CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II qualifed foreigner and a qualifed Filipino, the latter shall be
chosen over the former.
I. Due Process and Equal Protecton as Limitatons on
Police Power, Eminent Domain and Taxaton
A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND BILL OF
RIGHTS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS
G.R. No. 122156 | February 3, 1997
FACTS:
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation
No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and fnancial support to strengthen the proftability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September
1995 only two (2) bidders participatedd petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which ofered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
frm, with ITTSSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In
a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers
check issued by Philtrust Bank for P33,000,000.00 as Bid Security to match
the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad. which respondent
GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad.
ISSUE:
1. WON, Sec. 10, (2), Art. XII of the Constitution is a selfSexecuting
provision.
2. WON, Manila Hotel falls under the term National Patrimony.
RULING:
1. YES. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution(Filipino First Policy) is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage.
The term qualifed Filipinos simply means that preference shall
be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to
the common good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that
are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate
preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the
common good.In the granting of economic rights, privileges,
and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
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PRINCIPLE:
A consttuton is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defned as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns
to the diferent departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fxed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and efect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
TANADA v. ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
FACTS:
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted
Resolution No. 97 which resolved that the Senate concur, in the ratifcation
by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization. The instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a
selfSreliant and independent national economy efectively controlled by
Filipinos to give preference to qualifed Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods."
ISSUE:
WON, The provisions of the WTO agreement and its annexes
limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by congress.
RULING:
NO. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration
of principles and state policies. The principles in Article II are not intended
to be selfSexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of
Article XII are not selfSexecuting provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
The basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in the growth
in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.
The Constitution did not envision a hermitStype isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all
nations.
PRINCIPLE:
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
The country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifcations as may be necessary to ensure the fulfllment of the
obligations undertaken.
DOMINO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134015 | July 19, 1999
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO fled his certifcate of candidacy
for the position of Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in
his certifcate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEEC 2nd Division promulgated a
resolution declaring DOMINO disqualifed as candidate for the position of
representative of Sarangani for lack of the oneSyear residence requirement
and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certifcate of candidacy.
ISSUE:
WON, DOMINO is a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at
least 1 year immediately preceding the May 1998 election.
RULING:
NO. It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in
the law prescribing the qualifcations for sufrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to
reside in a fxed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fxed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return. Domicile is a question of
intention and circumstances.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of
choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown
by his certifcate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.To successfully
efect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fde intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and defnite acts which
correspond with the purpose. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefnite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on
November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration
in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of
registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of
residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year
residency requirement under the Constitution.
PRINCIPLE:
ELEMENTS OF DOMICILE
1. Physical Presence in the LEocality
2. Intention to adopt it as domicile
PAMATONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872 | April 13, 2004
FACTS:
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The COMELEEC declared petitioner and thirtySfve (35) others
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner
seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation
of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON, the constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to
opportunities for public officec grants constitutional right to run for or hold
public office.
RULING.
NO. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision
which suggests such a thrust or justifes an interpretation of the sort. The
"equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under
the Article are generally considered not selfSexecuting, and there is no
plausible reason for according a diferent treatment to the "equal access"
provision. LEike the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision
does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifes a guideline for legislative or executive action.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to
public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifcally on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is
not sacrifced as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to fle a certifcate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt
from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
YRASUEGI v. PAL
G.R. No. 168081 | October 17, 2008
FACTS:
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PALE that
due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost
leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of
almost fve (5) years," his services were considered terminated "efective
immediately.
ISSUE:
WON, Petitioner may invoke the equal protection clause
guaranty of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. The Bill of Rights is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Private actions, no
matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE
G.R. No. 196271 | February 28, 2012
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the frst
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further
reset the frst regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset
for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August
2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafer.
 Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certifcates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But onJune 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetng the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
ISSUE:
WON, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections.
RULING:
YES. While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The objective behind setng a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of
the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to
once every three years.
Thus, we fnd the contention that the synchronization
mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of
the ARMM unmeritorious.
PRINCIPLE:
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should
be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given
their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in
which case the signifcance thus attached to them prevails.
B. BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE,
THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, SIMILARITIES AND DISTINCTIONS, AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS
JUAN LUNA SUBDIVISION vs. SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-3538 | May 28, 1952
FACTS:
On December 29, 1941 it issued to the City Treasurer of Manila,
and the City Treasurer accepted checks No. 628334 for P2,210.52 drawn
upon the Philippine Trust Company with which it had a credit balance of
P4,940.17 on its account. On February 20, 1942, presumably afer the
exact amount had been verifed, which was P341.60, the balance of
P1,868.92, covered by voucher No. 1487 of the City Treasure's office, was
noted in the ledger as a credit to the Juan LEuna Subdivision, Inc.
Further than this, the records of the City Treasurer's office do
not show what was done with the check. But the books of the Philippine
Trust Company do reveal that it was deposited with the Philippine National
Bank, the City Treasurer's sole depository, on December 29, 1941, and that
it was presented by that Bank to the Philippine Trust Company on May 1,
1944 and was cashed by the drawee.
The City refused afer liberation to refund the plaintif's deposit
or apply it to such future taxes as might be found due, while the Philippine
Trust Company was unwilling to reverse its debit entry against the Juan
LEuna Subdivision, Inc. It was upon this predicament that the Juan LEuna
Subdivision, Inc. brought this suit against the City Treasurer and the
Philippine Trust Company as defendants in the alternative.
ISSUE:
WON, the whole amount of the check contending that taxes for
the last semester of 1941 have been remitted by Commonwealth Act. No.
703.
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RULING:
There is no ambiguity in the language of the law. It says "taxes
and penalties due and payable," the literal meaning of which taxes owned
or owing. Note that the provision speaks of penalties, and note that
penalties accrue only when taxes are not paid on time. The word "remit"
underlined by the appellant does not help its theory, for to remit to desist
or refrain from exacting, inficting, or enforcing something as well as to
restore what has already been taken.
The remission of taxes due and payable to the exclusion of taxes
already collected does not constitute unfair discrimination. Each set of taxes
is a class by itself, and the law would be open to attack as class legislation
only if all taxpayers belonging to one class were not treated alike. They are
not.
REYES v. ALMANZOR
G.R. No. L-49839-46 | April 26, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners J.B.LE. Reyes, Edmundo and Milagros Reyes are
owners of parcels of land situated in Tondo and Sta. Cruz Districts, City of
Manila, which are leased and entirely occupied as dwelling sites by tenants.
Said tenants were paying monthly rentals not exceeding three hundred
pesos (P300.00) in July, 1971. On July 14, 1971, the National LEegislature
enacted Republic Act No. 6359 prohibiting for one year from its efectivity,
an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units or of lands on which
another's dwelling is located, where such rentals do not exceed three
hundred pesos (P300.00) a month but allowing an increase in rent by not
more than 10% thereafer. The said Act also suspended paragraph (1) of
Article 1673 of the Civil Code for two years from its efectivity thereby
disallowing the ejectment of lessees upon the expiration of the usual legal
period of lease. Consequently, the Reyeses, petitioners herein, were
precluded from raising the rentals and from ejecting the tenants. In 1973,
respondent City Assessor of Manila reSclassifed and reassessed the value of
the subject properties based on the schedule of market values duly
reviewed by the Secretary of Finance. The revision, as expected, entailed an
increase in the corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to fle a
Memorandum of Disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals.
They averred that the reassessments made were "excessive, unwarranted,
inequitable, confscatory and unconstitutional" considering that the taxes
imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their
properties.
ISSUE:
WON, the Board erred in adopting the “Comparable Sales
Approachc method in fxing the assessed valued of appellants’ properties.
RULING:
YES. The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable
and natural classifcation for purposes of taxation but the government's act
must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least
discrimination that fnds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or
that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being diferent both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed
The frst Fundamental Principle to guide the appraisal and
assessment of real property for taxation purposes is that the property must
be "appraised at its current and fair market value."
Ironically, in the case at bar, not even the factors determinant of
the assessed value of subject properties under the "comparable sales
approach" were presented by the public respondents, namelyd (1) that the
sale must represent a bonafde arm's length transaction between a willing
seller and a willing buyer and (2) the property must be comparable
property.
PRINCIPLE:
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty".
taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected
without unnecessary hindrance. However, such collection should be
made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very
reason for government itself It is therefore necessary to reconcile the
apparently conficting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so
that the real purpose of taxations, which is the promotion of the
common good, may be achieved
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. REYES
G.R. No. 159694 | January 27, 2006
FACTS:
On July 8, 1993, Maria C. Tancinco (or decedent) died, leaving a
1,292 squareSmeter residential lot and an old house thereon. Revenue
District Office No. 50 conducted an investigation on the decedents estate
(or estate). Subsequently, it issued a Return Verifcation Order. But without
the required preliminary fndings being submitted, it issued LEetter of
Authority No. 132963 for the regular investigation of the estate tax case.
Azucena T. Reyes, one of the decedents heirs, received the LEetter of
Authority on March 14, 1997.
BIR issued a preliminary assessment notice against the estate in
the amount of P14,580,618.67. On May 10, 1998, the heirs of the
decedent received a fnal estate tax assessment notice and a demand
letter, both dated April 22, 1998, for the amount of P14,912,205.47,
inclusive of surcharge and interest.
As the estate failed to pay its tax liability within the April 15,
2000 deadline BIR notifed Reyes on June 6, 2000 that the subject property
would be sold at public auction on August 8, 2000.
ISSUE:
WON, the assessment against the estate is valid.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner violated the cardinal rule in administrative law
that the taxpayer be accorded due process. Not only was the law here
disregarded, but no valid notice was sent, either. A void assessment bears
no valid fruit.
The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal,
requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without frst
establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal
principle in administrative investigationsd that taxpayers should be able to
present their case and adduce supporting evidence.
In the instant case, respondent has not been informed of the
basis of the estate tax liability. Without complying with the unequivocal
mandate of frst informing the taxpayer of the governments claim, there
can be no deprivation of property, because no efective protest can be
made. The haphazard shot at slapping an assessment, supposedly based
on estate taxations general provisions that are expected to be known by
the taxpayer, is utter chicanery. Although taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, their assessment and collection should be made in
accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself.
CHEVRON v. BCDA
G.R. No. 1273863 | September 15, 2010
FACTS:
On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark
Development Corporation (CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on
the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic
Zone. On October 1, 2002, CDC sent a letter[6] to herein petitioner
Chevron Philippines, Inc. informing the petitioner that a royalty fee of
P0.50 per liter shall be assessed on its deliveries to Nanox Philippines
efective August 1, 2002. Thereafer, on October 21, 2002 a Statement of
Account[7] was sent by CDC billing the petitioner for royalty fees in the
amount of P115,000.00 for its fuel sales from Coastal depot to Nanox
Philippines from August 1S31 to September 3S21, 2002.
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ISSUE:
WON, the regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
RULING:
YES In the case at bar, we hold that the subject royalty fee was
imposed primarily for regulatory purposes, and not for the generation of
income or profts as petitioner claims.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the Policy Guidelines
was issued, frst and foremost, to ensure the safety, security, and good
condition of the petroleum fuel industry within the CSEZ. The questioned
royalty fees form part of the regulatory framework to ensure free fow or
movement of petroleum fuel to and from the CSEZ. The fact that
respondents have the exclusive right to distribute and market petroleum
products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA with SBMA and CSBTI does not
diminish the regulatory purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied
by petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
PRINCIPLE:
If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax
even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the
other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a
regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though
incidentally, revenue is generated.
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.
TAXATION POLICE POWER
PURPOSE To raise revenue To primarily regulate
THE OFFICE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL v. AYALA LAND INC.
G.R. No. 177056 | September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents Ayala LEand, Robinsons, and ShangriSla maintain and
operate shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent
SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and
other structures. The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents
have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of
parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or
adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking spaces.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on
Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation for the following
purposesd (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of
shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo that the
collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to fnd out the basis and
reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to
determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in
cases of thef, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the
back of the parking tickets
ISSUE:
WON, there is a valid exercise of police power to justify the
collection of parking fees.
RULING:
NO. Police power does not involve the taking or confscation of
property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for
instance, the confscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and frearms. When there is a taking or confscation of private property for
public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its
inherent powers, namely, eminent domain.
 Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the
parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their
collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is
already tantamount to a taking or confscation of their properties. The
State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give
the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an
excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they
wish, they are further prohibited from profting from its use or even just
recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of
the required parking facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking
facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also
cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power,
since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without
payment of just compensation.
PRINCIPLE
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property.
Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner.
C. DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL
Art. III Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protecton of the laws.
PEOPLE v. SITON
G.R. No. 169364 | September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were
charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the
arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior
surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be
frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
ISSUE:
WON, Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under
the Constitution
RULING:
NO. Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause;
neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed.
Ofenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for
being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license
or a justifcation to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and efects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afer
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police
authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on
respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfes the probable
cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not
moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a
source of police abuse in their case.
DLSU v. CA
G.R. No. 127980 | December 19, 2007
FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity who were expelled by the De LEa Salle University (DLESU) and
College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1] Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an ofensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap
and three other student members of Domino LEux Fraternity.
One week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his
dinner alone in Manangs Restaurant near LEa Salle, when he overheard two
men badSmouthing and apparently angry at Domino LEux. When he arrived
at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods.
Afer this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two
heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. But no apology was
made.
On March 29, 1995, ten minutes before his next class at 6d00
p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus.As he was about to reScross
Taf Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were
running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then,
respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in
his hands parang knuckles. Respondents Reverente and LEee were behind
Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front
of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent
Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of
attackers lef.
ISSUE:
WON, the private respondents were accorded due process of
law.
RULING:
Yes. The private respondents were given due process of law. he
Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a
civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional
behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law is solemn and infexible.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found
violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which
must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and
these ared that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges
against them by the DLESUSCSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner
Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them
as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the
hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the
right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. LEastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due
process when they were not allowed to crossSexamine the witnesses
against them.
ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167011 | April 30, 2008
FACTS:
RespondentSspouses, Carlos and Erlinda Romualdez registered
as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, LEeyte, in spite of the fact
that they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City. That being
the case, they are guilty of an election ofense due to double registration
under R.A. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter’s Registation Act of 1996.
ISSUE:
WON, petitioners were accorded due process of law.
RULING:
YES. They were accorded due process of law.
In the frst place, there appears to be no incongruity between
the charges as contained in the ComplaintSAffidavit and the Informations
fled before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and
Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be fled by the
COMELEEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, fled with the RTC,
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondent’s ComplaintSAffidavit.
The charges contained in private respondent’s ComplaintSAffidavit and the
charges as directed by the COMELEEC to be fled are based on the same set
of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s
ComplaintSAffidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations
fled with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEEC Resolution En Banc are the
same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute
or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEEC
fled with the RTC. Petitioners were aforded due process because they
were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
respondent’s ComplaintSAffidavit. Finding that due process was not
dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with
the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were
reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against
them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to
adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages,
petitioners actively participated.
GARCILLANO v. COMMITTEES
G.R. No. 170338 | December 23, 2008
FACTS:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a
wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a highSranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEEC) surfaced. On October 26, 2007, Maj. LEindsay Rex Sagge, a
member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the
Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without
being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of LEegislation, but
also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of LEegislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.
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However, with respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, no efort
was undertaken for the publication of these rules.
Respondents justify their nonSobservance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web
page
ISSUE:
WON, the Senate be allowed to continue the conduct of the
legislative inquire without duly published rules of procedure.
RULING:
NO. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct
of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[l]aws shall take efect afer 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines."
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of LEegislation had been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no efort was undertaken for the publication
of these rules when they frst opened their session.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred
until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
PLACIDO v. NLRC
G.R. No. 180888 | September 18, 2009
FACTS:
It appears that since August 2000, PLEDT had been receiving
reports of thef and destruction of its cables.1 On March 13, 2001, PLEDT
Duty Inspector Ricardo Mojica (Mojica) and PLEDT Security Guard/Driver
Mark Anthony Cruto (Cruto), responding to a report that cables were being
stripped and burned in one of the residences along Alley 2 Street, Project 6,
Quezon City, proceeded to the said area where they saw petitioners’ service
vehicle parked infront of the house at No. 162. They likewise saw
petitioners stripping and burning cables inside the compound of the house
which turned out to belong to Caragay’s mother. With the assistance of
police and barangay officials, PLEDT recovered the cables bearing the "PLEDT"
marking.
In a related move, PLEDT required petitioners to explain within 72
hours why no severe disciplinary action should be taken against them for
Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty.2 Afer several requests for extension to
submit their explanations, petitioners submitted a joint explanation3 on
June 11, 2001 denying the charges against them. By their claim, they were
on their way back from the house of one Jabenz Quezada (Quezada) from
whom they were inquiring about a vehicle when they were detained by
Mojica.
ISSUE:
WON, the petitioners were denied due process when PLEDT
refused to furnish them a copy of the investigation report and grant them a
formal hearing.
RULING:
NO. Court fnds that petitioners were not denied due process.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been aforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process, the requirements of which are satisfed where the parties are
aforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.
In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given
several written invitations to submit themselves to PLEDT’s Investigation
Unit to explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A hearing, which
petitioners attended along with their union MKP representatives, was
conducted on June 25, 2001 during which the principal witnesses to the
incident were presented. Petitioners were thus aforded the opportunity to
confront those witnesses and present evidence in their behalf, but they
failed to do so.
MENDOZA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188308 | October 15, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of
Governor of the Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The
petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office of
Governor.
The respondent seasonably fled an election protest with the
COMELEEC, which was rafed to the Second Division and docketed as EPC
No. 2007S44. Revision of ballots involving the protested and counterS
protested precincts in Angat, Bocaue, Calumpit, Doa Remedios Trinidad,
Guiginto, Malolos, Meycauayan, Norzagaray, Pandi, Paombong, Plaridel,
Pulilan, San Rafael and San Jose del Monte soon followed. The revision was
conducted at the COMELEECs office in Intramuros. Afer revision, the parties
presented their other evidence, leading to the parties formal ofer of their
respective evidence.
The COMELEEC approved the parties formal ofer of evidence
and then required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The
parties complied with the COMELEECs order. The case was thereafer
submitted for resolution.
On March 2, 2009 the COMELEEC transferred the Bulacan ballot
boxes, including those involved in the provincial election contest, to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with the protest fled by
Aquilino Pimentel III against Juan Miguel Zubiri. In light of this
development, the petitioner moved to suspend further proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON, the right to due process of the petitioners has been
violated.
RULING:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the
COMELEEC, as an administrative or quasiSjudicial tribunal, are those
outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
(1) The frst of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or afected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
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(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a fnding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial. "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
afected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
The frst of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive
rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this
aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
The second, third, fourth, ffh, and sixth aspects of the Ang
Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the
inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decisionSmaker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set
forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decisionSmaking.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance
of the decision of a quasiSjudicial body, further complements the hearing
and decisionSmaking due process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly
the facts and the law upon which it is based.
In the frst place, he does not dispute that he fully participated
in the proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed
submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the
ballots, duly presented his evidence, and summed up his case through a
memorandum. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in
court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or
of the right to be heard.
SURIGAO ELECTRIC v. ERC
G.R. No. 183626 | October 4, 2010
FACTS:
On February 8, 1996, the Association of Mindanao Rural Electric
Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the other 33 rural
electric cooperatives in Mindanao, fled a petition before the then Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the formula for automatic cost
adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating
that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier should be
deducted from the computation of the power cost upon ascertaining that
the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) of SURNECO resulted to an overS
recovery amounting to PhP18,188,794.
ISSUE:
WON, SURNECO was denied due process.
RULING:
 NO. SURNECO was not denied due process.
Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to
explain ones side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[24] It means being given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trialStype hearing is not
even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to present evidence
in support thereof.
Verily, the PPA confrmation necessitated a review of the
electric cooperatives monthly documentary submissions to substantiate
their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for
other required supporting documents and were allowed to submit them
accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives representatives,
SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary fgures and to doubleScheck
these fgures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, afer the
issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to fle
their respective motions for reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid,
therefore, that SURNECO was not denied due process.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHER v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
G.R. No. 178552 | Octber 5, 2010
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the
State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the
Human Security Act of 2007.
ISSUE:
WON, R.A 9372’s defnition of the crime of terrorism is
intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.
RULING:
NO.
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation
of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or asS
applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due
process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of
the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
From the defnition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culledd (1) the
ofender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal
laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the ofender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
Before a charge for terrorism may be fled under RA 9372, there
must frst be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation
of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given
the presence of the frst element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
PRINCIPLE:
A statute or act sufers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and difer as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respectsd (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
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discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary fexing
of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and
will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
HERITAGE HOTEL v. NUWHRAIN
G.R. No. 178296 | January 12, 2011
FACTS:
On October 11, 1995, respondent fled with the Department of
LEabor and EmploymentSNational Capital Region (DOLEESNCR) a petition for
certifcation election.[2] The MedSArbiter granted the petition on February
14, 1996 and ordered the holding of a certifcation election.[3] On appeal,
the DOLEE Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15, 1996, affirmed the
MedSArbiters order and remanded the case to the MedSArbiter for the
holding of a preelection conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner fled a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23, 1996.
The preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it
was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998. Subsequently, petitioner
discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of LEabor
Relations (BLER) its annual fnancial report for several years and the list of its
members since it fled its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, on May
19, 2000, petitioner fled a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of
respondent, on the ground of the nonSsubmission of the said documents.
ISSUE:
WON, the petitioners’ right to due process was violate.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner was not denied the right to due process when it
was not notifed in advance of the BLER Directors inhibition and the DOLEE
Secretarys assumption of the case. WellSsettled is the rule that the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.Petitioner had the opportunity to question the BLER Directors inhibition
and the DOLEE Secretarys taking cognizance of the case when it fled a
motion for reconsideration of the latters decision. It would be well to state
that a critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal, for all the elements of due process, like notice
and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come
from a partial and biased judge. It was precisely to ensure a fair trial that
moved the BLER Director to inhibit himself from the case and the DOLEE
Secretary to take over his function.
D. DUE PROCESS AND POLICE POWER
WHITE LIGHT CORP. v. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 122846 | January 20, 2009
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. LEim (Mayor LEim)
signed into law an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White LEight Corporation
(WLEC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) fled a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaintSinSintervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly
afects their business interests as operators of driveSinShotels and motels in
Manila.
ISSUE:
WON, the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power
RULING:
NO. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties
in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.
LEacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in
Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review
when life, liberty or property is afected.73 However, this is not in any way
meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose
exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
PRINCIPLE:
Police power, while incapable of an exact defnition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and fexible
response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justifcation for
numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and
cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by
the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal
system, its use has rarely been denied.
BSP MB v. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA
G.R. No. 184778 | October 2, 2009
FACTS:
On September of 2007, the Supervision and Examination
Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducted
examinations of the books of several banks. Afer the examinations, exit
conferences were held with the officers or representatives of the banks
wherein the SED examiners provided them with copies of LEists of
Findings/Exceptions containing the defciencies discovered during the
examinations. These banks were then required to comment and to
undertake the remedial measures stated in these lists within 30 days from
their receipt of the lists, which remedial measures included the infusion of
additional capital.
On May 12, 2008, the RBPI fled a complaint for nullifcation of
the BSP ROE with application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.
RBPI prayed that Fonacier, her subordinates, agents, or any other person
acting in her behalf be enjoined from submitng the ROE or any similar
report to the Monetary Board (MB), or if the ROE had already been
submitted, the MB be enjoined from acting on the basis of said ROE, on
the allegation that the failure to furnish the bank with a copy of the ROE
violated its right to due process.
ISSUE:
WON, the failure to furnish copies of ROE to a bank is a
violation of due process.
RULING:
NO. The respondent banks cannot claim a violation of their right
to due process if they are not provided with copies of the ROEs. The same
ROEs are based on the lists of fndings/exceptions containing the
defciencies found by the SED examiners when they examined the books of
the respondent banks.
Respondent banks are already aware of what is required of them by the
BSP, and cannot claim violation of their right to due process simply because
they are not furnished with copies of the ROEs. Respondent banks were
held by the CA to be entitled to copies of the ROEs prior to or
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simultaneously with their submission to the MB, on the principles of
fairness and transparency.
The respondent banks cannotthrough seeking a writ of
preliminary injunction by appealing to lack of due process, in a roundabout
manner prevent their closure by the MB. Their remedy, as stated, is a
subsequent one, which will determine whether the closure of the bank was
attended by grave abuse of discretion. Judicial review enters the picture
only afer the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent such action by the
MB. The threat of the imposition of sanctions, even that of closure, does
not violate their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
ROXAS v. DAMBA -NFSW
G.R. No. 149548 | December 4, 2009
FACTS:
Roxas & Co. fled its application for conversion of its three
haciendas from argricultural to nonSagricultural on the assumption that the
issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone,
reclassifed them to nonSagricultural uses. Its pending application
notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued
Certifcates of LEand Ownership Award (CLEOAs) to the farmerSbenefciaries in
the three haciendas including CLEOA No. 6654 which was issued on October
15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares.
ISSUE:
WON, PP1520 automatically convert the agricutural lands in 3
municipalities to nonSagricultural lands.
RULING:
NO. The application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it
fnding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the
afected municipalities from their original uses.
The assertion of DAMBASNSFW that the petitions for partial and
complete cancellations of the CLEOAs subject of DARAB Case Nos. RS401S
003S2001 to RS401S005S2001 and No. 401S239S2001 violated the earlier
order in Roxas v. Court of Appeals does not lie. Nowhere did the Court
therein pronounce that the CLEOAs issued cannot and should not be
cancelled, what was involved therein being the legality of the acquisition
proceedings. The Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has
primary jurisdiction to rule on the validity of CLEOAs. Thus it heldd
. . . [t]he failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due
process in the acquisiton proceedings does not give this Court the power to
nullify the [CLOAs] already issued to the farmer-benefciaries. To assume the
power is to short-circuit the administratve process, which has yet to run its
regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its
procedural lapses in the acquisiton proceedings. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer
benefciaries hold the property in trust for the rightul owner of the land.
E. DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
THE OFFICE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL v. AYALA LAND INC.
G.R. No. 177056 | September 18, 2009
*repeat (go back to page 4)
ORTEGA v. CITY of CEBU
G.R. No. 181562-63 | October 2, 2009
FACTS:
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega x x x are the registered
owners of a parcel of land. OneShalf of the above described land is occupied
by squatters. On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] fled an
ejectment case against the squatters.
On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City]
enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to
expropriate oneShalf (1/2) portion. of the spouses Ortegas land (which is
occupied by the squatters), and appropriating for that purpose the amount
of P3,284,400.00 or at the price of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P1,150.00) per square meter. The amount will be charged against
Account No. 8S93S310, Continuing Appropriation, Account No. 101S8918S
334, repurchase of lots for various projects. The value of the land was
determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in Resolution No. 19,
series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994.
ISSUE:
WON, Cebu City should be allowed to withdraw its complaint as
the just compensation is too high.
RULING:
NO. It is wellSsettled in jurisprudence that the determination of
just compensation is a judicial prerogative.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts
fndings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justS
ness of the decreed compensation.
An order of expropriation denotes the end of the frst stage of
expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stagethe
determination of just compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of
expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the
petitioner to condemn the respondents properties. Because an order of
expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not
hinge on the payment of just compensation. Afer all, there would be no
point in determining just compensation if, in the frst place, the plaintifs
right to expropriate the property was not frst clearly established.
LBP v. RUFINO
G.R. No. 175644 | October 2, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents Jose Marie M. Rufno (Rufno), Nilo M.
Resurreccion (Resureccion), Arnel M. Atanacio (Atanacio), and Suzette G.
Mateo (Suzette) are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel of
agricultural land.
By respondents claim, in 1989, they voluntarily ofered the
aforesaid property to the government for CARP coverage at P120,000 per
hectare. Acting thereon, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued a Notice of LEand Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996
declaring that out of the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares
was subject to immediate acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40
based on the assessment of petitioner LEand Bank of the Philippines (LEBP).
Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the
matter was referred by the provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon
to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary
administrative proceedings to determine just compensation.
ISSUE:
WON, the proper valuation of the proper is on the basis of the
market data approach.
RULING:
NO. While the determination of just compensation is essentially
a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian
Court.
In fxing the just compensation in the present case, the trial
court, adopting the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua
relied,[25] merely put premium on the location of the property and the
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crops planted thereon which are not among the factors enumerated in
Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply the formula
provided in DAR AO 6S92, as amended. This is a clear departure from the
settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657
and the DAR issuances implementing it.
His conclusion that the market data approach conformed with
statutory and regulatory requirements is beref of basis.
LBP v. JOCSON
G.R. No. 180803 | October 23, 2009
FACTS:
The property, two (2) parcels of tenanted rice land, was placed
under the coverage of the governments Operation LEand Transfer[2] (OLET)
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27[3] and awarded to the tenantS
benefciaries by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued
the compensation therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following
the formula prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228.
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 afer
computing the 6% annual interest increment
ISSUE:
WON, the valuation of SAC is grossly exorbitant or unjustifed.
RULING:
NO. The Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657
is the relevant law for determining just compensation afer noting several
decided cases[28] where the Court found it more equitable to determine
just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of
payment. This was a clear departure from the Courts earlier stance in
Gabatin v. LEand Bank of the Philippines[29] where it declared that the
reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the time
when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function, and the Court does not fnd the SAC to have
acted capriciously or arbitrarily in setng the price at P93,657.00 per
hectare as the said amount does not appear to be grossly exorbitant or
otherwise unjustifed. For the Court notes that the SAC properly took into
account various factors such as the nature of the land, when it is irrigated,
the average harvests per hectare (expressed as AGP based on three normal
crop years) at 117.73 cavans per hectare, and the higher valuation applied
by the DAR to a similar adjacent landholding belonging to Estacion.
Petitioner itself admits that a higher land valuation formula was applied to
Estacions property because it had been acquired under R.A. No. 6657.
EUSEBIO v. LUIS
G.R. No. 162474 | October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Said
parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as
a municipal road. On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of
land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig, in Resolution
No. 93S13 dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at
P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents
requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter
as the value of their land.
ISSUE:
WON, respondents are entitled to regain possession of their
property taken by the government and, in the event that said property can
no longer be returned, how should just compensation be determined.
RULING:
NO. In Forfom, the Court held that because the landowner did
not act to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long
period of time and even negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should
be paid as just compensation, said landowner is deemed to have waived its
right and is estopped from questioning the power of the PNR to
expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised.
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to
question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980
until the early 1990s) and, when asked during trial what action they took
afer their property was taken, witness Jovito LEuis, one of the respondents,
testifed that when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we
always asked for compensation. It is likewise undisputed that what was
constructed by the city government on respondents property was a road
for public use, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering
possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation.
The Court ruled that even if there are no expropriation
proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is
still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in
Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the
appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation
for the subject property. although ascertainment of just compensation is a
judicial prerogative, the commissioners fndings may only be disregarded
or substituted with the trial courts own estimation of the propertys value
only if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive.
Verily, the determination of just compensation for property
taken for public use must be done not only for the protection of the
landowners interest but also for the good of the public. With regard to the
time as to when just compensation should be fxed, it is settled
jurisprudence that where property was taken without the beneft of
expropriation proceedings, and its owner fles an action for recovery of
possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.
CITY OF ILOILO v. CONTRERAS-BESANA
G.R. No. 168967 | February 12, 2010
FACTS:
On September 18, 1981, petitioner fled a Complaint for
eminent domain against private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana and
Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. The
complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in
Javellana’s name to be used as a school site for LEapaz High School.
Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the immediate
possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1533,8 afer it had deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the
amount of compensation. Javellana fled an Opposition to the Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Possession10 citing the same grounds he raised in
his Answer – that the city already had a vast tract of land where its existing
school site was located, and the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject
Property’s tax valuation was grossly inadequate.
ISSUE:
WON, the order of expropriation became fnal.
RULING:
YES. Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The frst phase
ends with an order of dismissal, or a determination that the property is to
be acquired for a public purpose.32 Either order will be a fnal order that
may be appealed by the aggrieved party.33 The second phase consists of
the determination of just compensation. 34 It ends with an order fxing the
amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders, being fnal, are
appealable.
Javellana did not bother to fle an appeal from the May 17,
1983 Order which granted petitioner’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession and which authorized petitioner to take immediate possession
of the Subject Property. Thus, it has become fnal, and the petitioner’s right
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to expropriate the property for a public use is no longer subject to review.
On the frst question, therefore, we rule that the trial court gravely erred in
nullifying the May 17, 1983 Order.
Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the fling of the complaint. We commiserate with the private
respondent. The school was constructed and has been in operation since
1985. Petitioner and the residents of Iloilo City have long reaped the
benefts of the property. However, nonSpayment of just compensation does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their
expropriated lot.
Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years
and did not bother to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by
the petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing to withdraw or even
verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private respondent not only
accepted the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not interested
enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end. As such, private
respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property, but is
entitled to just compensation.
REPUBLIC v. MANGOTARA
G.R. No. 170375 | July 7, 2010
FACTS:
Dona Demetria owns two parcels of land and has titles to prove
ownership. 83 years later authenticity of said ownership was still in doubt
and the government fled a case of expropriation against occupants of the
land (not really the owners, just renters). The occupants questioned the
expropriation case contending that expropriation cases can only be fled
against owners, not mere occupants, of the land. The government also fled
a case of Reversion against Dona Demetria’s heirs contending two parcels of
land were fraudulently acquired. The owners of the land questioned the
case for Reversion contending that, since they fled a case for Reconstitution
of Titles in 1914 and they still have said titles at present, the government
has no right to the land.
ISSUE:
WON, the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an
action for exropriation.
RULING:
NO. An indispensable party is a partySinSinterest without whom
no fnal determination can be had of an action. expropriation proceedings
may be instituted even when title to the property sought to be condemned
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals. The same rule provides that a complaint for
expropriation shall name as defendants all persons owning or claiming to
own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest in the property sought to be
condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the
Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation
proceedings against itself. It can still, however, fle a complaint for
expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an
expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party.
In this case, the RTCSBranch 1 did not frst require the Republic
to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the
Republic upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914
Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teoflo and LEANDTRADE, and
Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of
land subject of Civil Case No. 106 sought leave of court to fle a
Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties.
REPUBLIC v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 185091 | August 8, 2010
FACTS:
 Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Department of
Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in LEipa City,
Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of LEots 1923
and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria
Mendoza.
On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused LEots 1923 and 1925
to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots. As a result of subdivision,
the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT TS11410 and issued new titles
for LEots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. LEot 2
remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the
name of the City Government of LEipa for LEot 4.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name
of the City Government of LEipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their
right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision
plan. Further, the property had long been taxSdeclared in the name of the
City Government and PPS built signifcant, permanent improvements on
the same.
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding
that it vacate the disputed property.
ISSUE:
WON, the Mendozas are entitled to evict the Republic from the
subject property.
RULING:
NO. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended
to cede the property to the City Government of LEipa permanently. In fact,
they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes.
And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four,
the Mendozas earmarked LEot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the
City Government of LEipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that
the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government,
whether to the City Government of LEipa or to the Republic, way back but
never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about
it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession
pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of
just compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the
taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives
his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering
such property.
LBP v. LIVIOCO
G.R. No. 170685 | September 22, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Enrique LEivioco (LEivioco) was the owner of 30.6329
hectares of sugarland. LEivioco ofered his sugarland to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square
meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The voluntarySoferStoSsell (VOS)
form[8] he submitted to the DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to
residential subdivisions and to an international paper mill.
The LEBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a total of
P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. LEivioco was then promptly informed of the
valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been kept
in trust pending [his] submission of the [ownership documentary]
requirements. It appears however that LEivioco did not act upon the notice
given to him by both government agencies. On September 20, 1991, LEBP
issued a certifcation to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has
earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for LEiviocos 26
hectares.
It was only two years later that LEivioco requested for a
reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that its value had already
appreciated from the time it was frst ofered for sale. The request was
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denied by Regional Director Antonio Nuesa on the ground that there was
already a perfected sale.
ISSUE:
WON, the compensation for respondents property was
determined in accordance with law.
RULING:
NO. For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of
an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking In expropriation cases, the propertys character refers to its
actual use at the time of taking, not its potential uses. Respondent himself
admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he ofered it for sale
to DAR in 1988.
The proper approach should have been to value respondents
property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the
improvements in the Municipality of Mabalacat. Valuing the property as a
residential land (as the lower courts have done) is not the correct approach,
for reasons explained above. It would also be contrary to the social policy of
agrarian reform, which is to free the tillers of the land from the bondage of
the soil without delivering them to the new oppression of exorbitant land
valuations.
PRINCIPLE:
Just compensaton must be valued at the time of taking.
The tme of takiing is the time when the landowner was deprived of the
use and beneft of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic.
APO FRUITS v. LBP
G.R. No. 164195 | October 12, 2010
FACTS:
On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of
land acquisition and valuation of their properties from the DARs Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47
per hectare, AFCs land was valued at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property
was valued at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for
being very low. In its follow through action, the DAR requested the LEand
Bank of the Philippines (LEBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank
account and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the
petitioners then withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPIs properties were
thereafer cancelled, and new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON, the petitioners received substantial just compensation.
RULING:
NO. In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the
petitioners landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,[11] the RTC, acting
as a special agrarian court, determined the actual value of the petitioners
landholdings to be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a fnding of fact, has
subsequently been affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond question. In
eminent domain terms, this amount is the real, substantial, full and ample
compensation the government must pay to be just to the landowners.
While the LEBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62
into the petitioners accounts these amounts were mere partial payments
that only amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the
expropriated properties. We point this aspect out to show that the initial
payments made by the LEBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken,
although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any means
be considered a fair exchange of values at the time of taking; in fact, the
LEBPs actual deposit could not be said to be substantial even from the
original LEBP valuation of P251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of
the immediate taking of the landholdings but cannot be claimed as
amounts that would excuse the LEBP from the payment of interest on the
