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Contents
1. Introduction
2. Background
Appendices
Appendix 3 - References
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1. Introduction
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, the European
Commission [EC] published the Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations [Offshore
Safety Directive/OSD]. This Directive defines minimum requirements for preventing major accidents
related to offshore oil and gas operations and to limit their consequences.
The Implementing Regulations are directly applicable to Member States who are bound by the
wording of the new reporting criteria and the reporting forms.
Member States are required to ensure that operators and owners of offshore oil and gas installations
provide to the competent authority, as a minimum, the data on major hazard indicators as specified
in Annex IX of the Directive, to the level of detail required by the Implementing Regulations.
The Directive lists 10 major hazard indicators, which are described as “Events” on the EU reporting
form:
Event A. Unintended release of oil, gas or other hazardous substances, whether or not ignited
Event B. Loss of well control requiring actuation of well control equipment, or failure of a well
barrier requiring its replacement or repair
Event C. Failure of a safety and environmental critical element
Event D. Significant loss of structural integrity, or loss of protection against the effects of fire or
explosion, or loss of station keeping in relation to mobile installation
Event E. Vessels on collision course and actual vessel collisions with an offshore installation
Event F. Helicopter accidents, on or near offshore installations
Event G. Any fatal accident to be reported under the requirements of Directive 92/91/EEC
Event H. Any serious injuries to five or more persons in the same accident to be reported under
the requirements of Directive 92/91/EEC
Event I. Any evacuation of personnel
Event J. A major environmental incident
For each Event, the relevant Section of the Directive notification form must be completed. This
guidance is in relation to type A events and Section A of the Directive notification form for the
unintended release of oil, gas or other hazardous substances, whether or not ignited - hydrocarbon
releases [HCRs].
However, in the event of an “Unintended release of oil, gas or other hazardous substances...” [i.e. an
incident reportable under Section A], it is likely that Section C [failure of a Safety and Environmental
Critical Element] will also have to be submitted. Section I [Evacuation of Personnel] may also be
relevant.
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There are significant differences between Section A of the Directive notification form and its
predecessors [the OIR9B and OIR12 forms]. In order to ensure continuity of HCR data there are
additional voluntary fields within the Event A notification form [which are clearly indicated].
Whilst these additional fields are voluntary, OSDR encourages operators to complete all parts of
Section A, as they have done with OIR12 notification forms since 1992. This will ensure consistency
of HCR intelligence and compliance with Recommendation 39 of the Cullen Report [see below].
The purpose of this Guidance is to provide operators and owners with useful supporting information
and examples to assist in completing Event A notifications, in a consistent way. It will also detail the
preferred taxonomy to ensure continuity of data and to aid consistent completion. Whereas the EU
reporting form generally has free text fields, the equivalent UK form will request that, where
appropriate, the reporter selects from a predefined list in order to maintain consistency and avoid
similar situations being reported differently. By completing the UK form, operators are complying
with the requirements of the EU.
2. Background
Since 1992 operators and owners of offshore oil and gas installations in UK waters have voluntarily
notified HSE of detail in relation to HCRs which are additional to those required in the mandatory
OIR9B form. This is in compliance with Recommendation 39 of the Cullen Report, following the Piper
Alpha disaster in 1988.
The regulatory body should be responsible for maintaining a database with regard to
hydrocarbon leaks, spills and ignitions in the industry and for the benefit of the industry.
The regulatory body should:-
discuss and agree with the industry the method of collection and use of the data,
regularly assess the data to determine the existence of any trends and report them
to the industry, and
provide operators with a means of obtaining access to the data, particularly for the
purpose of carrying out quantified risk assessment [para 18.43].
This additional voluntary detail is included within the equivalent UK reporting form.
HSE has hosted the HCR database [HCRD] since 1992. This has been the main repository for notified
HCR detail. The HCRD will continue to be populated by Event A notifications and there will be no loss
of continuity in data pre-Directive and post-Directive providing operators continue to co-operate in
providing the relevant data.
