COFFEE ZONE, COLOMBIA, JANUARY 25 EARTHQUAKE

Observations on the Behavior of Low-Rise Reinforced Concrete Buildings

By Santiago Pujol , Julio Ramírez and Alberto Sarria

INTRODUCTION

On January 25, 1999, at approximately 1:19 PM (local time), an earthquake of magnitude 5.9 mb1, 6.0 ML2, struck
the “coffee zone” in Colombia. This paper presents observations on the damage suffered by low-rise reinforced
concrete buildings in the cities of Armenia and Pereira. The observations presented are part of a study based on
data collected during a five-day visit to the mentioned cities. Recommendations intended to avoid in the future the
most frequently observed structural problems are presented.

SCOPE

The objective of the ongoing study, from which only the main field observations are presented here, is to correlate
seismic vulnerability of reinforced concrete, low-rise, monolithic buildings with their dimensions and arrangement
of columns and walls.

SEISMICITY AND GEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Geographic Location and Regional Seismicity

The location of the epicenter of the January 25, 1999, earthquake as estimated by Instituto de Investigación en
Geociencias, Minería y Química, (INGEOMINAS),2 is shown in Figure 1. Armenia, a 223,0003 people city, is
about 15 km north from the estimated epicenter (4.41N, 75.72W). Pereira, a 355,0003 people city, is approximately
50 km north from the same point.

Figure 1 Epicenter location relative to Armenia, capital of the Quindío department, and Pereira, capital of the
Risaralda department.

In Colombia, the Andes are divided into three mountain ridges. Both, Armenia and Pereira, lay on the western hills
of the central ridge, which is characterized by the presence of several volcanoes. The Del Ruiz volcano, known for
the catastrophic Armero mudslide of 1985, is among those.
1
Observatorio Sismológico del Suroccidente (OSSO), 1999. http://osso.univalle.edu.co.
2
Instituto de Investigación en Geociencias, Minería y Química, (INGEOMINAS), 1999.
http://www.ingeomin.gov.co.
3
From an official census made in 1993
Colombia and, in general, the northwestern corner of South-America, is a complex tectonic environment. Three
tectonic plates interact there: Nazca, South-America and Caribbean (Sarria, 1995). The Nazca plate is believed to
move from west to east at about 2.4 inches per year. The South-America plate moves from east to west at a relative
velocity of 0.4 to 0.8 inches per year. The Caribbean plate moves in the WE direction at a relatively smaller
velocity. The stress field generated by the interaction of these plates is evidenced by activity along several
geological faults. Some of these faults have been well identified. That is the case of the Romeral fault (See Figure
2), which crosses Colombia from South to North along more than 1000 km and through six major cities: Pasto,
Popayán, Armenia, Pereira, Manizales and Medellín (Sarria, 1995). A rupture along a branch of this fault
generated the 03/31/1983, Popayán earthquake, which caused 300 casualties and losses of 300 million dollars
(0.8% of Colombia’s gross internal production in 1982). The January 25, 1999, earthquake seems to have been
generated by a rupture along another branch of the Romeral fault: Cauca-Almaguer. Its strike and deep have been
estimated to be N15ºE and 73ºE respectively4. The rupture appears to be left lateral, which indicates a
displacement in the NS direction of the Andes block with respect to the eastern planes of Colombia.

Seismic History

The “coffee region” has a rich seismic history. Table 1 contains data on the main seismic events occurred in the
region in the last 20 years. Figure 2 shows the location of the epicenters of earthquakes with magnitudes (Ms)
equal or larger than 4 occurred in Colombia between 1566 and 1995.

Table 1. Main seismic events occurred in the

Coffee Region in the last 20 years
No Date Magnitude Depth
Mm/dd/yy Km
1 11/25/1979 6.4 (---) ---
2 02/08/1995 6.4 (mb) 90
3 01/25/1999 5.9 (mb) 5-15

Figure 2 Epicenters of seismic events with Ms≥4 between 1566 and

1995. (From Colombian Association of Earthquake Engineering, 1998)

4
Espinoza A., Areas Ltda., Bogotá, Colombia. Personal communication, February 15, 1999.

2
Geology and General Soil Characteristics

In general, the soils in the region affected by the earthquake may be described as deposits of volcanic ashes of
about 60 ft laying on conglomerates or igneous rocks. These volcanic ashes are very cohesive soils with values of
cohesion of about 7-14 psi 5.

The zones that were affected the most in Armenia and Pereira coincide with those where buildings lay on old fills
of bad quality.

Ground Accelerations Measured

The maximum horizontal accelerations measured in Pereira were 0.08G on rock and 0.30G on fills.6 Preliminary
information indicates that, in Armenia, values of 0.59G and 0.47G would have been measured at ground level for
horizontal and vertical peak ground acceleration, respectively.5

Aftershocks

As of February 9, 1999, more than 90 aftershocks have been registered. The main aftershock occurred about 4h:
21min after the main shock and had a magnitude of 5.8 (ML).7 The location of the aftershocks has migrated
towards the north, i.e., towards Armenia. No pre-shocks were recorded.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The January 25, 1999 earthquake affected 35 cities, caused more than 900 casualties and injured at least 4000. It
has been estimated that about 200,000 people were left without shelter (El Colombiano, Feb. 1, 1999). Preliminary
estimates indicate that reconstruction of the infrastructure of the cities affected will cost more than 500 million
dollars. (El Tiempo, Jan. 29, 1999). This is about 0.5% of the 1996 gross national product o f Colombia; a country
with an estimated fiscal deficit of 2% of this year’s projected gross national product (El Tiempo, Jan. 29, 1999).