unpaid balance of the compensation due. As discussed at length below,
they were not enough to compensate the petitioners for the potential
income the landholdings could have earned for them if no immediate
taking had taken place. Under the circumstances, the State acted
oppressively and was far from just in their position to deny the petitioners
of the potential income that the immediate taking of their properties
entailed.
PRINCIPLE:
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for
public use. It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for
the States existence; it is a power the State cannot do without.
Limitatons to the power of Eminent Domain:
(1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and
(2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private
property.
ABAD v. FILHOMES REALTY
G.R. No. 189239 | November 24, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had
occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands
to vacate them. Petitioners countered that there is no possession by
tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the lots for more than 30 years
On June 30, 2004, the City of Parañaque fled expropriation
proceedings covering the lots owned by respondents before the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque with the intention of establishing a socialized
housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including
petitioners. No payment had been made to respondents for the lots
therefore they still maintain ownership.
ISSUE:
WON, there was a valid transfer of ownership in favor of the
City.
RULING:
NO. The mere issuance of a writ of possession in the
expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of
the City. Such issuance was only the frst stage in expropriation. There is
even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of
respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19
of the LEGC.
Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named
benefciaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of
expropriation proceedings does not state so.[13] Petitioners cannot thus
claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non
sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be
benefciaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied
with before they can be considered to be benefciaries.
VDA. DE OUANO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 168770 | February 9, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, LEeticia
Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the
Decision[1] dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, a suit to
compel the Republic of the Philippines and/or the MactanSCebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel
of land.
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In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs
predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the LEahug Airport in
Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with
the owners of the properties situated around the airport.
As the landowners would later claim, the government
negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase
their respective lands should the LEahug Airport expansion project do not
push through or once the LEahug Airport closes or its operations transferred
to MactanSCebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance
and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however,
including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because
the purchase price ofered was viewed as way below market, forcing the
hand of the Republic.
ISSUE:
WON, petitioners are entitled to recover their property.
RULING:
YES. It has been preponderantly established by evidence that
the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the
afected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their
respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.
In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with
their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use
the realties for the expansion of LEahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the
bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey
the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of
their properties upon a state of afairs that was not conceived nor
contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In efect, the
government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the
proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was
actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to
perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then
the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their
old properties afer the payment of the condemnation price.
It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to
oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another
citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is
ofensive to our laws.
As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek
its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just
compensation received. To be compelled to renounce dominion over a
piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner. But
to be asked to sacrifce for the common good and yield ownership to the
government which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall
be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the
power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to beneft
another with infuence and power in the political process, including
development frms. Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated
cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell,
if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc.
This provides an added dimension to abandon Fery.
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
G.R. No. 165828 | August 24, 2011
FACTS:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An
Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC
undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water fow from
the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
On November 21, 1997, the respondents, Heirs of Macabangkit,
as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters sued NPC in
the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the
alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged that
they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC
that diverted the water fow of the Agus River for the operation of the
Hydroelectric Project traversed their land; that their discovery had
occurred in 1995 afer Atty. Gandamra rejected their ofer to sell the land
because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the
proposed Arabic LEanguage Training Center and Muslims Skills Development
Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global
Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into
a housing project. AlSAmanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines
had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence
of the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been
constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of
the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an
unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing
through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them
and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
ISSUE:
WON, NPC is liable for payment of just compensation.
RULING:
YES. We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just
compensation. The action to recover just compensation from the State or
its expropriating agency difers from the action for damages. The former,
also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the
value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used
to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The action to recover just compensation is based on the
Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory
enactments. the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power
of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter
emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather
than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential
nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on
tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property
without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear
language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for
private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory
prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC
should have frst moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit
either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation
proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the
owners the fair market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act
No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such
property at the time of the taking.
The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that
NPC was liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land traversed by the underground tunnels, NPC
constructed a tunnel underneath the
land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal
expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least
informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs
construction adversely afected the owners rights and interests because
the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing
any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any
portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.
Notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and
actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for
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public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common
and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be
wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the
property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands.
As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire
land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just compensation at P500.00/square
meter based on its fnding on what the prevailing market value of the
property was at the time of the fling of the complaint, and the CA upheld
the RTC.
F. EQUAL PROTECTION – ARTICLE III, SECTION I, 1987 CONSTITUTION
1. Economic Equality
Art. II Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in naton-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.
Art. III Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Art. VIII Sec. 5. (5) The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protecton and enforcement of
consttutonal rights, pleading, practce, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practce of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplifed and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy dispositon of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantve rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain efectve unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
xxx
Art. XII Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potental energy,
fsheries, forests or tmber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the excepton of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploraton,
development, and utlizaton of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such actvites, or it may enter into co-producton, joint venture, or
producton-sharing agreements with Filipino citzens, or corporatons or
associatons at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citzens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-fve
years, renewable for not more than twenty-fve years, and under such
terms and conditons as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigaton, water supply, fsheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, benefcial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the natonns marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citzens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utlizaton of natural
resources by Filipino citzens, as well as cooperatve fsh farming, with
priority to subsistence fshermen and fshworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporatons involving either technical or fnancial assistance for large-
scale exploraton, development, and utlizaton of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditons
provided by law, based on real contributons to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientfc and technical
resources.
The President shall notfy the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its executon.
Art. XII Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendaton of the
economic and planning agency, when the natonal interest dictates,
reserve to citzens of the Philippines or to corporatons or associatons at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citzens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formaton and operaton of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the natonal
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualifed
Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its natonal jurisdicton and in accordance with its natonal goals
and priorites.
Art. XIII Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and politcal inequalites, and
remove cultural inequites by equitably difusing wealth and politcal
power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisiton, ownership, use, and
dispositon of property and its increments.
Art. XIII Sec. 2. The promoton of social justce shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunites based on freedom of
initatve and self-reliance.
Art. XIII Sec. 3. The State shall aford full protecton to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunites for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organizaton, collectve
bargaining and negotatons, and peaceful concerted actvites, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be enttled to
security of tenure, humane conditons of work, and a living wage. They
shall also partcipate in policy and decision-making processes afectng
their rights and benefts as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferental use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliaton, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relatons between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of producton
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth.
2. Politcal Equality
Art. IX-C Sec. 10. Bona fde candidates for any public ofce shall be free
from any form of harassment and discriminaton.
Art. XIII Sec. 1. (Social Justce)
3. Social Equality
Art. XIII Sec. 1. (Social Justce)
DUMLAO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245 | January 22, 1980
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FACTS:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has fled his certifcate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualifed voter and a member of
the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualifed voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifcally questions the constitutionality of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is contrary to equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the
safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classifcation. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
diferentiations, one class can be treated and regulated diferently from
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classifed diferently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions,
to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classifcation although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
In the case of a 65Syear old elective local official, who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him
from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for
in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically signifcant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision.
QUINTO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 | February 22, 2010
FACTS:
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition fled by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and
declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,[2] Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code[3] and Section 4(a) of COMELEEC Resolution No. 8678,[4] mainly on
the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
and sufer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for
public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives
and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political
arena.
ISSUE:
WON, Section 4(a) of COMELEEC Resolution 8678 is violative of
the equal protection clause.
RULING:
2009.
YES. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
upon fling of CoCs, but not considering resigned all other civil servants,
specifcally elective ones, the law duly discriminates against the frst class
(appointive officials). Applying the four requisites of valid classifcation, the
Court fnds that treatment of persons holding appointive officers a
opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
law (Requisite No. 2). There is no valid justifcation to treat appointive
officials diferently from the elective ones. The classifcation simply fails to
meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of law.
2010.
NO. Section 4(a) of COMELEEC Resolution No. 8678 is not
violative of the equal protection clause. There is substantial distinction.
Elective officials are elected by his constituents, if they are deemed
resigned, the constituents will be afected. On the other hand, in the case
of appointive officials, they do not have ordinary succession, thus, there
will be vacancy during resignation. The dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of
the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the LEegislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to
balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of
deferring to the sovereign will.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190582 | April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Incorporated in 2003, Ang LEadlad frst applied for registration
with the COMELEEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied
on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
On August 17, 2009, Ang LEadlad again fled a Petition for registration with
the COMELEEC.
Before the COMELEEC, petitioner argued that the LEGBT
community is a marginalized and underSrepresented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LEGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence;
that because of negative societal attudes, LEGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang LEadlad complied with the 8Spoint
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong BayaniSOFW LEabor Party
v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang LEadlad laid out its national membership
base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined its platorm of governance.
ISSUE:
The denial of the application of Ang LEadlad is violative of the
equal protection clause.
RULING:
YES. Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our
Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classifcation. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in
the same treatment of similar persons.
The COMELEEC posits that the majority of the Philippine
population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable,
and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed
no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEEC describes it, the asserted
state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is
not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEECs diferentiation,
and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang LEadlad cannot contribute to the
formulation of legislation that would beneft the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
partySlist system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
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situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LEGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the partySlist system on the same basis as other
marginalized and underSrepresented sectors.
PRINCIPLE:
The equal protecton clause guarantees that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.
TRILLANES v. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817 | June 27, 2008
FACTS:
On July 27 2003, 300 heavily armed military officers and enlisted
men led by the founding members of MAGDALEO surreptitiously took over
Oakwood. They publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key
national officials. Former President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio Trillanes IV was
charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defned unfer Article
134SA of the Revised Penal Code. Trillanes threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6Syear term commencing June
30, 2007.
ISSUE:
WON, there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
RULING:
NO. In arguing against maintaining double standards in the
treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he
intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed
under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at the same time, gripes
about the granting of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment
are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon
court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to
establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as
a voter in December 2006, fle his certifcate of candidacy in February 2007,
cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senatorSelect, and take his
oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turnS
around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists
on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 163583 | April 15, 2009
FACTS:
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner insists that the
assailed provisions (1) violate the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clauses of the Constitution, (2) contravene Section 19,[1] Article XII
of the Constitution on unfair competition, and (3) infringe the constitutional
provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation. Petitioner further argues
that assuming the assailed provisions are constitutional, petitioner is
entitled to a downward reclassifcation of LEucky Strike from the premiumS
priced to the highSpriced tax bracket.
Petitioner argues that the classifcation freeze provision violates
the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses because Annex D
brands are taxed based on their 1996 net retail prices while new brands are
taxed based on their present day net retail prices.
ISSUE:
WON, the law violates the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clauses.
RULING:
 NO. It has been held that in the areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classifcation that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classifcation.
In Churchill v. Concepcion,[4] we explained that a tax is uniform
when it operates with the same force and efect in every place where the
subject of it is found.[5] It does not signify an intrinsic but simply a
geographical uniformity.[6] A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it
is not intrinsically equal and uniform in its operation.[7] The uniformity
rule does not prohibit classifcation for purposes of taxation.
In the instant case, there is no question that the classifcation
freeze provision meets the geographical uniformity requirement because
the assailed law applies to all cigarette brands in the Philippines. And, for
reasons already adverted to in our August 20, 2008 Decision, the above
fourSfold test has been met in the present case.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 | August 14, 2008
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents
from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of
2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenueSgeneration capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers fled this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They
contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
ISSUE:
WON, the system of rewards and incentives violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
RULING:
NO. Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated;
it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classifed based on substantial diferences in relation to the object to be
accomplished.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classifcation,
that is, a classifcation that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is
the optimization of the revenueSgeneration capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenueS generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have
the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
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related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classifcation and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands
of equal protection.
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 163583 | April 15, 2009
*repeat (see page 13)
SORIANO v. LAGUARDIA
G.R. No. 164785 | April 29, 2009
FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10d00 p.m., petitioner, as host of
the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made some remarks. Two
days afer, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitS
complaints were lodged by Jessie LE. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),[2] against petitioner
in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC
and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.[3] Forthwith, the
MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in
relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004
episode of Ang Dating Daan.
Afer a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the
MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing
of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days.
ISSUE:
WON, the preventive suspension was violative of equal
protection under the law.
RULING:
NO. The equal protection clause demands that all persons
subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. It guards
against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile
discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself
in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing
administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he ofers no
proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to
that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action.
If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner
remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does
not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court
need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of
Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang
Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too
diferent to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of
oppressive inequality.
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951 | December 21, 2009
FACTS:
The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the
LEeague of Cities of the Philippines (LECP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and
Jerry P. Treas[8] assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[9] each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws,
hereinafer) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
ISSUE:
WON, the 16 cityhood laws are violative of the equal protection
clause.
RULING:
NO. The Court fnds that all these requisites have been met by
the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal
protection clause.
 The classifcation is also germane to the purpose of the law. The
exemption of respondent LEGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million
income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the
passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the
exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice
would be accorded respondent LEGUs. LEet it be noted that what were then
the cityhood bills covering respondent LEGUs were part and parcel of the
original 57 conversion bills fled in the 11th Congress, 33 of those became
laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the
challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the
impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal
investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the
aborted impeachment.
While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation
of a privileged class without justifcation, inherent in the equality clause is
the exhortation for the LEegislature to pass laws promoting equality or
reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a
real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt
the respondent LEGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and
eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent
municipalities and the thirtySthree (33) other municipalities whose
cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. There is, thus, no
rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement
cannot be given to respondent LEGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent
LEGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33
other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is
tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal
protection clause.
PRINCIPLE:
The fundamental right of equal protecton does not require absolute
equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and
responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does
not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual
diferences between individuals and classes.
For classifcaton to be reasonable: (Test of Reasonablenesso
(1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
CHAMBER OF REAL v. ROMULO
G.R. No. 160756 | March 9, 2010
FACTS:
petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations,
Inc. is questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act
(RA) 8424 and the revenue regulations (RRs) issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) to implement said provision and those involving
creditable withholding taxes. Petitioner assails the validity of the
imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and
creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classifed as
ordinary assets.
Section 27(E) of RA 8424 provides for MCIT on domestic
corporations and is implemented by RR 9S98. Petitioner argues that the
MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if
there is no realized gain.
ISSUE:
WON, MCIT violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
NO. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means
that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.
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The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
classifcations for purposes of taxation.[87] Inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no
constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can
be validly treated diferently from other business enterprises.
Petitioner, in insisting that its industry should be treated similarly
as manufacturing enterprises, fails to realize that what distinguishes the
real estate business from other manufacturing enterprises, for purposes of
the imposition of the CWT, is not their production processes but the prices
of their goods sold and the number of transactions involved. The income
from the sale of a real property is bigger and its frequency of transaction
limited, making it less cumbersome for the parties to comply with the
withholding tax scheme.
PRINCIPLE
Taxaton is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.[34] It is a power that is
purely legislative. Essentially, this means that in the legislature primarily
lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose),
extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. the
legislature wields the power to defne what tax shall be imposed, why it
should be imposed, how much tax shall be imposed, against whom (or
what) it shall be imposed and where it shall be imposed.
BIRAOGO v. PHIL TRUTH
G.R. No. 192935 | December 7, 2010
FACTS:
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution[6] as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graf and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and
of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator
to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President
Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of
graf and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 with the primary task to investigate reports of graf
and corruption committed by thirdSlevel public officers and employees,
their coSprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafer to submit its fnding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
WON, the Truth Commission violate the equal protection clause.
RULING:
YES. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and fnd out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graf and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence.
That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and
intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least
three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive
Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be
focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The
equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional
discrimination.