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A: Unintended release of oil, gas or other hazardous substances, whether or not ignited;
[a] not ignited natural gas or evaporated associated gas if mass released ≥
1kg
[3] The unintentional release or escape of any hazardous substance, for which the
major accident risk has been assessed in the report on major hazards, on or from an
offshore installation, including wells and returns of drilling additives.
A: Unintended release of oil, gas or other hazardous substances, whether or not ignited;
This includes reporting of process or non-process petroleum hydrocarbon fluids in 1 and 2 below.
[1] Any unintentional release of ignited gas or oil on or from an offshore installation;
Any release must be reported, irrespective of the potential to cause a major accident.
Exclusions: (no requirement to report under this Regulation) controlled ignited releases
which are part of recognised safe operations such as flaring.
[a] not ignited natural gas or evaporated associated gas if mass released ≥ 1kg
Gas releases which are recognized as safe operations (emergency-shutdown, venting gas
manually to depressurize equipment in a controlled manner) or which is part of the designed
process (automatic release via a blowdown system or venting system) should not be
reported. However, where an intentional gas release, which is considered a safe operation,
escalates to the extent where immediate actions in addition to the arrangements for safe
operation result either automatically or are required by manual intervention to reduce risks
then this release should be reportable.
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Example:
“ During a routine manual blow-down of some gas lines routed to the atmospheric
vent, vapour from the vent drifted toward a local equipment room ventilation intake.
Gas was drawn into the room and local gas detection in the ventilation ducting
shutdown the equipment automatically. The weather was abnormally calm and
still.”
Fugitive emissions (ref. part 2 definitions) shall not be reported under this Regulation as long
as they are less than 3 kg/h or a 20% LEL at 50 cm is not reached. Emissions of this nature
are unlikely to present a significant safety hazard, and consequent risk of fire/explosion.
[3] The unintentional release or escape of any hazardous substance, for which the major
accident risk has been assessed in the report on major hazards, on or from an offshore
installation, including wells and returns of drilling additives.
This includes the release of any dangerous/hazardous substance identified in the assessment of
major accidents in the RoMH as defined in OSD Article 2 sub (1) which would lead to a significant
potential to cause fatalities or serious personal injury.
General
The information requested in the reporting form in section A includes:-
- A1.I type of substance leaked [non-process, crude oil, condensate, gas or 2-phase],
- A1.II estimated quantity released,
- A1.III estimated initial release rate,
- A1.IV estimated duration of leak.
The estimate of rate and quantity released must take into account the substance leaked, the physical
& process conditions and the successful operation or otherwise of SECEs intended to limit the
quantity released. The methodology can be based on the physical effects modelling used in the
Report on Major Hazards for the installation or on recognised formulae and standard assumptions as
referenced or validated by competent person[s]. Find below reference examples:
http://www.irfoffshoresafety.com/country/performance/scope.aspx
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/cmsfiles/modules/publications/pdfs/HS021.pdf
However, care should be taken to ensure that the assumptions inherent in these methods are valid
for the cases being reported.
Notes
If the owner/operator considers that a release is likely to be judged by the competent authority to be
a major accident and a SECE has failed, then section C should also be completed.
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If a release might have significant adverse effects on the environment then the owner/operator
should complete all the relevant fields in section A.
During well metering operations and oil sampling activities sample point isolation valve left
open following an unexpected vent of gas / liquid initiating a GPA.
Type of Installation
Tick one box for the production type of Installation i.e. Production or non-Production. Tick one box
to indicate the Occupancy type, Function Type and the Structure type.
The Quadrant and Block No. are stated on the registration documents, and are needed to categorise
the general location of the Installation, e.g. Northern, Central, Southern North Sea, etc.
If the release was hazardous but not a hydrocarbon substance then the operator should only
complete Sections A2, A3 and A4.
For PROCESS releases, tick the appropriate box for Oil, Condensate, Gas or 2-phase [includes multi-
phase fluids].
Releases of unprocessed hydrocarbon fluids [from wells, flowlines, manifolds and drilling/workover
operations] should be reported as 2-phase.
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Releases downstream of separation [such as oil/gas/produced water releases, for example] should be
reported as the hydrocarbon type related to the parent stream i.e. gas, oil, or condensate, not as 2-
phase.
