security prisons for which we have figures, nearly 1 in 5 inmates is a Muslim.

A complicating factor in all this analysis is that the phenomenon of conversion to Islam on the
part of inmates makes it difficult to know exactly what fraction of the prison population was
Muslim at the point of incarceration. According to one estimate, 30% of all people who identify
as Muslims in prison converted after being incarcerated, but the accuracy of this figure is
difficult to ascertain. It is also difficult to know how many people meeting our earlier definition
of Muslim (i.e. being of Muslim background and upbringing and not having renounced Islam) do
not identify themselves as Muslim in prison. These factors make it difficult to draw firm
conclusions, but it may well be the case that the disproportionality in „real‟ Muslim incarceration
is slightly less than the factor of three calculated above.

There is a great deal more to say on this subject, but we feel that it will be more profitably said
subsequent to other discussions. Accordingly, we will take this theme up again in Section VI.

III. Two Rhapsodies on the Theme of Muslim Crime

Pimping
Among the most disgusting examples of dereliction of duty on the part of our „law enforcement‟
apparatus is that which pertains to the pimping of underage white girls. Of course, the usual
disclaimers must be made here: it is not only Muslims that pimp out these unfortunate white
girls, and not all Muslims do pimp them out. However, insofar as one can discern from the
limited amount of information that makes its way into the mainstream media, there are certain
groups of Muslims who appear to be particularly culpable in this regard. We acknowledge the
uncertainties here, and the great difficulty in trying to develop any accurate picture of exactly
what is going on. As we will see, however, this lack of information is unlikely to be an accident.

Though we use the term „pimping‟ to describe the practice under examination here, the fact of
the matter is that it consists of the dragging of underage white girls into a life of sexual slavery
and violence. Those who are interested in learning about it in more detail are invited to read the
September 2007 Times article Mothers of Prevention by Julie Bindel4 and to watch the March
2008 edition of Panorama, „Teenage Sex for Sale‟. 5 We urge all those who read this document to
familiarize themselves with the relevant material, the better to understand the nature of the
multicultural paradise and glittering rainbow nation that is modern Britain.

Here, we will content ourselves with a brief summary of the essentials. Pakistani drug-dealing
gangs concentrated in the north of England are orchestrating a system in which underage white
girls „just happen‟ to make friends with Pakistani boys of roughly their own age. They are then
introduced to older „cousins‟ of these boys, who are the actual pimps, and who, in time, become

4
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2538090.ece
5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2b7N2gPchc is the URL for the first of six parts.

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their new „boyfriends‟. These men use a wide variety of techniques to control the girls and
induce them to prostitute themselves out to the Pakistani community. These techniques include,
but are not limited to, pretending to need money, threatening the girls, drugging them, and
beating them with iron bars. Through a combination of a reluctance to appear „racist‟ and fears
of race riots of unspecified type, the British police seem to have devoted rather less than their full
energies to this matter, with the result being that the Pakistani Muslim criminals in question are
essentially engaging in all these criminal activities with impunity.

It is hard to avoid the impression that there is a slice of the vibrant, bustling Pakistani Muslim
community of the UK that simply considers the native British population to be a resource,
existing for no other reason than to be chewed up and spat out by vibrant, bustling Pakistani
Muslim predators like themselves, for their sexual pleasure and financial gain. And it is far from
obvious that this slice is some sort of anomaly in this population. On the contrary, the Pakistani
organized crime gangs in question and their Pakistani customers seem to range from the very
young (the teenage boys used to befriend the girls), to their slightly older „cousins‟ (used to start
pimping the girls), to older men still (those orchestrating these activities in the background), with
the girls‟ clients presumably running the gamut from young to old.

That is the depth of the slice. What of its breadth? Well, let us consider the matter. There are
approximately one million people of Pakistani origin in the UK. Let us assume, not
unreasonably, that half of them are male. If 5,000 child prostitutes exist in the UK, 6 and the
problem is particularly bad in the north of England, which appears to be the epicentre of the
phenomenon, then there are perhaps 2,000 girls being prostituted there by Pakistanis (we will not
dignify them by calling them Britons of Pakistani descent). How many times, on average, has
each of these girls been raped by Pakistani „clients‟? 400? 500? How many individual „clients‟
have they been raped by? 100, with each having raped them 4 or 5 times, on average? What is
100 multiplied by 2,000? 200,000? Does that mean that 200,000 Pakistani males, or 40% of the
total, have raped underage white girls in the UK? Well no, probably not, as some Pakistani males
have presumably raped more than one girl. So shall we reduce our estimate by a (fairly arbitrary)
factor of two to take into account this redundancy in the Pakistani raping of underage white
girls? Why yes, let us do that, and generously conclude that only 100,000 Pakistani males have
raped an underage white girl. 7

Now, 100,000 is one fifth of 500,000. This means that, according to our estimate, one in five of
the male Pakistani population of the UK is the rapist of an underage white girl. Bearing in mind
that the fraction of the Pakistani population under the age of 18 is very large, and that these rapes
will be predominantly committed by the population aged 18 and over (who number
approximately 330,000), we must conclude that somewhere in the region of one in three adult
Pakistani males is the rapist of an underage white girl. Having concluded this, and bearing in
mind the various other forms of criminality and sedition that seem to be prevalent amongst
„British‟ Pakistanis that we have not even considered here, would it be unreasonable to suppose
that the Pakistani Muslim population of the UK is in fact, taken as a whole, an enemy of the
British people?

6
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/7317595.stm
7
Now all we need to do is add in the Pakistani taxi drivers, shop-owners, security guards, and schoolboys
aiding and abetting the entire process. How many would there be? Five thousand? Ten thousand?

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We seem to have arrived at a rather unfortunate conclusion. Surely there must be a mistake in
our reasoning, or a mistaken premise? Very well, let us take a stab at this puzzle from a different
angle. According to the information available in the mainstream media, pimping out one
underage girl for one year can bring in £300,000 to £400,000. Let us take the low end of the
estimate (£300,000) and see what we can conclude from it. How much does one have to pay to a
pimp to be able to rape the girl under his „care‟? Let us assume it costs £100 a time. This means
that a girl being pimped out is being raped 3,000 times a year, or roughly 60 times a week.
Returning to our earlier estimate of 2,000 girls being pimped out by Pakistanis, we see that there
are six million occasions each year upon which a Pakistani male rapes an underage white girl in
this fashion. Now, we established above that the population of adult Pakistani males in the UK
will be in the region of 330,000. Six million divided by 330,000 gives us a rounded-down figure
of 18, which means that the average adult Pakistani male in the UK rapes an underage white girl
or girls 18 times a year. But surely there must be many adult Pakistani males who are not
involved in this crime? Why yes, there must. Let us be generous and assume that half of all such
people are not involved. We must therefore conclude that the remaining 50% are perpetrating an
average of 36 such rapes a year. Perhaps two thirds of all adult Pakistani males are uninvolved,
leaving the remaining one third to rape underage white girls on an average of 55 occasions 8 a
year, or more than once a week.

Try as we might, we cannot refrain from concluding that the male Pakistani population of the
UK, as a whole, 9 views the native female children, and presumably the native population in and
of itself, as a barbarian horde might view the abject and downtrodden people of a country it had
just devastated. One need not be a goose-stepping, sieg-heiling, supporter of a future Fourth
Reich to think that something rather unfortunate is happening here, or that the unwillingness of
the authorities to shed much light on this problem is motivated by a desire to keep certain
uncomfortable truths under lock and key. For which government will freely acknowledge that a
minority population imported against the wishes of the natives is, in effect, waging an
underground war against them, a war in the face of which the apparatus of state appears to be
helpless?

Are any of the above estimates likely to be accurate? Well, the uncertainties being so great at
each step of the calculation, it is impossible to know for sure. But given that there is reason to
believe that both the pimping and consequent raping of underage white girls are low-risk
activities (at least if one is a Pakistani), it is hard to see what deterrents could exist to persuade
Pakistani males not to engage in them. And given further that no one else seems to have
generated any estimates as to just what fraction of the Pakistani population of the UK is involved
in this activity, who is there to gainsay us in this regard? Are there better figures out there? Can

8
Yes, 55, not 54. This is the rounding error coming back in.
9
It is crucial to understand what this means. We are interested here in the properties of groups of
individuals, not of individuals themselves. Lions are more dangerous to human beings than badgers, and this
conclusion cannot reasonably be altered even if we know that some lions are harmless and some badgers dangerous.
Similarly, the criminal and destructive behaviour of adult Pakistani males in the aggregate requires us to draw
certain conclusions. Those who object to this way of conceptualizing the issue should ask themselves whether they
would rather walk through a cage full of lions or a cage full of badgers. Few would choose the lions, and few would
consider themselves to have been discriminatory or prejudiced for having done so. There are patterns in the world,
and they do not go away just because some choose to ignore them.

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they be revealed? In the absence of real information, those who are concerned about the problem
will have to generate their own estimates of its severity. Those concerned, in turn, about these
estimates need to plug the gap with credible data. Until this is done, we see no reason to consider
the above analysis particularly implausible.

Ideally, of course, amateur criminologists such as ourselves would not have to engage in such
speculative calculation. But we can hardly rely on the police to do it for us, as they appear to
have already established (with certain honourable exceptions) such a record of willful
uselessness in this regard as to make Clouseau look like Columbo. Nothing illustrates better than
this sickening saga of professional malfeasance10 just how mistaken we are if we persist in
seeing the UK police as being some sort of relatively neutral law enforcement tool, that, like,
hears about a crime, then, like, investigates it, and then, like, brings the perpetrators to justice.
We are talking about a police force that once arrested a man for ostensibly homophobic
comments made to a horse. Does anybody really believe that the UK police force, in the 21st-
century, is some sort of unbiased, apolitical enforcer of the law?

No, our police force has become contaminated by:

1. A concern not to appear politically incorrect, let alone „racist‟.

2. A fear of the implications of actually enforcing the law with respect to large, hostile, and
unassimilated Muslim populations.

