Lawyer's Duty to Client Despite Non-Payment of Fees

1.
THIRD DIVISION
[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C.

MAGULTA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business;
it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is
accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,

sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law
Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to
legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties
for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly
paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty.
Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted,
copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount
of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4,
1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the
Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from
Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented
his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every
time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the
court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even
brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m.,
where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the
building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk
of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of
Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to
the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to
personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at
all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification
dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to
with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only
when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease
my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies
of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for
being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of
one of the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand
letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said
Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that
another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of
the formers law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent
drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and
prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the
files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed
him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these
fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant
promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary and told
her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the
acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the
amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the
filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental
Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The
negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant
proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees.
When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned
the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive
renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks
were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if

anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of
the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill
this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the
respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress
upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount
delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and not for the
filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect
the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help
maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. [5] Members of the bar must do
nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the
honesty, and integrity of the profession.[6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him
and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he
only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on
any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is
it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had
been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.[7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees. [8] Hence, despite
the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-
bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client,
they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.[9]They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[10]
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the mistake -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should
have lost no time in calling complainants attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument
is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. [15] Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of
their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [16] It may be true that they
have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and
that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received.
Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. [17] In any event, they must still exert all
effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.[18]Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former
returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be
imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondents file.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.
[1] Records, pp. 2-3.
[2] Ibid., p. 15.
[3] Id., at pp. 20-28.
[4] Report and Recommendation, pp. 10-11; records, 261-262.
[5] R. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1997 ed., p. 156.
[6] Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, AC No. 4073, June 28, 2001.
[7] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, September 21, 1949.
[8] Junio v. Grupo, AC No. 5020, December 18, 2001.
[9] Aromin v. Boncavil, 315 SCRA 1, September 22, 1999.
[10] Tan v. Lapak, 350 SCRA 74, January 23, 2001.
[11] Cantiller v. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246, December 18, 1989.
[12] Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 160, August 8, 1988.

[13] R. Agpalo, supra, p.12.
[14] Ibid., p. 13.
[15] Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, September 26, 1964.
[16] Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, supra; Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694, March 27,
2000, citing Obia v. Catimbang, 196 SCRA 23, April 19, 1991.
[17] Tanhueco v. De Dumo, 172 SCRA 760, April 25, 1989.
[18] Aromin v. Boncavil, supra.
[19] Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Phils. et al., AC No. 4215, May 21, 2001.
2.
FIRST DIVISION
MARCOS V. PRIETO, A.C. No. 6517

Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, CJ
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and

JUDGE FERDINAND A. FE, Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 6, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against

respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and
respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious
misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27,
Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the latters
actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v.
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled, Yolanda
Marquez Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.
Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to
the records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he was
also given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him in his quest to win the
case.
Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that
Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the former
counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-BG. Another reason for his
objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1518-
BG were obviously copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the complaint was
prepared by respondent Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of herein complainant
(plaintiff therein).Complainant claims that the foregoing constitute misconduct which
imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors of judgment. He insists that the
fact that respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the plaintiff
was his former client and which complaint was copied from the complaint he himself
prepared does not speak well of his intention as to the disposition of the case.
Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the

respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present it
to court as the latters work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in placing his
signature in the complaint not written by him, respondent lawyer committed deceit,
which serves as a ground for his disbarment.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court

referred the instant administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina
G. Salonga for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days
from receipt thereof.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December
2005, and directed the complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to
appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after
the marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that
they would not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given
a period of thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda,
after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent

judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the
respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:
In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez (Marquez) mortgaged six (6)

parcels of land to the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel of
land with an area of Twenty Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square
Meters (22,599 sq. meters) located at Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent granted on 5
July 1989.
Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2 August 1993,
the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction the highest bidder of which was
the petitioner.Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the name of the
petitioner.
In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto

and Monette O. Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to Far East Bank and
Trust Company.
Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent transfer of the
mortgaged properties in the name of the petitioner, Roque, Marquez daughter, filed a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts with Damages against said petitioner, the Rural
Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company. Respondent
judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained by Roque as her counsel of record in
said case and was the one who drafted said complaint.
On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge Jose
G. Pineda, issued an order dismissing the case on the ground that Roque was not a
real party in interest since her right of action has still to ripen upon the death of her
mother.
On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge

of RTC Branch 67. By reason of his appointment, he completely severed all his
professional relationships with his clients, including Roque, and turned over or
relinquished all case records of his office to said clients.
Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now
acquired by way of succession her mothers right of action to pursue the annulment of
contracts executed over the property formerly covered by OCT No. 15344, engaged
the legal services of respondent lawyer.
Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques counsel, filed a

complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of Property, and
Damages against petitioner, his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O.
Prieto, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust
Company, Inc., now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union.
On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was
raffled to the respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67, through Atty.
Jeovannie C. Ordoo, its Branch Clerk of Court, issued summons to the
defendants. The summons and copy of the complaint was duly served upon the
petitioner on 20 January 2004.
Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his court,
respondent judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and discovered that the
plaintiff therein was Roque, his former client. Immediately, without going over the
allegations of the complaint, the respondent judge issued an Order dated 23 January
2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the record of said case be
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 (RTC
Branch 33).
On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67

transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch 33 through
its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard T. Domingo, which was duly received by the latter.
On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch 67, an
Objection to Competency and his Answer to the Complaint. Since the records thereof
were already transmitted to RTC Branch 33, RTC Branch 67s Branch Clerk of Court
had said pleadings forwarded thereto. Since then, the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1518-BG have been conducted by RTC Branch 33.
In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their Answers
and the issues having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of
RTC Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial conference and ordered the submission of
the parties respective pre-trial briefs.
On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended

Answer together with the Authority given by his co-defendants Antonio O. Prieto
and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-
Trial Brief.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the

Supreme Court referred the instant administrative case to the undersigned for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt
thereof. A copy of the said Resolution was received by the undersigned on 18
November 2005.
Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the

undersigned set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005 directing the petitioner
and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit
documents relevant to the complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent judge, after
the marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that
they will not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a
period thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after
which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent

judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the
respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint

against respondents, and that complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous
complaint.
A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present
administrative case is unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Stripped
of all its verbosity, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against the
respondents should be treated for what they really are, mere allegations founded on
speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it must be stressed that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents committed the
act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the complaint must be
dismissed.
First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent
lawyer, through the intervention and assistance of the respondent judge, had free
access to the court records Civil Case No. 1081-BG fails to find evidentiary
support. Without more, petitioner deduced that the court records of Civil Case No.
1081-BG were made available to the respondent lawyer at the instance of the
respondent judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the complaint
filed by the latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case No. 1518-BG. Bare and
conclusory as it is, the said allegation deserves scant consideration.
Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant and
substantial portions of the complaint filed by the respondent judge does not in any
way bespeak of any illegal or unethical practice on his part.
For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained access to
the case record of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned from the records,
respondent judge had already turned over and relinquished his case records of Civil
Case No. 1081-BG to Roque after his appointment to the bench on 8 November
2001. Since she intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is expected, if not
necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously dismissed complaint to her
newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is the right of Roque and the
respondent lawyer, as her retained counsel, to request access to the court records for
their reproduction or certification.
For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed by

the respondent judge and the respondent lawyer belies petitioners claim that the latter
merely copied, verbatim or otherwise, the original complaint. True, some allegations
contained therein were substantially retained by respondent lawyer. However, these
allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of action of Roque against the
petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly a number of ways to construct a
sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim that respondent lawyer is legally
restrained from retaining or rewriting sentences earlier constructed by the respondent
judge.
More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent judge allowed the

respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG is
unfounded. Aside from the petitioners mere say so, there is not even an iota of
evidence to support this assertion. It is all too obvious that there is a dearth of
evidence that would in any way prove petitioners accusation against the respondents.
In the same vein, petitioners inference that respondent judge intended to try
Civil Case No. 1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the case refute
this. Reading his petition, it is evident that petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead
this court to believe that respondent judge is still conducting the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself therefrom. His intent to
deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass the respondents is undeniable.
As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in this

regard. He is well aware that the respondent judge already issued an Order dated 23
January 2004inhibiting himself from the case and ordering the transmission of the
record of said case to the RTC Branch 33. In fact, petitioner has been actively
participating in the proceedings of said case before the RTC Branch 33 prior to the
institution of the instant administrative case as he had already filed several pleadings
therewith.
If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously written
to deliberately and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact that the respondent
judge had already inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-
BG and that the records thereof had in fact been transmitted to RTC Branch 33.
All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in itself is
frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on the
integrity and reputation of both the respondents. The only piece of evidence that the
petitioner has offered in support of his claim is his bare assertions, which certainly
deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized that a mere charge or allegation
of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. There
must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. This brings to the fore the
application of the age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations.
Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner
Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents,

there is merit in the separate counter-petitions filed by the latter to hold the petitioner
administratively liable for filing an unfounded and frivolous suit.
As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against

the respondents are baseless, as they are mere allegations founded on pure
speculation and conjecture. Sans evidence, his petition was purposely written to
mislead the Court and cast a doubt on the integrity and dignity of the
respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as a vehicle to unduly
harass or otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his own
desire to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire judiciary
and the bar.
For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what the
Supreme Court had pronounced in the recent case of Galman Cruz vs. Alio-
Hormachuelos. Said the Court:
Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that,

although the Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or
omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or
diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to
shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in

Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:
By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become

commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for
lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Court a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. That same canon, as corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism
and clamor. And more, the attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be with all good fidelityto the courts. Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which he is bound to uphold.
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual

endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a courts decision in words calculated to jettison
the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and
men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, Justice

Sanchez further elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is. like the court itself,

an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith
in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to
the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that as an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.
Petitioners unfounded imputations against respondents are malicious and

offend the dignity of the entire judiciary. Scandalous as his bare allegations are, the
fact that petitioner maliciously insinuated that the respondent judge allowed access
to and assisted the respondent lawyer in the filing of his complaint desecrates and
mocks the integrity of the judiciary. Equally insolent is petitioners baseless
postulations that the respondent judge refused to inhibit himself from Civil Case No.
1518-BG purposely to give leverage to his former client and her lawyer.
Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing counsel, petitioner

violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that all lawyers must conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and
candor towards their colleagues and should avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel and commands all lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
We have reviewed the records, and after careful consideration thereof, we find
the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in the above-
quoted report to be well-taken and fully supported by the evidence on record, except
for the penalty imposed on complainant.
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded
complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good faith.[1]
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the

court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise
avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their
realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.[2]Canon 12[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert
every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons of

good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking
of the nature of a public trust.[4] Thus, a lawyer should not use his knowledge of law
as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same
constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[5] We
cannot countenance complainants act of misleading this Court into believing that
respondent judge was still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG.
What is evident is that even complainant was well aware of respondent judges
inhibition therefrom. The respondent judge, in fact, issued an Order dated 23 January
2004 inhibiting himself from the case.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[6] respondent-lawyer was suspended for six (6) months

for filing a groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass
her. In the case of Arnaldo v. Suarin,[7] complainant Atty. Arnaldo was
fined P5,000.00 for filing frivolous complaint. In this case, which we find analogous
to Arnaldo, we hold that a fine of P5,000.00 will suffice.
ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga

is APPROVED with modification as to the penalty imposed on complainant Atty.
Marcos V. Prieto. Respondents Judge Ferdinand A. Fe and Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz are
exonerated and the administrative complaint against them
is DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing
frivolous suit with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
[1] Duduaco v. Judge Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601, 11 August 2005, 466 SCRA 428.
[2] Agpalo, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, p. 117
(2004 Ed.).
[3] A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
[4] People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310,
316.
[5] Re: Administration Case Against Atty. Occea, 433 Phil. 138, 156 (2002).
[6] Adm. Case No. 1388, 28 March 1980, 96 SCRA 526, 529-530.
[7] A.M. No. P-05-2059, 19 August 2005, 467 SCRA 402, 409.
3.
55 Phil. 621
MALCOLM, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the first branch of the municipal
court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an accused person to avail himself of the
services of an agent or friend, not a licensed attorney-at-law, to aid him in the litigation.
It appears from the pleadings that Catalino Salas was charged in the municipal court of the City
of Manila with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence. Thereupon, Salas
authorized Crispiniano V. Laput to represent him in the case. Laput, it may be observed, is a law
student and, accordingly, not a recognized member of the Philippine Bar. The written appointment
of Laput was duly presented in court, but the respondent judge before whom the case was to be
tried refused to allow Laput to act as the counsel of Salas. Hence, this petition for a writ of
mandamus.
While the question appears simple, in order to resolve it properly there must be before us a
chronological statement of the applicable law.
The Judiciary Law, Act No. 136, enacted in 1901, in its section 69 parovided: "The existing
courts of justices of the peace in the City of Manila shall be continued as now organized, and with
the same jurisdiction as is now by law conferred upon them, and shall so continue until special
provisions shall be made by law for the organization of inferior civil and criminal tribunals for
the City of Manila." The Manila Charter, Act No. 183, approved in the same year, created
municipal courts with criminal jurisdiction and justice of the peace courts with civil jurisdiction.
Section 40 of the Charter, in one sentence, provided: "All proceedings and prosecutions for
offenses against the laws of the Philippine Islands shall conform to the rules relating to process,
pleading, practice, and procedure now or hereafter established for the judiciary of the Islands, and
such rules shall govern said police courts and their officers in all cases in so far as the same may
be applicable." Section 44 of the Charter, in its first sentence, further provided: "There shall be
appointed by the Civil Governor, by and with the consent of the Commission, two justices of the
peace and two auxiliary justices of the peace for the City of Manila, who shall be subject to removal
in the manner provided for their appointment, and who shall exercise within the City of Manila the
jurisdiction conferred upon justices of the peace in Act Numbered One hundred and thirty-six,
providing for the organization of courts; but no justice of the peace, or auxiliary justice of the
peace, of the City of Manila, shall exercise any criminal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction within the
City of Manila being confined to Courts of First Instance and to the municipal courts herein
provided." Likewise" in the same year, the Code of Civil Procedure was approved in Act No. 190,
and therein in section 34 was found the following: "Any party may conduct his litigation in a court
of a justice of the peace, in person or with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of a lawyer; in any other court a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a
duly authorized member of the bar." This section was subsequently amended and provisions
inserted to govern the occupation of procuradores judiciales.
This dual system of justice of the peace courts and municipal courts continued until Act No. 3107
was enacted in 1923. By this Act, section 2466 of the Administrative Code was amended to read:
"There shall be a municipal court for the City of Manila, for which three judges shall be
appointed, to be known, respectively, as judge of the first, second and third branch.
"The Municipal Court shall have the same jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and
the same incidental powers as at present conferred by law upon the Municipal Court
and justice of the peace court of the City of Manila, and such additional jurisdiction and
powers as may hereafter be conferred upon them by law." Section 2476 of the
Administrative Code, relating to justice of the peace courts in the City of Manila was
repealed.
The question now is, as to whether or not the existing municipal court of the City of Manila may be
considered a court of a justice of the peace within the meaning of section 34 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
When the Code of Civil Procedure was placed on the statute books, there were in the City of
Manila justice of the peace courts to which section 34 naturally applied; In these justice of the
peace courts, there could have been no question that a party could conduct his litigation with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose. When the justice of the peace courts were
abolished, the law was made to provide for a municipal court which was to have the same
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, and the same incidental powers "as are at present
conferred by law upon municipal courts and justice of the peace courts of the City of Manila." The
intention here was, without doubt, to transfer the justice of the peace court as then existing to the
municipal court and to make it a branch thereof. The justice of the peace court of the City of
Manila, like all other justice of the peace courts, being included within the wording of section 34 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and the powers of this court having been given to the municipal court,
it follows as a matter of course that, in so far as the civil jurisdiction of the municipal court was
concerned, it was the same as the former justice of the peace court of the City of Manila and akin
to that of justice of the peace courts in general.
To draw a distinction between criminal and civil cases in the municipal court of the City of
Manila, with respect to the applicability of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure would,
however, be unduly technical. The Organic Act recognizes three classes of courts only, the
Supreme Court, courts of first instance, and municipal courts. This court, in the early case of
United States vs. Bian Jeng ([1903], 2 Phil., 179), has given expression to a somewhat similar line
of reasoning. But after all, it is only incumbent upon us to decide the case before us, and as to this
case it is self-evident that, while a criminal prosecution, it has civil features which consist in fixing
the amount of the damages.
It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing
Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his
defense. The fear expressed that such a ruling may unduly embarrass the administration,of justice
loses its force when it is recalled that, according to existing law, no person could engage in the
occupation of appearing for or defending other persons in justice of the peace courts or in the
municipal court without first being authorized to do so by the judge of first instance of the district.
There is no reasonable ground for believing that in the City of Manila, judges of first instance will
ever consent to the naming of procuradores judiciales.
The writ prayed for will issue, without costs.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
STREET, J., with whom concur OSTRAND, and ROMUALDEZ, JJ., :
Although the court of the justice of the peace is a municipal court in the general sense that its
jurisdiction extends over the territory included in a municipality, in the same way that the
jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance extends over the territory of a province, it does not by
any means logically follow that the municipal court of the City of Manila is a court of the justice of
the peace within the meaning of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. This
section makes a clear distinction between the court of a justice of the peace and "any other court,"
as appears from the last sentence in the section. It is true that the municipal court of the City of
Manila now exercises all the functions of a justice of the peace court in and for the City of
Manila. But the municipal court has additional powers, and the conditions in the City of Manila,
with particular reference to the representation of litigants in court, are so different from those
found generally in the municipalities throughout the Islands, that it cannot in my opinion, be
reasonably inferred that it was intended by the Legislature that this section of the Code of Civil
Procedure should be operative, in the municipal court, for the purpose of allowing an agent, without
the qualifications of an attorney, to appear for a person who is brought before said court.
The petitioner Catalino Salas, who is being prosecuted for a misdemeanor in case No. F. 26815
upon the docket of the municipal court, asserts that he is fully able to bear the expense of
employing an attorney to represent him in that case, if he should have so desired; and in fact if
he had been so circumstanced as to be unable to bear the expense of employing a lawyer, a
competent attorney would have been appointed for him by the court. The case is therefore
evidently brought as a test case, doubtless with a view to opening the municipal court to the
practice of judicial agents (procuradores judiciales), a class of petty attorneys for the appointment
of whom provision is made in the proviso to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above cited;
and although the opinion of the court in the present case expresses the confident belief that the
judges of first instance in the City of Manila will never consent to the naming of procuradores
judiciales, this confidence seems to me to be misplaced, in view of the fact that the decision here
made by the majority of the court, if consistently followed, leads directly to the conclusion that such
agents may lawfully be appointed to practice in the municipal court of the City of Manila. Is it not
self-evident that if "court of a justice of the peace," at the beginning of section 34 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, includes the municipal court of the City of Manila, the expression "justice of the
peace courts," as used in the proviso to the said section, must also include the same municipal
court? There is no possible ground for the conclusion that the term "court of a justice of the
peace" or "justice of the peace court" has one meaning in the first part of the section and another
meaning in the second part. The expressions referred to evidently have the same meaning
throughout the section, and they are used in contradistinction to the expression "any other court"
found near the close of the section, where it is declared that "In any other court a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of a lawyer and his appearance must be either personal
or by the aid of a duly authorized member of the bar." In the light of these considerations it is
evident to the undersigned that section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be interpreted
as imposing on the judge of the municipal court the duty of permitting a friend or agent who is not a
lawyer to appear for any litigant.
4.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for
less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively,
as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among
others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being
friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners
Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the
Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in
plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf
from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo
San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed
by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by
an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor
as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended
party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately
from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on,
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for
the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who
was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error
was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary
for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if
the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that
the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision
and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant
Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of
the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby
ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a
Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning
of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness
or an offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput
and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a
criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect of
criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing
vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended
party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases. Orders set aside.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

appearing in court.
criminal case.
cases. Orders set aside.
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur
Separate Opinions
appearing in court.
criminal case.
cases.
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice Herrera.
5.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,
SECRETARY, respondents.
Reyes, Lozada and Sabado for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his
profession while employed in the Government.
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October
5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana
for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated
June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or
Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the
practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel
for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia
of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that
Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority
of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38
TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS,
KLGCD REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON
SANGGUNIAN SESSIONS, PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND
OTHER RELATED MATTERS
In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18,
there is a need to amend said Memorandum Circular to substantially conform to the
pertinent provisions of Circular No. 9-A.
xxx xxx xxx
C. Practice of Profession
The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter
alia that "members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the
mayors, do not keep regular office hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions of
the provincial board or the city or municipal council" and that provincial board members
are not even required "to have an office in the provincial building." Consequently, they
are not therefore to required to report daily as other regular government employees do,
except when they are delegated to perform certain administrative functions in the
interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as the case may be. For this reason,
they may, therefore, be allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an
authority . . . first be secured from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58, provided, however, that no government personnel, property,
equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their professions. While being
authorized to practice their professions, they should as much as possible attend
regularly any and all sessions, which are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which
they were elected as members by their constituents except in very extreme cases, e.g.,
doctors who are called upon to save a life. For this purpose it is desired that they always
keep a calendar of the dates of the sessions, regular or special of their Sanggunians so
that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of lawyers and Sanggunian sessions
can be avoided.
As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall
always be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all
cases, the practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by the
Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal
mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30, Rollo.)
On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant,
Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.
Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice
of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as
follows:
1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990
Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated
September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons
therein stated, with this information that, as represented and consistent with law, we
interpose no objection thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official functions.
LUIS T. SANTOS
Secretary.
(p. 60, Rollo.)
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth
guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials as follows:
TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional
Directors and All Concerned.
SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local
Elective Officials
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public
officials . . . now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials . . . during their incumbency shall not: (1)
. . . accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee
or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office
unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4,
1986, the authority to grant any permission, to accept private employment in any
capacity and to exercise profession, to any government official shall be granted by the
head of the Ministry (Department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides, in part, that:
No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . .
without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers . . .
whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted
outside of office should be fixed by the Chief of the agency to the end
that it will not impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer or employee . .
. subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems
necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as
expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant
of permission to the practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment
of local elective officials, to wit:
1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local
Government;
2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
government in conformity with Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local
Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to engage in the practice of
their profession and to accept private employment during their
incumbency:
3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their
profession or engage in private employment on a limited basis at the
discretion of the Secretary of Local Government, subject to existing laws
and to the following conditions:
a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should
be fixed by the local chief executive concerned to the end
that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officials concerned;
b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies
shall be utilized in the pursuit of one's profession or
private employment;
c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of
profession or engagement in private employment and the
official duties of the concerned official shall arise thereby;
d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems
necessary to impose on each particular case, in the
interest of public service. (Emphasis supplied, pp. 31-
32, Rollo.)
On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the
ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents.
His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed
into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana
thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-
81 and Section 90 of the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null
void because:
(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for
only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession
while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA
7160, Sec. 90 [b-1]).
In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner submitted a
Reply. After deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for
lack of merit.
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative
authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction
(Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657).
With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-
30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the
performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional
mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of
Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against
City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as
counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City
Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section
7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the
statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies
to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90
explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to
lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or
affect, the area of public service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
6.
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 810. January 27, 1998]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. [1] His
oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Courts resolution dated August 27, 1996
which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations subject to the condition that should (he)
pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyers oath pending approval of the
Court x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The conviction stemmed from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in
September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal
violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation.
On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and
terminated.
In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that he be
allowed to take his lawyers oath at the Courts most convenient time [2] attaching thereto the
Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging
him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law
abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the
Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III,
Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the
Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the
President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July
15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioners application, resolved to require Atty.
Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment
thereon. In compliance with the Courts directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his
comment which states as follows:
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing
him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the
lawyers oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture.
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its
resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No.712 that the infliction of
severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the
proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants
that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they
took advantage of the neophytes helpless and defenseless condition when
they were beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog, suggesting the
presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the
petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who
went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and
begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on
Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one
of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his sons involvement in
the case.
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the
criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in
whom he has a high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed him, he still
feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner
of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has
become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He
politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon.
Court. [3]
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan
admits that [h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has
become morally fit x x x and submits petitioners plea to be admitted to the noble
profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing
petitioners admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the
senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latters untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the
practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of
intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of
undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have
become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a
chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioners co-
accused below, to take the lawyers oath.[4]
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without any infraction of the
attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge
himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I.
Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. [5] Let
it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a
few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses.
Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly
according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr.
Justice Padillas comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The
Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr.
Cuevas, Jr., will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.[6]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to
take the lawyers oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court,
subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioners
personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Held on September 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1996, at De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila, with Associate
[1]
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco as Chairman of the Bar Committee.
[2] Manifestation With Motion TO Take The Lawyers Oath, p. 2.
[3] Comment, pp. 1-2.
[4] Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712,
March 19, 1997.
[5] Id.
[6] Id., at p. 5.
7.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta
charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and
unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the
execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case
No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil
action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by
virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps.
Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in
the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a
sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps.
Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps.
Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached
by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411
dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents
admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7,
1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state,
the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg
to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid
P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under
IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP
official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of
every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when
he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of
his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the
Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
8.
FIRST DIVISION
MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged

respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the
ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee,
Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the
forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to
its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and
Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on

