CASTILLO, HONEY GRACE LTD-Assigned cases: October 17, 2017

1. HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ V. DE CASTRO 5. CASTILLO V. ESCUTIN

2. DELA MERCED V. GSIS 6. GURBAX SINGH PABLA AND CO V. REYES
3. AMODIA VDA MELENCION V. CA 7. GR NO. 88233 OCT 4, 1991
4. REPUBLIC V. ROXAS 8. LOPEZ V. DE CASTRO

THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON, ANTONIO GUICO
LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE
LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE
LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS
LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE
LEON, petitioners, vs. HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO
PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and
their successors-in- interest, respondents.
G.R. No. 112905; 3 February 2000

Facts:
Application for registration of the same parcel of land filed 12 years apart in different
branches of the CFI; a certificate was issued in one case while the other was still pending.

In 1956, Predo Lopez, et al. filed an application for registration of a parcel of land in
Tagaytay City, to which the Municipality of Silang, Cavite opposed; a portion of the land
being leased by the municipality to private persons had been its patrimonial property since
1930.

Applicant claimed that part of the land was their inheritance, but was excluded in the
application for registration since it is located in Laguna; same with the part of the land in
Tagaytay which was excluded from the proceedings in the CFI of Laguna.

Lower court denied the motion to dismiss since the oppositor municipality had no
personality to intervene.

Meanwhile, the Land Registration Commission discovered that part of the land had been
decreed in favor of private respondent de Castro, the land being initially owned by one
Hermogenes Orte who sold the land to the father of de Castro in 1932. However the deed of
sale was destroyed during the Japanese occupation.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of judgment and cancellation of land
titles of the defendants, claiming that they had been unduly deprived ownership and
possession of the land due to wrongful registration by means of fraud and
misrepresentation.

Issue:
Were the heirs of Pedro Lopez deprived of their ownership and possession of the contested
land?

Ruling:
No. The petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for
land registration. In the same way that publication of their application for registration was
supposed to have rendered private respondents on constructive notice of such application,
the publication of notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private
respondents had the same effect of notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed
to have been notified of the land registration proceedings filed by private respondents,
thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.

Petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, they could or should have done earlier. They neglected or
omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that they
either had abandoned or declined to assert it. In short, they were guilty of laches.

COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substituted by his heirs namely, LUIS CESAR DELA
MERCED, BLANQUITA DELA MERCED nee MACATANGAY, and MARIA OLIVIA M.
PAREDES, Petitioners, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
Spouses VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167140; November 23, 2011

FACTS: This case involves five registered parcels of land located within the Antonio
Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 (subject
properties). These lots were originally owned by, and titled in the name of, Jose C. Zulueta
(Zulueta), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26105 which contains
several lots other than the subject properties within the Antonio Subdivision.

Later, the Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots contained in TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS,
which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including the subject properties.
Upon consolidation of GSISs ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled,
and TCT No. 23554 was issued in GSISs name.

Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor, Francisco Dela Merced (Dela
Merced), later on substituted by his heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the
GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block
8) on the ground that he, not the Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the
foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor and Milagros Manlongat, who were claiming
Lot 6, Block 2 by virtue of a sale executed by the GSIS in their daughters (Elizabeth
Manlongat) favor. Dela Merced argued that, due to the nullity of GSISs foreclosure over the
subject properties, it had no ownership right that could be transferred to Elizabeth
Manlongat.

After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in the petitioners favor and
nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part of
its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of the Decision,
petitioners filed a Motion for Execution which GSIS opposed on the basis of Section 39 of
the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291 which allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court processes. A writ of execution was
finally issued, however, first by the RTC and then by the CA. The GSIS filed a petition for
review before the SC which was denied by the latter.
After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners encountered more
problems with the execution of the Decision. According to the RD of Pasig City, Policarpio
Espenesin, he could not cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 because it no longer had
title over these two lots and had already conveyed the same to two other persons. Hence,
the RD claimed that the writ of execution must first be modified to include the cancellation
of derivative titles of the GSIS title.

ISSUES:

[1] Can the GSIS still raise the issue of exemption?

[2] Can a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat be enforced against
their successors-in-interest or holders of derivative titles?
[3] Does an order to cancel title to a particular property include an order to provide
technical descriptions and segregate it from its mother title?

HELD: [1] The issue of GSIS's alleged exemption under RA 8291 had been finally decided
against when this Court denied GSIS's petition for review. GSIS's attempt to resurrect the
same issue by interjecting the same in this proceeding is barred by the principle of "law of
the case," which states that "determinations of questions of law will generally be held to
govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has already
been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort."

[2] A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real
property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the
said property. It is not disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on
TCT No. 23554 of the lots in question. The current holders of the derivative titles to these
lots were aware of such annotation when the individual titles were issued to them.
Ineluctably, both were bound by the outcome of the litigation.