It is hard to say which of these factors is the more important in explaining the criminal
negligence of the police vis-à-vis pimping. Perhaps they can tell us themselves. But one thing
should be understood. If the Pakistani Muslim populations of many towns in the north of
England are now large enough to force the police to refrain from enforcing the law concerning a
matter of this gravity, then, short of massive ethnic cleansing or a radical change in law
enforcement policy, this state of affairs will exist in perpetuity, as the rapid growth of these
populations can only stack the deck ever more against the apparatus of state. Have the British
people given their consent to the effective expulsion11 of the police from vast swathes of urban
Britain? If not, they need to ask themselves whether the state is even attempting any longer to
fulfill its obligations under the social contract that exists between itself and the people, and what
they will eventually be required to do if it is not.

We are reminded of fairy tales in which, once a year, a dragon descends upon some unfortunate
village, and demands a fair young maiden to devour in return for not destroying the villagers‟
homes with its fiery breath. The main difference with our situation is that rendering up the
maiden to the dragon at least buys the villagers a year of peace and quiet.
10
We do not say what we say about the police to malign the rank and file, well aware as we are of the fact
that most people who join the police do so to serve and protect the people of this country. These good people will be
just as horrified by the situation as we are. Our criticisms are aimed at the politicians and the politically-motivated
senior police officers for whom protecting the public comes in a distant second compared with sweeping thorny
subjects under the carpet whilst mouthing platitudes about how diversity has enriched us all. Has it enriched the girls
destroyed by one of its most despicable manifestations?
11
By this, we do not mean that the police do not operate in the areas in question but that, at least with respect
to certain crimes, they might as well not due to their complete lack of interest in carrying out their responsibilities
therein.

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What, precisely, is being purchased by the disgraceful, despicable, degenerate behaviour of those
police forces that have, it seems, „de-emphasised‟ the pursuit of the systematic rapists, pimpers,
druggers, and destroyers of white girls? An extra hour‟s kip, feet up on the desk, snoring away?
Or something even more important? Can we be told?

Of course, many will protest that it is really terribly, terribly, difficult to crack down on a crime
of this sort. This is presumably why the authorities have had to resort to „educational campaigns‟
and the writing of warning letters to suspected pimps (yes, really). Jack Straw‟s Blackburn
constituency is one of those afflicted with a Pakistani pimping problem, 12 and Mr. Straw is
quoted in Mothers of Prevention talking about how he has undertaken only various vague and
unquantifiable activities to address the problem.

We do not intend here to cast aspersions upon Mr. Straw himself. Quite the contrary, in fact. Of
all the Stalinist, dhimmi-by-choice, pointlessly-spacefilling, turnips-on-a-stick to have sat in the
House of Commons in the last five years, he is by some margin the most distinguished. But if he
really believes that discussing matters with „community leaders‟ might help him address the
sexual destruction of the children of his own country by recklessly imported Muslim savages,
then one rather wonders what could possibly be the point of him.

Given that the police find it so frightfully, frightfully hard to deal properly with the pimping
problem, there are only two ways this matter can develop. The first is that this blight on the face
of our country continues, with vibrant, bustling Pakistanis destroying staid, non-bustling white
girls with impunity. The second is that non-state actors respond as they see fit, paying no heed to
the law. If the former is unacceptable, where does that leave us? And does it not seem probable
that, if faced with a realistic threat of the latter occurring, the police would suddenly discover
that the problem was not so terribly difficult to deal with after all?

If there is a better reason than the above-outlined Pakistani Muslim depravity for lighting
torches, grabbing pitchforks, and launching a tribal civil war that burns down the entire country
and leaves it populated only by seagulls and hedgehogs, so that, before too long, people in
mainland Europe talk only of a legendary country called Brittaine that existed, it is rumoured, in
the days of yore, then it has not yet occurred to the authors of this document. And we have
thought about it jolly hard. If it proves to be the case that the apparatus of state has chosen not to
protect the female children of this country from the depredations of hostile, rapacious aliens, then
a great number of heads of all different shapes and sizes will have to be observed to roll before
justice can be considered to have been done.

12
By rights, white British people should be responsible for a majority of all crime types in all areas, due to
their massive numerical dominance. According to the detective quoted in „Teenage Sex for Sale‟, however, „Asians‟
are mainly responsible in the north of England, blacks in the West Midlands, and whites, Turks and Kurds elsewhere
(note that Turks and Kurds are also overwhelmingly Muslim). That such small groups as the minorities in question
dominate this type of crime in any area at all makes it clear just how big a problem their members are on a per-capita
basis. If 20% of the population of an area is responsible for 90% of all crime of a certain type in that area, that
means that the 20% in question is overrepresented for that crime by a factor of fully thirty-six, or one and a half
orders of magnitude. This point must be understood, or all too many people will shrug this matter off as a case of
Pakistanis dominating in one area, blacks and whites in others. To arrive at this conclusion would be to
misunderstand the matter entirely.

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In closing, I invite readers of this document, kafir and believer both, to reflect with the utmost
seriousness on what the future could hold for this country if these matters are not dealt with to
the satisfaction of British patriots, who see no reason to be colonized and preyed upon by
Pakistani Muslims, a people so hopeless as to have turned their own country into a byword for
national collapse, civilizational failure, and religiously-inspired psychopathy. On this matter, we
demand satisfaction.

Female Genital Mutilation

Female genital mutilation is by no means a cultural practice engaged in by all Muslims around
the world. Nor, indeed, is it one engaged in only by Muslims, there existing many places in
Africa where it is practiced by non-Muslim peoples. Nonetheless, it provides us with a specific
example of a very disturbing phenomenon, and one which threatens to discredit the law and with
it the legitimacy of the apparatus of state. The disturbing phenomenon in question is not the
removal of certain parts of the sexual organs of young girls, disgusting, dangerous, inhumane,
and repugnant though this is. Rather, it is the conversion of enforceable laws into unenforceable
laws through the importation of culturally alien peoples.

To make this point properly, we need to understand what is meant by an unenforceable law.
Consider the law prohibiting the possession of ecstasy, a Class A drug. Strictly speaking,
possession of ecstasy is punishable by up to seven years in prison, which makes it a serious
criminal offence. Nonetheless, it was once estimated that, every weekend in the UK, a million
people take this drug. Assuming for the sake of illustration that this figure is still accurate, this
means that one million people, give or take, are breaking the law in this regard every week.

Now, what steps could the British government take if it were to suddenly to decide that this state
of affairs were unacceptable, and that ecstasy use must be eradicated? In principle, the police
could start raiding nightclubs across the country on Friday and Saturday nights, slamming
punters up against the wall, and going through their pockets. Some number of unfortunate
clubbers would, as a consequence, find themselves facing seven years (reduced, of course, to
three and a half) inside. But the British prison population is already about 95,000-strong, and
incarcerating people is a fantastically expensive thing to do.

In addition, the political fallout that would greet a government using such heavy-handed tactics
and consuming such massive resources in a „war‟ against a drug that seems to be essentially
harmless (we ignore here the many other considerations a full discussion of this matter would
require) would make the whole affair prohibitively expensive in that regard too. Even dragging
2,000 people off to jail on a single weekend would leave the other 998,000 (or 99.8% of the
total) unmolested by the long arm of the law. If we assume three and a half years incarceration
each, multiply by 2,000 people, and then multiply by £40,000 for the costs of one year of
incarceration, then we have a cost of £280 million for the incarceration of these wrongdoers.
Adding in police costs, court costs, and the opportunity costs of the incarcerated not being able to
work, we are surely looking at a bill in excess of £500 million to remove 0.2% of all ecstasy
users from the streets of the UK for three and a half years.

11
If these exertions were repeated every weekend for a year, at a total cost including incarceration
of, say, £26 billion, 89.6% of the original one million users would still be at large at the end of
the year, despite having broken the law a grand total of 52 times. It is hard to envisage a scenario
in which such massive exertions could possibly be considered to have any net benefits, which is
why they do not occur. Trying to stop the flow of ecstasy into the UK in the first place might
seem like a better idea, but the slightest familiarity with the U.S. War on Drugs suggests that
such things are not easily accomplished.

This is not to suggest that the possession (and therefore the use) of ecstasy could not be
prevented in principle. Paramilitary death squads could be created and equipped with on-the-spot
ecstasy blood tests to dispense „justice‟ to those having indulged in the drug. But this would be
politically impossible in the UK, and the cost-benefit analysis would still, to put it mildly, edge
towards the unfavourable. What this means is that the laws on ecstasy possession are completely
unenforceable in any meaningful sense, as the takers of this drug understand very well.

The reader will now be wondering what, if anything, any of this could possibly have to do with
FGM, and the answer is simply that the British government is already in an essentially identical
position with respect to this hideous crime. It is estimated that several hundred female genital
mutilations take place every year in the UK, mainly within the UK Somali population. Let us put
this figure at 500, and assume that both the mother and the father of the mutilated child are
implicated in the crime. That means that 1,000 people, mainly Somalis and all immigrants, are
implicated every year in the crime of mutilation.

If, on the last day of 2010, the police were to build irrefutable cases against 100 of them, who
were then arrested, tried and sentenced to long prison sentences, a great blow would have been
struck for justice and the British way of life, and our political overlords would be thrilled.
Correct? Actually, no. Incorrect. There is nothing our political overlords would like less than
this. Let us explain.

Consider what putting 100 Somalis (fifty Somali couples) in prison will involve. Under the
Female Genital Mutilation Act, someone found guilty of female genital mutilation can receive a
sentence of up to 14 years. Let us assume they receive average sentences of ten years each, of
which they serve five. Let us also bear in mind that:

 Such convictions could only be secured via compulsory medical examinations, against the
wishes of the parents.
 Convicting two Somali parents of this crime will mean that all their children will have to be
taken away from them, permanently, and placed in care, at great public expense.
 There is no guarantee that other Somali parents will be deterred by this, making it
overwhelmingly likely that the whole process will have to be repeated, perhaps in perpetuity.

