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Remedial Law Review II | Case Digests | jgg

Case Digests in Criminal Procedure

1. PEOPLE V. LIPATA, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016

Facts: Rolando Cueno went to his aunt’s house to ask for malunggay leaves. However,
appellant, Larry Lipata and a certain Rudy attacked him by repeatedly stabbing him.
When the victim fell on the ground, the assailants escaped. Rolando’s neighbors rushed
him to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. The RTC found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and to pay the heirs of the Rolando
Cueno for damages. Appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice
of appeal. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, informed this
Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant’s death extinguishes his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling: The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant are declared extinguished
by his death prior to final judgment. Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. We also ruled that if
the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

2. GIRLIE QUISAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 216920, January 13,
2016

FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor filed an information to the RTC charging
petitioner for violation of Section 10 of R.A No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Petitioner moved for the quashal of
the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the
same before the RTC because the resolution was issued without the approval or authority
from the City Prosecutor. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with
a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.

The RTC ruled to deny the petitioner’s motion to quash due to lack of merit since it found
that the certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal has sufficiently complied with Section
4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by,
among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Information. Petitioner then moved for
reconsideration but denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA that consequently,
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly held that RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing petitioner’s motion to quash.
HELD: NO. CA erred in affirming CA’s ruling. As a general rule, complaints or information
filed before the courts without prior written authority or approval of the authorized officers
renders the same as defective and therefore subject to quashal. In this case, there was
no proof that a certain officer was authorized to perform the written authority with the
approval and in behalf of the City Prosecutor. In the prior circumstances, the CA erred in
affirming RTC’s ruling, that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority
to do so. Thus, Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed resulting in the dismissal of the criminal
case against petitioner. Finally, it must be stressed that the Rules of Court governs the
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For an orderly
administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all
litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA
GOMEZ y CAMPOS, G.R. No. 174471; 12 January 2016

FACTS: Jerry Pepino looted the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation.
Therafter, they abducted Edward and demanded ransom from his father. After the ransom
was given, Edward was released. After five months, the NBI informed Edward that they
had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup
consisting of seven persons. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and Mario.
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented Zeny
Pepino and Reynaldo Pepino who alleged that they were arrested without a valid warrant
of arrest leading to a violation of their rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the illegal arrest of an accused is sufficient cause for setting aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

RULING: No. The Court pointed out at the outset that Gomez did not question before
arraignment the legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction
over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest. It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the
guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day
to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the
accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a
judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.

4. DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE GR No. 209387, January 11, 2016

Facts: Accused Dela Cruz was about to board a vessel. However, while his bag went
through the security scan, the operator called the port’ baggage inspector when firearms
inside Dela Cruz’s bag registered in the machine. When as ked if he owns the bag,
accused said yes. Thereafter, a port police officer came and arrested Dela Cruz for
violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms and Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 on Election Gun Ban. Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges
during arraignment. No objections were made prior to his plea.

After trial, RTC convicted Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Dela Cruz appealed
alleging that the evidence is in admissible because his bag was illegally searched.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures when he failed to object before he entered his plea

Ruling: YES. It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Appellant is
now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move
for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDGARDO PEREZ G. R. No. 208071, 09 March


2016

Facts: In an Information, accused-appellant Eduardo was charged with the crime of rape,
committed by having carnal knowledge of his niece, AAA, a 13-year-old girl, against her
will and to her damage and prejudice:
That on or about January 3, 2000, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, y means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, have
carnal knowledge of one AAA, a girl, 13 years old, against her will;
furthermore, there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years old and the accused is an uncle by affinity of the
latter.

Issue: Whether the Information contains all the necessary allegation.

Ruling: No. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings requiring that Informations charging an
accused with the crime of rape qualified by relationship must succinctly state that said
accused is a relative within the third civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. The
Information merely alleged that "the accused is an uncle by affinity of the latter," failing to
clearly state that appellant herein is AAA's relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or· affinity, as expressly required by the aforecited ruling. Appellant herein
cannot, therefore, be properly ·convicted of rape in its qualified form resulting in a higher
award of damages.

Case Digests in Evidence

6. PEOPLE v. GODOFREDO COMBOY Y CRONICO, GR No. 218399, Mar 02, 2016


Facts: Accused, being the father of [AAA] with lewd and unchaste design, exercising,
moral ascendancy upon said private offended party, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own daughter [AAA], an 11
year old minor girl while she is asleep or is otherwise unconscious, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice. Accused asserted that AAA merely fabricated the
accusations against him as she was angry at him for being too strict apart from the fact
that he was not at home when the alleged crime happen.

Issue: WON the defense of denial and alibi can prevail over positive and categorical
testimony of the victim

Ruling: NO. Suffice it to say that Comboy's flimsy defense of denial and alibi cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crimes. In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would
not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father,
allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek
justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father,
imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen," as in this case.

7. AMADO I. SARAUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 205472, January
25, 2016

FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted against "Pata." During the operation, "Pata"
eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. The operatives entered the shanty
where Saraum and Esperanza were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation
to have a "shabu" pot session. The confiscated items were placed in the plastic pack of
misua wrapper, and made initial markings. At the police station, the paraphernalia
recovered from Saraum were also marked. After the case was filed, the subject items
were turned over to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor. Saraum
denied the commission of the alleged offense. The RTC find Saraum guilty of the charge
which CA affirmed. On appeal, Saraum questioned the decision of the lower court in
finding him guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia and the chain of custody of the
items seized.

ISSUE: WON the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule render the arrest illegal
or the items confiscated from the accused inadmissible.

HELD: NO. Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending
team must immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph
them, non-compliance therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team. While the procedure on the chain of custody should
be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does
not necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez
G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Leonen, J.:

Facts: The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance,
Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before
the Sandiganbayan. "The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by the
Gimenez Spouses as dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos." During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the
positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez
Spouses. The Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days to file its formal offer of
evidence. The Republic move for an extension to file its formal offer of evidence which
was granted by the Sandiganbayan, but when it failed to file its formal offer of evidence
it move again for an extension which was again granted. When the Republic failed again
to file its formal offer of evidence, the Sandiganbayan in its resolution, deemed the
Republic to have waived its right to file its formal offer of evidence.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that Republic of the Philippines
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Held: Yes. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to
an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just
judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the
administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to
grave criticism."
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays
petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on
recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules
be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al
G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016
Perez, J.:

Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with
homicide through the use of an unlicensed firearm. At his arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato Senior
Police Officer 2 Fernando Figueroa and Dr. Jun Concepcion. Shirley, the widow of the
victim, testified mainly regarding her husband's disappearance and discovery of his
death. SPO2 Figueroa testified concerning the circumstances surrounding accused-
appellant's arrest. Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and
the cause of his death. The RTC found the accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA
on appeal. Accused-appellant vehemently maintains that there is no direct evidence that
he robbed and murdered the victim; and that the lower courts erred in convicting him
based on circumstantial evidence consisting only of the fact of his possession of the
allegedly carnapped vehicle.
Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt
Held: Yes. It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and
persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What
is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the
prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the
Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man
for the rest of his life. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the final analysis, the
circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral certainty on
the guilt of accused-appellant.
Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
Peralta, J.:

Facts: Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165. According to the prosecution a telephone call was received
regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-
bust team was then formed against a certain "Pata." During the operation, "Pata" eluded
arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a
curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were
holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. By
way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. Believing that he
had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest is valid
Held: Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not
require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines


G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
Leonen, J.:

Facts: Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. At around 12:00
noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to
Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him
around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the
terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator
of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag Igot asked Dela Cruz whether
he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented
to Igot's manual inspection of the bag. Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his
violation of a crime punishable by law. Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges during arraignment. It was only on appeal when Dela Cruz raised the issue of his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue: Whether there was a waiver of accused’s rights against unreasonable search and
seizure
Held: It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Appellant is
now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move
for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial.

People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis
G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016
Mendoza, J.:

Facts: Accused-appellant Piad was charged in two (2) informations with the crimes of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On August 8,
2005, Piad, Villarosa and Carbo were arraigned and they pleaded "Not Guilty." Davis,
however, was not arraigned because he had jumped bail. On May 15, 2008, after Davis
was arrested, he was arraigned and, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charges against him. All the accused were found guilty by the RTC. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The OSG asserted that when Davis jumped bail on
August 8, 2005, the RTC should have immediately cancelled his bailbond; that he should
have been placed under custody after the promulgation of the judgment; and that he had
become a fugitive from justice who had lost his standing to appeal.
Issue: Whether accused has waived his right to seek relief from the court.
Held: When the R TC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his counsel were
present in the courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal before
the RTC or the CAI° Nonetheless, any motion for bail pending appeal should have been
denied because Davis violated the conditions of his previous bail. Necessarily, as he
previously jumped bail and no bail pending appeal was secured, the R TC should have
immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him. In the same manner, the CA should
not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an accused escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. As no such surrender was
made in this case, in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore,
not entitled to seek relief from the courts.

People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez


G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016
Brion, J.:

Facts: The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, Edward
Tan was kidnapped by Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. On the same day the
kidnappers called Edward’s father and demanded a P40 million ransom for his release.
Edward's father told the kidnappers that he did not have that amount. The abductors
negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a P700, 000.00 ransom. After four days
after the kidnappers had received the ransom for Edward Tan, they freed the latter. After
five months, the National Bureau of Investigation informed Edward that they had
apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting of
seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez,
and one Mario Galgo. Both the accused contends that their right to counsel was violated
because they were not assisted by a counsel during the police lineup.
Issue: Whether the right to counsel of the accused was violated
Held: No. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a
police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be
assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police lineup.

Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes


G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.
Leonen, J.:

Facts: Dr. Ortega, also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several
radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, he was shot dead. After a brief chase with
police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an
extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo
"Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-
Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was
former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the
killing of Dr. Ortega. Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091
creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.
Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor
Reyes as the mastermind of her husband's murder. The First Panel concluded its
preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-
Complaint. The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new
panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. Former
Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
assailing the creation of the Second Panel. In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary
of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel.

Issue: Whether the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion in determining


probable cause
Held: No. It is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710
because she had reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional
evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel
was created not to overturn the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to
make sure that all the evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused to
admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary
and despotic manner,’ by reason of passion or personal hostility."
15. GR 213847 ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN AUGUST 18, 2015

FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post
bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was
issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he
is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its
assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion to fix bail.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced
age. Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure
the personal appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires and
at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of
his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to
his health and endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen.
Enrile be granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore
achieving the true purpose of bail.

16. GR NO. 213455 ENRILE VS PP AUGUST 11, 2015


FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for plunder against Enrile,
Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis
before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the
Sandiganbayan contending that that the information is vague. On the same date, he filed
a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at
the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars on the ground that it is not the proper remedy. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague or
indefinite.
HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint
or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for
trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars
may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the
Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.

17. GR no. 217456 LAUDE VS JUDGE GINEZ-JABALDO ET AL. NOVEMBER 24, 2015
FACTS:
Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay
Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude,
against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. Pemberton
was later on detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.

The Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton before the
Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was issued.
Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-
Jabalde), and he was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. After the hearing, Judge
Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has legal personality to pursue the case.

RULING: Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that all criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended
party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the
prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

In the given case, the Court ruled that the required conformity of the public prosecutor
was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party
does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the
People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest. The criminal case must be
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, when the public prosecutor
does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have the
required legal personality to pursue the case.

18. GR NO. 193150 JAVIER VS GONZALES JANUARY 23, 2017

FACTS: A criminal case was filed against PEPITO GONZALES and was charged of
Murder with Frustrated Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder. The case was filed before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora. Trial on the merits proceeded and the
Court admitted the prosecution's evidences. The accused filed a Motion for Leave of
Court for Demurrer to Evidence and the Demurrer was attached to the Motion and
subsequently was denied. The decision was promulgated in absentia when the accused
again failed to appear and counsel de officio was appointed to assist him. The accused
was convicted of the charges against him and was sentenced to a death penalty. Issuance
for the arrest was ordered for his non-appearance and forfeiture of his bail bond was
ordered. The decision was entered in the docket book of the Court.
ISSUE: Whether the promulgation in absentia of the earlier judgment of conviction was
valid.

RULING: The promulgation of the decision rendered by Judge Buted was ruled to be
valid. The accused and the offended parties were properly notified of the scheduled
promulgation. Under Sec. 6, par 5, Rule 120, Rules on criminal procedure, Judgment is
for conviction and he failure of the accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall
lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the Court shall order
for his arrest.

19. GR NO. 224974 MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ VS PP JULY 3,2017
FACTS:
Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an Uninhabited Place
and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal and
a copper pipe worth ₱72,000.00 collectively. Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the
amount of ₱12,000.00.