PRINCIPLE:
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and
extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. TEVES
G.R. No. 181704 | December 6, 2011
FACTSd
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria MacapagalSArroyo
signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took efect on February 11, 2005. RA
[No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenueSgeneration capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Sometime in 2008, highSranking officials of the BOC pursuant to
the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to comply with the
stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District
Performance Contracts7 (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking
officials and rankSandSfle employees to sign.
ISSUE:
WON, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s
members to equal protection of laws.
RULING:
NO. Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. the concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on diferences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions —
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classifcation and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
In Abakada the Court held, Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way
violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided
by law and only afer due process is accorded the employee. In the case of
RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors afecting the level of collection. This
standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.
DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185128 | January 30, 2012
FACTS:
Pursuant to a confdential information that petitioner was
engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido
Masnayon, afer conducting surveillance and testSbuy operation at the
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house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3
o'clock in the afernoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives
went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to
petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's
residence is a twoSstorey house and the petitioner was staying in the
second foor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and
informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they
can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run
towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with
the entrances and exits of the place.
ISSUE:
WON, the search warrant is valid.
RULING:
YES. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant ared (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifcally describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.[12] According to petitioner, there was
no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defned as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an ofense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the ofense are in the place sought to be
searched.
In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570S9S1197S24
specifcally designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the
place to be searched. Having been established that the assistance of the
barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who efected the
searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of
persons in authority.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. HYPERMIX FEEDS
G.R. No 179579 | February 1, 2012
FACTS:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO 27S2003. Under the Memorandum, for tarif purposes, wheat
was classifed according to the followingd (1) importer or consignee; (2)
country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an
exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions
and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classifed either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tarif for
food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
ISSUE:
WON, the regulation is in violation of the equal protection
clause.
RULING:
YES. The guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable classifcation. For a classifcation to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.
Unfortunately, CMO 27S2003 does not meet these requirements.
The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is afected by who imports
it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO
27S2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be
declared as feed grade wheat, a classifcation subjecting them to 7% tarif.
On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27S2003 have
imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tarif, thus
depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not
become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
In summary, petitioners violated respondents right to due
process in the issuance of CMO 27S2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise
violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when they provided
for an unreasonable classifcation in the application of the regulation.
GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267 | June 25, 2013
FACTS:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie JaypeSGarcia (private respondent)
fled, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verifed petition6
(Civil Case No. 06S797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed
to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infdelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of fnancial support.
ISSUE:
WON, R.A. 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING:
NO. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the
fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
diferences justifying the classifcation under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of diferences ... is the essence of
true equality."
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who sufer
violence and abuse. Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating
to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history
of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its
most difficult struggles was the fght against the violence of law itself. If we
keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfllment."118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
II. Requirements of Fair Procedure
A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Art. III Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and efects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge afer examinaton under
oath or afrmaton of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and partcularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Art. III Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communicaton and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violaton of this or the preceding secton
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
1. Requirements for Search Warrants
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IN RE MORALES
A.M. No. P-08-2519 | November 19, 2008
FACTS:
In an unsigned and undated letter which allege that Atty.
Morales, was consuming his working hours fling and attending to personal
cases, such as administrative cases against employees in his old sala, using
office supplies, equipment and utilities. On March 16, 2005, a spot
investigation was conducted, the team was able to access the personal
computer of Atty. Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive.
Atty. Morales's computer was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.
[2] Upon Atty. Morales's motion however, the Court ordered the release of
said computer with an order to the Management Information Systems
Office of the Supreme Court to frst retrieve the fles stored therein.
In the same spot investigation conducted by DCA De LEa Cruz on
March 16, 2005, a partly hidden plastic box was discovered containing the
amount of P65,390.00 and six commercial checks, which Siwa voluntarily
opened to the team. These were also confscated and turned over to the
custody of the OCA.
ISSUE:
WON, the evidence were confscated without a valid search and
seizure order.
RULING:
NO. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III
thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
such right. The fact that the present case is administrative in nature does
not render the above principle inoperative.
In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had
an actual intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the
opening of his personal computer and the printing of fles therefrom, in the
presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staf and some NBI agents during the March
16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales
immediately fled an administrative case against said persons questioning
the validity of the investigation, specifcally invoking his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting
standards required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court
cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him
for it violated his constitutional right.
PRINCIPLE:
There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless
search.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specifc, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.
VALID CONSENT OR WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
AGAINST OBTRUSIVE SEARCHES
(1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
PEOPLE v. NUNEZ
G.R. No. 177148 | June 30, 2009
FACTS:
At 6d00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz,
LEaguna Police Detectives in coordination with the LEos Baos Police Station
(LEBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R.
Nuez based on reports of drug possession. Before proceeding to appellants
residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain
Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving
the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellants house, Mundin called on
appellant to come out. Thereafer, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan
showed Nuez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed
appellants room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two
barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirtyS
one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and
aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610
inside appellants dresser. The group also confscated a component,
camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted
carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for
shabu.
ISSUE:
WON, there is an irregularity in the search conducted.
RULING:
YES. As a rule, only the personal properties described in the
search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In the case at bar, Search
Warrant No. 42[24] specifcally authorized the taking of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of
ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or
kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will
usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement
which would repel such inference.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the
search conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera,
component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer,
drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they
bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said
items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and
determined for themselves which items in appellants residence they
believed were proceeds of the crime or means of commitng the ofense.
This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.
PRINCIPLE:
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be
taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search
warrant SS to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fshing expedition
to confscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specifed in the search
warrant should be restored to appellant.
DEL ROSARIO v. DONATO
G.R. No. 180595 | March 5, 2010
FACTS:
On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris)
wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance in
curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City,
Pampanga. Afer doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor
Donato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confrming
the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes.
On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search
warrant to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on
March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear the application and issue the search
warrant. Respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the
warrant. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes.
ISSUE:
WON, the search warrant was valid.
RULING:
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YES. A judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described
illicit article does not of itself render the courts order unlawful. The Del
Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by
fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the
search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully
obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law.
Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was
served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith,
malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same
are mere conclusions of law.
Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the
apprehension and criminal prosecution of those reportedly appropriating
its trademark and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI
instituted a police action that included applying for a search and seizure
warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that they were storing
and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in violation of the penal provisions of
the intellectual property law.
PRINCIPLE:
When the respondent or his representative is not present during the
search, the rules require that it be done in the presence of two residents
of the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from
possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or
clandestinely.
The rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to
be residents of the premises to be searched. If this were the case,
criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other peoples
residence for storing such articles to avoid being raided and searched.
PEOPLE v. TUAN
G.R. No. 176066 | August 11, 2010
FACTS:
At around nine oclock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two
male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank LEadSing (LEadS
ing) arrived at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group) that a certain Estela Tuan had been selling
marijuana. SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and LEadS
ing. At around one oclock in the afernoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong
and LEadSing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two
informants to the accusedSappellants house. Tudlong and LEadSing entered
accusedSappellants house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent
house. Afer thirty minutes, Tudlong and LEadSing came out of accusedS
appellants house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they
bought. When the laboratory examination yielded positive results for
marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for
accusedSappellants house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and LEadSing, fled the
Application for a Search Warrant udge Cortes personally examined SPO2
Fernandez, Tudlong, and LEadSing, afer which, she issued a Search Warrant,
being satisfed of the existence of probable cause.
Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, and team
implemented the warrant. Before going to the accusedSappellants house,
SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the Search
Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one
Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accusedSappellants neighbor, to come along. The
CIDG team thereafer proceeded to accusedSappellants house. Even though
accusedSappellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into
the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accusedSappellants father, afer he
was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez
began searching the rooms on the frst foor in the presence of Magno and
Pascual. They continued their search on the second foor. They saw a
movable cabinet in accusedSappellants room, below which they found a
brick of marijuana and a frearm. At around six oclock that evening,
accusedSappellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accusedS
appellant to open a builtSin cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of
marijuana. PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confscated from
accusedSappellant[10] and a certifcation stating that the items were
confscated and recovered from the house and in accusedSappellants
presence.
ISSUE:
WON, the search warrant validly issued.
RULING:
YES. There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors
for a validly issued search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal
determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under
oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, LEadSing
and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes.
A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as
there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an ofense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the ofense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.
SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not
only on the information relayed to him by LEadSing and Tudlong. He also
arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accusedSappellant.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable efort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfes the constitutional requirement of defniteness.
In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched
in the Search Warrant was specifc enough. There was only one house
located at the stated address, which was accusedSappellants residence,
consisting of a structure with two foors and composed of several rooms.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the
Search Warrant for accusedSappellants house issued by MTCC Judge
Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue
thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accusedSappellant.
PRINCIPLE:
FACTS FOR VALEIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANTd
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not
by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
PEOPLE v. MAMARIL
G.R. No. 171980 | October 6, 2010
FACTS:
On 25 March 2003, at 9d30 oclock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis
Gotidoc, along with the members of Intel Operatives implemented Search
Warrant No. 144C dated 18 March 2003 against the appellant in her
residence. Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad
Oscar Tabamo of Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search
and seizure operation in the appellants house. With Barangay Kagawad
Tabamo, the police team presented the search warrant to appellant and
informed her of the purpose of the search and her constitutional rights.
Aferwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the
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appellants house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo.
During his search, he found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1)
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafer he
prepared a Certifcate of Good Search and Confscation Receipt which the
appellant refused to sign. The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac
Provincial Crime LEaboratory located at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for
qualitative examination. the white crystalline substance, yielded positive
results for 0.055 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and
planted the shabu inside her house because of her refusal to give them
money.
ISSUE:
WON, the search warrant was based on a probable cause.
RULING:
YES. The search warrant was based on probable cause. The
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant ared (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
and (5) the warrant specifcally describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Based on the records, the Court is convinced that the questioned
search warrant was based on a probable cause. There is no general formula
or fxed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must
be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the fndings or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination.
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly
performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination
of a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination.
PRINCIPLE:
Probable cause means such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an ofense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
ofense are in the place sought to be searched.
TAN v. SY TIONG GUE
G.R. No. 174570 | December 15, 2010
FACTS:
On March 22, 2010, respondents fled a Motion for
Reconsideration[2] wherein respondents informed this Court, that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the
Information fled in Criminal Case respondents prayed that the decision be
reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search
warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of
the criminal case.
On July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere
reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment
and which have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision.
Petitioner alleges that he also fled with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila a Complaint for Qualifed Thef against the respondents based on
the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualifed Thef be
fled with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search
warrants will be used as evidence therein.
ISSUE:
WON, there was probable cause warranting the issuance of the
search warrants for respondents (Sy Tiong Gue)
RULING:
YES. A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable
cause in connection with only one specifc ofense alleged in an application
on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of
Robbery in a separate case of Qualifed Thef, even if both cases emanated
from the same incident.
Even if an Information for Qualifed Thef be later fled on the
basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery,
petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein.
Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as
evidence in any other ofense except in that in which the subject search
warrants were issued.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information
was based on the fndings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there
was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an
essential element for the crime of Qualifed Thef, all ofenses which are
necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be fled, much
more, prosper.
TY v. DE JEMIL
G.R. No. 182147 | December 15, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation (Omni) as
per Omnis General Information Sheet[6] (GIS) dated March 6, 2004
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The case all
started when Joaquin Guevara Adarlo & Caoile LEaw Offices (JGAC LEaw
Offices) sent a letter dated March 22, 2004[7] to the NBI requesting, on
behalf of their clients Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul
Dealers Association, Inc., and Totalgaz Dealers Association, Inc., for the
surveillance, investigation, and apprehension of persons or establishments
in Pasig City that are engaged in alleged illegal trading of petroleum
products and underflling of branded LEPG cylinders in violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 33.
Agents De Jemil and Kawada attested to conducting surveillance
of Omni in the months of March and April 2004 and doing a testSbuy on
April 15, 2004. The NBIs testSbuy yielded positive results for violations of
BP 33, Section 2(a) in relation to Secs. 3(c) and 4, i.e., reflling branded LEPG
cylinders without authority; and Sec. 2(c) in relation to Sec. 4, i.e.,
underdelivery or underflling of LEPG cylinders. Thus, on April 28, 2004,
Agent De Jemil fled an Application for Search Warrant. On the same day,
the RTC issued Search Warrants which the NBI served the next day,
resulting in the seizure of several items from Omnis premises duly itemized
in the NBIs Receipt/Inventory of Property/Item Seized.
ISSUE:
WON, there was probable cause to cause the issuance of the
search warrants.
RULING:
YES. Foregoing considered, in the backdrop of the quantum of
evidence required to support a fnding of probable cause, we agree with
the appellate court and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which
conducted the preliminary investigation, that there exists probable cause
for the violation of Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended.
It must be noted that the criminal complaints, as clearly shown
in the complaintSaffidavits of Agent De Jemil, are not based solely on the
seized items pursuant to the search warrants but also on the testSbuy
earlier conducted by the NBI agents.
Petitioners cannot deny that the seized LEPG cylinders were in
the possession of Omni, found as they were inside the Omni compound.
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PRINCIPLE:
Probable cause has been defned as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief probable
cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion
but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized.
POLLO v. CONSTANTINO-DAVID
G.R. No. 181881 | October 18, 2011
FACTS:
On January 3, 2007 at around 2d30 p.m., an unsigned letterS
complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina ConstantinoS
David which was marked Confdential and sent through a courier service
(LEBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual was received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following
office practice in which documents marked Confdential are lef unopened
and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to
Chairperson David.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel
with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo
directing them to conduct an investigation and specifcally to back up all the
fles in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALED) and LEegal
divisions.
The next day, all the computers in the PALED were sealed and
secured for the purpose of preserving all the fles stored therein. Several
diskettes containing the backSup fles sourced from the hard disk of PALED
and LESD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of
the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for LEegal Afairs (OLEA). It
was found that most of the fles in the 17 diskettes containing fles copied
from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering
about 40 to 42 documents, were draf pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
ISSUE:
WON, the search conducted on his computer and the copying of
his personal fles is valid.
RULEINGd
YES. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all
searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or governmentSissued computer
which contained his personal fles. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.
Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to
prevent other employees from accessing his computer fles. On the
contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSCS
ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates
and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer
which to him seemed a trivial request.
 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner
had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
reasonable. The search of petitioners computer fles was conducted in
connection with investigation of workSrelated misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letterScomplaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSCSROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly lawyering for individuals with
pending cases in the CSC.
A search by a government employer of an employees office is
justifed at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of workSrelated
misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on
petitioners computer was justifed at its inception and scope.
2. Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizure
A. SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES
ANIAG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 104961 | October 7, 1994
FACTS:
On 26 December 1991 COMELEEC issued Resolution No. 2327
providing for the summary disqualifcation of candidates engaged in
gunrunning, using and transporting of frearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P.
Taccad, SergeantSatSArms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who
was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return
of the two (2) frearms3 issued to him by the House of Representatives.
Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staf,
petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up
the frearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to
Congress.
Meanwhile, at about fve o'clock in the afernoon of the same
day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent
Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some
twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the
policemen manning the outpost fagged down the car driven by Arellano as
it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the
frearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk
of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that
he was ordered by petitioner to get the frearms from the house and
return them to SergeantSatSArms Taccad of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
WON, the warrantless search of his car is valid.
RULING:
NO. As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not
absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of
evidence in plain view,17 as well as the search conducted at police or
military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed
that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to
if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law ofender or
that they would fnd the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched.19 The existence of
probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts
of each case.
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In the case at bench, we fnd that the checkpoint was set up
twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce
Resolution No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen
were impelled to do so because of a confdential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
frearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier,
was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that
could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying
circumstances specifcally pointing to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen
unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently,
the frearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that
time it was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEEC, driver
Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation,29 driver Arellano
being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled
the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search
conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if
there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on
Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
EPIE v. ULAT-MARREDO
G.R. No. 148117 | March 22, 2007
FACTS:
At around 2d30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an
information from a confdential agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117
at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber. SPO2 Ngina
immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1
Domingo Pulig. They then swifly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay,
Benguet. At around 4d00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted
the jeepney heading toward LEa Trinidad. They fagged it down but it did not
stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, LEa Trinidad where it
fnally halted.
The police saw fve persons inside the jeepney then loaded with
assorted vegetables, like womboc3 and chili. When SPO4 Quitoriano lifed a
womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his
companions admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The
police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong
Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged
with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
WON, there is probable cause for the warrantless search.
RULING:
YES. As a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried
through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure
constitutes derogation of a constitutional right. Here, the search involved a
moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be
conducted by peace officers.
We recall that at around 2d30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a
confdential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney
with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96,
Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP
roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the
jeepney. At around 4d00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the
vehicle. They fagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase
it until it reached Shilan, LEa Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed
several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the
required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
Where a vehicle sped away afer noticing a checkpoint and even
afer having been fagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt
to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or
that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some
ofense.
PRINCIPLE:
WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT WARRANTd
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of the evidence in plain view;
(5) search when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable
cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe
that an ofense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the ofense are in the place to be searched.
PEOPLE v. TUAZON
G.R. No. 175783 | September 3, 2007
FACTS:
In the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police Station
received through telephone, a confdential information that a Gemini car
bearing plate number PFC 411[6] would deliver an unspecifed amount of
shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo
City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen
to the area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville
Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately fagged it
down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window of said
vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as
members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel
Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan
inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to
him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said frearm.
This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As
soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw fve
plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant
allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafer immediately
brought to the police station.
The white crystalline substance confscated from appellant was
found to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
ISSUE:
WON, there is probable cause for the warrantless search.
RULING:
YES. When a vehicle is fagged down and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe prior to the search that they would fnd the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to
efect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A
confdential informer tipped them of that said car was going to deliver
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shabu at Marville Subdivision. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun
tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support
his possession of said frearm which all the more strengthened the polices
suspicion. Afer he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers
seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These
circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for
the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into
evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
PEOPLE v. MARIACOS
G.R. No. 188611 | June 16, 2010
FACTS:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police
Station of San Gabriel, LEa Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police
station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of
marijuana. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the
Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang
to conduct surveillance operation.
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2
Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger
jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned
three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said
jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in
motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked
inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney
about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted
together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who
took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few
moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue
plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught
up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them
that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
ISSUE:
WON, the warrantless search is valid.
RULING:
YES. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge afer personally determining the existence of probable cause.
it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave.
PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had
enough time to board the vehicle before the same lef for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night
before appellant’s arrest, the police received information that marijuana
was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a
checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October
27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence
Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had
probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that
search is also valid.