June 30, 1965.[1] Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence
certificate[2] of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated
January 5, 1962.[3] Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his
signature as donor in a deed of donation[4] (containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will
and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed
from (sic) one another in all angle[s].[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence

certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters
affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in
the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of
the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed
by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s]
files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint
against him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the
decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He
alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will
and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per
affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated
by the joint affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and
Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.[9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him
because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will
was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the
contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action
against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of
nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of

pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative
Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon
1[11] and Rule 1.01[12] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus,
the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May
26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the
laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years.[14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed

by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after
his death.[15] A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution
of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity.[16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be

subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.[17]
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo.
On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.[18] This is in
consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses.[19] The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.
[20]
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public
that the same is his or her own free act and deed.[21] The acknowledgment in a
notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after
his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he
intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows

that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with.
For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates
of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the
notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a
clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held
in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before
him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the

degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.[23] A
notary public, especially a lawyer,[24] is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence
certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every

contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula]
residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be
entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue,
and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.[25]
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the

Residence Tax Act[26] which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document
before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such
transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence
certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and
correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of
residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired
residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the
old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to
demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a
copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy
of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis
supplied)
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the
notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the

necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law
required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological
order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;

2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
6. give each entry a consecutive number; and
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the
instrument.[27]
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule,

respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the
will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To
reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification[28] stating that the
archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is

shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence
and cause of the unavailability of the original,[29] otherwise, the evidence presented
will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not
admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to
comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated

September 21, 1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the
certification dated March 15, 2000;[31] its contents did not squarely prove the fact of
entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32] and utmost fidelity the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire
will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and
delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this
case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.
[34] Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of
the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.[35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:

Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the
part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.
[36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of
his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court[37] and Canon 1[38] and Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
[40] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation
imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic
requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover
make himself an example for others to emulate.[42] Being a lawyer, he is supposed to
be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.[43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[44] A breach of

these conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary
sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has
engaged in professional misconduct.[45] These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers
include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.[46] We have held
in a number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution[47] and should not be decreed if any punishment less severe such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired.[48] The rule then is
that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the

elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as
Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and
had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx,
we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such
recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission[50] and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty

of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old
Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made
part of the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 3.
[2] Now known as Community Tax Certificate.
[3] Page two, Last Will and Testament of Vicente Lee, Sr., rollo, p. 3.
[4] Id., p. 10.
[5] Id., p. 1.
[6] Rollo, p. 9.
[7] Dated July 11, 2001. Id., p. 94.
[8] Dated July 11, 2001. Id., p. 95.
[9] Id., p. 90.
[10] Rollo, p. 107.
[11] CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.
[12] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
[13] Annex A, Report and Recommendation by Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III,
dated February 27 2006. Rollo, p. 13.
[14] Notice of Resolution, IBP Board of Governors. (Emphasis in the original)
[15] CIVIL CODE, Art. 783.
[16] Jurado, Desiderio P., COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON
SUCCESSION, 8th ed. (1991), Rex Bookstore, Inc., p. 52. In re: Will of Tan
Diuco, 45 Phil. 807 (1924); Unson v. Abella, 43 Phil. 494 (1922); Aldaba v.
Roque, 43 Phil. 379 (1922); Avera v. Garcia, 42 Phil. 145 (1921); Abangan v.
Abangan, 40 Phil. 476 (1919).
[20] Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006, 487 SCRA 142.
[21] Id.
[22] A.C. No. 6252, 5 October 2004, 440 SCRA 98.
[23] Santiago v. Rafanan, id., at 99.
[24] Under the old Notarial Law, non-lawyers may be commissioned as notaries
public subject to certain conditions. Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, effective August 1, 2004), however, only lawyers may
be granted a notarial commission.
[25] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book I, Title IV, Chapter 11, Sec. 251.
[26] Commonwealth Act No. 465.
[27] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book I, Title IV, Chapter 11, Sec. 246.
[28] Dated March 15, 2000. Rollo, p. 105.
[29] When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 5.
[30] Supra note 6.
[31] Rollo, p. 105.
[32] Bon v. Ziga, A.C. No. 5436, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 185.
[33] Zaballero v. Montalvan, A.C. No. 4370, 25 May 2004, 429 SCRA 78.
[34] Annex A, Report and Recommendation by Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III,
dated February 27, 2006, rollo, p. 12
[35] Id., p. 13.
[36] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book 1, Title IV, Chapter 11.
[37] Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines;
(b) Xxx, RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20, par. (a).
[38] CANON 1, supra note 11.
[39] Rule 1.01, supra note 12.
[40] Montecillo v. Gica, 158 Phil. 443 (1974). Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-
79690-707, 7 October 1988, 166 SCRA 316.
[41] Agpalo, Ruben E., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 7th Edition (2002), Rex
Bookstore, Inc., p. 69. Comments of IBP Committee that drafted the Code of
Professional Responsibility, pp. 1-2 (1980).
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Agpalo, Ruben E., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 7th Edition (2002), Rex
Bookstore, Inc., p. 465.
[45] Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline.
[46] San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580, 15 June
2005, 460 SCRA 105.
[47] Santiago v Rafanan, supra note 22 at 101. Alitagtag v. Garcia, A.C. No. 4738,
10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 335.
[48] Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 140; Amaya
v. Tecson, A.C. No. 5996, 7 February 2005, 450 SCRA 510, 516.
[49] Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., A.C. No. 6589, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 449.
[50] Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6139, 11 November 2003, 415 SCRA
361. Guerrero v. Hernando, 160-A Phil. 725 (1975).
[51] Tan Tiong Bio v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6634, 23 August 2007.
9.
EN BANC
DOLORES C. BELLEZA, A.C. No. 7815

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 23, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza
against respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in
connection with the handling of a criminal case involving complainants son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their

mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services
in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165.[1] Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent

thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an
additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both
payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue
any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son.
Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the
next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several
occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case
of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint[2] for disbarment against
respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit[3] of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata,
Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose
and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan
Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is
facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who

facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores
Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
Date Amount
November 11, 2004 P15,000.00

A week after 10,000.00
November 18, 2004 5,000.00
4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees

were immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the
foregoing statements.
x x x x x x x x x[4]
In a letter dated May 23, 2005,[5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter
transmitted the complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).[6]
In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of
time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005,[8] simply brushed aside the complaint
for being baseless, groundless and malicious without, however, offering any
explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his
answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions[9] for second and third extensions of
time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they
were ordered to submit their respective position papers.[10]
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,[11] the CBD ruled that
respondent failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint
despite several chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or

deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was
unfit and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar.
The CBD recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that
repetition of similar acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended
that respondent be ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the
provisional liberty of the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to
return to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorneys
fees.[12]
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but
we modify the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
RESPONDENT DISRESPECTED
LEGAL PROCESSES
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges
against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer
and refute the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In doing so, he
failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper.
His propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and
disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took when he
was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly
constituted legal authorities. He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to
this Court which is the source of the CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not
only irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.[13] His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey
court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.[14] Respondent should have known that the
orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases
against lawyers) were not mere requests but directives which should have been
complied with promptly and completely.[15]
RESPONDENT GROSSLY NEGLECTED

THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son.

Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT

AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxxxxxxx
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL

WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself

(particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy
thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[16]
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to

serve his client with competence and diligence.[17] He must conscientiously perform
his duty arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a
retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the
requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess;
that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation
entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his
skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take
all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest.[18]
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and
prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of
the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his
client is both unprofessional and unethical.[19]
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent
his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously
attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who
represents an accused in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.
[20] However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample
legal assistance by his lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The
due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality
that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right
to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly
at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.[21]
∞○∞
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right.

Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is
through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.[22]
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the

lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.[23] Tersely put, it means an
effective, efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory
representation.[24]
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving
his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and
efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the
cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to
him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO RETURN

HIS CLIENTS MONEY
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on
a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from the client.[25]
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses),
he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use
the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
[26] His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[27]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as
they fall due or upon demand.[28] His failure to return the clients money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use
to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.[29] It is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[30] Indeed, it may
border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose
of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the
money for its intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he
unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant despite the latters
repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to

the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable
compensation for his services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an
attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the
client.[31] Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled to
attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of
the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands
for. In so doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and
in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar.[32] Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[33]
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the
money for the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client.[34] He failed to live up to
his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he
would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral
principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a
shame to the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only
of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John
Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01,
16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the

amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
promulgation of this decision until full payment. Respondent is
further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within
ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject him to criminal prosecution.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION

CASTROAssociate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
* On official leave.
[1] Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
[2] Rollo, pp. 2-5.
[3] Annex A of the Complaint. Id., p. 6.
[4] Id.
[5] Id., p. 1.
[6] The CBD docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 05-1524.
[7] Id., p. 8.
[8] Id., pp. 9-10.
[9] Dated September 2, 2005 and October 4, 2005, respectively. Id., pp. 16-17 and
21-22, respectively.
[10] Order dated April 19, 2006. Id., p. 27.
Despite receipt by the parties of the order, no position paper was filed. Hence, the investigating commissioner
resolved the case based on the pleadings and papers available to him.
[11] Prepared and signed by CBD Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag. Id., pp. 32-
36.
[12] Resolution No. XVIII-2007-182 dated October 12, 2007.
[13] Sibulo v. Ilagan, A.C. No. 4711, 25 November 2004, 486 Phil. 197 (2004).
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, 3 February 2005, 450 SCRA 406.
[17] See Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[18] Islas v. Platon, 47 Phil. 162 (1924).
[19] See Villaflores v. Limos, A.C. No. 7504, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 140.
[20] See Section 14(2), Article III, Constitution.
[21] People v. Molina, 423 Phil. 637 (2001).
[22] Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 US 365 (1986) cited in People v. Liwanag, 415
Phil. 271 (2001).
[23] Callangan v. People, G.R. No. 153414, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 269
citing People v. Ferrer, 454 Phil. 431 (2003).
[24] Id.
[25] See Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[26] In re Nueno, 48 Phil. 178 (1948).
[27] See Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520 (1998).
[28] Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply
so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
[29] Pentecostes v. Ibaez, 363 Phil. 624 (1999).
[30] Id.
[31] Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 570 (1935).
[32] Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
[33] Id.
[34] CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENT.
10.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17384 October 31, 1961
NESTOR RIGOR VDA. DE QUIAMBAO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Manuel Y. Macias for petitioners.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings to this Court for review the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-
G.R. No. 17031-R, reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Manila and dismissing petitioners'
complaint.
The facts are not in dispute. On March 7, 1940, Gaudencio R. Quiambao, deceased husband of
petitioner Nestora Rigor Vda. de Quiambao and father of the other petitioners, bought from respondent
Manila Motor Company, Inc. one (1) Studebaker car on the installment plan. Upon default in the
payment of a number of installments, respondent company sued Gaudencio Quiambao in Civil Case
No. 58084 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 4, 1940, judgment was entered in said
case, awarding in favor of the plaintiff the sum of P3,054.32, with interest thereon at 12% per annum,
and P300.00 attorney's fees.
On July 14, 1941, the court issued a writ of execution directed to the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac, who
thereupon levied on and attached two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18390
of the Office of the Register of Deeds for Tarlac. On August 27, 1941, Attorney Felix P. David, then
counsel for the Manila Motor Company, accompanied by the sheriff, personally apprised Gaudencio
Quiambao of the levy. The latter pleaded to have the execution sale suspended and begged for time
within which to satisfy the judgment debt, proposing that in the meanwhile, he would surrender to the
company the Studebaker car. This proposition was accepted, accordingly, Gaudencio Quiambao
delivered the car to the company, and Attorney David issued a receipt therefor that reads:
August 27, 1941
Received from Mr. Gaudencio Quiambao, Studebaker President Sedan License No. 45-368
pending settlement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 58043 CFI Manila rendered in favor of
Manila Motor Company.
DAVID AND ANGELES

by (Sgd.) Felix P. David.
Attorneys for Manila Motor Company
On October 16, 1941, Gaudencio Quiambao remitted to the company, on account of the judgment, the
sum of P500.00; he, however, failed to make further payments, thus leaving a balance still unsettled of
P1,952.47, with interest thereon at 12% per annum from March 6, 1940.
In the meantime, the Pacific war broke out, and when the Japanese forces occupied the country shortly
thereafter, the invaders seized all the assets of the Manila Motor Company, Inc., as enemy property.
After the war, the company filed with the Philippine War Damage Commission, among other things, a
claim for its mortgage lien on the car of Gaudencio Quiambao and was awarded the sum of P780.47,
P409.75 of which amount had already been paid.
On October 12, 1949, the company addressed a letter to Gaudencio Quiambao asking him to fill a
blank form relative to the lost car. Quiambao having since died, his widow, Nestora Rigor Vda. de
Quiambao, returned the form with the statement that the questioned car was surrendered to the
company for storage. On May 18, 1953, a demand was made on the widow to settle the deceased's
unpaid accounts, but in view of her refusal, the company urged the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac to carry
out the pre-war writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 58043. Although the records of that case had
been lost during the war, and have not been reconstituted, a copy of said writ of execution kept on file
by the provincial sheriff was saved. Accordingly, the latter advertised for sale at public auction the
properties levied upon. Notified of the sheriff's action, the heirs of the deceased Quiambao filed this suit
to annul and set aside the writ of execution and to recover damages. Judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of plaintiffs-petitioners, but on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the decision was reversed and another entered dismissing the complaint. Hence, this appeal by writ
of certiorari.
Briefly, the issues are:
(a) Did the delivery of the Studebaker car to respondent company produce the effect of rescinding or
annulling the contract of sale between the company and the deceased Gaudencio Quiambao and of
barring the former from executing its pre-war judgment in Civil Case No. 58043?
(b) Did the payment to respondent company and the latter's acceptance of war damage compensation
for the lost car amount to a foreclosure of the mortgage covenated in its favor? and
(c) Was the pre-war judgment already prescribed taking into account the moratorium laws?
Anent the first issue, petitioners, citing the case of H.E. Heacock Company vs. Buntal Manufacturing
Company, et al., 66 Phil. 245-246, maintain that the "taking of the automobile by respondent company
from Gaudencio Quiambao ... amounted to a waiver of said company's right to execute its judgment in
Civil Case No. 58043 and clearly constituted a cancellation or rescission of the sale," which, under the
first paragraph of Article 1454-A of the old Civil Code 1, then applicable, bars any further claim for
unpaid installments. There is no merit in this claim. Unlike situation that arose in the H.E. Heacock
Company case wherein the vendor demanded the return of the thing sold and thereby indicated an
unequivocal desire on its part to rescind its contract with the vendee, here it was the buyer (deceased
Gaudencio Quiambao) who offered, indeed pleaded, to surrender his car only in order that he might
given more time within which to satisfy the judgment debt, and suspend the impending execution sale
of the properties levied upon. The very receipt issued then by the company, and accepted without
objection by the deceased (Gaudencio Quiambao), indicated that the car was received "pending
settlement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 58043." Other circumstances that militate against
petitioners' theory of rescission or annulment of the contract of sale and waiver of the judgment of debt
and, conversely, strengthen the proposition that the delivery of the car to respondent company was
merely to postpone the satisfaction of the judgment amount, are that the deceased still paid the further
sum of P500.00 on account of his indebtedness about two months after the car was surrendered, and
that despite respondent company's acceptance of the car, the company made repeated demands
against the petitioners to settle the deceased's unpaid accounts.
Since respondent company did not receive the car for the purpose of appropriating the same, but
merely as security for the ultimate satisfaction of its judgment credit, the situation under consideration
could not have amounted to a foreclosure of the chattel mortgage as petitioners imply.
Petitioners next argue that "the payment of war damage compensation to respondent company . . .
produced the same and equal legal effect as formal foreclosure," and in view of the second paragraph
of Article 1454-A2 of the Spanish Civil Code, the latter is now precluded from claiming unpaid
installments. We do not agree. Having been the party who was last in possession of the lost car, the
company was well within its rights, or better still, under obligation, to protect the interest of the car
owner, as well as its own, by claiming, as it did, the corresponding war damage compensation for the
car. Such action of the company can not reasonably be construed as a constriction of its rights under
the pre-war judgment.
Furthermore, in Manila Motor Company, Inc. vs. Fernandez, 52 Off. Gaz. No. 16, 6883, 6885, we held:
. . . At any rate, it is the actual sale of the mortgaged chattel in accordance with section 14 of Act
No. 1508 that would bar the creditor (who chooses to foreclose) from recovering any unpaid
balance (Pacific Commercial Company vs. De la Rama, 72 Phil. 380).
But perhaps the best reason why respondent company may not be construed as having rescinded or
cancelled the contract of sale or foreclosed the mortgage on the automobile in question is precisely
because it brought suit for specific performance, and won, in the pre-war Civil Case No. 58043.
There is likewise no merit in the contention that the pre-war judgment had already prescribed. Said
judgment was entered on December 4, 1940, and on July 14, 1941, a writ of execution was issued.
Respondent company took no further step to enforce the judgment until May 19, 1954, on which date,
respondent scheduled two (2) parcels of land owned by the petitioners for sale at public auction
pursuant to the writ of July 14, 1941. From the entry of the judgment to May 19, 1954, a period of 13
years, 5 months and 15 days had elapsed. From this term we must deduct the period covered by the
debt moratorium under Executive Order No. 32 (which applied to all debts payable within the
Philippines), from the time the order took effect on March 10, 1945, until it was partially lifted by
Republic Act No. 342 on July 26, 1948.
Deducting the period during which Executive Order No. 32 was in force, which is 3 years, 4 months and
16 days, from 13 years, 5 months and 15 days, the period covered from the entry of the pre-war
judgment to the time respondent company attempted to sell the levied properties at auction, there is still
left a period of 10 years and 29 days. But as held in Talens vs. Chuakay & Co., G.R. No. L-10127, June
30, 1958, this Court may take judicial notice of the fact that regular courts in Luzon were closed for
months during the early part of the Japanese occupation until they were reconstituted by order of the
Chairman of the Executive Commission on January 30, 1942. 3 This interruption in the functions of the
courts has also been held to interrupt the running of the prescriptive period (see also Palma vs. Celda,
81 Phil. 416). That being the case, respondent company could not be barred by prescription from
proceeding with the execution sale pursuant to the levy and writ of execution issued under the pre-war
judgment, considering that even the minimum period of from December 8, 1941, the outbreak of the
Pacific War to January 30, 1942 is already a term of one (1) month and 23 days.
Petitioners raised the issue whether or not the pre-war writ of execution and levy may still be enforced
by sale of the levied property after the lapse of the five-year period within which a judgment may be
executed by motion. On this point, this Court has held:
We are of the opinion that a valid execution issued and levy made within the period provided by
law may be enforced by a sale thereafter. . . . The sale of the property by the sheriff and the
application of the proceeds are simply the carrying out of the writ of execution and levy which
when issued were valid. This rests upon the principle that the levy is the essential act by which
the property is set apart for the satisfaction of the judgment and taken into custody of the law,
and that after it has been taken from the defendant, his interest is limited to its application to the
judgment, irrespective of the time when it may be sold (Southern Cal. L. Co. vs. Hotel Co., 94
Cal. 217, 222). (Government of P.I. vs. Echaus, 71 Phil. 318)..
The case of Ansaldo vs. Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-2378, April
27, 1951, invoked by the petitioners, is not in point, for there the judgment creditor attempted to carry
out the writ of execution 10 years after entry of judgment. As correctly observed by the appellate court
below, both cited cases —
. . . affirm the fundamental principles that a valid judgment may be enforced by motion within
five years after its entry, and by action after the lapse of said period but before the same shall
have been barred by any statute of limitations, and that a valid execution issued and levy made
within the five-year period after entry of the judgment may be enforced by sale of the property
levied upon thereafter, provided the sale is made within ten years after the entry of the
judgment.
The petitioners should, however, be credited the amount of P409.75 which the respondent Manila Motor
Company actually received from the Philippine War Damage Commission on account of the car of
Gaudencio Quiambao that had been seized from it by the enemy occupant during the war. This should
reduce the principal amount still due the respondent from the petitioners to the sum of P1,542.72.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against petitioners.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon,
JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 The provision reads:
"In a contract for the sale of personal property payable in installments, failure to pay two or more
installments shall confer upon the vendor the right to cancel the sale or foreclose the mortgage
if one has been given on the property, without reimbursement to the purchaser of the
installments already paid, if there be an agreement to this effect."
2 The paragraph reads:
"However, if the vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he shall have no further action
against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owning by the same, and any
agreement to the contrary shall be null and void."
3 In Alcantara vs. Chico, 49 O.G. 150, the Court of Appeals estimated that in Bulacan, courts
were not opened for nearly five (5) months.
11.
89 Phil. 279
BENGZON, J.:
For the amount of four hundred and fifty pesos, Japanese currency, Fausto Isaac, plaintiff, sold to
Leopoldo Mendoza, defendant, a parcel of land in Pili, Camarines Sur, reserving the right to
repurchase within four years. The sale took place in February 1944. After liberation, the seller
offered to redeem, but defendant objected, saying the redemption was premature. Hence this
litigation instituted in the court of first instance of said province, in February 1946, to compel re-
transfer.
After having been duly summoned, the defendant failed to answer. Consequently, upon plaintiff's
motion, he was defaulted by order of May 10, 1947. Thereafter, i.e. on September 23, 1947,
considering the plaintiff's evidence the court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to execute a
deed of re-sale of the land, to receive the amount of P90 Philippine currency which Fausto Isaac had
consigned in court, and to pay damages in the sum of P95.
On December 9, 1947 Leopoldo Mendoza submitted a petition to set aside the judgment invoking
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Opposed by plaintiff, the petition was denied.
Wherefore defendant appealed directly to this court.
Basis of defendant's petition was the allegation that as his attorney Jorge C. Briones had not
received notice of the court's denial of his motion, to dismiss the complaint, he had reason to
believe the time to answer had not expired.
It appears from the record that, duly summoned, defendant through Attorney Briones filed a motion
to dismiss, which was overruled by order of April 8, 1946. At the bottom of that order there is a
notation that copy had been furnished Attorney Briones by ordinary mail. On February 8, 1947, the
plaintiff filed his motion for default, asserting that, defendant's motion to dismiss had been denied
and that so far, defendant had interposed no answer. On February 15, 1947 the court issued
an auto suspending consideration of plaintiff's motion and giving the defendant a period of ten days
within which to reply thereto, if he so desired. Copy of this directive was sent by registered mail to
Attorney Briones, but the latter "refused to claim the registered letter despite the notices given him
by the postmaster". And according to an affidavit submitted to the court, Attorney Penas for the
plaintiff, had again and again reminded Briones that the time was come for the answer.
Apprised of the foregoing circumstances, the court of first instance denied the petition to set aside.
We think such denial was entirely proper. According to the rules, Attorney Briones is. deemed to
have received the copy of the auto of February 15, 1947 which he declined to accept from the mails
(Rule 27 section 8). That order was sufficient to advise him of the rejection of his previous motion
of dismissal, supposing he had not actually r.eceived the copy of the order of April 8, 1946, which
had been forwarded to him by ordinary mail.
The appellant insists here that "the record fails to show a conclusive evidence that Atty. Jorge C.
Briones * * * was notified". This is refuted by the above account of the facts and of the governing
principles. It is remarkable that, to meet the conclusions therein set forth, defendant has not
introduced any sworn statement of Attorney Briones.
In connection with the argument that defendant should not suffer for his lawyer's shortcoming, it
should be explained that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique [1]; but if the client is prejudiced by the attorney's negligence or misconduct
he may recover damages.[2]
Another point, which is equally decisive. Unless the appellant has filed a motion to set aside the
order of default, on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 38, he has no standing in court nor the
right to appeal.[3] Examining appellant's motion of December 9, 1947 we observe that he merely
requested for the annulment of the decision rendered after his default (September 23, 1947) without
praying for the revocation of the order of May 10, 1947 declaring him to be in default. But granting,
for the sake of argument, that the aforesaid pleading impliedly included the second prayer, we are
met by the insuperable objection that the petition was too late, because filed beyond the six-month
period within which applications for relief under Rule 38 may be entertained. From May 10 to
December 9 seven months had elapsed.
Wherefore, this appeal being without merit, we affirm the order of the trial judge denying the
petition to set aside. With costs.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,
concur.
[1] 127 sec. 21; U. S. vs. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; Montes vs. Court of First Instance, 48 Phil., 640.
[2] In re Filart, 40 Phil., 205.
[3] Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 4C Off. Gaz., 3350; 80 Phil., 166.
12.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES.
JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA
K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE
LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS
ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name,
or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized
the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a
deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
— a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in
the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there
is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries
now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased
partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from
including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty.
E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their
firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in
view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client,
and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from
their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name,
shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those
of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to
liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm
name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-
lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment
to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received
from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division
are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered
into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of
deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will
have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm,
can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first
factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding
Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of
the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which
continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in
a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9 têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding

partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a
partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be
distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and
reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals
or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as
"a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in
support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm
names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety
of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp.
207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided
by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm
name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in
part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom.
Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice
should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by
a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean
that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom
must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the
absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the
Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against
which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil
law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which
are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be
considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A

trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial
to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self
assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely
competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the
world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession
does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and
learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers'
or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way
worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public
service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they
secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they
served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of
the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office
of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,
and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For
the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to
the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and
Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their
petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the
death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the
firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm
name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio,
on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established
in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired
an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom,
is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is
to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners.
That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law
firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year
when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of
the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office
of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,
and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For
the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to
the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and
Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their
petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the
death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the
firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm
name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio,
on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established
in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired
an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom,
is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is
to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners.
That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law
firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year
when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.
13.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks
the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their
witnesses who were residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said
province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts of
stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog
City; that when she was still a teenager and first year in college she came to know
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a
friend of her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the respondent
as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and
subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at
Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of the
usherettes in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973
and, she told respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent did,
and her father consented; that for three whole days she served as usherette in the
convention and respondent picked her up from her residence every morning and took
her home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and
invited her for a joy ride with the permission of her mother who was a former classmate
of respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled
along the beach, and in the course of which respondent proposed his love to her; that
respondent told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she would think it over
first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their house almost every night,
and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her decision on respondent's
proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and
respondent continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to
get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of her
father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched
her from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking
her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and took her to the airport at Sicayab,
Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where there were no houses
around; that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his
promise to marry her and then started caressing her downward and his hand kept on
moving to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then
said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry
you" and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have
been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be
afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time pulling
down her panty; that she told him that she was afraid because they were not yet
married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with
him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent
again reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he would
marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the
Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times a week, after which
he would take her to the airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had
this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of two or three
times a week, and she consented to all these things because she loved him and
believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her
menstruation which usually occurred during the second week of each month did not
come; she waited until the end of the month and still there was no menstruation; she
submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent and
respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but she objected and respondent did
not insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they would get married within
one month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her
parents about their marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in
Manila so as not to create a scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant
and her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent would
follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the house of
complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at
Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he could not marry complainant because
he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said:
"Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p.
138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant not to worry
because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years and he would work
for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.);
respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a monthly
support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually
sent the promised support; he came back to Manila in January 1974 and went to see
complainant; when asked about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told
complainant that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in
February and in March 1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.);
complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she delivers the child, but her
mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in
Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the
Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza
Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact
respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was ashamed she
just stayed in their house; she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for
medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did not come to
see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case
against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the case was referred
to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and
thus she filed the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth
certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as follows: that he
was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old; that because of
incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was
baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952
because he was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother because they were
former classmates in high school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he
used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became friends and often
talked with each other, and even talked about their personal problems; that he
mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her parents
he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him
to fetch her from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was
during this occasion that they became close to each other and after the convention, he
proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his
proposal and since then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his partner
during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m.
of that evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a headache, so he
decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he
drove around the city and proceeded to the airport; that when they were at the airport,
only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they were carried by their passion;
they forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he took her home; that
thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went on joy
riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place they could be
alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of her
pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and
respondent would take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents
of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married but
estranged from his wife; that when complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if
he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, otherwise, he would
be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his marriage as he had
been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to have sexual
intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery,
deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by complainant
because of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for
the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical expenses when she
went to Zamboanga City for medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about
20 years and 7 months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with
respondent, having been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and
41 years old at the time of the said relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that
the marriage ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that
said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his
relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime, having
been a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of
complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other
sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her
residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became a close friend when he
invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her
at her residence in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each
day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant
accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973,
complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber
of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock
that evening, they left the place but before going home, they went to the airport at
Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses
around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act and at
about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have
joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make
love twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant
became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it
was agreed that complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her
mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her
brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there
on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974; that
later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a
baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza
Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that
during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of
her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she
instituted the present disbarment proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing,
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent attorney
of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent
only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being
eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage
proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception
after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly,
respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a ground for annulment of
marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying in
Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as
though he was never married much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies
respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very
start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the
satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with
the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the
Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married
man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when he
said that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January
13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so
seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA
1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their
marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could
enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15).
As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any
evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the
Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he
was already married and would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January
13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming,
why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He
said while he was a moslem, but, having been married in a civil ceremony, he could no
longer validly enter into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977). Consequently, if respondent
knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant,
then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant because
he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has
amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in
order. Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which
all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA
653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains the power to
discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who
convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still
legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot
a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case
No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.
Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of
mental and moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to
impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action — disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality.
The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967];
Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such
a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and
Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued
membership in the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy
of being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent
Daarol.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
14.
QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is
an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years.
The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the
hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to
respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness
and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a
certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship
between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she
gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds
for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is
that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege
to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it
is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent
in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of
a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old)
Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of
the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states
that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must
conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As
stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a

consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
FIRST DIVISION
[Adm. Case No. 389. January 31, 1972.]
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA, Complainant, v. ARMANDO PUNO, Respondent.
Armando Puno in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; REINSTATEMENT; CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED, CASE AT BAR. — Where the
petitioner has striven to lead and has led a model and exemplary life despite the hardships undergone by him and
his family, and his exemplary conduct, since his disbartment is attested by public officials and civic organizations,
in which he has served as officer, of Zamboanga City; and considering that the complainant has expressed no
objection to his reinstatement in the practice of the law, provided said respondent supports his child by the
aforesaid complainant, to which condition respondent has expressly agreed; and considering that this Court is now
convinced that said respondent has evidenced his moral reform and willingness to atone for the misconduct that
led to his exclusion from the bar, and will endeavor in the future to lead an upright and irreproachable life,
assiduously avoiding occasion to bring the profession into disrepute, respondent Puno should be reinstated in the
practice of the law as a member of the Philippine Bar.
RESOLUTION
ON MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Respondent Armando Puno, of Zamboanga City, in Administrative Case No. 389, petitions for the lifting of the
disbarment decree issued against him by this Court in its decision of 28 February 1967, 1 pleading that since then
he has striven to lead and has led a model and exemplary life, despite the hardships undergone by him and his
family. His exemplary conduct since his disbarment is attested by public officials and civic organizations of
Zamboanga City, specially the local chapters of the Jaycees and the Boy Scouts, the Family Workshop of the
Philippines, the Zamboanga City Amateur Athletic Federation and the Amateur Basketball Association, in which he
has served as officer thereof. All of them have certified to this petitioner’s proper and irreproachable behaviour
during the past four years.
Considering that the complainant has expressed no objection to his reinstatement in the practice of the law,
provided said respondent supports his child by the aforesaid complainant, to which condition respondent Armando
Puno has expressly agreed: and considering that this Court is now convinced that said respondent has evidenced
his moral reform and willingness to atone for the misconduct that led to his exclusion from the bar, and will
endeavor in the future to lead an upright and irreproachable life, assiduously avoiding occasion to bring the
profession into disrepute: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As prayed for, respondent Armando Puno is ordered reinstated in the practice of the law as a member of the
Philippine Bar, subject to the conditions that (1) he shall formally acknowledge his child, Armando Puno, Jr., now in
the care of mother, complainant Flora Quingwa, and (2) the said petitioner will provide a minimum amount of
P126.00 per month for the support of said child starting from 31 January 1971. Let the name of said respondent be
restored to the roll of attorneys upon his taking anew the corresponding oath of office before this Court, and upon
his submittal of the formal acknowledgment of his child. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439.
15.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio.1One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not
in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the
defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was
previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In
appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be
very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing,
should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for
the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge
its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of
respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such
motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as
counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,
1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the
objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel
for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission
on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the
stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for
the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964
that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of
counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense
obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963,
November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino
H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to
March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been
postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from
Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty
of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of
the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring
Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State,
the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of
course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice
to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live;
certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him
as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11reiterated such a view in these words: "It is
true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high
a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the
latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his
care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not
mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is
expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance
was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough
for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether
he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if
he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic.
For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put
matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith,
no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an
exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above,
that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence,
if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there
are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
16.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86250 February 26, 1990
ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F. LACSON, ROMEO F. LACSON and ZENA F.
VELASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 22, and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and EPHRAIM J.
SERQUINA, respondents.
Victor H. Volfango for petitioners.
Ephraim J. Serquina for and his own behalf as respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
On August 26, 1987, the private respondent, Ephraim Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the
probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin. His petition was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
127-87 of the respondent court, entitled "In Re Testate Estate of Carmelita S. Farlin, Ephraim J.
Serquina, Petitioner." He also petitioned the court in his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein
petitioners, and as executor under the will.
The petition was not opposed and hence, on November 17, 1987, the respondent court issued a
"certificate of allowance," 1 the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, the Court hereby renders certification that subject
will and testament is accordingly allowed in accordance with Sec. 13 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 2
On March 14, 1988, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's fees" 3 against the petitioners,
alleging that the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the sum of P68,000.00.
Thereafter summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were a complaint against said
heirs" 4 directing them to answer the motion.
Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the sum
agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.
After pre-trial, the respondent court rendered judgment and disposed as follows:
In the light of the foregoing, considering the extent of the legal services rendered to the
clients, the value of the properties gained by the clients out of said services, the petition
for attorney's fees is granted. Judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent
heirs to pay their lawyer the sum of P65,000.00 as true and reasonable attorney's fees
which shall be a lien on the subject properties. Cost against the respondent.
SO ORDERED. 5
On October 21, 1988, eleven days after the heirs received a copy of the decision, 6 the latter filed a
notice of appeal.
On November 7, 1988, the respondent court issued an order directing the heirs to amend their notice of
appeal. 7
On October 27, 1988, the respondent court issued an order "noting" the notice on appeal "appellants
[the heirs] having failed to correct or complete the same within the reglementary period to effect an
appeal." 8
On November 24, 1988, the respondent court issued yet another order denying the notice of appeal for
failure of the heirs to file a record on appeal. 9
Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution.
On December 5, 1988, the respondent court issued an order granting execution. 10
The petitioners submit that the decision, dated October 26, 1988, and the orders, dated October 27,
1988, November 24, 1988, and December 5, 1988, respectively, are nun and void for the following
reasons: (1) the respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over the "motion for attorney's fees" for
failure on the part of the movant, Ephraim Serquina, to pay docket fees; (2) the respondent court
gravely abused its discretion in denying the heirs' notice of appeal for their failure to file a record on
appeal; and (3) the respondent court also gravely abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees
contrary to the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Serquina now defends the challenged acts of the respondent court: (1) his motion was a mere
incident to the main proceedings; (2) the respondent court rightly denied the notice of appeal in
question for failure of the heirs to submit a record on appeal; and (3) in collecting attorney's fees, he
was not acting as executor of Carmelita Farlin's last will and testament because no letters testamentary
had in fact been issued.
We take these up seriatim.
I.
Anent docket fees, it has been held 11 that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Although the rule has since been tempered, 12 that is, there must be a clear showing that the party had
intended to evade payment and to cheat the courts, it does not excuse him from paying docket fees as
soon as it becomes apparent that docket fees are indeed payable.
In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's fees" was clearly in the nature of an action commenced by
a lawyer against his clients for attorney's fees. The very decision of the court states:
This case is an out-growth from Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of same Court which was long
decided (sic). It resulted from the filing of a petition for attorney's fees by the lawyer of
the petitioner's heirs in the case against the latter.
Upon the filing of the petition for attorney's fees, the heir- respondents (sic) were
accordingly summoned to answer the petition as if it were a complaint against said heirs
who retained the petitioner as their lawyer in the said case.13
In that event, the parties should have known, the respondent court in particular, that docket fees should
have been priorly paid before the court could lawfully act on the case, and decide it.
It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an
escape valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether separate or as an
offshoot of a pending proceeding, the payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of
P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid the fees in question before the respondent
court could validly try his "motion".
II.
With respect to the second issue, it has been held that in appeals arising from an incident in a special
proceeding, a record on appeal is necessary, otherwise, the appeal faces a dismissal. 14 It has likewise
been held, however, that in the interest of justice, an appeal, brought without a record on appeal, may
be reinstated under exceptional circumstances. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is noted, however, that the question presented in this case is one of first impression;
that the petitioner acted in honest, if mistaken, interpretation of the applicable law; that
the probate court itself believed that the record on appeal was unnecessary; and that the
private respondent herself apparently thought so, too, for she did not move to dismiss
the appeal and instead impliedly recognized its validity by filing the appellee's brief.
In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that the
petitioner should be given an opportunity to comply with the above-discussed rules by
submitting the required record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal. The
issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs
already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent court. 15
In the instant case, the Court notes the apparent impression by the parties at the outset, that a record
on appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by: (1) the very holding of the respondent court that "[i]t is
now easy to appeal as there is no more need for a record on appeal . . . [b]y merely filing a notice of
appeal, the appellant can already institute his appeal . . . ;" 16 (2) in its order to amend notice of appeal,
it did not require the appellants to submit a record on appeal; and (3) Atty. Serquina interposed no
objection to the appeal on that ground.
In any event, since we are annulling the decision appealed from, the matter is a dead issue.
III.
As we have indicated, we are granting certiorari and are annulling the decision appealed from, but there
seems to be no reason why we can not dispose of the heirs' appeal in a single proceeding.
It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will is barred from recovering
attorney's fees from the estate. The Rule is specifically as follows:
SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for
services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. — An
executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care,
management and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for
the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so much
of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the
payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or
devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value, one per
centum of so much of such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed
thirty thousand pesos, one-half per centumof so much of such value as exceeds thirty
thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos, and one-
quarter per centum of so much of such value as exceeds one hundred thousand pesos.
But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended
with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If objection to the fees allowed
be taken, the allowance may be reexamined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be
apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by
them respectively.
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his
executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written
instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the
will. 17
The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary
expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His
compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executor's or
administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees. In one case, 18 we held that "a greater sum
[other than that established by the rule] may be allowed 'in any special case, where the estate is large,
and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator.'" 19 It is also left to the sound discretion of the court. 20 With
respect to attorney's fees, the rule, as we have seen, disallows them. Accordingly, to the extent that the
trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate as a
"lien on the subject properties," 21 the trial judge must be said to have gravely abused its discretion
(apart from the fact that it never acquired jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said Mr. Serquina's
"motion for attorney's fees").
The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a lawyer of an
administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his client. 22 Mutatis
mutandis, where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay
therefor.
In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly
proved. 23 They are also subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be reasonable, that is to say,
they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject matter in controversy; (2) the extent of the
services rendered; and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. 24 In all cases, they must be
addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the bare word of the parties. 25 And always, they are subject to
the moderating hand of the courts.
The records show that Atty. Ephraim Serquina, as counsel for the heirs, performed the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That after the order of allowance for probate of the will, the undersigned counsel
assisted the heirs to transfer immediately the above-mentioned real estate in their
respective names, from (sic) the payment of estate taxes in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of the titles, in order for the heirs to
sell the foregoing real estate of 10,683 sq. cm (which was also the subject of sale prior
to the death of the testator) to settle testator's obligations and day-to-day subsistence
being (sic) that the heirs, except Zena F. Velasco, are not employed neither doing any
business; 26
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty. Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed by
him (P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court (P65,000.00). The Court observes that these are
acts performed routinely since they form part of what any lawyer worth his salt is expected to do. The
will was furthermore not contested. They are not, so Justice Pedro Tuason wrote, "a case [where] the
administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an improvident disbursement of a substantial
amount without having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense to the estate," 27 to entitle
him to a bigger compensation. He did not exactly achieve anything out of the ordinary.
The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already been paid the sum of P6,000.00. 28 It is our
considered opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his efforts on a quantum meruit basis.
Hence, we hold the heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) GRANTING the petition and
making the temporary restraining order issued on January 16, 1989 PERMANENT; and (2) ORDERING
the petitioners to PAY the private respondent, Atty. Ephraim Serquina, attorney's fees in the sum of
P9,000.00. The said fees shall not be recovered from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
17.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77042-43 February 28, 1990
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC., et al., petitioners
vs.
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Manuel R. Singson for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the joint decision * promulgated on December 22, 1986, by the respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01063 entitled "International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs. Radiowealth, Inc. and Domingo M. Guevara, defendants-
appellants" and in CA-G.R. No. 01064 entitled "International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs. Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc., Radiowealth, Inc.
and D.M.G., Inc., defendants-appellants," the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, p. 101).
The basic facts appear undisputed and they are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, petitioners Radiowealth, Inc. (RWI) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. (RFC)
applied for and obtained credit facilities from private respondent International Corporate Bank
(Interbank). Petitioners Domingo Guevara (Guevara, for short) and D.M.G., Inc., acted as sureties to
the obligations contracted by RWI and RFC. The obligations of petitioners were accordingly covered
and evidenced by promissory notes, trust receipts and agreements.
A common stipulation in the covering promissory notes, trust receipts, and continuing surety
agreements between the borrowing petitioners and the lending private respondent provided, to wit:
In the event of the bringing of any action or suit by you or any default of the undersigned
hereunder I/We shall on demand pay you reasonable attorney's fees and other fees and
costs of collection, which shall in no cases be less than ten percentum (10 %) of the
value of the property and the amount involved by the action or suit. (Rollo, p. 211).
From 1978 to 1980, petitioners were not able to comply with their obligations on time with Interbank due
to subsequent severe economic and financial reverses. Petitioners thus asked Interbank for a
restructuring of their outstanding loans, but the parties were not able to arrive at a mutually acceptable
proposition.
On December 28, 1979, Interbank, constrained to seek judicial remedy, through its counsel Norberto J.
Quisumbing and Associates, lodged before the then Court of First Instance of Manila its first complaint,
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 128744, for collection of sum of money with an application for a writ
of preliminary attachment against RWI and Guevara covering the principal sum of P1,585,933.61 plus
penalties, service charges, interests, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 31-38).
This was followed by another complaint filed on January 9, 1980 before the same trial court against
RFC, RWI and D.M.G., Inc., also with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment, docketed as
Civil Case No. 128897, for the collection of the principal sum of P2,113,444.58, plus interests, penalties,
service charges, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 39-47).
Petitioners, however, opted to amicably settle their obligations promptly. They, therefore, did not file any
answer nor any responsive pleading to the complaints, and instead entered into a compromise
agreement with Interbank shortly about four (4) months later. Said compromise agreement between the
parties was embodied in two Motions for Judgment Based on Compromise dated March 21, 1980
(Rollo, pp. 48-55) corresponding to the separate claims in the said two complaints which were
accordingly submitted to the court a quo for approval. These motions did not however, cover the
payment by the petitioners of Interbank's claims for attorney's fees, costs of collection and expenses of
litigation which were left open by the parties for further negotiations.
In its decision in Civil Case No. 128744, dated March 28, 1980, the trial court approved the parties'
corresponding compromise agreement thereto, with the reservation that "(T)his decision does not
terminate this case because matters respecting payment of attorney's fees, costs and collection."
Similarly, the trial court, in its decision in Civil Case No. 128897 of even date, also approved the parties'
corresponding compromise agreement thereto with the Identical reservation as aforequoted (Rollo, pp.
60-61).
Thereafter, further proceedings were conducted by the trial court particularly on the issue of the alleged
unreasonableness and unconscionableness of the attorney's fees. It appears from the records of the
cases, however, that Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, counsel for Interbank, was able to adduce his
evidence in support for the attorney's fees due to his said client, while Attys. Reyes and Guevara,
counsel for petitioners in the trial court, were not given their request for further hearing against the
claimed attorney's fees despite some supervening events as alleged in their motion for reconsideration
dated January 29, 1981 (Rollo, pp. 82-84) which was denied in the Order of January 30, 1981 (Rollo, p.
85).
At any rate, the trial court, in its Order dated January 2, 1981, had already reduced Interbank's claim for
attorney's fees, from the stipulated 10 % to 8 %, pertinent portions thereof are hereunder quoted, thus:
(T)he 'ten per cent' in the foregoing quoted provisions includes attorney's fees, other
fees and cost of collection. In paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 128744 under which the defendants therein acknowledge their indebtedness
of Pl,585,933.61 as of December 28, 1979, it is provided that in paying the same there
shall be added to it 16 % per annum as interest, 2 % per annum as service charge, 2 %
per month or any fraction thereof as penalty from January 31, 1980. A similar provision
is contained in paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement filed in Civil Case No..
128897 under which the defendants therein admitted their indebtedness of
P2,113,444.58, payment of which was to commence on or before January 31, 1980. The
service charge of 2 % should be deducted from the 10 % already mentioned above, to
give the rate of attorney's fees which is 8% in accordance with the provisions already
aforequoted. Eight percent (8 %) of l,585,833.61, or P126,824.68 is the attorney's fees
in Civil Case No. 128897 — sums which ... are not excessive and perhaps acceptable to
plaintiff which was willing to have its claim reduced to P73,987.57 had defendants
acceded to its offer to compromise attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the defendants in Civil Case No.
128744 to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally P126,824.68 and the defendants in Civil
Case No. 128897 to pay the plaintiff, also jointly and severally, P169,075.56 with interest
at 12 % per annum from this date until the same is paid.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 80-81).
Not satisfied with said trial court's order, petitioners appealed the same before the respondent appellate
court raising therewith the following assigned errors:
A. The lower court erred in not giving the defendants the opportunity to
be heard in a hearing set for the purpose of determining the amount of
attorney's fees;
B. The lower court erred in insisting that the amount of attorney's fees
should be governed by the contract signed by the parties;
C. The lower court erred in not substantially reducing the amount of
attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 242-243).
The respondent appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the assailed order of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
I. Whether or not the reasonableness of attorney's fees in the case at bar
is a question of law;
II. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in the case at bar is
reasonable;
III. Whether or not a contracted stipulation regarding attorney's fees may
be disregarded by this Honorable Court;
IV. whether or not attorney's fees require proof (Rollo, p. 243).
Deducible from the contentions of the parties, is the sole issue of whether or not the amount equivalent
to 8 % of the recovery or sums of money due from the two civil complaints adjudged as attorney's fees
by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is fair and reasonable under the
peculiar facts and circumstances herein. Corollarily, whether or not the court has discretion to modify
the attorney's fees previously agreed upon by the parties under a valid contractual stipulation.
Petitioners assert that the sums of P126,824.68 in Civil Case No. 128744 and P169,075.56 in Civil
Case No. 128897 or 8 % of the amount involved in the respective suits, adjudged as attorney's fees
due to Norberto J. Quisumbing and Associates, counsel of record of the judgment creditor the herein
private respondent Interbank, per the order of the trial court, is unreasonable, exhorbitant and
unconscionable under the premises considering the following undisputed facts: that said cases were
immediately settled with the execution of a compromise agreement after the complaints with prayer for
preliminary attachment had been filed by the private respondent against the petitioners in the lower
court, and no answer was filed by petitioners; that pursuant to the Compromise Agreement between the
parties, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc. has fully paid to Interbank in Civil Case No. 128744 the total
amount of P2,867,802.64, while petitioner Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. (RFC) has fully paid to
Interbank in Civil Case No. 128897 the total amount of P3,018,192.52; that of the amounts paid to
Interbank, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc., has fully paid the total sum of P118,075.84 as service charge
and penalties, while petitioner Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., had paid the total amount of P135,526.40
as penalties and service charges, all in addition to the interests paid by petitioners to Interbank.
Interbank, on the other hand, avers that petitioners have omitted to state certain facts and
circumstances, as follows: that the collection suits filed against petitioners involve charges of violation
of the trust receipts law for disposing of the goods they had received from Interbank on trust receipts
and failing to surrender the proceeds thereof; that Atty. Quisumbing had successfully obtained
attachment against their properties; that Atty. Quisumbing succeeded in forcing petitioners to agree in
the joint motions for judgment based on compromise to such stipulation which made them fear a default
in the payment of the amortizations or installments of the compromise amount; that the principal
amount collected from petitioners totalled P3,699,378.19, not counting the interests; that petitioners'
obligations to Interbank were not evidenced by one but many letters of credit and trust receipts; that the
records were destroyed by fire and had to be reconstituted; that Interbank had already given petitioners
very substantial discounts on penalty charges; and, despite clear contractual stipulations, the lower
court had already reduced the 10 % stipulated attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to 8 %.
As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify or change even an
admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding attorney's fees is conceded. The high
standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if
not limit the lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to
undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of
the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It
becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable
character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative
of the courts (Panay Electric Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos vs. City of
Manila, 45 SCRA 409 [1972]; Rolando vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 8 SCRA 826 [1963]). And this Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an
agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the
contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987]; Mutual Paper Inc. vs. Eastern Scott Paper Co.,
110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe vs. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425 [1959]; Turner vs. Casabar, 65 Phil. 490
[1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. vs. Alejano, 53 Phil. 986 [1929]). For the law recognizes the validity of
stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to
attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable
(Philippine Engineering Co. vs. Green, 48 Phil. 466).
There is no mistake, however, that the reasonableness of attorney's fees, though seemingly a matter of
fact which takes into account the peculiar circumstances of the case, is a question of law where the
facts are not disputed at all. For a question of law does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties (Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]), and
where the issue is the construction or interpretation to be placed by the appellate court upon
documentary evidence, or when a case is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts or where all the
facts are stated in the judgment, the question is one of law where the issue is the correctness of the
conclusion drawn therefrom (Cunanan vs. Lazatin, 74 Phil. 719 [1944]; Ng Young vs. Villa, 93 Phil. 21
[1953]). In the case at bar, the issues do not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence because the ultimate facts are admitted by the parties and all the basic facts are stated in the
judgment.
Nevertheless, a careful review of the records shows that the modified attorney's fees fixed by the trial
court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, appears reasonable and fair under the admitted
circumstances of the case. As aptly reasoned out by the said court:
We find nothing wrong in the aforegoing disquisition of the lower court.
It is to be remembered that attorney's fees provided in contracts as recoverable against
the other party and damages are not, strictly speaking, the attorney's fees recoverable
as between attorneys and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather,
the attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulations
therefor is aptly called a penal clause, So long as such stipulation does not contravene
law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the defendant (Polytrade
Corporation vs. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187 [1969]). However:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty,
shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. For
this reason, we do not really have to strictly view the reasonableness of
the attorney's fees in the light of such facts as the amount and character
of the service rendered, the nature and importance of the litigation, and
the professional character and the social standing of the attorney. We do
concede, however that these factors may be an aid in the determination
of the inequity or unconscionableness of attorney's fees as liquidated
damages. (Supra)
May the attorney's fees granted by the court be tagged as iniquitous or unconscionable?
We give the answer in the negative. The high standing of plaintiffs counsel has not been
challenged.
In the motion for judgment based on compromise agreement, defendants acknowledged
and admitted their default or failure to pay their joint and several obligations or
indebtedness arising from the credit facilities which plaintiff extended to defendants and
availed of by the latter, the punctual payment of which having been guaranteed and
warranted by the other defendants. Having admitted such default in the payment of their
obligations, the filing of the action in court and, consequently, the legal services of
counsel became imperative and thereby, set into operation the contract clause on the
payment of attorney's fees.
The complaints are not simple actions for collection. They are accompanied with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and charge defendants with
violation of the trust receipts law and they involve several letters of credit and trust
receipts. The fact that the compromise agreements were entered into after the
complaints were filed against appellants indubitably proves that the legal action taken by
counsel for the plaintiff against the defendants contributed in no measure to the early
settlement of defendants' obligation.
Considering further that, apart from the reduction and waiver of penalty charges due to
the plaintiff to the extent of P79, 191.72, the service charge of 2 % was further deducted
by the lower court thereby, reducing the attorney's fees to 8 % the court is of the
considered opinion and so holds that given the prestige of plaintiff's counsel, the nature
of the action and quality of legal services rendered, the award of attorney's fees in a
sum equivalent to 8 % of the judgment which is below the stipulated fees of 10 % could
hardly be suggested as iniquitous and unconscionable. On the contrary, it easily falls
within the rule of conscionable and reasonable. (Rollo, pp. 100-101).
The foregoing disquisition merits our assent.
Moreover, even if the so-called supervening event which ought to have been heard in the trial court as
alleged in petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated January 29, 1981, i.e., "that supervening events
happened from the time the trust receipt agreements were signed in which the defendants agreed to
pay 10 % of the amount due as attorney's fees and costs of collection up to the actual filing of the
complaint and these events were the payments of interest in the amount of P285,341.27, as interest,
P41,507.37 as service charges and P76,568.47 as penalty by Radiowealth, Inc.; that Radiowealth
Finance Co., Inc. has paid the amount of P281,940.12 as interest, P38,721.83 as service charges and
P96,804.57 as penalty (Rollo, pp. 137-138), were to be considered, they would still be insufficient to
justify a further substantial reduction in the adjudged attorney's fees. At any rate, it would be noted that
petitioners have not even prayed for a specific reduction as to amount or percentage of the attorney's
fees except for their sweeping allegations of unreasonableness, exhorbitance and unconscionableness.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent appellate court is Affirmed, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
18.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
08265-08268 1affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to pay
its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, movant therein, the amount of
P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.
The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the above-
mentioned civil cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX
AND XXIV) in behalf of petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds
of sale, with damages.
The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder
set forth as found by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A
certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a
total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the
petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel
Corporation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates
of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser thereof Subsequently, Alejandro,
alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the parcels
of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.
It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister
corporation, Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On
the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction
Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby
mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that
private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed
an urgent motion for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on
August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien,
pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice,
petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the
same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of
title of the parcels of land.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated and
were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints
therein, which motion the lower court granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On
December 29, 1983, the same court ordered the Register of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens of
private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to
453099 of the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.
On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit,
which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner
manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of
P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance,
including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private
respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent
court, granting payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (METROBANK) and Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation 4 are hereby
ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and Associates the amount of P936,000.00 as its
proper, just and reasonable attorney's fees in these cases. 5
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on February
11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the same was
denied in a resolution promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.
The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1)
whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and
(3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in
the civil cases before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the
words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments. 6
We agree with petitioner.
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of
his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such
lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance
of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce
his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services
were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. 7
In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the
frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor
made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein.
This being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It
is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner
as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.
In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movant-
appellant attorney sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint
for injunction which was dismissed by the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by
the litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, it follows that no sum can be awarded the defendant for damages. It becomes
apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the defendant, herein appellant's lien could
not be enforced. The appellant, could, by appropriate action, collect his fees as attorney.
Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of
whatever nature," 10 relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some
American cases holding that the lien attaches to the judgment recovered by an attorney and the
proceeds in whatever form they may be. 12
The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are some American
cases holding that the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules on
which they are based and the factual situations involved therein are neither explained nor may it be said
that they are of continuing validity as to be applicable in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that legal
concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or nuances upon adoption by other
jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited expressly
declares that "in the absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general
rule is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with
respect to the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title of his client thereto,
recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended successfully such client's
right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the situation in the case at bar.
This is an inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in
doctrinal rulings of converse or modulated import.
To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to
judgments for money and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec
verba. The language of the law is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate interpretation. 14
Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case law
despite the dearth of cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., 15 the
Court had the occasion to rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the
property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution." In Ampil
vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the Court once again declared that a charging lien "presupposes that the
attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands
vs. Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for
delivery of real property as in the instant case."
Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent,
there was an express declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in
litigation."
Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the
adverse party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not
extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. 18 More specifically, an attorney merely
defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in
litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client's title to
property already in the client's
possession. 19
While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating
the services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising
his action, 20 this rule cannot find application here as the termination of the cases below was not at the
instance of private respondent's client but of the opposing party.
The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which amply
demonstrates that private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien.
Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within
the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is
settled. 21 There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to determine
attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules,
however, apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.
On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with the
authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper
proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main
action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The
persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the
question of their propriety or amount. 23 Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter
in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the
lawyer. 24 These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number of
decisions as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of all these factors would
indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence
to establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.
Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on
private respondent in collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise of
any other right conferred by law, the proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural rules
duly observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of abuse or prejudice, or what may be
misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation. 26
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private
respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
19.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124242. January 21, 2005]
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, PABLO S. BABASANTA, SPS. MIGUEL LU and
PACITA ZAVALLA LU, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
From a coaptation of the records of this case, it appears that respondents Miguel Lu
and Pacita Zavalla, (hereinafter, the Spouses Lu) owned two (2) parcels of land situated in
Sta. Rosa, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-39022 and TCT No. T-39023 both measuring
15,808 square meters or a total of 3.1616 hectares.
On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land to
respondent Pablo Babasanta, (hereinafter, Babasanta) for the price of fifteen pesos
(P15.00) per square meter. Babasanta made a downpayment of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of the same
date. Several other payments totaling two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) were
made by Babasanta.
Sometime in May 1989, Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand the

