Compiled Case Digest in

Succession
2018-2019
Rhina Angela Sudayon
9/28/2018

Note: This document is a compiled digested case in succession. The sources of the digested cases are from the
internet and other compiled case digests in succession uploaded by other law students :) Moreover, there are
some cases that cannot be searched, so better read the full cases.
1. Limjoco vs. Estate of FragranteG.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

FACTS: On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said
intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court
of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive
capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice
produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for
is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE: Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD: The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If

Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except
for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately
operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the
decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets
left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations
which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the
deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical
persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived
after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during
the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
estate which survived after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a
part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the
commission.
2. IBARLE v. PO GR No.L-5064 February 27, 1953
Topics/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death.
FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy
who later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her
appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in
question, which portion now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant
Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to
the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the
children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the
children's share.

On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the
competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded
is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not
avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

3. LORENZO VS POSADAS G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death.

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, leaving a will and considerable amount of
real and personal properties. The will which was duly admitted to probate, provides among
other things, that all properties of the testator shall pass to his nephew, Matthew Hanley.
However, it also provides that all real estate shall be placed un-der the management of the
executors for a period of ten years,after the expiration of which the properties shall be
given to the said Matthew Hanley. Plaintiff Lorenzo was appointed as trustee. During
plaintiff’s incumbency astrustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that
the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty and personalty,
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax. The defendant prayed that the trustee be
ordered to pay the Government the inheritance tax together with the penalties for
delinquency in paying such tax. The trustee paid under protest and however, he demanded
that he be refunded for the amount paid. The plaintiff contends that the inheritance tax
should be based upon the value of the estate at the expiration of the period of ten years
after which according to thetestator’s will, the property could be and was to be delivered
tothe instituted heir, and not upon the value thereof at the timeof the death of the testator.
The defendant overruled plaintiff’s protest and refused to refund the amount.

ISSUES: 1. When does the inheritance accrue?

2. Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of
thetestator’s death or on its value 10 years later?

HELD:1. Invoking the provision of Art. 657 (now Art. 777) of the Civil Code, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, held: “Whatever may be the time when actual
transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event at the
moment of the decedent’s death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the
inheritance tax accrued as of that date. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or
devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or
privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed ,to receive, or take property by or under a will
or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Thomas
Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.

2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s death - If death is the
generatingsource from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its
being and if,upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the
estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it
stood at the time of thedecedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of
any subsequent increaseor decrease in value.A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the
time of the predecessor's death, notwithstandingthe postponement of the actual possession
or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, andthe tax measured by the value of the
property transmitted at that time regardless of itsappreciation or depreciation.

4. Bagtas vs. Paguio G.R.No.L- 6801March 14, 1912

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts: Pioquinto Pagiuo executed a will; the wife was propounded as executrix and
opposed by the son and grandchildren by a former marriage on the ground that the will
was executed while the testator was suffering from debility of the body and poor memory
which allegedly lacks testamentary capacity.
Issue: Whether or not physical debility or poor memory constitutes incapacity to execute a
will?
Held: Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility will affect the capacity to
make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains, failure of memory is not sufficient to create
incapacity.

ISSUE: Was the will validly executed?

HELD: The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well-established,
and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by the court of
competent jurisdiction , this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the
opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. The opponents failed to
do this. The courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body , induced by
age and disease does not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not
require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical
and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard , few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The
authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in the statement that the question of
mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest
degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated insanity or idiocy.

5. walang digest

6. HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES

FACTS: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina)
with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married
Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G.
Favis (Mariano), he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate
children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four
children.

Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly
executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his
grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis
children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of
Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC
against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.

RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and
plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a
valid Deed of Donation.

The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA
motu proprioproprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to
make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated
by Article 151 of the Family Court.

ISSUE: May the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made?
HELD: The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate
courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, Art.151.No suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.

The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made on any of the following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds
for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided
under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court
motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9
provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim,
namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and (d) prescription of action.

It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS
Management and Development Corporation where we noted that the second sentence of
Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to
dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second
sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only from
the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling
on a waived ground.

A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among

members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the
statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint
of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been
filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of
the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any
defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial
court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought
before the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is

wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and
did not, after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of
the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court
unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of
petitioners complaint.

The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents
opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a
procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and
respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. GRANTED.

7. walang digest

8. Garcia v. Lacuesta
90 P 489
FACTS: This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects was
signed by the testator through a cross mark (an “X”). The will was signed by
Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly wrote
a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because its
attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was signed by
Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator wrote a cross at the
end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that the 3 witnesses signed the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE: Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause since
the testator had placed a cross mark himself as his signature.
HELD: The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
Mercado directed Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction.
Petitioner’s argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed the will
himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which
has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a
thumb mark, because the crossmark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb
mark.
9. Nera v. Rimando G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911
'Test of Presence'
Facts:1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room
by a doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room
when the other witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument.
2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the
witness as of vital importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case
of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was
in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to
invalidate the execution of the will.
3. The CA deemed the will valid.
Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other
witnesses in the act of affixing their signatures.
HELD: YES
The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer
room when the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would
have invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was
not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the
witness to the testator and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the
rooms.

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of
the attaching the signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each
other sign but whether they might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso
considering their physical, mental condition and position in relation to each other at the
moment of the inscription of the signature.
10. walang case
11. Icasiano vs. Icasiano G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for
his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on
September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it
was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy
of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses
failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages
simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was
signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his
signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence.
Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not
intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate
since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly
signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of.
Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should
be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all
respects.
12. German Jaboneta vs. Ricardo Gustilo, et al. G.R. No. 1641 Justice Carson

Topic/Doctrine: WILLS; PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND WITNESSES; VALIDITY.—The

true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other
sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and
position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.

FACTS: Probate of the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied by
the lower court because the latter was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the
hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the
presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

According to the testimony of Jena, he left the room seeing Javellana holding the pen in
position to sign the last will and testament of the testator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta complied with the
requirement of the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

HELD: Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand
and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of
the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his
name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The
fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the
name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses
and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were
together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana
signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his
eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so,
therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the
room.
We are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument were
complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the ground
stated in the ruling appealed from.

DOCTRINE
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testatorâs name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will
and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the
attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.
SPECIFIC ISSUE Whether or not the subscribing witnesses, in compliance with Art. 805 of
the New Civil Code, must actually witness (on their eyes) the signing of the instrument by
the other witnesses.
HOW DID THE SC DECIDE ON THE ISSUE BASED ON THE DOCTRINE
The fact that Isabelo Jena (one of the witnesses) was still in the room when he saw Julio
Javellana (another of the witnesses) moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his
signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which
shows that Julio Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces the
SC that the signature was affixed in the presence of Isabelo Jena.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator
is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument
subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence are
vision and mental apprehension.
The true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but
whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and
position at the time of the subscription.
These principles are equally applicable in determining whether the witnesses signed the
instrument in the presence of each other, as required by the statute.
Applying these to the facts of the case, SC is in the opinion that the statutory requisites as to
the execution of the instrument were complied with.
13. Cruz vs. Villasor G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Topic/Doctrine: Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)

FACTS: Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu
allowing the probate of the last will of testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. The surviving
spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was
execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly
as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was
not executed in accordance with law. The first requiring at least three credible witnesses to
attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to
acknowledge the will before a notary public.