H2S
For either gas or 2-phase please state the level of hydrogen sulphide [H 2S] content in the process
stream in parts per million [ppm]. If the H2S is of a low value[less than 5 ppm] then please state
“insignificant”. The aim of this input is to assess the relative toxicity of the gas, so approximate
values would be sufficient.
Liquid Density
Please state liquid density at working conditions in kg/m 3. This can be used to calculate the release
rate and/or for use in further conversions.
Water Cut
Where relevant please state the water cut, expressed as a percentage by mass of water in the liquid
phase.
The water quantity should then be deducted from the “Estimated quantity released” in the
subsequent section, as this quantity relates to the hydrocarbon or hazardous substances only.
Was the release limited/stopped due to a local manual intervention / isolation, separate
from the ESD system?
It is known that in many cases of loss of hydrocarbon containment, the quantity actually released is
rather less than the isolated volume and that therefore the consequences of a release of the
reported hole size is less than would otherwise be assumed given the inventory, the operating
conditions and the implementation, or otherwise, of isolation and blowdown systems reported
elsewhere in the form. This may be because it was possible to isolate the leak closer to the point of
release than the ESDVs or because while the emission was from a relatively large final aperture, the
flow was choked by a much smaller orifice, such as a valve not properly closed.
This question is intended to identify if such a situation was relevant to the incident being reported. If
so, the details should be provided in the event description.
Some examples of a local manual intervention / isolation, separate from the ESD system are;
activating a local pump stop, or closing a manual valve.
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The following graphs and tables help give guidance on estimating the mass of gas released for
different leak hole sizes, pressures, pipe system inventories etc.
Definition: Nm3 [normal cubic metres] - volume at normal temperature and pressure.
Again, if the percentage of inventory lost can be estimated, then the amount released can be found
from comparing this to the normal total inventory, remembering to state the units used.
This section requires an estimate of the size of the hydrocarbon release only and should not include
water and/or other non-hazardous substances. If the quantities of water and other non or low
hazard substances is not significant then the impact of these on the estimate of the quantity released
these can be ignored.
The calibre of information quoted in this field is variable, and sometimes difficult to relate to the
“estimated quantity released”. Since there is a need to relate estimated quantity released to the
total HC inventory, in terms of estimated percentage inventory lost, the units used should preferably
be the same. The preferred unit is kg.
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An indication of which detectors were activated and their distance from the source may be useful.
As well as giving details of how hydrocarbons accumulated or dispersed in the area, this box may
also be used to describe details of gas detection [in terms of LEL etc.] together with details of why
fixed gas detection failed to detect a particular leak.
The release rate can be back calculated, e.g. from the extent of any gas dispersion, to estimate the
release rate and equivalent hole diameter [see below].
The preferred method is a direct measurement of the actual hole size. If this is not practical, back
calculation methods maybe needed to estimate the hole size.
Hole size is important in the estimation of release rate. In order to standardize the calculation of
these within the database, the actual size of hole involved in the leak of hydrocarbons needs to be
related to an equivalent round hole of the same area and thence to its diameter.
Hole sizes are used to determine hole size distribution per type of system or equipment, which then
gives an indication of probability of the hole size in a loss of containment event.
Where the start time cannot be readily determined, then estimate the time from discovery e.g.
alarm, electronic log or by visual means, etc.
Termination of the leak is defined as the time that the release was stopped, not simply when it was
brought under control, or when an ESD was initiated.
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v. Location of Leak
In the free text box please indicate the name in most common use for the Area or Module involved,
including subsea if appropriate. For example “underside of flange located 3.5 metres along the gas
outlet line from the first stage separator in process module P1”.
Systems
Equipment
Valve type
Flange type/rating/size category
It is essential that only one system and one item of equipment is indicated on the form for any one
hydrocarbon incident. Appendix 1 to this guidance gives further guidance on the definition of each
system, and equipment type.
For valves, flanges, pumps, tubing, pipework, pipelines and other fittings please also specify the
actual size in terms on nominal bore in mm, which may mean the nominal bore of the piping that the
equipment is connected to.
