SALVADOR ATIZADO G.R. No.

173822 as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the

and SALVADOR MONREAL, place, were seated in the sala of Desders house, she heard
Petitioners, Present: thundering steps as if people were running and then two successive
gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she
BRION, shouted: Stop, thats enough!; that while aiding Llona, she heard three
-versus - BERSAMIN, clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking
VILLARAMA, JR., and sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving
SERENO, JJ. backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that
the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to
Respondent. report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a
October 13, 2010 hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.[5]
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RTC RULING:
FACTS:
The RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:
The Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally
charged the petitioners with murder through the following information,
to wit: Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is
hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he being a
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at detention prisoner, his immediate release from the
provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged
Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla, Province of
of other lawful cause or causes.
Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and being detained, shall be credited in full in the service of
feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, their sentence.
and without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent
CA RULING:
to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot
one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan
member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting upon WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is
him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused AFFIRMED.
his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
Issue
of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in
.
finding them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the
eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a credible
Mirandilla narrated that she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandillas testimony
her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta; that they had gone unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the
to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them
shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the
assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the
supposed mastermind; (c) the autopsy report stated that Llona had
been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to Mirandillas
claim; (d) Mirandillas testimony was contrary to human experience;
and (e) Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas.
Ruling
The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to
modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts
and kinds of damages as civil liability.
I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CA
are accorded respect
The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas
positive identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on her
description of the acts of each of them made during her court
testimony on March 6, 1995,[13] viz:
q Who were you saying we sat together?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my
5 years old child to sleep.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this
Honorable Court the size of the sala and the
house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the
relative position, the sitting arrangement of yours,
Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on
my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of me, I was
at the right side of Kdg. Llona
q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd.
Llona was facing the door in otherwords, the door
was at his back.
q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.
q Was the door immediately found Rather was this the
main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the
house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you
said you have finished assisting the persons in
Bongga about the program, ... after that, what
were you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was
fanning my child.
q How about Kgd. Jesalva?
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his
drunkenness.
q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on
that situation, if there was any incident that
happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they
were running and there were successive
shots.
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive
shots can you see the origin or who was
responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and
saw Salvador Atizado.
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.
q Can you be able to identify him?
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked
of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually
shot?
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I
saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.
q Then after that what happened?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons
responsible stop thats enough, and I gave
assistance to Kgd. Llona.
q Then after that what happened?
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I
heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the gun.
q Then what did you do when you heard that?
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw
this Salvador Monreal but at that time I do not
know his name.
q Then what did you see of him?
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward
and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun.
q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3)
clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun was
pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.
q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually
fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.
q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal,
can you still recognize this man?
a Yes, sir.
q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in
Court?
a Yes, sir.
q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench
and tap the shoulder of the person, the person
tapped by the witness answered to the name
Salvador Monreal.)
q You said, when you stood up and face with him while
he was adjusting his revolver and he was moving
backward, did you see other persons as his
companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw
this Atizado he was already on the process of
leaving the place.
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado
q And did they actually leave the place at that
moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the
CA. Indeed, Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the
killers, and her declarations on what each of the petitioners did when
they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with
treachery.
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction
that the trial judges evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the
witness testimony is accorded the highest respect because the trial
judges unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the
witness enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the
truth or not.[14] Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding
on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered,
would materially affect the disposition of the case.[15] We thus apply
the rule, considering that the petitioners have not called attention to
and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted
circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is
that Mirandillas positive declarations on the identities of
assailants prevailed over the petitioners denials and alibi.[16]
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.[17] Yet, the State did not have to prove
the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder,[18] because
their conspiracy was deduced from the mode and manner in which
they had perpetrated their criminal act.[19] They had acted in concert in
assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of
purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the
conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals.[20] Thus, they
cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in
murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which
provides:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities
enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.
the
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
offended party might make.[21] For treachery to be attendant, the
means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offenders.[22] Moreover, treachery must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.[23]
The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative sufficiently
established that treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim because
Atizados shooting the victim at the latters back had been intended to
ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals
conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene
of the crime each armed with a handgun that they had fired except
that Monreals handgun did not fire.[24]
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The
petitioners mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without
the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an altercation
between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor
had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants
had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to
deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.[25] Such
manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that
ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There
being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was
conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.[26] But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a
minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not
appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the
murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the
trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18
years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly,
his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17
years of age.[27] Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest
mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May
18, 1994.[28]Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that
Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.[29] Fourthly, as
RTCs minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999showed,[30] Monreal
was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9,
1999,[31] which meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he
committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a
teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.[32]
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally
sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in
conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in
conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child
may be determined from the childs birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the
child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in
conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information
in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the
Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in
conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate
court, the person shall file a motion to determine the
age of the child in the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said motion,
proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age
of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,[34] when the offender is
over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the
RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of
imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its
periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate
penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the
minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the
time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the
entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in the service
of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No.
9344,[35] the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate
release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with
the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to
promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and
services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their development,
are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence.
Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of
the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the
age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this
Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately
released if they are so qualified under this Act or
other applicable laws.
Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay
damages to the surviving heirs of Llona. Their solidary civil liability
arising from the commission of the crime stands,[36] despite the
reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must reform the awards of
damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA
granted only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual
damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the
amounts for death indemnity and moral damages should each
be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case law;[37] and that
exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the attendance of treachery
should be further awarded,[38] to accord with the pronouncement
in People v. Catubig,[39] to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order
and other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which, is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for
the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which
is basically a State concern, the award of damages,
however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for
the offended party who suffers thereby. It would
make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be
withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary
or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for
being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December
13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the
following modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City to immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully
served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being held for other
lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily
to the heirs of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as death
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate
implementation to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
 in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of
Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this
decision within five days from service.
SO ORDERED.
JOEMAR ORTEGA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of
Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for
allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8) years of age. The
accusatory portions thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of
XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual
intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6
years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the
Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and
G.R. No. 151085 within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence
Present: and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
Chairperson, minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,* CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ. Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.[9] Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the
Promulgated: course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
The RTC's Ruling
August 20, 2008
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty
and credibility.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the
accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation
of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be
imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years
and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
 Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the
offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[30]
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the
corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount
of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending
appeal.[31]
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC,
holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over
the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any
showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female
organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element
of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded
great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly
in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the assailed
Decision which the CA denied in its Resolution[33] dated November 7,
2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE
AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT
AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR.
LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT,
AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED
AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED
RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S
FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND
CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE
ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION
OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.[34]
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the
CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from
overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the
result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA
and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA
felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are
true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina,
certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or
lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age
at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such
allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas
who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical
examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications
that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA
committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report
since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists.
Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of
the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual
experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason
that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of
AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled
or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing
the instant case,
as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner.
Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated
that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4
days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination
on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant
case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a
case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable
that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to
depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who
raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely
coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.[35]
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments
raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the
testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions,
rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of
the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony
of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996;
even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's
age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing
petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be
committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover,
the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial
court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether
said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that
petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime,
as manifested in his covert acts.[36]
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it
took effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law establishes a comprehensive
system to manage children in conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and
children at risk[40] with child-appropriate procedures and
comprehensive programs and services such as prevention,
intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care
programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its
implementation, the law, particularly Section 8[41] thereof, has created
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with
certain duties and functions[42] such as the formulation of policies and
strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the
administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and
rehabilitation of theCICL. The law also
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically
Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory
Provisions.[43]
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen
(15) Years Old and Below. Upon effectivity of this Act,
cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at
the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. Such officer, upon thorough
assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or
refer the child to prevention programs, as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation
center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary
to the best interest of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the
child is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall
also determine whether or not continued detention is
necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary
and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth
detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained
Children in Conflict with the Law. The PNP, the BJMP
and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the
JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the
law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of
Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. If a child reaches the age of eighteen
(18) years pending diversion and court proceedings,
the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with
the local social welfare and development officer or the
Family Court in consultation with the Social Services
and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the
appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the
child in conflict with the law has already availed of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, the child may apply for probation if
qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.
They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is
whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with
the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before
this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering
that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13
years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape
against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is
the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that
basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's
credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the
heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor.
Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw
petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the
imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or
father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their
daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial
knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.[45] We find
petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr.
Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from
petitioners parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in
most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was
only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is
improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held
that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is
not required.[46] Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the
petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest
touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.[47]
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete
absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or
voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.[48] Therefore, while
there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus,
in Guevarra v. Almodovar,[49] we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied
in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because . . . the infant (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from
criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years
of age and below are not capable of performing a
criminal act.
In its Comment[50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that
petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A.
No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by
the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No.
9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as
defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG
claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as
explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted
that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38[51] of
R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if
finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a
recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself
provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the
crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal
liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the
age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years
old.[52]
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court
accord retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law -
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.[53] This principle
is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and
the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given
expanded application in certain instances involving special
laws.[54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even
patent from the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as
follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory
Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that
we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following
provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE
CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE
WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE
LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM,
PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW
15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough
facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the
CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the
moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be
transferred whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a
clarification. When we speak here of children who do
not have criminal liability under this law, we are
referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be
released either to their parents or through a diversion
program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will
have to be a process of sifting before that. That is why
I was proposing that they should be given to the
DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except
that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we
have no argument. We will now have to just craft it to
ensure that the input raised earlier by the good
Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to
be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the
issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The
moment this law becomes effective, all those
children in conflict with the law, who were
convicted in the present Penal Code, for example,
who will now not be subject to incarceration under
this law, will be immediately released. Is that the
understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under .
...
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr.
President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet
available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which
has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for example,
for conferencing family mediation, negotiation,
apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies
will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in
detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr.
President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel
from the DSWD will have to address the
counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of
building the capacity and absorbing those who will
benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically
provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none,
the Santiago amendment is accepted.[55]
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective,
Mr. President, in their application, I would
like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could
incorporate some kind of a transitory provision
that would make this law apply also to those who
might already have been convicted but are
awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as
adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a
provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein
we address the issue raised by the good Senator,
specifically, Section 67. For example, Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission
of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer. So that
would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be
prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already
been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of
juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults
awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to
include that as an additional amendment, subject to
style.
 Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that
because that is a reality that we have to address,
otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also
include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final
conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at
the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor
under this law, he should be given the benefit of the
law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that
proposed amendment.[56]
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the
dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has
declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it
is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of
the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence
of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which
gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the true intent
of the legislature and to adopt that sense which
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.[57]
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused.[58] In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's
unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most
favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for
the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never
assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA.
Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from
criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for
the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof
expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil
liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly
affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay
AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages,
distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count
of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the
necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of
rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.[59]
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact
that a law intended to protect our children from the harshness of life
and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and
children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress.
However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised
on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that: Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress
criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).
has compounded the problem of employment of
children in the drug trade several times over. Law SO ORDERED.
enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the
police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates
have become more aggressive in using children 15
years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the
drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has
rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of
their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into
custody children 15 years old or below who openly
flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of
illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them
from criminal liability under the new law. [60]