Taking hundreds of Somali children into care, and therefore out of their communities, every year
would itself result in accusations of cultural genocide or the like. Accusations of „stigmatisation‟
would fly through the air thick and fast. After a few short years, there would already be facilities
somewhere full of Somali children in care where, presumably, the staff would have to be Somali

12
so as to allow the children to preserve the oh-so-precious cultural heritage from which they had
to be rescued in the first place.

It is fairly clear that no one is going to walk into the expensive, nasty, grueling, polarising
minefield such an endeavour would turn out to be without good reason. And if the welfare of the
children in question constituted such a reason, it would already have happened. Besides, they
would have been cut in Somalia, would they not? Now they are being cut here instead. What of
it?

Anyone who is unconvinced by this analysis needs to present an alternative explanation for the
way in which, despite the Female Genital Mutilation Act having been passed in 2003, there have
been, to date, no convictions at all. Life peer Ruth Rendell would certainly appreciate such an
explanation. As quoted in December 2009 in the Independent 13:

“When I helped take the Bill [the FGM Act] through Parliament seven years ago, I was very
hopeful that we‟d get convictions and that would then act as a deterrent for other people. But
that has never happened and my heart bleeds for these girls. [...] I have repeatedly asked
questions of ministers from all departments about why there has never been a prosecution
and why we still do not have a register of cases. But while they are always very sympathetic,
nothing ever seems to get done.” [Italics added]

We do not wish to scorn the efforts of Ruth Rendell, who is clearly a compassionate woman, and
one who has committed a good deal of time and energy to opposing the horrible barbarity of
FGM. But expressions of sympathy are cheap, and she is reading too much into those made by
the empty suits with whom she discusses these matters.

Given that incontrovertible evidence of FGM can be obtained by medical examination, the
failure of all these supposedly titanic efforts to address it must indeed seem odd to some. But it
will only do so as long as one continues to look it at from the wrong perspective, in which those
in government are genuinely trying to bring this barbarity to an end. The correct perspective is
built on the insight that to date, our governing elite has introduced useless smokescreen
legislation to give the impression that it is doing something, whilst making absolutely sure that
the police do not have the powers they need to address this crime properly, i.e. the power to
perform, or have performed, medical examinations.

To rephrase, this lack of police power is not a bug, but a feature, in this system, a system whose
architects are doubtless relieved that the mutilation in question does not consist of plucking out
an eyeball — that would oblige them to actually do something about it, as empty eye sockets are
not so easily hidden.

Certain anti-FGM campaigners argue for a tactic of targetting the „cutters‟ who are responsible
for the mutilation. They present this as a more moral course of action, targetting those profiting
from the work rather than confused and uneducated parents doing what they think is best for
their children. But this makes no sense, as the cutters themselves are of the same culture, and are

13
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-fails-to-halt-female-genital-mutilation-
1845731.html

13
doubtless just as „confused‟ and uneducated as the parents, sharing as they do their beliefs about
the necessity of the procedure. Indeed, they have probably all already been „cut‟ themselves.

We suspect these campaigners understand all too well that the problem is hopeless within extant
political paradigms, under which FGM has become de facto legal, for the reasons outlined above.
Targetting the cutters is their only remaining option, as it would, in principle, allow them to
address the problem by targetting people whose incarceration would not pose the insoluble
political problems described above. However, we must observe that this approach, roughly
analogous to targeting drug dealers instead of drug users in the „War on Drugs‟, would likely
prove similarly ineffective for the same reasons, even supposing that it managed to secure one of
the convictions that have so far eluded it. Cutting down on the supply of cutters will only
increase the price of their service, and with it the incentives to provide it.

Can the grotesque contamination of our country that FGM constitutes be tolerated? Most of us
are probably relatively unconcerned about the de facto legality of ecstasy consumption. But can
we look at each other, shrug, and say that, for some groups in 21st-century Britain, cutting pieces
of the sexual apparatus out of one‟s daughters is an entirely risk-free undertaking with respect to
the law?

Even if, appallingly, we thought we could stomach the occasional clitoridectomy, we should not
delude ourselves that this is the only type of crime that has slipped off the radar of the criminal
justice system, and therefore, in effect, out of existence. Forced marriages (often of underage
girls) and attendant abductions, beatings, and threats; honour killings; the drugging, pimping, and
raping of underage white girls; violence towards and the forced confinement of female family
members: what reason do we have to believe that the authorities really have the slightest interest
in enforcing the law with respect to „culturally sensitive‟ matters? And why is it that so many
culturally sensitive crimes are committed overwhelmingly, if not entirely, by Muslims? Is this a
coincidence?

Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves one key question. Is British law to be determined by our
democratically elected representatives in Parliament? Or is it to be determined, in practice if not
in principle, by the cultural standards of whatever random assembly of unassimilable aliens has
been allowed to congregate on our shores, through immigration policies which have long since
ceased to reflect the desires of the British people?

We end this discussion by including the closing paragraph of the Independent article mentioned
above:

“A Home Office spokesman said: „We have appointed an FGM co-ordinator to drive forward
a co-ordinated government response to this appalling crime and make recommendations for
future work.‟”

„Future work‟ that will have no effect on anything at all. A slow, slow train coming.

14
IV. A Critique of Police Priorities in the Face of Muslim Crime
There is criticism aplenty of the apparatus of state in the previous section, both explicit and
implicit. However, there is one particular issue that needs to be addressed here directly. If one
were to ask a thousand people at random what the primary objective of the police is, nearly all
would surely reply that it is to enforce the law, bring criminals to justice, and thereby deter to
some extent future crimes. Intriguingly, there does not seem to be any consensus amongst
criminologists or other students of these matters that this answer would be correct.

Of course enforcing the law is one of the primary objectives of the police, but there is a body of
thought that insists that, in actuality, the maintenance of public order is (or at least ought to be)
their main concern. Many otherwise incomprehensible phenomena can be understood once one
realizes that this second objective vies with the first.

It is far from contemptible that the police should be required to attach great importance to the
maintenance of public order, for frequent, uncontrolled disorder in the public sphere will have
seriously detrimental effects on any country in short order. However, we are troubled by the way
in which the relative importances attached to the maintenance of public order and the
enforcement of the law appear to vary as a function of the ethnic/religious group being policed.
A great many examples of this disturbing trend already exist, but we will examine a single one
here to establish the point.

We are confident that all readers of this document will remember the now-infamous
demonstration outside the Danish Embassy in London, in February 2006. During the Mohammed
Cartoon Crisis, the Saviour Sect and Al-Ghurabaa, two of the most unsavoury of the many
unsavoury Muslim groups in the UK, held a protest outside this embassy. The protest showcased
the global ummah at its most unappealing, consisting as it did of several hundred deranged,
frothing, homicidally-inclined Muslims loosing a volley of outrageous threats and abuse towards
the Danish cartoonists and Europeans in general.

The photos of these protesters and their placards — in our capital city — have sullied, in
perpetuity, the reputation of our country. Given that the protest was illegal irrespective of content
(in that the organizers had not obtained a permit) and given further that it was illegal in terms of
its content too, involving as it did a large number of psychopathic Muslims openly and
unashamedly inciting murder against the entirely innocent citizens of a friendly country, would it
really have been too much to expect the police to break it up, with force if necessary? Clearly,
the answer to this question was yes, because the maintenance of public order took precedence
over the enforcement of the law.

According to an article14 in the Telegraph which provides a serviceable summary of the police
and public response to the demonstration:

Scotland Yard, which has received at least 100 complaints from members of the public so
far, defended the decision not to make arrests. It said the officer in charge at such scenes had

14
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1509742/Arrest-pedlars-of-hate-police-urged.html

15
 to weigh the need to make arrests against the likelihood of provoking more serious unrest.
[Italics added]

This may seem innocuous enough on first reading, but it contains the seeds of something terribly
destructive. If the likelihood of arrests being made is inversely proportional to the potential for
serious disorder, then those more likely to cause serious disorder will be extended greater leeway
to break the law in public. And this fact is unlikely to be lost on them.

Sadly, it was most certainly lost on the Metropolitan Police, who made the decision to allow the
protest to go ahead unmolested. Having seemingly forgotten that prevention is better than cure,
they decided that, rather than actually stop the crimes being committed, they would gather
evidence to be used later, in their assiduous pursuit of the perpetrators of the crimes they had
proven so unwilling to prevent in the first place. According to a police spokesman quoted in the
Telegraph:

Specialist officers were deployed to record any potential event, should it be needed at any
point in the future.

They would deploy some of their specialist officers, no less, to bring justice to the wrongdoers.
We can reveal here for the first time, after extensive independent investigation, that said
specialists were not bog-standard peelers with video cameras. Far from it, in fact. Every single
one of the specialists deployed by those tasked with our protection had spent the last ten years on
a mountain top in China, training in the arcane art of „filming-criminals-whilst-they-are-
breaking-the-law-but-not-actually-doing-anything-about-it-because-they-might-lose-their-
tempers.‟

Given that the Metropolitan Police had decided to pull out

all the stops and use their „specialists‟ to bring the guilty
to justice after the protest had ended, readers might be
tempted to conclude that they did not botch their response
so badly after all. But, cruel, cruel world! To the great
dismay of these modern-day ninja warriors, certain of the
more technically savvy Muslims unleashed a devastating
countermeasure of their own: a high-tech cloaking device
which rendered them completely impervious to the long
arm of the law. Needless to say, the device does not
bestow complete invisibility on its user. One can still
make out a vague, and vaguely human, silhouette. But it
is, nonetheless, a formidable weapon in the criminal
armoury of the global ummah. Readers are invited to
study the accompanying image to see exactly what the
police were up against. Who said Muslims were
technological incompetents?

Such dastardly criminal brilliance, in the face of which Holmes himself would have gnashed his
teeth and Moriarty swooned in admiration, seems to have confounded the best efforts of the

16
specialists deployed by our law enforcement establishment. Consider their dilemma. There are
people. They are breaking the law. They are standing still, in public. But they have covered their
faces. How to proceed?

Thumbing desperately through their well-worn copies of Law Enforcement for Dummies, brows
furrowed in concentration as they wrestled fiercely with conceptual difficulties that would have
reduced Newton himself to a groaning wreck, they eventually admitted defeat. A thousand
curses! There was nothing to be done! We tried filming them, but the face coverings worn by the
criminals were visible not only in real life, but in our footage too! Cameras are complicated! This
was not covered in training! Ten years on top of a mountain for nothing!