It is essential that the single system from which the release emanated be chosen.
A number of hydrocarbon releases are "carry-over" type incidents, where a release occurs and the
hydrocarbon passes through other systems / equipment before subsequently being released to
atmosphere. [E.g. via the flare system].
Where possible, the system [and equipment] selection should represent the items from which the
hydrocarbon emerged [e.g. piping within the flare system]. In “carry over” incidents, the causation
details may then be used to reflect the mode of failure of the system and/or equipment item that
caused the release.
Incidents involving Well Operations [i.e. wireline, workovers] should also be coded as "Drilling" from
the system list. They must also be further described as either Wireline or Coiled Tubing or Snubbing
or Well Test or Recompletion or Abandonment [or Other if necessary]. The selection should also
show whether the operation concerned was on an Oil or Gas well, and whether the operation was
With Tree or Without Tree.
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Incidents involving permanent drilling equipment should also be coded as "Drilling" from the systems
list, but no further system related information is required in this instance. The equipment type
should then be specified using only the Mud / Shale / Drilling option on the equipment list.
“Well” system should be selected for Wellhead or Xmas Tree equipment releases. The type of well
should then be indicated from oil production or gas production or gas injection, and whether surface
or subsea.
Incidents involving a fuel line to a turbine should be recorded as either the “Diesel” or “Fuel Gas”
system, rather than the “Power Generation” system.
Depending on choice of Primary equipment, a Secondary choice may be needed. Select this from the
drop down list. Again, depending on Primary and Secondary choices, a Tertiary choice may be
required. Select this from the drop down list.
Example:
2” compressed joint flange is selected as follows:
It is essential that the single equipment item from which the release emanated be chosen.
Equipment lists are based on the definitions quoted in Appendix 1 of this guidance and the choices
made should best describe the equipment item considered to be responsible for the release.
No equipment type need be selected for Drilling Operations, since the equipment population in the
database excludes down hole components.
No equipment classification is required to be selected for Well Operations [or workover] as these are
characterized by the use of temporary equipment, which is not a permanent part of the installation.
For a permanent drilling system failure [i.e. not Drilling/Well Operations] the equipment type should
then be specified using only the Mud / Shale / Drilling option.
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“Well Control” system incidents should only ever be related to BOP equipment [and not component
flanges / valves etc.].
“Well” system incidents should only ever be related to Wellhead or Xmas Tree equipment [and not
component flanges / valves etc.]
Incidents involving a fuel line to a turbine should be coded as either the “Diesel” or “Fuel Gas”
system, rather than the “Power Generation” or “Gas Compression” system.
Topsides flowline incidents should be associated with piping, rather than pipelines.
Swivels, as employed in FPSO turrets, are a special type of flange and should be chosen from the list
of flange types given.
Zone 1: An area in which hydrocarbons, in the form of an explosive vapour/air mixture, is likely to
occur in normal operation [drill floor, vent or flare area].
Zone 2: An area in which hydrocarbons are not likely to occur in normal operation, and if occurring
will exist only for a short time [process, wellhead area].
Allowances should also be made for louvres or other openings affecting ventilation by similarly
"factoring" the effectiveness of the side involved, e.g. entering 0.8 for a louvred wall, or 0.75 for one
which has an opening at the top of the wall for its entire length.
A module will therefore have a maximum of 6 sides for a fully enclosed module not involving grating,
louvres, etc.
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Wind speed
The preferred unit is m/s.
Wind direction
Wind direction is required as a heading compared to True North, in degrees, to nearest whole
number. The direction indicated should be that from where the wind is blowing.
Actual pressure
For Actual Pressure please state the pressure that the equipment was operating under at the time of
release. This is not necessarily the normal working pressure, since some change in pressure may
have been experienced prior to failure.
Actual Temperature
For Actual Temperature please state the temperature that the system was operating under at the
time of release.
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x. Means of detection
Please tick the appropriate box [or boxes if more than one means of detector was involved].
Cause of leak
Please see the Cause of Leak Checklist [which also includes the operational mode in the area at the
time of release].