The case was eventually dismissed by virtue of the Affidavit of Desistance that was filed
by the complainant. Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release
Cash Bond. However, said motion was dismissed on the ground that the case was
dismissed through desistance and not through. Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond. Said petition
was dismissed on the ground that they should have filed an appeal and not a petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy instead of an appeal.

RULING: Yes. Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court states that bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the
dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of
Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused. Non-
compliance with the Rules of Court is not a mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

20. GR NO 214300 PP VS MANUEL ESCOBAR JULY 26, 2017


FACTS: Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition),
which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in the Order dated October 6, 2008 and by
the Court of Appeals in the Decision dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in
the accused's case compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition).
On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied this on the ground of res judicata. In
the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial
Court Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.
ISSUE: Whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata.
RULING: NO, Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine
is not recognized in criminal proceedings.
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between
the parties or their successors-in-interest. In the case of Trinidad v. Marcelo, it was
declared that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a
principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings. Moreover, Rule 124,
Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the provisions of Rules 42, 44
to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court
in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal
cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under
Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

21. GR NO. 220054 VALDERRAMA VS PP AND VIGDEN MARCH 27, 2017


FACTS:

Deogracia M. Valderrama (Valderrama) was charged with the crime of oral defamation
pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL Vigden (Vigden).

During the trial, Vigden was present but the private prosecutor was absent despite notice.
On motion of the defense, the Metropolitan Trial Court considered the prosecution to have
waived its right to present further evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary
evidence within five (5) days. Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider explaining
that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he had to manage his high blood
pressure.

Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his
conformity to Vigden's Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court.
The Metropolitan Trial Court granted Vigden's Motion to Reconsider and set the
continuation of the prosecution's presentation of further evidence for the last time.

ISSUE: Whether the public prosecutor's conformity to the Motion to Reconsider is


necessary.
RULING: YES. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that all criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended
party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the
prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was not
denied by the private respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the Office of
the City Prosecutor did not object to the filing of the Motion to Reconsider. Since the
Motion to Reconsider pertains to the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, it
involves the criminal aspect of the case and, thus, cannot be considered without the public
prosecutor's conforme.
22) Republic v. Gimenez G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016

FACTS: Commented [1]:

The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic to have waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence and granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Gimenez
based on demurrer to evidence. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30
days "to file its formal offer of evidence." The Republic moved "for an extension of thirty
(30) days to file [its] formal offer of evidence." which was granted. The Republic again
moved for an additional 15 days to file its Formal Offer of Evidence and was again
granted. Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated
its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its
Formal Offer of Evidence. Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence
to support its cause of action.

ISSUE: Commented [2]:

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to
evidence.

HELD: Commented [3]:

YES. The Court held that the rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally
offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the
determination of the case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period
of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it."88

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:


SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against
them and take the necessary actions to secure their case.89 Hence, any document or
object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered
and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the
witness called upon to prove or identify it."

23) Benzon Ong and Benny Ong v. People, G.R. No. 213910, February 3, 2016

FACTS: Commented [4]:

Petitioners were the owners of Jaguar. In the course of an entrapment operation, several
Police Officers, acting as poseur customers, handed sum of money as marked money to
the manager of Jaguar in exchange for sexual service. Such operation resulted to multiple
arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia and the rescue of 146 women and minor children.
Accordingly, a criminal complaint for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to
Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 was filed against them. In defense, Vinson denied
ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights and interests therein.
Similarly, Benny claimed that he was neither the owner nor manager of Jaguar and was
not even present during the raid. He raised "mistake in identity" as defense. Petitioners
then filed an omnibus motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, praying that
the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest be held in abeyance pending
resolution thereof, and for the case against them to be dismissed for lack of probable
cause.

ISSUE: Commented [5]:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in dismissing the criminal case against petitioners for lack of probable cause.

HELD: Commented [6]:

NO. The Court held that the determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial
in nature. The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary
investigation for the purpose of filing an information in court. At this juncture, the
investigating prosecutor evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of
the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this
stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and on the
strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines
the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order liot to frustrate the
ends of justice.
24) PEOPLE v. VICTORIA ARAMBULO AND MIGUEL ARAMBULO, JR. G.R. No.
186597, June 17, 2015

FACTS: Commented [7]:

Jose Buban, as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped),
filed a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr.
(Miguel). He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the
ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped. Respondents then
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of
the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending. Respondents asserted that the
resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues of whether of the group
of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they
are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would necessarily result in their
acquittal in the criminal case.

ISSUE: Commented [8]:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question
which calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

HELD: Commented [9]:

YES. The Court held that a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until
the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.

25) Ongcoma Hadji Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, September 2, 2015.

FACTS: Commented [10]:


The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II2 of RA 9165. The
petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.03 grams of shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment. PO1 Tan was
the lone witness for the prosecution. While proceeding to the area together with civilian
agent (C/A) Tangcoy, onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No
Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to
cross at the pedestrian crossing area. The petitioner picked up something from the
ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife and confiscated
a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a
sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.

ISSUE: Commented [11]:

Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded
the search conducted on the petitioner's body.

HELD: Commented [12]:

NO. The Court held that to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it
is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.21 There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this purpose,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer.

26) People v. Gawat, G.R. No. 227309, August 16, 2017.

FACTS: Commented [13]:

P03 Christian Carvajal was tasked to act as poseur buyer in the buy bust operation
against Jocelyn Carlit. He, together with a civilian asset, went to conduct the buy bust
operation. They approached the Accused and personally bought shabu from her, handing
the buy bust money, while the Accused handed a sachet of shabu. After he got hold of
the shabu, the police officer introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the
Accused. The shabu was marked in the police station with the officer's initials and also
recovered the buy bust money. RTC held that accused-appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto in a legitimate buy-bust operation. Carlit interposed the defense of denial. She
claimed that she was illegally arrested and questioned the chain of custody of the
purported object of the sale, and points out that the buy-bust team failed to inventory,
mark, and photograph the drugs in her presence, with a representative of the Department
of Justice and a barangay official, immediately after her arrest.
ISSUE: Commented [14]:

Whether or not there was a proper chain of custody.

HELD: Commented [15]:

YES. The Court held that the failure to immediately mark the seized items, taken together
with the absence of a representative from the media to witness the inventory, without any
justifiable explanation, casts doubt on whether the chain of custody is truly unbroken.
Plainly, there was a failure of the prosecution to prove that the chain of custody was
unbroken due to (1) its failure to offer the testimony of the evidence custodian, and (2)
non-compliance with Paragraph 1, Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, without justifiable
reason. As such, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, warranting her acquittal of the crime charged.

27) People v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 197953, August 5, 2015.

FACTS: Commented [16]:

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman charged Mayor Saludaga and Revenue Collection
Clerk Adriatico, together with De Luna, a private individual, for falsification of public
documents. The respondents pleaded not guilty. The prosecution averred that Mayor
Saludaga antedated the mayor's permit to confer on De Luna the status of a bona fide
pakyaw contractor when the contracts were executed on December 9 and 17, 1997. Both
Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico purportedly knew that De Luna was not a licensed pakyaw
contractor when they issued the mayor's permit and the subject OR. The prosecution
further claimed that the provincial treasurer only issued the Official Receipt Booklet
containing the subject OR to the municipality in October 1998, and thus, it could not have
been used as an official receipt for a transaction completed in 1997. Ultimately, the
prosecution submitted that the respondents connived, confederated with, and mutually
helped one another in falsifying the subject OR and the mayor's permit to make it appear
that De Luna was a bona fide pakyaw contractor.

ISSUE: Commented [17]:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
respondents' demurrer.

HELD: Commented [18]:

NO. The Court held that a demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in
an action to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law to make out a case or sustain the issue.32 The party filing the demurrer
challenges the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. The Court's task is to ascertain
if there is competent or sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt.

In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the dismissal order
may not be appealed as this would place the accused in double jeopardy.34 Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed through certiorari under Rule
65.

28) Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015.

FACTS: Commented [19]:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse
of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile
respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among
others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan but was denied on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law. Sandiganbayan then ordered for his arrest. Enrile
voluntarily surrendered and was later on confined at the PNP General Hospital. In support
of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although
he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not
reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition
must further be seriously considered. Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail.

ISSUE: Commented [20]:

Whether or not Enrile should be allowed to post bail.

HELD: Commented [21]:

YES. The court held that Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be
presumed innocent. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion. The general
rule is, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a
matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when
evidence of guilt is not strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of
the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the


crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion


perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. For purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v.
Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is
a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.

29. PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION vs. ANG


G.R. No. 199371; February 3, 2016
Criminal Procedure – Search Warrants

DOCTRINE: Probable cause for purposes of issuing a search warrant refers to "such
facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place
to be searched.
FACTS: Herein petitioners filed a complaint before the NBI requesting assistance in the
surveillance, investigation and apprehension of respondents for the alleged illegal trading
of LPG products in violation of BP 33, as amended by PD no. 1865. Upon conducting
surveillance, it was found that respondents are engaged in the illegal distribution of LPG
products. Thereafter, the NBI filed applications for search warrants to conduct a search
on the alleged plant where the illegal distribution is taking place before the RTC of
Bauang. Thereafter, the search warrants were duly issued. After confiscating the items
specified in the warrant, respondents filed a motion to quash the same alleging that that
the issuing court did not comply with the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant; that there is no probable cause to issue the subject search warrants, and that
the applicants for said warrants have no personal knowledge of the charges. The RTC
granted the quashal of the search warrants stating that the application thereof was not
based on the personal knowledge of the applicants thereby lacking probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the search warrants for lack of
probable cause?
HELD: NO. The court finds that the surveillance conducted by the NBI agents constitutes
personal knowledge which could form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant. The
surveillance and investigation conducted by an agent of the NBI obtained from
confidential information supplied to him enabled him to gain personal knowledge of the
illegal activities complained of. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
1. Probable cause is present;
2. Such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
3. The judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
the witnesses he or she may produce;
4. The applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
5. The warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed
by the accused.
30. VILLAMOR vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200396; March 22, 2017
Criminal Procedure – Warrantless Arrests

DOCTRINE: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not
vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a
valid warrant of arrest or search warrant.
FACTS: Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and
soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng". Meanwhile, another
Information was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law.
The lower court rendered its Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of committing illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng," a variant of the game Last
Two, respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator,
controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. The RTC held that petitioners
were caught in flagrante delicto and seen by the arresting officers in the act of counting
bets before the arrest was made inside Bonaobra's compound. Bonaobra argued that his
right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different from that
with which he was charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or
agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor m1der
Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.
HELD: NO. Petitioner’s arrest was not properly established. In warrantless arrests made
pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer." The Court finds that there was no
valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established that petitioners had
just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said
act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Considering that 15 to 20
meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court
finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was
ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a
search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. It appears that the police officers
acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant, and not on
personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed,
or was about to be committed in their presence.
31. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
FACTS: On August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding
the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, CebuCity. A buy-bust team
was then formed in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
against a certain "Pata."During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run
towards his shanty. The operatives entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza
were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot
session(One (1) lighter; One (1) rolled tissue paper; One (1) aluminum tin foil).The
confiscated the itemswereplaced in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial
markings. At the police station, the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum were also
marked. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over to the property
custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor. Saraum denied the commission of the alleged
offense. He testified that he was just passing when he was held by men with firearms. He
learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court. RTC find Saraum
guilty of the charge. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. On appeal, Saraum questioned
the decision of the lower court in finding him guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia
and the chain of custody of the items seized.
ISSUE: W/N the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule render the arrest illegal or
the items confiscated from the accused inadmissible.
HELD: Such possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has
convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia,
particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and
admitted in evidence.2. NO. Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the
apprehending team must immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and photograph them, non-compliance therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable
ground and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. While the procedure on the chain
of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain. Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. The most important factor is the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. In this case, the prosecution was
able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug
paraphernalia had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the
chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they
were brought to the court for examination.
32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus RAUL YAMON TUANDO
G.R. No. 207816 24 February 2016

Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 69, Pasig City
(stationed in Taguig City) in a Criminal. Case No. 134740-H, finding accused Raul Yamon
Tuando (Tuando) guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-A(l) (c) in relation to Article
266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code. Tuando, who was the common-law spouse of AAA’s
mother, BBB, raped AAA on or about January 2006. AAA was 13 years old at that time.
After raping AAA, Tuando threatened her not to tell BBB about what happened. Since
then, Tuando continued raping and threatening AAA upon the latter’s arrival from school.
It was only months later upon finding out her pregnancy that AAA revealed to BBB that
Tuando raped her. BBB brought her daughter to her employer’s house until AAA gave
birth. On October 2006, AAA was again raped by Tuando when she went back to their
house to visit her brothers. AAA told BBB that she was raped again by Tuando. Prompted
by the abuse on her daughter, BBB filed a complaint before the barangay official.
Thereafter, AAA and BBB proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation Office to
report the rape and executed their sworn statements about the crime. The barangay
officials transferred Tuando to NBI for investigation. Tuando denied raping AAA and
insisted that he never forced AAA to submit to sexual intercourse; that it was consensual
and that it was committed out of love. After the trial, the RTC rejected the sweetheart
defense of the accused and found that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Convinced that Tuando raped AAA, the RTC found
the accused guilty of qualified rape. Upon appeal, the court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications the ruling of the trial court; hence, the appeal to Supreme Court.