PRINCIPLE:
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justifed on
the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
B. SEARCH INCIDENT TO A VALID ARREST
PEOPLE v. AGULAY
G.R. No. 181747
FACTS:
On 24 August 2002, at around 6d30 in the evening, an informant
arrived at Police Station 5 and reported to the Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU) that a certain Sing had been selling shabu. A
police entrapment team was formed. PO2 Herrera was assigned as poseurS
buyer and was given a P100.00 bill, which he marked RH, his initials.
The informant pointed the target pusher to PO2 Herrera. They
approached and afer being introduced to Sing, PO2 Herrera bought shabu
using the marked P100.00 bill. Sing gave a small plastic sachet to PO2
Herrera who, thereafer, scratched his head as a signal. The other police
companions of PO2 Herrera, who were deployed nearby, then rushed to
the crime scene. PO2 Herrera grabbed Sing and then frisked him. PO2
Herrera recovered two (2) plastic sachets from Sings pocket. He also got
the marked money from Sing.
ISSUE:
WON, the arrest was valid.
RULING:
YES. A buySbust operation is a form of entrapment which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid and efective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. In a buySbust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the ofender, without anybody inducing or prodding
him to commit the ofense.
Considering that the legitimacy of the buySbust operation is
beyond question, the subsequent warrantless arrest and warrantless
search and seizure, were permissible. The search, clearly being incident to
a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity. Thus, contrary to
accusedSappellant's contention, the contraband seized from him, having
been obtained as a result of the buySbust operation to which the defense
failed to impute any irregularity, was correctly admitted in evidence.
The arrest of accusedSappellant was made in the course of an
entrapment, following a surveillance operation, normally performed by
police officers in the apprehension of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The Court so holds that in the absence of proof of any odious
intent on the part of the police operatives to falsely impute such a serious
crime, as the one imputed against accusedSappellant, it will not allow their
testimonies to be overcome by the selfSserving claim of frameSup.
CHING v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177237 | October 17, 2008
FACTS:
At around 12d00 oclock noon on 19 October 1998, while Police
Chief LEeonardo Suan was in his office at Camp Crame, Quezon City, he
received information from a confdential informant about a drug deal to be
consummated by the latter with petitioner Ching. SPO1 Cadoy was
designated as the poseurSbuyer, while SPO1 Bernardo was assigned as one
of the backSups of the former. Seven pieces of genuine one thousandSpeso
bills were prepared as marked money. The said bills were placed over the
boodle money in an attach case.
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When the informant returned, he was accompanied by Ching
who was carrying with him a green bag bearing the name Prudential Bank.
[10] The confdential informant introduced SPO1 Cadoy to Ching and told
the latter that the former wanted to buy shabu. At once, Ching requested to
see the money. SPO1 Cadoy showed the money inside the attach case. Afer
seeing the money, Ching handed the green bag to SPO1 Cadoy saying Ito na
ang tatlong kilo. SPO1 inspected the contents of the green bag which
contained three plastic packs of white crystalline substance. Convinced that
the white crystalline substances were illegal drugs, SPO1 Cadoy handed the
attach case to Ching. As soon as the money was in Chings possession, SPO1
Cadoy executed the preSarranged signal by removing his hat. . The arresting
officers brought Ching to Camp Crame where he was subjected to custodial
investigation.
ISSUE:
WON, the arrest is valid
RULING:
YES. The rule is settled that an arrest made afer an entrapment
does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless
arrest. Having established that the buySbust operation is factual and
legitimate, the subsequent warrantless arrest of Ching and as well as the
warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs was permissible
PEOPLE v. RACHO
G.R. No. 186529 | August 3, 2010
FACTS:
On May 19, 2003, a confdential agent of the police transacted
through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent
later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local
police force to apprehend the appellant. The agent gave the police
appellants name, together with his physical description. He also assured
them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11d00 a.m., appellant called up the agent
and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in
Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped TSshirt.
The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in
Baler, Aurora. At around 3d00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confdential agent pointed
to him as the person he transacted with earlier. As appellant was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police
station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the
accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
ISSUE:
WON, the arrest and the subsequent search was valid.
RULING:
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful
arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case,
we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to
arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete
defnition, it ordinarily signifes a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the ofense with which
he is charged.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even
without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would
arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to
another questiond whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable
cause to efect a valid warrantless arrest.
 The longSstanding rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually commitng, or is attempting to
commit an ofense. We fnd no cogent reason to depart from this wellS
established doctrine.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not commitng a
crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting
officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed, was commitng, or about to commit an ofense.
At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus
and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to
suspect and conclude that he was commitng or intending to commit a
crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant
would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made,
and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confscated.
PEOPLE v. ARANETA
G.R. No. 191064 | October 20, 2010
FACTS:
On July 5, 2002, between 3d00 and 3d30 oclock in the morning,
a confdential informant arrived at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit
(SDEU) the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of liveSin couple Botong and
Malou, later identifed as appellants Rolando Araneta y Abella and Marilou
Santos y Tantay.
SPO2 Zigapan designated PO2 Damasco as the poseurSbuyer
giving him a marked P100 bill to be used in the entrapment. The team
proceeded to the target area on board two vehicles. The team arrived at
the target place around 4d10 in the morning. They positioned themselves
some 20S30 meters from the alley where appellants were allegedly staying.
PO2 Damasco and the informant went near the appellants who
were standing just outside their house. The informant and appellants
exchanged greetings. Afer a short conversation, Botong went inside their
house. The informant introduced PO2 Damasco to Malou by saying, ISscore
itong kaibigan ko. Baka meron ka dyan. Malou then asked PO2 Damasco, IS
score ka na ba. Afer Malou asked PO2 Damasco, Magkano, the latter
immediately gave her the marked P100 bill.
Malou called Botong and when the latter came out, Malou
handed to him the marked money. Botong then gave Malou a plastic
sachet which she handed to PO2 Damasco. Afer examining the plastic
sachet, PO2 Damasco immediately gave the preSarranged signal to the
other members of the team who thereafer rushed to the scene. PO2
Damasco arrested Malou while SPO2 Zigapan arrested Botong.
ISSUE:
WON, the arrest was valid by virtue of a buySbust operation.
RULING:
YES. The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible.
A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a
buySbust operation and the accused were caught in fagrante delicto in
possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseurSbuyer. It was
defnitely legal for the buySbust team to arrest, and search, them on the
spot because a buySbust operation is a justifable mode of apprehending
drug pushers. A buySbust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the
operation is legal and has been proven to be an efective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken.
ONG v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 197788 | February 29, 2012
FACTS:
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PO2 Emmanuel LE. Alteza, who was then assigned at the SubS
Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially
testifed that on March 10, 2003 at around 3d00 oclock in the morning, he
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to fag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet
(sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come
inside their subSstation since the place where he fagged down the accused
is almost in front of the said subSstation; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance,
he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getng something
from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out
the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon
inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickelSlike tin or metal container about two
(2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of
scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he
asked the accused to open it; that afer the accused opened the container,
he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu
ISSUE:
WON, there was a lawful arrest where a warrantless search is
permitted.
RULING:
NO. There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was fagged
down for commitng a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for
this reason, arrested.
Under R.A. 4136, or the LEand Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of
the ofender, but the confscation of the drivers license.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court,
PO3 Alteza himself testifed that the only reason they went to the police
subSstation was that petitioner had been fagged down almost in front of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the
arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to
be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed
inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was
not immediately apparent.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While
he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however,
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
PRINCIPLE:
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an ofense. It is efected by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSON GIVING CONSENT:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning; (
8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
C. WHEN THINGS SEIZED ARE WITHIN PLAIN VIEW OF A SEARCHING
PARTY
ABENES v. CA
G.R. No. 156320 | February 14, 2007
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local
elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, through its
Company Commander Major Pedronisto Quano, created a team composed
of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in
Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban
which was then being implemented by the COMELEEC.
At about 10d30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw
FX trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team and
directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the
vehicle could not be seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer
Requejo, a member of the team, knocked on the vehicle’s window and
requested the occupants to step down for a routine inspection. Eight
occupants, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1 Requejo and
SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered frearm was tucked at the right waist
of Abenes. The frearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not
covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3
Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the frearm, and
whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by
the COMELEEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then
demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to support Abenes’
claim. He could not show any.
ISSUE:
WON, there was valid search and seizure.
RULING:
YES. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain
view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case.
The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of
the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from
which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist.
The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the
petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
PRINCIPLE:
WHEN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE APPLIES:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justifcation for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
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may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182010 | August 25, 2010
FACTS:
On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2
Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around 4d00 p.m. on December 10,
2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the
activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only
as Ryan.
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him
and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner
who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow
cigarette case what appeared to be a small heatSsealed transparent plastic
sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the
plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started
acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as
a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was
placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to fee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1
Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet
from the cigarette case.
ISSUE:
WON, the search was valid.
RULING:
YES. In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to efect a
valid search or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted.
Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of
their law enforcement eforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case,
it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it
was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her.
That petitioner reacted by attempting to fee afer he introduced himself as
a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the
more pricked his curiosity.
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious
conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him.
The Court fnds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid stopSandSfrisk operation. The search/seizure of the
suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession S later voluntarily
exhibited to the police operative S was undertaken afer she was
interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and afer PO1
Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time
of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact
attempted to fee afer the police officer had identifed himself.
PRINCIPLE:
DUAL PURPOSE OF STOP-AND-FRISK:
(1) the general interest of efective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfSpreservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.[
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 191366 | December 13, 2010
FACTS:
On September 2, 2006, at around 12d45 oclock in the afernoon,
PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along
Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the
precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales. pon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1
Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon
inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw
accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and
immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales,
Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R.
Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police.
In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue),
pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
ISSUE:
WON, the arrest is lawful.
RULING:
NO. This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which
require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the
constitutional guarantee.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was
illegal and the subject items were confscated as an incident thereof.
According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit[13] with
PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot
session was going on in said house. Although this Court has ruled in several
dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is sufficient probable cause
to efect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the case at
bench because said cases involve either a buySbust operation or drugs in
transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as
basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers
entering a house without warrant to efect arrest and seizure based solely
on an informers tip.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests
without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of commitng an ofense, is based on actual facts, that is,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
D. STOP AND FRISK
POSADAS v. CA
G.R. No. 89139 | August 2, 1990
FACTS:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10d00 o'clock in the morning Pat.
Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated
National Police, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street,
Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial
Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him
to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identifed themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to fee but his attempt to get
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away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. hey then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .
38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two (2)
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the
police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess
frearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.
ISSUE:
WON, the warrantless search is valid.
RULING:
YES. The law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be
efected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually commitng,
or is attempting to commit an ofense; or when an ofense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person arrested has committed it.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to fee with the buri bag there was a probable
cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the
bag in the possession of the petitioner only afer they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
PEOPLE v. MENGOTE
G.R. No. 87059 | June 22, 1992
FACTS:
Before noon of August 8, 1987, afer the Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspiciousSlooking persons at the corner of Juan LEuna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place. they there saw two men "looking from
side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached
these persons and identifed themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who
turned out to be the accusedSappellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith
and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion,
later identifed as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front
right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by
the Intelligence Division.
ISSUE:
WON, the arrest is lawful.
RULING.
NO. At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedSappellant
was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
ofense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at
least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setng of the arrest
made them less so, if at all. It might have been diferent if Mengote bad
been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no
reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11d30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly afer
alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking
in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of
the noonday sun.
 MANALILI v. CA
G.R. No. 113447 | October 9, 1997
FACTS:
At about 2d10 oclock in the afernoon of April 11, 1988,
policemen from the AntiSNarcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station
were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery because of an information that drug
addicts were roaming the area.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen
alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front
of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached
him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person
tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see
what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and
allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the
wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
ISSUE:
WON, the search was valid.
RULING:
YES. StopSandSfrisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions
observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was
wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according
to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the AntiSNarcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession
ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182010 | August 25, 2010
*repeat (see page 22)
E. EXPRESS WAIVER
VEROY v. LAYAGUE
G.R. No. L-95630 | June 18, 1992
FACTSd
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol
Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom
Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners in
Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help
of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not
present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. LEuisa was
contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to
ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being
used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma.
LEuisa Veroy responded that she is fying to Davao City to witness the search
but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of
Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long
time family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. LEuisa Veroy
was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma.
LEuisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the
permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his
presence.
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The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the
house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search
pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. LEuisa Veroy. The
caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted
to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen.
However, a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed
to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt.
Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and
conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a
magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an
unlocked drawer. Three (3) halfSfull jute sacks containing printed materials
of RAMSSFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the
children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing
assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short
sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel
made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a
book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of
the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines
and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. LEeo
Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt
of the articles seized, in the house.
ISSUEd
WON, the petitioners validly waived their rights against
warrantless search and seizure.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and efects against unreasonable
searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto
ared (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle;
and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view.
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason
for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being
used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt.
Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house
because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not
present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search
warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather
contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was
indeed granted by Ma. LEuisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain
the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable
that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did
not.
A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary
principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the
criminal action against them for illegal possession of frearms.
PEOPLE v. NUEVAS
G.R. No. 170233 | February 22, 2007
FACTS:
PO3 Teoflo B. Fami (Fami) testifed that in the morning of 27
September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a
stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking. They had
received information that a certain male person, more or less 54 in height,
25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually
wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana
dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who ft the
description, carrying a plastic bag, later identifed as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas),
alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that
they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas
answered arrogantly but aferwards, calmed down. Nuevas informed him
that there were other stuf in the possession of a certain Vangie, an
associate, and two other male persons. LEater on, Nuevas voluntarily
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his
bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male
persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less fve
(5) kilos.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to
Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was
where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From
there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National
Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light
blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to
Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.
ISSUE:
1. WON, there is a valid waiver for the warrantless search on
the part of Nuevas.
2. WON, there is a valid waiver for the warrantless search on
the part Din and Inocencio.
RULING:
1. YES. Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves
cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more
specifcally, as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not
lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it
must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was
unequivocal, specifc, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly
submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police
officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself
from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them
the plastic bag and even revealed his associates, ofering himself as an
informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human
inclination to fnd excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the cost
of others lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction
had he not withdrawn his appeal.
2. NO. In the case of Din, the Court fnds that no such consent
had actually been given The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar
testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the bag. This
already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Dins submission of
the plastic bag. There was no mention of any permission made by the
police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for
the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in cases where the Court
upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities expressly
asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be
searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and
positive proof.
PRINCIPLE:
FUNDAMENTALS TO CONSTITUTE A WAIVER:
(1) the right exists;
(2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
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PEOPLE v. DEQUINA
G.R. No. 177570 | January 19, 2011
FACTS:
at about 6d00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he and SPO1
Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief Inspector Romulo
Sapitula to proceed at the corner of Juan LEuna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo,
Manila, where, according to the report three persons a male and two
female[s] would be coming from Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of
marijuana. In no time, they arrived at the designated place and parked their
mobile patrol car along Juan LEuna Street.
At around 9d00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming From it
emerged three passengers a man and two women each one of them
carrying a black travelling bag. As the trio ftted the descriptions given to
them by Inspector Sapitula, they intently watched and monitored their
movements. As the patrol car got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its
presence. She started walking in a more hurried pace (parang walkathon) as
if she wanted to run away (parang patakbo). While thus trying to get away,
[Dequina] dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the zipper of the
bag gave way. Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags
case into view. Suspecting the stufs to be marijuana, they further inspected
the other two bags in the possession of [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] and found
out that they had the same contents. While in transit, [Dequina] pleaded to
them to allow her to make a call but they did not heed the request as the
car was still in motion.
ISSUE:
WON, the warrantless seizure was lawful.
RULING:
YES. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and efects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as
followsd (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest,
accusedSappellants were caught in fagrante carrying/transporting dried
marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco
need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content
because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked
briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag,
causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein.
Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accusedSappellants,
their warrantless arrest was legally justifed, and the following warrantless
search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful
arrest.
PEOPLE v. UYBOCO
G.R. No. 178039 | January 19, 2011
FACTS:
At around 10d30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her
wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were riding in the
Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan).
Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped of Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M.
Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid
Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian
Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a
tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in
police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of hitng the son of a
Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when
the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to
the stainless jeep while the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car. The
tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while
Jeson Kevin was sitng on the tomboys lap. They were brought to a house
in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque.
While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out
of the car and place a call to the secretary of her employer to inform the
latter that they were in Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car
undetected and afer a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from
the car and they were locked inside the comfort room.
At 6d00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the
ransom to P10 Million.[13] That night, Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson
when two men handed the telephone to her. She recognized one of them
as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office
sometime in the frst week of December 1993.
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers
called up Jepson numerous times to negotiate for the ransom. In one of
those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he
had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for
at least a hundred times during a span of two to four years.
On 11d30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested
appellant to deliver the ransom money to the kidnappers. Appellant
acceded to the request. He asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to
accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati
area and wait for further instructions. Appellant called up Jepson who told
him that he would deliver the money to appellant once instructions were
given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers fnally called and asked appellant
to proceed to Shell Gasoline StationSMagallanes. He informed Jepson of
this fact and the latter asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes
Commercial Center where he would just put the money inside the car
trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepsons car
and put it inside his car trunk and proceeded to Shell Gasoline station.[30]
Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepsons children at
the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him.
They then decided to go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7d00
p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him because
they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there
were many policemen stationed in the area, which prompted them to
release the victims. Appellant lef his office at around 7d20 p.m. to go
home in Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about ten (10) meters
away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path. He saw P/Supt.
Cruz, a certain LEt. Rodica and two other men alight from the car and were
heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him with their
frearms.
ISSUE:
WON, the warrantless search is lawful.
RULING:
YES. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the paySof for a number of hours long enough for them to be
informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is
equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
LEikewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was
legal because the latter consented to such search as testifed by P/Supt.
Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police
to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident
to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
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In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's
reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the
area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
F. SEARCH OF WAREHOUSE IN VIOLATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF
CODE OR TO ENFORCE CUSTOMS LAWS.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. OGARIO
G.R. No. 138081 | March 30, 2000
FACTS:
On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of
Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention[1] of 25,000
bags of rice, bearing the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped
on board the M/V "Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City.
The warrant was issued on the basis of the report of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had
been illegally imported. The report stated that the rice was landed in
Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN,
Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel
M/V "Alberto."
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the
consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer, respondent Elson Ogario, fled
a complaint for injunction.
ISSUE:
WON, the customs has the power to efect customs searches,
seizures, or arrests.
RULING:
YES. Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals
that regular courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of
probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the
articles under Customs jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture
proceedings."[11] They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the
question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject
sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine.The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the
articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be
shipped abroad before they may exercise the power to efect customs
searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the
administrative hearings.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals, There is no question that Regional
Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitng in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are
precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through
petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
RIETA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147817 | August 12, 2004
FACTS:
On October 12, 1979, Col. Panflo LEacson, the[n] Chief of the
Police Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group
(MISG for brevity), received information that certain syndicated groups
were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It
was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at nightme and
the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being
escorted by some police and military personnel. He felded three
surveillance stakeSout teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard and
Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they were to watch out for a
cargo truck with Plate No. TSSYS167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out
of it. On the basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck
was registered in the name of Teresita Estacio
At around 9d00 oclock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col.
LEacson and his men returned to the same area, with Col. LEacson posting
himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port
Area, Manila, because as per information given to him, the said cargo truck
will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC
stands for Constabulary OfSShore AntiSCrime Battalion. The night watch
lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About 3d00 a.m. an
Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It
returned before 4d00 a.m. of [the] same day.
When the cargo truck with Plate No. TSSYS167 was searched,
305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The cargo
truck driver known only as Boy was able to escape while the other
passengers or riders of said truck were apprehended, LEacsons men hauled
the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men and confscated goods to Camp
Crame, Quezon City. All the 371 cases (305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes
were turned over to the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE:
WON, the search, seizure and arrest without warrant is lawful.
RULING:
YES.
Under the Tarif and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest
may be made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs
and tarif laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial
warrant, the Code specifcally allows police authorities to enter, pass
through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is
not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel
or aircraf and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on
board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to
have been introduced into the country in violation of customs laws, is one
of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions.
SALVADOR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 146706 | July 15, 2005
FACTS:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special
Operations Squadron conducted routine surveillance operations at the
Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and
smuggling being facilitated by certain PALE personnel.
At 12d15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported
that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had
disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an
airplane tow truck with its lights of. The PAF surveillance team promptly
boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraf tow truck. At the LEima
Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck.
Sgt. Teves then got of, identifed himself and asked the four (4) persons on
board to alight.
He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing a
girdle. While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in
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brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the package contained smuggled
items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, Positivee Thereupon, the rest of
the team surrounded petitioner and his two coSaccused who surrendered
without a fght. The team searched their bodies and found that the three
were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets
wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded fve (5) packets, while
petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confscated the packets
and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.
One of the packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable
goods, she proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the
accused. She then prepared an inventory of the items seized and listed the
weight of the packets.[4] Thereafer, she brought the seized packets to the
InSBoard Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where their contents
were identifed and appraised. The Bureau of Customs found 248 pieces of
assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries
ISSUE:
WON, there was probable cause for the search and arrest.
RULING:
YES. As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law
enforcers to a persons body, personal efects or residence, unless the same
are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in compliance with
the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The
above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but
only such as are unreasonable.
It should be noted that during the incident in question, the
special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance
operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PALE
personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by
the PAF team on petitioner and his coSaccused was in the nature of a
customs search. As such, the team properly efected the search and seizure
without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the
customs law.
we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his coS
accused were on board a moving PALE aircraf tow truck. As stated earlier,
the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy
to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search
is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in a mobile
ship, aircraf or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[14] Verily, we
rule that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that
the articles involved in the instant controversy were validly seized by the
authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence
against petitioner and his coSaccused.
G. EXIGENCY
PEOPLE v. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 102009-10 | July 6, 1994
FACTS:
In the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of
the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was
on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November
30, 1989 at around 10d00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied
by elements of the RAMSSFP as a communication command post.
A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the
onSgoing bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. Afer a while, a group of fve
men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of
the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in
front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to
start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six
meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fred at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right
thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they
sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the crossSfre.
As a consequence, at around 6d30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a
searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to fnd and
confscate six cartons of MS16 ammunition, fve bundles of CS4 dynamites,
MSshells of diferent calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the
rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia was the only person
then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col.
Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested
appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors
at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written
in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering
that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces
and there was simultaneous fring within the vicinity of the Eurocar office,
aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
ISSUE:
WON, there was a valid search and seizure.
RULING:
YES. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15
The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office
was being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there
was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance
team was fred at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office
is obviously not a gun store and it is defnitely not an armory or arsenal
which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of
an unusual quantity of highSpowered frearms and explosives could not be
justifably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos
and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense fring within
the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was
under attack by rebel forces.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion
that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the frst place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground
to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently
more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
H. SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY PRIVATE PERSONS
PEOPLE v. MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 | January 18, 1991
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his commonSlaw wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex carrying with them four (4) gif
wrapped packages. . The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was
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sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant flled up
the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifs to his
friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer
insisted on inspecting the packages.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for fnal
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles,
he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of
the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof. Dried marijuana leaves were
found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to
locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport
being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from
the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his
mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried
leaves were marijuana fowering tops as certifed by the forensic chemist.
ISSUE:
WON, appellant may invoke the violation of unlawful search and
seizure against private persons.
RULING:
NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. The case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and
seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate
that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable
and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Customs or the Bureau of Posts
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be frst secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative
of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION v. NLRC
G.R. No. 113271 | October 16, 1997
FACTS:
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from
WATEROUS Vice PresidentSGeneral Manager Emma R. Co warning her not
to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters accounts
because the same was a prohibited practice.
Verifcation was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy
and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The
undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied
having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon
conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confrmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by
Ms. Catolico.
Forthwith, in her memorandum[11] dated 31 January 1990, Co
asked Catolico to explain, within twentySfour hours, her side of the
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation,[12] and she was granted a 48Shour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
efective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.
ISSUE:
WON, the evidence against respondent is violates her
constitutional rights.
RULING:
NO. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is
not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
PEOPLE v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 109279 | January 18, 1999
FACTS:
On November 11, 1988, accusedSappellant, his wife Cecilia
Mendoza, and their then 10SyearSold daughter attended the birthday party
of a relative of accusedSappellant held at McDonald's in Harrison Plaza.
While the party was going on, accusedSappellant let and proceeded to
Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had some beer. When it was
time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not fnd accusedS
appellant, hence, they decided to just leave.
At about 9 o'clock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine lef
Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the gate of the subdivision where they
live, they saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilia's godSdaughter, and
they hitched a ride home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked
in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house were on but the
screen door was locked. A moment later, however, accusedSappellant
opened the back door and mother and daughter went straight to the
master's bedroom
While inside the master's bedroom, accusedSappellant who was
drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to douse him.
Thereafer, Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out of her
room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the foor of their living
room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accusedSappellant hiding a gun
under the bed in her parents' room. The victim bled to death on the foor.
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Cecilia's father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his
daughter's death, and that valuables were being taken out of his daughter's
house, decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of
property therein, including accusedSappellant's personal efects.
ISSUE:
WON, the rights of accusedSappellant against unreasonable
search and seizure was violated.
RULING:
NO. The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such rights
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies.
this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person
from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order
were discovered by accusedSappellant's fatherSinSlaw Alipio Eusebio, a
private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accusedSappellant's claim that he was
licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol, the certifcation of
Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, LEegal and Research Branch of
the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that
accusedSappellant is not a licensed fream holder of any kind.
PEOPLE v. BONGCAWARAN
G.R. No. 143944 | July 11, 2002
FACTS:
On March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of
Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from
passenger LEorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of
her coSpassengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other
members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section.[4] The suspect was
identifed as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed
of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his
consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his
baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to
the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the
suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took
pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. the Philippine
Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized itemsSS
the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight (8) small plastic packs of
white crystalline substance.[7] When asked about the contraband articles,
the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican Alex
Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan City.[8] The
accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to
the Presidential AntiSOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
ISSUE:
WON, the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure of the accusedSappellant was violated.
RULING:
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this
Court in the case of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the absence of governmental
interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accusedSappellant was
searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only afer they found
shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband
items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and
hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accusedSappellant
that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel
should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like
the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order.
The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does
not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of
the law.
I. AIRPORT SECURITY
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
G.R. No. 138881 | December 18, 2000
FACTS:
On June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aboveSnamed
Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons
family in Calamba, LEaguna. She was due to fy back to the United States on
July 26. At around 7d30 p.m. of June 26, 1998, Olivia Ramirez was on duty
as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. When she frisked
accusedSappellant LEeila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the
United States via Continental Airlines CSS912, she felt something hard on
the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she
needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation
as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.
She was directed to take accusedSappellant to the nearest
womens room for inspection. Inside the womens room, accusedSappellant
was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
accusedSappellant gave the same answer she had previously given.
Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. AccusedS
appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over
to Embile. The confscated packs, marked as Exhibits CS1, CS2 and CS3,
contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI
Chemist George de LEara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
ISSUE:
WON, the constitutional rights of the accused was violated.
RULING:
NO. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
refecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit
in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraf routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carrySon baggage as well as checked luggage are
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routinely subjected to xSray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches
are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are ofen notifed through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against the accusedSappellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justifed since it was efected
upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in fagrante delicto.
PEOPLE v. CANTON
G.R. No. 148825 | December 27, 2002
FACTSd
on 12 February 1998, at about 1d30 p.m., SUSAN was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger
bound for Saigon, Vietnam.[2] When she passed through the metal detector
booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee
of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and
the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying Excuse me
maam, can I search you?[3] Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of
SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the package
contained what felt like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she
felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked
SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and saidd Money,
money only. Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los
Reyes, her supervisor on duty.
Mylene and LEorna discovered three packages individually
wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily
handed to them. The frst was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the
second, from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh.
Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes.
ISSUE:
WON, the warrantless search and arrest was constitutional.
RULING:
YES. The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures
is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are
(1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing
through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on
the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs abdomen. The
strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were
the packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was
deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest.
Prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport security
personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body;
hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was
only afer the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the
white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be
shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to
have been done incidental to a lawful arrest.
 In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 6235
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in
Annex D of her Brief, the aforeSquoted provision is stated in the Notice to
All Passengers located at the fnal security checkpoint at the departure
lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the
Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to
search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, afer the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented
to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It
was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the
discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled
by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the
packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that
SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No.
6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the
action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into
the aircraf and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby
depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to
further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and inefectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment
of society.[28] Thus, the strip search in the ladies room was justifed under
the circumstances.
PRINCIPLE:
The Terry search or the stop and friski situaton refers to a case where a
police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the
general interest of efective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he
could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
J. JAIL SAFETY
PEOPLE v. CONDE
G.R. No. 113269 | April 10, 2001
FACTS:
Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three
companions approached and stabbed the Indians. He later identifed the
other two assailants as Alejandro Perez, Jr., and Allan Atis. He also saw
Allan Atis take the goods 3 which were being sold by the two Indians on
installment. Afer the stabbing, the four men fed from the crime scene
towards Mabolo Street. The fourth assailant remained unidentifed.
Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away from the place where the crime
was committed.
On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three accused. Police
recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare,
Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to the accused. These
weapons were discovered inside her bag afer a routine inspection.
Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest
when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant
when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house of
a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items.
ISSUE:
WON, the search of the bag of Macabre while visiting her
detainee husband is lawful.
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RULING:
On the other hand, we fnd in order the search of the bag of
Felicidad Macabare, at the time she was visiting her husband who was a
detainee. PO3 Sevillano testifed, this search is part of police standard
operating procedure, 42 and is recognized as part of precautionary
measures by the police to safeguard the safety of the detainees as well as
the overSall security of the jail premises.
3. Consttutonality of Checkipoints and nAreal Target Zonings “
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988 | September 29, 1989
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to LEetter of Instruction 02/87 of
the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an efective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and
of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their
cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and checkSups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the beneft of a search warrant
and/or court order.
ISSUE:
WON, the checkpoints violate the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fxed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts
of each case.
The setng up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable
the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing efective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the beneft of the public. Checkpoints
may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shif to urban centers and their suburbs of
the insurgency movement, so clearly refected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed frearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most
likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum
up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988 | May 24, 1990
FACTS:
 In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners'
petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as
unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON, all checkpoints are legal.
RULING:
NO. nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize
all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the
Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government
is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave
peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifes a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is
a lawSofender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments
of some ofense.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a
checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but
subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority
act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally
and civilly for their abusive acts.
PRINCIPLE:
A warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival
and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not
constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest,
safety, and necessity.
PEOPLE v. EXALA
G.R. No. 76005 | April 23, 1993
FACTS:
On 2 November 1982, at about 8d15 in the evening, a private
jeep driven by accusedSappellant Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped at a
police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding unlicensed
frearms and other prohibited items. A member of the inspection team
went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were frearms inside.
They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the
vehicle by beaming a fashlight inside. He noticed a black leather bag
measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long with its sides
bulging. He asked what it contained. Nobody answered. Instead, the three
(3) accused suddenly became fdgety. Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened.
He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana,
napakaraming marijuanae" At this juncture, the three (3) remained
motionless in their seats and appeared petrifed with fear. They were
brought to the police station that same night for further investigation.
ISSUE:
WON, the evidence seized without a valid search warrant is
admissible.
RULING:
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be
efected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. The checkpoint
in the instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the
main object of which was to search for unlicensed frearms and other
prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing
through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the
checkpoint, it was fagged down and the occupants were asked routine
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questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the
sides of which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were.
None of the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the
accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they
were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared
to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if
not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal,
provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led to
the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuf.
Signifcantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search.
The accused remained silent even afer their arrest.
Their submissive stance afer the discovery of the bag of
marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when
arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence but
also confrms their acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was
waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was
made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There
was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was
committed.
GUAZON v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 80508 | January 30, 1990
FACTS:
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age,
bona fde residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their
respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or
general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their
human rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities. They
claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests
and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before this
Court."
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or
saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police
as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7)
persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand fve hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3
during the drive at LEower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that
the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses.
ISSUE:
WON, the search through areal target zonings is violative of the
Constitution.
RULEINGd
YES. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the
police or military may go in force to the combat areas, enter afected
residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the
mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and
respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or criminal activity
similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been
no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested.
There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the
"areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low
income families are fully protected.
ABENES v. CA
G.R. No. 156320 | February 14, 2007
*repeat (see page 21)
4. Wire Tapping
 R.A. No. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER
RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the partes to any private communicaton or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communicaton or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a partcipant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communicaton or spoken word secured
either before or afer the efectve date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writng, or to furnish transcriptons thereof, whether complete or partal,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investgaton or trial of ofenses
mentoned in secton 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibiton.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the
preceding secton or who violates the provisions of the following secton
or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such
violaton shall, upon convicton thereof, be punished by imprisonment for
not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualifcaton from public ofce if the
ofender be a public ofcial at the tme of the commission of the ofense,
and, if the ofender is an alien he shall be subject to deportaton
proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it
unlawful or punishable for any peace ofcer, who is authorized by a
written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding sectons in cases involving the crimes of
treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, incitng to rebellion, sediton, conspiracy to commit sediton,
incitng to sediton, kidnapping as defned by the Revised Penal Code,
and violatons of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and
other ofenses against natonal security: Provided, That such written
order shall only be issued or granted upon written applicaton and the
examinaton under oath or afrmaton of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has
been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed:
Provided, however, That in cases involving the ofenses of rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, incitng to rebellion,
sediton, conspiracy to commit sediton, and incitng to sediton, such
authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts
of sediton, as the case may be, have actually been or are being
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essental to the convicton of any person for, or
to the soluton of, or to the preventon of, any of such crimes; and (3)
that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identty of the person or
persons whose communicatons, conversatons, discussions, or spoken
words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communicatons, the telegraph line or the
telephone number involved and its locaton; (2) the identty of the peace
ofcer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communicatons,
conversatons, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the ofense or ofenses
committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the
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authorizaton. The authorizaton shall be efectve for the period
specifed in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the
date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court
upon being satsfed that such extension or renewal is in the public
interest.
All recordings made under court authorizaton shall, within forty-eight
hours afer the expiraton of the period fxed in the order, be deposited
with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be
accompanied by an afdavit of the peace ofcer granted such authority
statng the number of recordings made, the dates and tmes covered by
each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the
deposit, and certfying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any
part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or
copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court.
The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the
recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed,
except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon
moton, with due notce and opportunity to be heard to the person or
persons whose conversaton or communicatons have been recorded.
The court referred to in this secton shall be understood to mean the
Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdicton the acts for
which authority is applied for are to be executed.
Section 4. Any communicaton or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, efect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any informaton therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violaton of the preceding sectons of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislatve or
administratve hearing or investgaton.
GAANAN v. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986
FACTS:
On October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
which they fled. Afer they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to LEaconico . That same morning,
LEaconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. LEeon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called up, LEaconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension
so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Appellant heard complainant enumerate conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault. Twenty minutes later, complainant called up
again to ask LEaconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. LEaconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told LEaconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.
Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and LEaconico with
violation of the AntiSWiretapping Act.
ISSUE:
WON, petitioner is in violation of the AntiSWiretapping Act.
RULING:
NO. The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others
of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common
especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by
wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within
a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the
party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a
party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category
as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was
not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary
office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine
the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fxing the meaning of
any of its parts.
5. What May Be Seized
RULE 126, Sec. 2
xxx
Section 2. Court where applicaton for search warrant shall be fled. —
An applicaton for search warrant shall be fled with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdicton a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the applicaton, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal acton has already been fled, the applicaton
shall only be made in the court where the criminal acton is pending.
xxx
6. Remedies in Cases of Violaton
A. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Article III, Sec. 3(2)
(2) Any evidence obtained in violaton of this or the preceding secton
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in
the contested warrants.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice
or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the soScalled
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times
of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is
likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to
be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objectived the elimination of general warrants.
PASTRANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104504 | October 31, 1997
FACTS:
On February 13, 1989, a group of students went to see Capt.
Rodolfo Maoza, then intelligence operations officer of the Philippine
Constabulary. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his
father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but
expressed fear of the petitioner who, according to them, had frearms.
Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the victim of foul
play.
On February 20, 1989, two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his
estranged wife S James Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton Steve G. Pastrano S
also saw Capt. Maoza, seeking his assistance in connection with the death
of their brother Clyde. The brothers reported that their father and his
commonSlaw wife were keeping unlicensed frearms in their house. They
executed a joint affidavit on February 20, 1989 in which they stated that
they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito Pastrano
was keeping three (3) frearms of diferent calibers in the bedroom of his
house. On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza
applied for a search warrant on the same day.