This information is helpful in determining trends in design, equipment, operational and procedural
failures related to hydrocarbon releases.
Further details of each of the 4 cause of leak types are given as follows:
Design
If there is a suspected design fault in the equipment or related system which contributed to the
hydrocarbon release, then tick the relevant box.
This option is intended to include failure to design against anticipated levels of corrosion, erosion,
fatigue and wear. However, where the corrosion etc. that caused the leak is greater than anticipated
in the design then this shouldn’t be classed as a design failure.
Equipment
Failure of equipment is a common contributor to hydrocarbon leaks, and the main categories are
listed on the form. If the mode of equipment failure is not included here then tick OTHER and
specify the fault.
Operation
The main operational failure modes are listed in the form, but if the leak is attributable to one not on
the list, then tick OTHER and specify.
Procedural
Any procedural failure should be notified if it contributed to the release of hydrocarbons. Please tick
the relevant [most appropriate] box[es], or add details to OTHER if required.
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It is important to record the mode of operation at the incident site not the mode of operation of the
installation as a whole, which may be different.
Blowdown
Cleaning
Commissioning
Construction
Drilling
Flushing
Inspection
Installation
Maintenance
Routine Maintenance
Normal Production
Pigging
Reinstatement
Removal
Replacement
Sampling
Shutdown
Shutting down
Start Up
Temporary
Testing
Top Up
Well Operations with tree
Well Operations without tree
Normal Production
Use this only where everything was normal with no intervention going on in the area.
Note for non-production installations the category “normal production” should be selected to
indicate normal operation of that non-production installation.
Reinstatement / Start up
Reinstatement should be used where the system was re-started following work carried out on the
item or plant from which the release emanated including maintenance / construction operations,
inspection, testing, venting etc. including planned shutdowns.
Start-up should be used where the system was re-started following an operational shutdown such as
a plant trip etc., and where no intervention work was carried out.
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If the Reinstatement / Start-up is known to have followed a shutdown but it is not clear whether this
was following maintenance or construction etc., then REINSTATEMENT should be assumed.
If it is not known whether the Reinstatement / Start-up followed a shutdown or not, then START-UP
should be assumed.
Delay time
If delayed, then please add estimated delay time, i.e. time between start of leak and the point when
it ignited, [preferred unit is seconds].
Where the ignition was of a continuous operational release [e.g. accidental ignition of a cold vent] or
in a location where a flammable mixture is normally present then enter the ignition timing as
‘immediate’ and tick the ‘continuous operational release’ box. . This will signify that the release
would not have been reported if it had not ignited.
Where the leak start time cannot be readily determined, then use the detection time, where
“detection" means the first instance of detection of the leak e.g. alarm or by visual means, etc.
If the release needed to disperse to reach its ignition source, then this should be recorded as delayed
ignition and an estimate of the time to ignition provided.
For example, if there was an explosion followed by a jet fire, put "1" in the EXPLOSION box, and "2"
in the JET FIRE box. If, however, there was a flash fire followed by a pool fire, and then by a jet fire,
the sequence would be "1" in FLASH FIRE, "2" in POOL FIRE and "3" in JET FIRE.
Where some form of blast damage or indication of a blast wave was present [e.g. persons felt blast
wave], record this as an explosion. Otherwise, the ignition of the gas or vapour cloud should be
categorised as a flash fire.
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Call to Muster at stations includes all designated muster stations on the installation including the
Temporary Refuge area.
Shutdown and Blowdown emergency action codes do not solely relate to the shutdown and/or
blowdown of an entire system, but may also be used to describe instances of shutdown/blowdown
of individual items of machinery and sections of process, rather than describing these in the "other
emergency actions" field [though isolation activities can be coded as "other emergency actions"].
Shutdown is either a full platform or system shutdown but also includes a much smaller isolation of a
system part, i.e. any closure of a valve which limits the inventory available. If any of the ESDVs fails
to close this should also be reported in section C.
If the section where the release occurred was already isolated e.g. due to maintenance in progress,
Shutdown can still be selected.