execution of a final deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of the
purchase price. In the same letter, Babasanta notified the spouses about having received
information that the spouses sold the same property to another without his knowledge and
consent. He demanded that the second sale be cancelled and that a final deed of sale be
issued in his favor.
In response, Pacita Lu wrote a letter to Babasanta wherein she acknowledged having

agreed to sell the property to him at fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter. She,
however, reminded Babasanta that when the balance of the purchase price became due,
he requested for a reduction of the price and when she refused, Babasanta backed out of
the sale. Pacita added that she returned the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to
Babasanta through Eugenio Oya.
On 2 June 1989, respondent Babasanta, as plaintiff, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 31, of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages[1] against his co-respondents herein, the Spouses Lu. Babasanta alleged that
the lands covered by TCT No. T- 39022 and T-39023 had been sold to him by the spouses
at fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter. Despite his repeated demands for the
execution of a final deed of sale in his favor, respondents allegedly refused.
In their Answer,[2] the Spouses Lu alleged that Pacita Lu obtained loans from
Babasanta and when the total advances of Pacita reached fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), the latter and Babasanta, without the knowledge and consent of Miguel Lu,
had verbally agreed to transform the transaction into a contract to sell the two parcels of
land to Babasanta with the fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to be considered as the
downpayment for the property and the balance to be paid on or before 31 December 1987.
Respondents Lu added that as of November 1987, total payments made by Babasanta
amounted to only two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) and the latter allegedly
failed to pay the balance of two hundred sixty thousand pesos (P260,000.00) despite
repeated demands. Babasanta had purportedly asked Pacita for a reduction of the price
from fifteen pesos (P15.00) to twelve pesos (P12.00) per square meter and when the
Spouses Lu refused to grant Babasantas request, the latter rescinded the contract to sell
and declared that the original loan transaction just be carried out in that the spouses would
be indebted to him in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Accordingly, on 6 July 1989, they purchased Interbank Managers Check No. 05020269 in
the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in the name of Babasanta to
show that she was able and willing to pay the balance of her loan obligation.
Babasanta later filed an Amended Complaint dated 17 January 1990[3] wherein he

prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order
and the inclusion of the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna as party defendant. He
contended that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was necessary to restrain the
transfer or conveyance by the Spouses Lu of the subject property to other persons.
The Spouses Lu filed their Opposition[4] to the amended complaint contending that it
raised new matters which seriously affect their substantive rights under the original
complaint. However, the trial court in its Order dated 17 January 1990 [5] admitted the
amended complaint.
On 19 January 1990, herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC)
filed a Motion for Intervention[6] before the trial court. SLDC alleged that it had legal
interest in the subject matter under litigation because on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of
land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and 1764-B, had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute
Sale with Mortgage.[7] It alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and
therefore it had a better right over the property in litigation.
In his Opposition to SLDCs motion for intervention, [8] respondent Babasanta demurred
and argued that the latter had no legal interest in the case because the two parcels of land
involved herein had already been conveyed to him by the Spouses Lu and hence, the
vendors were without legal capacity to transfer or dispose of the two parcels of land to the
intervenor.
Meanwhile, the trial court in its Order dated 21 March 1990 allowed SLDC to
intervene. SLDC filed its Complaint-in-Intervention on 19 April 1990.[9] Respondent
Babasantas motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction was likewise granted by the
trial court in its Order dated 11 January 1991[10] conditioned upon his filing of a bond in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
SLDC in its Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that on 11 February 1989, the Spouses

Lu executed in its favor an Option to Buy the lots subject of the complaint. Accordingly, it
paid an option money in the amount of three hundred sixteen thousand one hundred sixty
pesos (P316,160.00) out of the total consideration for the purchase of the two lots of one
million two hundred sixty-four thousand six hundred forty pesos (P1,264,640.00). After the
Spouses Lu received a total amount of six hundred thirty-two thousand three hundred
twenty pesos (P632,320.00) they executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage in its favor. SLDC added that the certificates of title over the property were
delivered to it by the spouses clean and free from any adverse claims and/or notice of lis
pendens. SLDC further alleged that it only learned of the filing of the complaint sometime
in the early part of January 1990 which prompted it to file the motion to intervene without
delay. Claiming that it was a buyer in good faith, SLDC argued that it had no obligation to
look beyond the titles submitted to it by the Spouses Lu particularly because Babasantas
claims were not annotated on the certificates of title at the time the lands were sold to it.
After a protracted trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on 30 July 1993 upholding the
sale of the property to SLDC. It ordered the Spouses Lu to pay Babasanta the sum of two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) with legal interest plus the further sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees. On the complaint-in-intervention,
the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the original of the TCT No. T-39022 (T-7218) and No. T-
39023 (T-7219).
Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that since both Babasanta
and SLDC did not register the respective sales in their favor, ownership of the property
should pertain to the buyer who first acquired possession of the property. The trial court
equated the execution of a public instrument in favor of SLDC as sufficient delivery of the
property to the latter. It concluded that symbolic possession could be considered to have
been first transferred to SLDC and consequently ownership of the property pertained to
SLDC who purchased the property in good faith.
Respondent Babasanta appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals
alleging in the main that the trial court erred in concluding that SLDC is a purchaser in
good faith and in upholding the validity of the sale made by the Spouses Lu in favor of
SLDC.
Respondent spouses likewise filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. They contended
that the trial court erred in failing to consider that the contract to sell between them and
Babasanta had been novated when the latter abandoned the verbal contract of sale and
declared that the original loan transaction just be carried out. The Spouses Lu argued that
since the properties involved were conjugal, the trial court should have declared the verbal
contract to sell between Pacita Lu and Pablo Babasanta null and void ab initio for lack of
knowledge and consent of Miguel Lu. They further averred that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the complaint filed by Babasanta; in awarding damages in his favor and in
refusing to grant the reliefs prayed for in their answer.
On 4 October 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[11] which set aside the
judgment of the trial court. It declared that the sale between Babasanta and the Spouses
Lu was valid and subsisting and ordered the spouses to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance in favor of Babasanta, and the latter to pay the balance of the purchase price
in the amount of two hundred sixty thousand pesos (P260,000.00). The appellate court
ruled that the Absolute Deed of Sale with Mortgage in favor of SLDC was null and void on
the ground that SLDC was a purchaser in bad faith. The Spouses Lu were further ordered
to return all payments made by SLDC with legal interest and to pay attorneys fees to
Babasanta.
SLDC and the Spouses Lu filed separate motions for reconsideration with the
appellate court.[12] However, in a Manifestation dated 20 December 1995,[13] the Spouses
Lu informed the appellate court that they are no longer contesting the decision dated 4
October 1995.
In its Resolution dated 11 March 1996,[14] the appellate court considered as withdrawn
the motion for reconsideration filed by the Spouses Lu in view of their manifestation of 20
December 1995. The appellate court denied SLDCs motion for reconsideration on the
ground that no new or substantial arguments were raised therein which would warrant
modification or reversal of the courts decision dated 4 October 1995.
Hence, this petition.
SLDC assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAN LORENZO WAS
NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH BECAUSE WHEN THE SELLER PACITA
ZAVALLA LU OBTAINED FROM IT THE CASH ADVANCE OF P200,000.00,
SAN LORENZO WAS PUT ON INQUIRY OF A PRIOR TRANSACTION ON THE
PROPERTY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
ESTABLISHED FACT THAT THE ALLEGED FIRST BUYER, RESPONDENT
BABASANTA, WAS NOT IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY
WHEN SAN LORENZO BOUGHT AND TOOK POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY AND NO ADVERSE CLAIM, LIEN, ENCUMBRANCE OR LIS
PENDENS WAS ANNOTATED ON THE TITLES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE FACT
THAT RESPONDENT BABASANTA HAS SUBMITTED NO EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT SAN LORENZO WAS AWARE OF HIS RIGHTS OR
INTERESTS IN THE DISPUTED PROPERTY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING
ITS FULL CONCURRENCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL
COURT, IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT UPHOLDING THE TITLE OF SAN LORENZO AS A BUYER AND
FIRST POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH. [15]
SLDC contended that the appellate court erred in concluding that it had prior notice of
Babasantas claim over the property merely on the basis of its having advanced the
amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) to Pacita Lu upon the latters
representation that she needed the money to pay her obligation to Babasanta. It argued
that it had no reason to suspect that Pacita was not telling the truth that the money would
be used to pay her indebtedness to Babasanta. At any rate, SLDC averred that the amount
of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) which it advanced to Pacita Lu would be
deducted from the balance of the purchase price still due from it and should not be
construed as notice of the prior sale of the land to Babasanta. It added that at no instance
did Pacita Lu inform it that the lands had been previously sold to Babasanta.
Moreover, SLDC stressed that after the execution of the sale in its favor it immediately
took possession of the property and asserted its rights as new owner as opposed to
Babasanta who has never exercised acts of ownership. Since the titles bore no adverse
claim, encumbrance, or lien at the time it was sold to it, SLDC argued that it had every
reason to rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and it was not obliged to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Invoking the presumption
of good faith, it added that the burden rests on Babasanta to prove that it was aware of the
prior sale to him but the latter failed to do so. SLDC pointed out that the notice of lis
pendens was annotated only on 2 June 1989 long after the sale of the property to it was
consummated on 3 May 1989.
Meanwhile, in an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation dated 27 August 1999, the Spouses

Lu informed the Court that due to financial constraints they have no more interest to
pursue their rights in the instant case and submit themselves to the decision of the Court
of Appeals.[16]
On the other hand, respondent Babasanta argued that SLDC could not have acquired
ownership of the property because it failed to comply with the requirement of registration of
the sale in good faith. He emphasized that at the time SLDC registered the sale in its favor
on 30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the
property made as early as 2 June 1989. Hence, petitioners registration of the sale did not
confer upon it any right. Babasanta further asserted that petitioners bad faith in the
acquisition of the property is evident from the fact that it failed to make necessary inquiry
regarding the purpose of the issuance of the two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
managers check in his favor.
The core issue presented for resolution in the instant petition is who between SLDC
and Babasanta has a better right over the two parcels of land subject of the instant case in
view of the successive transactions executed by the Spouses Lu.
To prove the perfection of the contract of sale in his favor, Babasanta presented a
document signed by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as partial payment for 3.6 hectares of farm lot situated at Barangay Pulong,
Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.[17] While the receipt signed by Pacita did not mention the
price for which the property was being sold, this deficiency was supplied by Pacita Lus
letter dated 29 May 1989 [18] wherein she admitted that she agreed to sell the 3.6 hectares
of land to Babasanta for fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter.
An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence presented by
the parties, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement between Babasanta and
the Spouses Lu is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
Contracts, in general, are perfected by mere consent, [19] which is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. [20] Moreover, contracts
shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present. [21]
The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares of farm
lot situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the
ownership of the property until full payment of the price which is a distinguishing feature of
a contract to sell, the subsequent acts of the parties convince us that the Spouses Lu
never intended to transfer ownership to Babasanta except upon full payment of the
purchase price.
Babasantas letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein that despite
his repeated requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor so that he
could effect full payment of the price, Pacita Lu allegedly refused to do so. In effect,
Babasanta himself recognized that ownership of the property would not be transferred to
him until such time as he shall have effected full payment of the price. Moreover, had the
sellers intended to transfer title, they could have easily executed the document of sale in
its required form simultaneously with their acceptance of the partial payment, but they did
not. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by Pacita Lu should legally be considered as a
perfected contract to sell.
The distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale is quite germane. In a
contract of sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a
contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass
until the full payment of the price. [22] In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot
recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a
contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such
payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but an
event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. [23]
The perfected contract to sell imposed upon Babasanta the obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price. There being an obligation to pay the price, Babasanta
should have made the proper tender of payment and consignation of the price in court as
required by law. Mere sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to pay
without the accompanying payment is not considered a valid tender of payment.
[24] Consignation of the amounts due in court is essential in order to extinguish Babasantas
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. Glaringly absent from the records is
any indication that Babasanta even attempted to make the proper consignation of the
amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the sellers to convey title never acquired
obligatory force.
On the assumption that the transaction between the parties is a contract of sale and
not a contract to sell, Babasantas claim of ownership should nevertheless fail.
Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent [25] and from that
moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance. [26] The essential elements of a
contract of sale, to wit: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3)
cause of the obligation which is established. [27]
The perfection of a contract of sale should not, however, be confused with its
consummation. In relation to the acquisition and transfer of ownership, it should be noted
that sale is not a mode, but merely a title. A mode is the legal means by which dominion or
ownership is created, transferred or destroyed, but title is only the legal basis by which to
affect dominion or ownership.[28] Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, ownership and other
real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and
intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition. Contracts only
constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or
tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same. [29] Therefore, sale by itself does not
transfer or affect ownership; the most that sale does is to create the obligation to transfer
ownership. It is tradition or delivery, as a consequence of sale, that actually transfers
ownership.
Explicitly, the law provides that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the
vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Article 1497
to 1501.[30]The word delivered should not be taken restrictively to mean transfer of actual
physical possession of the property. The law recognizes two principal modes of delivery, to
wit: (1) actual delivery; and (2) legal or constructive delivery.
Actual delivery consists in placing the thing sold in the control and possession of the
vendee.[31] Legal or constructive delivery, on the other hand, may be had through any of
the following ways: the execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale; [32] symbolical
tradition such as the delivery of the keys of the place where the movable sold is being
kept;[33] traditio longa manu or by mere consent or agreement if the movable sold cannot
yet be transferred to the possession of the buyer at the time of the sale; [34] traditio brevi
manu if the buyer already had possession of the object even before the sale;
[35] and traditio constitutum possessorium, where the seller remains in possession of the
property in a different capacity.[36]
Following the above disquisition, respondent Babasanta did not acquire ownership by
the mere execution of the receipt by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of partial payment
for the property. For one, the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu, though
valid, was not embodied in a public instrument. Hence, no constructive delivery of the
lands could have been effected. For another, Babasanta had not taken possession of the
property at any time after the perfection of the sale in his favor or exercised acts of
dominion over it despite his assertions that he was the rightful owner of the lands. Simply
stated, there was no delivery to Babasanta, whether actual or constructive, which is
essential to transfer ownership of the property. Thus, even on the assumption that the
perfected contract between the parties was a sale, ownership could not have passed to
Babasanta in the absence of delivery, since in a contract of sale ownership is transferred
to the vendee only upon the delivery of the thing sold. [37]
However, it must be stressed that the juridical relationship between the parties in a
double sale is primarily governed by Article 1544 which lays down the rules of preference
between the two purchasers of the same property. It provides:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains
greater significance in case of double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold
twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of
Property, both made in good faith, shall be deemed the owner. [38] Verily, the act of
registration must be coupled with good faith that is, the registrant must have no knowledge
of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which
should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. [39]
Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds after it had acquired
knowledge of Babasantas claim. Babasanta, however, strongly argues that the registration
of the sale by SLDC was not sufficient to confer upon the latter any title to the property
since the registration was attended by bad faith. Specifically, he points out that at the time
SLDC registered the sale on 30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens on
the file with the Register of Deeds, the same having been filed one year before on 2 June
1989.
Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens obliterate the effects of delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly
had occurred prior to SLDCs knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta?
We do not hold so.
It must be stressed that as early as 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed

the Option to Buy in favor of SLDC upon receiving P316,160.00 as option money from
SLDC. After SLDC had paid more than one half of the agreed purchase price
of P1,264,640.00, the Spouses Lu subsequently executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor or SLDC. At the time both deeds were executed, SLDC had no
knowledge of the prior transaction of the Spouses Lu with Babasanta. Simply stated, from
the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment of transfer and delivery of
possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the subsequent annotation
of lis pendens has no effect at all on the consummated sale between SLDC and the
Spouses Lu.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other person in the property. [40] Following the foregoing definition, we rule that SLDC
qualifies as a buyer in good faith since there is no evidence extant in the records that it
had knowledge of the prior transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the time of the sale of the
property to SLDC, the vendors were still the registered owners of the property and were in
fact in possession of the lands. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a person dealing
with the owner of registered land is not bound to go beyond the certificate of title as he is
charged with notice of burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register
or on the certificate of title. [41] In assailing knowledge of the transaction between him and
the Spouses Lu, Babasanta apparently relies on the principle of constructive notice
incorporated in Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which
reads, thus:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease,
lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall,
if registered, filed, or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from
the time of such registering, filing, or entering.
However, the constructive notice operates as suchby the express wording of Section
52from the time of the registration of the notice of lis pendens which in this case was
effected only on 2 June 1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDC had long been
consummated insofar as the obligation of the Spouses Lu to transfer ownership over the
property to SLDC is concerned.
More fundamentally, given the superiority of the right of SLDC to the claim of
Babasanta the annotation of the notice of lis pendens cannot help Babasantas position a
bit and it is irrelevant to the good or bad faith characterization of SLDC as a purchaser. A
notice of lis pendens, as the Court held in Natao v. Esteban,[42] serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that
he should keep his hands off the same, unless he intends to gamble on the results of the
litigation. Precisely, in this case SLDC has intervened in the pending litigation to protect its
rights. Obviously, SLDCs faith in the merit of its cause has been vindicated with the Courts
present decision which is the ultimate denouement on the controversy.
The Court of Appeals has made capital [43] of SLDCs averment in its Complaint-in-
Intervention[44] that at the instance of Pacita Lu it issued a check for P200,000.00 payable
to Babasanta and the confirmatory testimony of Pacita Lu herself on cross-examination.
[45] However, there is nothing in the said pleading and the testimony which explicitly relates
the amount to the transaction between the Spouses Lu and Babasanta for what they attest
to is that the amount was supposed to pay off the advances made by Babasanta to Pacita
Lu. In any event, the incident took place after the Spouses Lu had already executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage in favor of SLDC and therefore, as previously
explained, it has no effect on the legal position of SLDC.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that SLDCs registration of the sale had been tainted by
the prior notice of lis pendens and assuming further for the same nonce that this is a case
of double sale, still Babasantas claim could not prevail over that of SLDCs. In Abarquez v.
Court of Appeals,[46] this Court had the occasion to rule that if a vendee in a double sale
registers the sale after he has acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration
constitutes a registration in bad faith and does not confer upon him any right. If the
registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is no registration at all, and the buyer who
has taken possession first of the property in good faith shall be preferred.
In Abarquez, the first sale to the spouses Israel was notarized and registered only
after the second vendee, Abarquez, registered their deed of sale with the Registry of
Deeds, but the Israels were first in possession. This Court awarded the property to the
Israels because registration of the property by Abarquez lacked the element of good faith.
While the facts in the instant case substantially differ from that in Abarquez, we would not
hesitate to rule in favor of SLDC on the basis of its prior possession of the property in good
faith. Be it noted that delivery of the property to SLDC was immediately effected after the
execution of the deed in its favor, at which time SLDC had no knowledge at all of the prior
transaction by the Spouses Lu in favor of Babasanta.
The law speaks not only of one criterion. The first criterion is priority of entry in the
registry of property; there being no priority of such entry, the second is priority of
possession; and, in the absence of the two priorities, the third priority is of the date of title,
with good faith as the common critical element. Since SLDC acquired possession of the
property in good faith in contrast to Babasanta, who neither registered nor possessed the
property at any time, SLDCs right is definitely superior to that of Babasantas.
At any rate, the above discussion on the rules on double sale would be purely
academic for as earlier stated in this decision, the contract between Babasanta and the
Spouses Lu is not a contract of sale but merely a contract to sell. In Dichoso v. Roxas,
[47] we had the occasion to rule that Article 1544 does not apply to a case where there was
a sale to one party of the land itself while the other contract was a mere promise to sell the
land or at most an actual assignment of the right to repurchase the same land.
Accordingly, there was no double sale of the same land in that case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 31, of San Pedro, Laguna is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] RTC Records, pp. 1-11.
[2] Id. at 30-37.
[3] Id. at 73-90.
[4] Id. at 104-106.
[5] Id. at 96.
[6] Id. at 98- 100.

[7] Id. at 116-119.
[8] Id. at 120-121.
[9] Id. at 162-168.
[10] Id. at 287-288.
[11] Penned by Justice Cesar D. Francisco, concurred in by Justices Eubulo G.

Verzola and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili.
[12] CA Rollo, pp. 204-220 for SLDC and pp. 224-230 for Spouses Lu.
[13] Id. at 251.
[14] Id. at 261-262.
[15] Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[16] Id. at 347-348.
[17] RTC Records, p. 9.
[18] Rollo, p. 11.
[19] Art. 1315, Civil Code.
[21] Tan v. Lim, 357 Phil. 452 (1998); Cenido v. Apacionado, 376 Phil. 801 (1999).
[22] Ong v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 228 (1999).
[23] Odyssey Park, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 475 (1997).
[24] Vda. de Zulueta, et.al., v. Octaviano, 205 Phil. 247 (1983).
[25] Co v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 745 (1998); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil.
349 (1998).
[26] Xentrex Automotive, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258 (1998).
[27] San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 631
(1998); Archipelago Management and Marketing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 359 Phil. 363 (1998.
[28] VILLANUEVA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON SALES, 1995 Edition, at p. 5.

[29] Gonzales v. Rojas, 16 Phil. 51 (1910); Ocejo, Perez and Co. v. International
Bank, 37 Phil. 631 (1917-18); Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51
(1907).
[30] Art. 1495, Civil Code
[33] Art. 1498, par. 2, Civil Code.
[35] Ibid.
[37] Dawson v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 356 Phil. 1037 (1998).
[38] Nuguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77423, 13 March 1989, 171 SCRA 213;
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106042, 28 February 1994, 230 SCRA
446.
[39] Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858 (1996).
[40] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[41] Viray v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 107 (1998); Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao,
Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 815 (1998); Heirs of Spouses Benito Gavino
and Juana Euste v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 686 (1998).
[42] 124 Phil. 1067, 1072 (1966); citation omitted.
[43] Rollo, pp. 25-29.
[44] RTC Records, p. 165.
[45] TSN, September 19, 1991, pp. 11-12, 14-15, 19.
[46] G.R. No. 95843, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 415 citing Palanca v. Director of
Lands, 43 Phil. 146 (1922); Cagaoan v. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554 (1922);
Fernandez v. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581 (1922).
[47] 11 Phil. 768 (1908).

20.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1037. December 14, 1998]
VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant, vs. ATTY. CIRIACO C.

SAYSON, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers
are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,"[1] it is imperative that they live by the
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in
the legal profession.
In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurrecion charged Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C.

Sayson with acts constituting "malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation
of his duties and oath as a lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through reckless
imprudence case, in which Complainant Resurrecion was the defendant and Respondent Sayson
was the counsel for the offended party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The complainant alleged that,
pursuant to the amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to the
respondent who, however, never gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was compelled
to give another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded the
return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the Complaint for Disbarment.
The records show that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) conducted several hearings on
the matter; during which the complainant was represented by Atty. Ronaldo Lopez. Although
respondent had been notified, he failed to attend a number of such hearings. He eventually appeared
through his new counsel, Atty. Wenceslao Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed to attend
the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4, 1973 Order, [2] deemed the investigation of the case
terminated. But upon the motion of the respondent, the OSG on October 31, 1973, set aside its
earlier Order and once again set the case for a hearing of the former's evidence. Since then,
however, it appears that the OSG has not been able to submit its report and recommendation on the
case.
In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took cognizance of the case [3] and
tasked Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo with the investigation, of which both the complainant and
the respondent were duly notified. Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the pursuit of
the matter, but Respondent Sayson could not be found. [4] In his Report, Commissioner Manalo
presented the following facts:
"Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was accused of having converted and
appropriated [for] his own personal benefit the amount of P2,500.00 representing the
amount which was delivered by the complainant to the respondent as compensation
or settlement money of a case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
"Complainant alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident
which occurred at Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City which involved a boy
[named] the name of Armando Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By reason
of the said incident, complainant was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence
before the City Fiscal's Office at Quezon City. In the preliminary investigation, the
father of the victim Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., was represented by
respondent. Complainant was however, represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence was amicably settled on 8 August 1970 and
respondent received from the complainant the amount of P2,500.00. Respondent
allegedly assured complainant that the sum [would] be delivered to his client Mr.
Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent acknowledged in writing having received the amount
of P2,500.00.
"Contrary however, to the assurances of the respondent, he had not delivered the said
amount of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed for which reason complainant
was compelled to pay anew the heirs of the victim the amount
of P2,500.00. Demands were made for the respondent to return the said amount
of P2,500.00 but the latter failed. By reason thereof, complainant filed a complaint
for estafa against the respondent before the City Court of Quezon City which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. III-149358 entitled 'People of the Philippines vs.
Ciriaco C. Sayson'.
"In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant Victoriano P. Resurreccion
appeared assisted by his counsel. There was however, no appearance for the
respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The investigator declared his failure to appear as a
waiver of his presence and Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. was presented as witness. He
testified that he [was] the father of Armando Basto, Jr. who was ran over by a motor
vehicle then driven by the respondent. By reason of such death a case was filed in
court and he was represented by Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, respondent in this case. A
settlement arrangement was arrived at and complainant entrusted the amount
of P2,500.00 to the respondent for the latter to turn over the same to his client. Atty.
Ciriaco Sayson, however, failed to turn over the said amount of P2,500.00 to his
client for which reason the case was not immediately dismissed. To effect dismissal
of the case, complainant was forced to pay anew the sum of P2,500.00.
"Complainant was next presented as witness and he testified that on 30 May 1970, he
was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one Armando
Basto, Jr. By reason thereof, he was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence[,]
and to effect settlement of that case he agreed to pay the amount of P2,500.00.
"On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his counsel conferred with [the]
respondent in the latter's office at May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila and in a
conference, a settlement was arrived at whereby complainant [would] pay the amount
of P2,500.00. This was done and payment was delivered to the respondent who
acknowledged having received the said amount.
"Subsequently, complainant learned that the said amount of P2,500.00 was not
delivered by respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father of the victim for which
reason he was compelled to pay another amount of P2,500.00 to the heirs of the
victim.
"Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said amount of P2,500.00 from the
respondent. Despite visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times, Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson
still failed to return the money. Thus, complainant filed a complaint for estafa which
was elevated in Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 49358.
"A Decision finding the respondent guilty of [the] crime of estafa was promulgated
by the City Court of Quezon City."[5]
Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and recommendation in this wise:
"Complainant was able to establish by more than convincing evidence that the
misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent. This fact [is] eloquently
proven by Exhibits "A" to "E", all of which were not controverted by the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
"In view of the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that
the above-entitled case be endorsed by the Honorable Board Governors to the
Supreme Court with the recommendation that the complain[ant be] disbarred and his
name be stricken off xxx the roll of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx"[6]
On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of Commissioner Manalo. The Resolution, signed by IBP National
Secretary Roland B. Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28, 1998, is worded as follows:
"RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202
Adm. Case No. 1037
Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson is DISBARRED and
xxx his name xxx stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for having been found guilty of
Estafa promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City and [which] complainant was
able to establish by more convincing evidences that misappropriation was in fact
committed by the respondent, all of which were not controverted by the
respondent."[7]
The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo's findings and conclusion, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson must be disbarred.
Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on
September 20, 1973.[8] Such conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals [9] and upheld by this
Court.[10]
In In re Vinzon,[11] the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa and held that
"moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In
essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals."
In a more recent case,[12] the Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents,
because she was "totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." In adopting the
recommendation, we held that "good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity."
True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and member of the bar.[13] Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[14] However, in the present case, the
Court notes that even if respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established, there is
no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed any
remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent,
caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of
his change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges
brought against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain
a member of the bar.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially
in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265; cited in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 214.
[2] Issued by the investigating officer, Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo.

[3] Largely due to Complainant Resurreccion's steadfast determination to pursue the
case. He had written letters bewailing the delay in the resolution of the disbarment
case and had submitted documents which he thought were necessary for the proper
disposition of the case, which were either lost or misplaced at the Office of the
Solicitor General.
[4] All letters to Sayson were returned to the IBP.
[5] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 36-38.
[6] Ibid., p. 39.
[7] Rollo, vol. I, p. 35.
[8] The decretal part of the trial court's Decision, penned by Judge Pacifico I.
Punzalan, reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa as charged in the information, defined and penalized under Article 315, sub-division three, sub. par. 1-b of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby imposes upon him as penalty, to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional as maximum, to
indemnify the offended party Victoriano Resurreccion in the sum of P2,500.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, together with all the accessory penalties of law, and to pay the costs." (CA Decision, p. 1).
[9] In People of the Philippines v. Atty, Ciriaco C. Sayson, CA-GR No. 15299-CR,
the Court of Appeals (First Division, composed of Justice Roseller T. Lim, ponente;
and Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Sixto A. Domondon, concurring) disposed of
the case as follows:
"The failure, therefore, of appellant to produce the money when confronted at the Fiscal's Office, or even when the
present action was filed, is a clear indication of converting or misappropriating for his own use and benefit the money
he received for his client. We agree with the conclusion of the lower court as follows:
'From the facts of the above-entitled case, brought out during the trial by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence,
this court is of the view that when the accused received the amount of P2,500.00 in Manila from the offended party
REsurreccion, pursuant to the agreement reached by parties in Quezon City, accused imposed upon himself the
obligation and duty to deliver the said amount to his client Basto, Sr. in Quezon City, and should he fail to do so, to
return the said amount to Resurreccion, as borne out [by] the testimonies of Resurreccion and Atty. Umali. The failure
of the accused to deliver the amount of P2,500.00 to Basto and the subsequent failure of the accused to return the said
amount to Resurreccion, coupled with his failure to give any reason for such failure despite demands, clearly show
misappropriation or conversion, or at least part thereof, as an essential ingredient of the offense of the estafa, occurred
in Quezon City. The fact that Resurreccion was constrained to pay Basto again the amount of P2,500.00 in order that the
case against him would be dropped, as it was indeed dropped, sufficiently prove[s] prejudice and damage on the part of
the complainant Resurreccion.'
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant."
(CA Decision, pp. 9-10).
[10] Rollo, vol. I, p. 15. The Court's March 18, 1977 Resolution is worded thus:
"L-43834 (Atty. Ciriaco Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, eat. al.). Considering the grounds of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of August 20, 1976 which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals as well as the Solicitor General's comment thereon, the Court Resolved to DENY the motion for
lack of merit and this denial is FINAL. The Court of Appeals is directed to remand the records of this case to the trial
court for prompt execution of judgment to the trial court and to submit to this Court proof of such remand, both within
five (5) days from notice hereof."
[11] 19 SCRA 815, April 27, 1967. See also Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1,
September 26, 1964, and In Re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182, January 17, 1958.
[12] Villanueva v. Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707, July 11, 1995.
[13] Tapucar v. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998.
[14] For example, in Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554, March 11, 1996, the
respondent, who was accused of estafa by his client, was suspended for one year from
the practice of law. Likewise, in Igual v. Javier (254 SCRA 416, March 7, 1996),
suspended from the practice of law for one year was the respondent, who was
accused of having unlawfully withheld and misappropriated complainant's money in
the amount of P7,000.00, allegedly paid as acceptance fee for a matter on which
respondent never performed any work.
21.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005]
MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO

ARANETA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for
deceit and nonpayment of debts.
The complaint,[1] dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena
Moreno on two causes of action. The first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No.
B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and
indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in
consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that almost a year later, the
warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Aranetas nonpayment of debts in the amount
of P11,000. Moreno alleged that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000
from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return
the said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta
borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since he
failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount
of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30
June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000. However, when
Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked
Account Closed. She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter.
Araneta, however, ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500
from him. To accommodate her, he allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in
question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorneys fees,
and gave her an additional P323 in cash.
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued
the two undated checks in her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating
them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she
could show the bank where she was working that she had money coming to her. Araneta
further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a
closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant
to issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two borrowed checks. The
respondent offered this check in evidence.
Moreno, however, contended[2] that this check for P11,000 belonged to the Philippine
Leasing Corporation, which she managed when her father passed away. She claimed she
signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to
Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the corporation. She concluded
that Araneta falsely filled up the check in a desperate bid to turn the tables on her.[3]
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4]
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine oclock in the morning,
when the complainant and her counsel appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice.
Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend himself,
the hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine oclock in the morning.
Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing were effected to the respondent through
a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973.[5] On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more
did not appear, so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24

January 1973 with the complainant, Moreno, taking the stand.[6] On 27 February 1973,
Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare
his defense.[7] No further hearings appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is
shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a
joint motion for postponement with the conform of Morenos lawyer, as he, Araneta, was
earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainants basic grievance.
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988,

records of the case were forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission notified[8] both parties
of a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the
complainants counsel appeared despite due notice. It appears that notice could not be
served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts
were unknown. An inquiry[9]made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The
Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988 at two oclock in the afternoon.
[10] Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so
far adduced, the case was submitted for resolution on such date.[11]
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her

Report,[12] which reads in part:
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it
may, it is worthwhile considering. The stop payment of Treasury Warrant No. B-
02997354 was an act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a
subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc.
and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about
why the stop payment of the treasury warrant was done but neither witness appeared
(as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At
the dorsal portion of Exh. B, the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature
which complainant claims to be that of the respondent beneath which is the word
President and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination
of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits G and H do not
show definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there is
no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as
president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same
treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her
account. There is no evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.
There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about
the stop payment or even any written demand by the complainant to the respondent
that the payment of the treasury warrant having been stopped he should reimburse her
with what he received as consideration for this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for
P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her
creditors that money was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have been
aware when he issued said checks that his account with the bank against which
[these] checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered from the fact that
the checks were dishonored for said reason.
Even disregarding the complainants evidence and considering the answer of the
respondent, the act of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and
the other for P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her
creditors that money was coming her way, when there was none and the respondent
knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with the complainant to
make use of these useless commercial documents to deceive the public. However
beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer
is abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case,
committed by the respondent, belittles the confidence of the public in him and
reflects upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a
necessity which the respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months arising from his
irresponsible conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the
decision of suspension.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted[13] the above report, but increased its
recommended period of suspension from three months to six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C.
Fernandez, transmitted[14] the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule
139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court.[15] On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar
Confidant filed a Report[16] regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further
made mention of a Resolution[17] from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent
for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document. The Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering that the
motion of petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of
September 16, 1977 which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime
of estafathru falsification of commercial document, was denied in the resolution
dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit, which
denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta
from the practice of law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE
within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case
had been archived on 20 November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondents last filed
pleading dated 28 May 1973, when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing
on this case to settle matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and the present,
Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we

disagree with the penalty sought to be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts
is irrelevant, because by his own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of
Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a closed account. And though
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this
act abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar, which belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his
integrity and morality.
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct,[18] as the effect transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals.[19]
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of
moral turpitude.[20]
In Co v. Bernardino[21] and Lao v. Medel,[22] we held that for issuing worthless

checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law, or
a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation.[23]
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time,
apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,

modesty, or good morals.[24] It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[25]
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this
case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe
penalty.
In fact, we have long held[26] that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction
by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of
Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,[27] [t]he review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the
privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction,
the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.[28]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his

name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
22.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29543 November 29, 1969
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR
CO.,respondents-appellees.
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the lower Court's Order of dismissal of her
petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction against respondent judge's order
denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated August 16, 1968 certifying
the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July 21, 1962
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal Court of
Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares before
the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was docketed
in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to the sala of the
respondent Judge Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows:
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made goods
and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not make the
full payment up to the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85, representing the
balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is already overdue and
payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of
goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company, the respective dates they were
taken and by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging that without
this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the complaint.
After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of particulars.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court, she then brought the
incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her petition
that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion.
But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, for the
reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed by the said company in the inferior court,
particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the
defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of action against her
so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2) that things asked for in the motion for a
bill of particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill. Convinced that
the said motion of the company is well founded, the lower court accordingly dismissed the
petition on April 21, 1962.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court below,
Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under her lone
assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in dismissing her
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as amended by
its order dated August 18, 1962.
The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1) whether the allegations of the
complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against her;
and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of
particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions. A
perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all involved
in this appeal.
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by
respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case instituted in
the Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of
P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and
delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the ultimate
or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance with the requirements of
the Rules of Court.1
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as
plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods represented by the alleged
amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on which they were delivered to the
defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars
sought all concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of the
Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any
matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial."
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at her stall
at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors from whom she used to
buy on credit ready made goods for resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought
by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars
were just as much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could not logically pretend ignorance as to
the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own records of her outstanding account with
appellee and state in her answer whether from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness
was in the sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case, it had written
appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account in the said sum of P354.85 within
one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee under date of March 23, 1962,
acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the operation
of her stall, she would not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at
once. I would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you P10.00 every
15th and end of the month as heretofore."
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing appellant's petition
for certiorariagainst respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars, as pretended
by appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in an analogous case,2that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove
that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such
attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to
meritorious cases."
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had
appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the
reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she
has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate
court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been much more than
sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt,
burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in
litigation in this worthless cause.
As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that
needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more
faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action."
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel shall pay treble
costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-
appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
23.
QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a

member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is
an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years.
The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the
hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to
respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness
and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a
certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship
between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she
gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds
for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is
that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege
to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it
is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent
in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of
a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old)
Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of
the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states
that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must
conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As
stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a

consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
24.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the
bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity
of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due
weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous
with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The
minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is
without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be
amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since
the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,.
Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause
or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23,
1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in
Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as
a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the
Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there
were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration
dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the
full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned
out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said
to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this
Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been
duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy.
Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former
clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can
integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had
elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It
may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing
the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission
to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is
that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition
on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.
Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
25.
THIRD DIVISION
ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES Adm. Case No. 5910
and MRS. NATIVIDAD
CELESTINO, Present:
Complainants,
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION September 21, 2005
JAVIER,
Respondent.
xx - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xx
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By complaint[1] dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad
Celestino (complainants) charge Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for
malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers
oath.
The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by respondent in the

pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East
Faculty Association (UEFA), as counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then
Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former UEFA President Eleonor Javier,
before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) against herein complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-LRD (audit
case),[2] and from the pleadings filed by respondent in another labor case as counsel
for the one hundred seventy six (176) faculty members of the University of the East
complainants against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L. Torres, et al.,[3] docketed as
NCR-0D-0201-0005-LRD (attorneys fees case).[4]
The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action against respondent.
The first cause of action is based on respondents Urgent Motion to Expedite with
Manifestation and Reiteration of Position (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case
which complainants allege contained statements which are absolutely false,
unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of
UEFFAs funds, destruction or concealment of UEFAs documents and some other acts
tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon their persons.[5] Portions of the
questioned motion read:
Undersigned attorney would like to manifest just so it can not be said later on that he
kept mum on the matter that when individual respondents-appellants realized that an
audit of Union funds was looming, it appears that they decided to destroy or conceal
documents as demonstrated by an Incident Report Re Robbery dated May 6, 2002 (a
copy just recently secured by the undersigned), attached hereto as Annex A, where
the police investigator stated that no forcible entry was noted by him but that air
condition on the respective rooms were (sic) slightly move (sic) to mislead that
suspect as the same as their point of entry.[] The police officers stated that no cash of
(sic) money were stolen but instead claimed that still undetermined
documents/important papers were stolen by the suspects.
This brings to mind the United States case against Andersen officials who shredded
documents related to the Enron scandal when they thought nobody was looking. As in
the Andersen/Enroncase, the individual respondents-appellants in the instant case
knew that the law was going to come knocking at their door, asking a lot [of]
questions about financial matters.
From the undersigneds standpoint, the alleged robbery of still undetermined