STONEHILL v. DIOKNO ISSUE:

G.R. No. 19550 | June 19, 1967 WON, the Search Warrant issued is valid.
RULING:
FACTS:
YES. Trial court actually examined the two brothers, James
Respondent Judges issued on diferent dates a total of 42
Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton G. Steve Pastrano. These two were the
search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they
ones who reported the matter to Capt. Maoza. They gave information of the
were officers, directed to the peace officer, to search the person aboveS
illegal possession of frearms by their father, petitioner herein, on the basis
names and the premises of their offices, warehouses and residences, and
of personal knowledge. Their testimonies, not that of Capt. Maoza, formed
to seize and take possession of the following personal propertyd Books of
the basis of the trial courts fnding of probable cause for the issuance of a
accounts, fnancial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
search warrant.
journals, portolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and proft and loss statements and Bobbins B. CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
(cigarette wrappers). As the subject of the ofense; stolen or embezzled New Civil Code
and proceeds or fruits of the ofense or used or intended to be used as the
means of commitng the ofensec which is described in the applications Article 32. Any public ofcer or employee, or any private individual, who
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank LEaws, Tarif and Customs
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
LEaws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." impedes or impairs any of the following rights and libertes of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
ISSUE:
WON, the search warrants are null and void.
(1) Freedom of religion;
RULING: (2) Freedom of speech;
YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with this
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publicaton;
constitutional mandate, namelyd (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detenton;
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
(5) Freedom of sufrage;
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the