Tick the appropriate boxes for any actions taken, and whether they were automatic or manual. The
aim of this is to assess if shutdown was by automatic instigation of an actuated valve, manual
instigation of an actuated valve or local isolation as a result of an operator closing a valve.
In the case of any other type of emergency actions taken, tick other and specify e.g. fire teams
deployed.
If relevant please tick the evacuation box [es] for any partial down- man or full evacuation by
helicopter, lifeboats, or other.
There are invariably some relevant facts pertaining to the incident which are not quite covered by
the headings on the form. Please add these details in this box which may be pertinent, e.g. details of
any damage and/or fatalities sustained, etc. This should include details of impairment of walls, decks
and support structures and escalation to other hydrocarbon containing equipment.
Current [June 2015] intentions are for this section to be left blank in the UK form because it will be
auto populated with the text from the initial brief description section.
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Direct Causes
Direct [or immediate] causes are the unsafe acts or conditions that initiated the release.
The operator may answer this part of the question by simply referring to his answer in A.1.XI – Cause
of Leak checklist.
Underlying Causes
Underlying [or root] causes are the failings that allowed the unsafe acts or conditions that initiated
the release.
Underlying causes may need to be explored further as they usually arise from organisational or
safety management system failings.
When completing sections A3 operators and owners should use causes listed in Annex II section 4.5
of the IR (copied below) to assist in the preparation of the annual publication report (Annex II of IR)
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Identifying deficiencies in risk control management systems will enable operators to improve their
management of risk in the future, and this will feed into lessons learnt and recommendations to
prevent recurrences of similar incidents. As such it is important to effectively identify relevant
underlying causation.
As such it is imperative to be as candid as is possible and to get to the “heart” of the issue.
It is also important to note that a poor response to this question may reflect a flawed investigation
process.
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For example, if a subsea oil production well is involved, then select WELL in the first drop down box
select OIL PRODUCTION in the 2nd drop down box and select SUBSEA in the 3 rd drop down box.
A list of system definitions is provided below. The boundary limits for each system will generally be at
the ESD valve isolations between systems, unless otherwise indicated.
It is important that the chosen system interfaces are adhered to when reporting hydrocarbon
releases, since these are then matched to the relevant population data which should also adhere to
these same interfaces.
BLOWDOWN:
The equipment associated with process blowdown and depressurization, usually situated
between the respective Process and the Vent/Flare system.
The blowdown system ends and the vent or flare system starts at the blowdown valve.
DRAINS:
Includes transfer pumps, de-gasser vessels and piping, valves and flanges, with caissons
included in drains piping. Note that oil and condensate are assumed to share common
drains.
DRILLING:
This category comprises mud, shale, kill, de-gasser, diverter, riser [incl. lower riser package]
and workover equipment including any piping, valves, and flanges, but excluding BOP stacks,
wellhead connections and xmas trees.
EXPORT:
This category includes all export pipeline/risers and associated equipment out of the 500
meter safety zone.
In the case of crossovers between export and import systems, there would normally be an
agreed interface between the systems [usually at a common isolation valve] which should
also be adhered to for reporting purposes.
Tankage used for storage of stabilized crude prior to export should be included here.
FLARE:
An LP flare is usually the system handling all [low pressure] process effluent gases.
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An HP flare is for handling all [high pressure] process upset releases from blowdown due to
overpressure etc.
The Flare system is defined as being from the header and anything downstream. The
Blowdown system would then be from the BDV to the flare header.
FLOWLINE:
In this case the boundary is not at a valve but at the manifold connection.
Flow lines are lines that have been designated by the operator as Major Accident Hazard
Pipelines [MAHPs].
Comprises the piping, flanges, valves and instrumentation between the wing valve [and the
annulus valve for lift gas] and the relevant manifold [or pipeline isolation valve in the case of
a subsea satellite well].
This category includes all flow lines, with the potential of carrying hydrocarbons, both
topsides and subsea. It should be noted that the lines between subsea satellite wells or
manifolds and the parent installation are counted as pipelines. Choke and kill flow lines
should be included under "other".
GAS COMPRESSION:
This includes all interstage scrubbing/cooling equipment associated with the compression
process, as well as the compressors themselves, and including piping, valves, and flanges.