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case
effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed
against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when
she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the laws
greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because
of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject
to review by this Court.[61] Any perception that the result reached
herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress.
Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our
task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.[62]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083

and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are
hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered
 FACTS:
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 186523
PHILIPPINES, On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabuag, Reina Malonzo, and
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present: Ediborah Yap, were serving their duty shift as nurses at
Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Basilan. Joel Guillo, the hospital accountant, on the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* other hand, had just finished his duty and decided to rest
- versus - PERALTA, in the doctors quarter.
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ. At around 12:30 past midnight of June 2, 2001, the Abu
Promulgated: Sayaff Group (ASG for brevity) led by Khadaffy Janjalani
URBAN SALCEDO and Abu Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered and
ABDURAHMAN ISMAEL June 22, 2011 took control over said hospital. Previously, however,
DIOLAGRA, ABDULAJID another group of ASG with 60 followers led by Abu
NGAYA, HABER ASARI, Umran hiked towards Lamitan for the sole purpose of
ABSMAR ALUK, BASHIER reinforcing the group of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu
ABDUL, TOTING HANO, JR., Sabaya. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the
JAID AWALAL, ANNIK/RENE hospital, a firefight had already ensued between the
ABBAS, MUBIN IBBAH, military forces and the group of Janjalani and
MAGARNI HAPILON IBLONG, Sabaya. Simultaneously, the band also became
LIDJALON SAKANDAL, entangled in a firefight with a civilian group led by one
IMRAM HAKIMIN SULAIMAN, retired Col. Baet, who was killed during the
NADSMER ISNANI encounter. Moments later, the band fled to different
SULAIMAN, NADSMER directions, with its members losing track of one another.
ISNANI MANDANGAN
KAMAR JAAFAR, SONNY Pandemonium ensued in the hospital on that early
ASALI and BASHIER morning, as the people were thrown into a frenzy by the
ORDOEZ, shouting, window glass breaking, and herding of
Accused-Appellants, hostages from one room to another by the ASG. The
group was also looking for medicine and syringes for
their wounded comrades as well as food and
KHADAFFY JANJALANI, clothing. The firefight lasted until the afternoon of June
ALDAM TILAO alias ABU 2, 2001. Finally, at around 6:00 in the evening, the ASG
SABAYA, ET AL., and MANY and the hostages, including those from the Dos Palmas
OTHER JOHN DOES, PETER Resort, were able to slip out of the hospital through the
DOES and RICHARD DOES, backdoor, despite the intense gunfire that was
Accused. ongoing. Hence, the long and arduous hiking towards
x-------------------------------------------------- the mountains began.
-x
On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the group of
Janjalani and Sabaya met with the group of Abu Ben in
Sinagkapan, Tuburan. The next day, Himsiraji Sali with
approximately 60 followers also joined the group. It was
only on the third week on July that year that the whole
group of Abu Sayaff was completed, when it was joined
by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a. Abu Umran.
Subsequently, new hostages from the Golden Harvest
plantation in Tairan, Lantawan were abducted by the
Hamsiraji Sali and Isnilun Hapilon.
On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed the hostages
that Sobero had been beheaded and was warned of the
consequences should said hostages fail to cooperate
with the ASG. Hence, the ASG formed a striking force
that then proceeded to behead 10 innocent civilians.
On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was separated from
the other hostages and taken to Zamboanga City by Abu
Arabi with two other ASG members on board a
passenger watercraft to stay at a house in Sta.
Maria. Later on October 13, 2001, a firefight broke out
between the ASG and the military, giving Joel Guillo and
3 other hostages the opportunity to escape from their
captors. On even date, Sheila Tabuag was released
together with 2 other hostages from Dos Palmas,
allegedly after paying ransom. Reina Malonzo was soon
after also released by order of Khaddafy Janjalani on
November 1, 2001.
Finally, after a shootout between the ASG and the
military on June 7, 2002, at Siraway, Zamboanga del
Norte, Ediborah Yap, died at the hands of her
captors. Thereafter, a manhunt by the military was
conducted, where the accused-appellants were
subsequently captured and held for trial.
Hence, criminal informations for kidnapping and serious
illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7659 were filed
against 17 ASG members on August 14, 2001, October
29, 2001, March 6, 2002, and March 12, 2002. As
defense for the accused-appellants, 11 of the 17 of them
raise the defense of alibi. Among them were Jaid
Awalal, Imran Hakimin Sulaiman, Toting Hano, Jr.,
Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, Mubin Ibbah, Absmar
Aluk, Bashier Abdul, Annik/Rene Abbas, Haber Asari,
Margani Hapilon Iblong, and Nadzmer Mandangan. On
the other hand, Bashier Ordonez, Sonny Asali, Lidjalon
Sakandal/Sabandal, and Abdulajid Ngaya claimed that
they were merely forced by the Abu Sayyaf to join the
group. The defense of being deep penetration agents of
the military was conversely raised by 2 accused-
appellants, Urban Salcedo and Kamar Jaafar.
After due trial, the court a quo, on August 13, 2004,
rendered the appealed decisions which convicted all the
accused-appellants of the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joel Guillo,
accused-appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua; in Criminal
Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina Malonzo, they were
sentenced to Death; in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the
kidnapping of Sheila Tabuag, they were sentenced to Death; and in
Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the kidnapping of Ediborah Yap,
they were also sentenced to Death.
The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view
of the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants. However, in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,[3] and the amendments
made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and
Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the Court transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.
On November 24, 2008, the CA promulgated its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, We
hold to AFFIRM the appealed judgments with the
modification that the penalty of death be reduced
to Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-
1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187.
SO ORDERED.[4]