We are reluctant to continue in this facetious vein in a document written in deadly seriousness.
Nor would we want our readers to jump to the unwarranted conclusion that we have a low
opinion of Sir Ian Blair, who was commissioner of the Metropolitan Police during this
disgraceful fiasco.

Quite the contrary, in fact. Of all the useless, insensate, dhimmi-by-choice, Hello-Kitty pieces of
vegetable matter to have ever been in charge of policing in our capital city, he was by some
margin the most intellectually distinguished. But if he really thinks that responsible police work
consists of filming people for the purposes of subsequent identification despite the fact that the
people in question are hiding their faces and cannot be identified, then it is rather hard to see
what could possibly have been the point of him. 15

Anyway, we have digressed shamefully and must return to the original subject of our enquiry, to
wit, Holocaust-inciters swathed in ACME cloaking devices. Perhaps the Americans, or the
Israelis, or some other such group of serious people, could have devised a way to bring this
woman to justice. But not the British bobby. No, the despicable creature who advised us to „Be
Prepared for the Real Holocaust‟, is still at large. What would the police have done if they had
wanted, or needed, to arrest her? Deployed their tactical Ouija board?

Of course, this is not to suggest that the police let all the protesters get away scot-free. On the
contrary, the „film-first-arrest-later‟ approach resulted in a total of four (quatre, cuatro) protestors
eventually being convicted of a variety of offences relating to the incitement of hatred.
According to the Metropolitan Police, there were 450 protestors present on the day, which means
that a trifling 99.1% of them were able to participate in the inciting of all kinds of death and
damnation against all manner of people without suffering any unpleasantness themselves on the
day itself or afterwards. Behold the majesty of the law!

If the 450 Muslim protestors outside the Danish Embassy had been 450 neo-Nazi protestors
outside the Israeli Embassy, with equivalent signs and rhetoric, screeching about holocausts and
whatnot, and with an identical ability to riot and cause public disorder, would the same softly-
softly approach to the policing of criminal scum still have been adopted by the Metropolitan

15
It is worth remembering that his deputy, Brian Paddick, was a man of great comedic talents. Subsequent to
the 2005 London Tube and bus bombings, he said that „Islam and terrorism are two words that do not go together‟.
Of course, if this were true, there would have been no reason to say it. What sane man ever denied a connection
between kumquats and terrorism?

17
Police? Or would they have waded in and given it, shall we say, a bit of welly? It is impossible to
say for sure. But we are fairly confident that their response would have been quite different, and
that, if a few heads had needed to be cracked to make our hypothetical Nazis see the error of
their ways, then they would have been cracked good and hard.

There are many examples of this unfortunate wilting of the police in the face of Muslim anger or
expected Muslim anger:

 The last-minute cancellation of the legal SIOE (Stop the Islamization of Europe) and EDL
demonstration outside the Harrow mosque due to mass Muslim violence and the threat of
such violence.
 The treacherous, pusillanimous behaviour of the despicable Anil Patani of the West
Midlands Police, who pursued the makers of Undercover Mosque rather than the Muslims
caught on camera within it.
 The refusal to properly investigate pimping as described above.
 The willingness of the police to tolerate vast numbers of Muslims calling, in public, for
Salman Rushdie to be killed.

All of this makes terribly clear the relationship that now exists between the British state and the
Muslim population of the UK. The degree of tribalism, aggression, and contempt for this
country, its people, and its laws in the UK Muslim community is so great, and so ready to erupt
at any time, that the police have taken appeasing it as being one of their chief objectives, the
better to preserve public order.

We need to be clear as to what exactly this means. A disproportionately criminal, parasitic,

terrorist, and seditious group of people, having escaped the run-down hellholes that they or their
recent ancestors hail from, are doing their level best to convert our country, Britain, into the
same kind of hellhole, where the same moral standards and general chaos obtain for the same
reason (i.e. the dominance of those Muslims who will engage in massive religiously-motivated
violence and disorder at the drop of a hat). And the police are letting them do it. For when the
maintenance of public order trumps all other considerations, those who threaten it most
effectively will be granted the most concessions. In contrast, those who can be cracked down on
without fear of repercussions will find themselves on a much shorter leash.

The Thin Blue Line is proving itself to be not only thin, but feeble to boot, and more feeble by
the day, at least vis-à-vis Muslims. The British police are, like any other police force anywhere
in the world, not some sort of omnicompetent law enforcement mechanism, a magic wand that
can be waved over any infringement of our laws to make it go away. They have evolved over the
years, as has our entire criminal justice system, to deal with the public order and law
enforcement challenges of a specific people, the British, in a specific country, Britain. They are,
in a fundamental structural sense, quite incapable of adequately policing our Muslim population
which, despite its diversity in terms of national origin, is, in certain crucial ways, showing its
„Muslimness‟ in much the same way as the Muslim population of every other Western European
country.

18
Tribal, aggressive, implacable, and a strong presence in every major urban area throughout the
country; the British police, indeed our criminal justice system as a whole, have not been
designed, trained, or equipped to deal with such operational challenges. Those who are still
sceptical on this point would do well to view the footage available on Youtube of the
aforementioned attempts of SIOE and the EDL to stage a legal demonstration outside Harrow
mosque, and the complete inability of the police to allow them to do so. The police are, perhaps
unwittingly, simply incentivising disorder and the threat of disorder, and disincentivising law-
abiding behaviour. Do we need to point out that this cannot lead anywhere that we could
possibly want to be?

All this with a Muslim population of 4%! How will things be when the Muslim population of the
country is 6%, or 8%, and has taken over an even greater fraction of virtually every part of the
urban UK? The fear of disorder on the part of our authorities and the willingness of Muslims to
threaten it are an unholy combination, setting up a positive feedback loop which must be broken
sooner rather than later.

For the Danish Embassy protest was emblematic of a wider problem. If the UK is not to
eventually turn into a country dotted with a patchwork of Muslim no-go zones in and around
which British law barely obtains at all, the authorities will eventually have to establish that the
law applies to Muslims as much as to anyone else.

Two things are patently obvious to the current authors:

1. That breaking out of this vicious cycle will be extremely painful and costly.
2. That there is no guarantee that the poltroons responsible for formulating law enforcement
policy vis-à-vis the possibility of Muslim disorder have the courage required to endure this
pain or these costs.

We wish to state here for the record that the potentially catastrophic consequences of the
hopeless short-termism that seems to prevail on the part of our law enforcement establishment
are not wreathed in mist. They are, by and large, fairly obvious, and include the complete
breakdown of law and order in Muslim-dominated areas, as can already be seen in parts of many
European countries, and a descent into outright, permanent, sectarian conflict between Muslims
and their host societies, conflict that the authorities will be powerless to control.

Let those in positions of authority, whether in government or in the police, not pretend to be
unaware of this. Their culpability will not be forgotten when British patriots are eventually
forced to do what is necessary to save their society from complete disintegration.

19
V. Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a
Psychologist
It is important to understand that the problems Britain faces with Muslims and their criminality
are not anomalous in the wider European context. On the contrary, other Western European
countries seem to have even worse Muslim crime problems than the UK.

In the Netherlands, the Muslim crime problem in Moroccan and Turkish form has been largely
responsible for propelling the brilliant Geert Wilders to a position of political prominence. One
can only conclude that the Dutch no longer have any interest in being attacked and robbed in,
and in extreme cases driven off, their own streets. Those Britons feeling a sense of dismay over
the type and scale of Muslim criminality in the UK can look to the Netherlands to see what
happens when this particular cancer is allowed to metastasise even more freely than it is here,
fostered by insane immigration policies and subsidised by a welfare state that acts as a magnet
for the useless, the criminal and the indolent.

Casting our gaze further afield, the link between Islam and crime becomes ever clearer. In
France, rioting on the part of Muslim youth of mainly Maghrebian and African origin has
become uncontrollable and endemic, with the 2005 riots being only the most extreme example to
date. In Sweden, the mass importation of Muslims, largely from Iraq and other parts of the
Middle East, combined with consequent white flight, threatens to turn Malmö, the third largest
city in the country, into a Muslim-majority city in the not-too-distant future, with everything that
implies for crime (which is surging), the rule of law (which is disintegrating), and the general
character of the city (which is deteriorating). Jews are already fleeing due to the constant
intimidation they experience there, and arson, rioting, and the stoning of representatives of the
state are daily occurrences in the worst-afflicted parts of the city.

In Norway, the police report that in the period 2007-2009, all 41 assault rapes in the city of Oslo,
all of them, were committed by non-Western immigrants, and overwhelmingly by Muslims. And
in Germany, a police union has suggested that Turkish police, which is to say Turkish police
from Turkey, not German police of Turkish origin, be asked to patrol immigrant (and, one
assumes, heavily Turkish) ghettos in North-Rhine Westphalia, due to the inability of the German
police to maintain law and order in these areas themselves. Such is the scale of the problems
European countries now face in the form of Muslim criminality.

We cannot do justice to this subject here, but we can share with readers the insights of a man all
too familiar with the Muslim crime problem currently tearing apart the social fabric of his own
country. Nicolai Sennels16 is a Danish psychologist who has very generously contributed a key
section of this document. We will let him share his insights with readers in his own words.

16
Nicolai Sennels (born 1976) is a psychologist and the author of „Among Criminal Muslims: A
Psychologist‟s Experiences from Copenhagen Municipality‟ (Free Press Society, 2009). The book describes the
psychological mechanisms leading to high Muslim crime rates and hostile, parallel Muslim societies. It also explains
why integration of Muslims into Western societies is doomed to failure. His work is based on his experience in
Copenhagen youth prison where he had around 150 Muslim and 100 Danish clients. It is on the basis of the
comparisons this client pool allowed that he draws a psychological profile of the Muslim mind. His controversial
work was well received by the Danish magazine for professional psychologists, which stated that the book was „a

20
Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist (by Dr.
Nicolai Sennels)
As a psychologist in a youth prison in the municipality of Copenhagen I had around 150 Muslim
and 100 non-Muslim clients (seven out of ten inmates in Danish youth prisons are of Muslim
backgrounds). All the clients were in the same age group, and had similar backgrounds with
respect to family incomes and parents‟ educational backgrounds. Having hundreds of therapy
sessions both individually and in groups (Muslim, non-Muslim and mixed) was an excellent
opportunity to compare the two groups. On the basis of these sessions, I concluded that Islam
itself is the main reason for the unsuccessful integration of Muslims, the creation of lawless and
hostile Muslim parallel societies, and the high crime rates that prevail among Muslim
immigrants.