documents/papers was an inside job as investigation has shown that there is no
evidence of forced entry. Besides, it would be a cinch to establish a motive by
individual respondents-appellants Torres and Celestino to destroy documents related
to the audit ordered by Regional Director Alex E. Maraan. In any event, the
undersigned thinks that the legal process should go on. Lumang gimmick na yang
robbery ng mga evidensya. They may try to cover up the looting of union funds, but
there is such a thing as secondary evidence, not to mention the power of this
Honorable Office to issue subpoenas even to the unions depositary banks.
[6] (Underscoring supplied)
Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorneys oath that he obey the
laws and do no falsehood, the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule
10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the Rules of Court for
directly pointing to them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery at
the UEFA office, and for citing the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant,
impertinent, and immaterial to the subject of quasi-judicial inquiry.[7]
As second cause of action, complainants allege that in the attorneys fees case,
respondent, in his Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment
filed before the DOLE, used language that was clearly abusive, offensive, and
improper,[8] inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
[9]
As third/last cause of action, complainants quote respondents statement in the

aforesaid Reply, to wit:
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear notaries public asking their sons,
wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them. These
girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths and certify documents. x x
x,[10]
and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession,
uncalled for and deserve[s] censure, [as] the same might shrink the degree of
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document.[11]
By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he was angry[12] while

he was preparing his Motion to Expedite in the audit case, it having come to his
knowledge that the UEFA office had been burglarized and complainant Atty. Torres
had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to
the burglary. [13]
Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the
loss of the vital documents so that the resolution of the pending motion for
reconsideration filed by complainants would be expedited;[14] and that the
information regarding the burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case as a figure
of speech were relevant in drawing a link between the burglary and the audit the
burglary having rendered the complete implementation of the audit unattainable.[15]
With respect to the attorneys fees case, respondent claims that Atty. Torres did
not in his Answer confront the issues thereof but instead mock[ed] his wife and
fabricat[ed] and distort[ed] realities[16] by including malicious, libelous and
impertinent statements and accusations against his wife which exasperated him.
[17] A portion of Atty. Torres Answer in the attorneys fees case reads:
x x x in her incumbency as President of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999) she got
only about P2.00/hr CBA increase which took effect only [in] 1994, with no other
substantial improvements of the teachers benefits, and yet she spent for more than
half a million negotiation expenses from the UEFAs funds. Her 1994-1999 CBA was
only a carbon copy of her old 1989-1994 CBA with no substantial improvements,
with uncertain amount of her expenses, because she removed/concealed all the
financial records of the UEFA during her term. . . I and the other lawyers/teachers
denounced her unlawful deduction of 10% attorneys fees from the small backwages
received by the teachers on April 28, 1993 although there was actually no lawyer who
worked for itand there was no Board nor General Membership Assembly Resolutions
passedthe assembly [Nov. 24, 2001] was apparently irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier
when she was booed while talking on the floor, like a confused gabble (sic)[18]
Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent

admits having responded with a counter-attack in his Reply to Respondents (Torres
and Marquez) Answer/Comment[19] wherein he stated:
What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres just
cannot kick the habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters in
his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his teeth. The undersigned thinks that if
he has any common sense at all he should shut up about his accusation that Prof.
Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation expensesshe obtained
only P2-increase in union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of the
damage suit against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his life as a
practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case No. NCR-
OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain pogi points prior to the UEFA election in
1994.[20]
xxx
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any common sense at all, he should stop
making irrelevant, libelous and impertinent allegations in his pleadings. This means
changing his standard tactic of skirting the main issues by injecting a web or a maze
of sham, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matters.[21] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the BLRs attention that
Atty. Torres had the habit of hurling baseless accusations against his wife to
embarrass her, including one for unjust vexation and another for collection and
damages both of which were dismissed after trial on the merits, thus prompting him
to state that these dismissed cases indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental
dishonesty.[22]
Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the same attorneys fees case,
Atty. Torres accused his client, Prof. Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary
public and of deliberately us[ing] a falsified/expired Community Tax Certificate in
order to justify the dismissal of the case against him (Atty. Torres);[23] and that Atty.
Torres continued harassing his clients including his wife by filing baseless complaints
for falsification of public document.[24] Hence, in defense of his clients, the
following statements in his Reply:
Respondent further concluded that lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad falsified the said
petition by causing it to appear that he participated in the falsification when he did
not in truth and in fact participate thereat . . . obviously oblivious of the obvious that
it is highly improbable for Prof. Maguigad to have forged the signature of the notary
public. If he intended to forge it, what was the big idea of doing so? To save Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) for notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation that lead (sic)
petitioner Maguigad used a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently unfounded and
malicious.
But that is not all. Respondents went further and charged Profs. Mendoza, Espiritu,
Ramirez and Javier with the same crime of falsification of public document . . . by
causing it to appear that Rogelio Maguigad had indeed participated in the act of
verifying/subscribing and swearing the subject petition before notary public Atty.
Jorge M. Ventayen, when in truth and in fact he did not participate thereat.
To the mind of the undersigned, this is the height of irresponsibility, coming as it does
from a member of the Philippine Bar. There is no evidence to charge them with
falsification of public document, i.e. the verification appended to the present petition.
They did not even sign it. The crime imputed is clearly bereft of merit. Frankly, the
undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige
with such a very serious charge.
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s] to hear notaries public asking their
sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them.
These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths, and certify
documents. Believing that the said veification was signed by an impostor-relative of
the notary public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan] through no fault of his client, Prof.
Maguigad, the undersigned sought the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). On May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the undersigned to
inform him that he arrested in the area near UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen whom he
caught in flagrante delicto notarizing an affidavit of loss and feigning to be Atty.
Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his uncle.[25]
xxx
Petitioners devoted so much space in their answer/comment vainly trying to
prove that Profs. Maguigad, Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and Javier committed the
crime of falsification of public document reasoning out that they made untruthful
statements in the narration of facts in the basic petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law books is
he reading?
He should know or ought to know that the allegations in petitioners pleading

are absolutely privileged because the said allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues.[26](Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found
respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for using
inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings.
The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioners Report and

Recommendation read:
Respondent admits that he was angry when he wrote the Manifestationand

alleges that Complainant implicated his wife in a burglary. Moreover, Respondent
alleges that Complainant has been engaged in intimidating and harassing his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant and herein Respondents wife have had a series of
charges and counter-charges filed against each other. Both parties being protagonists
in the intramurals within the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA).
Herein Complainant is the President of the UEFA whereas Respondents wife was the
former President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat this matter of charges and
counter-charges filed, which involved the UEFA, as extraneous, peripheral, if not
outright irrelevant to the issue at hand.
xxx
Clearly, [r]espondents primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his
pleadings was his emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was
in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained. Indeed, the remarks
quoted above are offensive and inappropriate. That the Respondent is representing his
wife is not at all an excuse.[27](Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be

reprimanded.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by
Resolution[28] of October 7, 2004, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken but not its
recommendation to reprimand him.
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy,

utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of
pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may
be.[29]
The requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection
given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be
abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified.[30] If the
pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter
which is libelous, he loses his privilege.[31]
A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man
can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.[32] That matter alleged in a pleading need
not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must,
however, be legitimatelyrelated thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.[33]
The first cause of action of complainants is based on respondents allegation in his

Motion to Expedite that a burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation
to complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out the burglary the concealment
and destruction of vital documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be false
but it could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the resolution of the audit
case. In that light, this Court finds that the first cause of action may not lie.
As regards the second cause of action, it appears that respondent was irked by
Atty. Torres Answer to the complaint in the attorneys fees case wherein he criticized
his (respondents) wifes performance as past President of UEFA.
This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres incorporating in his Answer in
the attorneys fees case statements such as the assembly . . . was apparently irked by
Mrs. Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor like a confused
gabble (sic). But neither does it countenance respondents retaliating statements like
what kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?, he lies through his teeth, if he has any common
sense at all he should shut up, and Atty. Torres forgets the sad chapter of his life as a
practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which he filed to
gain pogi points. Nor respondents emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the habit of hurling
baseless accusations against his wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases against
his wife, of which Atty. Torres was the complainant, indubitably indicate Atty. Torres
pattern of mental dishonesty.
The issue in the attorneys fees case was whether the 10% attorneys fees
checked off from the initial backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly,
the above-quoted statements of respondent in the immediately preceding paragraph
cannot be said to be relevant or pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may have
conducted himself improperly is not a justification for respondent to be relieved from
observing professional conduct in his relations with Atty. Torres.
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing
between clients should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward
each other or toward suitors in the case.[34]
In the attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as counsel for himself as
respondent and complainant was acting as counsel for his wife as complainant.
Although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that in the defense of ones clients -
especially of ones wife or of ones self, the zeal in so doing may be carried out to the
point of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the
spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and
recrimination is far from edifying, and detract from the dignity of the legal
profession.[35]
Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the attorneys fees case on the
basis of the alleged forgery of the notary publics signature, respondent did not only
endeavor to point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an argument, but
personally attacked Atty. Torres mental fitness by stating that the undersigned thinks
that even a dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige with such a very
serious charge, and [r]espondent Torres is a member of the bar [b]ut what law books
is he reading.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language must be
dignified and choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings.[36] In
the assertion of his clients rights, a lawyer even one gifted with superior intellect is
enjoined to rein up his temper.[37]
As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent

was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to
which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend. Personal colloquies between
counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should be carefully
avoided.[38]
If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public documents
against respondents clients as a scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate
recourse in law, for if they plead for a righteous cause, the course of justice will
surely tilt in their favor, the courts being ever vigilant in the protection of a partys
rights.[39]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

FAIRNESSS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
instructs that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another.[40] The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions
which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.[41]
As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of

notaries public basis of the last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity
that should characterize the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial
document, respondent, who justifies the same as legitimate defense of his client who
was being accused by Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the relevance of the
statement to the subject matter of the pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt.
Respecting the verified complaint Annex EJ-A[42] to the Comment of

respondent filed by his wife, Prof. Eleonor R. Javier, against complainant Atty.
Torres, the same cannot be consolidated with the present administrative case since the
parties and causes of action of such complaint are completely different from those of
the present complaint.
WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings,

respondent Atty. Jose C. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
One (1) Month, effective upon receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY
WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo at 1-13.

[2] Id. at 2.
[3] Id. at 55-56.
[4] Id. at 2.
[5] Id. at 5.
[6] Id. at 17-18.
[7] Id. at 7.
[8] Id. at 8.
[9] Id. at 9.
[10] Id. at 29.
[11] Id. at 11.
[12] Id. at 59.
[13] Id. at 71.
[14] Id. at 74-75.
[15] Id. at 79.
[16] Id. at 64.
[17] Id. at 89.
[18] Id. at 87.
[19] Id. at 64.
[20] Id. at 38.
[21] Id. at 40.
[22] Id. at 39.
[23] Id. at 81.
[24] Id. at 83-85.
[25] Id. at 146-147.
[26] Id. at 33.
[27] Id. at 532-533.
[28] Id. at 529.
[29] Gutierrez v. Abila, 111 SCRA 658, 663 (1982).
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Tolentino v. Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396, 400 (1961).
[33] Ibid.
[34] People v. Sesbreno, 130 SCRA 465, 470 (1984).
[35] Id. at 469-470.
[36] Id. at 470.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Gutierrez v. Abila, 111 SCRA 658, 664 (1982).
[40] Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, 420 SCRA 132, 137 (2004).
[41] Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 445 (1967).
[42] Rollo at 196-200.
26.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated
2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public
statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-
00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987
Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying
his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this
respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and
employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and
Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner
Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special
Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No.
80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That
Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-
01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner
Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's
lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition:
(1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP
Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case
No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar,
this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan).
The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30)
days from the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent,
the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party
respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining
Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on
Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein"
ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570,
entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the
order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the
petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to
the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a
photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of
the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can
aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe
in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that
only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against
him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter
wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio
Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft
charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they
involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez
said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against
two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of
the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme
Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some
people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that
while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time,
'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to
know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time
could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be
informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis
supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof
read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY
the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising
the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he
was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone
by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two
Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by
"some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the
press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next
several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2
May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of
April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the
media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and
disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or
indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not
be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
making such public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the
"Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1,
1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had
taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases
against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of
persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to
render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too
hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate
Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3)
members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its
official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to
this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and
to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of ten
(10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to
respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for
Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution
of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he
gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being
allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial
sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4)
Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and
resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court
in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante
Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4
June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this
Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also
submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential
to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the
Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of
the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here;
the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court
may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls
into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and
arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives
the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such
proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the
'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not
involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
property and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against
the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there
be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of
justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because
public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly
of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting
requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure
under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of
acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present
case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his
defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements
set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges
that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of
retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices
cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop
respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April
1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that
matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure
the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling
implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal
merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon
respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is
very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of
this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were
made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or
Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as
early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in
these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its
Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing
the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also
disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for
Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring
the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision
finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for
the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against
respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they
have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends,"
including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge
too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It
is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said
notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to
have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first
accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even
with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court.
Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into
gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court
and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one
hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons
to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be
seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive
tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason'
and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation
to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly
was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly
erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously
denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against
the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of
his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had
ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also
found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there
administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the
membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional
precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one
may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted
to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the
administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others,
the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and
anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an
impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as
well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible
administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court
in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the
impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the
members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that
a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare
the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to
heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of
acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this
Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at
respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and
willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused
by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and
duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this
Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over
members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have
been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's
authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander
case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals
had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of
Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This
suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of
Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar
some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of
the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified
true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would
have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to
the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed
by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the
purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that
they may well know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis
supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said
evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up
deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No.
L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice.
We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to
the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their
younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is
an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in
G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found
no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances,
both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under
their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but
pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the
land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with
gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to
enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in
their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice
and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at
242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-
representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to
the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up
and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect
does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion
for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September
1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect
thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968"
and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in
effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to
the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.
The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a
number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of
the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion,
brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused
it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition
is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices;
who may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more.
This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest
for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the
graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to
the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or
to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million
dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three
(3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a
'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as
'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the
case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices
of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it
would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been
known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less
likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.'
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He
points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that
loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen
in our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For
one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense
may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these
justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up?
Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to
paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the
tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the
part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern.
Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers.
and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and
degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus
transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court
and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31,
1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the
motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the
Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and
would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to
more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case'
in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads
return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider
the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the
appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision
of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people
may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the
contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed
to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases
brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at
565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why
our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal
state of Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our
self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended
Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made
the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of
Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on
the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means,
because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction
and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not
want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the
Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep
their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to
perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810;
emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to
express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found
these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is
but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such threats and
disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct
contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People
vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of
First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April
29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable
is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy
all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused
to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number
of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30
days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his
paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness
of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I
announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a
constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even
the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he
should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the
people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might
be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes
an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all
the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court
which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly
some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at
the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above,
the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority
of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of
the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts
of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are
derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish
Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language,
15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after
the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in
his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he
states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make
it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes
of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot
mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court
is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that
it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as
any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its
integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re
Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates
nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728;
emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter.
In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases
discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907
(1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April
1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67
Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is
compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt
and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements,
especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office,
merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the
Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court,
the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have
had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a
complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this
Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this
Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right
of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent
judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a
free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary
through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent
means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional
right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of
its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of
the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is
the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot
be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and
the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than
that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is
also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as
the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of
criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations
and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown,
and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of
27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first
place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the
Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures
brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for
which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and
redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in
general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at
a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are
not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the
courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of
such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this
case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the
remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent
Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not
only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely
attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
27.
EN BANC
FOODSPHERE, INC., A.C. No. 7199

Complainant, [Formerly CBD 04-1386]
Present:
PUNO, C.J.
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
ATTY. MELANIO L. CARPIO MORALES,
MAURICIO, JR., CHICO-NAZARIO
Respondent. VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 22, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat

processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products
under the brand name CDO, filed a Verified Complaint[1] for disbarment before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as Batas Mauricio
(respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong
TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!,and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG
BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers
oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought

from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver
spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the
CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of
worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites
in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993,

the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the
spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant
refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy
and, in any event, outrageous.
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses

incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was
turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the
media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to

the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant
via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the
tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12[2] which complainant found to contain
articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to
the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-
offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which
would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent
directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television
program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN[3] seeking the withdrawal of

their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.
[4] Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later
wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising
Contract[5] asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for
its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a
Program Profile[6] of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking
complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy
15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy
[13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page

advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement,
and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total
of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his
Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with
the publication of the articles/columns.[7]
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG

BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest
sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:
OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest

si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo,
tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po
natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan
kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo
sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa
nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa
lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong
sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? [8] (Emphasis
and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant
in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas
BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In
another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN![9] which
appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the
same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article
entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.[10]
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING
HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:
[11] (a) Uod sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);
[12] (b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);
[13] (c) Pagpapatigil sa CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);[14] (d) Uod sa
liver spread kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);[15] (e) Salaysay ng
nakakain ng uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);[16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO
itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);[17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping laban sa
CDO guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);[18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO
guards, Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);[19] (i) CDO guards pinababanatan
sa PNP, Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);[20] (j) May uod na CDO liver spread
sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);[21] (k) Desperado na ang
CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);[22] (l) Atty. Rufus Rodriguez
pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);[23] (m) Kasunduan ng
CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);[24] (n) Bakit
nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).[25]
In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!, respondent
wrote an article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.[26]
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television

program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what
complainant claimed to be the same baseless and malicious allegations/issues against
it.[27]
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for
Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised
Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela
City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present
administrative complaint.[28]
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of
Justice,[29] alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for
miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would
ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with
an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief
Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would
elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of
the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the
system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela
City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the
Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for
his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what
would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even
by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the
Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should
investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a
pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be
given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he
filed his kidnapping charge here;[30]
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction[31] which respondent
filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is
inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no
jurisdiction over this action.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against

respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,[33] before the
Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against
complainant[34] and to malign complainant through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating

Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the
following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:[35]
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio]
Mauricio, et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was
issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court,
inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an
opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater,
as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that
all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting
for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further
publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the
Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of
vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products.
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent

by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance
of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13
December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear
directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more
specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its
products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the
prohibited subject matter in his column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and 17,
2004 issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the
Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the
Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party.
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said
pleading, respondent made the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions

on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected
with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said
Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any
evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-
quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and
[m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd
[s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.
III.
The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex
C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein
respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the
said Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero
against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the consequent dismissal of
the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably
launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein
complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3
tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As
already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against
complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued
against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he
indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to
expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant
claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers
that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in to respondents request
that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent.
Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive
of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from
the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan which
he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent
was less than forthright when he prepared said Kasunduan and then turned around
and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in
said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case
proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses
Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful
conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[36](Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March

20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every
lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession,[37] which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged
in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to
advance his interest to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships
and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a
status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting
of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks
against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1
also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a
member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,
by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:[38]
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of
their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers
language even in his pleadings must be dignified.[39](Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of
the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the
dignity of the legal profession.[40]
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be

underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[41] the therein complainant engaged
therein-herein respondents services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-
justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,[42] only to later find out that
after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was
taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him

over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same
could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for

reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness
when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.[43]
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years
is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath
and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon
his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), pp. 1-21.