"Gas" means product gas compression for export, injection, or gas lift purposes.
IMPORT:
Includes all import pipelines/risers and associated equipment in from the 500metre limit,
plus all piping etc. from the recognized pipeline [valved] interfaces up to the interfaces with
the systems being served, which may include export cross-overs [see above].
MANIFOLD:
The common gathering or distribution header, topsides or subsea, for all flow lines of a
particular type, e.g. gas lift manifold, oil production manifold, gas injection manifold, etc.
This category includes piping, valves, flanges, and instrumentation forming the manifold and
terminating at the next downstream isolation valve, for import manifolds or upstream
isolation valve for well injection and gas lift manifolds.
METERING:
This category includes prover loops, densitometers and other equipment specifically supplied
as part of the metering package. The meter runs themselves, i.e. excluding valves, flanges
and instruments, should just be counted as piping within the metering system.
All turbine meters and/or fixed orifices located in other processes are to be counted as
instruments in those processes.
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PROCESSING:
These are the downstream processes associated with gas and/or oil treatment, but excluding
all other systems stated elsewhere in the form [e.g. separation, compression, utilities, etc.].
Oil Processing systems are: Oil Treatment; Produced Water Treatment; Methanol Injection;
Chemical Injection.
Gas Processing systems are: Dehydration; Produced Water Treatment; Methanol Injection;
Chemical Injection; LPG/Condensate; Sour [CO 2, H2S] Treatment.
SEPARATION:
This category includes all vessels, valves, piping etc. associated with product separation as
distinct from other "downstream" processes which are covered in processing systems [see
below].
It should be noted that test separation systems are to be treated as separate from
production separation systems.
A distinction is also made between gas separation and oil separation, but this applies only to
the main feed product being treated, i.e. if the majority, by mass, of inflow hydrocarbon is
gas then it is a gas separator and if not it is an oil separator.
Gas and condensate lines and other equipment associated with oil separation are therefore
counted as oil separation, and not as gas separation.
UTILITIES:
This category mainly includes the non-process systems which involve hydrocarbons.
OIL utilities are: Helifuel/Jet fuel; Diesel; Heat Transfer Oil; Power Generation Turbines [oil
only].
GAS Utilities are: Fuel Gas and Power Generation Turbines [including dual fuel].
VENT:
An LP vent is also known as the atmospheric vent.
Both categories also include any associated vessels, piping, valves, and flanges.
WELL:
This category also includes Xmas tree, wellhead connection, and the well itself.
Note that a gas injection well means one where gas is injected into the reservoir. A gas lifted
well is one where lift gas is employed to assist flow, and should be counted as a production
well.
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WELL CONTROL:
This category includes all BOP stacks permanently held on the Installation, both Surface and
Subsea, but not the piping, valves, and flanges connected to them [which will either be in
flowlines or drilling systems].
Equipment categorization
The information given here will ensure that the release is allocated to the appropriate item of
equipment.
It is essential that only one equipment item is indicated on the form for any one hydrocarbon
incident.
From the first drop down box select the relevant [most appropriate] EQUIPMENT category, select
sub-categories from the 2nd and 3rd drop down boxes to further define the equipment item involved.
For example, for a leak on a 24” flexible pipeline select PIPELINE from the 1 st drop down box,
FLEXIBLE from the 2nd drop down box and D>16 from the 3 rd drop down box.
BOP STACKS
This category includes valves, flanges, rams, etc. down to the wellhead connection and up to
the first flange, but excluding all piping, valves and fittings beyond the first flange [e.g.
flowline or choke/kill connection] and excluding the flange itself. Please also indicate the
design pressure rating, e.g. 5,000 psi.
COMPRESSORS
This category comprises the COMPRESSOR itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
DEGASSERS
This category comprises the DEGASSER itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
DIVERTERS
This category comprises the DIVERTER itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
DRAIN OPENING
Drain openings are included as a separate equipment type. The remainder of the drain
system would be piping, valves, etc.