Though some will no doubt consider it controversial to include people‟s religious and cultural
backgrounds when analysing the causes of anti-social behaviour, it is actually an expression of
true humanism. We have to look at the whole person, including his culture and religious beliefs,
if we want to understand what motivates his actions. The argument that poverty and
stigmatisation are the only reasons for destructive behaviour among Muslims reveals a very one-
dimensional view of the human being. In reality, our actions are influenced by far more, and far
stronger, factors than simply the amount of money in our bank account or what other people
think of us and say about us. Cultural and religious values are much more important factors than
these.

Unfortunately, many people are unable to recognize the obvious; that different cultures cultivate
different characteristics in people. All families develop certain patterns, a specific culture even,
within themselves, and these patterns have great influence over the development of the children.
Some families manage to produce self-confident, empathetic, and responsible offspring, while
others do not. In the same vein, the different cultures of the world influence people in different
ways, and they are not all equally good at inculcating characteristics conducive to productive and
law-abiding behavior in Western societies.

On the basis of my years as a professional psychologist treating Muslims, I will try to explain
how Islam tends to inculcate certain psychological characteristics amongst its followers.

Aggression
One of the most important of my findings is that Muslim cultures have an opposite view of anger
to the one that prevails in Western societies. We see anger as an expression of weakness. In
Denmark we have a saying: „Only small dogs bark. Big dogs don‟t have to.‟ Sudden outbreaks of
anger result in the loss of face and social status. As people who have engaged in such

provoking eye-opener, convincing and with concrete examples,‟ and the magazine for professional teachers of
teenagers stated that „Nicolai Sennels‟ conclusions and critical analysis concerning our effort to help criminal youth
deserve wide attention.‟ Sennels regularly writes articles for Danish newspapers and internet magazines, of which
„Muslims and Westerners: The Psychological Differences‟ and „Sexual Abuse Widespread among Muslims‟ (both
available online) are the best known. Sennels can be contacted through his homepage: www.nicolaisennels.dk.

21
embarrassing behaviour (such as at work, or at a family dinner) know, it takes time and a
conscious effort to allow people to regain their trust in us.

In Muslim cultures, anger, threats, and violence are much more socially accepted as ways of
handling conflicts or showing power. As a Muslim, your family and friends expect you to react
aggressively if you, or what you represent, are challenged in any way. If you, as a Muslim, fail to
do this, doubts will immediately be sown as to whether you are able to shoulder your share of
responsibility in defending your family, ethnic group, territory or religion. A recent study
involving in-depth interviews with 45,000 teenagers in Germany supports this conclusion. 17

One does not have to be a psychologist to see that this attitude towards anger is one of the main
causes for the high violent crime rates amongst Muslims. And the problem is exacerbated
immensely by the Muslim concept of honour. This creates fragile, glass-like personalities, and
makes male Muslims in particular sensitive to the slightest criticism. What Muslims call
„honour‟, we in the West tend to refer to as low self-confidence.

Locus of Control
Another important finding from my therapy room concerns the so-called „locus of control‟. Our
locus of control determines whether we experience our life as mainly influenced by inner or
outer factors. In the West, we learn throughout our lives that our own attitudes and decisions
shape our lives and influence our states of mind. The same goes for our way of handling our
thoughts and feelings, and our ability to handle difficult experiences and situations
constructively. Thus our locus of control is largely internal. Muslims, on the other hand, are
primarily brought up to have an external locus of control, consisting of strict external cultural
and religious rules, and immediate and heavy consequences for individual thinking or stepping
outside the “box”. Our Western societies are built on the assumption of individual free will, and
the notion that we are masters of our own fate. In contrast, the Islamic term „inshallah‟ (Allah
willing) follows every wish or plan Muslims make about the future.

Our Western sense of responsibility for self hugely increases our ability to solve our own
problems. Muslims, on the other hand, and as we have seen, have an external locus of control
and therefore tend to blame others, with non-Muslims and non-Islamic authorities being the
usual scapegoats. While Westerners tend to think „what can I do differently?‟ when experiencing
difficulties, Muslims tend to think „who did this to me?‟.

This feeling of an outer locus of control is the basis of, and the fuel for, a lot of the anger among
Muslims everywhere towards non-Muslims and the non-Muslim world in general. They see us as
the cause of their (usually self-created) emotional misery, financial woe, and lack of social
status. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many Muslims see the hostile attitudes and
destructive behaviour they so often direct at their „oppressors‟ as being natural and justified. The
resulting violent hostility towards non-Muslims and non-Islamic authorities is an ever-prevalent
consequence of this, and one that is entirely explicable and predictable.

17
“Religious Muslim boys more violent”, http://www.thelocal.de/society/20100606-27673.html

22
Unfortunately, the problems caused by the Muslim external locus of control are exacerbated by
the broadly accepted but mistaken view that anti-social people are victims of some unjust
external factor with respect to which they are powerless. This interaction reinforces the childlike
victim mentality that is the natural consequence of having an external locus of control. No
experienced psychologist will accept such attempts at self-justification. If we do not dare to show
people how they create and perpetuate their own problems, how will they ever mature, take
responsibility for themselves, and stop being a burden on those around them?

As a psychologist for criminal Muslims, I found that they often felt no remorse whatsoever for
their harmful actions. The external reasons they provided for their harmful behaviour (such as
being „provoked‟ or treated „unfairly‟, and thus „forced‟ to „retaliate‟) resulted in there being no
possibility of them feeling personally responsible. In some professional circles, there is currently
much discussion as to whether Islam might actually inculcate psychopathic character traits (such
as lack of empathy) in its followers.

Identity
A third finding during the hundreds of hours with Muslim clients on my couch is that the extent
to which they identify with being Muslims, and as belonging to the Muslim community, is very
great indeed. It is something they feel far more strongly than most Westerners would identify
with being, for example, Christian. Most of these clients were not practising Islam, and in many
cases they had had sex before marriage and had drunk alcohol, things antithetical to being a
„good Muslim‟. Despite their often less-than-holy behaviour, they felt a strong loyalty towards
Islam nonetheless. Thus many of my Muslim clients had ended up in the prison I worked at
precisely because of the obligation they felt to defend their religion against any kind of criticism,
by any means necessary (starting riots, attacking the authorities, threatening people who criticise
Islam, etc.).

Muslims‟ strong identification with their cultural and religious background is the cause of a
powerful and dangerous us-and-them mentality. Thus I experienced far more racism among the
Muslim inmates than among any other group. While our societies try to inculcate tolerance and
equality, Muslim culture and Islamic teachings insist on the importance of the difference
between believers and infidels. I had dozens of Muslim clients that had been involved in serious
riots against the Danish authorities, and the general picture is very clear. The victim mentality
and acceptance of anger that are part of Muslim culture, combined with Muslims‟ loyalty
towards Islam and their strong discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims, are the main
reason that — while police, firemen and other representatives from our non-Islamic authorities
are being met with hostility and violence when entering Muslim-dominated areas in our cities —
Islamic authorities such as imams, patrols of older Muslim men, and Sharia courts are free to
exert their power.

Unless it concerned rival Muslim gangs or „honour‟-related crimes, all violence committed by
my Muslim clients had been against non-Muslims. When I talked with my Muslim clients about
this fact during therapy, and especially during anger management sessions, they told me that
non-Muslims were a more legitimate target. It emerged that they see our society‟s lack of
meaningful response and Europeans‟ non-aggressive ways of handling conflicts as signs of

23
exploitable weakness. Alarmingly, I also discovered that there exists amongst Muslims a
demonisation of non-Muslims that has many similarities to the propaganda countries disseminate
against their enemies during wartime, propaganda that serves to strengthen the hatred soldiers
feel for their enemies, killing off all empathy and enabling them to fight without mercy.

It is worth mentioning in closing that there is an interesting phenomenon amongst Muslim

prisoners, in that the greatest social status and respect always accrue to the more extreme
Muslims. This is a dangerous tendency indeed.

Islam, Muslims and Crime

Seen from the perspective of Western psychology it is without doubt unhealthy for the
development of one‟s personality to grow up in an Islamic environment. Its high acceptance of
anger and lack of self-responsibility and tolerance produces a relatively high number of anti-
social and psychologically immature individuals.

Having had a closer look at Muslim cultures than most, I have no doubts whatsoever that the
integration of Muslims into our Western societies will never happen to any useful extent. Muslim
pressure for the Islamization of our societies will therefore never end and there will be constant
and growing violent conflicts between Muslims and their non-Islamic surroundings.

I believe the solution to this problem will consist of the following steps. Firstly, we must bring a
complete halt to Muslim immigration and the awarding of citizenship to Muslim immigrants and
refugees, at least until the feasibility of Muslim integration is established. Secondly, we have to
make non-integration so impractical and financially detrimental that immigrants who cannot or
will not integrate feel that repatriation (state-sponsored emigration) is, for them, the better
option. Thirdly, we have to limit the state child support so that families only receive financial
support for a number of children equal to the average in a given country. Parents that work,
which is to say natives and well-integrated immigrants, will still have the necessary financial
means to have large families if they wish. There is nothing wrong with making unpleasant guests
feel unwelcome!

VI. The Dark Figure and Other Subtleties

We have already pointed out that official crime statistics are not available by religion of
perpetrator, which makes it impossible to say what the official Muslim crime rate is for any
particular crime. However, even if such statistics were available, there would still be questions as
to their reliability.