Thus, the case is now before this Court on automatic review. Both the
prosecution and the accused-appellants opted not to file their
respective supplemental briefs with this Court.
In the Brief for Accused-Appellants filed with the CA, it was argued
that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It was further averred that some of the accused-
appellants were merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for
fear for their lives and those of their relatives, while four (4) of them,
namely, Wahid Salcedo, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer
Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar, were supposedly minors at the time
the alleged kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9344 (otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006), should apply to said accused-appellants. It was then prayed
that accused-appellants Nadzmer Isnani Madangan, Magarni Hapilon
Iblong, Wahid Salcedo, Kamar Jaafar, Abdulajid Ngaya, Lidjalon
Sakandal and Sonny Asali be acquitted, while the sentence for the
rest of the accused-appellants be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, appellee maintained that the State had been able
to prove accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
the defense failed to adduce proof of minority of the four accused-
appellants.
The Court finds no reason to reverse or modify the ruling and penalty
imposed by the CA.
The defense itself admitted that the kidnapped victims who testified
for the prosecution had been able to point out or positively identify in
open court all the accused-appellants[5]as members of the ASG who
held them in captivity. Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses
were unwavering in their account of how accused-appellants worked
together to abduct and guard their kidnapped victims, fight-off military
forces who were searching and trying to rescue said victims, and how
ransom was demanded and paid. The prosecution likewise presented
two former members of the ASG who testified that they were part of
the group that reinforced the kidnappers and helped guard the
hostages. They both identified accused-appellants as their former
comrades.
In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-appellants
could muster are denial and alibi, and for accused-appellants Iblong,
Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged minority. Accused-
appellants' proffered defense are sorely wanting when pitted against
the prosecutions evidence. It is established jurisprudence that denial
and alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive identification of
the accused-appellants. More so where, as in the present case, the
accused-appellants failed to present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime
scene at the time of the commission thereof.[6] In People v.
Molina,[7] the Court expounded, thus:
In light of the positive identification of appellant by the
prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive on their
part or on that of their families was shown that could
have made either of them institute the case against the
appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he
did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must
necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that
the defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot
prevail over the clear and positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x[8]
Furthermore, the detention of the hostages lasted for several months
and they were transferred from one place to another, being always on
the move for several days. Thus, in this case, for accused-appellants'
alibi to prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for all
those months. This they were not able to do, making the defense of
alibi absolutely unavailing.
Some of the accused-appellants maintained that they were merely
forced to join the ASG. However, the trial court did not find their
stories persuasive. The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the
trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor
of witnesses.[9]The Court again explained the rationale for this
principle in Molina,[10] to wit:
As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as
correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is
 more competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they
gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can
better determine if such witnesses were telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court
as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility
are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court,
particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said
findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which could substantially affect the
outcome of the case.[11]
The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation
from said rule.
Lastly, the Court sustains the trial court's and the appellate court's
ruling regarding the minority of accused-appellants Iblong,
Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born on
August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated his birth date as July 6, 1987;
Salcedo said he was born on January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed
he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was indeed July
13, 1981, then he was over 18 years of age when the crime was
committed in June of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority. It
should be noted that the defense absolutely failed to present any
document showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did they
present testimonies of other persons such as parents or teachers to
corroborate their claim of minority.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:
Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with
the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She
shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the
law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old
or older. The age of a child may be determined from
the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age
of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
xxxx
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with
the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the
person shall file a motion to determine the age of the
child in the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said motion,
proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age
of the child in conflict with the law.[12]
It should be emphasized that at the time the trial court was hearing
the case and even at the time it handed down the judgment of
conviction against accused-appellants on August 13, 2004, R.A. No.
9344 had not yet been enacted into law. The procedures laid down by
the law to prove the minority of accused-appellants were not yet in
place. Hence, the rule was still that the burden of proving the minority
of the accused rested solely on the defense. The trial court, in the
absence of any document stating the age of the aforementioned four
accused-appellants, or any corroborating testimony, had to rely on its
own observation of the physical appearance of accused-appellants to
estimate said accused-appellants' age. A reading of the afore-quoted
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 shows that this manner of determining
accused-appellants' age is also sanctioned by the law.The accused-
appellants appeared to the trial court as no younger than twenty-four
years of age, or in their mid-twenties, meaning they could not have
been under eighteen (18) years old when the crime was
committed.[13] As discussed above, such factual finding of the trial
court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed by the CA,
must be accorded great respect, even finality by this Court.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four accused-appellants
were indeed less than eighteen years old at the time the crime was
committed, at this point in time, the applicability of R.A. No. 9344 is
seriously in doubt. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 are as
follows:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of
the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from
the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That the suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteenyears
(18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
xxxx
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. -
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
cooperation with the DSWD.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the evidence before the
Court show that accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and
Jaafar, were not minors at the time of the commission of the crime,
hence, they cannot benefit from R.A. No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November
24, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C No. 00239, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

If said child in conflict with the law has reached

eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.[14]
If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born in 1985 and
1987, then they have already reached 21 years of age, or over by this
time and thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of R.A. No. 9344
is now moot and academic.[15]
However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it should be
borne in mind that if indeed, an accused was under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then as held
in People v. Sarcia,[16] such offenders, even if already over twenty-one
(21) years old at the time of conviction, may still avail of the benefits
accorded by Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344 which provides, thus:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183563 Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R.
Plaintiff-Appellee, CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
Present:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, AFFIRMED RTC.
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and The Issues
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Promulgated: THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN

Accused-Appellant.
December 14, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x
FACTS:
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant
charged[4] with eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations.
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7,
rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of
the RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his
minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct
examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was born on
February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old when
the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999,
respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated November 6, 2002, the trial
court denied the accused-appellants motion, holding that the latter
failed to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation
of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and
were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.[27] The parties then filed their
respective briefs.[28] On February 7, 2006, we resolved[29] to transfer
the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v.
IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]
The Ruling of the Court
.
was Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the
accused-appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before
the Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the
settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire
case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors,
though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict
with the law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in
conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in
conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child
 himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.
[70]
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People, we clarified that, in the past, the
Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the
minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions
concur, namely: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence
such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents
that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary
evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies
are untrue.[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born
on February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first
incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.[72] Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his
birth. However, the records of this case show neither any objection to
the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary
evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellants minority in
ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still
applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled
to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They
shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act
should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[74]i.e., from under nine years of
age and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without
discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but
below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption
from criminal liability.[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information
in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995,
the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he
was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the
prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of
rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously
discussed, any doubt therein should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.[76] The Court, thus,
exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count
of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable
therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the
year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We
likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted
with discernment. In Madali v. People,[77] the Court had the occasion
to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may
be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all
the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In
this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment
was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had
already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did
not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of
the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her
mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA
in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full
well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia,
when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the
proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each
count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-
appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been
entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of
rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application. Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years
(18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after
considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be
applied in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now
about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a
limit to the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the
child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the
Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with
the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached
eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to
 discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.(Emphasis ours.)

Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of

Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in

Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A
child in conflict with the law may after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of
Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of
Social Welfare and Development].

Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the

second and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above
disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law
and the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
 The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, G.R. No. 182941 evidence on record specifically: the allegation of the Information, the
Petitioner, testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never
Present: objected to, and the findings of the RTC established that he was not
more than 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES The Peoples Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor
- versus - **
CHICO-NAZARIO, General (OSG), counters that the burden belongs to the petitioner
***
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and who should have presented his birth certificate or other documentary
BRION, JJ. evidence proving that his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also
stressed that while petitioner is presumed to be a minor, he is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, disqualified to have his sentence suspended following the ruling
Respondent. Promulgated: in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton.[18]

July 3, 2009 THE ISSUES

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who

bears the burden of proof for purposes of determining exemption from
FACTS criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the time the
crime was committed.
The petitioner was charged with rape under the following Information:

On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a
minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen
years of age, against the latters will and consent.
Contrary to law.[6]
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the
prosecution as the party who stands to lose the case if no evidence is
presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-year old minor
entitled to the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No.
9344.[14] He additionally claims that Sections 3,[15] 7,[16] and 68[17] of
the law also provide a presumption of minority in favor of a child in
conflict with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age should be
resolved in his favor.
THE COURTS RULING
We grant the petition.
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the
outset that the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim
are material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for
purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under
R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in characterizing
the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that
R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took
effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights
of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a
system that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner
appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition
measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling,
probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and
other alternatives to institutional care.[26] More importantly in the
context of this case, this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of
criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age and
above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without
discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but below
18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law as the old
paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did presumes that the
minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right
from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which
they cannot be held accountable.[27] The current law also drew its
changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it
considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors
of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and
intervention measures.[28]
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal
liability because he was not more than 15 years old at the time the
rape took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioners
failure to present his birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A.
No. 9344.[29] The CA also found him disqualified to avail of a
suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for the crime
of rape is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on
Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts
in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal
case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls
upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential
ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon
as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the
required elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or
to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did
not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable
therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence
and had done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of
evidence has now shifted to the defense which now claims, by an
affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt
from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the
crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of
showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when
he committed the rape charged.[30]
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that
minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape; the
prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To
impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make minority
and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they are not. [31] If
the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates to
proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the
crime of rape.[32]
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence
to Prove the Accuseds Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing
that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the
crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a
child in conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a
child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the
age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344
provides the implementing details of this provision by enumerating the
measures that may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to
ascertain the childs age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs
age, such as
(a) Childs birth certificate;
 (b) Childs baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but
not limited to the childs school records, dental
records, or travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or
pending receipt of such documents, the law
enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures
to determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining
information that indicate age (e.g. date of
birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have
knowledge that indicate[s] age of the child (e.g.
relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g.
height, built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having
been passed only in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence
existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as
satisfactory proof of the accuseds minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,[33] we accepted
testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in
the absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing
the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas[34] where the
defendants statement about his age was considered sufficient, even
without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16
years at the time he committed the offense charged. Subsequently,
in People v. Tismo,[35] the Court appreciated the minority and age of
the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any
contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution.
Then, in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found the testimony of the
accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his
minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v.
Morial[37] and David v. Court of Appeals,[38] and ruled that the
allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as
facts upon the prosecutions failure to disprove the claim by contrary
evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial
evidence on the accuseds minority and age upon the concurrence of
the following conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2)
the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age
and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident
without any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of
any contrary evidence showing that the accuseds and/or his relatives
testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the
petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority and age when
the rape was committed.[39] Second, the records before us show that
these pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by the
prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present any contrary
evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the
crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No.
9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved
in his favor.[40] Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the petitioners
age at the time he committed the rape should be resolved in his
favor. In other words, the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old
when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not
more than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A.
No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing
rules, and established jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory
developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not
appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the petitioners and CCCs
testimonies relating to the formers age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344
took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years
old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit
of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.[41] As we
explained in discussing
[42]
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344 in the recent case of Ortega v.
People:[43]

Section 64 of the law categorically provides that

cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time
of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development
officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore,
with respect to the exemption from criminal liability
of the CICL, is not the CICLs age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICLs age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
[Emphasis supplied]

The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under

Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which provides that penal laws
are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused
who is not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of
this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual criminal.

Civil Liability

The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that

the accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption
from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA
despite his exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil
liability depends on the crime he would have been liable for had he
not been found to be exempt from criminal liability.
INITIAL CONTACT
"Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the apprehension
or taking into custody of a child in conflict with the law by law
enforcement officers or private citizens.
RAYMUND MADALI AND RODEL
MADALI,
Petitioners,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - the deceased during the night in question was debunked by the very
-x
FACTS:
For the death of AAA,[4] Raymund, Rodel and a certain
Bernardino Jojo Maestro (Bernardino) were charged before the RTC
with the crime of Murder. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of April 1999, at
around 11:00 oclock in the evening, in the Barangay
XXX, Municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did
then and there by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, strike with a coconut frond and llave
inglesa and strangle with a dog chain, one AAA,
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts
of his body which caused his untimely death.[5]
Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals findings, which gave weight and credence to the
G.R. No. 180380 account of the incident given by prosecution witness Jovencio, whose
testimony according to them was replete with patent and substantial
Present: inconsistencies. First, petitioners set their sights on the conflicting
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,affidavits executed by Jovencio. The first affidavit implicated the three
Chairperson, accused in the death of AAA, which was controverted by the second
CHICO-NAZARIO, affidavit where Jovencio denied having seen the three accused
VELASCO, JR., butcher the victim, while the third affidavit restated the material points
NACHURA, and in the first affidavit. Petitioners also pointed out the discrepancy
PERALTA, JJ. between the first and the third affidavits, as the former stated that
Jovencio was not seen by the three accused when they executed the
victim; whereas in the latter affidavit, Jovencio stated he was with the
Promulgated: three when the killing took place. Second, petitioners assert that the
testimony of Jovencio relating to the alleged fact that his companions,
August 4, 2009 Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis, saw the three accused and
testimonies of Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis wherein they
declared otherwise.
Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals erred in disbelieving the defense of alibi they interposed,
considering that the prosecution failed to muster the required quantum
of proof, and that said defense was corroborated by testimonies of the
other defense witnesses.
The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the
parties and their witnesses.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values
to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimonies in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct
and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.[11] This is
especially true when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the
lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and
circumstances of significance in the case.[12] Q: Who?