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(6) The right against deprivaton of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensaton when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) The right to the equal protecton of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and efects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communicaton and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associatons or societes for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petton the
Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusaton against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fnes, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
which has not been judicially declared unconsttutonal; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this artcle, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission consttutes a criminal ofense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entrely separate and distnct civil
acton for damages, and for other relief. Such civil acton shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecuton (if the latter be insttuted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his act or omission consttutes a violaton of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.
ABERCA v. VER
G.R. No. L-69866 | April 15, 1988
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and
other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintifs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task
Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct preS
emptive strikes against known communistSterrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in
Metro Manila. Plaintifs allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintifs; that plaintifs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period afer their arrest, they
were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintifs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military
men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintifs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to
forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintifs
and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
On November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court issued a
resolution granting the motion to dismiss. the defendants' contention (3)
that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since
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there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint
confscated plaintifs' purely personal properties in violation of their
constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and
maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct
supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious
liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior
be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to
the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
RULING:
YES. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly'
or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General
Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo LEantoria,
Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panflo LEacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst LEt.
Pedro Tango, LEt. Romeo Ricardo and LEt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of
their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone
'have been specifcally mentioned and Identifed to have allegedly caused
injuries on the persons of some of the plaintif which acts of alleged
physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of
action. But such fnding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord
with law and jurisprudence.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect,
is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and
jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the
complaint.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to
provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined
in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. It is necessary to remind ourselves that certain
basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrifced to the
transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law
must prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does
not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded
from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
FORBES v. CHUOCO TIACO
G.R. No. L-6157 | July 30, 1910
FACTS:
That on the 1st of April, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco (alias
Choa Tea) fled a suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
against the plaintifs in which substantially the following allegations and
petition were made, alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under the
orders of the said W. Cameron Forbes, GovernorSGeneral of the Philippine
Islands, he was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, by the
aforesaid J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the
police and of the secret service, respectively, of the city of Manila, and that
having been able to return to these Islands he feared, as it was threatened,
that he should be again deported by the said defendants, concluding with a
petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued against the plaintifs
in this case prohibiting them from deporting the defendant, Chuoco Tiaco
(alias Choa Tea), and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an
indemnity.
ISSUE:
WON, the political rights of aliens are protected by due process
of law.
RULING:
NO. The political rights of aliens is not governed by that “due
process of lawc which governs in dealing with their civil rights. The
certifcate of admission is a mere license and may be revoked at any time.
An alien’s right to remain in the territory of a foreign government is purely
a political one and may be terminated at the will of such government. No
cases have been found, and it is confdently asserted that there are none,
which establish a contrary doctrine.
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fne not exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public ofcer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his
authority or use unnecessary severity in executng the same.
Article 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon a public ofcer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper,
shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in
the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default,
without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.

