COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORP v.
LAGMAN prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
G.R. No. 165487 | July 13, 2011
 the following:
FACTS:
● Santos applied for a license with the National Food
Authority (NFA) to engage in warehouse business
(storing of palay).
○ Under the General Bonded Warehouse Act
approval for said license was conditioned
upon posting of a cash bond, a bond
secured by real estate, or a bond signed by
a duly authorized bonding company.
● Accordingly, petitioner Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation issued Warehouse Bond No. 03304
through its agent, respondent Antonio Lagman.
o Santos was the bond principal,
Lagman was the surety and NFA was
the obligee.
● In consideration of these issuances, corresponding
Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos.
o Lagman and other co-signors bound
themselves solidarily liable to Country
Bankers for any damages, prejudice,
losses, costs, payments, advances and
expenses of whatever kind and nature
which it may sustain as a consequence
of the said bond.
● Santos secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as
collateral.
○ Santos defaulted in his payment
when the loan matured.
● By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers
was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.
○ Subsequently, Country Bankers filed
a complaint for a sum of money
against Lagman.
● Lagman: alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid
only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as
evidenced by receipts.
● Trial court: declared Lagman and other co-signors,
jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers
relying on the indemnity agreement.
● Lagman anchors his defense on 2 arguments:
1) the 1989 Bonds have expired and
2) the 1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds
by presenting a photocopy of the 1990
Bond.
● CA: rejected Country Banker’s argument that the 1989
bond were continuing held that the 1989 bonds
were effective only for 1 year, as evidenced by the
receipts on the payment of premiums.
ISSUE #1:
Whether the photocopy of the 1990 bond should be admitted as
proof.
HELD:
NO.
Such copy is inadmissible. Under the best evidence rule, the
original document must be produced whenever its contents
are the subject of inquiry.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its nonproduction in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad
faith to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, and contents.
A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for the non- production of the
original instrument. When more than one original copy exists,
it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can
be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
CASE AT BAR
Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there
are actually four duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these
duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He
admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but could
no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties
with Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why
severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-
availability of his copy of the bond considering that he himself
is a bondsman. Neither did he explain why he failed to
secure the original from any of the 3 other custodians he
mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to
find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely
contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman
failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.
ISSUE #2: (Insurance Law)
Whether the 1989 Bonds have expired and the 1990 Bond
novates the 1989 Bonds.
HELD:
NO. It is continuing bond.
The 1989 Bonds have identical provisions and they state in very
clear terms the effectivity of these bonds i.e. that the bond shall
remain in force until cancelled by the Administrator of NFA. This
provision in the bonds is in compliance with the second paragraph
of Section 177 of Insurance Code, which specifies that a
continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration
date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by
the Insurance Commissioner, and by the court. The clear import of
these provisions is that the surety bonds in question cannot be
unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. Thus: In case of a continuing
bond, the obligor shall pay the subsequent annual premium as it
falls due until the contract of suretyship is cancelled by the
obligee or by the Commissioner or by a court of competent
jurisdiction, as the case may be.
Lagman, being a solidary debtor by virtue of the 1989 Bonds
under the Indemnity Agreements, is liable for the entire
obligation. Petition is GRANTED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v IMELDA “IMEE” MARCOS-
MANOTOC, et. al.
GR No. 171701 | February 8, 2012 | Sereno, J. | Panaga
FACTS:
● This case involves P200B of the Marcoses alleged ill-
gotten wealth. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed a Complaint for Reversion,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages
against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted
by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and
herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene
Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc,
and Gregorio Araneta III. Four amended Complaints
were filed imputing active participation and
collaboration of other persons in the alleged illegal
activities and undertakings of the Marcoses.
● Petitioner presented and formally offered evidence1
against respondents.
○ Against Imee and Bongbong
■ Sworn statement and Deposition
of one of the financial advisors
of the late Marcos, Rolando
Gapud2
○ Against Imee for the alleged dollar salting
with De Soleil Apparel and the media
networks
■ Affidavits of witnesses
■ TSN taken during the PCGG
hearing
● Against Irene and Gregorio
■ Articles of Incorporation,
Memorandum of Agreement and
Purchase Agreement between
Pantranco and Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co.
● Respondents objected to the offer on the ground that
the documents violated the best evidence rule as they
were unauthenticated, and that petitioner failed to
provide a reason as to why the original documents
could not be provided.
● Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence with some
reservation: the documents were admitted as evidence
but its evidentiary value shall be left to the
determination of the Court.
● Respondents filed their respective Demurrers to
Evidence contending that the documents presented
were inadmissible in court.
● Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrers except one by
Imelda.
○ Imelda – Her demurrer was denied because
she admitted that she and her husband
owned properties enumerated In the
complaint, saying that it was lawfully
acquired. However, her admission was
deemed as prima facie case against her
considering that the value of the properties
were disproportionate to their lawful
income
○ Imee and Bongbong – Their involvement
was never established based on the
witnesses presented, which none of them
mentioned the siblings, nor the
1 document itself, except in the following cases: (d) when the
Photocopies of the documents
2
Statements were taken in Hong Kong on various dates
documentary evidence3 pinpoint any