The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any A: Jojo [Bernardino] followed by Raymund then AAA,
significant facts in the case. then Rodel.

This Court itself, in its effort to ferret out the truth based on the Q: And what happened when they arrived?
evidence on records has diligently pored over the transcripts of
stenographic notes of this case and, like the RTC, finds the testimony A: They were also standing by there.
of Jovencio credible. Subjected to the grueling examinations on the
witness stand, Jovencio steadfastly pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Q: How long did they stand by in that place?
Bernardino as the persons who slaughtered the victim. He testified as
follows: A: I do not know how many hours?

Q: Mr. Witness, will you tell us where were you on April Q: Then, what happened next?
13, 1999?
A: Around 10:30 oclock we went there.
xxxx
Q: When you said we, to whom you are referring as
A: I was at the Rizal standing by. your companions?

xxxx A: Jojo [Bernardino], Rodel, Raymund and AAA.

PROS. BENEDICTO continuing: Q: What happened to Michael?

Q: While you were at Rizal on April 13, 1999 in the A: He went home.
evening, [who was your companion]?
Q: When you said you went there, to which place are
A: Only Michael. you referring?

Q: And what were you doing with Michael? A: Near the high school at hagdan-hagdan.

A: Only standing by there. Q: There are three (3) main streets in the Poblacion of
Romblon, which street did you take in going to
Q: Did anything happen while you were standing by hagdan-hagdan near the high school?
with Michael?
A: In the middle.
A: None, sir.
Q: Did you climb the stairs?
Q: Did anyone arrive while you were there?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was ahead? Q: After AAA, what is the family name of this AAA?

A: AAA. A: AAA.

Q: And who came next? Q: After AAA was blindfolded, what happened next?

A: Rodel. A: Then [Bernardino] told him Join the rugby boys!

Q: Then, after Rodel, who? Q: Did AAA make any reply?

A: Raymund. A: AAA said Thats enough.

Q: Then? Q: What happened after Jojo Maestro said you join the
rugby boys?
A: [Bernardino].
A: AAA was struck by a coconut frond three (3) times.
Q: [Bernardino] who?
Q: Who struck him with the coconut frond?
A: Maestro.
A: [Bernardino].
Q: What is the relation of this Jojo Maestro to
Bernardino Maestro you pointed a while ago? Q: What happened to AAA when he was struck three
(3) times with the coconut fronds?
A: That Jojo is his alias.
A: He was made to stand.
Q: Did you reach the top of the stairs?
Q: After standing, what happened next?
A: Yes, sir.
A: AAA was again struck with the coconut frond
Q: Upon reaching the top of the stairs, what did you do, byRaymund.
if any?
Q: Was AAA hit?
A: [Bernardino] blindfolded AAA.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With what?
Q: Where?
A: Handkerchief.
A: Here (witness is pointing to the posterior aspect of
Q: Where did he get that handkerchief? his right thigh).

A: From Raymund. Q: What happened to AAA when he was hit by the

coconut frond?
A: As if he became weak. A: Raymund used his handkerchief in tying the neck of
my cousin.
Q: How about Rodel, what did Rodel do, if any?
Q: Who is this cousin of yours?
A: He boxed the body and the head.
A: AAA.
Q: Of whom?
Q: What is the family name?
A: Of Rodel.
A: AAA.
Q: Who was boxed by Rodel?
COURT:
A: AAA.
How about Bernardino as part of the question?
Q: In Exhibit C you mentioned about llave inglesa, what
is this llave inglesa? PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:

A: Lead llave inglesa. Q: Bernardino, what did he do, if any?

Q: And how does it look like? A: The chain for the dog was tied to the handkerchief.

A: I forgot already but it was a brass knuckle. COURT:

Q: Did Exh. C mention that Rodel punched him in How about Rodel?
different parts of his body with a llave
inglesa causing him to fall to the ground, how A: They helped in lifting him and making him stand and
did Rodel use this llave inglesa? hooked the tie to the tree.

A: Worn in his hand (witness raising his right hand and
motioning the left as if wearing something in his
right hand), then punched him.
Q: When he was punched on different parts of his body
by Rodel using llave inglesa, what happened to
AAA?
A: He lost consciousness.
Q: When AAA lost consciousness, what did Bernardino
Maestro, Raymund Madali and Rodel Madali
do, if any?
Q: What is this tie which was hooked to the tree made
of?
A: The chain.
Q: Referring to the dog chain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While all these things were happening, what was
Jovencio Musa doing who is a cousin of AAA?
A: I got shock upon seeing it.