In which three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr.
Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same
time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As
the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only
two witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. Notwithstanding
her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this
appeal by certiorari which was given due course.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code?

HELD: After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties. We are inclined to
sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed
in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot
be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public
himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of
himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To
permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangement ( Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if
the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be
interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of
his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud . He the notary public acted not only as
attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805
and 806 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC
HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An
acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before'
means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality
into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he
making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental
witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position,
thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

14. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. De Jesus and Bibiana Roxa de
Jesus, Simeon R. ROXAS and Pedro ROXAS de Jesus, petitioners vs. Andres R. de
JESUS, Jr. G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985
FACTS: After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was
instituted by Simeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the
estate and consequently, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the
holographic will of Bibiana which was then set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the
compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing the purported holographic Will of
Bibiana was not executed in accordance with law. However, the lower court issued an
order allowing the probate which was found to have been duly executed in accordance with
law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged
holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending
that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution
and that this should be strictly complied with. The court then reconsidered its earlier order
and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the ground that the word “dated” has
generally been held to include the month, day, and year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the
deceased Bibian Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must

be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out
of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
 As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic will should include the day, month and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud,
bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and
the only issue is whether or not the date “FEB/61” appearing on the holographic will is a
valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should
be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

15. FAUSTO E. GAN v. ILDEFONSO YAP

FACTS:On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of
Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had
not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.After hearing the parties
and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the
alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

HELD: NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium
of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic
will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct”
proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.

16. Rodelas vs Aranza

Facts:1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased
did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will
was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

17. Azaola v. Singson

FACTS: Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner
submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir
as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was
presented to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one
month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife;
and that it was in the testatrix’s handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power
of the attorney, and the general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an
affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing the testatrix’s
signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.

The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and
(2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the
same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on
November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature
are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone
witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the
handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will’s authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and
signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse
party.

ISSUE: W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD: Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the
will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but
even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 can not be
interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness
may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law
(Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely
a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses “who
know the handwriting and signature of the testator” and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not so express) “that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator”. There may be no available witness of the testator’s hand; or
even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert
evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will’s
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call
for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of
those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of
inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.

18. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN
VDA. DE MOLO v. LUZ, GLICERIA AND CORNELIO MOLO

Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay,
province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending
line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo,
and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased
brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17,
1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939.

On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There
being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein
oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case
was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court
rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed
to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February
24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the
petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the
probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required
by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

Issues:
1. Was Molo’s will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939?

2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence
of the testator’s belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid
and the latter would be given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?

Doctrines:

1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that “a
subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for
the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.”

Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps
because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the
subject of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the study of
the pertinent authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.

1. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
“dependent relative revocation”. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose
validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make
at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a
new will.

19. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA,

executrixappellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants, v.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA
and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees. PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura. appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children
with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura
filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees.

In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and
appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate.
Said will was admitted to probate on January 14,195. Gregorio Ventura died on September
26, 1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her
appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favour.

On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters
testamentary was issued in her favour. On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted
an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura. On June 17, 1960, she filed her accounts of
administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.

Oppositions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to remove as executrix
and administrator Maria Ventura on the grounds that (1) that she is grossly incompetent;
(2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the
inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious
relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts
and failed to comply with the Order of the Court. The court a quo, finding that the executrix
Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has
failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date
statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered the
questioned decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura as
executrix and administratrix.

RULING: REVERSED. In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and
Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property.

It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.” Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between
next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the
person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving
spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.

20. Guevara v. Guevara

Facts:1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his
wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural
daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there
any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the
land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did
nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not
probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy.

Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

21. Walang digest

22. Gallanosa v. Arcangel

Facts: 1. Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned
61 parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon.
In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if
she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses
Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3
parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

2. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal
heirs filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on
the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for
annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result,
the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due
execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence.
Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may
only be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and
2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed
within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

23. Austria v. Reyes (same with 31)

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and
testament which was opposed by petitioners, who are her nephews and nieces. The
opposition was dismissed and the will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her
estate designated for respondents, all of whom declared by Basilia as her legally adopted
children. More than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died.
Petitioners filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are
the nearest of kin of Basilia, and asserts that the five respondents had not been adopted by
the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers
to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. The court a quo allowed the
petitioners' intervention. Petitioner then moved the lower court to set for hearing the
matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents but before the date set by the
court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meñez filed a motion
asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention,
should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent. The lower
court issued an order delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the
deceased which were not disposed of in the will. Same court denied the petitioners' motion
for reconsideration and the second motion for reconsideration. A petition for certiorari was
filed praying this Court to annul the all the orders restricting petitioners' intervention to
properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to
intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs. They alleged that the language used
imply that Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-
half of her entire estate to the respondents as the latter’s legitime, with the inference that
respondents would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious
adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms,
“sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the
impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief
that under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies
whereby, “the statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as
not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE: Whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there
exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

HELD: Yes. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must
be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other
considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely
favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding
the respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews and nieces
would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear
wishes of the decedent. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially
where the will shows an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate, as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final
judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full
expression to her will must be in order.

24. Aznar v. Duncan

Facts:Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died

leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. (In 1954) The will was admitted to probate by
the CFI and it also declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was a natural child of the
deceased. The decision was appealed to the SC and was affirmed.

(In 1963) In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased’s estate, the
RTC approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of
the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia
appealed from the order of approval and the SC reversed the ruling on the ground that the
validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law. SC returned the
case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said
law.

(In 1964) CFI issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the
executor wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy
Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.

Lucy Duncan appealed with the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting
the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares or whether the
inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.

RTC ruled and appellee now maintains that there has been preterition of Helen
Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of
heir pursuant to Article 854 of the CC. Appellant contends that Helen Garcia is entitled only
to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were instestate.

In the will of the deceased, Helen Garcia was given a legacy of P3,600.00.

Issue: Whether or not there was preterition.

Ruling: No, there was no preterition. The solution (from three SC Spain decisions cited by
Manresa) was that the heir ask that the legitime be completed and not that the institution
of heirs be annulled entirely. This solution is more in consonance with the expressed
wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the
provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared
judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration
come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards here would have undergone any
change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who
alone was expressly recognized by him.

The testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

Therefore, ¼ of the estate of the deceased which consisted of 399 shares of stocks
and a certain amount of cash descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became
the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent, she is entitled to a
corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing.

Therefore, there is no preterition if the heir is given a legacy or devise.

25. Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs.Pablo and Basilio SABLAN, opponent-

appellees. (same with number 45)

FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who
inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died,
unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of
her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of
Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if
granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each
parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such
a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said
two uncles. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable

property.
2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause its
registration.

RULING:A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a
valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil
Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and
a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood
relationship.

Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter
acquired without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or
sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line where the property
proceeded.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from
another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial court’s
ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore
in accordance with the law.

The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond
any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express
provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hadn’t, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or
constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that
only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire
it.26.

26. Beatriz L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, et al.,

respondents.(same with number 46)

FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was
survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children. The real properties left
by Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and
the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by
her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). She later died and her will was
admitted to probate as a holographic will in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are
reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and
three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda.
That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed an ordinary civil action
against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose
of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of
her three daughters and her three sons.

The lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez.

Mrs. Gonzales appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 and contends that the lower court
erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891
of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal?

2. Whether or not Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of the properties in
question in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children?

RULING: The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when
at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus
Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

The reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of
the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven
reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor.

27. Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu

Nature: Direct appeal from judgment of CFI dismissing the complaint of Tirso Reyes and
ordering the same to deliver to Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties received by his
deceased wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto.

Parties:

Tirso Reyes, guardian of minors Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, all surnamed Reyes y
Barretto, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

Facts: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they acquired
vast estate (real property in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18,
1936), he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto (mother of the minors) and Lucia
Milagros Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa
Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria (the
widow). As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed by her
in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros. It was approved, and the estate
was distributed and the shares delivered. Salud took immediate possession of her share
and secured the cancellation of OCTs and issuance of new titles in her name.

Upon Maria’s death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed two wills: in the
first, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first
rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes (as guardian of the children of
Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria by her
husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.
 TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Bibiano is null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee
(Salud), predecessor of Tirso et. al., was not a daughter of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The
nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Art. 1081 (OCC) (A partition in
which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be
null and void). As Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano, she was entitled to recover
from Salud and her successors all the properties received by her from Bibiano’s estate, in
view of Art. 1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by mistake or fraud is held by
its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner.

Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her legitimate heir, Tirso now falls
back upon the remnant of the estate of Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct
to Maria. Hence, this action for the recovery of the one-half portion thereof. This action
afforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership; not only of the fishpond
under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being a
spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly
attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court
based thereon as well.

Issues/Held: (1) W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question
is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it. NO.

(2) W/N Milagros’ action is barred by the statute of limitations. YES.

Ratio :(1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied! Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in
Bibiano’s last will and testament together with Milagros. Hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void under Art. 1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does
not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the
testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not
for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros
was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution
of Salud as heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of a forced heir here.

The view that the partition in question is void for being a compromise on the civil status of
Salud, in violation of Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise presupposes the
settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties; and the condition of
Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the
settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute.
While a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement
by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for distribution of
estate), it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled. It is that judicial decree of
distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. Where a court has validly
issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud was not her child,
the act of Maria in agreeing to the partition and distribution was a fraud on her rights and
entitles her to belief. This contention is unfounded.

First, there is no evidence that when Bibiano’s estate was judicially settled and distributed,
Salud knew that she was not Bibiano’s child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was Maria
who was solely responsible; and neither Salud nor her minor children can be held liable
therefor.

Second, granting there was such fraud, relief therefor can be obtained within 4 years from
its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago.

At the time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She became of age 5 years later
(1944). On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the
court decree distributing her father’s estate and the 4-year period of limitation started to
run, to expire in 1948. Conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in
1946, her action still became extinct in 1950. Her action was barred in Aug. 1956, when
she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano’s
estate.

There is no evidence of an alleged verbal promise by Tirso to reconvey the

properties received by Salud, which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of the
action. Granting that there was such promise, it would not bind Tirso’s wards, who are the
real parties-in-interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
disposition, and not of administration, cannot bind his wards, being null and void as to
them unless duly authorized by the proper court

Dispositive: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it orders Tirso to reconvey
to Milagros the properties enumerated in said decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar as
it denies any right of Milagros to accounting. The action for partition of the fishpond must
be GIVEN DUE COURSE.

28. ART 838

1) TESTATE ESTATE OF PILAPIL :

FACTS:

Father Eleuterio Pilapil was a parish priest in Muaboal, Cebu.

 He died in 1935.

In the absence of a will, after his death, his brother Calixto filed a case for intestacy.

After complying with the requisite publication and notices , the court heard the case
and the estate was declared intestate.

On March 4, 1939, just a few days after, a case was filed by Adrian Mendoza, a niece
of the testator, for the probate of the last will and testament of Fr. Pilapil.

In the said will, Mendoza was appointed administrator of the estate.

In case, he would fail or be negligent, it was stipulated that he will be replaced by

another niece of the testator, Jose Cabatingan.

The probate of said will was opposed by the Pilapil and others, appellants to this
case.

The grounds on which they rely their opposition include the following:

• the documents contain erasures and alterations;

• it was not been proven that the decedent possessed knowledge of the Spanish
language in which the documents were written;

• the provision that prohibits the probation of the will in the courts;

• that both documents had been prepared, signed and witnessed in accordance with
the provisions of Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: WON the will was valid ?

HELD:

The issue about erasures and alterations should have been raised at the trail court.

There is the presumption that the evidence raised at the trial court had already been
appreciated.

The testator’s knowledge of the language in which the will is written is presumed
because he was a priest and while at the seminary, he must have learned not only Spanish
but English as well.

The disposition of the testator that his "last will and testament not be heard by the
court" can not strip courts of their authority to determine whether the will is valid or not.
 The law requires, under penalty, that wills made by a testator should be delivered
to the COurt, after the person dies, by the person to whom custody has been entrusted, so
that the court can determine whether the will is valid and at the same time determine the
disposition of the testator to dispose of their property as instructed on the same

if the contract be declared that the testator died intestate, the will not being capable
of legalization.

In the probation of a will, some defects in the will and testament should not be
allowed to obstruct the legal formalities x x x in consideration of wills and to frustrate the
wishes of the dead solemnly expressed in their wills, as to the granting of which there is not
even a shadow of bad faith or fraud.

NOTE: The important issue here is that whatever defects there are in the last will and
testament of the testator, as long as there is substantial compliance of the basic
requirements of the law, the same should be given effect in the absence of fraud. It can be
gleaned in the poorly translated original text, that the testator has given instructions as to
how his property should be disposed of. This could not be given effect unless the court has
passed upon its validity in probate proceedings because of the provisions of ARTicle 838.

When we took up ART 805, this case was also assigned to us. The issue there was that even
if the attestation clause did not mention the numbe of pages in the will, it was still valid
because this fact was mentioned in the body of the will. The important requirements of
mentioning the number of pages and the way it was supposed to be paged are found the
will itself.

29 [No. 24168. September 22, 1925]

FLORENCIO MANALO, as guardian of the minors Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta,
petitioner, vs. Honorable ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and
PHILIPPINE FOOD COMPANY, respondents.