Issues: Whether or not the appellate court gravely erred in convicting Tuando under a
different criminal information which violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him?
Ruling: The court dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. In the issue of denial of due
process, Tuando contended that his right to be informed was violated when the appellate
court affirmed his conviction despite the fact that the crime of which he was convicted
was different from the one he pleaded to and was charged with. He cited the case of
People vs. Valdesacho to support his argument. But the court disagreed and stated that
his reliance on Valdesacho was misplaced for the circumstances of his case was different
from that case. In this case, the accused was charged with rape committed sometime in
January 2006 against AAA. He was able to present evidence (based on sweetheart
defense in that he and AAA were lovers and that they had a consensual sexual
intercourse on the said date) proving where he was on January 2006 when the crime was
committed. As embodied in Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Further,
paragraph 2 of the same section, it provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is
further provided under Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
complaint or information to be filed in court must contain a designation given to the offense
by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same, and
if there is no such designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The court ruled that the appellant was sufficiently informed of the crime he was
accused of. That was clear from the defense that he mounted, i.e., that the victim is his
sweetheart and that they treated each other as spouses. In short, Tuando was not denied
of his constitutional right and was given every opportunity to answer the accusation
against him.
33. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016
FACTS: Senit charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty. However, he
transferred residence and his whereabouts became unknown so he was not presented
as a witness by his new counsel. Thus, RTC rendered its Decision in Absentia convicting
Senit of the crime charged. Senit filed a motion for new trial on the ground that errors
of law or irregularities have been committed during trial which prejudiced his substantial
rights. He claimed that he was not able to present evidence during trial because he was
not notified of the schedule. The motion for new trial was denied. CA affirmed RTC
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in denying
the motion for new trial to allow Senit to present evidence on his behalf?
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. The SC ruled that a new trial may not be
opened on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented
due to its negligence. Here, Senit was given the opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own
negligence, by not informing his counsel of his whereabouts and not appearing in court
at the scheduled hearings.
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established that notices have been served to the
counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the
reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the
petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia
for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.
34. People of the Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016
FACTS: five (5) Informations were filed before the RTC charging Comboy of raping his
minor biological daughter, AAA. Comboy interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.
Upon his arraignment on October 23, 2009, Comboy pleaded not guilty to each of the
charges levelled against him. At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated that AAA
is a minor, as evidenced by her Birth Certificate, and that Comboy is her father. In a
Decision, the RTC found Comboy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Statutory Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape. Dissatisfied, Comboy appealed his
conviction to the CA. the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto. It held that Comboy's moral
ascendancy and influence over AAA as the latter's biological father were sufficient to
comply with the force and intimidation required by law for one to have carnal knowledge
without her consent. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not Comboy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape.
RULING: The appeal is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.26

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify Comboy's conviction
from two (2) counts of Statutory Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape to two (2)
counts of Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Qualified Rape.

35. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212593-94;
Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and the People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos.213163-78, 15 March 2016
Facts: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in
the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as
reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas
(Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount
of P172,834,500.00. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a
Complaint for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on September
16, 2013, (NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November
18, 2013, (FIO Complaint).
On March 28, 2014, OMB issued a 144-joint resolution finding probable cause against
petitioners 1 count of Plunder and 15 counts of violation of Ra 3019. On June 4, 2014,
the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying, among others, the MR filed by petitioners.
This led to the filing of the 4 petitions before this Court commonly assailing the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-
C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396.
Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the Ombudsman
before the Sandiganbayan, charging, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1)
count of Plunder; and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis with
fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, which were raffled to the
Sandiganbayan's Third Division.

On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case, "along with several other related cases," the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest against "all the accused," stating that the filing of a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause was a mere superfluity given that it was its bounden duty
to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence
before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused.
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of
probable cause against them, and several others, and consequently, setting their
arraignment. The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the MR of the judicial finding of
probable cause against them and requested that their arraignment be held in abeyance
pending the resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles siblings alleged that the
Sandiganbayan acted on their MR through the latter's Resolution dated November 14,
2014, declaring that the presence of probable cause against them had already been
settled in its previous resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the
petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the September 29, 2014 and
November 14, 2014 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue/s: WON there is a grave abuse of discretion in judicially determining the
existence of probable cause?
Held: NO. There is no grave of discretion in judicially determining the existence of
probable cause.
Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus,
elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of
probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued
ordering the detention of the accused.
The conclusion that the requirement to personally evaluate the report of the Ombudsman,
and its supporting documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it explicitly
declared in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014 that it had "personally read and evaluated
the Information, the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June
4, 2013 of the [Ombudsman], together with the above-enumerated documents, including
their annexes and attachments, which are all part of the records of the preliminary
investigation x x x." A similar pronouncement was made by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated September 29, 2014, wherein it was said that "[a]fter further considering
the records of these cases and due deliberations, the Court finds the existence of
probable cause against the said accused x x x." Later on, in a Resolution dated November
14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier findings when it held that the presence
of probable cause against all the accused "was already unequivocally settled x x x in its
[Resolution] dated July 3, 2014 x x x." Besides, the Sandiganbayan should be
accorded with the presumption of regularity in the performance of its official
duties. This presumption was not convincingly overcome by either Reyes or the Napoles
siblings through clear and convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail. As such, the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings was
judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when it examined the evidence, found
probable cause, and issued warrants of arrest against them.
Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially
determining the existence of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and
in denying Reyes's Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal
of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R. Nos. 215880-94 is in order.

G.R. No. 203026 January 28, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
NATHANIEL PASION Y DELA CRUZ A.K.A. "ATHAN" AND DENNIS MICHAEL PAZ
YSIBAYAN, Accused-Appellants.

Pasion was caught selling shabu while Paz have in his possession marijuana in San
Nicolas, Ilocos in the evening of June 10, 2009 during a buy-bust operation. For their
defense, they alleged thatthey were framed up. The RTC ruled against them. Both of
them appealed but the CA affiremed the RTC decision. Thus they appealed to the SC.
They assailed that the operation was illegal considering that their constitutional rights
were violated by the irregularity done by the PDEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the accused were violated.

HELD: No, both accused-appellants Pasion and Paz, especially Pasion, claimed that the
evidence against them was absolutely planted, they proffered no justification why the
police officers would frame them both, at intertwined surrounding circumstances, for sale,
delivery and possession of dangerous drugs. We adhere to the well-entrenched rule that
full faith and credence are given to the narration of police officers who testify for the
prosecution on the entrapment or buy-bust operation, because as police officers, they are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Indeed, the presumption of regularity
must prevail over appellants’ unsubstantiated allegations. This presumption is overturned
only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the officers were not properly
performing their duty or that they were inspired by improper motive.

G.R. No. 206832 January 21, 2015


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of shabu
under RA 9165. When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.
The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
findings of the trial court. Thus, Morales appealed to the Supreme Court. While, the case
was pending, Morales died while in prison.

ISSUE: Whether the death of Morales pending appeal extinguishes his civil and criminal
liabilities.

HELD: YES. Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. x x x x

Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil
liability needs extinguishment.

G.R. No. 189272 January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,


vs.
CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE
SENGLAO, Appellants.

FACTS: The appellants were apprehended for importing and bringing shabu in the
Philippines while their boat was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of
Looc, Occidental Mindoro. They pleaded not guilty. The trial court found them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision. So they appealed to the
CA. On appeal to the SC, appellants alleged violation of their constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to the absence of probable cause, their
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on their persons and possession
is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of regulated drugs therefrom are
inadmissible against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of their constitutional rights.


HELD: None, under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

This Court has ruled that for anarrest to fall under the above exception, two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the
apprehending officers in flagrante delicto. In addition, this Court does not find the
consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted on appellants unreasonable in
view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view of the
arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of
obtaining a search warrant.

(Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a
right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.45 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. )

G.R. No. 184762 February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
DOMINGO GALLANO y JARANILLA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: Gallano was arraigned and tried for raping his niece, AAA, a 12 year old minor
being cared for by his wife BBB. Gallano denied the charge, and asserted alibi, insisting
that on the day the rape was committed he had been working in the sugarcane field.
During the trial, the age of AAA was not questioned hence RTC convicted Gallano of
rape, qualified by minority and relationship and to suffer the penalty of death. CA modified
the decision because of the passage of RA 9346.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

HELD: Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In order that the
accused is convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the victim must be a less than 18 years old; and
(2) the offender must either be related to the victim by consanguinity of by affinity within
the third civil degree, or is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. These two
requisites must be both alleged and proved with absolute certainty. Although Gallano's
relationship with AAA went uncontroverted because both he and BBB had testified that
they were legally married, AAA's minority was not thereby competently established.

To convict an accused charged with qualified rape instead of rape in its simple form not
only condemns him to a more serious offense but also exposes him to an even greater
liability. As such, the State is mandated to sufficiently allege in the information and to
competently prove during trial the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
with the same certainty as the crime itself.

G.R. No. 203466 February 25, 2015

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:Benaybe and her supervisor Tupag were authorized to collect and receive
payments of loans, did collect and receive payments from the bank's borrowers or clients
in the total amount of ₱688,833.00, under the express obligation on the part of said
accused to remit the amount collected to the bank, but said accused converted,
misapplied said amount to their own use and benefit, and despite repeated demands,
they failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay. Benaybe alleged that she
remitted the money to her supervisor. Tupag, however, failed to offer any testimony so
the court convicted him. The RTC convicted Benaybe for Estafa through
misappropriation. Both appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the decision and ruled that Tupag
lost his right to appeal. Benaybe appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: What is the effect of Benaybe’s appeal to the conviction of Tupag?

HELD: Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which states: SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable
to the latter. While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her
appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. Considering that under
Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a
favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or
those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the
conviction became final and executory, Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa is
likewise applicable to Tupag.
G.R. No. 210430 February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
RONALD NICAL y ALMINARIO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: The accused was charged for raping AAA. He pleaded not guilty. AAA alleged
that with use of force, Nical pushed her, causing her to bump her head in the concrete
making her dizzy and unconscious thus allowing accused to consummate the crime. Nical
alleged jealousy on part of AAA as the reason for the charge. The trial court convicted
him based on presumptio hominis that no young Filipina woman would admit being raped
if she was not in fact raped. On appeal, Nical alleged that his right to be informed of the
charge against him was violated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of accused’s constitutional right to due
process.

HELD: Yes. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the praesumptio hominis
that no young Filipina would cry rape if it were not true.1âwphi1 However, its decision
totally disregarded the paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed
innocent until proven otherwise. Where the evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one
consistent with the accused’s innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that which
favors the accused should be properly considered.

G.R. No. 171672 February 2, 2015

MARIETA DE CASTRO, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Accused was a bank teller of BPI Family. She commited four counts of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document by forging signstured of depositors
Matuguina and Cornejo in withdrawal slips thus enabling her to withdraw money. The
accused initially denied the claims against her but when she was asked to write her
statement down, she confessed to her guilt. The RTC convicted her. CA affirmed. In her
appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not her constitutional rights were violated.

HELD: No, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial
investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or law enforcement
officer. She was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and
in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She
was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say
anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental and
moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on the
soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply
irrelevant.

(Thus, the right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which
the Miranda doctrine applies - when the official proceeding is conducted under the
coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to
a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the Supreme Court said very clearly that the rights are
invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person undergoing a
normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit
examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.)