[3] The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is for the RD to cancel GSIS's
titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8, inter alia. Whether these titles are individual or
contained in a mother title is of no consequence. The RD has to cause their cancellation. If
the cancellation can only be carried out by requiring GSIS or the Bureau of Lands to provide
the necessary information, then they can be compelled to do so. Otherwise, the Courts
decision would be rendered inefficacious, and GSIS would retain ostensible ownership over
the lots by the simple expedience that they are included in a mother title, instead of
individual titles. That result is manifestly contrary to the Courts ruling and would subvert
the very purpose of bringing this case for a complete resolution.
 CECILIA AMODIA VDA. DE MELENCION, VENERANDA AMODIA, FELIPE AMODIA,
EUTIQUIO AMODIA and GO KIM CHUAN, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 148846 : September 25, 2007]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES-BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, Petitioner,
vs. VICENTE ROXAS AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL
MINDORO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157988;December 11, 2013
 DINAH C. CASTILLO, Petitioner, versus
ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS, MARIETTA L. LINATOC, AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
March 13, 2009; G.R. No. 171056

FACTS:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel
Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her
favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla
K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square
meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00449. Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was
able to secure an Order dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf &
Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713
owned by Perla K. Mortilla, et al. and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the City
Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification [if stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No.
00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy
of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a
Certificationattesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla,
was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the
issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot
13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in
May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was
inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty
and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City
office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty,
and even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too
powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION ACT

RULING:

From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by
respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she even
assert that a particular action was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it
may be true that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No.
00942-A was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the
responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present
statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that respondents should have
done or not done a particular act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents
Mistas and Linatoc should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in
the name of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or
recognizes the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any
reliable evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired with one another and with
corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than speculation, surmise, or
conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents were consistently favorable to Summit
Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner prejudice.
Respondents actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over
Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system, and
accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.

GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH PABLA, OJAGAR SINGH,
DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG KIAT, petitioners-appellees,
vs.HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO, respondents-appellants.
G.R. No. L-3970; October 29, 1952

The respondents appealed to the court on a decision rendered by the RTC demanding them
to surrender owners „duplicate of TCTs so that the contract of lease entered into by the
petitioners and the land owner be annotated thereon.

John Tan Chin, the owner of the said land entered in to a contact of lease with Gurbax
(petitioner) with a condition that they build a 3-storey building from value of 80k to 90k.
And the contract also provides that the building shall become the exclusive property of the
owner but Gurbax (petitioner) were to occupy it for 3 years, 6months from its completion
without paying rentals thereto. This contact of lease was registered on July 23, 1948.

-But after period, Gurbax (petitioner) continued occupying the same building with a monthly
rental of 2k. This contract of lease was registered on August 10, 1948. - But at the time the
contract was entered into, there was already an existing mortgage in favor of Jose Calvo for
a sum of 100k. This mortgage was cancelled and a new mortgage was executed in favor
Reyes (respondent) on March 8, 1949.

The first contract of lease was amended by which the period under which Gurbax
(petitioner) was to occupy without rentals was extended to 7years and 4months and this 3rd
contract was registered on May 20, 1949.

On May 25, 1949, the Gurbax (petitioners) wanted to annotate the new contract of lease on
the title of the Calvo (respondents) however the Calvo‟s son (respondents) demanded
payment of the overdue interest of the mortgage from the owner of the land, John Tan Chin
before they will deliver their title and have it annotated.

Against this petition Reyes (respondents) filed an opposition alleging that:1. They had no
knowledge whatsoever of the contract of lease, or of its amendments, and that the
execution of the amendment2. It violated the express provision of the mortgage, to the
effect that the owner could not sell, assign, or encumber the mortgaged premises without
the written consent of the mortgages.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered.

Ruling:

- SC found that the issues raised by Reyes (respondents), were not properly investigated
because Reyes (respondents) did not have the opportunity to present evidence thereon and
did not even present copy of their mortgage at the hearing, and the trial court decided the
questions without full and complete investigation.

- SC also held that the purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all
persons; it is not intended by the proceedings for registration to seek to destroy or
otherwise affect already registered rights over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of
the registration.

- The rights of parties who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when an
instrument is presented for registration; nor are its effects on other instruments previously
registered put in issue by the procedure of registration Thus, in so far as it orders the
surrender of the certificates of title for the registration of the contracts of lease, is affirmed.

OSCAR NATIVIDAD, BARTOLOME RAMOS and EUGENIO PASCUAL, petitioners,vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 88233 October 4, 1991

This is a petition for review of the decision dated August 25, 1988 of the Court of Appeals
reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Makati, Metro Manila, that
allowed the registration in the names of petitioners Oscar Natividad, Eugenio Pascual and
Bartolome Ramos of six (6) parcels of land which had originally been applied for by Tomas
Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (TCMC for short) in LRC Case No. 10585.

The subject land of this cases are the six (6) parcels of land which had originally been
applied for by Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. However, the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the New Philippine Constitution to hold alienable land of the
public domain (Sec. 11, Art. XIV, New Constitution).

On November 19, 1982, TCMC filed a motion for substitution, praying that it be substituted
by petitioners Oscar Natividad, Eugenio Pascual and Bartolome Ramos because on
November 9, 1982, it sold to them the six parcels of land subject of its application. The
motion was granted by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1982.