For any crime to enter the official statistics, it must first be reported, and then recorded. Let us
consider each of these processes in turn. The first, reporting, is fairly self-explanatory, but still
requires a little thought. For a crime to be reported, there must be:

1. An awareness on the part of the victim that a crime has taken place at all.
2. A willingness to report the crime.

24
Staying with our two examples from Section III, it is far from obvious that a seven-year-old who
has just undergone FGM knows she has had a crime committed against her. Similarly, it is far
from obvious that a 14-year-old girl who is being drugged, threatened, beaten, and pimped will
be prepared to go to the police to report these various crimes. These two factors both force down
the reporting rate to an extent that varies widely as a function of the crime in question, though
not necessarily its seriousness.

Nearly all burglaries are reported, as reporting a burglary to the police is necessary to make an
insurance claim. However, rape — a much more serious crime — is reported much less
frequently due to such factors as shame and a reluctance to have it made public that one was
raped.

Next, there is the question of whether or not the report in question will result in the police
recording it as a crime. If the police are not satisfied that a crime has actually taken place as
reported, they will simply not record it, and it will effectively disappear from the official
viewpoint. Taken together these two processes constitute attrition, that process whereby the
number of actually-committed crimes is, in effect, whittled down to the official figure. The
difference, i.e. the number of crimes that have „gone missing‟, is referred to as the dark figure.
This dark figure is the source of many of the difficulties that bedevil the discipline of
criminology, and criminologists have developed various methods for trying to address it.
However, none of these methods will be useful for addressing the dark figure for those Muslim
crimes most likely to escape the attention of the authorities. 18

We have now established a number of key points:

1. Trying to establish the amount of any given crime taking place is a very difficult endeavour
due to fundamental methodological difficulties.
2. This is particularly true for certain categories of crime. Most obviously, these include those
that the victims do not consider to be crime, and those that they refuse to report, for whatever
reasons. Other studies can help fill in the blanks in some cases, but not with respect to the
crimes we are most interested in here.
3. A significant fraction of the most depraved and damaging Muslim crime (FGM, pimping,
etc.) is of a type that is unlikely ever to show up in official statistics, and therefore, by
definition, cannot result in police action, much less appropriate convictions.
4. Any official statistics that exist on these crimes are therefore likely to be hopelessly
inaccurate. This means that only unofficial estimates can be given, and these are always of
doubtful reliability, especially with respect to crimes such as pimping.
5. Any official statistics that could, in principle, exist are not broken down by the religion of
perpetrator anyway.
18
The methods in question are victim surveys (crime viewed from the victim‟s perspective) and self-report
studies (crime viewed from the perpetrator‟s perspective). Both are useful criminological tools in certain contexts
and to certain extents, particularly the former. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these studies is
beyond the scope of this document, but suffice it to say here that there is no reason to believe that they currently
shed any light on that part of the dark figure that concerns us, or even that they are ever likely to do so.

25
As a consequence of the above, we are concerned by the impossibility, at present, of a member
of the general public really gaining any sort of idea at all as to how prevalent Muslim crime is, or
how disproportionately involved in crime Muslims are. Of course, this impossibility also obtains
with respect to Chinese crime, or Armenian crime, or any other sort of crime. However, there is
no reason to believe that these groups are particularly criminal, or that the police tend to turn a
blind eye to their criminal activities. Neither claim can be made with respect to Muslims.

We would seem to have no option but to look at the disproportionality in incarceration to give us
a general idea, as noted in Section II of this document. But there are problems here too. Even if
we ignore the conversion problem outlined earlier, we still have great difficulties in this regard:

 Is the threefold overrepresentation of Muslims in the prison system evidence of crime rates
three times higher across the board, with an identical probability of post-crime incarceration
for Muslims and non-Muslims?
 Are Muslim crime rates perhaps ten times higher, with the probability of incarceration for
Muslims somehow having moved down lower than for non-Muslims?
 Or are Muslims no more criminal than anyone else, their greater incarceration rates simply
being the consequence of a biased criminal justice system?

So far in this document we have discussed two different metrics that could, in principle, shed
some light on the true nature and scale of the Muslim crime problem: crime rates and
incarceration rates. The first, as we have noted, do not exist for Muslims as a group, and the
second are not easy to interpret. We consider it worth pointing out here that the relationship
between them may also be somewhat counterintuitive. We expect, intuitively, that a group with
disproportionately high crime rates will also have disproportionately high incarceration rates. But
the extent to which the law enforcement apparatus is actually brought to bear on a given group is
also of relevance to this analysis.

If all Muslims in prison were to be let out of prison, then the Muslim incarceration rate would
fall to zero, so this indicator would suggest a complete lack of criminality on the part of
Muslims. But the release of approximately 10,000 Muslims with criminal records into the
country at large would, fairly obviously push up the Muslim crime rate by some margin, making
Muslims appear more criminal as seen via this metric (however it were deduced). Conversely,
putting all Muslims in prison permanently would see the Muslim crime rate fall to zero,
suggesting zero Muslim criminality with this metric, but pushing the Muslim prison population
to 2.4 million, suggesting absolute criminality with the other.

The point of this slightly odd thought experiment is to suggest that, if the policing of a given
community starts to weaken and become more permissive in some regard, then, all other things
being equal, its incarceration rate will fall while its crime rate rises. And, as we have argued
above, there are already good grounds for believing that the police have become less than
completely assiduous in pursuing Muslim criminals, at least in certain respects. As such, we may
surmise that the only concrete indicator we have of relative Muslim criminality (their relative

26
incarceration rate) is lower than it would be if the law were applied evenly, and that the one that
is invisible to us (their relative crime rate) is higher than it would otherwise be.

Let us put the point more concretely. If the British police dropped all their concerns about
appearing „racist‟, and were given the powers they need to adequately address FGM, pimping,
and other crimes that are „culturally sensitive‟, and that they have therefore edged away from
until now, how many more criminal Muslims would be in prison, and how much lower would
Muslim crime therefore be? There is no way of answering this question precisely, and we do not
propose to try. But there is clearly a strong possibility that huge amounts of Muslim crime are
simply not registered by the criminal justice system at all, as they are not reported, offenders are
never brought to justice, and the crimes themselves simply disappear into the unknowable
Muslim-specific „dark figure‟, which, we suggest, is almost certainly much greater than for other
communities.

Note that we do not imply by the foregoing that the police are bringing all wrongdoers to justice
when the wrongdoers in question happen to be non-Muslims. Rather we suggest that a relative
slackness with respect to the application of the law to certain Muslim groups will result in the
one firm, quantitative indicator of Muslim crime we have (incarceration rates) underestimating
the scale of the problem. Coupled with an admittedly impressionistic perception of the
prevalence of Muslim crime picked up, rightly or wrongly, from the mainstream media, it is hard
to resist concluding that Muslim crime is a) rampant and b) substantially unaddressed. The
absence of any reliable relative crime rate data for Muslims, their already-high incarceration rate,
and the existence of good reason to believe that they enjoy, in some respects at least, an ill-
deserved legal impunity with respect to extremely serious crimes: all these factors serve to
strengthen this conclusion. The disproportionality in incarceration rates for Muslims is, at
present, a factor of three.19 But perhaps it should be a factor of five, or ten, or twenty. How can
we possibly know?

We must maintain a position of agnosticism here. As already stated, we strongly suspect that,
though overrepresented in the prison population by a large margin, Muslims are almost certainly
still underrepresented relative to what we will call their „true state‟, i.e. that which would obtain
if they enjoyed no special treatment. However, this should not be taken to imply that all Muslims
are criminals destroying our society from within. It is, rather, a friendly shot across the bows of
the relevant authorities. Nature abhors a vacuum, and an informational vacuum that pertains to
the criminality of a problematic religious minority, whose relationship with the rest of the
country is already rather strained, cannot be in anyone‟s best interests, theirs or ours.

Let us reiterate here that the types of crime with respect to which Muslims enjoy a certain degree
of impunity are hardly trifling matters. FGM, sexually enslaving underage girls, the dealing of
hard drugs and associated crimes of violence, „honour‟ violence, and a constellation of offences
relating to inciting violence and/or insurrection against the British state, people, and armed
forces: these crimes are not exactly on a par with parking on double-yellow lines or casually
throwing away a crisp packet. Even if we turn to terrorism itself, there are undoubtedly Muslims
in the UK today whom the security services could pull in and have charged for terrorism-related
offences if keeping them under surveillance and building up intelligence on their networks were
19
A figure which is already difficult to interpret, as we have noted.

27
not deemed to be of greater value. How many such Muslims might there be? 10? 50? 100? We
have no way of knowing, but the point is that even with respect to terrorism (for valid reasons, in
this case), we cannot assume that the numbers we see in prison are reflective of the true scale of
the problem. Hence the informational vacuum to which we have already alluded.

VII. Some Pre-Emptive Responses to Predicted Objections

Given that many of the reflexive objections to this dossier and its contents are largely predictable
in advance, we endeavour here to try to clear some of them up, so that people of good faith who
genuinely wish to engage with the position herein need not waste their time with them.

Are We Stigmatising Muslims?

„Stigmatisation‟ is one of the accusations most frequently hurled at those who presume to draw
attention to the undesirable characteristics of ideologically protected groups. Like many such
charges, however, it has no real meaning. If we were to accuse the Orthodox Jewish community
of the UK of being disproportionately represented amongst the ranks of armed robbers, would
we be accused of stigmatising them? Obviously not. We would be accused, and deservedly so, of
outright fabrication and slander, but not of stigmatisation. When a false claim is made about a
group, the counterclaim of „stigmatisation‟ serves no useful purpose, as defenders of the group in
question can respond far more effectively by pointing out that the claim is false.

Once this simple point has been understood, it can be seen fairly clearly that the charge of
„stigmatisation‟ is only meaningful when directed at true claims. It will therefore only be made
in response to true claims, and is, in essence, an implicit admission of their accuracy. If one
points out that Muslims in the UK tend far more strongly to terrorism, sedition, and subversion
than any other group, then one is making a claim which very few people acquainted with the
facts could possibly deny. In response, many will accuse the claimant of „stigmatising‟ Muslims.
Despite their apparent belief that they are thereby saying something substantive and thought-
provoking, they are in fact only saying that a) one‟s claims are true, but that b) it is simply not
cricket to point out such unpleasant truths. For my part, we are content to be correct, and will let
loftier intellects concern themselves with what is, and what is not, cricket.