#43
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. LINO ALEJANDRO Y PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018
FACTS:
Accused was charged with two counts of rape. After the victim has testified, the
accused manifested in open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the
defense and submitted the case for decision. The RTC acquitted the accused. On the
same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision. Accused filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory
and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused in
double jeopardy. The RTC denied the motion and rendered a joint decision convicting the
accused or two counts of rape. Accused appealed to the CA. The OSG countered that
there was no error in the recall of the acquittal. It ratiocinated that the public prosecutor’s
manifestation was filed on the same day of the promulgation of the recalled decision,
pointing out that AAA actually testified during the trial and her testimony, if considered,
would result in a different verdict. The OSG stressed that what was proscribed under the
double jeopardy clause was the filing of an appeal to allow the prosecutor to seek a
second trier of facts of defendant’s guilt after having failed with the first. The CA dismissed
the appeal and held that the RTC’s Order of recalling and setting aside the judgment of
acquittal was justified.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal amounts to double jeopardy.
RULING:
We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable. The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused
against double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must
concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of
the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case
was dismissed without his express consent. Here, all the elements were present.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1)
Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a
mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances. We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case. Here, there was
no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the prosecution
was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

#44
CECILIA RIVAC VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an information filed before the RTC, charging
Rivac of the crime of estafa. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all
the elements of the crime charged and held that Rivac was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. After the promulgation of the judgment and before it lapsed into finality, Rivac
moved to reopen proceedings which was granted. Nevertheless the RTC affirmed its
judgment. The CA upheld Rivac's conviction. Preliminarily, it held that the RTC erred in
allowing the reopening of the case, since it had already promulgated a ruling therein. In
this regard, the CA opined that the RTC proceedings after the promulgation of its ruling
can be likened to a new trial, which is likewise improper as the grounds for its allowance
are not extant.
ISSUE: W/N the CA properly ruled that it was improper for the RTC to reopen its
proceedings.
RULING: NO.
Sec. 24, Rule 119 provides that: "At any time before finality of the judgment of
conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case,
reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice.xx” Sec 24, Rule 119 and
existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued
by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the
presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days
from the issuance of the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, and in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will
not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to
reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally
offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after
promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline covering a
motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case
was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

#45
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THRU PRIVATE COMPLAINANT BRIAN VICTOR
BRITCHFORD, VS. SALVADOR ALAPAN
G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018
FACTS:
In an Information, respondent Salvador Alapan and his wife Myrna were charged
with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Spouses Alapan borrowed money from
petitioner Britchford and to secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8)
postdated checks. When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at PNB, however,
the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks
were drawn was closed. The MTC convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that
respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he
was a first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did
not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an
appeal before the RTC. Which the RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed
a petition for review with the CA. The CA likewise dismissed the petition since it was filed
without the intervention of the OSG. Hence this petition
ISSUE: W/N petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court’s order.
RULING:
In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power
is expressly provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of
the Philippines in all criminal cases. Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of
the private complainant is limited only to the civil liability arising from the crime. In Bautista
v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, the Court ruled:
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.

#46
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SHELDON ALCANTARA Y LI, JUNNELYN ILLO
Y YAN, NATIVIDAD ZULUETA Y YALDUA, MA. REYNA OCAMPO Y CRUZ, MAILA
TO Y MOVILLON, MA. VICTORIA GONZALES Y DEDIOS, ELENA PASCUAL Y
ROQUE, MARY ANGELIN ROMERO Y BISNAR AND NOEMI VILLEGAS Y BATHAN
G.R. No. 207040, July 04, 2018

FACTS:
An Information charging the respondents with qualified trafficking of persons was
filed in the RTC. Respondents filed an urgent motion for judicial determination of probable
cause before the presided by Judge Calpatura. The RTC issued its order finding no
probable cause for the indictment of the respondents and dismissed the case. Hence this
petition. The OSG claimed that the determination of probable cause to hold a person for
trial is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Calpatura erred when he dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause.
RULING:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Judge Calpatura can personally determine the existence of probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. However, the reasons of Judge Calpatura in
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause are evidentiary matters which should be
properly ventilated during the trial. Here, the records do not disclose that the prosecutor's
finding of probable cause was done in a capricious and whimsical manner evidencing
grave abuse of discretion. As such, his finding of probable cause, being primarily lodge
with him, should not be interfered with by the courts. Clearly, Judge Calpatura erred when
he dismissed the case against the respondents for lack of probable cause.

#47
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ROMEO ANTIDO Y LANTAYAN A.K.A. ROMEO
ANTIGO Y LANTAYAN ALIAS "JON-JON"
G.R. No. 208651, March 14, 2018

FACTS:
In a resolution dated April 7, 2014, the Court affirmed the decision dated December
7, 2012 of the CA in finding accused-appellant Romeo Antido (accused) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. However, it appears that before the promulgation
of the said resolution, accused-appellant had already died on December 28, 2013, as
evidenced by his Certificate of Death.
ISSUE: W/N pending the accused-appellant’s death pending appeal of his extinguishes
his criminal and civil liability

RULING:
Upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is
well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the
victim, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, the victim may file a
separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law
and procedural rules. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
thandelict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b)
Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x e) Quasi-delicts.
#48
G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOEL DOMINGO
FACTS:
Three informations, were filed against accused-appellant Joel Dominngo and Roel
Domingo charging them with two counts murder and frustrated murder. The three cases
were originally raffled to Branch 15 of the RTC of Laoag City. Subsequently, the accused
through counsel filed a motion praying for the re-raffle of these cases to another branch
since proceedings had not gone beyond the pre-trial stage although they had been
detained for more than a year. The Motion was granted by Branch 15, and the cases were
re-raffled to Branch 14 of the same Court.Pre-trial conference ensued. There, it was
agreed that the prosecution would present its evidence in four settings of a joint trial. The
prosecution failed to present a single witness in each of those four settings. Thus, the
Court dismissed the cases and directed the release of the two accused. The Office of the
prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted. Accused Joel Domingo
was then rearrested and was later on convicted by the RTC of two counts of murder and
frustrated murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE: W/N the CA committed serious error when it set aside the dismissal transgressing
the accused’s right to speedy trial.

RULING:
To determine whether accused-appellant's right to speedy trial was violated, "four
factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant." The Court has also
ruled in People v. Tampalthat "[i]n determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements
of the scheduled hearings of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy
trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time."
#49
KIM LIONGV. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200630, June 04, 2018

FACTS:
Liong was charged with estafa. When it was their turn to cross-examine the witness
presented by the prosecution, he failed to do so and moved for the resetting of the
hearing. The cross-examination was reset for a couple of times, four were attributable to
Liong. Until such time the court the court declared that he waived his right to cross-
examine the witness. Liong engaged a new counsel and filed a motion for
reconsideration, admitting that the failure to cross examine prosecution witness was due
to the negligence of his counsel who failed to appear and perform his task as counsel for
the accused, and he should not be punished for the negligence of his counsel. The motion
was denied by the RTC. Liong filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA however
agreed with the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring as waived petitioner
Kim Liong's right to cross-examine prosecution’s witness.

RULING:
Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the testimony of the
witness incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. However, like any right, the right to
cross-examine may be waived.It "is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.] When
an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the
accused shall be deemed to have waived this right. When the accused abuses its option
to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to have waived his right to
confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of postponements and changes of
counsel in this case is so obvious and patent. Petitioner should have been dissuaded by
any of the lawyers, unless they, too, connived in such an amateurish strategy, which
wastes the time and resources of our judicial system.

EVIDENCE
1) CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and BREGIDO MALACAT, JR.
vsPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
March 8, 2017 G.R. No. 205745

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 37 found petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder, ruling that petitioners, with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another attacked and assaulted Rolando Bahian.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari where they insist on their version of events. They
emphasize several factual details and maintain that they did not initiate an assault on
Bahian. They assert that Bahian sustained the injury on his forehead through his own
fault; thus, they could not be held liable for acting with intent to kill Bahian.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated


murder.

RULING: No. A careful review of this case and of the body of evidence that was
available for the Regional Trial Court's perusal reveals that there has been a gross
misapprehension of facts on the part of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
Thus, we reverse and acquit petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido
Malacat, Jr.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense
responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its own
merits, not merely on relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, acquittal must follow as a matter of course.

The defense points out several facts, which lend greater plausibility to its claim that
the possibly fatal injury sustained by Bahian on his forehead was not inflicted by any of
the petitioners, and that petitioners did not initiate an assault against Bahian. Negating
the fact of the alleged perpetrators' assault and infliction of a potentially fatal injury
negates the corpus delicti of the offense charged. Physical evidence is evidence of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. They have been
characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which rate high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence."

First, it appears that the location where the altercation occurred between Bahian
and Kagawad Abalde, on the one hand, and petitioners, on the other, is not as plain and
austere as the prosecution made it seem.
Second, while the prosecution painted a picture of a relentless assault that lasted
for as much as 30 minutes- with petitioners supposedly not content with Bahian falling
onto a parked jeep, but even attacking him until he lay on the pavement, and thereafter
still continuing to punch and kick him. However, Bahian's medical certificate showed no
injury other than that on [his] forehead.

Third, Bahian himself was noted to have admitted that his head injury was "caused
by [him] hitting the edge of the concrete pavement.

Finally, several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have
belied the prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun,
a bolo and an iron bar, respectively.

2) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI


November 29, 2017 G.R. No. 203121

FACTS:

Sota and Gadjadli were found guilty of murder and arson by the RTC of Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte. The lower court ruled that the prosecutor established the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength and the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation in the death of Artemio Eba and the burning of his
house by the accused in 1999.

The CA held that the requisites in order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient for conviction had been satisfied in these cases and which proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Sota and Gadjadli, together with three other unidentified
individuals, killed Artemio and burned his house. The CA however modified the decision
of the RTC as to the penalties to be imposed on Sota and Gadjadli, and the damages to
be awarded.

Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the court a quo proved the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING: Yes. The Court did not find any compelling cause or impetus to
disturb the findings of the CA especially so that the accused-appellants failed to
convincingly argue their claim that these cases fall within the determined exclusions that
the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.

Most significantly, in every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-
fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged;
and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons
responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there can
be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
ascertained. In these cases, the prosecution had undoubtedly discharged its task in
accordance with the required degree of proof.

Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for determining
the weight of a particular testimony. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.

3) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO ARPOSEPLE y SANCHEZ and


JHUNREL SULOGAOL y DATU
November 22, 2017 G.R. No. 205787

FACTS:

Arposeple and Sulogaol were both charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165. The
RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol found appellants guilty of illegal trafficking and possession
of shabu in a buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for failure of the arresting
team to comply with the requirements of the chain of custody and the failure to present
the informant. However, the CA ruled for the People, holding that the failure of the buy-
bust team in complying with Section (Sec.) 21, R.A. No. 9165 on chain of custody did not
render the items as inadmissible in evidence considering that what were essential and
necessary in drug cases were preserved by the arresting officers in compliance with the
requirements of the law. On the one hand, the non-presentation of the informant was
ruled by the CA as dispensable for the successful prosecution of the cases because his
testimony will only be corroborative and cumulative.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE


ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND RESONABLE DOUBT.

RULING:

Yes. . Jurisprudence dictates that to secure a conviction for illegal sale of


dangerous drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution must establish the
following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and its
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The
essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11 are as follows:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possesses the said drug. On the one hand, the elements of illegal possession
of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under
Sec. 12 are the following: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law.

The CA erred in ruling that all the elements of the offenses charged against
appellants were established with moral certainty.

Equally significant therefore as establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. No. 9165
is proving that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia. It would be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the
elements of the crime if the corpus delicti had not been proven beyond moral certainty.
Irrefragably, the prosecution cannot prove its case for violation of the provisions of R.A.
No. 9165 when the seized items could not be accounted for or when there were significant
breaks in their chain of custody that would cast doubt as to whether those items presented
in court were actually those that were seized. An enlightened precedent provides for the
meaning of chain of custody.

Chain of custody is defined as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.80

Even the presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their


official duties easily disappeared before it could find significance in these cases.
Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that a high premium is accorded the
presumption of innocence over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty.

To recapitulate, the records of these cases were bereft of any showing that the
prosecution had discharged its burden to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence
which appellants enjoy; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken
chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (4) offer any explanation why the provisions of
Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with.

Thus, the Court is constrained to acquit the appellants based on reasonable doubt.
RONALD IBAÑEZ v. PEOPLE [ GR No. 190798, Jan 27, 2016 ]

Facts: For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the
petitioners together with their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez
(David), who have remained at large, were charged with the crime of frustrated homicide
in an Information dated October 11, 2001.

Issue:

Ruling:
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the
offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Emilio
himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the
incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio
failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on the date and time
in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over
the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the
crime. In the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses
as one of the assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused
himself and his immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his
favor, as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was
somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's defense of alibi
will not hold.

[ GR No. 212340, Aug 17, 2016 ] PEOPLE v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT

Facts: Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Gerrjan


Manago y Acut (Manago) assailing the Decision[2] dated May 20, 2013 and the
Resolution[3] dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CEB-
C.R. No. 01342, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. CBU-79707, finding Manago
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II[5] of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause
and/or Motion for the Suppression of Evidence, [14] contending, inter alia, that there is
neither probable cause nor prima facie Evidence to conduct an arrest and search on him;
as such, the item seized torn him, i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu, is inadmissible
in evidence pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. [15] However, in kn
Order[16] dated May 31, 2007, the RTC denied the said motion.
Issue: Whether or not the Evidence presented is admissible.