1.WILLS; PROBATE OF; PROCEEDING "IN REM."—

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice
prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be
entered therein is binding against all of them.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION.—Through the publication of the petition for the probate of
the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will;
and any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is binding against the whole
world.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL.—The court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and all
the persons interested in the case, any error that it might have committed in rendering
judgment cannot be corrected through mandamus, but by the proper appeal presented in
due time and manner.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Francisco, Lualhati & Lopez and Juan S. Rustia for petitioner.

Claro M. Recto, Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for respondents.

J. E. Blanco for the intervenor Hidalgo.

VlLLA-REAL, J.:

This is a proceeding for mandamus commenced originally in this court by Florencio

Manalo, as guardian of the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus addressed to the Honorable Isidro Paredes, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, and the Philippine Food Co., ordering the publication of the petition for the
probate of the will of the deceased Francisco Villegas, case No. 4217 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna; and injunction commanding the respondent judge, Honorable Isidro
Paredes, to suspend the proceedings in the registration case No. 954 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, wherein the Philippine Food Co. is the applicant and the minors Lazaro
and Daria Mendieta opponents, until the termination of the proceeding for the probate of
the will of Francisco Villegas, in which said minors are named legatees of the land involved
in said registration case.

On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Laguna an application for letters of administration of the estate
left by her deceased husband, who, according to the application, died intestate (rec. No.
4031, file 1, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).

In the course of said administration and on May 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, Lazaro
Mendieta, Daria Mendieta, and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, through
their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate of
the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his property was given as a legacy
to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the deceased
Francisco Villegas (rec. No. 4031, file 1, fol. 47).

On August 8, 1924, Messrs. E. M. Lopez and V. F. Reyes, attorneys, on behalf of the executor
Melecio Fule, filed a motion (Exhibit 3) wherein they stated that the attesting witnesses,
Exequiel Evidente and Albino Villegas, had assured them that the supposed will had not
been executed by Francisco Villegas in accordance with law, and that the executor Melecio
Fule no longer took interest in the case (rec. No. 4031, fol. 116).
On June 5, 1924, having received an order of the court requiring her to produce the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas, Justina Mendieta filed a motion, wherein, among other
things, she said:

"That having learned of the aforesaid order of this court, I hereby freely and spontaneously
state that I know not of any will executed by the deceased Francisco Villegas except the one
that I had had said deceased Francisco Villegas sign on January 18, 1924, which he signed
at my request and inducement in order that my children begotten by him might have a
share in his estate, as said deceased did in fact sign said will only in my presence and
compelled by the pressure exerted by me and for my aforesaid children. (Rec. No. 4031, file
1, fol. 70.)

Notwithstanding the foregoing motions, the court, on September 3, 1924, ordered the
publication in the newspaper El Debate, of Manila, of the application of Melecio Fule and of
Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, and Daria Mendieta for the probate of the supposed will
of the deceased Francisco Villegas, setting said application for hearing on the 3rd day of
October, 1924 (rec. No. 4031, file 1, fol. 192).

On September 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, together with her children Lazaro Mendieta and
Daria Mendieta, filed another application for the probate of the same will through their
attorneys, Messrs. Azada and Veluz (rec. No. 4031, file 1, fol. 199), and on October 13, 1924,
the same attorneys and Attorney Marcelino Lontok, on behalf of Justina Mendieta and her
minor children, filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for said minors
(rec. No. 4031, file 2, fol. 117).

At the trial, which was held October 16, 1924, the court below appointed Justina Mendieta,
natural mother of said minors, as their guardian ad litem. Laureana Hidalgo entered her
objection to the probate of the will (rec. No. 4031, file 2, fol. 136) and immediately the court
proceeded to hear the evidence of the 'parties, each and everyone of the attesting witnesses
of the supposed will, named Tomas Dizon, Albino Villegas, and Exequiel Evidente having
testified, and the applicants having introduced Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, and
N and the opponent Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4, the trial having been suspended thereafter, to be
continued on October 24, 1924.

When the case was called on October 24, 1924, for the continuation of the trial, Justina
Mendieta, for herself and in her capacity as guardian ad litem of her minor children Lazaro
Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented by their attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok
and Marcial Azada, on the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, represented by her attorney,
Mr. J. E. Blanco, on the other, submitted to the court an agreement wherein Justina
Mendieta stated that she withdrew her application for the probate of the supposed will of
the 'deceased Francisco Villegas on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify
the probate of said will, and consequently, she prayed that said will be held not allowable
to probate and that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs than his
legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria
Mendieta, and that the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance with said
agreement (rec. No. 4031, file 2, fol. 171).
By an order dated October 25, 1924, the court approved said stipulation and rendered
judgment, holding that the supposed will of Francisco Villegas could not be probated, and
awarding to the. heirs of the deceased the estate left by Francisco Villegas in accordance
with said agreement (rec. No. 4031, file 2, fol. 173). From this order no appeal has been
taken. .

On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased
Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new application for the probate of the same
supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas

As may be seen from the facts above stated, the will, the probate of which is applied for in
the petition dated the application of May 5, 1924, and of September 5 1924 January 7 1925,
is the same one that was the subject of The only difference lies in that the first application
was filed Mendieta second attorney Mr. her children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta
represented by the attorneys Messrs. Azada and Veluz, and the third and last by one
Gelacio Malihan who claimed to his first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas.

The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding to in rem proceeding p. 1265), and
the court acquires juris-diction over all the persons interested through the publication of
the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may
be entered is binding against all of them. Through the publication ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco
Villegas, filed by Justina Mendieta and her minor children Lazaro and Daria Mendieta and
Melecio Fule, testamentary executor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, said court
acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in the supposed will,
including Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for probate, hearing all
the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will, the applicant Justina
Mendieta for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, represented by their
attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok and Marcial Azada, on the one hand, and Laureana
Hidalgo, widow of Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney, Jesus E. Blanco, on the
other, having submitted a stipulation wherein the former withdrew her application and the
latter reserved certain rights over the estate left by Francisco Villegas in favor of Justina
Mendieta and her minor children; and the court having approved said stipulation and
declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to said agreement, all the parties
became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not
satisfied with the court's 'decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice
that might have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of
mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the
same will. in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial 'duty
imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being
extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error (26 Cyc., 177; 18 R. C. L.,
par. 443); especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary
provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him
(25 R. C. L., 359).
The first ground of the petition for mandamus is a consequence of the second and we need
not deal with it.

As to the motion of the petitioner that the record of the proceeding be transmitted to the
Attorney-General for investigation, in order to discover any irregularity or fraud that may
have been committed, and to institute the proper proceeding against those who may be
found guilty, this court will take no action unless specific charges are filed.

For all of the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is denied with the costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.

Writ denied.

30. Walang digest

31. Chua v. CFI

Facts: Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3 children- Ignacio,
Manuel and Lorenzo. When Patricia died, he married Consolacion de la Torre and had one
child- Juanito Frias Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate. After the intestate proceeding the
court adjudicated half of lot in question to Consolacion and the other half to their only son,
Juanito. The two sons in the first marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k and P1550
respectively. (Manuel already died).

Juanito also died intestate without issue. Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of
heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito in the lot in
question. When dela Torre died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a complaint praying
that the one-half portion of the Lot be declared as a reservable property for the reason that
the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC.