Accordingly, in lieu of TCMC, the petitioners thereafter adduced evidence in support of the
application, showing that the original owners had possessed and cultivated the land as
owners for more than 30 years before they were sold to TCMC.

On March 16, 1983, the lower court rendered a decision, ordering the registration of Lots
3010, 2855, 2853, 2851 and 5650 in the names of Oscar H. Natividad, Eugenio P. Pascual
and Bartolome R. Ramos.

The Director of Lands appealed the lower court's decision to the Court of Appeals (formerly
Intermediate Appellate Court) alleging that the trial court erred in not holding that the
registration of titles of the parcels of land in question in favor of petitioners through
substitution was a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by
private corporations of alienable lands of the public domain and that furthermore,
petitioners failed to adduce adequate and substantital proof that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
in the concept of owners since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required by law.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents circumvented the Constitution‟s prohibition disqualifying a

private corporation from purchasing public lands.

Ruling:

Determinative of this issue is the character of the parcels of land — whether they were still
public land or already private — when the registration proceedings were commenced. If
they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by a
private corporation would not apply (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., 146 SCRA 509)

As a rule no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares, the exception is that parcels of
land in question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors-in-interest

In this case, predecessors-in-interest of TMC, the farmers, have been in possession for more
ed land into private ownership. So therefore, conclusion the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution did not apply to them
 THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON,
ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA
LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON,
MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA
LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO
LOPEZ DE LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE
LEON,petitioners, vs. HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married
to ANTONIO PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C.
VDA. DE CASTRO, and their successors-in- interest, respondents.

GR No. 112905, February 3, 2000

“two applications of a parcel of land”

Facts:

The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay
City with the CFI in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an opposition alleging
that the land is its patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the
whole tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but was excluded
from their application upon recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg. Office
because the land is located in the Province of Laguna. The motion to dismiss by the
Municipality of Silang was denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the
municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot was outside its territorial
limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the incorporation of
Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the latter. Thus the right to action
accrues to the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of Court
recommended to grant the application with its report disclosing that since time
immemorial, the De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the
father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of
the land. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently
partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and ordered the registration of the
land in favor of the petitioner.

While examining the records in the course of granting the registration to the petitioners, it
was found out that the land was already registered in favor of the respondents Honesto de
Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in its Branch
IV in Tagaytay City and a decision was promulgated to issue the decree of registration in his
favor. The said land was allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who sold it to the father of
the respondent by virtue of a deed of sale that was destroyed during Japanese occupation.
His father continued possession and occupation of the land until his death and his wife and
children continued the possession thereof and finally registered it in their name. 7 years
later, the petitioner files a complaint for the execution of the judgment rendered in their
favor by the court and cancellation of title of the respondents and order the respondents to
vacate the property. In their counterclaim, the respondents interpose the defense of latches,
prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and asserting the indefeasibility of their
title under the Torrens System.

Lower court: held that it could not enforce the judgment against the respondents
considering they were not made parties to the case. Nor can it order the register of deeds of
Tagaytay City to cancel the title of respondents since it was not also made a party to the
case thus the court does not acquire jurisdiction over it. Further, the court held that the
action brought by the petitioners would be tantamount to the nature of collaterally
attacking the validity of the title of the respondents.

Court of appeals: Upon appeal to the CA, it re-affirms the lower court‟s decision with
emphasis on the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title while citing the Civil Code provisions on
Article 1544 on sale of property to different vendees where in case the land has been
registered in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date of registration shall
prevail.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can question the validity of the title of the respondents over
the property in dispute?

Ruling:

The court held that a land registration is an in rem proceeding which involves a
constructive notice against all persons including the state which is effective through the
publication of the application for land registration. The court held that when more than one
certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding the prior certificate of title is
entitled to a better right against the person who relies on the subsequent certificate. This
rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not on the date of filing the application
for registration of title. In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to
take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on
account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The
publication made with respect to the application of the respondents served as a
constructive notice against the whole world thus the court upheld the validity of their title
and its indefeasibility against collateral attack from the petitioners.

Granting that the petitioners did not have actual knowledge about the respondent‟s
application to the land, they waited for 7 more years after knowing that the property was
already registered in the name of the respondents to demand for the execution of judgment
and cancellation of the respondent‟s title. Therefore the SC finds them guilty of latches.
Petitioner‟s petition was denied.

Note:

Jurisdiction issue:

The governing law when the respondent sought registration of their land was the Judiciary
Act of 1948 providing permanent station of 2 district judges in Cavite, thus the application
was filed before the court in Cavite. This was later amended providing for the 4 judges to
preside in the Province of Cavite, the cities of Cavite and Tagaytay. Following the rule on
jurisdiction, the court of the place where the property is located should take cognizance
over the registration of property therefore upon the creation of Tagaytay City branch of
court, the application should have been transferred from Cavite to Tagaytay branch.
Retaining the venue of the application in Cavite however is in order since venue is merely
procedural not jurisdictional and may be waived in lieu of convenience to the parties. The
petitioner‟s assailing the jurisdiction of the Cavite branch rendering decision in favor of the
respondent‟s title over the property located in Tagaytay cannot be sustained by the court.