specific involvement of the two.
○ Irene and her husband Gregorio – The
testimonies and documents presented4
were not enough to support petitioner’s
allegations.
○ PEA-PTGWO – No evidence showing that
Pantranco was illegally acquired since the
documentary evidence presented were
mere photocopies and affiants had not
been presented as witnesses.
● Petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration
insisting that there was a preponderance of evidence
that respondents had connived with their parents as
compulsory heirs of the late Marcos.
● It contends that these documents fall under the 3rd
exception under the Rules on Evidence5 wherein these
documents are public records in the custody of a public
officer or are recorded in a public office. Since the
documents were collected by PCGG, then it falls under
such exception.
● PCGG’s record officer Magno testified that these
documents had been gathered and taken into custody
by the PCGG
● The court denied the motion, pointing out that it made
its reservation in the assessment of the evidentiary
value of the admitted evidence. It also stated that even
if it included the testimonies of witnesses, these were
not substantial to hold respondents liable
ISSUE: WON the granting of the demurrers to evidence was valid
HELD: YES. Petitioner failed to observe the best evidence rule. It is
petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its complaint
through a preponderance of evidence. Failure to do so has made
the Demurrer filed by the respondents valid. What should be
proved are the contents of the documents and as such, the
original documents must be presented. Since the submitted
evidence were mere photocopies, the petitioner has violated the
best evidence rule which mandates that the evidence must be the
original document itself.6
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a reason as to why the
originals were not presented nor did they present any compelling
ground which would have the court admit the documents as
3
Documents showed the interests of Imee in the media networks
IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, which she allegedly obtained through
illegal means and to prove her alleged participation in dollar
salting through De Soleil Apparel
4
Said documents sought to prove how the Marcoses used the
Potencianos as dummies in acquiring the bus company Pantranco
5
Sec. 7, Rule 130. Evidence admissible when original document is
a public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.
6
Sec. 3(d) Rule 130. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office
secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who
had executed them.
It cannot also say that said documents fall under Rule 7, Sec. 130
of the Rules. The fact that they were collected by the PCGG in its
investigation does not make them per se public records. Even if
there was a witness to that effect, Magno was not a credible
witness who could testify as to the contents of the documents.
Witnesses can only testify as to those facts which are of their
personal knowledge.
The affidavits submitted, although considered as public
documents, if they are acknowledged by a notary public, are still
classified as hearsay evidence. Affidavits are generally rejected
unless affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify.
The TSN may be a public document but what was presented was a
mere photocopy. Under the Rules, when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, a photocopy of a public document is valid if it is a
certified copy issued by the public officer who has custody. In
this case, the TSN was not even a certified copy and was not even
signed by the stenographer who took down the proceedings.
REPUBLIC v. GIMENEZ
TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FE ROA
GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
NOTES: Skipped demurrer and went straight to Best Evidence
Rule; I did not include all the evidence kasi sobrang haba ng list;
Please check codal for the provisions stated sa ruling.
FACTS:
● The Republic (REP), through the PCGG, instituted a
Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses
before the Sandiganbayan (SB). The Complaint seeks to
recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by Spouses as
dummies, agents, or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
● During trial, the REP presented documentary evidence
attesting to the positions held, business interests,
income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez
Spouses.
● After which the REP then manifested that it was "no
longer presenting further evidence.” Accordingly, the
SB gave the REP 30 days "to file its formal offer of
evidence." The REP moved "for an extension of thirty
(30) days, within which to file its formal offer of
evidence." – GRANTED.
● The REP moved for an additional 15 days – GRANTED.
No further extensions where asked.
● In a resolution, the SB noted that the REP failed to file
its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated
extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus,
declared that REP waived the filing of its Formal Offer
of Evidence.
● Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer
to Evidence. He argued that the REP showed no right
to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause
of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss
don the ground of failure to prosecute.
● Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez's filing of the Motion
to Dismiss, REP filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of
the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence.
○ ANG DAMI MGA BES. Exhibits A – TT (A – Z,
AA – TT). Basically it consist of several
pieces of evidence presented to the court
to prove that the spouse got ill-gotten
wealth such as the Income Tax Returns,
Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On
Compensation, Checking Statements
Summary issued by the Banks, Checks,
Certification proving that Gimenez worked
with the Office of the President etc.
● In another resolution, the SB denied the REP's Motion
for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses'
Motion to Dismiss:
○ REP failed to prosecute its case for an
unreasonable length of time and to comply
with the court's rules. The court also noted
that the documentary evidence presented
by the REP consisted mostly of certified true
copies. However, the persons who certified
the documents as copies of the original
were not presented. Hence, the evidence
lacked probative value.
● Petitioner argues that:
○ a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the
identity and authenticity of the
documentary evidence presented by
petitioner; and
○ b) the documents it presented were public
documents, and there was no need for the
identification and authentication of the
original documentary exhibits.
● Petitioner relies on the SB order that the defendant Fe
Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate
that the documents to be presented and identified by
the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the
PCGG,
● Petitioner claims that the exhibits were acquired in
relation to the PCGG's functions prescribed under
Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of
the official records of the PCGG: "Certifications as to
the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-
Gimenez, her salaries and compensation during her
stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns
and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the
declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of
Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses
Gimenezes' interests on various corporations; and
several transactions involving huge amounts of money
which prove that they acted as conduit in the
disbursement of government funds."
● On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez
argues that petitioner's documents are not "official
issuances of the Philippine government." They are
mostly notarized private documents. Petitioner's
evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on
demurrer to evidence is only proper. Respondent Fe
Roa Gimenez claims that the SB did not err in holding
that the majority of petitioner's documentary evidence
has no probative value, considering that most of these
documents are only photocopies.
ISSUE: Whether the SB erred in holding that petitioner REP
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting
respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez's Motion to
Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
HELD: YES. The evidence presented by petitioner before the SB
deserves better treatment.
RATIO: The nature and classification of the documents should
have been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original
document must be presented during trial when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence
Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. In
case of unavailability of the original document, secondary
evidence may be presented as provided for under Sections 5 to 7
of the same Rule.
Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule: the best evidence rule
applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the
document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained
thus — But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best
evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is
the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need for accounting for the original. Thus,
when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition
it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol
evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule
should apply to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding
the existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind
that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130,
Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court.
Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before
courts, documents are classified as either public or private under
Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. The same Rule provides
for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of
proof for public documents in SEC. 23. - SEC. 30
Public v Private Document as Evidence: The nature of documents
as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its
official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or
because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law,
is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement
is proved or set forth.
In short: Public documents are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On
the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence
unless they are properly authenticated.
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented
as evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements
submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies
presented were certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which
under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents.
Thus, the statements presented were private documents.
Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their
admissibility in evidence.
In this Case:
● Petitioner merely presented a memo attesting to the
increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue,
prepared by a member of his management team.
● While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes
competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a
private document, the best proof available must be
presented.
● The best proof available, in this instance, would have
been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's
external auditor who prepared the audited financial
statements – Eh wala (nothing was presented), so it
was not authenticated.
● Petitioner presented as witness its records officer,
Magno, who testified that these public and private
documents had been gathered by and taken into the
custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission's
investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, Magno was not a credible witness
who could testify as to their contents. (To reiterate,
"[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them,
they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses
can testify only to those facts which are of their
personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their
own perception).
● Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained
custody of these documents, but not as to the
contents of the documents themselves.
● Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants
of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the
court. (while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary
public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay
evidence).
HOWEVER, the SC highlighted that the SB brushed off the totality
of evidence on which petitioner built its case. Even assuming that
no documentary evidence was properly offered, it is clear that the
SB did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner
during the 19 years of trial. The SB erred in ignoring petitioner's
testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous
exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner's
witnesses. Petitioner presented both testimonial and
documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption
that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe
Roa Gimenez's incumbency as public officer and which total
amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her
husband's salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.
Petitioner presented five witnesses, two of which were Atty.
Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG,
and Danilo Daniel, then Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank
accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the control of
spouses Gimenezes. Several exhibits excluded by the
Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence (Madami din). The court cannot arbitrarily disregard
evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which
tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the
determination of its probative weight is canonical. Admissibility of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question
of whether or not it proves an issue.
The SB should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.
where SC held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for
determination of its probative value than to outright reject it
based on very rigid and technical grounds. Although trial courts
are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held
that: [I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on
doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state's policy to
recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed
with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to
evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment
on the merits. This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action," it
specifically "pertains to the merits of the case.
Petition is GRANTED.
HEIRS OF PARDON v. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ
GR No. 170604 | September 2, 2013 | Bersamin, J. | Perez
DOCTRINE:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written
document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting
of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a
property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and
the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other
than the original document.
FACTS:
● The children of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave
filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages
against Margarita Prodon.
○ They alleged that their parents were the
registered owners of the subject parcel of
land and that upon their parents’ deaths,
they had continued the possession of the
property as heirs.
○ However, they could not locate the owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT but the original
copy on file with the Register of Deeds of
Manila was still intact.
○ The original copy contained an entry stating
that the property had been sold to Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase.
○ They alleged that the entry had been
maliciously done by Prodon because the
Deed of Sale did not exist.
● Prodon claimed that Maximo executed the Deed of
Sale with right to repurchase. She had then become
the absolute owner of the property when Maximo
failed to repurchase the property within 6 months
from the date of execution of the Deed.
○ Prodon’s testimony has been confirmed by
the Notarial Register and by the Primary
Entry Book of the RD of Manila.
● During trial, the custodian of the records of the
property attested that the copy of the Deed could not
be found in the files of the RD.
● The RTC ruled in favor of Prodon.
○ Although the Deed itself could not be
presented as evidence in court, its contents
could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
130.
○ The execution and existence of the Deed
has been adequately established by reliable
and trustworthy evidences.
○ The original copy of the Deed of Sale with
right to repurchase had been lost, and that
earnest efforts had been exerted to
produce it before the court.
● The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
○ Before secondary evidence as to the
contents of a document may be admitted in
evidence, the existence of the document
must first be proved, likewise, its execution
and its subsequent loss.
○ Maximo suffered from paralysis of half of
his body and blindness due to cataract and
was hospitalized more than once. This lends
credence to the heirs’ assertion that their
father was not physically able to personally
execute the Deed.
○ The TCT had not been transferred in
Prodon’s name. Also, from the sale in 1975
to 1996 when the case was finally filed,
Prodon never tried to recover possession of
the property nor had she shown that she
ever paid Real Property Tax thereon.
○ The Notary Public who notarized the Deed
testified that there has about 4 or 5 original
copies of the said Deed. Hence, all originals
must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. Prodon
merely accounted for 3 original copies.
ISSUE: Whether the Best Evidence Rule should apply.
HELD:
NO. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a
writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced
concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or
delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best
Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary
evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.
Despite the fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue,
the RTC inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case
and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the
admission of secondary evidence had been complied with,
without being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to
be excluded. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake by
likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule, except that the CA
concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not
established the existence, execution, and loss of the original The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that the heirs
document as the prerequisites for the presentation of secondary preponderantly proved that the Deed of Sale with right to
evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule naturally led repurchase executed by Maximo did not exist in fact.
the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been
admitted, but like the RTC, the CA did not state what excluded
secondary evidence it was referring to.

Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable

because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine
whether the existence, execution, and loss, as prerequisites for
the presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by
Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and
determined whether or not the “existence” and “execution” of
the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance
of evidence. Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the
existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the original
document would have sufficed even without first proving the loss
or unavailability of the original of the deed.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a

written document the original of the document must be produced
in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original
writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:
(a) The existence or due execution of the original;
(b) The loss and destruction of the original, or the reason
for its non-production in court; and
(c) The absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to
which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that

the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court,
considering that:
(a) The precision in presenting to the court the exact
words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, because a slight variation in words may
mean a great difference in rights;
(b) There is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the
human process of making a copy by handwriting or
typewriting; and,
(c) As respects oral testimony purporting to give from
memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of
error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally.

The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a

party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it,
and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld
for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and
defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences
resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings.

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof
sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability of the
original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. In
contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability
of the existence of the Deed.