[2] Annex B of the complaint, id. at 23.
[3] Annexes C and C-1, id. at 24-25.
[4] Annex F, id at 29. The Order reads:
Before us is a Kasunduan dated 10 August 2004 duly signed by the parties praying that the above-entitled case be
dismissed with prejudice on the ground that they have agreed to settle their differences amicably.
The Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1 s. 1993, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
provisions of Chapter III[,] Title V of RA 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines provides
for the encouragement of both parties to settle the case amicably. (Rule III, Section 1, C.1)
The agreement of the parties is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy.
PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED.
xxxx
[5] Annex D, id. at 26.
[6] Annexes E and E-1, id. at 27-28.
[7] Id. at 7.
[8] Id. at 8.
[9] Annex G-1, id. at 32-33.
[10] Annex G-2, id. at 34-35.
[11] Attached to the complaint as Annexes H-series.
[12] Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), p. 37.
[13] Id. at 38.
[14] Inadvertently not attached to the Annexes H-series.
[15] Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), at 39.
[16] Id. at 40.
[17] Id. at 41.
[18] Id. at 42.
[19] Id. at 43.
[20] Id. at 44.
[21] Id. at 45.
[22] Id. at 46.
[23] Id. at 47.
[24] Id. at 48.
[25] Not attached but is supposedly included in the Annexes H-series of the
complaint.
[26] Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), p. 49.
[27] Id. at 10. The copies of the complaint-affidavits are attached as Annexes J, J-1,
and J-2.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Id. at 121-125.
[30] Id. at 122-124.
[31] Id. at 126-128.
[32] Id. at 126.
[33] The complaint was for libel but a reading of the complaint shows that it was a
complaint for damages. Annex L, id. at 129-164.
[34] Respondent wrote and publicized: Buwelta sa CDO (October 2004); Child
Abuse Kontra CDO (November 2-8, 2004).
[35] Rollo (Vol. III of CBD rollo), pp. 37-41.
[36] Id. at 45-48.
[37] Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 209, 221.
[38] A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359.
[39] Id. at 368.
[40] Vide Catu v. Rellosa, supra note 37 at 220.
[41] A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508.
[42] Id. at 509.
[43] A.C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 307, 318.
28.Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 April 27, 1988
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, CLAIMING TO BE
AND ACTING AS TANODBAYAN-OMBUDSMAN UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-80578 April 27, 1988
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondent.
Francisco Carreon and Nestor C. Lumba for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In G.R. Nos. 79690-707 "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65," petitioner
Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos.
12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground thatsaid cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without
legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,
1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to
file cases with the Sandiganbayan. The complete prayer of the petition reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this petition
or until further orders of the Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue upon
the filing of a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the Honorable Court, restraining
the Honorable Sandiganbayan from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to
12161, and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar is concerned and
from hearing and resolving the special prosecutor's motion to suspend (Annex J) and
thereafter, final judgment be rendered: —
(1) ordering that the amended informations in the above-mentioned crimininal cases be
or issuing a writ of mandamus commanding and ordering the respondent
Sandiganbayan to do so and, in consequence, prohibiting and restraining the
respondent Sandigan-bayan from proceeding to hear and try the abovementioned
criminal cases or making the temporary preliminary injunction permanent;
(2) declaring the acts of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan-Ombudsman" after 2
February 1987 relating to these cases as anullity and without legal effect, particularly,
the promulgation of Tanodbayan resolution of 5 February 1987, the filing of the original
informations on 3 March 1987 and the amended ones on 4 June 1987, and the filing of
the Motion for Suspension Pendente Lite.
PETITIONER prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed proper in the
premises, with costs against the respondents.
Manila, Philippines, September 9, 1987.
(pp. 45-47, Rollo)
In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the first petition,
prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary investigations and similar
cases with the Sandiganbayan. The prayer reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this petition
or until further orders of this Honorable court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue
restraining the respondent from further acting in TBP CASE NO. 87-01304 and,
particularly, from filing the criminal Information consequent thereof-, and from conducting
preliminary investigations in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/
cases now pending or which may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of
the respondent.
It is likewise prayed that the present petition be consolidated with G.R.L-Nos. 79690-
79707.
After proper proceedings, it is prayed that final judgment be rendered annulling the acts
of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan- Ombudsman" after 2 February 1987 relating
to the investigation of complaints against petitioner, particularly:
(1) Annulling, for absolute want of jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation conducted,
and the Resolution rendered, by respondent in TBP CASE NO. 87-01304;
(2) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from filing any criminal Information as a
consequence of the void preliminary investigation he conducted in TBP CASE NO. 87-
01304, or annulling the criminal Information in the said case which may, in the
meantime, have already been filed;
(3) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from conducting preliminary investigations
in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/cases now pending or
which may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of the respondent.
PETITIONER further prays for such other and further reliefs as may be deemed proper
in the proper with costs against the respondent.
Manila, Philippines, November 18,1987
(pp. 24-25, Rollo)
We issued the restraining orders prayed for.
After a study of the petitions, We have decided to give due course to the same; to consider the
comments of the Solicitor-General and of Tanodbayan Gonzalez as their Answers thereto; and to
forthwith decide the petitions.
We find the petitions impressed with merit.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from theincumbent Tanodbayan) is
charged with the duty to:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or commission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient (Sec. 13, par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
be provided by law, contemptexcept those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7) (Emphasis ours).
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent
Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of
the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been
divested of such authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or
orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same
if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still
claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may,
however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long as he
has not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the
Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are
Identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of
Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY
the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising
the powers and function of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I maintain, however, consistent with my dissent in De Leon vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, that the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 11, 1987.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I maintain, however, consistent with my dissent in De Leon vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, that the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 11, 1987.
29.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City
Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San
Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the
Court, specifically the nonpayment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the
questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also
the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration
did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution
dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy
of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines
whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all
the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly
rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the
complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-
complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its
improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no
jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty.
Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively
dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his
"Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents
(sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the
Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and
no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according
to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the
complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common
tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the various
statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the President of the
Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable
Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative
Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the
scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without
bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the accused-complainant
concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel
with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of
Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable
Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias
(sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the
reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that they are
may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino
Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and
Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to
the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring
back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of
your people and the only country which God has given us. —
PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they
refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren
in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
IX
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of
the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money
reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino,
who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme
Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and
innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in
our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is
too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein
are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby
grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and
means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of ranks and status in
life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the
requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which
legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were
so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine
justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as
proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges
and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general
for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for
contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel
means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with
close relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to
save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the
dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court
maintains a double standard in dispensing justice — one set for the rich and another for the
poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause
of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final
arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the
Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous
influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully
comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of
cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989, after due publication.
It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted
the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial court's
decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in
complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate
original or duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court
judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence
excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his
motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the
reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that
"(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of
dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to
the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and
incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court,
in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty.
Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he
should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence
of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate
his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to
resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo."22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism
of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may
have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it
is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing
language or behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even
the most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this
occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or
declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the
Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in
good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents ( sic)" is
but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance
displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having
complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a
weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was
not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor
and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to
render justice according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and
IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to
PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros
Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law
throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a
WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of
this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other
Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Paras and Feliciano, JJ., is on leave.
30.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and
DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA
GONZALEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.
G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for
the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory
language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:
...
This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for
Ayala ... 2
... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but also
jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading the
judiciary ... 3
...
The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in issue,
such as those summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify
such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom,
are unparalleled in the history of this Court ... 4
...
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the exclusive
benefit of the residents of Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's admission of
said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do but did not even
contend, is a manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala and puts to serious
question its integrity on that account. 5
...
[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's competence
and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a blatant
disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual findings of the
trial court fully supported by the records and the true significance of those facts which
both the respondent court and this Court did not bother to read and consequently did not
consider and discuss, least of all in the manner it did with respect to those in which it
arrived at conclusions favorable to Ayala. 6
To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in BAVA
which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new development
in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal
right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason therefor, smacks of judicial
arrogance ... 7
...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the
current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be enhanced
by such broad discretionary power of courts? 8
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of
graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open
assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records
before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the
parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one
party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be
aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the
highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of the trial
court (in which his clients prevailed). But if we did not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does
lâwphî1.ñèt
not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the
findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory
statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to
preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession." 9
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients. As
we held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that
end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10 And while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in
utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the thinking
in the Decision, 11 comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded
accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration, but as we
held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of
words' ". 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169,
74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants
have raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with
inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace
criticisms of my decisions". 13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court
is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty.
Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke.
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to
insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule
71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined
by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01...
Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05...
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice.
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griñ;o-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.
31.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995
LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA
LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod City, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside
the Order dated July 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod City in Civil Case
No. 5331, which nullified the order earlier issued by the Municipal Trial Circuit Court (MTCC) of the City
of Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed the return to petitioner of the amount of P14,000.00 which had
been seized by the police.
I
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC,
alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at the North
Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols
(Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended
to be used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the same day, the application was granted by the
MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in
the application (Rollo, p. 15).
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized
the following articles:
(1) Two (2) envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000.00 (one envelope
P10,000.00 and another P4,000.00);
(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic) SN-00485;
(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R w/Antenae (sic);
(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base;
(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC;
(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and
(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack (Rollo, p. 16).
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the seized
articles, issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day,
Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in contemplation of
law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and
verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the
applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his answer to the motion, Lt. Col.
Nicolas Torres, the station commander of the Bacolod City Police, said that the amount of P14,000.00
had been earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the Armed City Partisan (ACP) and other
"known NPA personalities" operating in the City of Bacolod.
On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized
to petitioner. The court opined that in the implementation of the search warrant, any seizure should be
limited to the specific items covered thereby. It said that the money could not be considered as
"subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of gambling.
Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a petition
for certiorariseeking the annulment of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331). The petition alleged
that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return
citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986).
In those cases, the Court held that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the
articles, they should remain in custodia legis. The petition also averred that a criminal complaint for "any
of the crimes against public order as provided under Chapter I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code" had
been filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and therefore, should the money be found as
having been earmarked for subversive activities, it should be confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting the petition for certiorari and directing the
clerk of court to return to the MTCC the money pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation
being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal complaint. In said order, the RTC held:
The Court observed that private respondent Leon Tambasen never questioned the
validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.
A perusal of private respondent's "Motion to Declare Search and Seizure Illegal and to
Return Seized Properties" dated October 7, 1988 shows that respondent Tambasen
questions not the validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Demosthenes Magallanes, but rather, the execution or implementation of the said
warrant principally on the ground that the articles seized are not allegedly mentioned in
the search warrant. However, the question thus raised involves matters determinative of
the admissibility in evidence and the legality of the articles seized. These matters, it is
submitted, go beyond the immediate and limited jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to
inquire into the validity of the search warrant he issued. These issues which relate
exclusively or principally with the intrinsic and substantive merits of the case or cases
which are being prepared against respondent Tambasen, and insofar as Tambasen is
concerned involve matters of defense which should be properly raised at the criminal
action or actions that may be filed against respondent Leon Tambasen (see DOH v. Sy
Chi Siong Co., Inc. et. al., G.R. No. 85289, Feb. 20, 1989). They cannot be addressed to
the respondent Judge because the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the said
issue. It is clear therefore that respondent Judge has transcended the boundaries of his
limited jurisdiction and had in effect encroached upon the jurisdiction of the appropriate
trial court or courts that will try the criminal case or cases against respondent Leon
Tambasen, in issuing the assailed order dated December 23, 1988. Ostensibly, the
assailed order, if not corrected, will unduly deprive the prosecution of its right to present
the evidence in question and, consequently, will improperly oust the trial court, which will
try the criminal case or cases against private respondent Leon Tambasen of its original
and exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and legality of the said evidence.
This order of respondent court is tantamount to a denial of due process. It may be
considered as a grave abuse of discretion reviewable by certiorari (Esparagoza v. Tan,
94 Phil. 749) (Rollo, pp.
47-48).
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order commanding the city prosecutor to cease and desist from continuing with
the preliminary investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 and the RTC from taking any step with respect to
Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search Warrant No. 365 and the seizure of his personal
effects be declared illegal and that the Order of July 20, 1989 be reversed and annulled.
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite
rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal
possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned
in the search warrant. Moreover, since a complaint against him was filed only after his house had been
searched, petitioner claimed that the police were "on a fishing expedition."
During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of events related to the questioned search and
seizure transpired. At around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, petitioner, who was then on board a
passenger vehicle, was arrested by intelligence operatives in Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City and
forthwith detained. On the strength of sworn statements of two rebel returnees, the police filed a
complaint for subversion against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The following day, the
City Prosecutor filed an information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Law against petitioner with RTC,
Branch 42, Bacolod City (Criminal Case No. 8517). An order for the arrest of petitioner was issued on
March 2, 1990.
On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 8517.
On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted petitioner's motion to quash and recalled the warrant of
arrest. The court also directed the City Prosecutor to resolve BC-I.S. Case No. 88-1239.
On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria Lastimosa Marcos manifested before RTC,
Branch 42 that petitioner had been "dropped" from BC-I.S. No. 88-1239. However, the City Prosecutor
had, by then, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Resolution of March 15, 1990. The motion
was denied.
Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted with the question of whether RTC, Branch 44 gravely
abused its discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioner's house, specifically the amount
of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis.
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search
Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No.
365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216
SCRA 101 [1992]).
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not
be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache &
Co. [Phil.] Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same
constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and
unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when
attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized from
petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance
of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual
(People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public
welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v.
Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary
methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
For the retention of the money seized by the police officers, approval of the court which issued the
search warrant is necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In like manner, only the
court which issued the search warrant may order their release (Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295
[1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]).
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as the sole accused, was ordered quashed
by the trial court and the prosecution's motion for the reconsideration of the quashal order had been
denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being investigated by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent. Hence, there appears to be no criminal
prosecution which can justify the retention of the seized articles in custodia legis.
A subsequent legal development added another reason for the return to him of all the seized articles:
R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and, therefore, the crimes
defined in the repealed law no longer exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the People of the Philippines is ORDERED to RETURN
the money seized to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
32.EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5161. April 14, 2004]
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S.

TORRES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra

Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of
complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating
his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres,
who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents
died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing
an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by
TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No.
(T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No.
T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with
her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due
them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She
attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the
perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986,
wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented
that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot
No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel
Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by,
Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the
forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that
time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in
favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification
was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was
received and misappropriated by Felicisimaand Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the
Original Copy and Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No.
1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainants
sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross
misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and
Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and
Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the
reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and
Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100
and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was
even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for
the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain
Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of
reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be
impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12
August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the
Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment,[2] the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts
that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of
the estate left by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam
were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted
by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot
1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in
good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever
complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in
LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of
Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente
Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight.
Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and
his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a
paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false
misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end of
November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr.
Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted
by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in

bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-
855 for Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages; and a criminal
case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made
by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the
following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the
properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was
still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including
respondents wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to
the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka.
She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he
admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. [3]
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by
both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice
of law.[4]
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333[5] of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the
IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and
conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally
and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is
time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate
themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and
impartial dispensation of justice.[6] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When
the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn
promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus
adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings.
[7] There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate
of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being
married to complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the
complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines. [8] Yet, the respondent
presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the
transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted [9] regarding the falsification of
complainants signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement [10] dated 17 March 1995 involving
Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the
property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that document.
[11] Such act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that the
complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to
falsification of a public document.[12]
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against
committing falsification, he presented [13] such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure
a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. [14] He himself, therefore, may also
be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant
and her other co-heirs.[15] Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that
he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603. [16]
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are
contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is
to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey
the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of
such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. [17] For a lawyer is the
servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. [18] As such, he should make himself
more an exemplar for others to emulate. [19] He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[20] He makes himself unfit to remain in the
profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct. [21]
Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law
Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving
Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following
circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the
petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.
[22] Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether
she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of
that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente
Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.[23]
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony [24] in
court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and
circumstances of the case.[25] Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false
testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony. [26]
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes

candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.[27] This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted
Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he
offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court
called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary
action against him.[28]
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in
evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him.
During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in
that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession
of the title[29] and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the
respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot
1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk
of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released
within the month.[30]Respondents information was misleading because he presented
evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter. [31] Such act,
therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.
Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable
dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be
disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
-- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer,
we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[32]While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily
addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. [33]
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. [34] Verily, given the
peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross
misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore
adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres

guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-ASntiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, 1-4.
[2] Rollo, 47-51.
[3] Rollo, 209.
[4] Per the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline; Rollo, unpaginated.
[5] Notice of Resolution signed by Jaime M. Vibar, National Secretary, IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline Board of Governors; Rollo, unpaginated.
[6] Radjaie v. Alovera, A.C. No. 4748, 4 August 2000, 337 SCRA 244, 255-256.
[7] Exhibit L, Rollo, 43.
[8] TSN, 25 September 2001, 76-78.
[9] TSN, 30 May 2002, 20-21.

[10] Art. 172(1), in relation to Art. 171, Revised Penal Code.
[11] TSN, 4 April 2002, 37-38; TSN, 11 April 2002, 28-29.
[12] Art. 172(1), in relation to Art. 171, Revised Penal Code.
[13] Exh. L-1, Rollo, 43.
[14] Exh. D-3, Rollo, 40.
[15] Art. 172, last paragraph, in relation to Art. 171, Revised Penal Code.
[16] Exh. R-1, Original Records (OR), Vol. II, 65.
[17] Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[18] RUBEN E. AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS 61 (6th ed. 1997), citing Comments of
the IBP Committee that drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility, pp. 1-
2 (1980).
[19] Id., 62.
[20] Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility; Collantes v. Renomeron, A.C.

No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584.
[21] In re Gutierrez, 115 Phil. 647, 651 (1962).
[22] Exh. J, Rollo, 11.
[23] Exh. J-2, Rollo, 22.
[24] Art. 182, Revised Penal Code.
[25] TSN, 16 May 2002, 33-35.
[26] Art. 184, Revised Penal Code.
[27] Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[28] People v. Jardin, 209 Phil. 134, 142 (1983).
[29] TSN, 16 May 2002, 13-23.
[30] Exh. K, Rollo, 39.
[31] TSN, 25 September 2001, 72.

[32] In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78 (1903).
[33] In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 602.
[34] Garcia v. Manuel, A.C. No 5811, 20 January 2003.