In Armenia, the police headquarters suffered partial collapse. The fire station collapsed. The water, telephone and
electricity lines suffered severe damage. Traffic through the main access roads and airport operations were
interrupted. Government buildings were evacuated. Because of these events, the first days after the earthquake in
the city were very chaotic. For similar reasons, the emergency in other cities of the region could not be properly
managed either. In Circasia and Córdoba the hospital buildings collapsed. The Calarcá hospital suffered partial
collapse.

In Pereira, on the other hand, there was a basic infrastructure for emergency response in place. This permitted
organized efforts to be conducted toward rescue and clean-up operations. This preparation can be attributed to the
lessons learned from the earthquakes of 11/25/1979 and 02/08/1995.

A daunting task now facing not only Pereira and Armenia but all 35 cities affected is that of reconstruction,
particularly, of the low income housing infrastructure.

PAST MITIGATION EFFORTS

In the years from 1950 to 1980, the city of Armenia experienced the largest construction development in the last
decades. But only since 1984 and in response to the damage caused by the 1983 Popayán earthquake, application
of seismic design recommendations by the Colombian Association of Seismic Engineering is enforced by a law of
the Republic of Colombia. A revision of these recommendations was made in 1998 (Colombian Association of
Earthquake Engineering, 1998). Design provisions are made according to estimations of seismic risk that suggest a
division of the Colombian territory into three zones with different hazard levels as shown in Figure 3. Observe that
the cities of Armenia and Pereira lay on a zone with estimated high seismic hazard. Design ground acceleration in

5
Espinoza A., Areas Ltda., Bogotá, Colombia. Personal communication, February 15, 1999.
6
OSSO, 1999. http://osso.univalle.edu.co.
7
INGEOMINAS, 1999. http://www.ingeomin.gov.co.

3
this zone varies from 0.25G to 0.4G. The
recommended design ground acceleration for
Pereira and Armenia corresponds to the lower
bound of this range.

The Calima, 1995 earthquake caused damage in

Pereira. Consequently, a local mitigation program
was deployed which benefits not only Pereira but
also Dosquebradas and Santa Rosa de Cabal.

Mitigation efforts before the 1999 earthquake also

included retrofitting of some structures in Armenia.
A detail showing how columns of a building at
University of Quindío were upgraded is shown in
Figure 4. In this figure, one of the original columns
in the roof level is shown surrounded by steel in
preparation for the casting of concrete around the
original section. The behavior of this building
during the January 25 earthquake was acceptable.
It suffered relatively light damage of nonstructural
masonry walls and moderate damage of the roof.

In addition to triggering efforts to enforce the use

of seismic design guidelines, the 1983 Popayán
earthquake together with the 1985 Armero
mudslide led to the development of the National
Office for Emergency Response. Figure 3 Seismic Hazard in Colombia (Colombian
Association of Earthquake Engineering, 1998).

This office was successfully tested by the Paez, June 1994 earthquake.
At the same time that the National Office for Emergency Response was
established, a national network of seismographs together with over 100
accelerometers, most of them digital, began to be established throughout
Colombia. Unfortunately, both emergency response and detection efforts
have been underfunded in recent years. It is hoped that the lessons
learned from the Jan. 25, 1999 earthquake will bring new impetus to both
projects.

OBSERVATIONS

Most of the structural damage observed in low-rise, reinforced concrete

buildings may be classified into four categories:

Captive Columns

It is common practice in Colombia to use unreinforced masonry walls,

about 5 inches thick, as partitioning system. The interaction between
these walls and the structure seems to be often ignored. This observation
Figure 4 Eng. Bldg., University of was frequently corroborated by the failures of many captive columns in
Quindío. Armenia as shown in Figures 5 to 8.

In view of the potential consequences of ignoring the problem, an

explanation is presented next.

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 Figure 5 Collapse of one building of Figure 6 Detail, Coproquin Buildings.
Coproquin condominium, Armenia.

Figure 7 Old Building at University of Figure 8 Detail of Column in the first

Quindío, Armenia. story of ICBF Bldg., Armenia

Exact determination of the forces induced in a column of a structure subjected to strong ground motion is not an
easy task. A pragmatic approximation, very useful in design, is to assume that the element reaches its flexural
capacity at both ends and under oposite curvatures. The maximum probable shear that can therefore act on a given

5
section of such an element is limited to twice the plastic moment capacity of the section divided by its clear height.
When a nonstructural element restrains the column along part of its height only, the maximum probable shear
increases almost in inverse proportion to the reduction in clear height. For instance, if a column is restrained by a
retaining wall in a first story, a practice observed in several buildings in Armenia (Figure 6), so that its clear height
is one fourth of its original clear length, the maximum probable shear that could eventually act on this element
would be four times higher than that calculated ignoring the possible interaction between the wall and the column.