Lower court dismissed complaint.

Issue: WON property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose
Frias Chua gratuitously (as first requisite of Reserva Troncal).

Held: Yes

Ratio:

 In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following
requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant
from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
 descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
 All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records,
Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour
leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his
mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had
relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein
 According to Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when
the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the
person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return.
 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from
pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident
from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias
Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by
means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
 As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity,
itg is gratuitous.

32. Guevara v. Guevara

Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural
daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there
any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the
land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did
nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not
probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Issues 1. Whether or not the original of the record on appeal did not comply with the Rules
of Court?

2. Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over the case?

3. Whether or not the petition for probate of the will of Victorino L. Guevara is barred
by the statute of limitations, considering that the testator died on September 27, 1933,
and that the petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years later, or, to be
exact, on October 5, 1945.

Held: 1. No. The first ground is predicated upon the fact that, instead of transcribing the
motions, petitions, orders and resolutions incorporated in the original record on appeal,
Respondents herein merely attached to the original copy of said record on appeal, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, their own copies of said motions,
petitions, orders and resolutions. Accordingly, the copy of said record on appeal
furnished to Petitioner herein did not contain or enclose the aforementioned parts of the
record. It appears; however, that the Respondents were given several extensions of time
within which to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and those
Respondents eventually did so. There being no question on the authority of the court of
first instance to grant said extensions of time, it is clear that the first ground, relied upon by
Petitioner herein, is untenable.

2. No. Petitioner maintains the negative, upon the ground that the appeal involved only
questions of law. This is not correct, for the very motion for reconsideration adverted
to above, indicated that the appeal raised some issues of fact, such as, for instance,
whether or not the will in question was in the possession of Respondent Rosario
Guevara and whether Respondent Quinto had been authorized by her to perfect the appeal
on her behalf. At any rate, the case is now before us and, upon examination of the record
and consideration of all the issues therein raised, we are of the opinion that, had the appeal
been forwarded directly to this Court, we would have disposed of it in the manner set forth
in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the review of which is sought by herein Appellant.
3. No. Section 1299 declares that any person interested in the estate ‘may at any time after
the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will proved.’ This
implies that there is no arbitrary time limit.’

Section 1317 declares: If the court is satisfied, upon the proof taken or from the facts found
by the jury that the will was duly executed and that the will testator at the time of its
execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress menace fraud, or
undue influence, a certificate of the proof and the facts found, signed by the judge and
attested by the seal of the court, must be attached to the will.’

Under Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts
and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must
first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the
will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary
to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate,
because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy.

The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in
the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no
knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of
the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion
of others.’

“In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below
failed to notice that its doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition
and violative of the owner’s right to control his property within the legal limits. The
appealed order in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs
interested in their suppression.

Ruling: Petition denied

33. In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant and

appellee, vs. AGUSTIN CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants.

FACTS: On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as
the last will and testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir
Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity
questioned the genuineness of the will on the following grounds: First, that it was
improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate by excluding
her blood relatives; and second, that if such will was not expressed in fact, it was due to
extraneous illegal influence.
ISSUE: Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her
estate.

HELD: YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but
we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The
liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced (compulsory) heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1989.

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore,
although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and
customary, still this would not be null per se.

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over
his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or
legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will,
and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is
not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can
prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice,
frivolity, or revenge can dictate. X X X ” (40 Cyc., 1079.)

34. Walang digest

35. BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ

Facts: Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur was survived by her husband,
Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B.
Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial
will which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the
owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute
owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it
was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV). In paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he
was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were
all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal
assets.

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr.
should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr., wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed
that he was interested in its probate.

Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's
will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six
children.In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. Lower court "denied" the opposition and
reset for hearing the probate of the will. Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the
lower court's order. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros,
opposed that motion. Lower court denied it in its order.

David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel
of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion for "leave of court to withdraw probate of
alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding." Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
conjugal assets or allegedly affected a compromise of future legitimes. In another motion of
the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

Lower court acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice
to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of
Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void.Dismissed the petition for the probate,
converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing. The notice to creditors was
issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of
petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion asked for
the reconsideration of the lower court’s Ground: that Atty. Montaña had no authority to
withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Withdrawal of the petition for the
probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder
to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. LC:
denied the motion in its order. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its
own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's
arguments.
Issue: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

Held: The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring, in its
order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding.

Ratio:

1. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established.

a. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void.
b. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

2. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.

a. Notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his
hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate.

3. General Rule: "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made"

a. "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid
parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating
the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"
b. The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share
was inchoate and proindiviso
c. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
4. The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share).
 a. She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080.
b. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash.
c. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty
years.

5. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share
of the conjugal partnership

a. But insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights

and his one-half share in the conjugal estate, it should be subject to the
limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code.
b. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and
maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

6. In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will.

a. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art.
170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate,
such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

7. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights.

a. Remember this: Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious."
b. As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed
and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs.
Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
c. c. The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his
will because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make
(Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

36. Walang digest

37. Walang digest

38. Austria v. Reyes

Facts: 1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the
respondents, alll have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by
the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will
was allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they
were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed
as heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of
heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule
is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the
institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must
concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it
must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved
on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners’
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.

HELD: No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must
be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other
considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely
favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding
the respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews and nieces
would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert
the clear wishes of the decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done
in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to
prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the decedent
possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to her will must be
in order.

Issue: WON the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof
that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was false

Held: YES.

Ratio: Article 850 of the Civil Code which reads, “The statement of a false cause for the
institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such
cause.”

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated
in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the
face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause.

From the use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang
mana” (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents
was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed
what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in
her will.

Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law,
independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her
supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes.

Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete
agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners’ own proposition,
is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will.

One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on
the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
 The phrases, “mga sapilitang tagapagmana” and “sapilitang mana,” were borrowed from
the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of
heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance.

They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than
the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for
legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely
favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter’s children, and the children of the
respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.

Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her
blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the
children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces
would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result which would subvert the
clear wishes of the decedent.

Dispositive: The present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

39.Nuguid v. Nuguid
GR L-23445, June 23, 1966

FACTS:Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were

her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years before her death and prayed that
she be admitted to the probate and be appointed administrator. The parents opposed
saying that they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line and
that the will should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.

ISSUE:Is the will void on the ground of preterition?