Ruling:

Section 2, Article III[32] of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must
be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article IIIof the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed

People vs. Mahinay, G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017

FACTS : The accused was charged with rape. Accused was a Security Guard and
AAA (victim) is a housemaid. Accused sent a message to AAA (victim) which was
acceptedby the latter, entered a Jollibee, ordered food and went to Aroma Motel.
Victim alleged that she refused to go up the stairs of the motel and accused
impelled him to hold her by hand insisted only that they would only talk and eat.
Upon entering the room, the victim tried to leave but accused closed the door and
pushed her toward the bed.
The medico-legal found the presence of fresh deep hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock
position with edges bleeding; abrasion measuring 1.3 cm. on the left breast; and
contusion measuring 1.5 cm. on the right hand of AAA.

Accused claimed that they were lovers, had gone out once on a date on March 6,
2006, and again on March 14, 2006, they went to a Motel, she told him she loved him,
they started kissing, she took off the towel, she did not resist when he went on top of her,
inserted his penis in her vagina, but he stopped when she told him that she was not yet
ready, they left the motel, boarded the jeepney, she called him through his celfon and
asked if they could see each other again,until a police officer identified as German
arrested and handcuffed him.
RTC found the accused guilty of Rape beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed the
conviction.

ISSUE
Did the RTC and the CA correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape beyond
reasonable doubt?

RULING
No.
The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong
corroboration.
Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual
intercourse interposed by the accused. To be noted first and foremost is that he
and AAA were adults capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse.

Moreover, the mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not preclude
the giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and
contusions could also be suffered during voluntary submission of the partners to
each other’s lust. Such possibility calls for us to open our minds to the conclusion that
the sexual intercourse resulted from consensuality between them.

In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind.

P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 208001, 19 June 2017

Facts: At around 7 :00 a.m. of September 15, 2010, Granados was fatally shot by Bautista
in front of his home in Tacloban City. After the shooting, Bautista attempted to flee the
crime scene but was unsuccessful because his getaway motorcycle failed to start its
engine. A neighbor of the victim, Butch Price, came to the rescue and shot and wounded
Bautista. Granados was immediately rushed to the hospital but was declared dead.
Bautista was also brought to the hospital. On the same day, SP02 Norman Loy Fevidal
interviewed Bautista while the latter was still confined. Bautista executed an extrajudicial
confession implicating Pfleider as the mastermind of the assassination claiming that
Pfleider induced him by means of a price of P60,000 for the hit. An Information for Murder
was filed with the RTC of Tacloban but the judge dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause. However, the OSG filed a certiorari with the CA which was granted. Hence, this
petition questioning the reversal of the CA of the finding of lack of probable cause by the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the determination of the presence of probable cause may be made by
the Supreme Court.

Ruling:

NO.
It must be emphasized that the SC is not a trier of facts. The determination of probable
cause is and will always entail a review of the facts of the case. The CA, in finding
probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but raised questions that
would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that, "Questions remain
as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfelider as the inducer and why the
other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime." From this query, the CA has raised
doubt. In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause,
outrightly dismissed the case. The contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well
noted and from the very provision of the Rules of Court, the remedy, in case of doubt, is
for the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. Therefore, the SC
finds it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a
proper determination of probable cause based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution

SENATOR ESTRADA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUSDMAN


G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

Facts: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen.
Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen.
Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9
December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request
to be furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of
New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made
“pursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court) and to have access to the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue: What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

Ruling: The quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in


administrative proceedings. Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence,
as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations
of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally
adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even
partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can
include hearsay evidence.

LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA MENDOZA


G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015

FACTS: Luis Uy filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca and spouses Jose
Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the
lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the
time they were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed
of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he
alleges to be a part of their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and
claimed that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union with a
marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the
bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to
secure a marriage contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent,
in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
RULING: Yes, the sale is valid. The main issue in determining the validity of the sale of
the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption
may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven
by any competent and relevant evidence. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then
became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally
married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show
that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR.


G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

FACTS: Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga and Ligaya Cercado-Belison claimed that


they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo, who were married
last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners
presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina
Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public
document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate
original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Granting that
the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document
should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the
requirement of authentication.


ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove
the fact of marriage.

RULING: Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is
admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and
saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the
person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution
thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of
such witnesses.
While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now
argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’
argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one
that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly
more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.
 The
marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE"
G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

FACTS: At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-
month-old grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3
Leopoldo Zapanta, who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television when
4 successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2
Borre's house and saw two 2 men armed with .38 calibre revolvers standing a meter away
from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could
not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.

PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola, brought SPO2
Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told
Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor,
Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre,
who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2
Borre died.
ISSUE: Whether Palanas’ conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the
basis of Dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

RULING: Yes. SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, it may be


reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death
was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and
is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make
a careless and false accusation. In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise
be deemed to form part of the res gestae. In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to
a startling occurrence. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to
contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity
and only in reaction to the startling occurrence

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON.JESUS M. MUPAS


G.R. No. 181892 September 08, 2015
FACTS: Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to
submit competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's unsolicited proposal in
accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules. Both AEDC and Paircargo
offered to build, however, DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO).
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign
corporations organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO
defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed
to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. Trial ensued, there has been an issue as
to the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original
documents to the court. However, PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified
under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous accounts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-submission of original documents is justified.
RULING: The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission
due to numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under the rule. Under the best
evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms
of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under
the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the
terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented
in courts are authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall
not be admissible as evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the project.

MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO.
190583. December 7, 2015.

FACTS: An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner,
Salazar, and Carpon. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner unlawfully deprived Cebuana of cash/ money when she took out pawned items
and released them to redeeming pledgers in exchange for redemption payments which
she, however, did not turnover to the pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own
gain. She gravely abused the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault
custodian when she exploited her exclusive and unlimited access to the vault to facilitate
the unlawful taking.
The accused submitted pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the
redemption payment by their respective pledgers. She submitted them during the spot
audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing
value of jewelry were actually already redeemed.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.


RULING: Yes. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely
made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself
to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The
admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition
vividly present in this case.
The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It
bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was
replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious
that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s
liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA


G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015

FACTS: Accused-appelant, Alvin Esugon was charged with Robbery with Homicide,
allegedly for robbing cash money amounting to P13,000 from one Josephine Castro and
in the process killing the same. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that
on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father,
were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls
"Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped
through a chair.
The RTC found appellant guilty for the crime charged. On appeal, the appellant
argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite
crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness
whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the perpetrator was credible and competent
considering that the witness was a 5 year old child.

RULING: YES. Anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and
can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not
necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the
disqualifications as listed the rules. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason
for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were
treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified
to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the
ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood,
or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of
a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
78. Manulat, Jr. v. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No.190892,

August 17, 2015.

[PERALTA, J.]

FACTS:

Vicente, herein petitioner, is the husband of the deceased Genebe. They have two
children, Vince Earl and Leslie Kate, aged three and two years old, respectively. One
evening, Vicente, with his two children left their home and went to the house of his mother-
in-law, Carmen. Vicente left after dinner.The following morning, Carmen bathed the two
children and asked them what happened to their parents. Leslie Kate answered, “Father
threw the cellphone, mother’s mouth bled,” while Vince Earl said, “Father choked mama”
and “Mama was left home dead.” Carmen did not mind what the children told her and
instead told them that their mother was on duty at Gold City. That same day, Genebe was
found dead appearing to have committed suicide by hanging herself using nylon rope.
However, medical findings apparently show that the hanging was done post mortem. A
case for parricide was filed against Vicente.

One of the prosecution witness was Carmen, testifying on the statements made by her
grandchildren Vince Earl and Leslie Kate. In order to discredit the evidence of the
prosecution, Vicente claims that the testimony of Carmen was purely hearsay and not
reliable since the prosecution never presented the children as witnesses to testify as what
was told by them to Carmen, their own grandmother. Hence, inadmissible in evidence
being hearsay and not statements as part of the res gestae.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Carmen as to the statements of her grandchildren


qualify as part of res gestae.

HELD: YES.

The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must
have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in
the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under
such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation.“There
are three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.In People v. Salafranca, the Court cited two tests in applying
the res gestae rule: (a) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part
of the transaction itself; and (b) the said evidence clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.

There is no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a
number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the
time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of
the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the
declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events
between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the
circumstances of the statement itself.

In this case, this Court finds that the statements of the petitioner and victim’s three-year-
old son and two-year-old daughter were spontaneously made. They had no opportunity
or chance to invent a story although they made the statements the morning after the
occurrence while being bathed by their grandmother Carmen. Their statements were
unreflected and instinctive since a three-year-old and a two-year-old children, given their
age, do not have the capability, sophistication or malice to fabricate such an incredible
story of a violent altercation between their parents and to impute their own father to the
killing of their mother.
79. MONICO LIGTAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200751.
August 17, 2015.

Facts:

Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in
the plantation of belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of
abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where
Ligtas pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is the
one who cultivated such, he further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that
the alleged taking did not happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres
attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when
the alleged harvesting happened but later on when confronted he admitted harvesting the
abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being a tenant of 1.5 to two hectares of land that
he just prevented the men to harvest from the land which he himself cultivated.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform


Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002,the DARAB rendered the
Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. While records are bereft as
to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court,
records are clear thatthe DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and
Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that the prosecution
was able to prove the elements of theft Ligtas defense of tenancy was not supported by
concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and
Anecita Pacate dulycorroborated by any witness.

Issue:

Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be
taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft?
Held: YES.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking
was done without the owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had
legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore,failed to establish all
the elements of theft. No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be
presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. It is better to acquit ten guilty
individuals than to convict one innocent person.Thus, courts must consider every
circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.Equally settled is that where the
evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, andthe other
with innocence, the accused must be given the beneÞt of doubt and should be
acquitted.In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice
of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried
or are actually pending before the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.(Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 662 SCRA 152 [2011]).
80. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERIC ROSAURO Y BONGCAWIL
G.R. No. 209588,
February 18, 2015

Facts:
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that drugs were being
distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30
o’clock in the afternoon, the Provincial AntiIllegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit
(PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned
themselves in the house of their confidential agent.

There, they saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent and in exchange for
the one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave
him a marked 100-peso bill with serial number YZ7 12579. After the transaction, Larot
and Dizon came out of their hiding place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the
confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, marked it with the marking
“Exhibit A”, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the
drugs. In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for
Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime
laboratory. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and claimed that he was merely a victim of instigation. Thereafter, pre-trial and
trial on the merits ensued. Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish
the guilt of accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction After a review
of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled that what
transpired in the case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant
when his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Held: NO.

This Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful
prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like
shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus
delicti, and that the statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were
not followed. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It
must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or
seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit.

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave
the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it “Exhibit A.”
Upon reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as
well as the request for laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the
marked money and accused-appellant were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of
the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy
Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same
item seized from accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant’s guilt having been established, we likewise affirm the penalty


imposed by the RTC and the CA.
81. REPUBLIC v. FE ROA GIMENEZ
GR No. 174673
January 11, 2016

Facts:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution
and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint
seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agent,
or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the
positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez
Spouses. The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the
Research and Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank
accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V.
Daniel's testimony. The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence."Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29,
2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or
until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence." This Motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13,
2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. Following this, no additional Motion
for extension was filed by the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that
the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated
extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of
evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of
Evidence.
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May
30, 2006. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence
to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13,
2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined
Ignacio Gimenez's demurrer to evidence.
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez's filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15,
2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and
to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
denied the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses'
Motion to Dismiss.
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006
before this court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner's Motion to
Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities depriving petitioner of
its right to due process.
Ruling:
Testimonial evidence is offered at the time witness is called to testify. Documentary
and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered after the presentation of a party's
testimonial evidence. Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally
unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.
More importantly, the Rules specifically provide that evidence must be formally
offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the
determination of the case. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of
time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee
of due process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted
against them and take the necessary actions to secure their case. Hence, any document
or object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was formally offered
and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the
witness called upon to prove or identify it. This court is of the belief that it is but only just
that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of
Evidence. The Sandiganbayan's Resolutions should be reversed.

82. PEOPLE v. RICARDO LAGBO


GR No. 207535
Feb 10, 2016

Facts:

One afternoon in October 2000, AAA was washing dishes inside their house. She
was alone with her father, as her mother was at the marketplace selling vegetables while
her siblings were playing outside the house. All of a sudden, accused-appellant grabbed
her and forcibly removed her short pants and her panty. After removing his short pants,
accused appellant pushed AAA and made her lie down on their "papag". Thereafter, he
boxed AAA's face twice and threatened to kill her mother and siblings. He then placed
himself on top of AAA and made pumping motions while covering her mouth and pulling
her hair. AAA felt pain and cried as accused-appellant's sex organ penetrated hers. After
gratifying himself, accused-appellant put on his clothes, sat beside AAA and told her to
stop crying. AAA did not relate this incident to her mother for fear that accused-appellant
would make good his threat to harm her mother and siblings.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court’s decision is correct and binding between the parties?
Held: YES.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is truer if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court,said findings are generally binding upon this Court.

83. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO R. DE BORJA


G.R. No. 187448
January 9, 2017

Facts:
The case started in a complaint filed before Sanguniangbayan (SB) by the
petitioner thru Presidential Commission on Good Government for the recovery of ill-gotten
assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents therein, during the administration
of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Geronimo Z. Velasco, was the President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) in
which respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.

It appears from the records that PNOC would regularly enter into charter
agreements with vessels and, pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay
"address commissions" to PNOC as charterer, amounting to five percent (5%) of the total
freight wherein during the tenure of Velasco, allegedly, no address commissions were
remitted to PNOC.

Given the foregoing, petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected
these address commissions on behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony
of Epifanio F. Veranoa witness for petitioner Republic. De Borja was further alleged to
have acted as Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned and/or
controlled, such as DRMC.

Respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence of even date, stating therein,
among others:

1. that Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified that he delivered an envelope to


Velasco who, in turn, instructed him to deliver the same to De Borja;
2. that Verano admitted that the envelope was sealed;
3. that Verano did not open the envelope and therefore had no knowledge of the
contents thereof;
4. that Verano did not deliver the envelope personally to De Borja; and that Verano
did not confirm whether De Borja in fact received the said envelope.

SB finds that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that
defendant De Borja is liable for damages as averred in the complaint. witness Verano
admitted that although he was instructed to deliver two envelopes to the office of De Borja,
he did not know for a fact that De Borja actually received them. Moreover, witness Verano
testified that after he delivered the envelopes, he did not receive any word that they did
reach De Borja, nor did Verano confirm De Borja's receipt of them. Where the plaintiff's
evidence against defendant De Borja consists only of Verano's testimony and Reyes'
affidavit, no preponderance of evidence has been satisfactorily established. The SB
rendered a Decision dismissing Civil Case No. 0003 with respect to the remaining
respondents therein. This, in turn, was subject of an appeal before Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether or not the SB committed irreversible error in granting respondent De


Borja's Demurrer to Evidence.

Held:

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of


evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence
produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff,
by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of


evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is
precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without
the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the determination as to
whether the plaintiff's evidence entitles it to the relief sought.

The insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can best be described
as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano
reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or
conduit of Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.

The Court concurs in the SB's observations. As admitted by Verano himself, he


did not and could not have known what was inside the envelopes when they were
purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In the same vein, Verano did not even confirm
respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes, despite numerous opportunities to do so.
Relatedly, it was further revealed during the cross-examination of Verano that in the first
place, Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers.

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support
the allegations of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to
show any right to the relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to
Evidence.

GUYAMIN v. FLORES, G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017


FACTS:
In 2006, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of respondents without the latter’s filing
of their Formal Offer of Evidence. The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex
parte hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and were incorporated
into the records of the case. Petitioner claimed that it was an error for the lower courts to
have ruled in favor of respondents in spite of the fact that the latter made no formal offer
of their evidence. Herein respondents' evidence cannot therefore be considered, since it
is a settled maxim that "courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered."
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in rendering a decision without the filing of the formal offer
of evidence?
HELD:
No. While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate
the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. This Court has time
and again reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at
facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application
of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the
rules, that is, to enhance fair tria.ls and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.

PEOPLE v. SALIM, G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017


FACTS:
On August 25, 2003, SPO4 Araneta received a report that Ismael Salim was engaged in
selling shabu. SPO4 Araneta formed a buy-bust team where SPO1 Santiago would act
as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back up.
Upon arrival at Barangay Talabaan, Santiago walked towards Salim and told the latter
that he wanted to buy shabu. He then gave Salim the ₱100.00 marked money and the
latter took from his left pocket one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance
which he handed over to Santiago. Upon seeing the exchange, Rodriguez, rushed in and
arrested Salim. At the police station, the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance subject of the buy-bust operation, two plastic sachets also containing white
crystalline substance, and marked money, were turned over by Santiago and Rodriguez
to, PO3 Napalcruz, who likewise turned these over to PO2 Tan, the latter then placed his
initial on the items recovered from Salim.
Issue:
Whether the chain of custody was broken?
Held:
Yes. In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous
drug seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of
utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to
have been duly preserved. It is clear from the testimonies that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1
Santiago did not mark the seized drugs immediately after they were confiscated from
appellant. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such that there
can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has
previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from
the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on
reasonable doubt."

ZABALA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015


FACTS:
Alas and Zabala were neighbors. Alas would call Zabala to repair his vehicle and allow
Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought.
On June 18, 2007, when he returned from work, he discovered that his money P68,000
was missing.
Pinon testified that on the same day, she and her boyfriend, Zabala, were together and
she saw him climb the fence and enter the house of Alas. When he returned, she noticed
that he had a bulge in his pocket. Zabala then bought two Nokia phones.
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstantial evidence warrants a conviction of Zabala with theft?
RULING:
No. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to
a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others,
as the guilty person.
The prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the
petitioner of the offense charged.
PORTUGUEZ v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 194499, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
On April 16, 2003, a buy-bust operation was conducted with PO1 Mariano as poseur
buyer. Arriving at the scene, PO1 Mariano saw Bobot and petitioner transacting illegal
drugs. When PO1 Mariano and the asset met petitioner and Bobot on the road, the asset
asked petitioner, “P’re, meron pa ba?” At this point, petitioner looked at PO1 Mariano and
thereafter, attempted to run. However, PO1 Mariano was able to take hold of him.
Petitioner was asked to open his hand. Upon seeing the suspected shabu on his hand,
they arrested petitioner. Before leaving the area, PO1 Mariano placed the markings “EXH
A ARM 04-16-03” on the seized shabu.
Petitioner claims that there were no inventory and photographs of the prohibited item
allegedly seized from him. He argues that as a result of this failure, there is doubt as to
the identity and integrity of the drugs, and there was a break in the chain of custody of
the evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody was broken?
RULING:
No. Non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 does not make the items
seized inadmissible. What is imperative is “the preservation of the integrity and the
evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.”

In this case, the chain of custody was established through the following link: (1) PO1
Mariano marked the seized sachet subject of the in flagrante delicto arrest with “EXH A
ARM 04-16-03” which stands for his full name, Aldrin Reyes Mariano;37 (2) a request for
laboratory examination of the seized item (3) the request and the marked item seized
were personally delivered by PO1 Sabo and received by the PNP Crime Laboratory on
the same day of the arrest on April 16, 2003; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-687-
03E39 confirmed that the marked item seized from petitioner was methamphetamine
hydrochloride; and (5) the marked item was duly identified by PO1 Mariano in court and
offered in evidence.

Hence, it is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were
preserved.

PEOPLE v. ANGNGAO, G.R. No. 189296, March 11, 2015


FACTS:
On November 23, 2003, a buy-bust operation was conducted which resulted to the arrest
of the accused for the sale and possession of marijuana. He was convicted by the RTC
which was upheld by the CA. However, the assailed decisions of both the RTC and the
CA do not show that the arresting lawmen had marked the seized drugs immediately upon
confiscation at the site of the arrest, or even later on in the police station. In fact, the RTC
did not advert to any markings at all. Although the CA noted that the drugs were marked
with the initials of the apprehending police officers, the circumstances attendant to such
markings, like when and where the markings were done, were not sufficiently revealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC and CA erred in its decision?
RULING:
Yes. The State bears the burden of establishing the chain of custody of the dangerous
drugs confiscated during a buy-bust operation. The evidence of the chain of custody must
meet the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no question that the State had the responsibility to explain the lapses in the
procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the
explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delicti became unreliable, and the
acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt had not been shown
beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v. MERCADO, G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, acting on a tip that accused was selling shabu, the SAID-SOU of the
PNP organized a buy-bust operation. At the scene, PO3 Galvez, the poseur buyer,
approached the accused offering to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. He then handed the
buy-bust money and accused brought out from his pocket three (3) pieces of plastic
sachets, chose one (1) sachet and gave it to PO3 Galvez. As the sale was already
consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the
accused. PO3 Galvez marked the plastic sachet with "BMS/RG" and told SPO1 Moran
about the remaining two (2) plastic sachets in accused-appellant’s pocket. SPO1 Moran
then frisked him and confiscated the items which he marked as "BMS/FM-1" and
"BMS/FM-2". Thereafter, they brought the accused and the confiscated items to the SAID-
SOU office and turned them over to the investigator who prepared the corresponding
evidence acknowledgment receipt and request for laboratory examination. Qualitative
examination conducted on the confiscated three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance yielded positive for shabu.

ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody was broken?
RULING:
No. Although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from the accused-appellant, because the chain
of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the
case.
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist
to the court. A circumspect study of the evidence movements reveal the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the suspected drugs were safeguarded.

PEOPLE v. DACUMA, G.R. No. 205889, February 4, 2015


FACTS:
The accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation for sale and possession of shabu.
During the trial, no one among the prosecution witnesses testified about the marking of
the four sachets subject of illegal sale. Though the police officers in their testimonies
narrated that there was a buy-bust operation and they apprehended the accused red-
handed, all of them failed to testify on who among them complied with the marking
requirement to identify the seized items. Quite notably, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest also
failed to mention that the apprehending officers marked the four sachets confiscated from
Dacuma. It was only then when Police Superintendent Marquez sent a request for a
laboratory examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory that the fours sachets containing
white crystalline substance were shown to be marked as "SD." These specimens
eventually became the specimens tested by Forensic Chemist which resulted to a positive
result of methamphetamine hydrochloride and presented in court as the corpus delicti.
ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody was broken?
RULING:
Yes. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the
seized contrabands are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
The Court sanctioned substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of
custody, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team/officers. There is a liberality on minor deviations as
long as there is no gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the
substantive law. However, when serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the
seized items presented in evidence, liberality ceases and presumption of innocence takes
precedence over substantial compliance.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1.Spouses Butong v. Plazo
G.R. No. 187524, May 08, 2015

Facts:
Pedro L. Rinoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his
two marriages, as well as several properties including resort, the land where it was located
and a family home. In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents alleged that Pedro’s second wife and his
other children had sold the said properties to petitioners spouses Villafria without their
knowledge and consent.
Subsequently, respondents learned that a notice of extra-judicial settlement of
estate of their late father was published. Because of this, they caused the annotation of
their adverse claims over the properties and filed their complaint for the annulment of all
documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto.
Petitioners, substituted by their son, Ruel Villafria, question the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment
of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's
estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the
number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate
estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was for Judicial Partition.
Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial
court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon
the issues of forgery and ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not the action filed by the petitioners is one of an action for settlement
of estate and whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case?

Held:
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the
nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of
estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on
the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if
testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent,
or refuses the trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint
a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court.[29] An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of
Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his estate,
may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an...
administrator by the court.[30] The reason is that where the deceased dies without
pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled.

2. Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo


G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015

Facts:
Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago
were in the airport awaiting for the arrival of their baggage but were informed t h a t i t
was offloaded and transferred to a different flight. W hile they were
lodging a complaint before the complaint desk, Raymart saw a man
takingphotos of his wife. He then approached him and found out that it was Ramon
“Mon” Tulfo. The confrontation then escalated to a brawl which came to a stop
because of the interference of the airport security personnel.
Days after the incident, the brother of Mon Tulfo aired on their on their
TV program comments and expletives together with a threat that they will retaliate
against the Santiagos. Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo should be granted?

Held:
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule
has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are
generally characterized as "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,"27 while "enforced disappearances," according
to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851,28 otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on
Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by
a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does
not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats
thereof, in the senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad
invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out
by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government participation.
Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh, properly exercised
its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal determination,
regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court, indeed, has the discretion
to determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the relief in the first place. And
when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the
duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties through prolonged but
futile litigation.

3. IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALAN SALIBO


V. WARDEN, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 197597, August 8, 2015

Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a
pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan
Malang Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station
in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear
his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport,boarding
passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in
Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and
detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The
CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the
Return, the trial court granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate release from
detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ
of habeas corpus may be involved. Salibo’s proper remedy, according to the CA, should
have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.

Issue:
Whether or not Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus?

Held:
Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty dueto mistaken identity.
In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being
illegally detained. First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and
accused in the Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs
Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he
could not have been Butukan S.Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any
warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a
court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence
of authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo
was also not an escape prisoner. The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due
process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

4. CALLO V COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE


G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

Facts:
Danielle Tan Parker is a holder of Philippine Passport issued by the
Department of Foreign Affairs on March 5, 2010 and valid until March 4, 2015.
On January 15, 2013, she was charged for deportation for being an undesirable
alien. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive from USA with an
outstanding arrest warrant issued against her. Subsequently, on January 24,
2013, a Summary Deportation Order was issued against Nopuente, also known
as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, for overstaying. Parker was
not in the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her
American Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of
State.
Nopuente was arrested and was taken to the Immigration Detention
Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently detained as the
deportation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with
falsification and use of falsified documents before the MTC of Davao City. On
September 12, 2014, she filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus which was
dismissed by the RTC. On March 23, 2017, Callo filed this petition for writ of
amparo with prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle
Tan Parker from Detention. Callo argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino
Citizen and thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of
Immigration.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to life, liberty and security of Parker is
threatened by the respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo
and subsequently the award of the interim reliefs?

Held:
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this
case. There is also no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a
detention carried out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth
elements are not present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom
or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits,
Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. The
Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had
produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for the writ of habeas
corpus previously initiated by Parker herself. Similarly, there is no intention to remove
Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the Bureau of
Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City,
which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country.

5. CAPABLANCA V. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS


G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017

Facts:
Andres Bas and Pedro Bas acquired Lot and was registered under their
names. Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal, married to Juan Balorio, his portion
which was evidence by a notarized Deed of Sale. After the death of spouses
Balorio, their heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs
and Deed of Absolute Sale. One of the heirs, Alejandra Balorio sold her portion
to Edith Deen which was subsequently sold to Norberto Bas, who took
possession of and built a house on it. Bas died intestate leaving Lolita Bas,
his niece, as his only heir.
Lolita then filed a complaint before the RTC of Cebu for the cancellation
of the titles. Having been in long possession, it was not necessary for her to
be first declared as his heirs before the filing the complaint. The RTC decide
in favour of Lolita A motion to dismiss on the ground that Lolita should be first
be declared an heir. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a need of declaration of Heirship before the filing
of a complaint for the cancellation of title of the said property?

Held:
This Court grants the petition. This Court finds no need for a separate proceeding
for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles
of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the
validity of the sale of the property from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of
transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with
Pedro's sale of the property, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to
property that would have been transmitted to his heirs.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-
interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What petitioner is pursuing is
Norberta's right of ownership over the property which was passed to her upon the latter's
death.no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his
or her right to the property of the deceased.
The pronouncement in the Heirs of Yaptinchay is misplaced in this case, wherein it was
declared in this case that a declaration of heirship must be made only in a special
proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance of property was based on
Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera[55] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[56] which involved different
factual milieus.
Here, as stated, the main issue is the annulment of title to property, which
ultimately hinges on the validity of the sale from Pedro to Faustina. Petitioner does not
claim any filiation with Pedro or seek to establish her right as his heir as against the
respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her right over the property which has
been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents.

EVIDENCE
1. ZABALA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015

Facts:
Alas and Zabala were neighbors. Alas would call Zabala to repair his
vehicle and allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash for needed
spare parts. One day, when Alas returned home, he discovered that his money,
P68,000.00, which he kept in an envelope was missing. Pinon testified that on
the same day, she and Zabala, her boyfriend, were together and she saw him
climb the fence and enter Alas’ house. When he returned, she noticed that he
had a bulge in his pocket. Zabala bought two Nokia phones.
Zabala testified that on the same day, he was with his conductor plying
the route of his driven jeepney. They did not drop by the house of Alas. Neither
did he meet Pinon, of whom he regarded only as an acquaintance.
Zabala was then charged with theft. The evidence of the prosecution
purports to establish the following narrative: (1) that Alas hides P68,000 in
cash in his closet; (2) that Zabala is aware that Alas hides money in his
bedroom closet; (3) that on the night of the incident, Zabala was with his then
girlfriend; (4) that Zabala climbed through the fence of Alas’ house and
successfully gained entrance; (5) that Zabala later went out of the house with
a bulge in his pocket; and (6) that day, Zabala and Pinon went shopping for a
cellphone. The trial court held that these series of circumstances are sufficient
to support conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence in the case warrants the
conviction of Zabala for theft?

Held:
No.It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction,and that direct evidence is not always necessary. Circumstantial evidence, sometimes
referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is that which goes ” to prove a fact or
series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to
establish a fact in issue.”
The prosecution failed to present suffcient circumstantial evidence to convict thep
etitioner of the offense charged. First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas,
where the money was hidden. Second, the evidence is insufficient to determine without
reasonable doubt that the cash was lost due to felonious taking. Third, Pinon testimony
fails to establish that Zabalas’ pocket indeed contained the stolen money. And fourth, the
prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for some other person
to have committed the crime of the theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce
evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the
house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of
Alas. Thus, Zabala should be acquitted.

2. GUILBEMER FRANCO V PEOPLE


G.R. No. 191185, January 02, 2016

Facts:
On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto
(Nakamoto) went to work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo,
Manila. After he finished working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth
PI8,500.00 on the altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to the
comfort room to change his clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone,
but it was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was also working out, informed
him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto requested
everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he found out that
Franco had left within the time that he was in the shower.
Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived
thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Manila.In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if
Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could
have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym, having left only at around
2:45 p.m.[11] He also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but
claimed these to be his. RTC convicted Franco and it was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable... doubt to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime?

Held:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court provides that the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be
more than one circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is
based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is
essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain,
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap
and a cell phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot be considered a
positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive
identification. While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the
altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that
he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell
phone."
The testimony of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and
authenticated during the course of Ramos' testimony.The logbook or the particular page
referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor confirmed by him as the same logbook
which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym users, or that the writing and notations
on said logbook was... his.
The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass
the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, G.R. No. 210580 (April


18, 2018)

Facts: Ludyson Catubag and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each other as husband
and wife, union begot two (2) children. In order to meet the needs of his family, Catubag
took work overseas. Meanwhile, Shanaviv stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to the
needs of their children. They eventually tied the knot and acquired a housing unit.
Thereafter, Catubag returned overseas to continue his work. While working abroad, he
was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never returned. In the
meantime, Catubag's relatives took care of the children. Worried about his wife’s
disappearance, he looked for his wife to every possible location she might be, but still
could not locate her. After almost seven (7) years of waiting, Catubag filed with the RTC
a petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead. The RTC granted the petition.
However, the Republic through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the CA.

Issue: Whether Catubag failed to establish a well-founded belief that his wife is
presumptively dead.

Held: Yes. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under
the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period
required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief' which can only
be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Catubag's efforts in searching for his
missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. He could have easily convinced the Court
otherwise by providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no
explanation or justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs GO PEI HUNG, G.R. No. 212785 (April 4, 2018)

Facts: Go Pei Hung - a British subject and Hong Kong resident - filed a Petition for
Naturalization seeking Philippine citizenship. After trial, the RTC issued a decision
granting the respondent's petition for naturalization. Upon reviewing the records, the
pieces of documentary evidence and the testimonies of the petitioner and his two (2)
character witnesses, Go Pei Hung has complied with all the qualifications stated in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. Under Republic Act 530, this decision granting the
application for naturalization shall not become final and executory until after two (2) years
from the promulgation of the decision and after another hearing is conducted to determine
whether or not the applicant has complied with the requirements of Section 1 of said law
with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative: (1) [has] not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; and (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.

Issue: Whether the absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as
this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

Held: Yes. Respondent came to the country sometime in 1973; thus, he should have
attached a Certificate of Arrival to his Petition for Naturalization. This is mandatory as
respondent must prove that he entered the country legally and not by unlawful means or
any other manner that is not sanctioned by law. Naturalization granted without the filing
of a certificate of arrival as required by the statute, the same being a matter of substance,
is illegally procured. The Certificate of Arrival should prove that respondent's entry to the
country is lawful. Without it, his Petition for Naturalization is incomplete and must be
denied outright. Even if respondent acquired permanent resident status, this does not do
away with the requirement of said certificate of arrival. An application to become a
naturalized Philippine citizen involves requirements different and separate from that for
permanent residency here. Strict compliance with all statutory requirements is necessary
before an applicant may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization. The absence of
even a single requirement is fatal to an application for naturalization. In naturalization
proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a
citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by
the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to
be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the
chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him, and to
acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and
requirements.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS


WITH PETITION FOR RELIEF INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
PANGASINAN LEGAL AID and JAY-AR R. SENIN vs DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
G.R. No. 232413 (July 25, 2017)

Facts: The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal
Aid Program, as well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National
Police (PNP) on the extant condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that several
detention prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case being filed in
court by the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause. For the IBP, it is the height of injustice when innocent
persons are left to suffer in jail for years without a fixed term. Contending that it is their
duty to defend the Constitution and protect the people against unwarranted imprisonment
and detention, the IBP is requesting the Court to act on the amendment of the Rules on
Preliminary Investigation, by way of a letter, which has been forwarded to the Committee
on Revision. Pending the desired amendment, however, the IBP urges the Court to act
on the urgent and imperative need to release from detention those who are wrongfully
imprisoned despite the absence of probable cause. The IBP represents in this case its
client, Jay-Ar Senin (Senin). Senin's rights were allegedly violated because he has been
detained for at least eight months without any finding of probable cause or a case having
been filed in court.

Issue: Whether the controversy has become moot and academic.

Held: Yes. Due to numerous complaints about illegal drug cases being whitewashed or
dismissed due to sloppy police work, D.C. No. 46 was issued, empowering the DOJ to
automatically review dismissed cases filed in violation of R.A. No. 9165 and involving the
maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death. The circular also applied to cases which
had been dismissed prior to its issuance if such dismissal had not yet attained finality as
of the date of the circular. D.C. No. 46 was followed by D.C. No. 12 which reiterated the
provisions of the first circular but added that automatic review of dismissed drug cases
shall be without prejudice to the right of the respondent to be immediately released from
detention pending automatic review, unless respondent is detained for other causes. In
this circular, the only respondents who may be released, pending automatic review of
their cases by the SOJ, are those whose cases were dismissed during inquest
proceedings on the ground that the arrest was not a valid warrantless arrest under Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, or that no probable cause exists to charge
respondents in court. In order to address the problem of delay in the disposition of cases
subject to automatic review and the prolonged detention of drug suspects without any
case filed against them. D.C. No. 50 was issued, directing all heads of prosecution offices
to immediately issue corresponding release orders in favor of respondents whose cases
are still pending automatic review before the SOJ beyond the 30-day period prescribed
in the subject circular, unless respondents are detained for some other causes. In view
of the considerable number of petitions for habeas corpus filed against the DOJ by
accused languishing in jail for years while their cases were pending automatic review by
the DOJ, D.C. No. 50 and 22 were revoked and D.C. No. 12 was reinstated, mandating
immediate release of respondents pending automatic review, unless respondents are
detained for other causes. The Court agrees with the OSG that this controversy has
become moot and academic. First, the DOJ already issued D.C. No. 004, series of 2017,
which recognizes the right of a detainee to be released even if the dismissal of the case
on preliminary investigation is the subject of automatic review by the
SOJ. Second, records show that the order of dismissal was reversed; that upon filing of
the information with the court, there was judicial determination of probable cause against
Senin; and that following such judicial determination, the court issued a warrant of arrest
and a commitment order.

PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., vs THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C.


FARINAS, G.R. No. 232395 (July 3, 2018)

Facts: Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr. and five (5) others - all employees of the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte and storied as "Ilocos 6" - seek that the Court assume
jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus petition earlier filed by petitioners before the Court of
Appeals (CA). Petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondent House
Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali) before the CA. The CA
scheduled the petition for hearing where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its special appearance for Detabali, arguing that the latter was not personally served with
a copy of the petition. The CA issued a writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to
produce the bodies of the petitioners before the court but Detabali again failed to attend.
Instead, the Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives appeared to
explain that Detabali accompanied several members of the House of Representatives on
a Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to attend the scheduled hearing. A motion to
dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on
petitioners' constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the motion.
CA denied Detabali’s motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus and granting
petitioners' Motion for Provisional Release upon posting of a bond. Accordingly, the CA
issued an Order of Release Upon Bond.

Issue: Whether the release of persons in whose behalf the writ of habeas corpus was
filed renders the petition for the issuance thereof moot and academic.

Held: Yes. The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was devised as a
"speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ "is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." Under the Constitution, the privilege
of the writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it. Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no
longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful
process or order of the court because since then, the restraint has become legal. Thus,
with the subsequent release of all the petitioners from detention, their petition for habeas
corpus has been rendered moot. The rule is that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved and
thus, will not determine a moot question as the resolution thereof will be of no practical
value. Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal
deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions
for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement and custody, the courts
lack the power to act on the petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof
must be refused.

MARIA CALMA vs MARILU TURLA, G.R. No. 221684 (July 30, 2018)

Facts: Marilu C. Turla filed a Petition for Letters of Administration alleging that her father,
Mariano C. Turla, died intestate leaving real properties, bank deposits and other personal
properties, all with an estimated value of P3,000,000.00. She contends that she is the
sole legal heir entitled to inherit and succeed to the estate of her deceased father who did
not leave any other descendant or other heir entitled to the estate as his wife, Rufina de
Castro, had predeceased him. As the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC gave due course to it and set the petition for hearing and subsequently, the Letter
of Special Administration was issued. However, Maria Turla Calma, claiming to be the
surviving youngest half-sister of Mariano as he was her mother's illegitimate son before
her marriage to her father, filed an Opposition to the petition for administration and alleged
that Marilu Turla is not a daughter of Mariano and that the information recited in her two
birth certificates are false, the truth being that Mariano and his wife Rufina did not have
any child. She argued that she is entitled to the administration of the estate of her half-
brother and nominated Norma Bernardino, who has been managing the business and
other financial affairs of the decedent, to take charge of the management and
preservation of the estate pending its distribution to the heirs. A DNA test result showed
that Marilu Turla is not maternally related to Rufina. With this, the RTC removed her as
special administratrix of the estate of Mariano.

Issue: Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it removed Marilu
Turla as special administratrix.

Held: Yes. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to
rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity,
justice and legal principles. We agree with the CA when it found that the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing respondent as Special Administratrix of the estate
of Mariano Turla on the basis of the DNA result showing that she is not maternally related
to Rufina, Mariano's wife. The estate to be administered is that of decedent Mariano Turla,
hence, it is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Respondent Judge to remove
petitioner on the ground that she is not related to Rufina Turla. True, that she claims to
be the daughter of the Spouses Mariano Turla and Rufina Turla. However, a finding that
she is not the daughter of Rufina Turla does not automatically mean that she is not the
daughter of Mariano Turla as well, especially since in the two versions of her birth
certificate, it was Mariano Turla who reported her birth and who signed the same as the
father of the child. Records show that respondent had submitted with the RTC an
accounting of the funds that had come to her possession during the initial year of her
administration.

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA vs. MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and
MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, G.R. No. 187524 (August 5, 2015)

Facts: Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with
his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several
properties including a resort and a family home. In their Amended Complaint for Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents alleged that
they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other
children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and
Maria Butiong, who are now deceased, without their knowledge and consent.
Subsequently, respondents learned that a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate
of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of
all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto.

Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error in not ruling that the RTC acted without
jurisdiction.

Held: No. It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate,
or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor o named is incompetent,
or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint
a qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the
heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate
either extra-judicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for
judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the
court. The reason that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer them. In this case, it was
expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will,
leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate
of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to
have the same partitioned, judicially or extra-judicially. Thus, respondents committed no
error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs KAMRAN F. KARBASI, G.R. No. 210412 (July


29, 2015)

Facts: Kamran F. Karbasi filed a petition for naturalization and after finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for hearing
and ordering the publication thereof. Karbasi and his counsel appeared and presented
proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. Nobody appeared to interpose
an objection to the petition. During the hearing, Alton C. Ratificar and Dominador
Natividad Tagulo testified as character witnesses. The RTC found Karbasi’s evidence
sufficient to support his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its decision.
However, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the ground that the
RTC erred in granting Karbasi’s petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity.
Specifically, the OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants
reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as
required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral character as shown by his disregard
of Philippine tax laws when he had under-declared his income in his income tax returns
(ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization. The CA rendered the
assailed decision affirming the grant of Filipino citizenship to Karbasi. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the CA correctly affirmed the decision granting Karbasi’s application for
naturalization.

Held: Yes. While it is true that a naturalization case is not an ordinary judicial contest to
be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the preponderance of the
evidence, this does not accord infallibility on any and all of the OSG’s assertions. If this
were the case, the rules of evidence might as well be brushed aside in order to accord
conclusiveness to every opposition by the Republic. Needless to state, the Court still has
the final authority and duty to evaluate the records of proceedings a quo and decide on
the issues with fair and sound judgment. Article 7 of the said Convention expressly
provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of
contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi' s status as a refugee has to end with the
attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements
and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the
developments in international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality to
refugees and stateless persons.

G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015


SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA
FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1989, Pedro Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including the
respondents, several properties, including a resort and a family home. No debts were
also left by Pedro. After filing an Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment
of Title and Recovery of Possession, the respondents found out that the resort was sold
to the petitioners. The trial court and the Court of Appeals decided against the petitioners
because of the irregularities surrounding the documents that they have presented as
evidence.

After which, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the
respondents committed an error in filing an action for judicial partition because they
should have filed a special proceeding for the settlement of estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for judicial partition is correct.

RULING: YES. The allegations of respondents in their complaint are mandatory to a


complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro
died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with
the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for
the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that
there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's
estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of
intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is
one for judicial partition.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid by his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.
Therefore, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead
of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same.

G.R. No. 203770


MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner
vs.
EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY, Respondents

FACTS: In 2008, the widow of the late Primo Villasin, Rosario died and left a holographic
last will and testament, wherein she named Remedios, her sister, and Manuela, her niece,
as executors. Both filed a petition for probate of the holographic will with a payer for the
issuance of letters testamentary.

This was opposed by Marty, who alleged that she was the adopted child of the late
spouses Villasin and prayed for the inventory of all the properties which included the
properties under the name of Primrose Corporation for said properties are owned by the
late spouses Villasin despite the Torrens Title of all properties registered under Primrose
Corporation.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marty by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil, it
included the properties of Primrose in the inventory of the estate of Rosario.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court was correct in ordering the inclusion of the properties
of Primrose in the inventory of the estate of Rosario.

RULING: No. Jurisprudence provides that when the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more importantly, covered by a transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of
their possession and ownership of the property.

A perusal of the records of the case would show that that no compelling evidence was
ever presented to substantiate the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one
and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of the
decedent's properties. Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of
the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of
Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's
claims are bereft of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction.

G.R. No. 181186


SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO LAW OFFICES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. NORMA CHIONLO-SIA, in her Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 56 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, and the TESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED
SUSANO RODRIGUEZ, Represented by the Special Administratrix, Respondents.

FACTS: Remedios Rodriguez (Remedios) sought the services of Siguion Reyna


Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office (SRMO) in the intestate settlement of the estate of her
deceased husband. During the proceedings, Remedios was awarded her widow’s
allowance but she sold all her rights and interests in the estate of her husband to Gerardo
in a duly executed Deed of Sale. In turn, Gerardo executed a document authorizing
SRMO over all the rights involved in the prior sale with Remedios.

This prompted SRMO to file a motion for the payment of the widow’s allowance which
was granted by the court but later on, SRMO was ordered by the same court to reimburse
the amount representing the widow’s allowance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the widow’s allowance can be the subject of a contract.

RULING: NO. Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court provides for the allowance granted
to the widow and family of the deceased person during the settlement of the estate. This
allowance is rooted on the right and duty to support under the Civil Code. The right to
support is a purely personal right essential to the life of the recipient, so that it cannot be
subject to attachment or execution. Neither can it be renounced or transmitted to a third
person. Being intransmissible, support cannot be the object of contracts. Nonetheless, it
has also been held that support in arrears is a different thing altogether. It may be
compensated, renounced and transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title.
Therefore, the allowance of Remedios cannot be a valid subject of a Deed of Sale
because the allowance during the settlement of an estate is a purely personal right
essential to the life of Remedios.

G.R. No. 211590


CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, Petitioner,
vs.
JA HOON KU, Respondent.

FACTS: On December 23, 2013, the Interpol of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila
requesting for assistance in the location and deportation of Ja Hoon KU for arbitrarily
spending reserve funds of a Korean Corporation. The Embassy of Korea wrote a letter-
request to the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration, Hon. Mison, for the immediate arrest
and deportation of Ku. Mison issued a Summary Deportation Order. Upon the expiration
of Ku’s passport, Mison, through the assistance of Manila Police, arrested and detained
Ku.

Ku filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo which Judge Gallegos granted and
ordered that custody of Ku shall be with the Philippine Red Cross.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge Gallegos was correct in granting the privilige of the writ
of amparo.

RULING: No. The coverage of the writ of amparo is confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearance.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of
amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and
as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated.
It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the
disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of
an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need
for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 191416


MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA,
NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD,
ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG, Petitioners
vs.
LEOMAR BUENO, Respondent

FACTS: In 2009, the store of Mayor Mamba’s mother was robbed. Consequently, a Task
Force was created to conduct an investigation about it. The Task Force went to the
respondent’s house to invite him for questioning regarding the robbery. The respondent
acceded and was brought to the police station. Due to almost four days of absence, the
mother of respondent asked the Mayor about his son but the Mayor denied of ever
knowing the respondent.

The version of the respondent is that after he was fetched from the police station, he was
brought to Mayor Mamba’s house. Later in the evening, he was made to board a van
where he was beaten with a gun and was also threatened. He was released after 4 days.
Due to the respondent’s absence, his mother sought the assistance of the Commission
on Human Rights which advised her to file for a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo. The Court of Appeals gave the petition due course and ordered the issuance of
the writ of amparo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in issuing the writ of amparo despite the
release of the respondent.
RULING: YES.In Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court
emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as
it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.

Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding
that he has already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is
issued to facilitate the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through
subsequent investigation and action.

G.R. No. 199194


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: In 1991, Jose met Netchie and fell in love with her. They got married after five
years. But because he was a seaman, they only lived as husband and wife for one month.
After three months, he never received any communication with Netchie. When his
contract expired, he tried to look for Netchie by asking her relatives but they did not know
where she was. This prompted Jose to presume that Netchie was dead. So, he filed a
petition before the RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Netchie for purposes
of remarriage.

The RTC granted the petition because Netchie was absent for more than 4 years. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA decided against the
Republic because it made use of a wrong remedy because a writ of certiorari may not be
used to correct a lower court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other
words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in stating that a Petition for Certiorari is an
improper remedy in cases involving the declaration of presumptive death.

RULING: YES. Jurisprudence provides that the RTC’s Decision on a Petition for
declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 186059


SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO,
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU,
MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, and POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE
MARTIN,Respondents*,
vs.
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-
STRUGAR, and BEYERL Y LONG ID, Respondents.

FACTS: A petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo was filed by the relatives of James
M. Balao (James) before the RTC, alleging that he was abducted by five (5) unidentified
men in 2008 because of his activist/political leanings as founding member of the
Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA). The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of amparo,
thereby commencing the conduct of several investigations by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). In their Formal Reports
submitted to the RTC, the AFP and PNP stated that they encountered problems in
gathering evidence that would lead to the resolution of the case, and thus, proposed that
their investigation be terminated. Thus, RTC recommended the archiving of the case
because it has reached an impasse.

When the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court partially adopted the RTC's
recommendations but directed further investigation regarding another angle of the
disappearance. The PNP was given six months but when it submitted its full report to the
RTC which showed another impasse because the testimony of the witnesses alluded the
possibility that James was takenby members of the CPA. Due to this, the RTC requested
the Court to archive the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should adopt the recommendation of the RTC to archive
the case.

RULING: YES. The Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is
impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on
their lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court
from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings.

As such, the second investigation of the PNP on James's case has once more reached
an impasse without, this time, any other active leads left to further pursue. Given this
situation, the Court therefore concludes that the archiving of the case is now appropriate
and adopts the recommendation of the RTC for the archiving of the case.

84. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLANDO SANTOS ZARAGOZA


G.R. No. 223142
January 17, 2018
Facts:

Accused-appellant Santos was charged before the RTC of Caloocan City with
three (3) counts of violation of certain provisions of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

When arraigned, both Santos and Loquinario-Flores pleaded not guilty. Joint trial
of the cases thereafter ensued.

The RTC ruled that the entry in the house of Santos by the NBI team and the
subsequent confiscation of the paraphernalia and marijuana were valid and legal since
the team had a search warrant.

The CA denied the appeal filed by the accused and affirms the decision of the
RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a significant gap in the chain of custody of the seized
items.

Held: NO

There was no significant gap in the chain of custody of the seized items. Moreover,
the assertion of Santos that the forensic chemist did not testify to explain the measures
undertaken to preserve the integrity and identity of the substance examined until their
presentation in court, has no merit. As earlier mentioned, both the prosecution and the
defense had agreed to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist upon
stipulation on certain facts. Moreover, the defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-
examine the forensic chemist but, as revealed by the records, his cross-examination
never dealt on matters pertaining to the measures carried out by the NBI team to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated items.
In the same vein, it needs to be stressed that Cruz is a public officer; thus, his
reports carried the presumption of regularity. Besides, Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.65 It
necessarily follows that the findings of Cruz as contained in Dangerous Drugs Report
Nos. DDM-09-08 and DDM-09-47 were conclusive in view of the failure of the defense to
present evidence showing the contrary.

Noteworthy, the legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that "the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill
will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the
burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the
presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties." Santos had miserably
failed in presenting any evidence that would justify a finding that the NBI team had ill
motive in tampering with the evidence in order to hold him liable for these grave offenses.

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