Note that the accusation that we are „fostering hatred‟ would be essentially analogous to the
claim that we are engaging in stigmatisation. The rebuttal is therefore simply a slight variation on
the above theme.

Surely There Is No Such Thing as ‘Islam’?

It is often argued, when attention is drawn to unpleasant aspects of the way in which Muslims
behave, whether in the UK or anywhere else, that there is no such thing as Islam. It is
meaningless to try to generalize about Islam. There are many Islams. Why, there are as many
Islams as there are Muslims.

28
We must not essentialise Islam, clever people tell us. Furthermore, there is huge ethnic, cultural,
and linguistic variation amongst the Muslims in the UK, and throughout Western Europe in
general. Surely it is meaningless to speak of Muslims as being one thing rather than another, and
inflammatory to do so on a subject as controversial as crime?

If Islam and crime have nothing to do with each other, then we should not expect to observe any
patterns, any regularities, when we look at crime through the prism of Islam. To rephrase,
looking at crime from the perspective of Islam should impose no more order on the underlying
data than doing so from the perspective of any other arbitrarily selected and irrelevant parameter.

Let us make the point with an example. If we were to trawl through every Crown Court
conviction in the UK in the last twenty years, looking for a pattern between the first letter of the
surname of the convicted and the type of offence they had been convicted of, what would we
expect to discover? That all murderers had surnames beginning with the letter „G‟ and all rapists
surnames beginning with the letter „M‟? Surely not. We expect, for reasons too obvious to need
explaining, there to be no relationship at all between these two parameters.

But what if we did find a relationship? What if all murderers really did have surnames beginning
with the letter „G‟, and all rapists surnames beginning with the letter „M‟? If we checked and
double-checked our research and were confident of our results, then we would have discovered
something very significant, and something that could not possibly be a coincidence. Even if we
did not understand the relationship we had discovered, would it not be remiss to fail to draw
attention to it and demand that it be studied? Objecting that we were „essentialising‟ the letters of
the alphabet would be neither here nor there. Regularities do not emerge at random from
otherwise unordered data.

So it is with Islam. If it is observed that taking Islam as a parameter of interest allows patterns to
be observed in crime rates and types throughout Western Europe, with its hundreds of millions of
people and many millions of Muslims, and if it can further be established that Islam is not a
proxy for some other variable such as poverty (more on this below), then Islam as a risk factor
for crime must be taken seriously, even if the nature of the relationship between the two is not
yet clear. Occam‟s Razor is not easily blunted, least of all by the delicate sensibilities of
multiculturalists.

The pioneering work and immense political courage of Nicolai Sennels in Denmark are already
leading the way in unraveling the role that Islam plays in causing its adherents to perpetrate
criminal acts. Do British psychologists and criminologists have a contribution to make in this
regard? Or does putting quotation marks around the word crime (excuse us, „crime‟) already
consume all their intellectual energies?

Just a Tiny Minority?

Inevitably, when disproportionate criminality on the part of an immigrant group is observed and
stubbornly refuses to be explained away by the self-appointed defenders of that group, the claim
will eventually emerge that the perpetrators of the crime in the group in question are a „tiny
minority‟ of the whole, and that the „vast majority‟ of the members of the group are law-abiding

29
citizens. The woeful predictability and peculiarly seductive nature of this claim make it
particularly important to unpack.

The tiny minority defence essentially makes four assertions:

1. That a given problem caused by a given ethnic/religious group in a given society is only
committed by a „tiny minority‟ of that group.
2. That the problem, though unpleasant, is therefore essentially manageable, at least in
principle.
3. That it is unfair to blame the problematic group as a whole, as the vast majority of the
members of that group are not engaging in the unfortunate behaviour in question.
4. That whether one blames the group as a whole or not, it is unfair to take any type of action
against it as a whole, as such collective action/punishment will affect many innocent people.

The basic problem with this fallacious reasoning lies in the implicit assumption that, in a healthy
and functional society, anything other than the very tiniest minority could be committing serious
crime. Even in the most crime-ridden societies on Earth, serious crime is always committed by
tiny minorities of the population. Let us consider why this should be so.

During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, there were approximately 3,500 sectarian killings of all
sorts, including the killings of civilians (Catholic and Protestant), British soldiers, IRA members,
and members of Loyalist paramilitaries. This is an average of about 121 per year for the 29 years
of the conflict. If we take the mean population of Northern Ireland as being about 1.25 million
throughout these years, then we have what is, for our purposes, an average sectarian murder rate
(not an official murder rate) of 9.68 per 100,000 per annum (the UK murder rate in recent years
has been approximately 1.2 per 100,000 per annum). Performing a similar analysis for Sri Lanka
during its 27-year civil war (90,000 killings, 27 years, assuming an average population of 18
million people throughout the period), yields a sectarian murder rate of 18.52 per 100,000 per
annum, nearly double that for the Troubles.

Now let us look at Jamaica. 20 According to Wikipedia, Jamaica‟s murder rate in 2009 was 58 per
100,000 per annum, a figure slightly higher than that obtained by adding the sectarian murder
rates for Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka above and doubling them. This is not the result of a civil
war. It is not an aberration, or a blip, or something that can be rectified by banging the side of the
TV set. It is, for reasons the authors of this dossier will not pretend to understand, just how
Jamaica happens to be. Now let us assume that, in any given year, a) every person who is
murdered is murdered by a single person (which will artificially reduce the number of
murderers) and that b) no murderer murders more than one victim, (which will artificially
increase the number of murderers). This means that there are 58 people per 100,000 engaged in
the act of murder in any given year, or 0.058% of the entire population. We have now established
that only a tiny minority of Jamaica‟s population is engaged in lethal violence in any given year,
and the same would doubtless be true for every other serious crime as well.

20
We do not mean to pick on Jamaica here, but, according to Wikipedia, it had one of the world‟s highest
murder rates for 2009. This makes it a good example of the point we are trying to make.

30
But what of it? Who feels emboldened with respect to taking a late-evening stroll through a
Kingston slum simply through the application of the tiny minority defence to Jamaica? The
problem here is that, although that fraction of the population of Jamaica engaged in lethal
violence in any given year is indeed a tiny minority, it is by no means tiny enough. A country
can, to be blunt, fall to pieces well, well before those committing serious crime become anything
more than a tiny minority. Should the South African authorities be unconcerned about the sky-
high murder rate in their country simply because only a tiny minority commits murder in any
given year?21

Only a tiny minority commits murder in any given year in Japan. But that tiny minority is
approximately two orders of magnitude smaller than its counterpart in Jamaica. Hence some of
the massive, qualitative differences between these two countries. And exactly the same analysis
can be applied to different groups within the same country, rendering the tiny minority defence
meaningless when the criminality of a specific group is being examined. One must understand
crime for what it is, not through applying arbitrary and ill-considered numerical standards to it.

Are We Forgetting Poverty?

Arguably the most predictable and reflexive of all „rebuttals‟ to the claim that Muslims are
somehow predisposed to engage in criminal behaviour is that which makes reference to poverty.
Are not Muslims disproportionately likely to live in poverty? Surely it is obvious that differences
in crime rates between different populations are essentially functions of poverty?

Alas, things are not so simple. Though poverty is often treated as if it were some sort of magic
wand which could explain away all sorts of social ills, this is certainly not true with respect to
crime. There are two problems with this claim. The first is that it is far from obvious that there is
a particularly strong positive correlation between crime and poverty at all if we are making
between-group comparisons. The second is that such a positive correlation, even if it were to
exist, would, in and of itself, establish nothing one way or the other about the existence or nature
of a causal relationship between the two variables.

The first point can be made sufficiently well by reference to the incarceration rates of different
ethnic groups in the UK. The incarceration rates of the white British population are higher than
those for the Chinese, the Hindus, or the Sikhs in the UK. Yet both British Chinese and British
Indians have higher poverty rates than white British people, which means they are more law-
abiding despite being poorer. Similarly, black Britons appear to have higher incarceration rates
than Pakistanis or Bangladeshis (both overwhelmingly Muslim groups), despite lower poverty
rates.

The second point is a more subtle one. To say that differences in crime rates are due (or largely
due) to differences in income is to say that, if we control for income between two different
groups, the differences in crime rates would disappear (or be significantly attenuated) because
21
This should not be taken as a suggestion that South Africa has fallen, or is falling, apart. We simply
mention it here as an example of a country with a murder rate sufficiently high as to cast a shadow over the future,
perhaps even the viability, of the country.

31
differences in income cause differences in crime rates. But this is much more problematic than it
seems.

Let us imagine that we compare Muslims and non-Muslims in the same income brackets and find
that differences in crime rates between them are seen to shrink to nearly zero. Can we then
assume that poverty is the most important causal factor underlying the crime rate differentials,
and that the „Muslim‟ crime problem is actually a poverty problem? The answer is no, and the
reason is the age-old logical fallacy of confusing correlation with causation. 22 To say that
controlling for poverty reduces crime rate differentials is, in effect, to say that poverty and crime
correlate with each other. But this is no more evidence that poverty causes crime than that crime
causes poverty, which could equally well be true. Similarly, it could be true that crime and
poverty are both caused by some as-yet-unconsidered variable, with neither actually causing the
other at all.

To rephrase, even if crime and poverty are correlated, it is not clear why that should be. Perhaps
the poor commit crime because they cannot afford to buy what they want, and are angry with the
world (A and B correlate, A causes B). Perhaps the criminal are poor because their criminal and
dysfunctional behaviour has disrupted their educational and professional development, and they
cannot find gainful, remunerative employment (A and B correlate, B causes A). Perhaps there is
a suite of psychological characteristics (impulsiveness, lack of ability to delay gratification, lack
of self-discipline, low intelligence) that tends to cause crime and poverty (A and B correlate, but
are both caused by a third factor, C, which correlates with both). Perhaps all these things are true
to some extent, creating a much more complex and analytically difficult situation.