RULING:YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she

left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. And, the will completely omits
both of them; thus receiving nothing by the testament, depriving them of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Note
that A. 854 of the NCC merely nullifies the “institution of heir”. Considering that the
will presented solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as
universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The will is null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be allowed probate. NO

RULING:
 The statute we are called upon to apply in ARTICLE 854 OF THE CIVIL CODE which, in part,
provides: ART. 854. The PRETERITION or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall ANNUL THE INSTITUTION OF HEIR; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
 And now, back to the facts and the law. The DECEASED ROSARIO NUGUID left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents,
now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the WILL completely omits both of
them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a CLEAR CASE OF PRETERITION.
 ***PRETERITION "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." DISINHERITANCE, in turn, "is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law. " The WILL HERE does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is
clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
 On top of this is the fact that the EFFECTS FLOWING FROM PRETERITION are totally different
from those of disinheritance. PRETERITION UNDER ARTICLE 854 OF THE CIVIL CODE, we
repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This ANNULMENT is in toto, unless in the will there
are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In INEFFECTIVE
DISINHERITANCE UNDER ARTICLE 918 OF THE SAME CODE, such disinheritance shall also
"annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited",
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in DISINHERITANCE
the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived.
 The disputed order, we observe, declares the WILL IN QUESTION "a complete nullity". ARTICLE
854 OF THE CIVIL CODE in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however,
that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.

Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and
preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such
universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

40. ACAIN vs. IAC

FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The
will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to
his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall
be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's
widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE: Was there preterition?

HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
 Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are
the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except
insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must

have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by
it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the
will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

41. Aznar v. DuncanG.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966

Facts: Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died
leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. (In 1954) The will was admitted to probate by
the CFI and it also declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was a natural child of the
deceased. The decision was appealed to the SC and was affirmed.
(In 1963) In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased’s estate, the
RTC approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of
the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia
appealed from the order of approval and the SC reversed the ruling on the ground that the
validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law. SC returned the
case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said
law.
(In 1964) CFI issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the
executor wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy
Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
Lucy Duncan appealed with the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting
the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares or whether the
inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.
RTC ruled and appellee now maintains that there has been preterition of Helen
Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of
heir pursuant to Article 854 of the CC. Appellant contends that Helen Garcia is entitled only
to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were instestate.
In the will of the deceased, Helen Garcia was given a legacy of P3,600.00.

Issue: Whether or not there was preterition.

Ruling:
No, there was no preterition. The solution (from three SC Spain decisions cited by
Manresa) was that the heir ask that the legitime be completed and not that the institution
of heirs be annulled entirely. This solution is more in consonance with the expressed
wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the
provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared
judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration
come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards here would have undergone any
change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who
alone was expressly recognized by him.

The testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

Therefore, ¼ of the estate of the deceased which consisted of 399 shares of stocks
and a certain amount of cash descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became
the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent, she is entitled to a
corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing.

Therefore, there is no preterition if the heir is given a legacy or devise.

42. Morales vs. Olondriz

G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016

Facts: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. Believing that the decedent died
intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the partition of
the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003. On
July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that
the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and
for hex appointment as special administratrix. Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier
Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.
Issue:Whether or not there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and lot
inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.

Ruling: Yes. The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition. Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain
valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any
devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in
total intestacy. During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present
evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from
the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively
waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the
reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

43. Maninang vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO. L-57848, 19 June 1982

Facts: Soledad Maninang, petitioner herein, filed for probate the holographic will of the
decedent Clemencia Aseneta who died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. Said
willleft all her property to the petitioner and contained a provision stating: “I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.” Meanwhile,
respondent Bernardo Aseneta “Nonoy”, the adopted son mentioned in the will, claims to
bethe sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. He filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and
void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy
should ensue.

Issue: Whether or not the adopted son was preterited or disinherited.

Ruling: No. There is no preterition but there is valid disinheritance in the present case.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the
omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law.
Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntary". Moreover, the effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally
different. Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of
heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article
918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but
only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in
the case of preterition. Otherwise stated, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

44. Perez vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930

Facts: P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name, with the La Urbana in Manila, as the
final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is
said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the
defendant Mariano Garchitorena.The la atter held a judgement for P7,872.23 for due
execution against the husband of Ana Maria, Joaquin Perez Alcantara hence the deposited
amount in La Urbana was attached. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary
injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the
dissolution of the injunction.The court held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the
plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final
writ of injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a fideicommissary
substitution.

Ruling: There is a fideicommissary substitution. All the elements of this kind of

substitution are present. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this
case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according
to clause IX of the will. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and
transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in
clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's)
surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by
will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only
disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition
thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. A second heir. Such are the children of the
heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause
XI.
45. Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs.Pablo and Basilio SABLAN, opponent-
appellees.
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:

Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who inherited
two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and
without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership. The
two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed
the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right
reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land
Registration denied the registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature
of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be
presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable

property.
2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause
its registration.

RULING:

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for
he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very
definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood
relationship.

Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant

property which the latter acquired without a valuable
consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or
sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of
land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from
another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial court’s
ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore
in accordance with the law.
 The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express
provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hadn’t, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or
constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that
only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire
it.

46.Gonzales vs. Legarda

G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981

FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on
June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow Filomena and their seven children: four
daughters and three sons.

The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito
Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena Legarda died
intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena
Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating to
herself the properties, which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda,
which were the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit
of adjudication, Filomena Roces Legarda succeeded her deceased daughter as co-owner of
the properties held pro indiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten identical documents wherein she disposed of
the properties, which she inherited from her daughter in favor of her son’s children, a total
of 16 grandchildren all in all. Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned all
the properties consisting of the 1/3 share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason, which
the children inherited, in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the testatrix filed a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother’s estate the properties, which she inherited from her deceased
daughter on the ground that said properties are reservable properties, which should be
inherited by FilomenaLegarda.
 Without awaiting the resolution on the motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civilaction against
her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother’s estate for the purpose of
serving a declaration that said properties are reservable propertieswhich Mrs. Legarda
could not bequeath in her will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her sons and
daughters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject properties are subject to ReservaTroncal

RULING:

In reservatroncal:

1. A descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from

a brother or sister;
2. The same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of
law from said descendant, and
3. The said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendants (prepositus) and who belong to the
line from which the said propertiescame.

So three transmissions are involved:

1. A first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from

an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant;
2. A posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation; and,
3. A third transmissions of the property (in consequence of the reservation) from
the reservor to the reserves (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister
of the deceased descendant.

THUS, if there is only two transmission there is no reserva.

The persons involved in reservatroncal are:

1. The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
2. The descendant or prepositus who received the property;
3. The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law; and,
4. The reservee who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the
line (linea or tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.
 The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved
by descent. He is called the propositus.

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely:

1. The death of the ascendant obliged to reserve; and,

2. The survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which the property came.

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of
the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the
time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease
the reservor.

The reservor’s alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,

meaning that if at the time of the reservor’s death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor’s death, the transferee’s title would become absolute. On the other hand, the
reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would
disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reservee.

Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything
that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel
the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive.

The reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of
them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing. The reservatarios, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservista but frm the descendant prepositus, of whom the
reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservista.

Hence, upon the reservista’s death, thereservatario nearest to the propositus becomes
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. The reservee
CANNOT impugn any conveyance made by the reservor BUT he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser. In this case,
the properties in question were indubitably reservable property in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservaton became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus
Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
47. Hindi mahanap

48. G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow “en
plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or “free portion” shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.” Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free
portion is charged with the widow‟s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national,
died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez

-widow

-French who lives in Paris

-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion

Roberto and Jorge Ramirez

-two grandnephews

-lives in Malate

-received the ½ (free portion)

Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion

-Austrian who lives in Spain

-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion

-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID because first heirs
(Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator

b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second
heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC

c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5

d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow
and appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them

-LC: approved partition

ISSUE: WON the partition is valid insofar as

a. widow’s legitime

b. substitutions

c. usufruct of Wanda

HELD a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over
which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever[2]

-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a usufruct
over 1/3 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it will run
counter to the testator’s express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of
the estate “enpleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than what she is given
under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle
more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for as stated above his
disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case
where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include
refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.

BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a
fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one
degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed
on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that
the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he
permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe
usufructuaries and naked owners.

c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion
that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition
will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an
alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does
not vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Decision:½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez

Issue: Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.

Ruling: Yes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he
could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever.
(Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The
court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio"
as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to
have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her
legitime and tended to favor Wanda

49. Crisologo vs. Singson

G.R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962

Facts:The spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo commenced an action

for partition against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel
St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that
Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino
owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona
Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made
demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus
compelling them to bring action. It is admitted that Dña. Leona Singson, who died single on
January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On
July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special
Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in G.R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were
her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and
Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendant appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called
substitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.

Ruling: The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion
vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be
effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after
that of the testatrix.The substitution of heirs provided for in the will is not expressly made
of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that

appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix.
As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death—whether this happens
before or after that of the testatrix— her share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

50.PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate

Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,
ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May
1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie
however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be
turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada,
the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing
probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they
were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an
iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will.
Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s
estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted.
Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as
administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to
Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno
also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national
law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of
legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie
was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoidoctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed
to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law
is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at
the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other time). NOTE:
Dynamics of law

51. Aglibot v. Mañalac

G.R. No. L-14530, April 25, 1962

FACTS: The subject parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Anacleto
and Maria. They had a daughter named Juliana. When Maria died, she was survived by her
husband, daughter, and 2 sisters. Her ½ portion of the conjugal property was inherited by
her daughter.

Subsequently, Anacleto contracted a second marriage with Andrea, with whom he had 6
children. Thereafter, Juliana died intestate without any descendant, thus living to her father
the property she inherited from her mother. Years later, Anacleto died.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to the land that Anacleto inherited from his daughter, as between
the sisters of Maria on the one hand, and Andre and their 6 children, on the other hand?

RULING: The land in question is reservable property in accordance with the provisions
of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 891 of the New Civil Code).
In accordance with law, therefore, AnacletoMañalac was obliged to reserve the portion he
had thus inherited from his daughter for the benefit of the Aunts of Juliana on
the maternal side and who are, therefore, her relative within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came.

52. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC,
petitioner-appellant,
vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA
ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979

FACTS: Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a
will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. In addition to the devices contained therein, the
will had a provision to the effect that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his
nearest male relative who would become a priest. It was stated therein that the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the
interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.

ISSUE: Whether or not a device in favour of a person whose identity at the time of the
testator’s death cannot be ascertained, may be efficacious.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest
male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment
the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil
Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe

them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at any time after his death would
render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his
estate. That could not have been his intention.

The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at
the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high
school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer
the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be
terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January
31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood."
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged
in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when
the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had
not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated.
Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no
nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a
priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil
Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in
which the right of accretion exists."

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that
belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands
the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the
testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

53. Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio
be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other
hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING: No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously
enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted
the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the estate of
the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

54. ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS VS ALCORAN

FACTS: RaymundoAlcoran was married to JoaqinaArado they produced a son Nicolas.

Nicolas later married Florencia but had no offspring. He had an extramarital affair with
Francisa and begot a son, Anacleto, husband of Elenette (herein respondents). The
petitioners herein are the sister, nephew and niece of Joaqina. Raymundo and Nicolas died.
Joaqina later died leaving a will bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the will
was yet to be probated. The petitioners filed a claim for recovery of properties against
respondents claiming that they are the rightful owners as Anacleto was not recognized by
Nicolas as his legitimate son. Respondents countered that Anacleto can inherit the subject
properties since he was recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son as evidenced by his
birth certificate, baptismal, school records and a picture. RTC and CA dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners and said that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas.

ISSUE: Whether or not Anacleto has been acknowledged as the illegitimate son of Nicolas
and if he is entitled to the subject properties.

RULING: None of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the subject proeprties without
the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo (governed by the Spanish Civil Code),
Nicolas (Civil Code) and Joaqina had been previously partitioned. Anacleto was able to
establish his illegitimate filiation (as evidenced by his birth certificate) during his lifetime.
ART 172 Only the birth certificate fully warranted the evidence of paternity. Anacleto has
the right to inherit from Nicolas, but not from Joaqina. Art 992 of the Civil Code: an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not
inherit from the legitimate child. Neither can he inherit for Joaqina by virtue of her will
since Art 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

55. walang digest

56. Legal or intestate succession

G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977

GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

Facts:The late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a
plane crash. Petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
Oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate surviving wife of the deceased.
MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of the late FELIX and DOROTEA DEL
ROSARIO CONANAN.

The Parties prayed that the Court declare who are the heirs of the deceased.

Ruling of RTC:

The instant case was filed under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of
Court which among others provide that:

“Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a deceased person, whether he

died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is
made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the
petition of an interested person and upon hearing, xxx the court may proceed
summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without
delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there is, to determine who
are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion
and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the
court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of
lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and
qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court
shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all
orders and judgment made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in
the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate,
shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office.

The rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which does not exceed
P10,000.00, The instant petition, however, clearly alleges that the value of the real
properties alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is
obviously over and above-the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The petition must
perforce be dismissed.

The law on intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving
spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession. The contention
of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case finds no basis for 'the said
article is applicable in cases where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of the
adopted child.
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal

Issue:Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343 or
Articles 341, 978 and 979?

Held:The governing provision is article 343 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles
893 and 1000 of said law, which directs that:

Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and

by an adopted person. the latter shall not have more successional rights than
an acknowledged natural child.

It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related
artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by
blood in the direct ascending line. The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the
surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat
the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where
legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the
latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. This is affirmed by
Article 893 of the New Civil Code which states:

If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall have a right to one fourth (only) of the hereditary estate.

Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the adopted child and the
legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law is clear, and a contrary view
cannot be presumed.

Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased
adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is
comprehended in the term "illegitimate children". Consequently , the respective shares of
the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of
the New Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate

children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to onehalf of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse
and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-
fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth.

57. THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V.

MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.
FACTS:Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria
Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent
Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange
for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of
Teresita.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for

the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time
of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth
P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty
worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3
supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806
Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for
44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the
certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson
worth P30,000.00.

Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the

inventory. The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence
and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of
the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory.

The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the
administratrix's motion for approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-
do the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her
possession.

Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the
order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No.
3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty,

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion
of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301
square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the
various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989
and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned.

ISSUE: Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES
and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued
on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB
entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

RATIO: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties
for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties
are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.

Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may
be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and
willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration
to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months
from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
 Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. — Within three (3) months after his appointment
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may
order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his
or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real
and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified
by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in malting a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with
wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that
of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the
inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the
estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the
appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them,
unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is
special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that
the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should
be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v.
Agtarap:

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or
an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases,
a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.

The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate

proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation
or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent
to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the
heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the
legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of
the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the

inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio
rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

58. Bicomong vs Almanza

(Note: This is a case of half-blood nephews and nieces claiming from the estate of a half-
blood aunt. Greens vs Yellows; all those in white are dead.)

Guerrero, J.

Facts:(Note: This is a case of half-blood nephews and nieces claiming from the estate of a
half-blood aunt. Greens vs Yellows; all those in white are dead.)

Guerrero, J.

 Simeon Bagsic was married twice.

 His first marriage was to Sisenanda Barcenas with whom he had 3 children:
Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of Simeon Bagsic.

 His second marriage was to Silvestria Glorioso with whom he had 2 children: Felipa
and Maura. Silvestria and Simeon both died.
  From first marriage:
o Ignacio Bagsic died and leaving plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir.
Igmedia Bagsic also died survived by plaintiffs Dionisio, Maria and Petra, all
Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died survived by the plaintiffs Gaudencio,
Felicidad, Salome, and Gervacio, all Bicomong.

 From second marriage:

o Maura Bagsic died leaving no heir. Felipa Bagsic married Geronimo Almanza.
She died and was survived by her husband defendant Geronimo Almanza, her
daughter Cristeta Almanza. Cristeta died survived by her husband defendant
Engracio Manese.
 The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura
Bagsic in five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother,
Silvestra Glorioso (second marriage).

 After the death of Maura, the subject properties were administered by her niece
Cristeta. The plaintiffs requested the partition of the properties but Cristeta
convinced them to wait until the expenses for Maura’s illness and burial have been
paid. After all the debts have been paid, Cristeta agreed to the request but she died
before the partition was effected.

 The possession and administration of the properties were left to Cristeta’s father
and Cristeta’s husband, defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Manese,
respectively. Defendant Geronimo Almanza died and was substituted by Florentino
Cartena.

 The grandchildren from the first marriage brought suit for the recovery of their
lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.

 The trail court found for the plaintiffs awarding them 10/24 share on the five
parcels of land. (Guys, the case says there are 10 half-nephews/nieces but only 8 were
named. Sorry.)

 Engracio Manese did not appeal so the ruling became final as to him. Florentino
Cartena, substitute of Geronimo Almanza appealed to the CA. The CA referred the
case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the heirs of the half blood brothers and sisters are able to inherit
from the estate left by a half-sister.

Held: Yes. They inherit in their own right and not by representation.
Articles 975, 1006 and 1008 are applicable in this case.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit
in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that
is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

Felipa, the full-blood sister predeceased the decedent Maura which means that only
nephews and nieces are claiming inheritance in this case. In Art 975, the sole niece of whole
blood (Cristeta) of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half blood.

The only difference between the whole and half blood relatives is in the amount of their
shares provided in Arts 1006 and 1008:

Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with
brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double
that of the latter.

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita
or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the
full blood.

59. AGUINALDO-SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAYG.R. No. 183053 June 16, 2010

FACTS:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
a. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico.
b. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely:
herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II
3. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter,
Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different
women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
 5. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren. It was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents.
6. After the death of his spouse, Federico, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita
7. On October 26, 1995, respondent Isabela filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse
of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico
filed a Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedent’s estate on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s
Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
9. In the course of the proceedings, Federico died.
10. The trial court rendered a decision, appointing petitioner Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. The RTC ruled that what
matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of
such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court honestly believes that to
appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised
Emilio III from infancy as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of
the surviving spouse who nominated Emilio III for appointment as administrator.
11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III.
The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus,
barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate
mother, the decedent. That he cannot be appointed for the ff reasons:
a. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.,
Federico’s appointment as administrator of the estate. The death of Federico
before his appointment rendered the nomination of Emilio III inoperative.
b. As between the legitimate offspring (Isabel) and illegitimate offspring
(Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I, Isabel is preferred, being the "next of
kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
c. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother.

ISSUE : Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent's estate.
HELD:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the
administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. The underlying philosophy of our
law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of
the decedent, absent a valid and effective will.
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is
quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship
between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both spouses
acknowledged Emilio III as their grandchild. Cristina’s properties forming part of
her estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains
undetermined and unliquidated. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,
entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree
from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
3. It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration
of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate
of Cristina is as much as the interest therein of Isabel. Considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside
from his share in the conjugal partnership."
4. However, the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an
estate found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances of each case.
5. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. In this case, the attendant facts and circumstances of
this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
6. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here.
a. The subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs,
including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Tañedo.

Other issue:
1. Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance
 where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as
their own son.
a. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
b. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel
for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil
Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial
restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina
and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

60. G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014

MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and THE HEIRS OF

EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J.
MARCELO REVILLA, and JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO, Petitioners,
vs. JOSE T. MARCELO, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four
compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially,
petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for
the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC. Pending
issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as special
administrators. However, Edward was the one appointed as regular administrator.

A project of partition was submitted, Edward manifested that oppositor Jose T. Marcelo, Jr.
had already expressed his conformity to the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of
Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by his signature therein. He therefore
prays that the said document which bears the conformity of all four (4) compulsory heirs of
Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be approved. RTC approved the proposed partition. However, the
distribution was deferred pending submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. At this
stage, Edward died. Wasting no time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings
involving his father’s estate, S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448, and moved for his appointment as
new regular administrator thereof, which was approved by the RTC. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and now moved for the appointment instead of
George as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate
ISSUE 1: Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at this
liquidation, partition and distribution stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s
estate.

RULING: Yes. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is
at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides
for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate. The rule provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – x x x No distribution shall be
allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. x x x
The inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the heirs.

ISSUE 2: Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of Jose,

Sr.’s estate bars his present appointment as such even in lieu of Edward who is now dead.

RULING: Yes. Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and
unsuitable to administer his father’s estate. Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
provides for the general disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator: Who
are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.— No person is competent to
serve as executor or administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the
Philippines; and (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason
of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

More importantly, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only is
George the eldest son of Jose, Sr. and, therefore, his most immediate kin, he has, moreover,
been chosen by the rest of the heirs of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of an
administrator. In this regard, in addition to George and the heirs of Edward, Helen executed
an Affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Jr. and to support the appointment of
George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given to the [Court of
Appeals.] we thus issue Letters of Administration to George to facilitate and close the
settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

61.Diaz vs IAC (1990)

Facts: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero; that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero
in 1976; that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona
Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz
and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Ruling:

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil
Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines)
constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children
certain successional rights. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially
Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate
children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate
grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.

Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general
rule and Article 992 the exception. Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional
rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their
death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the
right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should
not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as
the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of.
(Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision,
Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties
who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since
petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least
amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law
literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.