It may be argued, that the present action is one to recover

damages against the Governor and the others mentioned in the cause, for
the illegal acts performed by them, and not an action for the purpose of in
any way controlling or restraining or interfering with their political or
discretionary duties. No one can be held legally responsible in damages or
otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the
law, to do. Therefore, if the GovernorSGeneral had authority, under the law,
to deport or expel the defendants, and the circumstances justifying the
deportation and the method of carrying it out are lef to him, then he can
not be held liable for damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if
the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the
purpose of controlling or interfering with the exercise of the political
powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it
must follow that the courts can not intervene for the purpose of declaring
that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority.

If it be true that the Government of the Philippine Islands is a

government invested with "all the military, civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands until otherwise provided by
Congress" and that the GovernorSGeneral is invested with certain
important political duties and powers, in the exercise of which he may use
his own discretion, and is accountable only to his superiors in his political
character and to his own conscience, and without authority to interfere in
the control of such powers, for any purpose, then it must follow that the
courts can not take jurisdiction in any case against him which has for its
purpose the declaration that such acts are illegal and that he is, in
consequence, liable for damages. To allow such an action would, in the lost
efective way possible, subject the executive and political departments of
the Government to the absolute control of the judiciary. Of course, it will
be observed that we are here treating only with the political and purely
executive duties in dealing with the political rights of aliens. The
conclusions herein reached should not be extended to cases where vested
rights are involved. That question must be lef for future consideration.

C. CRIMINAL CASES UNDER REVISED PENAL CODE

Section Two. - Violttion of domiicile

Article 128. Violaton of domicile. - The penalty of prision correccional in

its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public ofcer or employee
who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling
against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other efects
found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or having
surrepttously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the
premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the ofense be committed in the night-tme, or if any papers or efects

not consttutng evidence of a crime be not returned immediately afer
the search made by the ofender, the penalty shall be prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods.

Article 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the

service of those legally obtained. - In additon to the liability attaching to
the ofender for the commission of any other ofense, the penalty of

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