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DRAIN PLUGS
No further guidance on this category
EXPANDERS
No further guidance on this category
FILTERS
This category comprises the FILTER itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges, instruments
and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
FLANGE
An individual flange is considered to be a single face rather than a flange joint. Please also
indicate Flange type [see below].
HEAT EXCHANGERS
This category comprises the HEAT EXCHANGER itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
INSTRUMENT
This category includes instrument tubing. One Instrument comprises the instrument itself,
plus up to 2 valves, up to 4 flanges, 1 fitting and associated small bore piping / tubing
[usually I" dia. or less]. Should the hydrocarbon leak occur anywhere between the fitting and
the instrument itself, then it should be recorded as an instrument leak.
MUD/SHALE
This category is for the major equipment items associated with drilling activities; including
mud pumps, mud tanks, and shale shakers.
PIG LAUNCHERS
This category comprises the PIG LAUNCHER itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
PIG RECEIVER
This category comprises the PIG RECIEVER itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
PIPELINE
A "Pipeline" is beyond the riser, on the sea bed and up to the 500 metres safety zone. It
excludes SSIV component parts [valves, flanges, etc.] which are reported under the
appropriate equipment category.
Please specify whether steel or Flexible, and add the pressure rating.
PIPING
"Piping" includes all process pipes between the last valve on the wells and riser ESDVs,
excluding all valves, flanges, and instrument fittings.
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PRESSURE VESSEL
This category comprises the PRESSURE VESSEL itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings. However, blanked off flanges fitted directly to the pressure vessel
should be part of the PRESSURE VESSEL category.
PUMPS
This category comprises the PUMP itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges, instruments
and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
RISER
The “Riser" is from the last point of isolation on the installation to the point where it touches
the seabed. Thereafter it is the pipeline.
STORAGE TANK
This category comprises the STORAGE TANK itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
TURBINE
This category comprises the TURBINE itself, but excludes all valves, piping, flanges,
instruments and fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.
VALVE MANUAL
This category comprises the valve body, stem and packer, but excludes any flanges, controls,
and instrumentation.
MANUAL Valve FUNCTIONS include block [includes isolation, shut-off, and kill], bleed, choke,
and check. Please indicate whether it is a Bleed, Block, Choke or Check valve and its size.
VALVE ACTUATED
This category comprises the valve body, stem and packer, but excludes any flanges, controls,
and instrumentation.
ACTUATED Valve FUNCTIONS include ESDV [Topsides and Pipeline to be separately identified],
control [FCV or PCV], block, choke, blowdown, relief, and pipeline SSIV. Please indicate
whether it is a, Block, Blowdown, Choke, Control, ESDV, PL/ESDV, PL/SSIV Assembly or a Relief
valve. Please also indicate its size.
WELLHEAD
Joint between xmas tree/BOP stack and the well itself. This category comprises the
WELLHEAD itself.
WORKOVER EQUIPMENT
This category comprises the WORKOVER equipment itself [such as coiled tubing units,
snubbing units or wireline units.
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XMAS TREE
Entire unit including valves, flanges, rams, etc. down to the wellhead connection and up to
the first flange, but excluding all piping, valves and fittings beyond the first flange [e.g. flow
line or choke / killconnection] and excluding the flange itself.
Flange Type
Note that a flanged joint comprises two flanges and a gasket [where fitted]. Only the flange need be
indicated since its type will indicate the type of joint employed.
Flange types include Ring type joint, compressed joint, Spiral wound, Clamp [Grayloc], Hammer
union [chicksan].
Valve type
It is essential that only one valve type is indicated on the form for any one hydrocarbon incident.
Please indicate whether the valve was a ball, globe, butterfly [for check valves], gate, plug, needle or
pig valve.
For PIG LAUNCHER/RECEIVERS and PRESSURE VESSELS give both the LENGTH and the DIAMETER in
mm or inches, as available.
For BOP Stacks indicate the design pressure rating, e.g. 5,000 psi.
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Further guidance on RIDDOR Reportability Criteria is available in Oil & Gas UK Supplementary
Guidance on the RIDDOR Reporting of Hydrocarbon Releases – Issue 2 [2014]
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Appendix 3 – References
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