Q: Did Jovencio Musa utter anything or do something?
A: Everytime AAA was being struck I said Enough!
(Tama na!).
Q: How many times did you say that is enough?
A: Twice.
Q: How did the three (3) react to your saying Tama na,
tama na!?
A: It is already here so we will proceed.
COURT:
Translate that.
A: Yari na ini, idiretso na.
xxxx
Q: After tying the dog chain to the tree, what happened
next?
A: I was told by the three (3) that if I would reveal I
would be the next to be killed.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: No more, we went home already.[13]
Jovencio saw at close range the incident as it was unfolding
before his very eyes as he was there when it happened. He was in the
company of the perpetrators and the victim. Thus, the incident could
not have escaped his attention. The prosecution adequately
established in graphic detail, through the eyewitness, the
circumstances that transpired before, during and after the killing of
AAA. At around 11:30 p.m. of 13 April 1999, Jovencio, together with
the victim, as well as with Rodel, Raymund and Bernardino, went to a
place near the Romblon National High School. Jovencios earlier
companion, Michael Manasan, did not go with the group, as he had
already left a little earlier. As they reached their destination, the group
ascended the stairs leading to a reservoir near the said school. AAA
was ahead, followed by Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and
Jovencio. Upon reaching the top, Bernardino blindfolded the victim
with a handkerchief and told the latter, Join the rugby boys! The victim
responded, Thats enough! Bernardino then hit the victim thrice, using
a green and hard coconut frond. Unable to withstand the beatings, the
victim hit the ground and was lifted to his feet by Bernardino,
Raymund and Rodel. With the same coconut frond, Raymund hit the
victim on his right thigh. Rodel followed by punching the body and the
head of the victim with a brass knuckle (llave inglesa) wrapped around
the formers right fist. Feeling for his cousin, Jovencio shouted Tama
na! Tama na! Bernardino responded, Yari na ini, ideretso na, (We
have come this far, we have to finish it.) The victims strength was no
match to the injuries he received. He passed out. Raymund then tied
a handkerchief around the victims neck, fastened a dog chain to the
ends of the said handkerchief and, with the aid of Raymund and
Rodel, hoisted the victims body to and hanged it from a nearby
tree. Shocked at what was happening, Jovencio just watched the
whole incident, failing to muster enough courage to help his dying
cousin.
The perpetrators warned Jovencio not to divulge to anyone
what he saw, or he would be the next victim. Then they all left the
place, leaving the victims body hanging from a tree.
The testimony of Jovencio was substantiated by the medical
findings indicating that the victim was hit in the head by hard blows,
causing his death. Other pieces of evidence such as the coconut
frond, the dog chain and the handkerchief found in the scene also
supported Jovencios account.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution,
petitioners Raymund and Rodel could only muster mere
denial. Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too flaccid to
stay firm against the weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and
self-serving evidence that deserves no weight in law. It cannot be
given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible
witness who testifies on affirmative matters.[14] Between the self-
serving testimonies of petitioners and the positive identification by the
eyewitness, the latter deserves greater credence.[15]
Petitioners alibi, which was supported by the testimonies of
close relatives and friends, cannot overcome the convincing evidence
adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative testimonies of
relatives and friends are viewed with suspicion and skepticism by the
Court.[16]
Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, two elements must concur:
(a) the accused was in another place at the time the crime was
committed; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. In the case under
consideration, Raymund was within a 5-kilometer distance from the
scene, while Rodel was within a 14-kilometer distance. Even
assuming arguendo that Raymund and Rodels defense were true,
still, it was not physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene
and to be participants in the gruesome crime. It was not difficult for
them to travel from where they allegedly were and arrive at the scene
during the killing episode.
Petitioners made an issue of the affidavit of recantation
repudiating the earlier one laying the blame on them. The affidavit of
recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot prevail over
the testimony made during the trial.[17] Jovencio effectively repudiated
the contents of the affidavit of recantation. The recantation would
hardly suffice to overturn the trial courts finding of guilt, which was
based on a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown
trial. As held by this Court, an affidavit of recantation, being usually
taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in
open court.[18] A recantation is exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it
is easily secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration.[19] Considering the age, the
social standing and the economic status of witness Jovencio, it is not
far-fetched that the combination of these factors impelled him to affix
his signature to the recanting affidavit. Besides, Jovencio explained
why he executed the second affidavit or the affidavit of recantation,
which supposedly exonerated petitioners. He had been threatened by
a certain Wilson, who was a relative of petitioners. Jovencio testified:
Q: Alright, in Exh. C specifically C-1, you mentioned
that, you said that somebody fetched me in the
evening of May 7, 1999 who told me that Rey
Andrade wanted to talk to me regarding the
incident, who was that somebody who fetched
you in the house?
A: I do not know but he is known as Andrade.
xxxx
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with
Andrade?
A: About the Nephew of Wilson.
xxxx
Q: How about this Wilson you were referring to?
A: Wilson all of a sudden arrived there.
Q: Did Wilson say anything?
A: Wilson said, if we will lose, all our expenses will be
paid and if he wins I will be the next.[20]
Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged
contradiction between Jovencios narrative -- which claimed that
Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan saw the victim in the
company of the malefactors immediately prior to the killing -- and the
testimonies of these two witnesses denying such allegation.
Unfortunately, this is just a minor inconsistency. The common
narration of Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan that they did not
see the perpetrators with the victim prior to the killing are too
insignificant, since their narration did not directly relate to the act of
killing itself. Said inconsistency does not dilute the declarations of
Jovencio. Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its
incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight
inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly
weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material
and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-
appellants.[21] As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate
one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot
destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not
undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.[22] The minor
inconsistencies and contradictions only serve to attest to the
truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that they had not been
coached or rehearsed.[23]
The declaration of Michael Manasan -- that he did not see the
petitioners together with Jovencio and the victim immediately prior the
incident -- does not help a bit the cause of petitioners. As the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out, Michael could not have seen the
malefactors in the company of the victim because according to
Jovencio, Michael had gone home earlier that evening.
In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court, which
were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there being no cogent reason
to veer away from such findings.
As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of
age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from
criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents
or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344,
to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child
has the duty to immediately release the child to the
custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the
absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said
authority shall give notice to the local social welfare
and development officer who will determine the
appropriate programs in consultation with the child and
to the person having custody over the child. If the
parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be
located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may
be released to any of the following: a duly registered
nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay
official or a member of the Barangay Council for the
Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare
and development officer; or, when and where
appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein
has been found by the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents
will not comply with the prevention program, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the
DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare
Code."
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law
should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not
shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have
a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a
 final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not
extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic
Act No. 9344.
As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. A determination
of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary
pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. x x x.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.[24] Such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate
when it opined that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel, together
with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to
anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that
killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He
fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be
imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper
period.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 68, the
maximum penalty should be within prision mayor, which is a degree
lower than reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the maximum penalty should be in the medium period
of prision mayor or 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere within
the penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision
correccional.Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals,
which is 6 months and one day of prision correccional to 8 years and
one day of prision mayor, is in order. However, the sentence to be
imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38
of Republic Act No. 9344, which states:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application. Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after
considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