These questions on the subject of causality in the social sciences are not unanswerable, at least
not in principle. But no consideration of the Muslim crime problem can expect to shed any light
on it, or even begin to properly address it, as long as it is obstructed by the confused and
confusing folk criminology that plagues so much discussion in modern political discourse.

Quite apart from the above considerations, it should be fairly obvious that crimes such as trying
to blow up ten airliners simultaneously, plotting to poison British water supplies, blowing up
trains, threatening to kill people for writing novels and drawing cartoons, stabbing people and
throwing acid over them for sullying the family „honour‟, cutting pieces of the sexual organs out
of one‟s own daughters, and beating up journalists investigating electoral fraud are not caused by
poverty. Does anyone doubt this? Could anyone doubt this?

Are We Forgetting Age Profile Differences Between Muslims and Others?

Different groups within the same country often have different age distributions, and crime rates
can vary as a function of age. As such, a crime rate differential between two different
ethnic/religious groups can, in principle, be at least partly a function of that age difference.

22
Perhaps the most seductive and ubiquitous of all logical fallacies, the „correlation-equals-causation‟ fallacy
crops up here in a slightly unorthodox form, which no doubt accounts for the blind spot otherwise intelligent and
educated people have in this regard.

32
If, for example, we discovered that vandalism rates were higher for the Muslim community in
the UK, but also that vandalism was more common amongst the young, we would then be faced
with the question of whether or not the crime rate differential was partly a function of age
differences. This question could be investigated by comparing the crime rates between similar
age groups drawn from the Muslim community and the rest of the country. We could discover,
on so doing, that part of the variation in the crime rate disappeared as a consequence, that all of it
disappeared, or even that, controlling for age, Muslims were less likely than others to commit
vandalism. Alternatively, we might discover that the effect of controlling for age depended on
the age group in question. All these questions are empirical questions, and therefore cannot be
answered from first principles.

It should be noted that the causality problems that arise with respect to poverty do not arise here,
as it is possible only for variation in age to cause variation in crime rates, not for variation in
crime rates to cause variation in age. Accordingly, this is in general a far more legitimate
objection to a superficial interpretation of crime rate differentials than that based on poverty,
whether in this context or any other. Nonetheless, large crime differentials are exceedingly
unlikely to be explained away in this fashion, though they may be somewhat attenuated. Until
criminologists attack these questions rigorously, the most that those who would take issue with
our arguments can say is that controlling for age could reduce some crime rate differentials
between Muslims and non-Muslims to some extent. Given that Muslims in general exhibit the
characteristics that disproportionately criminal groups always do (poor educational and
professional achievement, heavy reliance on public assistance, etc., which cannot be explained
away as age effects), we find it unlikely that crime rate or incarceration rate differentials are
likely to be exposed as being age effects to any significant extent. And we are certainly not likely
to discover that, for example, the Muslim tendency to plan acts of terrorism is a consequence of
them being younger than other populations.

Are We Being Xenophobic?

The word xenophobia is frequently flung at those in the UK who object to any aspect of the
behaviour of any group of foreign origin, implying as it does that the objections in question are
less than genuine, and are actually motivated by nothing other than an animus towards the group
in question. However, unless there are grounds for believing that no behaviour of any immigrant
group can be legitimately objected to (which seems unlikely, to put it mildly), the burden of
proof is surely on the accusers in this regard.

A question for those who believe that those who focus on Muslim crime do so only because they
are xenophobes who simply dislike those of foreign origin: why do these xenophobes not focus
their attention on the Chinese as well? Is it simply that they have not yet found some reasonably
plausible pretext upon which to attack the Chinese and present them as a threat? Or could it be
because the Chinese do not cause any particular problems? Could it be because the Chinese
seem to be disproportionately likely not to commit crime, particularly violent crime, sexual
crime, and property crime? Might that not have something to do with it? Might it not be that the
significant ethnic and cultural differences that exist between the Chinese and other groups in the
UK are simply not of any particular significance or interest to those concerned about Muslim

33
crime, much less grounds for hostility? And might this not be rather difficult to reconcile with
the claim that these people are merely an assembly of xenophobes and racists?

VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, we feel that it is legitimate to make the following observations:

 It is generally true that Muslims in the UK are substantially more criminal than the UK
population as a whole, irrespective of national background, or what generation of immigrant
they are (first, second, etc.).
 This trend is a robust one, and can be seen in similar form throughout Western Europe.
Indeed, a glance at the Muslim crime problem in countries such as France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden makes it clear that the UK, disturbingly, and
despite its many problems in this regard, has a much less severe problem with Muslim crime
than many of its European neighbours.
 Certain non-Muslim immigrant groups in the UK are more law-abiding than the white British
population, as is demonstrated by their lower incarceration rates and the prevailing
perceptions of their law-abidingness. That this should be so, despite their higher poverty rates
and the integration-related difficulties they no doubt experience, makes it very clear that the
Muslim crime problem is not an „immigrant‟ problem, a „race‟ problem, a „poverty‟ problem,
or a „social exclusion‟ problem.
 It seems, therefore, to be a reasonable conclusion that there is something about Islam itself
that, statistically speaking, induces people whose attitudes and behaviours derive from it to
engage in criminal, aggressive, and violent behaviour more often than would otherwise be
the case. Indeed, there is a gradually emerging body of evidence from modern criminologists
and psychologists to suggest that this is so.
 These Islam-induced behavioural discrepancies are not insignificant, and can be very large
indeed. We in the UK are fortunate in that they appear to be, as yet, relatively small (though
still large in an absolute sense). However, we do not consider this to be a reason for
complacency, much less a reason not to attend resolutely to this troubling state of affairs
sooner rather than later.
 Given the serious Muslim crime problem that we already face, the rapid rate of growth of the
UK Muslim community, the general lack of integration of the UK Muslim community, and
the existence of strong separatist, supremacist, and subversive tendencies within that
community, we feel that the possibility of a serious breakdown of civil order in heavily
Muslim areas is a distinct possibility in the years to come. Note that we do not argue that
such a breakdown is inevitable. We simply point out that allowing an ever-greater fraction of
the population of the UK to consist of a disproportionately criminal, hostile, estranged, and
self-estranging religious group (whatever divisions and fissures might exist within the group
itself) cannot be accepted as being simply „inevitable,‟ and therefore to be endured
irrespective of the consequences.

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On the basis of the foregoing, we make the following requests.

1. We ask that the Home Secretary make clear what sort of balance the police are required to
maintain between law enforcement and maintaining public order. We also ask whether this
balance is the same for all ethnic and religious groups in the UK, and, if it is not, why not.
Answers to the effect that it „depends on the circumstances‟ will be considered invalid.
2. We ask that the Home Secretary create an independent task force to study the relationship
between Islam and crime, with said task force taking into account evidence not only from the
UK, but from across Western European countries with similar experiences of Muslim
immigration.
3. We ask that the Home Secretary calculate the total annual costs imposed on the British state
(i.e. the publicly-borne costs) and people (i.e. the privately-borne costs) as a consequence of
Muslim crime. These costs are to include both the direct costs of this crime (physical harm,
property damage, etc.), and the indirect costs (expenditures on and by the police, prisons, and
security services, productivity costs imposed by anti-terrorism measures, etc.).
4. We ask that the Home Secretary introduce much more finely-grained data-collection methods
in all areas that bear on the Muslim crime problem, so as to enable analysts to enhance their
understanding of the situation.
5. We ask that the Immigration Secretary clarify whether or not the Muslim crime problem has
any influence on immigration policy vis-à-vis Muslims. If it does not, we ask the
Immigration Secretary to explain exactly how he has concluded that the Muslim crime
problem is so trivial, and will continue to be so trivial, as to be unworthy of being reflected in
the relevant aspects of immigration law and policy (such as those pertaining to family
reunification immigration, one of the major sources of growth for the UK Muslim
community).
6. We ask that the Home Secretary take any and all measures to ensure that foreign criminals,
Muslim or otherwise, are permanently deported from the UK upon completion of their
sentences. We also ask that new legislation be introduced to permit particularly violent
and/or serious criminals of foreign origin to be stripped of their British citizenship as and
when possible, so as to facilitate their deportation to their countries of origin.
7. We ask that the Home Secretary consult with the police as to the likely long-term
implications of having ever-larger, disproportionately criminal Muslim populations in the
UK. The results of this consultation should be made available to the British public as and
when they are ready.
8. We ask that the Home Secretary create an independent task force to conduct an in-depth
study of forced child prostitution („pimping‟) in the UK, with a particular emphasis on the
situation in the north of England vis-à-vis the criminal activities of the Pakistani population
there. We also ask that this task force investigate the relevant police forces to ascertain
whether or not they have been engaged in gross professional malfeasance with respect to
their responsibilities in this regard.
9. We ask that the Home Secretary conduct a full public inquiry into the likely long-term
ramifications of allowing the Muslim population of the UK to continue to be able to import

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 tens of thousands of spouses every year from its various countries of origin, thereby
increasing its rate of growth to the current alarming and unsustainable level.
10. We ask the Home Secretary whether he agrees:
a) That the legitimacy of the British state rests upon its ability to fulfill the obligations it has
in accordance with the social contract that exists between it and the British people.
b) That said legitimacy will decline in direct proportion to the failure of the British state to
fulfill these obligations.
c) That amongst the most important of these obligations is the protection of the persons and
property of the British people against predation and destruction.
d) That the Muslim crime problem represents a rapidly growing (though still partial) failure
to fulfill this obligation.
e) That continued failure on this front by the British state has the potential to dissolve the
social contract in its entirety.
f) That dissolution of the social contract will both entitle and oblige the British people to
take whatever steps they deem necessary to protect their persons and property against
predation and destruction, quite irrespective of the wishes of the British state.

If the Home Secretary disagrees with any or all of these statements, we ask that he make the
nature of and reasons for his disagreement clear, the better to allow the British people to
understand the British state‟s interpretation of the social contract that binds them.

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