Lack of transverse reinforcement

Columns with very small amounts of transverse

reinforcement, as the one shown in Figure 9, were observed
to have experienced severe damage. Observe that, in this
case, only one layer of transverse reinforcement was
provided within the zone where the element developed large
inelastic deformations. This was a 13.5 in x 13.5 in column
and the spacing of the stirrups was about 12 in. Notice that
besides the insufficient amount of transverse reinforcement,
its anchorage was not adequate. Ninety degrees hooks not
anchored in the core of the column could have limited the
development of the yield capacity of the plain ties provided.

Figure 9 Detail of Column of Los

Balcones Bldg., Armenia.

Damage related to the interaction between structural and

nonstructural elements

Figure 10 shows a column in the first story of a public school in

Armenia. In this case, the location of the inclined crack seems to
indicate that the direction of movement was such that one could
not relate the failure of this column with the possible effect of the
adjacent discontinuous wall. The slenderness of the member, in
turn, indicates that the shear stress that could have been developed
should not be expected to be high. However, it seems plausible
that the discontinuity generated by the failure of the adjacent
continuous wall may have triggered the failure of the column.

Deficient detailing

Figures 11 and 12 serve to stress the importance of good detailing.

Figure 10 Santa Teresa de Jesus
School, Armenia.
Figure 11 shows a column in which the architectural flare at the
top moved the critical section away from the joint region. This
made any transverse reinforcement that could have been provided
near the joint ineffective and, at the same time, the clear height of
the column was reduced.

6
Figure 12 shows a construction joint at the base of a column in the first story of a reinforced concrete building in
downtown Armenia. Observe the evident lack of continuity, the presence of rather unusual hooks, the use of plain
bars, and the absence of transverse reinforcement.

Figure 11 Detail of Column in the Figure 12 Detail of Column in the

first story of La Suiza I Bldg. first story of Centenario Hotel,

Additional observations

Several additional observations are worth discussing:

- Very fragile partitions consisting of

unreinforced, brick walls were
observed in Pereira and Armenia.
Their use in very flexible reinforced
concrete frames seemed quite
common. Columns with aspect
ratios –ratio of distance between
points of maximum and minimum
curvature to effective depth- of more
than 4 were frequently observed. In
general, severe damage to the
masonry was a common
consequence of the Jan. 25, 1999
earthquake (See Figure 13). In the
most fortunate cases, this only
caused economical losses. Some of
the 1998 revisions to the seismic
design recommendations for
Colombia (Colombian Association of
Earthquake Engineering, 1998) were
Figure 13 Masonry wall, 3rd floor, Aguas & Aguas Bldg, Pereira. intended to remedy this.

7
- Figure 14 shows what was left of a residential
building in Armenia after the January 25
earthquake. It was “identical” to the ones still
standing next to the debris. It is obvious that the
consequences could have been worse. The
structure consisted of reinforced concrete flat
slabs, slender reinforced concrete columns and
unreinforced masonry walls. The inadequacy of
the mechanism that could provide lateral
resistance in these buildings was made evident
by the January 25 quake.

- The remarkable importance of structural

redundancy cannot be overemphazised. It
represents the difference between collapse and
severe structural damage without collapse
(Figures 15 and 16).
Figure 14 Maria Cristina Condominium, Armenia.
- As important as design provisions, repair
guidelines represent a critical component of any
efforts toward the reconstruction of urban
infrastructure.

-The absence of reinforced concrete shear walls in the twenty buildings surveyed was noted.

Figure 15 Los Balcones Bldg., Figure 16 Detail, first story

Armenia. column.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writers want to express their gratitude with Mario F. De La Pava, Luz E. Ocampo and Luis C. Martínez,
Society of Engineers of Quindío; Ana Campos, Margarita Ochóa and Jaime Guzmán, Project of Seismic Risk of
Pereira, Dosquebrads and Santa Rosa De Cabal; Gabriel Fernández, University of Illinois; Adolfo Alarcón,
INGEOMINAS; Jorge E Durán, Gómez-Cajiao y Asociados; Augusto Espinoza, Areas; Omar D. Cardona,
Colombian Society of Earthquake Engineering; Josef Farbiarz and Jorge E. Polanco, National University of
Colombia at Medellín; Martha C. Vélez, Integral; Pedro F. Pujol, Gerinsa; and Marcia Collins, Tracy Mavity,
Vincent P. Drnevich and Mete A. Sozen, Purdue University.

REFERENCES

“Armenia Despertó con Nuevas Réplicas,” El Colombiano, February 1, 1999.

Colombian Association of Earthquake Engineering, 1998, Normas Colombianas de Diseño y Construcción Sismo
Resistente, 4 vols., Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia.

Sarria Alberto, 1995, Ingeniería Sísmica, Second Edition, Ediciones Uniandes and ECOE Ediciones, Santa Fe de
Bogotá, Colombia, 569 p.

“Se revisarán Proyectos de Desarrollo Acordados con el BID,” El Tiempo, January 29, 1999.