JOEMAR ORTEGA, G.R. No. 151085
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of
Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for
allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8) years of age.
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive
any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to
petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus,
the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the
accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation
of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be
imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years
and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as
Chairperson, maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
CORONA,* indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[30]
Promulgated:
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the
corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount
August 20, 2008 of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending
appeal.[31]
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC,
holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over
the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any
showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female
organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element
of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded
great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly
in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the assailed
Decision which the CA denied in its Resolution[33] dated November 7,
2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE
AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT
AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR.
LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT,
AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED
AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED
RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S
FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND
CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE
ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION
OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.[34]
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the
CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from
overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the
result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA
and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA
felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are
true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina,
certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or
lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age
at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such
allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas
who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical
examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications
that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA
committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report
since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists.
Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of
the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual
experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason
that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of
AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled
or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing
the instant case,
as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner.
Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated
that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4
days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination
on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant
case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a
case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable
that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to
depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who
raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely
coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.[35]
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments
raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the
testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions,
rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of
the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony
of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996;
even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's
age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing
petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be
committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover,
the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial
court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether
said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that
petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime,
as manifested in his covert acts.[36]
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it
took effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law establishes a comprehensive
system to manage children in conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and
children at risk[40] with child-appropriate procedures and
comprehensive programs and services such as prevention,
intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care
programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its
implementation, the law, particularly Section 8[41] thereof, has created
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with
certain duties and functions[42] such as the formulation of policies and
strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the
administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and
rehabilitation of theCICL. The law also provides for the immediate
dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68
of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.[43]
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen
(15) Years Old and Below. Upon effectivity of this Act,
cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at
the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. Such officer, upon thorough
assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or
refer the child to prevention programs, as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation
center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary
to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the
child is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall
also determine whether or not continued detention is
necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary
and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth
detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained
Children in Conflict with the Law. The PNP, the BJMP
and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the
JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the
law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of
Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. If a child reaches the age of eighteen
(18) years pending diversion and court proceedings,
the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with
the local social welfare and development officer or the
Family Court in consultation with the Social Services
and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the
appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the
child in conflict with the law has already availed of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, the child may apply for probation if
qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
 retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.
They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is
whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with
the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before
this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering
that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13
years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape
against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is
the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that
basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's
credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the
heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor.
Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw
petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the
imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or
father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their
daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial
knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. [45] We find
petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr.
Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from
petitioners parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in
most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was
only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is
improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held
that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is
not required.[46] Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the
petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest
touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.[47]
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete
absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or
voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.[48] Therefore, while
there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus,
in Guevarra v. Almodovar,[49] we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied
in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because . . . the infant (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from
criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years
of age and below are not capable of performing a
criminal act.
In its Comment[50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that
petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A.
No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by
the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No.
9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as
defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG
claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as
explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted
that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38[51] of
R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if
finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a
recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself
provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the
crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal
liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the
age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years
old.[52]
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court
accord retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law -
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.[53] This principle
is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and
the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given
expanded application in certain instances involving special
laws.[54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even
patent from the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as
follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory
Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that
we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following
provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE
CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE
WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE
LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM,
PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW
15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough
facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the
CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the
moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be
transferred whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a
clarification. When we speak here of children who do
not have criminal liability under this law, we are
referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be
released either to their parents or through a diversion
program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will
have to be a process of sifting before that. That is why
I was proposing that they should be given to the
DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except
that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we
have no argument. We will now have to just craft it to
ensure that the input raised earlier by the good
Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to
be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the
issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The
moment this law becomes effective, all those
children in conflict with the law, who were
convicted in the present Penal Code, for example,
who will now not be subject to incarceration under
this law, will be immediately released. Is that the
understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under .
...
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr.
President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet
available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which
has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for example,
for conferencing family mediation, negotiation,
apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies
will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in
detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr.
President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel
from the DSWD will have to address the
counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of
building the capacity and absorbing those who will
benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically
provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none,
the Santiago amendment is accepted.[55]
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective,
Mr. President, in their application, I would
like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could
incorporate some kind of a transitory provision
that would make this law apply also to those who
might already have been convicted but are
awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as
adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a
provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein
we address the issue raised by the good Senator,
specifically, Section 67. For example, Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission
of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer. So that
would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be
prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already
been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of
juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults
awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to
include that as an additional amendment, subject to
style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that
because that is a reality that we have to address,
otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also
include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final
conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at
the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor
under this law, he should be given the benefit of the
law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that
proposed amendment.[56]
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the
dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has
declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it
is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of
the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence
of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which
gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the true intent
of the legislature and to adopt that sense which
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.[57]

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused.[58] In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's
unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most
favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for
the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never
assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA.
Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from
criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for
the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof
expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil
liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly
affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay
AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages,
distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count
of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the
necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of
rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.[59]
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact
that a law intended to protect our children from the harshness of life
and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and
children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress.
However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised
on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of
criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old
has compounded the problem of employment of
children in the drug trade several times over. Law
enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the
police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates
have become more aggressive in using children 15
years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the
drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has
rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of
their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into
custody children 15 years old or below who openly
flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of
illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them
from criminal liability under the new law. [60]
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case
effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed
against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when
she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the laws
greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because
of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject
to review by this Court.[61] Any perception that the result reached
herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress.
Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our
task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.[62]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083
and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are
hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered
to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress

and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.