33.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RlCARDO RIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ray Anthony F. Fajarito for accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLVI * of
Makati, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 12042, accused-appellant Ricardo Rio interposed his
appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court of said regional trial court branch forwarded the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, forwarded the records of the
case to the Supreme Court in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989,
addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris,
manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.1
The Court resolved in a resolution dated 22 June 1990 to require the Solicitor General to comment on
the appellant's manifestation to withdraw the appeal.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action recommended was for the Court to ascertain
from the accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he desired the
appointment of a counsel de oficio on appeal, in view of the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of
his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty should not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also
recommended that the clerk of court of the trial court be required by the Court to submit the response of
the accused-appellant along with a certificate of compliance with the duty imposed on him 2 by Section
13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. — It shall be the duty of the
clerk of the trial court upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain
from the appellant, if he is confined in prison, whether he desires the Intermediate Appellate
Court or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend him de oficio and to transmit with
the record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate of
compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry.
The branch clerk of the trial court, in a letter addressed to the Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second
Division, this Court, in compliance with the resolution of this Court, dated 16 April 1990, adopting the
suggestions of the Solicitor General, which required him to comply with his duty mandated in Section
13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, submitted the reply of the accused-appellant informing the Court
that he was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. 3
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution dated 1 October
1990, denied the appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the
accused-appellant for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-
appellant reveal that the only reason offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to
retain the services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude
anyone from seeking justice in any forum.4
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to
prosecute his appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional
mandate provided in Section 11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial branch of the government which can cannot
be taken lightly. "The Constitution", as aptly stated in one case, "is a law for rulers and for people
equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times
and under all circumstances."5
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a criminal
prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary examination.
President Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by
imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have
assistance of counsel for the defense' ". 6 Today said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as
Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of crime." 7
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard
by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily
to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it
is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court
should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own."8
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It
continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists
where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the
accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason
for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the
court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the
accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have
more in law."9 Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether
rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to
favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more circumspect with
the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be
above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not
committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for
said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, upon submission of which the case
would be deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant
Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. 10
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the
Makati CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. 11 The
evidence for the prosecution adduced at the trial established the following facts:
During the months of February and March 1984, complainant Wilma Phua, then only 13 years of age,
was living with her mother and three (3) sisters in a house in Barangay Bayanan, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. At a distance of about three (3) meters from this house is another house with
a toilet and bath also owned by complainant's mother but which was uninhabited at that time. The
accused, complainant's uncle, being the younger brother of complainant's mother, was staying in their
house, free of board and lodging, although he helped in the household chores. The children used the
bathroom in the uninhabited house because the amenities in the inhabited house were used only by the
adults.12
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 24 March 1984, classes having closed for vacation and while
Maria Zena Phua Rio was in the house occupied by her family, her daughter Wilma (complainant)
asked her for the key to the comfort room of the uninhabited house because she had to answer a call of
nature. After having delivered the key to Wilma, the latter proceeded to the other house, entered the
comfort room, and seeing that nobody was around and that her uncle was washing dishes in their
house, proceeded to answer nature's call without taking the precaution of locking the comfort room from
inside.13
After relieving herself but before she could raise her panty, the accused entered the bathroom with his
body already exposed, held Wilma's hands, and ordered her in a loud voice to lie down and when she
resisted, the accused got mad and ordered her to lie down. After she lay down on her back, the
accused put himself on top of her and tried to insert his private organ into her private part. Wilma kept
pushing the accused away and calling for her mother; however, since the accused was heavier than
she, the accused succeeded in overpowering her, inserting his penis into her vagina and having sexual
intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, the accused released Wilma and allowed her to leave the
bathroom.14
Outside the bathroom door, complainant met her mother Maria Zena who, meanwhile, had proceeded
to the said other house after sensing that an inordinate length of time had passed and her daughter,
complainant herein, had not returned from the bathroom. Maria Zena, upon noticing that Wilma was
speechless, trembling and looking fearful, suspected something remiss so she tried to open the door of
the bathroom. Unable to open it the first time because it was locked from inside, Maria Zena waited a
few minutes before pushing the door again. This time she was successful in finding her brother, the
herein accused-appellant in the process of raising his pants. Maria Zena was ignored by her brother
when she asked him the reason for his presence inside the bathroom. 15
Still suspecting that the accused has done something to her daughter, Maria Zena continued her
inquisition of her brother for several days but to no avail. Finally, on 9 April 1984, the accused was
asked to leave the house and move out by his sister Maria Zena. 16
Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report to her mother the fact that she had been raped
by the accused four (4) times between the months of February and March of that year (1984). After
receiving such information, Maria Zena wanted her daughter to immediately undergo physical
examination; however, Wilma, apparently traumatized by her experience, was too weak to go with her
for such examination and frequently suffered from fainting spells. It was only on 30 April 1984 that Maria
Zena was able to bring Wilma to the police to report the matter and to file the complaint. After the report
to the police, they were referred to the P.C. Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame where Wilma underwent
physical examination.17
Dr. Dario Gajardo, the physician who conducted the internal examination of Wilma, submitted a report
of his examination dated 6 May 1984. The medical report showed, among others, the following findings:
There is a scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and gaping which pale
brown, slightly hypertrophied labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is
disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep lacerations at 3, 8 and 9 o'clock. ... 18
The medical report also showed that "there was (sic) no external signs of recent application of any form
of trauma."19 All these findings led him to conclude that Wilma is "in a non-virgin state
physicially."20 Later, on the witness stand, Dr. Gajardo would further testify that Wilma, on inquiry,
revealed that the first rape happened in the month of February 1984, but that he could not tell the
approximate period or age of the lacerations.21
Armed with this medical report, Maria Zena and Wilma went back to the police where a sworn
statement of Wilma was taken and the complaint for rape against the accused was filed before Third
Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro on 12 May 1984.22
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimony of the accused himself and his brother, Amado
Rio. The accused's defense was anchored on alibi and he substantially testified as follows: that contrary
to the statements made by the witnesses for the prosecution, he was not asked to leave their house in
April 1984, the truth being that he left in the month of January 1984 or about a month before the alleged
first rape on Wilma was committed because, contrary to an alleged employment agreement between
brother and sister, his sister, Maria Zena, had not paid him any salary as helper in their house; that from
the month of January 1984, up to 24 March 1984 when the rape charged in the complaint was allegedly
committed, he was in their hometown in Kambalo, Cahidiocan, province of Romblon; that at the time of
his arrest, he was informed of the criminal charge of rape on his niece filed against him in court; that
from January 1984 up to the time of his arrest on 6 May 1984, he had stayed in the house of his uncle,
Francisco Rio, and had never left the place during the whole period.
The accused vehemently denied the rape and conjectured that his sister could have fabricated the
charge because he left her house due to her non-payment of his salary as helper. The brother of the
accused in the person of Amado Rio corroborated the defense of alibi of the accused. 23
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Nemesia B. Merca, the Election Registrar of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, who brought with her a Voter's Affidavit which was executed on 31 March 1984 by one
Ricardo Rio and was subscribed and sworn to on 31 March 1984 before Tessie Balbas, Chairman of
Voting Center No. 37-A of Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. On cross-examination, Registrar Merca
admitted that she does not know the accused personally but that the xerox copy of the Voter's Affidavit
that she brought to court was copied from a book containing about 60 voter's affidavits of said
precinct.24
After comparing the signature appealing in the Voter's Affidavit with the penmanship appearing on a
letter25 dated 12 December 1985 written by the accused to his brother, Amado Rio and on the envelope
of said letter,26 the trial court ruled that the writing characteristics on the presented documents are the
same, especially the rounded dot over the letter "i" appearing in the afore-mentioned mentioned
documents. It was, therefore, satisfied that the Voter's Affidavit was indeed prepared by the accused in
Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, on 31 March 1984, before Tessie Balbas and that this piece of
evidence completely belies the defense of the accused as corroborated by his brother, Amado, that he
was in Romblon continuously from the month of January 1984 up to the time that he was arrested on 6
May 1984.27
Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the above-named accused guilty of the crime charged in the information
beyond reasonable doubt the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify Wilma Phua in the sum of
P15,000.00, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time
of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. This claim was corroborated by the
accused's brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's
submission of the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 March
1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
Upon careful examination of the voter's affidavit, the Court is convinced, as the trial court, that the
affidavit was indeed executed by the accused himself and the date appearing therein must be
presumed correct and genuine.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially between parents and children,
husband and wife, and other relatives and even among those not related to each other. For such
defense to prosper, the accused must prove that it was not possible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, in this case the
accused's brother Amado, it deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the Court notes the fact that
while the accused-appellant had another brother and sister living in Manila besides the complainant's
mother, those two never came to his aid. Were the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these
siblings would have readily helped in his defense. The testimony of his other brother Amado alone
cannot raise the necessary doubt to acquit him as against the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female, especially a twelve-year old child, would
undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention suffer the scandal,
embarrassment and humiliation such action inevitably invites, as wen as allow an examination of her
private parts if her motive were not to bring to justice the person who had abused her. A victim of rape
will not come out in the open if her motive were not to obtain justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve will abuse her child and make her undergo
the trauma of a public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for leaving her without the
services of an unpaid helper were it not with the aim to seek justice for her child. Nobody in his right
mind could possibly wish to stamp his child falsely with the stigma that follows a rape.
On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense. The new theory presented
by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with
her on 24 March 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984
and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had abused complainant. This allegation as well as
the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the fact
that there was consent. The charge was filed, according to defense counsel de oficio, only because the
complainant's mother caught them.31
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the complainant, fails to
generate doubt as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation indeed to believe that
one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world, would permit the occurrence of an
incestuous relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very own mother.
The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of the incident in
question, by way of alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the complainant.
This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different
from the counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift
be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get himself acquitted, 32 the
Court deems it more likely that this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the
appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the case. If the appointed counsel for the
accused, on appeal, had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, he would not have
changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense.
Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies equally in criminal cases, is that a party may not
shift his theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious, he would have known
that the sudden shift would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause
of the accused-appellant (his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of
their clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest requires that an attorney
exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause." 33 Lawyers are an
indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. 34 And a lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.35
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, 36 he is expected to take such reasonable
precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make
him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.37
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a counsel de
oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to his client. 38 The
ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective
of the client's capacity to pay him his fees.39 Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate
preparation distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar. 40
Returning to the case at bar, even if we consider the sudden shift of defense theory as warranted
(which we do not), the Court is just as convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused-appellant
is guilty of the crime as charged. His conviction must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all
the accessory penalties of the law, is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court, however, increases the amount of
indemnity to be paid by the accused-appellant to Wilma Phua to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in
line with prevailing jurisprudence on this matter. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
34.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94457. October 16, 1997]
VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
94, respondents.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991, decision of
the Courts's First Division, filed by private respondents New Cathay House, Inc.
(Cathay). A brief narration of facts is in order.
The parties hereto entered into a lease agreement over a certain Quezon City property
owned by petitioner Victoria Legarda. For some reason or another, she refused to sign the
contract although respondent lessee, Cathay, made a deposit and a down payment of
rentals, prompting the latter to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
94 a complaint[1] against the former for specific performance with preliminary injunction
and damages. The court a quo issued the injunction. In the meantime, Legardas counsel,
noted lawyer Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension of time to file an
answer which the court granted. Atty. Coronel, however, failed to file an answer within the
extended period. His client was eventually declared in default, Cathay was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte, and on March 25, 1985, a judgment by default was reached by
the trial court ordering Legarda to execute the lease contract in favor of, and to pay
damages to, Cathay.
On April 9, 1985, a copy of said decision was served on Atty. Coronel but he took no
action until the judgment became final and executory. A month later, the trial court issued a
writ of execution and a public auction was held where Cathays manager, Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr., as highest bidder, was awarded the property for P376,500.00 in satisfaction
of the judgment debt.Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued by the sheriff on June
27, 1985. Upon failure of Legarda to redeem her property within the one-year redemption
period, a Final Deed of Sale was issued by the sheriff on July 8, 1986, which was
registered by Cabrera with the Register of Deeds three days later. Hence, Legardas
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 270814 was cancelled with the issuance of TCT No.
350892 in the name of Cabrera.
Despite the lapse of over a year since the judgment by default became final and
executory, Atty. Coronel made no move on behalf of his client. He did not even inform her
of all these developments. When Legarda did learn of the adverse decision, she
nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel [2] and prevailed upon him to seek appropriate
relief. Thus, on October 23, 1986, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Court of Appeals. [3]
On November 29, 1989, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming the March
25, 1985, decision of the trial court, dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment, and
holding Legarda bound by the negligence of her counsel. It considered her allegation of
fraud by Cathay to be improbable, and added that there was pure and simple negligence
on the part of petitioners counsel who failed to file an answer and, later, a petition for relief
from judgment by default. Upon notice of the Court of Appeals decision, Atty. Coronel
again neglected to protect his clients interest by failing to file a motion for reconsideration
or to appeal therefrom until said decision became final on December 21, 1989.
Sometime in March 1990, Legarda learned of the adverse decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1989, not from Atty. Coronel but from his secretary. She then
hired a new counsel for the purpose of elevating her case to this Court. The new lawyer
filed a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the decision of the trial and
appellate courts and of the sheriffs sale, alleging, among other things, that Legarda lost in
the courts below because her previous lawyer was grossly negligent and inefficient, whose
omissions cannot possibly bind her because this amounted to a violation of her right to due
process of law. She, therefore, asked Cathay (not Cabrera) to reconvey the subject
property to her.
On March 18, 1991, a decision[4] was rendered in this case by Mr. Justice Gancayco,
ruling, inter alia, as follows: (a) granting the petition; (b) nullifying the trial courts decision
dated March 25, 1985, the Court of Appeals decision dated November 29, 1989, the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985, of the property in question, and the
subsequent final deed of sale covering the same property; and (c) ordering Cathay to
reconvey said property to Legarda, and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of
said property in the name of Cathay (not Cabrera) and to issue a new one in Legardas
name.
The Court then declared that Atty. Coronel committed, not just ordinary or simple
negligence, but reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence, which deprived his client of
her property without due process of law. His acts, or the lack of it, should not be allowed to
bind Legarda who has been consigned to penury because her lawyer appeared to have
abandoned her case not once but repeatedly. Thus, the Court ruled against tolerating such
unjust enrichment of Cathay at Legardas expense, and noted that counsels lack of
devotion to duty is so gross and palpable that this Court must come to the aid of his
distraught client.
Aggrieved by this development, Cathay filed the instant motion for reconsideration,
alleging, inter alia, that reconveyance is not possible because the subject property had
already been sold by its owner, Cabrera, even prior to the promulgation of said decision.
By virtue of the Gancayco decision, Cathay was duty bound to return the subject
property to Legarda. The impossibility of this directive is immediately apparent, for two
reasons: First, Cathay neither possessed nor owned the property so it is in no position to
reconvey the same; second, even if it did, ownership over the property had already been
validly transferred to innocent third parties at the time of promulgation of said judgment.
There is no question that the highest bidder at the public auction was Cathays
manager. It has not been shown nor even alleged, however, that Roberto Cabrera had all
the time been acting for or in behalf of Cathay. For all intents and purposes, Cabrera was
simply a vendee whose payment effectively extinguished Legardas liability to Cathay as
the judgment creditor.No proof was ever presented which would reveal that the sale
occurred only on paper, with Cabrera acting as a mere conduit for Cathay. What is clear
from the records is that the auction sale was conducted regularly, that a certificate of sale
and, subsequently, a final deed of sale were issued to Cabrera which allowed him to
consolidate his ownership over the subject property, register it and obtain a title in his own
name, and sell it to Nancy Saw, an innocent purchaser for value, at a premium
price. Nothing on record would demonstrate that Cathay was the beneficiary of the sale
between Cabrera and Saw. Cabrera himself maintained that he was acting in his private
(as distinct from his corporate) capacity[5] when he participated in the bidding.
Since the decision of the Court of Appeals gained finality on December 21, 1989, the
subject property has been sold and ownership thereof transferred no less than three
times, viz.: (a) from Cabrera to Nancy Saw on March 21, 1990, four months after the
decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and one year before the
promulgation of the March 18, 1991, decision under reconsideration; (b) from Nancy Saw
to Lily Tanlo Sy Chua on August 7, 1990, more than one year before the Court issued a
temporary restraining order in connection with this case; and (c) from the spouses Victor
and Lily Sy Chua to Janet Chong Luminlun on April 3, 1992. With these transfers,
Cabreras TCT No. 350892 gave way to Saws TCT No. 31672, then to Chuas TCT No.
31673, and finally to Luminluns TCT No. 99143, all issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City on April 3, 1990, August 8, 1990, and November 24, 1993, respectively.
We do not have to belabor the fact that all the successors-in-interest of Cabrera to the
subject lot were transferees for value and in good faith, having relied as they did on the
clean titles of their predecessors. The successive owners were each armed with their own
indefeasible titles which automatically brought them under the aegis of the Torrens
System. As the Court declared in Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, [6] (i)t is settled doctrine
that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond
the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens
and claims as are annotated on the title. [7] In the case at bar, it is not disputed that no
notice of lis pendens was ever annotated on any of the titles of the subsequent
owners. And even if there were such a notice, it would not have created a lien over the
property because the main office of a lien is to warn prospective buyers that the property
they intend to purchase is the subject of a pending litigation. Therefore, since the property
is already in the hands of Luminlun, an innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be
returned to its original owner by Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself.
Another point to consider, though not raised as an issue in this case, is the fact that
Cabrera was impleaded as a party-respondent only on August 12, 1991, after the
promulgation of the Gancayco decision. [8] The dispositive portion itself ordered Cathay,
instead of Cabrera to reconvey the property to Legarda. Cabrera was never a party to this
case, either as plaintiff-appellee below or as respondent in the present action. Neither did
he ever act as Cathays representative. As we held in the recent case of National Power
Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,[9](j)urisdiction over a party is acquired by his voluntary
appearance or submission to the court or by the coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by service of summons.[10] In other words, until Cabrera was impleaded as
party respondent and ordered to file a comment in the August 12, 1991, resolution, the
Court never obtained jurisdiction over him, and to command his principal to reconvey a
piece of property which used to be HIS would not only be inappropriate but would also
constitute a real deprivation of ones property without due process of law.
Assuming arguendo that reconveyance is possible, that Cathay and Cabrera are one
and the same and that Cabreras payment redounded to the benefit of his principal,
reconveyance, under the facts and evidence obtaining in this case, would still not address
the issues raised herein
The application of the sale price to Legardas judgment debt constituted a payment
which extinguished her liability to Cathay as the party in whose favor the obligation to pay
damages was established.[11] It was a payment in the sense that Cathay had to resort to a
court-supervised auction sale in order to execute the judgment. [12] With the fulfillment of
the judgment debtors obligation, nothing else was required to be done.
Under the Gancayco ruling, the order of reconveyance was premised on the alleged
gross negligence of Legardas counsel which should not be allowed to bind her as she was
deprived of her property without due process of law.
It is, however, basic that as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her
interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for
this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. The chronology of events
shows that the case took its regular course in the trial and appellate courts but Legardas
counsel failed to act as any ordinary counsel should have acted, his negligence every step
of the way amounting to abandonment, in the words of the Gancayco decision. Yet, it
cannot be denied that the proceedings which led to the filing of this case were not
attended by any irregularity. The judgment by default was valid, so was the ensuing sale at
public auction. If Cabrera was adjudged highest bidder in said auction sale, it was not
through any machination on his part. All of his actuations that led to the final registration of
the title in his name were aboveboard, untainted by any irregularity.
The fact that Cabrera is an officer of Cathay does not make him a purchaser in bad
faith. His act in representing the company was never questioned nor disputed by
Legarda. And while it is true that he won in the bidding, it is likewise true that said bidding
was conducted by the book. There is no call to be alarmed that an official of the company
emerges as the winning bidder since in some cases, the judgment creditor himself
personally participates in the bidding.
There is no gainsaying that Legarda is the judgment debtor here. Her property was
sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment debt. She cannot claim that she was illegally
deprived of her property because such deprivation was done in accordance with the rules
on execution of judgments. Whether the money used to pay for said property came from
the judgment creditor or its representative is not relevant. What is important is that it was
purchased for value. Cabrera parted with real money at the auction. In his Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985, [13] Deputy Sheriff Angelito R. Mendoza
certified, inter alia, that the highest bidder paid to the Deputy Sheriff the said amount
of P376,500.00, the sale price of the levied property. If this does not constitute payment,
what then is it? Had there been no real purchase and payment below, the subject property
would never have been awarded to Cabrera and registered in his name, and the judgment
debt would never have been satisfied. Thus, to require either Cathay or Cabrera to
reconvey the property would be an unlawful intrusion into the lawful exercise of his
proprietary rights over the land in question, an act which would constitute an actual denial
of property without due process of law.
It may be true that the subject lot could have fetched a higher price during the public
auction, as Legarda claims, but the fail to betray any hint of a bid higher than Cabreras
which was bypassed in his favor. Certainly, he could not help it if his bid of
only P376,500.00 was the highest. Moreover, in spite of this allegedly low selling price,
Legarda still failed to redeem her property within the one-year redemption period. She
could not feign ignorance of said sale on account of her counsels failure to so inform her,
because such auction sales comply with requirements of notice and publication under the
Rules of Court. In the absence of any clear and convincing proof that such requirements
were not followed, the presumption of regularity stands. Legarda also claims that she was
in the United States during the redemption period, but she admits that she left the
Philippines only on July 13, 1985, or sixteen days after the auction sale of June 27,
1985. Finally, she admits that her mother Ligaya represented her during her absence. [14] In
short, she was not totally in the dark as to the fate of her property and she could have
exercised her right of redemption if she chose to, but she did not.
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of
Legardas counsel. If she may be said to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts
of negligence of her counsel, with more reason are respondents truly innocent. As
between two parties who may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the counsel
of one, the party who was responsible for making it happen should suffer the
consequences. This reflects the basic common law maxim, so succinctly stated by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, that . . . (B)etween two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for
the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. [15] In this case, it was
not respondents, Legarda, who misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who
practically abandoned her case and who continued to retain him even after his proven
apathy and negligence.
The Gancayco decision makes much of the fact that Legarda is now consigned to
penury and, therefore, this Court must come to the aid of the distraught client. It must be
remembered that this Court renders decisions, not on the basis of emotions but on its
sound judgment, applying the relevant, appropriate law. Much as it may pity Legarda, or
any losing litigant for that matter, it cannot play the role of a knight in shining armor coming
to the aid of someone, who through her weakness, ignorance or misjudgment may have
been bested in a legal joust which complied with all the rules of legal proceedings.
In Vales v. Villa,[16] this Court warned against the danger of jumping to the aid of a
litigant who commits serious error of judgment resulting in his own loss:
x x x Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by
another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish
things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them -
indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and
restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the
law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the
situation and remedy it."
Respondents should not be penalized for Legardas mistake. If the subject property
was at all sold, it was only after the decisions of the trial and appellate courts had gained
finality.These twin judgments, which were nullified by the Gancayco decision, should be
respected and allowed to stand by this Court for having become final and executory.
A judgment may be broadly defined as the decision or sentence of the law given by a
court or other tribunal as the result of proceedings instituted therein. [17] It is a judicial act
which settles the issues, fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties, and determines the
proceeding, and it is regarded as the sentence of the law pronounced by the court on the
action or question before it.[18]
In the case at bar, the trial courts judgment was based on Cathays evidence after
Legarda was declared in default. Damages were duly awarded to Cathay, not whimsically,
but upon proof of its entitlement thereto. The issue of whether the plaintiff (Cathay)
deserved to recover damages because of the defendants (Legardas) refusal to honor their
lease agreement was resolved. Consequently, the right of Cathay to be vindicated for such
breach and the liability incurred by Legarda in the process were determined.
This judgment became final when she failed to avail of remedies available to her, such
as filing a motion for reconsideration or appealing the case. At the time, the issues raised
in the complaint had already been determined and disposed of by the trial court. [19] This is
the stage of finality which judgments must at one point or another reach. In our jurisdiction,
a judgment becomes ipso facto final when no appeal is perfected or the reglementary
period to appeal therefrom expires. The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are
not void is self-evident.The interests of society impose it. The opposite view might make
litigations more unendurable than the wrongs (they are) intended to redress. It would
create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the
judgment or order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.
[20] When judgments of lower courts gain finality, they, too, become inviolable, impervious
to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or
indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court. [21] In other words, once a
judgment becomes final, the only errors that may be corrected are those which are clerical.
[22]
From the foregoing precedents, it is readily apparent that the real issue that must be
resolved in this motion for reconsideration is the alleged illegality of the final judgments of
the trial and appellate courts.
Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without
jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion. [23] This case must be tested
in light of the guidelines governing the latter class of judgments. In this regard, an action to
annul a judgment on the ground of fraud will not lie unless the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral and facts upon which it is based (have) not been controverted or resolved in the
case where (the) judgment was rendered. [24] Where is the fraud in the case at bar? Was
Legarda unlawfully barred from the proceedings below? Did her counsel sell her out to the
opponent?
It must be noted that, aside from the fact that no extrinsic fraud attended the trial and
resolution of this case, the jurisdiction of the court a quo over the parties and the subject
matter was never raised as an issue by Legarda. Such being the case, the decision of the
trial court cannot be nullified. Errors of judgment, if any, can only be reviewed on appeal,
failing which the decision becomes final and executory, valid and binding upon the parties
in the case and their successors in interest. [25]
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that while Legarda went to the Court of Appeals
claiming precisely that the trial courts decision was fraudulently obtained, she grounded
her petition before the Supreme Court upon her estranged counsels negligence. This
could only imply that at the time she filed her petition for annulment of judgment, she
entertained no notion that Atty. Coronel was being remiss in his duties. It was only after the
appellate courts decision had become final and executory, a writ of execution issued, the
property auctioned off then sold to an innocent purchasers for value, that she began to
protest the alleged negligence of her attorney. In most cases, this would have been
dismissed outright for being dilatory and appearing as an act of desperation on the part of
a vanquished litigant. The Gancayco ruling, unfortunately, ruled otherwise.
Fortunately, we now have an opportunity to rectify a grave error of the past.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent New Cathay House, Inc.
is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision dated March 18, 1991, of the Courts
First Division is VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered
DISMISSING the instant petition for review and AFFIRMING the November 29, 1989,
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487. Costs against petitioner
Victoria Legarda.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ concur.
Narvasa C.J., I dissent, reserving the filing of a separate opinion.
Bellosillo, J., I join J. Hermosisima Jr. in his dissent.
Puno, J., I join J. Kapunan.
Vitug, J., I join Justice Kapunan in his separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, J., See separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion
[1] Civil Case No. Q-43811.
[2] Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 418, 425 (1991).
[3] CA-G.R. No. SP-10487.
[4] Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., (First Division) concurring.
[5] Roberto V. Cabreras Comment, Rollo, p. 293.

[6] 260 SCRA 283 (1996).
[7] Citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 550 (1990); Unchuan v. Court of
Appeals, 161 SCRA 710 (1988); Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 738 (1988); Director of Lands v. Abad, 61 Phil. 479; Agricultural and
Home Extension Development Group v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 563
(1992).
[8] Resolution dated August 12, 1991, Rollo, p. 235.
[9] G.R. Nos. 90933-61, May 29, 1997.
[10] Citing Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 244 (1992); Munar v.
Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 372 (1994); Ablan v. Enage, 120 SCRA 778
(1988); Habaa v. Vamenta, 33 SCRA 569 (1970).
[11] Article 1240, Civil Code of the Philippines.
[12] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, IV, 1991, p. 274, citing Muoz, p. 445.
[13] Annex F of Petition, Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[14] Rollo, p. 19.
[15] Francisco v. Government Service Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577 (1963),

reiterated in Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 391 (1993) and again in
the more recent case of Bacaltos Coal Mines v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA
460 (1995).
[16] 35 Phil. 769.
[17] 49 C.J.S. Judgments 1.
[18] Ibid., 2.
[19] 47 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, 1053 (Citations omitted).
[20] Domingo Lucenario, Annulment of Final Judgment, 55 SCRA 294 (1974), citing
Sawit v. Rodas, 40 O.G., No. 19, p. 3818; Contreras v. Felix, 44 O.G., No. 11,
p. 4306; and Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303.
[21] In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 (1995), citing Miranda v. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 302 (1986), in turn, citing Malia v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 138 SCRA 116 (1985); Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210 (1985);
Bethel Temple, Inc. v. General Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 136 SCRA
203 (1985); Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v.
Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 (1984).
[22] Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 599 (1995), citing
Lim v. Jabalde, 172 SCRA 211 (1989).
[23] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, II, 1979, pp. 236-237.
[24] Severiano S. Tabios, Significant Characteristics of a Valid Judgment, 95 SCRA

569 (1980), citing Valera v. Villanueva, et al., 50 O.G. 4242 and Ramos, et
al. v. Albano, et al., 92 Phil. 834.
[25] Vicente, et al. v. Lucas, et al., 95 Phil. 716, cited in Moran, supra.
35.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76232 January 18, 1991
VILL TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ENERGY CORPORATION, and the DEPUTY SHERIFF of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, respondents.
Romualdo M. Jubay for petitioner.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not notice of a decision served upon
counsel in a case who did not leave a forwarding address after he had moved from his address of
record, is a valid service thereby making the decision final and executory after the lapse of the period to
appeal.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
In Civil Case No. 45167 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXLI, defendant Vill
Transport Service, Inc. (Vill Transport for brevity) was held liable for damages for breach of contract in
favor of the plaintiff Energy Corporation. Vill Transport was ordered to pay Energy Corporation
US$25,524.75 or P191,435.62 as damages, P40,000 for charter fees, P33,931.65 for rental and
maintenance costs and P63,750 for service fees, with all of these amounts being subject to 12%
interest per annum from June 16, 1980, plus attorney's fees of P8,866.60.
On June 7, 1985 a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to Atty. Amante Pimentel, counsel
of record of Vill Transport, at his address at 563 Tanglaw Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. However,
it was returned to the court with the notation that the addressee had moved out of his given address
without leaving a forwarding address.
On September 14, 1985, Energy Corporation moved for execution of the decision and on September
19, 1985, the court favorably acted on the motion. On September 24,1985, a writ of execution was
therefore issued.
A month later, Vill Transport filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order of September 19,
1985 and served notice of its intention to appeal. It contended that the decision had not as yet become
final because it came to know of the decision only on October 21, 1985. It also claimed that the writ of
execution was void as no copy of the motion for execution was served on it.
Energy Corporation filed an opposition to said urgent motion pointing out that the decision had become
final and executory since a copy of the decision was served on Vill transport through its counsel at his
address of record and no appeal was perfected within the reglementary period of appeal. It added that
a motion for execution of a final and executory judgment did not have to be with notice to defendant.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved by the court, Vill Transport filed a motion for
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. Again, without waiting for the resolution of said motion, it
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction aimed
at the setting aside of the order of execution and the issuance of an order for a new trial.
On September 30, 1986, the Court of Appeals 1 rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.2 It held that petitioner's counsel was duty-bound to notify the trial court of any change of address
and his failure to do so could not be excused. It added that the trial court had every reason to consider
the service of its decision completed upon the expiration of five days from notice to counsel in the
absence of prior notice by the latter of any change of address. It opined that "to hold that Rule 13, Sec.
8 cannot apply here because Atty. Pimentel did not get the notice, would be to encourage litigants or
their attorneys to evade the service of judgments and orders by simply leaving their addresses without
notice of their whereabouts."3
Its motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, Vill Transport interposed the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner admits the negligence of its counsel in not leaving a forwarding address but contends that its
counsel was not actually notified of the registered letter containing a copy of the trial court's decision for
he had moved from his address of record. Hence, service thereof could not have taken effect after the
lapse of the five-day period mentioned in Rule 13, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. It invokes due
process complaining that it was deprived of its right to appeal from the decision of the lower court on
account of its failure to receive a copy of the decision.
On the other hand, private respondent avers that the petition was prosecuted manifestly to delay
execution of the decision of the lower court which had long become final and executory. It stresses the
fact that, being designated by Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court to receive copies of all court
processes, petitioner's counsel was duty-bound to inform the court of any changes in his address of
record and therefore, should he fail to do so, service of such processes in his address of record should
be considered complete and binding upon his client.
We find for the private respondent.
Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "(s)ervice by registered mail is complete upon
actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days
from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time."
In Barrameda vs. Castillo,4 the Court held that since the exception in service by registered mail refers to
constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is but fair and just that there be conclusive proof
that a first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. While in the more recent case of De la
Cruz vs. De la Cruz,5 the Court appears to have adopted the more stringent rule of requiring not only
that the notice of the registered mail be sent but that it should also be delivered to and received by the
addressee, We find that this rule cannot be applied in this case wherein the element of negligence is
present.
Petitioner herein disputes that a first notice was ever sent to its counsel of record because "the post
office just returned the registered letter and put the stampmark . . . 'Moved'" thereon. 6 To our mind,
petitioner's contention is sufficient proof that indeed a first notice was sent to its counsel of record. Its
non-receipt by the addressee, however, was due entirely to his neglect in informing the court of the fact
that he had moved and had a new address. To cater to petitioner's rhetorical argument would put a
premium on negligence and encourage the non-termination of cases by reason thereof.
In Antonio vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Court categorically stated that the requirement of conclusive proof
of receipt of the registry notice "presupposes that the notice is sent to the correct address as indicated
in the records of the court. It does not apply where, as in the case at bar, the notice was sent to the
lawyer's given address but did not reach him because he had moved therefrom without informing the
court of his new location. The service at the old address should be considered valid. Otherwise, no
process can be served on the client through his lawyer if the latter has simply disappeared without
leaving a forwarding address. There is no need to stress that service on the lawyer, if valid, is also valid
service on the client he represents. The rule in fact is that it is on the lawyer and not the client that the
service should first be made."
Losing a case on account of one's counsel's negligence is a bitter pill to swallow for the litigant. But
then, the Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures. And, in the observance thereof for
the orderly administration of justice, it cannot countenance the negligence and ineptitude of lawyers
who wantonly jeopardize the interests of their clients. 8 On his part, a lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.9
Thus, a lawyer should so arrange matters that official and judicial communications sent by mail will
reach him promptly and should he fail to do so, not only he but his client as well, must suffer the
consequence of his negligence.10 Failure to claim registered mail of which notice had been duly given
by the postmaster is not excusable negligence that would warrant the reopening of a decided
case.11 The same rule applies in cases like the instant one where the counsel, through his negligence,
caused the nondelivery of a judicial notice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of merit. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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1.

[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C.

That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if

The IBPs Recommendation

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Commissions recommendation.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

The Practice of Law -- a

[1] Records, pp. 2-3.

[2] Ibid., p. 15.

[3] Id., at pp. 20-28.

[4] Report and Recommendation, pp. 10-11; records, 261-262.

[5] R. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1997 ed., p. 156.

[6] Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, AC No. 4073, June 28, 2001.

[7] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, September 21, 1949.

[8] Junio v. Grupo, AC No. 5020, December 18, 2001.

[9] Aromin v. Boncavil, 315 SCRA 1, September 22, 1999.

[10] Tan v. Lapak, 350 SCRA 74, January 23, 2001.

[11] Cantiller v. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246, December 18, 1989.

[12] Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 160, August 8, 1988.

[14] Ibid., p. 13.

[15] Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, September 26, 1964.

[17] Tanhueco v. De Dumo, 172 SCRA 760, April 25, 1989.

[18] Aromin v. Boncavil, supra.

MARCOS V. PRIETO, A.C. No. 6517

ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against

Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court

On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent

In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:

In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez (Marquez) mortgaged six (6)

In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto

On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge

Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques counsel, filed a

On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67

On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the

Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the

On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent

In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint

For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed by

More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent judge allowed the

As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in this

Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner

Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents,

As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against

Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that,

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in

By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, Justice

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is. like the court itself,

Petitioners unfounded imputations against respondents are malicious and

Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing counsel, petitioner

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons of