Republic of the Philippines The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
2 It is so
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission
to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member
of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he
be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required
for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of
his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good
standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
[RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant
to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge
to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as
a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated
above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
KHAN VS. SIMBILLO, A.C NO. 5299, AUGUST 19, 2003
FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published
which reads:“Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”.
Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it
was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband,
Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided thecase will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears
that similar advertisements were also published.An administrative
complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation
and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo
for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not
appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against
him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was
time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because
the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD:
Yes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in
which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining
livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service
and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should
subordinate their primary interest.Worse, advertising himself as an
“annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the
sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact
encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage
bond.Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it
to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears
must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may
not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations
held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction,
arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-
arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment
dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a
report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
 On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he
may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted
no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of
the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert
Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan
states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical
injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only
homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house
on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally
on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-
accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in
his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise
and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is
now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only
to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble
profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and
re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior,
[which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner
has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the
sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for
a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even
more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to
causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his
having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a
position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to
allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign
the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared
to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a
mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should
at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue
with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is
hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by
the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice
the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Public Respondent.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
Private Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed
with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002[1] and
July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay
City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A.
Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the
public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit
herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission
to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC,
Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for
Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student,
anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the
petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for
himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin
Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to
which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion
to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge
Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss
and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Inhibit,[4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the
part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be
inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during
the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for
remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the
belief that justice will not be served.[5]
In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied
the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations
of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the
start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[7] of
the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with
finality.[8] In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure
of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance
was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated
that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34
of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are
applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge
denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order[10] dated July
31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this
Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE
PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF,
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO
RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF
JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN
INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE
PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE
COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2)
whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
application therefor will be directed.[11]A becoming regard of the
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with
the Court of Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and
only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[13]
Considering, however, that this case involves the
interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his
practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65
when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of
Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the
judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns
before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138,
Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law
student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may
appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of
the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not
appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to
comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the
court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18,
1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became
Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is
enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal education program
and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance
was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it
will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has
merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in
any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may
conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and
that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized
member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do
everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to
the termination of the litigation.[14] Considering that a party
personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law,[15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling
into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz
as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as
a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the
petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying
Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of
Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law
student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A
superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The
Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the
guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended
as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in
courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule
138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the
constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and
counsel,[16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to
counsel cannot be waived.[17] The rationale for this ruling was
articulated in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared that even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as
plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution
accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not
obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists
that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the
successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In
this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly
asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case
himself.Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter
730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of
the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a
law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in
court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the
respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling
that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her
alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay
naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers
that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already
manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice,
causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence
in the respondents impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the
petitioner filed an administrative case[19] against the respondent for
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for
lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts
findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she
did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the
ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to
disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,[20] as
voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on
whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case
before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
108, Pasay City are MODIFIED.Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9,
Signing of the Roll of Attorneys
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7
May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but
failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging
through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he
had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the
Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required
to provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances to be
credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable
to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado
justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could
offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin
to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case,
said action is not warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in
filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required
to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have
been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at different firms and companies.
constitute appearance without authority. A lawyer appearing after
his authority as counsel had expired is also appearance without
authority. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No.
8096, July 5, 2010.
Attorney; engagement of private counsel by LGU. Pursuant to this
provision [Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC], the municipal mayor is
required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang
Bayanbefore entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality.
In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously
passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a
lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the
execution of this Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v.
Province of Albay. The above-quoted authority necessarily carried
with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi
the Contract of Legal Services. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by
Hon. Mayor Jaime C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs.
Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of
inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because

everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact

when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance
before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was just an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that
he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was
the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in
spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he
willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise

transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. At
the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer.

However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of
P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not
allowed to engage in the practice of law.

Attorney; engagement of private counsel by GOCC. In Phividec

Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, we listed three (3)
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer:
(1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the
GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of
the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the
case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also
be secured. Failure to comply with all three conditions would
 THIRD DIVISION
REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A.C. No. 8096
A. PANES, JR.,
Complainants, Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY.
LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN,
ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR., Promulgated:
AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D.
NADUA, July 5, 2010
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x contract in its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion[13] in Civil Case
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-335[1] passed on July 17, 2008 by the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-
1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case
filed by the complainants against the respondents.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael A.
Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17,
2006.[2] The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the
employment of Atty. Ignes.[3] However, controversy later erupted
when two (2) different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Pea
board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of
Directors of KWD.
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Pea
board filed Civil Case No. 1793[4] for Injunction and Damages,
seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T.
Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director
Allan D. Yaphockun whose hostility to the present Board of
Directors, the Dela Pea board, is supposedly of public knowledge.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pea board also adopted Resolution
No. 009[5] appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and
Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating counsels for
all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct
supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and
Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of
Court[6] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented
herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V.
Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No.
1799 for Injunction and Damages[7] entitled Koronadal Water
District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, &
Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas. On March 9, 2007, KWD
and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint[8] in
Civil Case No. 1799.
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 079[9] dated February 16, 2007,
the OGCC had approved the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin
B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14,
2007.
In its letter[10] dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed
Eleanor P. Gombas insistence that the retainership contract of Atty.
Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as
stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime
without need of judicial action; that OGCCs grant of authority to
private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable
circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Igness contract
was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities
Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new
Board of Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty.
Igness services and requested to hire another counsel.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal
authority, complainants filed a disbarment complaint[11] against the
respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953. Complainants alleged that
respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as
counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated in
their position paper[12] that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD
even after the OGCC had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Igness
No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented
herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme
Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren
Y. Cabucay.
In his defense,[14] Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow
respondents can validly represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since
Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contracts pre-termination. Atty.
Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD after April 17,
2007 in deference to the OGCCs stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and
Nadua echoed Atty. Manns defense.[15]
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation[16] before
the IBP with the following attachments: (1) the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No.
1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the
January 7, 2008 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid
transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and
Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.
In his report and recommendation,[17] the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Ignes be
dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held
that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1)
year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-
termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No.
50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that they be fined P5,000 each for
appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do so,
per Santayana v. Alampay.[18] The Investigating Commissioner
found that they failed to secure the conformity of the OGCC and
COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissed
the case for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors
erred in dismissing the case because respondents had no authority
from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels of
KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No.
1796-25. Complainants point out that the retainership contract of
Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the Notice of
Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al. in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied
per Order dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
being filed by one not duly authorized by law; and that the
authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is
infirm since Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Pea board lacks the
conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence, according to
complainants, respondents are liable for willfully appearing as
attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent
KWD had expired on April 17, 2007, but he and his fellow
respondents stopped representing KWD after that date. He submits
that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without
authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound
similar arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from
private funds of the members of the Dela Pea board and KWD
personnel who might need legal representation, not from the
public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits
similar arguments.
After a careful study of the case and the parties submissions, we
find respondents administratively liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for
OGCC and COA conformity if a GOCC hires private
lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this
rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act as
the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of
Memorandum Circular No. 9,[19] issued by President Estrada
on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private
lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the
same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the
written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the
hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. In Phividec
Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation,[20] we listed three
(3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private
lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases;
(2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the
COA must also be secured.
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear
as counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid
authority to appear as collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case
No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows
that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating
counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly
states that he and Atty. Ignes presently stand as KWD legal
counsels, there is no proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty.
Naduas engagement as legal counsel or collaborating
counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their
appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution
No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the
private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that
case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec Industrial
Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in
Phividecs behalf considering that the requirements set by
Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with.[21] Thus,
Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar,
Jr. and Mann to act as collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty.
Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his own
retainership contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD
without authority, after his authority as its counsel had
expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we
assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of
his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he stopped
representing KWD after April 17, 2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of
complainants filed with the IBP on March 10, 2008. Attached
therein was the transcript of stenographic notes[22]in Civil Case No.
1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the
extremely urgent motion for the immediate return of the facilities
of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled to
ask him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he filed the
motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD
does not appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said
that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the
case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a motion for
reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil Case No. 1799 and
Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept any motion
for reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the
OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of
appeal[23] dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the
notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly
authorized by law, the RTC, in its Order[24] dated April 8, 2008,
denied due course to said notice of appeal.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January
28, 2008 was merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself,
however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the
case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return of
the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed
and argued a motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice
of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes
still appeared as counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had
expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to
the notice of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without
authority?
The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents
willfully and deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD without
authority. One, respondents have admitted the existence of
Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware of
our ruling in Phividec.[25] Thus, we entertain no doubt that they
have full grasp of our ruling therein that there are indispensable
conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-
compliance with the requirements set by Memorandum Circular
No. 9, the private counsel would have no authority to file a case in
behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD
without complying with what the rule requires. They signed
pleadings as counsels of KWD. They presented themselves
voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they
had no valid authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents authority as counsels of
KWD which question was actually raised earlier in Civil Case No.
1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWDs
counsels[26] dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing
on February 23, 2007[27] respondents still filed the supplemental
complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency
of this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the
RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an intended motion for
reconsideration in behalf of KWD.
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that
respondents are innocent of the charge even if they insist that the
professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as
collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of
KWD. To be sure, the facts were clear that they appeared as
counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as counsels of
the members of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel in their i.
private suits.
Consequently, for respondents willful appearance as counsels of
KWD without authority to do so, there is a valid ground to impose
disciplinary action against them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 ofj.
the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime k.
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which hel.
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or fora.
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always ben.
exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only for the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting a.
the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar.Accordingly, disbarment should notb.
be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand,
suspension or fine, would accomplish the end
desired.[28] In Santayana,[29] we imposed a fine of P5,000 on theo.
respondent for willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to ap.
case without authority to do so. The respondent therein alsoq.
appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification
Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC andr.
COA.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of P5,000 on each
respondent.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully
narrating what had happened after the RTC issued four (4) orders
on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No.a.
1799.[30] As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders
were nullified by the Court of Appeals.[31] We are compelled to
issue a reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibilityb.
requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor and
good faith to the courts.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board ofa.
Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. b.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann,
Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are
found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to ai.
case without authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to
this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution. Theyii.
are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents personal
records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
u.
v.
w.
x.
y.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique
Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar
Company, Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila
and Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company,
Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
FACTS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT
WITH BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a
notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
m. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-
objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages
ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services
Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a
lawyer.
Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:
i. Cipriano 10%
ii. Quintin Muning 10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis 5%
iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division
of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed
to share in said fees with lawyers
s. Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the
person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the
orderly presentation of evidence.
Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
t. The permission for a non-member does not entitle the
representative to compensation for such representation.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services.
Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar
Examination.
His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is
not a person of good moral character for having misrepresented,
sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was eligible
for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin
and name-sake, Juan M. Publico.
c. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
d. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for
falsification of school records or credentials.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of
Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
a. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the
complaint on the ground that his witnesses had
turned hostile.
Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
a. Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken
off the roll of attorneys.
Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate
 of the prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school,
prior to his admission to the practice of law.
z. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he
had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any
knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
a. He was advised to inquire into the outcome ofnn.
the disbarment case against him.
b. He resigned from all his positions in public and
private offices, and transferred to Manila.
c. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking
into consideration his exemplary conduct from
the time he became a lawyer, his services to the
community the numerous awards, resolutions
and/'or commendations he received,
aa. Court denied the Petition.
bb. ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for
lack of merit.
a. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year
High School in Manila was through the initiative
of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who
accompanied him to school and enrolled him in
a grade level above his qualifications in spite of
his demonstrations
cc. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being
merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as
he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his
disbarment
dd. ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
ee. ISSUE:
ff. May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
gg. The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
hh. WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. YES.
a. It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of
time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask
for extension but they were included as
petitioners in the present petition. Their
inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was
belated.
ii. HELD:
jj. ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF
BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST
MUNING.
kk. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and
he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
ll. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant
should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for
the ethics of the profession and for the protection of courts, clients and
the public.
mm. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated:
a. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both,
b. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or
benefit of an act or an act done in violation of
law
c. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to
whom to consult in case of necessity and also
leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from
the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures.
In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members:
a. YES because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial
court on behalf of its members
b. If an award is disadvantageous to its members,
the union may prosecute an appeal as an
aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
oo. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by
any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
a. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to
bear the financial burden of litigations.
A.C. No. 11078
VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie
Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the
complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of
P350,000.00 on the pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the
latter's mother redeemed.
Antecedents
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) sent several demand letters to
Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding her unpaid obligations secured by
the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches,
Caloocan City.2 To avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita
authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedaño
(complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC about the status
of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's
arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of the
mortgage was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but
who was not around at that time.
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her property
would be put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus
went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them
about their right to redeem the property within one year from the
foreclosure.3
In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and
expressed their intention to redeem the property by paying the
redemption price. The latter agreed and scheduled an appointment
with them on August 30,2013.
On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated
meeting place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita
and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they inquired on the
status of their mother's property. After the respondent had
oriented them on the procedure for redemption, the complainants
handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an
acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two
acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price and for
litigation expenses,5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC
identification card. Before leaving them, she promised to inform
them as soon as the documents for redemption were ready for
their mother's signature.6
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and
handed a letter7 that she had signed, along with the special power
of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8 The letter reads:
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City
Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-
2013
Dear Atty. Dabalos,
Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her
Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the property covered by
EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary
computation as to the full redemption amount in order
for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.
Thank you.
Truly yours,
(Sgd.) rances E. Ramon
Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to
follow up on the redemption, but discovered that the respondent
had already ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. On
September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the
Regional Trial Court in Makati City where she was attending a
hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under
process, and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in
two to three weeks time.9
After communicating through text messages with the respondent,
Verlita and Raymond finally went to see the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On November 27, 2013 to
inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered
that the respondent had not deposited the redemption price and
had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the property.10
On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch
145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where the respondent
had a hearing, and handed to her their demand letter requiring her
to return the amount she had received for the redemption. 11 She
acknowledged the letter and promised to return the money on
December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank
account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did not show
up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in Branch 145.12
With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, V erlita
and Raymond brought their disbarment complaint in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1âwphi1
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so.
She also did not attend the mandatory conference set by the IBP
despite notice. Hence, the investigation proceeded ex parte.13
IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and
Recommendation,14 whereby he found the respondent to have
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
engaging in deceitful conduct, and recommended her suspension
from the practice of law for two years, and her return to the
complainants of P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2,
2013.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's
recommendation as stated in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-
929,15 viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence
on record and applicable laws, and for violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Marie Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return
the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.
Ruling of the Court
The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every
lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be punished with either
disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other
commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no time
be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his
continued membership in the Law Profession.17 Any conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.
The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by
receiving money from the complainants after having made them
believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in
their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work
on the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did
not inform them soon enough, however, that she had meanwhile
ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to have so
informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize
the redemption by falsely informing them about having started the
redemption process. She concealed from them the real story that
she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she
had assured them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest
and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum of
P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the
task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her
actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings
with others, especially clients whom she should serve with
competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain
fealty to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter
entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith
rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of
returning the money and her refusal to communicate with the
complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the
neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings with the
complainants.
The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.1âwphi1
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or
omission of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.20The Code exacted from her
not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the
utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and
the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.21
Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton
disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case.
Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her
undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that
the Court has invested with the authority to investigate the
disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the
rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her
shoes should comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's
duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court
has particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of
investigating attorney misconduct.22
The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate
sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of Governors recommended
her suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her
return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The
recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the
misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of
suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional
misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law
because she had caused material prejudice to the clients'
interest.23 She should somehow be taught to be more ethical and
professional in dealing with trusting clients like the complainants
and their mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their
utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness
as a legal professional. In this connection, we state that the usual
mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct
being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor
considering that she had disregarded the several notices sent to her
by the IBP in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the
complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair
and just because she did not comply in the least with her ethical
undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the
mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned
against a similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will
have her suffer a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES
E. RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of
P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written
proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from
notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.c.no. 5161, april 14, 2004
Isdra ting-dumali vs. Atty. Rolando s. Torres
Facts: the complainant was among the heirs julita and vicente
ting.the respondent was the brother in law of the complainant.the
case stemmed from the execution of the deed of extra judicial
settlement and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery.the wife of the respondent as well as
another sister executed an affidavit stating that they are the only
heirs of the ting spouses and falsify the signature of the
complainant.the defense of the respondent was anchored on a
clear oversight of not inclusion the name of the complainant as
heirs.
Issue: whether the act of the respondent vioalative of his oath of
profession as well as the canons of professional ethics.
Ruling;the court resolved the issue as violations of the lawyer’s
oath and the code of professional responsibility.respondents acts or
omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring the intolerable
dishonor to the legal profession.the found the respondent guilty of
the provision of the lawyer’s oath and code of professional
responsibility thereby rendering the latter unworthy to remain
member of the legal profession.he is thus ordered isbarred from
the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the roll of
attorneys.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. P-13-3132 June 4, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ALABEL, SARAN GANI PROVINCE, BRANCH
38, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from the letter1 dated March 15,
2011 of Executive Judge Jaime L. Infante (Judge Infante) of the
Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, "Branch 38.
(RTC), addressed to complainant the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA),2 inquiring about the employment status of
respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of
the said RTC since August 3, 1993. In the aforementioned letter,
Judge Infante informed the OCA that despite Ampong's dismissal
from service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which dismissal
was affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any official
information or directive from the OCA on the matter. As such,
Ampong remains employed in the RTC and has been continuously
receiving all her monthly salary, benefits, allowances, and the like.
The Facts
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case
against Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having
impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir
(Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to
having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a
resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory
penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional
Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for
reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative
case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such,
she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her.
Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).4
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampong’s petition and
affirmed her dismissal from service on the ground that she never
raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her
and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on
August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for review
on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R.
No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service Commission,
CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26, 2008 Decision).
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office
(FMO) of the OCA, which did not receive any official directive
regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued to release her salaries and
allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter notifying the
OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum7 dated
September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it
had started to withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.8
In her Comment9 dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that
the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality
because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its
enforcement.10 Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that
the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the case against her.11
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum12 dated March 27, 2013,the OCA recommended
that Ampong be found guilty of Dishonesty for impersonating and
taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed from the service
on the ground that she no longer possesses the appropriate
eligibility required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits except accrued leave credits and with perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution.13
The OCA found that Ampong’s act of impersonating and taking the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers for
and on behalf of another person indeed constitutes dishonesty, a
grave offense which carries the corresponding penalty of dismissal
from service. It added that the fact that the offense was not
connected with her office or was committed prior to her
appointment in the judiciary does not in any way exonerate her
from administrative liability as an employee of the court.14
Further, the OCA found that Ampong’s appointment as Court
Interpreter III did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to
discipline employees from all branches and agencies of the
government in order to protect the integrity of the civil service.
Consequently, the CSC could validly impose the administrative
penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it that of
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided. In this relation, the
OCA emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of
her civil service eligibility and, hence, could no longer hold the
position of Court Interpreter III.15
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not
Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court
Interpreter III of the RTC.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.
As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had
already held Ampong administratively liable for dishonesty in
impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:
The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as
"an act which includes the procurement and/or use of
fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to
ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating,
collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which
amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination."
[Ampong] impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that the
latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a
deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve
dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
[Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a
judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should not
have been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been
made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service
examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampong’s] present status as a
judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue
of jurisdiction in the same case, viz.:
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority,
the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate
the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the
right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected
with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all
laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that
the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that
impersonating an examinee of a civil service examination is an act
of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.
A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton,
involving judicial employees who also impersonated civil service
examinees.1âwphi1 As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the
necessary charges before the OCA because respondents were
judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and
meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that "respondents’
machinations reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity,
rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public servants
and employees of the judiciary."
Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a
similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But
this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time
of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the
administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil
service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took
the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When
she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil
service-supervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC
does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the
Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee
belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense
was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.17 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted)
Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states
that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law,"18 Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008
Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of
dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should
be enforced in its full course. In line with Section 58(a)19 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility;
(b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be
made to similarly suffer the same.
To clarify, however, despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of
dishonesty, she should nevertheless been titled to receive her
accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned
provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of
the same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the
service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits
that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a
matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such
remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.20
It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be
an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public
servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity
not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her
personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the
court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel
who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.
Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the
courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore,
deserve to remain with the Judiciary.21
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent
Sarah P. Ampong, Court Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of
Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the ground of Dishonesty.
Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits are forfeited except
accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually disqualified from re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality,
including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
HELD : No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of
Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no
actual grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty.
Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow.
Besides, the petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and
his filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his
attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug as counsel for the widow.
The SC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not
guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his
appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955, after Mrs.
Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and
after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance.

TITLE : [001] Laput vs. Remotigue1, 6 SCRA 45 As to Atty. Patalinghug’s preparation of documents revoking the
(A.M. No. 219, 29 September 1962) LABRADOR, J. (En petitioner’s power of attorney, the SolGen found that the same
Banc) does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt
petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the
FACTS : Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge administratrix.
respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY.
FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethical Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to
conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. sustain the charges.
In May 1952, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty.
Laput to handle her "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera" case in CFI-
Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1)
closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final
accounting and partition of said estate. Mrs. Barrera did not
countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later that
respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written
appearance as the new counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955,
petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs.
Barrera’s counsel.

Petitioner alleged that: (1) respondents’ appearances were

unethical and improper; (2) they made Mrs. Barrera sign
documents revoking the petitioner’s “Power of Attorney"
purportedly to disauthorize him from further collecting and
receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. Macario Barrera’s
corporations, and make him appear as a dishonest lawyer and no
longer trusted by his client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghug entered his
appearance without notice to petitioner.

Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his

appearance on 11 Jan. 1955 Mrs. Barrera had already lost
confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading
discharging his services. The other respondent Atty. Remotigue
answered that when he filed his appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the
petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel.

The SC referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and
recommendation. The latter recommended the complete
exoneration of respondents.

ISSUE : Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug

are guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting
cases.

1 This case has a sequel under A.M. No. 434, 29 Sept.

1962 wherein complainant-petitioner Atty. LAPUT
charged respondent Atty. REMOTIGUE with malice, bad
faith, and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly
committed unfair and unethical practices bordering on
dishonesty. The SC approved the Solicitor General’s
recommendation for respondent's complete exoneration.
 SECOND DIVISION
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, A.C. No. 6198
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 15, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------
x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate
Generals Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for
having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil
Case No. Q-99-38778.[1]
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed
by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers
for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the
February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was
appearing in other cases he [complainant
Maligaya] filed before against the
same defendants. We had an agreement that if
we withdraw the case against him, he will
also withdraw all the cases. So, with that
understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension.[2] (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge
Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and
thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing
and file the appropriate pleading.[3] Weeks passed but Atty.
Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to
substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty.
Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission
on Bar Discipline.[4] The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla
with misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts
resulting [in] obstruction of justice,[5] was referred to a
commissioner[6] for investigation. Complainant swore before the
investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any
agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.[7] Atty. Doronilla, who took up
the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his
side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such
agreement.[8] Later he explained
in his memorandum that his main concern was to settle the case
amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial[9] and
insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath.[10] He pointed out,
in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his alleged acts
of falsity) had no effect on the continuance of the case and
therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.[11]
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla
guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[12] and
recommending that he be suspended from the government military
service as legal officer for a period of three months.[13] This was
adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on
August 30, 2003.[14]
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring
lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation
of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor.[15] The common caricature that lawyers by and large do
not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should
not become a common reality.[16] To this end, Canon 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant
had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these
peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His
act infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact
or law.[17]
Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct was compounded,
moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety
of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative
case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had
done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He
persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that
hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather
than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla
resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility,
professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the
information of Judge Daway but only as a sort of question to
complainant regarding a pending proposal to settle the case.[18]
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable
only for its speciousness,[19] cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads
us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain
facts for the unworthy
purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is
presumption of good faith[20] which keeps us from treating the hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He
incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was be dealt with more severely.
to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going
to trial,[21] perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he
really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation
as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal
were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the
duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of
makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as the AFP Judge Advocate Generals Service.
a fact that which is not true. A lawyers duty to the court to employ
only such means as are consistent with truth and honor[22] forbids SO ORDERED.
recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the
benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of
getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to
account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.

Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or

suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision

means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we
disagree with the IBPs recommendation for Atty. Doronillas
suspension from the government military service. After all, the only
purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronillas
liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a
legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for
us to order, as a penalty for his breach of

legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his suspension from employment
in the Judge Advocate Generals Service. Of course, suspension from
employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that
should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his
professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose
of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the
IBPs recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of
law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs recommendation

on the duration of Atty. Doronillas suspension. We need to consider
a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we
give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge
Daways courtroom.Second, the absence of material damage to
complainant may also be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.[23] And finally, since this is Atty. Doronillas first
offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.[24]

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the

conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the
wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time
away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge
himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise
justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
 Republic of the Philippines In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-
SUPREME COURT examination:
Manila
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. CARINGAL
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015
[Formerly CBD 09-2555] ....

ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant, Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu
vs. C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was about four years old.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
A : Yes, sir.
x-----------------------x
Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that
A.C. No. 10584 you are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t it?
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant, recently married to one of her cousins.
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
....

RESOLUTION
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and
Rufina C. Turla?
LEONEN, J.:
THE WITNESS
These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor
Rey Santos for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15,
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her
Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
relationship[s].

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino)

THE COURT
filed a Letter-Complaint4 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty.
Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that
Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.5 : What’s the name of the mother?

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de ATTY. CARINGAL
Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it
appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in : Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
1990.6
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by Mariano Turla, husband THE WITNESS
of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
prepared by Atty. Santos states:
: Yes, sir.
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to
succeed to and inherit the estate of said deceased who did not Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also
leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?
estate.9 (Emphasis in the original underscoring supplied)
A : Of course.
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of
Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a Complaint11 for sum of money Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.
with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary
restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09- You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted
269.12 this document which you requested to be marked as Exhibit B.

The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is THE COURT
an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos
: Exhibit?
represented clients with conflicting interests.15
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of
Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from
you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,]
Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra
Judicial.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question
regarding my legal ethics because it is not the issue in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and
appearing to have been duly notarized on or about 29th [of] June
1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book
number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P.
Angara. I call your attention to the document[,] more particularly[,]
paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.]
I read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am
the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of
the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or
any other heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this
particular provision that you have drafted into this document . . .
true or false?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding
the matter that would impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu
Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the
wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of
the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject of my continuing
objection from the very beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your
Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the floodgate to . . .
questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties
owned by the late Mariano Turla, your Honor. That is why that’s
only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents,
your Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection
on the materiality and impertinency and relevancy of this question,
your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection
before[,] and to be consistent with the ruling of the court[,] I will
allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before
this court that you have drafted a document that caused the
transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false,
you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five years later[,] that this is false,
is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what
about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . .
told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan".
So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication
wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for
himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose
Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No.
10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged
that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He
also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would
necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly
violating the so-called "Dead Man’s Statute"23 because "he [would]
be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the
death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be
unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his
professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute
a breach of trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon
1225 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he filed several
cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that
Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew
this to be false.29 Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s
niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla
had other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the
document some fifteen years ago, he is fully aware of all the
circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn
Batac Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for
the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the neat
set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes
the document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges
for the payment of the taxes due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the
fact recited in the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc. that said deceased
(Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any
other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the
original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement
in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla had no other heir. 33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the
heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were
rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed
to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the
rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited
the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death
certificate.37 He explained that the death certificate and the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla
and that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the
death certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that
he did not represent and was not representing conflicting interests
since Mariano Turla was already dead.39 Further, "he [was]
representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her
father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that
Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted
that he did not commit forum shopping because the various cases
filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds
used were being held by his client as the special administratrix of
the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos, payment
of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as
"expenses of administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal
services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to
question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of
law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable
because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was
registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos be suspended for three
(3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty.
Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified and used it to
support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise,
Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds
from Mariano Turla’s estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission
on Bar Discipline stated that the evidence presented did not prove
that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law."50 Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed
involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino
and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos represented clients with
conflicting interests.52 The Report and Recommendation53 of the
Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly
Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes members of the bar from
representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained
that "the proscription against representation of conflicting interest
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such
adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is
remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition
inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented
Mariano Turla is no secret. The respondent has in a number of
pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand
admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication
which expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who
claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To substantiate her claim
that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that
he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which
indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also
of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented
stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that
Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance
and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of
Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is
his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent
Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a position where he is to refute the
claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only
heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board of Governors)
adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in the Resolution57 dated
March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a
letter of transmittal dated July 15, 2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B,
Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
determines that the respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2) whether
the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of
law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board
of Governors’ Resolution. However, this court modifies the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from
three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation
in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must treat all information
received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to
encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their
case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained what
conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists,
respondent would necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he
is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla.
Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated
in the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his
April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case for Sum of Money with
Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of
Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr.
Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic]
to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay
Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with
the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]
properties for himself." This very admission proves that the
respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and
rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and
Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their
written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent
represented Marilu Turla in March 2009.65 It is understandable why
respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still,
respondent did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to
Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano Turla and
assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus,
the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was
sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding
that respondent violated Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine
res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the respondent’s act of failing to
thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of
Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu
Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent
failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the
stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper.
Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was
he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation
of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of
law. In doing so, lawyers are expected to be honest in all their
dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest.
With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded
to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to
imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the
authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this
court under the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys"70 and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to
discipline officers of the court and members of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of
the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the
Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the
practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the
practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate,
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of
the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration
of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
...
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar
is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the
Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society.71 (Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the
authority of this court to impose disciplinary action on those
admitted to the practice of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally
mandated duty to discipline lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the
duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can
only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers
of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature,
recommendatory.74
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based
on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
"[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified
complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist
this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual
findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be
imposed on the erring lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is
imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State—the administration of
justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are
bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."76 (Citations
omitted)
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the
Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is granted by the
Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The
Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best,
recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should
not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this
court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos
guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are
ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is imposed
upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA,
Complainant,
- versus-
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by
Valentin C. Miranda.[1]
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of
land consisting of 1,890 square meters located at Barangay Lupang
Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration
of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before
the Regional Trial Court ofLas Pias City, Branch 275. During the
course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his
original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular
accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,[2] complainant and respondent agreed
that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos
(PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos
(PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the
amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the
latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded
the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for
the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further
strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent
(20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for
his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was
contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the
subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to
the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge
and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to
satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their
relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-
226, granting the petition for registration, which Decision was
declared final and executory in an Order datedJune 5, 1998. On
March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent
complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds
(RD) of Las Pias City, which transmitted the decree of registration
and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's
duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-
94. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been
claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May
4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked
him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had
claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and
authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the
PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378
square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver
the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused
the demand, for not having been agreed upon.
In a letter[3] dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his
demand for the return of the owner's duplicate of the OCT. On June
11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent over
the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and
angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened to have the
OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000,
respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT wherein
he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services
was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date,
respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect
the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate
penalty upon respondent, complainant invokes the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and properties of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining
lien over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent
admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal,
notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete payment of his
agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the
property covered by the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890
square meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate of
PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of
PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that
he was ready and willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94, should complainant pay him completely the aforesaid
professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00,
however, he alleged that the amount earlier paid to him will be
deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot. He
alleged that the agreement was not reduced into writing, because
the parties believed each other based on their mutual trust. He
denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the
preparation of a memorandum, since he considered the same
unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant
for the payment of the 20% professional fees, respondent invoked
the principle of quantum meruit to justify the amount being
demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated June 9, 2005,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for unjustly
withholding from complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-
94 in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No.
XVII-2005-173,[5] dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors adopting the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for
review[6] with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution[7] dated August
16, 2006, directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper
disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel J.
Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.[8]
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11,
2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed Resolution No. XVII-
2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification that
respondent is ordered to return the complainant's owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of
notice. Hence, the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
which affirmed with modification the findings and
recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his
unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to
retain the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly
due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall
have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come
into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to
the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and
after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall
have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure
the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the
following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful
possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.[9] Further, the attorney's
retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account
between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents
and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's
possession in the course of his employment.[10]
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such
agreement for the payment of professional fee consisting of 20% of
the total area of the subject property and submits that their
agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the
appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any
agreement between the complainant and the respondent that the
latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20%
of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between
the parties only shows that respondent will be paid the acceptance
fee and the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly
received. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's
property. Hence, respondent could not validly withhold the title of
his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title
with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount
of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an
absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the
delivery of money andproperty to his client when due or upon
demand.[11]
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully
withholding and failing to deliver the title of the complainant,
despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to
additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent
violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It
is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional
fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon
at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset,
respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or
possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and
not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in
order for the complainant to determine if he has the financial
capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment
of additional professional fees on the basis of the principle
of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as
much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's
professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by
him from his client."[12] The principle of quantum meruit applies if a
lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In
such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
services, as much as he has earned.[13] In the present case, the
parties had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's
fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum
meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is
already compensated by such agreement.
The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that
he will be the one to secure the owner's duplicate of the OCT from
the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that the title
was already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went
to the RD of Las Pias City to get the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-
94, only to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed
by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer
must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with
integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with
his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith and fairness.[14] By keeping secret with the client his
acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with
his client. Respondent could have easily informed the complainant
immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on
March 29, 2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in
going to the RD to get the title.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property
belonging to his client and imposing unwarranted fees in exchange
for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary
sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting
and approving with modification the report and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered
to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is
hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from notice given
to respondent within which to return the title should be modified
and, instead, respondent should return the same immediately upon
receipt of the Court's decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt
of this Decision. He is ordered toRETURN to the complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this
decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Macario
D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Roy v. CA (Case Digest) G.R. No. 80718
Roy v. CA
G.R. No. 80718
January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
CO URT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA
CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners owned a firewall that had weakened and collapsed
on the tailoring shop owned by the private respondents, causing
injuries and death to Marissa Bernal, a daughter. The RTC ruled that
the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence and awarded
damages to respondents. The petitioners appealed to the CA, but
the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. A copy of the decision of
the CA was received by the petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, the petitioners asked the CA to extend the time to file a
motion for reconsideration. According to a previous case,
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. The petitioners contend that the case of Habaluyas could
not be made binding because it has not been published in the
Official Gazette at the time the CA promulgated its decision.
Issue:
Is the ruling on an unpublished case binding?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of a Supreme Court
decision for it to be binding and effective. The counsel of the
petitioners should be responsible for keeping abreast with Supreme
Court decisions as a lawyer.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN LARRAZABAL, MARTA
C. DE LARRAZABAL, MAXIMO ABAROQUEZ and ANASTACIA
CABIGAS, petitioners-appellants, ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, adverse
claimant-appellee.
Juanito Ll. Abao for petitioners-appellants.
Alberto R Fernandez in his own behalf.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition for the
cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant
on the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.
The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as
counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R-6573 of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs.
Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with
right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the
subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and
so he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services
of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, liable to compensate
his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal executed a
document on June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect
whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of
whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the
appeal prosper. The contents of the document as translated are as
follows:
AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ, Plaintiff in Case No.
R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
make known through this agreement that for
the services rendered by Atty. Alberto B.
Fernandez who is my lawyer in this case, if the
appeal is won up to the Supreme Court, I
Promise and will guarantee that I win give to
said lawyer one-half (1/2) of what I may recover
from the estate of my father in Lots No. 5600
and 5602 which are located at Bulacao Pardo,
City of Cebu. That with respect to any money
 which may be adjudged to me from Agripina
Abarquez, except 'Attorney's Fees', the same
shall pertain to me and not to said lawyer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right
thumb. mark to be affixed hereto this 10th of
June, 1961, at the City of Cebu(p. 5, Petitioner-
Appellant's Brief, p. 26, rec.)
The real Property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. R6573
was actually the share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and 5602,
which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which
were partitioned the heirs which included petitioner Maximo
Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez, the defendant in
said civil case.
This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition approved
by the Court which provided am other that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602
were to be divided into three equal Parts, one third of which shall
be given to Maximo Abarquez. However, Agripina Abarquez the
share of her brother stating that the latter executed an instrument
of pacto de retroprior to the partition conveying to her any or all
rights in the estate of their parents. Petitioner discovered later that
the claim of his sister over his share was based on an instrument he
was believe all along to be a mere acknowledgment of the receipt
of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for g care
of their father during the latter's illness and never an instrument
of pacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to annul the
alleged instrument of pacto de retro.
The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 27, 1963
reversed the decision of the lower court and annulled the dead
of pacto de retro. Appellee Agripina Abarquez filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated
January 7, 1964 (p. 66, Record on Appeal; p. 13, Rec.) and the
judgment became final and executory on January 22,1964.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was issued on
May 19,1965 in the name of Maximo Abarquez, married to
Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and
5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters (p. 110, ROA; p. 13,
rec.). These parcels of land later by the subject matter of the
adverse claim filed by the claimant.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to
petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply with ha
obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961
by delivering the one-half (½) portion of the said parcels of land.
Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered
to sell the whole parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841 to
petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse t
claimant immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing
with the trial court a motion to annotate Ins attorney's lien on TCT
No. 31841 on June 10, 1965 and by notifying the prospective buyers
of his claim over the one-half portion of the parcels of land.
Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a
wrong remedy, as it was not within the purview of Section 37, rule
138 of the Revised Rule of Court, but before the same was by the
trial court, adverse t by an affidavit of adverse claim on July 19,
1965 with the Register of Deeds of Cebu (p. 14, ROA; p. 13, rec.). By
virtue of the petition of mid affidavit the adverse claim for one-half
(½) of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961 document was
annotated on TCT No. 31841.
Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-
spouse Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia Cabigas conveyed by deed
of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two-thirds (2/3) of the lands
covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal
and Marta C. de Larrazabal. When the new transfer certificate of
title No. 32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT
No. 31841 necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate
of title. This adverse claim on TCT No. 32996 became the subject of
cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses on
March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (p. 2 ROA; p.
13, rec.). The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his
opposition to the petition for cancellation on March 18, 1966 (p. 20,
ROA; p. 13 rec.). The trial court resolved the issue on March 19,
1966, when it declared that:
...the petition to cancel the adverse claim
should be denied. The admission by the
petitioners that the lawyers (Attys. Fernandez
and Batiguin) are entitled to only one-third of
the lot described in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 32966 is the best proof of the authority to
maintain said adverse claim (p. 57, ROA; p. 13,
rec.).
Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal to this
Court and correspondingly filed the notice of appeal on April 1,
1966 with the trial court. On April 2, 1966, petitioner-spouses filed
the appeal bond and subsequently filed the record on appeal on
April 6, 1966. The records of the case were forwarded to this Court
through the Land Registration Commission of Manila and were
received by this Court on May 5, 1966.
Counsel for the petitioner-spouses filed the printed record on
appeal on July 12, 1966. Required to file the appellants' brief,
counsel filed one on August 29, 1966 while that of the appellee was
filed on October 1, 1966 after having been granted an extension to
file his brief.
The case was submitted for decision on December 1, 1966. Counsel
for the petitioners filed a motion to expunge appellees' brief on
December 8, 1966 for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period, but the same was denied by this Court in a resolution dated
February 13, 1967.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in the instant case is the validity or
nullity of the registration of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez,
resolution of which in turn hinges on the question of whether or
not the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty.
Fernandez, is prohibited by the Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
and Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates
Article 1491 because it involves an assignment of a property subject
of litigation. That article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot
acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the petition
of another.
 xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior and other o and
employees connected with the administration
of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions;this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession (Emphasis
supplied).
articulo 1459 podria con exito la nulidad de ese pacto
tradicionalmente considerado como ilicito.
xxx xxx xxx
Debe tenerse tambien en cuenta, respecto del ultimo parrafo del
articulo 1459, la sentencia del Tribunal Supreme de 25 Enero de
1902, que delcara que si bien el procurador no puede adquirir para
si los bienes, en cuanto a los cuales tiene incapacidad, puede
adquirirlos para otra persona en quien no concurra incapacidad
alguna (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, Tomo X, p.
110 [4a ed., 1931] emphasis supplied).
Castan, maintaining that it is not covered, opines thus;

C. Prohibiciones impuestas a las personas encargadas, mas o menos

This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale
directamente, de la administracion de justicia.—El mismo art. 1,459
or assignment between the lawyer and his client, of property which
del Codigo civil prohibe a los Magistrados, Jueces, individuos del
is the subject of litigation. As WE have already stated. "The
Minesterio fiscal, Secretarios de Tribunales y Juzgados y Oficiales de
prohibition in said article a only to applies stated: " The prohibition
Justicia adquirir por compra (aunque sea en subasta publica o
in said article applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by
judicial, por si ni por persona alguna intermedia). 'Los bienes y
his client of the property which is the subject of litigation. In other
derechos que estuviesen en litigio ante el Tribunal en cuya
words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or t of the property
jurisdicion on teritorio ejercieran sus respectivas funciones,
must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
extendiendo se esta prohibicion al acto de adquirir por cesion', y
property" (Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-26882,
siendo tambien extensiva ' Alos Abogados y Procuradores respecto
November 21, 1978).
a los bienes y derecho que fueran objeto del un litigioen que
intervengan pos su profession y oficio.'
Likewise, under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to
"cases where after completion of litigation the lawyer accepts on
El fundamento de esta prohibicion es clarismo. No solo se trata—
account of his fee, an interest the assets realized by the litigation"
dice Manresa—de quitar la ocasion al fraude; persiguese, ademas,
(Drinker, Henry S., Legal Ethics, p. 100 [1953], citing App. A, 280;
el proposito de rodear a las personas que intervienen en la
N.Y. Ciu 714). "There is a clear distraction between such cases and
administracion de justicia de todos los prestigios que necesitan para
one in which the lawyer speculates on the outcome of the matter in
ejercer su ministerio, librando los de toda sospecha, que, aunque
which he is employed" (Drinker, supra, p. 100 citing A.B.A. Op. 279).
fuere infundada, redundaria en descredito de la institucion.

A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491

Por no dor lugar a recelos de ninguna clase, admite el Codigo (en el
because the tranfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes
apartado penutimo del art. 1.459) algunos casos en que, por
effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant
excepcion, no se aplica el pricipio prohibitivo de que venimos
case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half
hablando. Tales son los de que se trate de acciones hereditarias
(1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might recover from his share
entre coheredero, de cesion en pago de creditos, o de garantia de
in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal.
los bienes que posean los funcionarios de justicia.
Hence, the payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or
assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in litigation will take
place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the tranfer actually Algunos autores (Goyena, Manresa, Valverde) creen que en la
takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on prohibicion del art. 1.459 esta comprendido el pacto de quota
appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation involving the litis (o sea el convenio por el cual se concede al Abogado o
property in question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent Procurador, para el caso de obtener sentencia favorable una parte
fee is not covered by Article 1491. alicuota de la cosa o cantidad que se litiga), porque dicho pacto
supone la venta o cesion de una parte de la cosa o drecho que es
objecto del litigio. Pero Mucius Scaevola oberva, conrazon, que en
While Spanish civilists differ in their views on the above issue —
el repetido pacto no hay propiamente caso de compraventa ni de
whether or not a contingent fee contract (quota litis agreement) is
cesion de derechos, y bastan para estimario nulo otros preceptos
covered by Article 1491 — with Manresa advancing that it is
del Codigo como los relativos a la ilicitud de la causa (Castan,
covered, thus:
Derecho Civil Espñol, Tomo 4, pp. 68-69, [9a ed., 1956], emphasis
supplied).
Se ha discutido si en la incapacidad de Ion Procumdam y Abogados
asta o el pecto de quota litis. Consiste este, como es sabido, en la
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917,
estipulacion de que el Abogado o el Procurador ban de hacer suyos
has ruled that Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of
una parte alicuota de In cona que se li m la son es favorable. Con es
our Civil Code) does not apply to a contract for a contingent fee
te concepto a la vista, es para nosortros que el articulo que
because it is not contrary to morals or to law, holding that:
comentamos no menciona ese pacto; pero como la incapacidad de
los Abogados y Procuradores se extinede al acto de adquirir por
cesion; y la efectividad del pacto de quota litis implica ... que no es susceptible de aplicarse el precepto contenido en el
necesariamente una cesion, estimamos que con solo el num. 5 del num. 5 del art. 1.459 a un contrato en el que se restrigen los
honorarios de un Abogado a un tanto por ciento de lo que se
obtuviera en el litigio, cosa no repudiada por la moral ni por la ley
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V [1959];
Castan, supra; Manresa, supra).
In the Philippines, among the Filipino commentators, only Justice
Capistrano ventured to state his view on the said issue, thus:
The incapacity to purchase or acquire by
assignment, which the law also extends to
lawyers with t to the property and rights which
may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession, also
covers contracts for professional services quota
litis. Such contracts, however, have been
declared valid by the Supreme Court"
(Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 44,
Vol. IV [1951]).
Dr. Tolentino merely restated the views of Castan and Manresa as
well as the state of jurisprudence in Spain, as follows:
Attorneys-at-law—Some writers, like Goyena,
Manresa and Valverde believe that this article
covers quota litis agreements, under which a
lawyer is to be given an aliquot part of the
property or amount in litigation if he should win
the case for his client. Scaevola and Castan,
however, believe that such a contract does not
involve a sale or assignment of right but it may
be void under other articles of the Code, such as
those referring to illicit cause- On the other
hand the Spanish Supreme Court has held that
this article is not applicable to a contract which
limits the fees of a lawyer to a certain
percentage of what may be recovered in
litigation, as this is not contrary to moral or to
law. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p.
35, Vol. V [1959]; Castan, supra, Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners her contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates
the Canons of Professional Ethics. this is likewise without merit This
posture of petitioners overlooked Canon 13 of the Canons which
expressly contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10 upon
which petitioners relied. For while Canon 10 prohibits a lawyer from
purchasing ...any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allowed a
reasonable contingent fee contract, thus: "A contract for a con.
tangent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the ca including the risk and uncertainty of
the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision
of a court, as to its reasonableness." As pointed out by an authority
on Legal Ethics:
Every lawyer is intensely interested in the
successful outcome of his case, not only as
affecting his reputation, but also his
compensation. Canon 13 specifically permits the
lawyer to contract for a con tangent fee which
of itself, negatives the thought that the Canons
preclude the lawyer's having a stake in his
litigation. As pointed out by Professor
Cheatham on page 170 n. of his Case Book,
there is an inescapable conflict of interest
between lawyer and client in the matter of
fees. Nor despite some statements to the con in
Committee opinions, is it believed that,
particularly in view of Canon 13, Canon 10
precludes in every case an arrangement to make
the lawyer's fee payable only out of the results
of the litigation. The distinction is between
buying an interest in the litigation as a
speculation which Canon 10 condemns and
agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes
primarily in his professional capacity, to accept
his compensation contingent on the
outcome (Drinker, Henry S Legal Ethics, p. 99,
[1953], Emphasis supplied).
These Canons of Professional Ethics have already received "judicial
recognition by being cited and applied by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines in its opinion" Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 9
[1949]). And they have likewise been considered sources of Legal
Ethics. More importantly, the American Bar Association, through
Chairman Howe of the Ethics Committee, opined that "The Canons
of Professional Ethics are legislative expressions of professional
opinion ABA Op. 37 [1912])" [See footnote 25, Drinker, Legal Ethics,
p. 27]. Therefore, the Canons have some binding effect
Likewise, it must be noted that this Court has already recognized
this type of a contract as early as the case of Ulanday vs.
Manila Railroad Co. (45 PhiL 540 [1923]), where WE held that
"contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines, and since
impliedly sanctioned by law 'Should be under the supervision of the
court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges'
(Canons of Profession 1 Ethics)". The same doctrine was
subsequently reiterated in Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co. (97 PhiL 833
[1955]) and Recto vs. Harden (100 PhiL 427 [1956]).
In the 1967 case of Albano vs. Ramos (20 SCRA 171 [19671), the
attorney was allowed to recover in a separate action her attomey's
fee of one-third (1/3) of the lands and damages recovered as
stipulated in the contingent fee contract. And this Court in the
recent case of Rosario Vda de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
(supra), which involved a contingent fee of one-half (½) of the
property in question, held than ,contingent fees are recognized in
this i jurisdiction (Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the Philippine Bar association in 1917 [Appendix B,
Revised Rules of Court)), which contingent fees may be a portion of
the property in litigation."
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the
benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where
the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which
to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law,
make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds
of the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics, p. 294 [1949], citing
Lipscomb vs. Adams 91 S.W. 1046, 1048 [1949]). Oftentimes,
contingent fees are the only means by which the poor and helpless
can redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.
Thus:
The reason for allowing compensation for
professional services based on contingent fees is
that if a person could not secure counsel by a
promise of large fees in case of success, to be
derived from the subject matter of the suit, it
 would often place the poor in such a condition
as to amount to a practical denial of justice. It
not infrequently happens that person are
injured through the negligence or willful
misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty
are unable to employ counsel to assert their
rights. In such event their only means of redress
lies in gratuitous service, which is rarely given,
or in their ability to find some one who will
conduct the case for a contingent fee. That
relations of this king are often abused by
speculative attorneys or that suits of this
character are turned into a sort of commercial
traffic by the lawyer, does not destroy the
beneficial result to one who is so poor to employ
counsel (id, at p. 293, citing Warvelle, Legal
Ethics, p. 92, Emphasis supplied).
Justice George Malcolm, writing on contingent fees, also stated
that:
amount to extortion, the court win in a proper
case protect the aggrieved party.
In the present case, there is no iota of proof to show that Atty.
Fernandez had exerted any undue influence or had Perpetrated
fraud on, or had in any manner taken advantage of his client,
Maximo Abarquez. And, the compensation of one-half of the lots in
question is not excessive nor unconscionable considering the
contingent nature of the attorney's fees.
With these considerations, WE find that the contract for a
contingent fee in question is not violative of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Consequently, both under the provisions of
Article 1491 and Canons 10 and 13 of the Canons of Profession
Ethics, a contract for a contingent fee is valid
In resolving now the issue of the validity or nullity for the
registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. Under d section,
an adverse claim may be registered only by..

... the system of contingent compensation has

Whoever claims any part or interest in
the merit of affording to certain classes of
registered land adverse to the registered
persons the opportunity to procure the
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the o
prosecution of their claims which otherwise
registration ... if no other provision is made in
would be beyond their means. In many cases in
this Act for registering the same ...
the United States and the Philippines, the
contingent fee is socially necessary (Malcolm,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 55 [1949], emphasis The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty
supplied). Fernandez an interest or right over the lots in question to the
extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became vested in Atty.
Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because only then did
Stressing further the importance of contingent fees, Professor Max
the assignment of the one-half (½) portion of the lots in question
Radin of the University of California, said that:
became effective and binding. So that when he filed his affidavit of
adverse claim his interest was already an existing one. There was
The contingent fee certainly increases the therefore a valid interest in the lots to be registered in favor of Atty.
possibility that vexatious and unfounded suits Fernandez adverse to Mo Abarquez.
will be brought. On the other hand, it makes
possible the enforcement of legitimate claims
Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in
which otherwise would be abandoned because
question arose long after the original petition which took place
of the poverty of the claimants. Of these two
many years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land
possibilities, the social advantage seems clearly
Registration Act under which the interest or claim may be
on the side of the contingent fee. It may in fact
registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 thereof.
be added by way of reply to the first objection
The interest or claim cannot be registered as an attorney's charging
that vexations and unfounded suits have been
lien. The lower court was correct in denying the motion to annotate
brought by men who could and did pay
the attomey's lien. A charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the
substantial attorney's fees for that purpose
Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not
(Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Cal. L.
to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real
Rev. 587, 589 [1940], emphasis supplied).
property as in the instant case. Said Section provides that:

Finally, a contingent fee contract is always subject to the

Section 37. An attorney shall have a lien upon
supervision of the courts with respect to the stipulated amount and
the funds, documents and papers of his client
may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event that there is any
which have lawfully come into his oppossession
undue influence or fraud in the execution of the contract or that
and may retain the same until his lawful fees
the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the
and disbursements have been paid, and may
court will amply protect him. As held in the case of Grey vs. Insular
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
Lumber Co., supra, citing the case of Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
Co., supra:
judgments, for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such
Where it is shown that the contract for a judgments, which he has secured in a litigation
contingent fee was obtained by any undue of his client ... (emphasis supplied).
influence of the attorney over the client, or by
any fraud or imposition, or that the
Therefore, as an interest in registered land, the only adequate
compensation is so clearly excessive as to
remedy open to Atty. Fernandez is to register such interest as an
adverse claim. Consequently, there being a substantial compliance
with Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is
held to be valid. Being valid, its registration should not be cancelled
because as WE have already stated, "it is only when such claim is
found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be
cancelled" (Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Lee Dy Piao 103 Phil. 867 [1958]).
The one-half (½) interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question
should therefore be respected. Indeed, he has a better right than
petitioner-spouses, Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
They purchased their two-thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in
question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty.
Fernandez. The adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer
certificate of title and was later annotated on the new transfer
certificate of title issued to them. As held by this Court:
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration
Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone
is claiming an interest on the same or a better
right than the registered owner thereof
(Sanchez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 332
[1976]; Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Le Dy Piao supra).
Having purchased the property with the knowledge of the adverse
claim, they are therefore in bad faith. Consequently, they are
estopped from questioning the validity of the adverse claim.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE
PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM SHOULD
BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-
APPELLANTS JUAN LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE
CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased),
substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of
FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa
Legados, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the
challenge to the October 11, 2005 decision2 and the May 9, 2006
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV
No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog
City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part the complaint for
recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the
Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita
Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to
Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).
The Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo
(collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant
over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415
(subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They
were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13,
1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On
April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the
spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames)
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently
issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an
action5 before the RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga
City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of
contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially
engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health
reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to
assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in
the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land
law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo
hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee
stipulation specifically reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced
to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the
prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of
₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the
subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty.
Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil
Case No. 1721was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot
to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their
children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames
mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No.
1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of
sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null
and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the
initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the
name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this
Court via the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which
this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the
DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the publication of a notice of
foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-
25984(under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya
immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure
sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya
filed on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames
filed a complaint7 before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for
Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good
Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo,
thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the
spouses Ames’ children).
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721,andthe spouses
Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October
24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as
attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into
two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable
and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the
spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered
the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The
latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No.
3352was pending.
On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable
settlement (compromise agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the
ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by
each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the
agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreementin a
decision dated June 10, 1982.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before
the RTC an action against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently denied
the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case
to the CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition
in its decision of January 31, 1984.
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to
the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18,
1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an
action9 against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved
compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo
prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their
one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render
an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from
1981;and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit
basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya
incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo
executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight
children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No.
41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not
clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC
declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and
unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares
and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by
Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was
₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that the parties
novated this agreement when they executed the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving
Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC added that
Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot,
sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds
the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the disposition
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done
precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the
property itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-
half portion of the subject lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent
fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was
convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not
sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive
award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his
time or skill, or to perform extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the
judgment, of the excess portion of their share in the subject lot to
be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its
fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
modified the decision in its resolution11 dated December 27, 1996.
The RTC ordered the respondents to account for and deliver the
produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the
5.2692hectares that the RTC ordered the spouses Amesto restore
to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final
restoration of the premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC’s September 17, 1996 decision and maintained the
partition and distribution of the subject lot under the compromise
agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty.
Lacaya served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until
1988,when the latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2)
during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship,
Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases
–Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443;
(3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even reached this
Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third
civil case lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise
agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty.
Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC
approved the compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all
of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses
Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them in
several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon
20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating the
factors that should guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees),
the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty.
Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the
probability of him losing other employment resulting from his
engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and
the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement
and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement
reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA
erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or
10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of
confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2)
not holding the respondents accountable for the produce, harvests
and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained
from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3)
upholding the validity of the purported oral contract between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous and
dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation
for professional services, especially those contained in the
pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s fees
to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral
agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was ₱2,000.00 in
cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly
stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721.
Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and
cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating
their contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as
Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee is excessive and
unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue that
the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the
alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was agreed by
the parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of
law; neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill
and effort in research. They point out that the two subsequent civil
cases should not be considered in determining the reasonable
contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his
services in Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been
instituted at that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered
in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim that the
spouses Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses
and costs for each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya
did not even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses Cadavedo’s
TCT covering the subject lot.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that
Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to
defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half of the
subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement
is a champertous contract that is contrary to public policy,
prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary relationship between
a lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in
Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did not novate their original
stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil
Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in
Civil Case No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee
stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee of
Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the questioned
stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if
granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty.
Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
caused the survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately
after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the
RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil
Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the
agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half
of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case)
approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally
designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the
compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the
partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of
Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely
inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He
was substituted by his wife -Rosa -and their children –Victoriano
D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya,
Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan,
Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-
Camaongay.16
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping
cases prior to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty.
Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of
discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and
proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or
voiding of contract of sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967.
The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or
Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with
Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23,
1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with
Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982.
Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al.
(Ejectment Case), filed between the latter part of 1981 and early
part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement on
May 13, 1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
The agreement on attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and
binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons
discussed below.
A. The written agreement providing for
a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee
of ₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the
subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint
filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired
the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo
undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should
the case be decided in their favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in
the nature of a penalty that the court would award the winning
party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a
representation to the court concerning the agreement between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation
for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature
of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to
the main action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the
CA and agreed as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee
agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced
to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s
engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No.
1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing
for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules
governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies
involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be
resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of
₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the
alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject
lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to
the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless
void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to
represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and
assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for
reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is
contrary to public policy.18
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an
aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to
the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed
"against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of
others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and
where the assistance rendered is without justification or
excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the
receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the
intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions, however, add
a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that
the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the
risks of, the litigation."22
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in
response "to medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent
claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that
such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those
claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an
entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard
the administration of justice, instances of champerty and
maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability
and a common law rule was developed, striking down champertous
agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable
on the grounds of public policy."24
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted
from American decisions, for public policy considerations.25 As
matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the
litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save
his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the
proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the
profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for
part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at
the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from
acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in
the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his
own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement
which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice
of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to
his client’s cause."27
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the
contingent fee agreement between therein respondent Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy.
There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses
paid by the former is against public policy, especially if the lawyer
has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of
some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client.29
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee
arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of
Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall
pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed
above underlie this rule.
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare
it void for being excessive and unconscionable.1âwphi1The
contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to
secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it
was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had
not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took
twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters
then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the
absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had
been involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the
RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of
Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply
dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within
five years from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in
the two subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise justify
an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the
petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate
arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these two
cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been
considered and taken cared of Based on these considerations, we
therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive
and unreasonable.
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of
the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by
purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of
litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession.32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics.33
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court
or when it is subject of the judicial action.34Following this definition,
we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya
acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the
following established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil
Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16,
1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took
possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after,
the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal
portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided
portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
executed the compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral
contingent fee agreement or an agreement subsequently entered
into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which
was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the
compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval,
was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of
these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between
Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the
disputed one-half portion and the compromise agreement –
independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find
them to be prohibited and void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are contrary to public
policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are
considered in existent and void from the beginning.37
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to
note that the transfer violated the provisions of Article 1491(5) of
the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the
transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the
pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No.
1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the
compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the
unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this
jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position, however,
this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent
fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to
depend upon the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation
involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been
rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of
the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the
subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client
relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the
Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence,
applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise
agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee
agreement.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause
pursuant to the terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement,
in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more,
stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of
public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him
and his clients.42
E.The compromise agreement could not
validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and
Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to
ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the
disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is
void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a void
transaction, should be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy is in existent
and void from the beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor the
action or defense for the declaration of the in existence of the
contract prescribe;45 and any contract directly resulting from such
illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the
written contingent fee agreement providing for attorney’s fee of
₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from questioning
its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and
voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it in
its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not
have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void
compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could
not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time.
Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of
possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate
action for recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence,
contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing the present
action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of
the disputed one-half portion and for judicial determination of the
reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –were not barred
by the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in
effect, impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorney’s
fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the
reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have
to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as
basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of
a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the
amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of
the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered
under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for
it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for it.49
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,51factors such as the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent
and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for
similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are
considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which
a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in
considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum
meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not
novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in
terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2)
Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in
three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners
filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v.
Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the
second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to
the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a
considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s
considerations in appreciating the character of the services that
Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on
valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled
to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the
subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed
one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the
petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that
litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer,
particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and
express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed
property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words,
is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped
the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way
around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a
property right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition
of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of
the disputed property, which in this case, the Court properly
accords.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT
the petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated September 17, 1996
and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the
MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T.
Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s
fees. The fruits that the respondents previously received from the
disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the attorney’s fees.
We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the
remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that
Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise
agreement.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5128. March 31, 2005]
ELESIO[1] C. PORMENTO, SR., complainant, vs. ATTY. ALIAS A.
PONTEVEDRA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified Complaint[2] dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C.
Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice
and misconduct, praying that on the basis of the facts alleged
therein, respondent be disbarred.
Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994,
respondent is his familys legal counsel having represented him and
members of his family in all legal proceedings in which they are
involved. Complainant also claims that his familys relationship with
respondent extends beyond mere lawyer-client relations as they
gave respondent moral, spiritual, physical and financial support in
his different endeavors.[3]
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift between
complainant and respondent began when complainants
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City was dismissed. Complainant claims that
respondent, who was his lawyer in the said case, deliberately failed
to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of
the order of dismissal by the trial court, as a result of which,
complainant was deprived of his right to appeal said order.
Complainant asserts that he only came to know of the existence of
the trial courts order when the adverse party in the said case
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of
land which is the subject matter of the suit. In order to recover his
ownership over the said parcel of land, complainant was
constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to
institute an action for the recovery of the subject property.[4]
Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his
rights and interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to
initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of the
alleged new owner of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of
the accused in said case. Complainant claims that as part of his
defense in said criminal case, respondent utilized pieces of
confidential information he obtained from complainant while the
latter is still his client.[5]
In a separate incident, complainant claims that in 1967, he
bought a parcel of land located at Escalante, Negros Occidental. The
Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared
and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who
claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he
heeded respondents advice to build a small house on the property
and to allow his (complainants) nephew and his family to occupy
the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of
the said property. Subsequently, complainants nephew refused to
vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case
with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental,
docketed as Civil Case No. 528. Respondent acted as the counsel of
complainants nephew.[6]
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of
malpractice and misconduct by representing clients with conflicting
interests and should be disbarred by reason thereof.[7]
In his Comment,[8] respondent contends that he was never a
direct recipient of any monetary support coming from the
complainant. Respondent denies complainants allegation that he
(respondent) did not inform complainant of the trial courts order
dismissing the latters counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.
Respondent claims that within two days upon his receipt of the trial
courts order of dismissal, he delivered to complainant a copy of the
said order, apprising him of its contents. As to his representation of
the persons against whom complainant filed criminal cases for
theft,[9] respondent argues that he honestly believes that there
exists no conflict between his present and former clients interests
as the cases he handled for these clients are separate and distinct
from each other. He further contends that he took up the cause of
the accused in the criminal cases filed by complainant for
humanitarian considerations since said accused are poor and needy
and because there is a dearth of lawyers in their community. With
respect to the case for ejectment filed by complainant against his
nephew, respondent admits that it was he who notarized the deed
of sale of the parcel of land sold to complainant. However, he
contends that what is being contested in the said case is not the
ownership of the subject land but the ownership of the house built
on the said land.[10]
On December 21, 1999, complainant filed a Reply to
respondents Comment.[11]
On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.[12]
On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to
complainants Reply adding that the instant complaint was
orchestrated by complainants son who wanted political vengeance
because he lost the vice-mayoralty post to respondent during the
1988 local elections.[13]
On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to
respondents Rejoinder.[14]
 Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position
Papers,[15] after which the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004,
Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga found
respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He recommended that respondent be
meted the penalty of suspension for one month.
In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board
of Governors resolved to annul and set aside the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner and instead approved the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-387
Adm. Case No. 5128
Elesio C. Pormento, Sr., vs. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDED [sic], as it is hereby ANNULED
and SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commission, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit of the complaint.
We do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint.
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that in complaints
for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement
which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons.[16] Formal investigations entail notice and hearing.
However, the requirements of notice and hearing in administrative
cases do not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, as
actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.[17] Due process
is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. [18]
From the records extant in the present case, it appears that
the Investigating Commissioner conducted a hearing on January 16,
2002 where it was agreed that the complainant and the respondent
shall file their respective position papers, after which the case shall
be deemed submitted for resolution.[19] No further hearings were
conducted.
It is also disturbing to note that the abovementioned
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, annulling and setting
aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, is
bereft of any findings of facts or explanation as to how and why it
resolved to set aside the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and instead dismissed the complaint against
respondent.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the reasons on which it is based. It shall be
promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submittal of the
Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cruz vs. Cabrera,[20] we reiterated the importance of the
requirement that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors must
state the facts and the reasons on which such decision is based,
which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of
record. We held therein that:
[A]side from informing the parties the reason for the decision to
enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with
which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to
appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the
Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the
process of legal reasoning.
Noncompliance with this requirement would normally result in the
remand of the case.[21]
Moreover, while we may consider the act of the IBP Board of
Governors in simply adopting the report of the Investigating
Commissioner as substantial compliance with said Rule, in this case,
we cannot countenance the act of the IBP Board of Governors in
merely stating that it is annulling the Commissioners
recommendation and then dismiss the complaint without stating
the facts and the reasons for said dismissal.
However, considering that the present controversy has been
pending resolution for quite some time, that no further factual
determination is required, and the issues being raised may be
determined on the basis of the numerous pleadings filed together
with the annexes attached thereto, we resolve to proceed and
decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record, in
the interest of justice and speedy disposition of the case.[22]
Coming to the main issue in the present case, respondent is
being accused of malpractice and misconduct on three grounds:
first, for representing interests which conflict with those of his
former client, herein complainant; second, for taking advantage of
the information and knowledge that he obtained from complainant;
and, third, for not notifying complainant of the dismissal of his
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.
We shall concurrently discuss the first and second grounds as
they are interrelated.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Corollary to this, Canon 21 of the same Code enjoins a lawyer to
preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02, Canon 21
specifically requires that:
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to
his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
In addition, Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties and any
interest in or connection with the controversy, which might
influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to
which confidence has been reposed.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of
conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[23] Another test to determine if there is a
representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[24]
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client
against a former client when the subject matter of the present
controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of
the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former
client.[25] Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new
client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a
matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there
being in that instance no conflict of interests.[26] Where, however,
the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyers new
client and his former client is in some way connected with that of
the former clients action, the lawyer may have to contend for his
new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for the
former client or to use against the latter information confided to
him as his counsel.[27] As we have held in Maturan vs. Gonzales:[28]
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney
and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with
his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the
action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A lawyer must
have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is
abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[29]
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with
respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight
such adverse interest may be.[30] In essence, what a lawyer owes his
former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him.[31]
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent represented herein complainants nephew and other
members of his family in the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 528, and in the criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case
No. 99-188, filed by herein complainant against them. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the parcel
of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who
notarized the deed of sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it
does not necessarily follow that respondent obtained any
information from herein complainant that can be used to the
detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed.
While complainant alleges that it was respondent who
advised him to allow his nephew to temporarily occupy the
property in order to establish complainants possession of said
property as against another claimant, no corroborating evidence
was presented to prove this allegation. Defendant, in his answer to
the complaint for ejectment, raised the issue as to the right of the
vendor to sell the said land in favor of complainant.[32] However, we
find this immaterial because what is actually in issue in the
ejectment case is not the ownership of the subject lot but the
ownership of the house built on the said lot. Furthermore, the
subject matter of I.S. Case No. 99-188 filed by complainant against
his nephew and other members of his family involves several parts
of trucks owned by herein complainant.[33] This case is not in any
way connected with the controversy involving said parcel of land. In
fine, with respect to Civil Case No. 528 and I.S. Case No. 99-188,
complainant failed to present substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for violating the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interests.
However, we find conflict of interests in respondents
representation of herein complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 and his
subsequent employment as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 3159.
The subject matter in Civil Case No. 1648 is Lot 609 located at
Escalante, Negros Occidental, the same parcel of land involved in
Criminal Case No. 3159 filed by herein complainant against several
persons, accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing
coconut trees within the premises of the said lot. Complainant
contends that it is in this criminal case that respondent used
confidential information which the latter obtained from the former
in Civil Case No. 1648.
To prove his contention, complainant submitted in evidence
portions of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during his
cross-examination in Criminal Case No. 3159. However, after a
reading of the said transcript, we find no direct evidence to prove
that respondent took advantage of any information that he may
have been acquired from complainant and used the same in the
defense of his clients in Criminal Case No. 3159. The matter
discussed by respondent when he cross-examined complainant is
the ownership of Lot 609 in its entirety, only a portion of which was
purportedly sold to complainant. Part of the defense raised by his
clients is that herein complainant does not have the personality to
file the criminal complaint as he is not the owner of the lot where
the supposed theft occurred. It is possible that the information as
to the ownership of the disputed lot used by respondent in bringing
up this issue may have been obtained while he still acted as counsel
for complainant. It is also probable that such information may have
been taken from other sources, like the Registry of Deeds, the Land
Registration Authority or the respondents clients themselves.
Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when
respondent was the counsel of complainant in Civil Case No. 1648,
he became privy to the documents and information that
complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land.
Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent
utilized against complainant any information given to him in a
professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
opposing side. As we have previously held:
The relations of attorney and client is [are] founded on principles of
public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of
the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.[34]
Moreover, we have held in Hilado vs. David[35] that:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to
the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainants cause.[36]
Thus, respondent should have declined employment in Criminal
Case No. 3159 so as to avoid suspicion that he used in the criminal
action any information he may have acquired in Civil Case No. 1648.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent
fully apprised complainant and his new clients and secured or at
least tried to secure their consent when he took the defense of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the
accused in the subject criminal case for humanitarian reasons and
with the honest belief that there exists no conflict of interests.
However, the rule is settled that the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.[37] Moreover, the fact that the conflict of interests is remote
or merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative.[38]
Respondent also asserts that when he accepted employment
in Criminal Case No. 3159, the attorney-client relations between
him and complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 had already been
terminated. This defense does not hold water because the
termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.[39]
Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests.
As to the third ground, we find that complainant failed to
present substantial evidence to prove that respondent did not
inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No.
1648. On the contrary, we find sufficient evidence to prove that
complainant has been properly notified of the trial courts order of
dismissal. The only proof presented by complainant to support his
claim is the affidavit of his daughter confirming complainants
contention that respondent indeed failed to inform him of the
dismissal of his counterclaim.[40] However, in the same affidavit,
complainants daughter admits that it was on December 4, 1989
that respondent received the order of the trial court dismissing
complainants counterclaim. Respondent, presented a certification
dated December 11, 1989, or one week after his receipt of the trial
courts order, where complainants daughter acknowledged receipt
of the entire records of Civil Case No. 1648 from
complainant.[41] The same certification relieved respondent of his
obligation as counsel of complainant. From the foregoing, it can be
inferred that respondent duly notified complainant of the dismissal
of his counterclaim. Otherwise, complainant could not have
ordered his daughter to withdraw the records of his case from
respondent at the same time relieving the latter of responsibility
arising from his obligation as complainants counsel in that
particular case.
As to the penalty to be imposed, considering respondents
honest belief that there is no conflict of interests in handling Civil
Case No. 1648 and Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that
this is respondents first infraction of this nature, we find the
penalty of suspension to be disproportionate to the offense
committed.[42] Moreover, we take into account respondents
undisputed claim that there are only three lawyers who are actually
engaged in private practice in Escalante, Negros Occidental, where
both complainant and respondent reside. One of the lawyers is
already handling complainants case, while the other lawyer is
believed by respondents clients to be a relative of complainant.
Hence, respondents clients believed that they had no choice but go
to him for help. We do not find this situation as an excuse for
respondent to accept employment because he could have referred
his clients to the resident lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office or to
other lawyers in the neighboring towns. Nonetheless, in view of
respondents belief that he simply adhered to his sworn duty to
defend the poor and the needy, we consider such situation as a
circumstance that mitigates his liability. Considering the foregoing
facts and circumstances, we find it proper to impose a fine on
respondent. In Sibulo vs. Cabrera,[43] the respondent is fined for
having been found guilty of unethical conduct in representing two
conflicting interests.
Respondent is further reminded to be more cautious in
accepting professional employments, to refrain from all
appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances
indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar,
especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions
with his clients.[44]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found
GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is hereby FINED in
the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is DIRECTED to be heedful of the requirements provided
for in Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as discussed in
the text of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11504
ARIEL G. PALACIOS, for and in behalf of the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),Complaint,
vs.
ATTY. BIENVENIDO BRAULIO M. AMORA, JR., Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM
The instant administrative case arose from a Complaint dated
March 11, 20081 filed by Ariel G. Palacios, in his capacity as the
Chief Operating Officer and duly authorized representative of the
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M.
Amora, Jr. for alleged violation of: (1) Canon 1, Rules 1.01 to 1.03;
Canon 10, Rules 10.01to10.03; Canon 15, Rule 15.03; Canon 17;
Canon 21, Rule 21.01 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR); (2) Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court;
(3) Lawyer's Oath; and (4) Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG), are as follows:
Complainant is the owner[-]developer of more or less 312 hectares
of land estate property located at Barangays San Vicente, San
Miguel, Biluso and Lucsuhin, Municipality of Silang, Province of
Cavite ("property"). Said property was being developed into a
residential subdivision, community club house and two (2)
eighteen[-]hole, worldclass championship golf courses (the "Riviera
project"). In 1996, complainant entered into purchase agreements
with several investors in order to finance its Riviera project. One of
these investors was Philippine Golf Development and Equipment,
Inc. ("Phil Golf'). On 07 March 1996, Phil Golf paid the amount of
Php54 Million for the purchase of 2% interest on the Riviera project
consisting of developed residential lots, Class "A" Common Shares,
Class "B" Common Shares, and Class "C" Common Shares of the
Riviera Golf Club and Common Shares of the Riviera Golf Sports and
Country Club.
On 02 June 1997, complainant retained the services of respondent
of the Amora and Associates Law Offices to represent and act as its
legal counsel in connection with the Riviera project (Annex "C" to
"C-5" of the complaint). Respondent's legal services under the said
agreement include the following: issuance of consolidated title(s)
over the project, issuance of individual titles for the resultant
individual lots, issuance of license to sell by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, representation before the SEC, and services
concerning the untitled lots included in the project. For the said
legal services, respondent charged complainant the amount of Php
6,500,000.00 for which he was paid in three different checks
(Annexes "D" to "D3" of the complaint).
On 10 May 1999, complainant entered into another engagement
agreement with respondent and the Amora Del Valle & Associates
Law Offices for the registration of the Riviera trademark with the
Intellectual Property Office (Annex "E" of the complainant) where
respondent was paid in check in the amount of Php158,344.20
(Annex "F" of the complaint).
On 14 March 2000, another contract for services was executed by
complainant and respondent for the latter to act as its counsel in
the reclassification by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, Cavite of
complainant's agricultural lot to "residential commercial and/or
recreational use" in connection with its Riviera project (Annexes
"G" to "G4" of the complaint). Under this contract, respondent was
hired to "act as counsel and representative of AFP-RSBS before the
Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, Cavite in all matters relative to the
reclassification of the subject properties from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses." On 21 March 2000, respondent furnished
complainant a copy of Resolution No. MI-007, S of 2000 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Silang dated 21 February 2000 ("resolution")
approving the conversion and was paid the amount of Phpl.8M
(Annex "H" of the complaint). Notably, the resolution was passed
on 21 February 2000 or a month before the signing of the said 14
March 2000 contract. Clearly, when [the] 14 March 2000 contract
was V signed by complainant and respondent, there was already a
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang approving the
conversion of complainant's properties to residential/commercial.
Clearly, the Php 1.8M demanded and received by respondent is not
justifiable for the sole and simple reason that respondent could not
have performed any service under the 14 March 2000 contract
considering that the result sought by the complainant
(reclassification) has been fulfilled and completed as early as 21
February 2000. Respondent, must therefore, be ordered to return
this amount to complainant.
On 06 November 2000, complainant entered into another contract
for legal services with respondent for which the latter was paid the
amount of Php 14,000,000.00 to secure Certificate of Registration
and License to Sell from the SEC (Annexes "I" to "I-5" of the
complaint). In addition, complainant further paid respondent the
following checks as professional fees in obtaining the Certificate of
Registration and Permit to Offer Securities for shares and other
expenses: EPCIB Check No. 443124 dated 13 February 2003 in the
amount of Phpl,500,000.00, CENB Check No. 74001 dated 29
February 2000 in the amount of Php6, 754.00, CENB Check No.
70291 dated 15 September 1999 in the amount Php261,305.00, and
LBP Check No. 48691 dated 26 January 2001 in the amount of
Php221,970.00.
As complainant's legal counsel, respondent was privy to highly
confidential information regarding the Riviera project which
included but was not limited to the corporate set-up, actual
breakdown of the shares of stock, financial records, purchase
agreements and swapping agreements with its investors.
Respondent was also very familiar with the Riviera project[,] having
been hired to secure Certificate of Registration and License to Sell
with the BLURB and the registration of the shares of stock and
license to sell of the Riviera Golf Club, Inc. and Riviera Sports and
Country Club, Inc. Respondent further knew that complainant had
valid titles to the properties of the Riviera project and was also
knowledgeable about complainant's transactions with Phil Golf
After complainant terminated respondent's services as its legal
counsel, respondent became Phil Golf’s representative and
assignee. Respondent began pushing for the swapping of Phil Golf’s
properties with that of complainant. Respondent sent swapping
proposals to his former client, herein complainant, this time in his
capacity as Phil Golf’s representative and assignee. These proposals
were rejected by complainant for being grossly disadvantageous to
the latter. After complainant's rejection of the said proposals,
respondent filed a case against its former client, herein
complainant on behalf of a subsequent client (Phil Golf) before the
BLURB for alleged breach of contract (Annex "R" of the complaint).
In this HLURB case, respondent misrepresented that Phil Golf is a
duly organized and existing corporation under and by virtue of the
laws of the Philippines because it appears that Phil Golf’s
registration had been revoked as early as 03 November 2003.
Despite Phil Golf’s revoked Certificate of Registration, respondent
further certified under oath that he is the duly authorized
representative and assignee of Phil Golf. Respondent, however, was
not authorized to act for and on behalf of said corporation because
Phil Golf’s corporate personality has ceased.
The Director's Certificate signed by Mr. Benito Santiago of Phil Golf
dated 10 May 2007 allegedly authorizing respondent as Phil Golf’s
representative and assignee was null and void since the board had
no authority to transact business with the public because of the
SEC's revocation of Phil Golf’s Certificate of Registration. 2
Due to the above actuations of respondent, complainant filed the
instant action for disbarment.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After hearing, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Report and Recommendation
dated June 21, 2010, penned by Investigating Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez, recommending the dismissal of the complaint, to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
Respectfully submitted.3
On review, the IBP-BOG reversed the recommendation of the
IBPCBD and recommended the suspension from the practice of law
of respondent for a period of three (3) years and ordering the
return of the amount of PhPl.8 Million to the complainant within six
(6) months. The dispositive portion of the Extended Resolution
dated December 28, 2015,4 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board RESOLVED to
unanimously REVERSE the Report and Recommendation dated 21
June 2010 recommending the dismissal of the Complaint dated 11
March 2008 and instead resolved to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years and ordered the latter
to return the amount of Php 1.8 Million to the complainant within
six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
The IBP-BOG found that respondent violated Rules
15.01,15.03,21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR, as well as Article 1491 of
the Civil Code.
As provided in Section 12(b), Rule139B of the Rules of Court, 6 the
IBP Board forwarded the instant case to the Court for final action.
Issue
The singular issue for the consideration of this Court is whether
Atty. Amora should beheld administratively liable based on the
allegations on the Complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court modifies the finding soft he IBP-BOG and the penalty
impose don’t he respondent who violated the Lawyer's Oath and
Rules 15.01, 15.03, 21.01 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent represented
Conflicting interests
The Lawyer's Oath provides:
I___________of__________do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no false hood, nor consent
to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent
to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Emphasis supplied)
While Rules 15.01 and 15. 03 of the Code state:
Rule 15.01.-A lawyer ,in conferring with a prospective client, shall as
certain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a
conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forth
within form the prospective client.
Rule 15.03.-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
The requirement under Rule 15.03 is quite clear.
A lawyer must secure the written consent of all concerned parties
after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent, however, failed to
present any such document. He points to the fact that complainant
approved several transactions between him and the complainant.
In his Position Paper dated October 2, 2008,7 respondent argues
that AFP-RSBS gave its formal and written consent to his status as
an investor and allowed him to be subrogated to all the rights,
privileges and causes of action of an investor.8
This purported approval, however, is not the consent that the CPR
demands.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana ,Jr. ,9 the Court ruled that a lawyer's failure
to acquire a written consent from both clients after a full disclosure
of the facts would subject him to disciplinary action:
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs .David:
xxxx
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the
spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot
prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where
lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to
labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a
prospective one. Granting also that there really was no other
lawyer who could handle the spouses 'case other than him, still he
should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by
conferring with the prospective client to as certain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with
another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after
a full disclosure of the facts. These respondent failed to do thus
exposing himself to the charge of double dealing.10 (Emphasis
supplied citation omitted)
Absent such written consent, respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent did
not merely act as its invest or at his own behest. In a letter dated
April 26, 2007,11 the respondent wrote AFP RSBS stating: "Further
to our letter dated 24 April 2007 and on behalf of my principal,
Philippine Golf Development and Equipment, Inc., xxx" Plainly,
respondent was acting for and in behalf of Phil Golf.
Worse, at Phil Golf’s instance, he caused the filing of a Complaint
dated October 10, 200712 against complainant with the BLURB,
stating that he is the duly authorized representative and assignee of
Phil Golf and that he caused the preparation of the complaint. 13
In Hornilla v. Salunat,14 We explained the test to determine when a
conflict of interest is present thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents in consistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client."This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential Communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance thereof.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Without cavil, or further need of elucidation, respondent's
representation of Phil Golf violated the rules on conflict of interest
as he under took to take up the causes of his new client against the
interest of his former client.
In Ylaya v. Gacott,16 the Court was succinct in saying that a lawyer
should decline any employment that would involve any conflict of
interest:
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be
imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity
and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer's duty
to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He is
duty bound to decline professional employment, no matter how
attractive the fee offered maybe, if its acceptance involves a
violation of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of
the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a
retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to
the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment
from another in a matter adversely affecting any interest of his
former client. It is his duty to decline employment in any of these
and similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting
representation of conflicting interests.17 (Emphasis supplied)
It thus becomes quite clear that respondent's actions fall short of
the standard set forth by the CPR and are in violation of his oath as
a lawyer. By representing the interests of a new client against his
former client, he violated the trust reposed upon him. His violation
of the rules on conflict of interest renders him subject to
disciplinary action.
Respondent used confidential
Information against his former
client, herein complainant
Additionally, by causing the filing of the complaint before the
HLURB, the IBP-BOG correctly points out that respondent must
have necessarily divulged to Phil Golf and used information that he
gathered while he was complainant's counsel in violation of Rules
21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR, which state:
CANON 21-A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND
SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONIS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01-A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of
his client except;
(a)When authorized by the client after
acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
(b)When required by law;
(c)When necessary to collect his fees or to
defend himself, his employees or associates or
by judicial action.
Rule 21.02-A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use
the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,unless the
client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The IBP-BOG properly found thus:
Using confidential information which he secured from complainant
while he was the latter's counsel; respondent accused his former
client of several violations. In the process, respondent disclosed
confidential information that he secured from complainant thereby
jeopardizing the latter's interest. As discussed below, respondent
violated his professional oat hand the CPR.
xxxx
xxxx In the instant case, despite the obvious conflict of interest
between complainant and Phil Golf, respondent nevertheless
agreed to represent the latter in business negotiations and worse,
even caused the filing of a law suit against his former client, herein
complainant, using information the respondent acquired from his
former professional employment.18
In Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, 19 the Court reiterated the
prohibition against lawyers representing conflicting interests:
Rule15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule15.03-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste
and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-
client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client's case, including its weak and strong points. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client;
for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof. It behooves lawyers not only to keep in violate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice. It is for these reasons that we have
described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and
actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was
be leaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually
led to the establishment of a lawyer-client
relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistances
her endered to complainant was only in the form of" friendly
accommodations," precisely because at the times he was giving
assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of
the opposing parties who had been referred to herby the
SEC.20 (Emphasis supplied)
It is undeniable that, in causing the filing of a complaint against his
former client, respondent used confidential knowledge that he
acquired while he was still employed by his former client to further
the cause of his new client. And, as earlier stated, considering that
respondent failed to obtain any written consent to his
representation of Phil Golf's interests, he plainly violated the above
rules. Clearly, respondent must be disciplined for his actuations.
No basis for th ereturn of
PhP1.8 Million
Rule 131, Section 3, par. (f) provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.-
The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and over come by other evidence:
xxxx
(f)That money paid by one to another was due the latter;
xxxx
By alleging that respondent was not entitled to the payment of
PhPl.8 Million, it was incumbent upon complainant to present
evidence to overturn the disputable presumption that the payment
was due to respondent. This, complainant failed to do.
Complainant alleged that:
At the time of the signing of said contract, there was already a
resolution approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang approving
the conversion of AFP-RSBS' properties to residential/commercial
.Atty. Amorac ould not,thus,have acteda sAF P-RSBS' legal counsel
and representative during the said proceedings, which was
conducted a month before he was hired by AFP-RSBS. However, he
charged AFP-RSBS and was paid by the latter the amount of
1.8million pesos for not doing anything. He did not represent AFP-
RSBS and was not instrumental in having the resolution passed
and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang.21 (Emphasis
supplied)
Notably complainant never presented any evidence to prove that
the resolution was passed without the intervention of respondent.
This it could have done by asking the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang
whether respondent represented AFP-RSBS before them. This,
complainant did not do.
The amount of PhP1.8 Million is a substantial amount that, in
normal humane xperience, no person would pay to someone who
did not render any service.
Further, the mere fact that the contract was executed after the
issuance of the resolution does no tips of acto mean that
respondent did not have any hand in its issuance.
Verily, complainant failed to overcome the above mentioned
disputable presumption. Mere allegations can not suffice to prove
that respondent did not render any service to complainant and,
therefore, not entitled to the payment of PhPl.8Million.
The Court adopts the findings of Commissioner Fernandez of the
IBP-CBD that respondent actually rendered the legal services in
connection with the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution converting the
land from agricultural to residential/commercial and that
respondent is legally entitled to the payment. The Court finds that
the explanation of respondent is credible and it clarifies why the
Agreement came after the issuance of the Resolution, viz:
The amount of Php1.8 Million was paid by complainant AFPRSBS for
fees and expenses related to the approval of Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. ML-007, Series of 2007. Based on the usual practice
during that time, respondent performed the work upon the
instruction of AFP-RSBS even without any written agreement
regarding his fees and expenses. When respondent secured the
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution, he then sent a billing for the fees
and expenses amounting to Php1,850,000.00.It was addressed to
Engr. Samuel Cruz, the then Project Director of RSBS-Riviera
Project. However, since At That time, AFPRSBS had a new President,
the Head of its Corporation Holding and Investment Group (Col.
Cyrano A Austria) instructed respondent to draw a new contract to
comply with the new policies and requirements.1âwphi1 Thus,
respondent and complainant entered into a contract for services if
only to document the service already performed by respondent in
accordance with the new policy of AFP-RSBS.22
As such, there is no basis to order respondent to return the
PhP1.8Million.
Respondent did not acquire
Property of a client subject of
litigation
Moreover, with regard to the finding of the IBP-BOG that
respondent violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code,We have to
digress.The Article reads:
Art.1491.The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial uction,either in person or through the mediation
of another:
xxxx
(5)Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction
or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession.
xxxx (Emphasis supplied)
On this point, We sustain the respondent's position that the
prohibition contained in Article 1491 does not apply in this case.
"The subject properties which were acquired by respondent Amora
were allegedly not in litigation and/or object of any litigation at the
time of his acquisition."23
The Court in Sabidong v.Solas, clearly ruled:
"For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property
must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property."24
Under the circumstances,
Atty. Amara must be suspended
Notwithstanding the respondent's absolution from liability under
Article 1491 of the Civil Code, the gravity of his other acts of
misconduct demands that respondent Amora must still be
suspended.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC.27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor.-A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do.The practice of soliciting case sat law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
While the Court cannot allow a lawyer to represent conflicting
interests, the Court deems disbarment a much too harsh penalty
under the circumstances.1âwphi1 Thus, in Francia v. Abdon, the
Court opined:
In Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, the Court emphasized, thus:
Indeed, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty
could accomplish the end desired.
Without doubt, aviolation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.
However, the said penalties are imposed with great caution,
because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and
their consequences are beyond repair.25 (citation omitted)
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court pointed out that
jurisprudence27 regarding the penalty solely for a lawyer's
representation of conflicting interests is suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) to three (3) years.While the IP-BOG
recommends the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) years be imposed on respondent, the Court finds that
under the circumstances, a penalty of two (2) years suspension
from the practice of law would suffice.
Atty. Amora, however, is warned that are petition of this and other
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE,the Court finds Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr.
GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oat hand Canon
15,Rule15.03;Canon21,Rule21.01 and 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Heishereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Atty. Amora is warned
that are petition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to the persona lrecord of Atty.
Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr. as a member of the Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all trial courts for theirin
formation and guidance.
SO ORDERED.