REPUBLIC v RAYALA

Facts: Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled
her ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist,
there must be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.
Issue: Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment

Rulings: Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-
related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment
or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws;
or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

Even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still
be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the
acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck
and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school
expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.
PHIL AUTOMOTIVE v NLRC

This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996
of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-12-08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not
guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent
Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse [1] of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7
November 1994.

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of
petitioner corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain
within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a
stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August
1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to
Mr. Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in
her time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1994 when
in fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was
read to her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the required explanation,
so that while her case was pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension
for thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994.

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was
issued by petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-
employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused
to receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known address
by registered mail.

Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00
and the punching-in of her time card by a co-employee.

On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her
of her termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect
of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust. [2]

On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and
its president Francis Chua.[3]

On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and
legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit. [4]

On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The
NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages
computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual reinstatement. [5]
On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was
denied;[6] hence, this petition for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.

The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is entitled
to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained.

The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate
the services of an employee,[7] which grounds should be strictly construed since a persons employment
constitutes "property" under the context of the constitutional protection that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law" and, as such, the burden of proving that there
exists a valid ground for termination of employment rests upon the employer. [8] Likewise, in light of the
employee's right to security of tenure, where a penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice, whatever
missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. [9]

A perusal of the termination letter indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment
for "serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust."
Specifically -justice

1. On August 2, 1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior
Mr. William Chua, the Plant Manager.

2. On August 23, 1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be
sent to CLMC for Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and was
not recovered.

3. On September 6, 1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show
that you were at work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As
per time card you were in at 8:02 A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.

4. On July 28, 1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an
ATM card of nine (9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees
complained by the name of Tirso Aquino about the status of his ATM Card and upon
query from the bank it was found out that no application and no deposit for said person
has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not open the ATM Card and
deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It turned out that said deposit was made
after a month later.[10]

As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant
Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving
special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for a date," which she would as often
refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual advances - touching her hands, putting his arms
around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special
treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she never
reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her
understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from
the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day
that her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal
belongings was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for
which reason, an argument ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged
with gross disrespect.[11]
Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for
transmittal was not lost; instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal
as evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the latter.[12]

With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in
her time card because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard
Tan, and that was with the permission of William Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith
believing that she was anyway only accommodating the request of a company executive and done for
the benefit of the company with the acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was
apparently tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing so. [13]

As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees,
private respondent claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was
employed as a company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her co-employees.

The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an

employee, has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it
must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c) must show that
the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. [14] The act of private respondent
in throwing a stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be
considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a
serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the
performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts
complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a
nurse. Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no
other.[15] Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending
investigation of her case was addressed to her as a nurse. [16]

As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to
punch-in her time card, although a violation of company rules, likewise
does not constitute serious misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith considering that she
was asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company,
with the consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit such infraction during
her five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the company did not lose anything by reason thereof
as the offense was immediately known and corrected. m

On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners
to private respondent dated 20 October 1994 [17] and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994,
the money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the employees
concerned, although belatedly. We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that -

The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by
itself, to support a conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of
duties. First, petitioner did not show that opening an ATM is one of her primary duties as
company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to show that Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly,
and purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for petitioners employees. It is of
common knowledge that a bank imposes upon an applicant certain requirements before
an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms, identification
cards, minimum deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay
was caused by Rosalindas neglect or willful act (emphasis supplied). [18]
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them.[19] The negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but
also habitual. Likewise, the ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly
prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee
may fairly be made to rest.[20] All these requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are wanting
in the case at bar.

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled
to recover such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by
malice or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her
services. In disbelieving the explanation proffered by private respondent that the transfer of her table
was the response of a spurned lothario, public respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter -

Complainants assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant
Manager where she threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her
refusal to submit to his advances to her which started from her early days of employment
and lasted for almost four years, is hardly believable. For indeed, if there was such
harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her during that period? Why did she
stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have taken that period for the Plant Manager
to react. This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all. [21]

Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4)
years to expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more
prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William
Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public
respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely
protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights. is

We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the
employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may
rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period
within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may
vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the
employee.

Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her
employer's sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that
can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not
issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only
speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed
to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily
"monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily but to
hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as
she could outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere
occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for
four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that
beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private
respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and
finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason
to terminate her.
In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral
damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of. [22] Exemplary damages, on the
other hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for
the public good"[23] if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner."[24]

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager
showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he
would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an
imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity
for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent
should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered,
petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the
oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a
forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over
their employees.

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions
committed considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or
that she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently
inimical to her employers interest. [25] Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was
pending investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the
dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners
Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages
computed from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in
view of the strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public
respondent, petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service until finality of this judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay
private respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs
against petitioners.
DIGITEL v SORIANO

Forced resignation must be sufficiently established by substantial, concrete and credible evidence.

Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing by Digitel Telecommunications

Philippines, Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice President for Business Division Eric J. Severino
(Severino) and Senior Executive Vice President Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a professional
dispute against Severino and Go, Soriano filed a resignation letter which was accepted by her
superiors.

After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that she was forced to resign
due to professional and sexual harassment. She alleged that her superiors are preventing her former
colleagues in testifying to the sexual harassment. She produced an affidavit by one of the persons
involved with Digitel stating that the employees of the company were being forced not to testify against
Go and Severino. In defense, Go and Severino provided witnesses that testified that the acts alleged
by Soriano din not happen.

The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC.
Hence,this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Soriano was forced to resign, due to professional and sexual harassment, thus
amounting to constructive dismissal.

HELD:
Soriano’s own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if not downright puny. An
analysis of her statements shows that her own conclusion that she was being sexually and
professionally harassed was on the basis of her own suppositions, conjectures, and surmises.

She could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently professionally harassed by
respondent Severino. The latter’s alleged words: “How come you claim you know so much yet nothing
ever gets done in your department?” do not jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly establish
“professional harassment.” Aside from these words, the complainant could only venture to allege
instances in general and vague terms. As to the facts allegedly constituting “sexual harassment”
advanced by Go and Severino, after an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their
respective counter-affidavits and further considering the other supporting documents attached to the
respondents’ pleadings, it is found that these far out weigh the Soriano’s own evidence

A reading of the affidavit of the witness, who was never an employee nor present at the party of Digitel,
reveals, however, that she merely “concluded” that the employees of Digitel were instructed or harassed
not to testify in favor of Soriano when they failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel employee “who kept
avoiding to meet with such tendency to threaten resignation every time higher management would
refuse her demand to transfer subordinates who had administrative differences with her, we therefore
have no doubt that complainant voluntarily resigned when respondent Severino refused to heed her
demand that Ms. Arnedo and Ms. Inductivo, her subordinates, be transferred to other departments. We
also have no doubt that such resignation does not constitute constructive dismissal, much less an illegal
one.
JACUTIN v PEOPLE

In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer Rico Jacutin of
Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of Sexual
Harassment, thusly:

That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then
the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by express
provision of RA 7975, committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking advantage
of his position, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual
favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor of
Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the office of the accused, namely: by demanding
from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated
by the accused, which sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms. Yee in the
Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual harassment. [1]

Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her
father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets
father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health
Office had just then filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be
able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and
they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in
December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be
considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine oclock in the morning, she and her father went back
to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning project
for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started
putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a
boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford
to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then
inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He
hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately
touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a research
program. She was requested to be back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to
seek divine guidance as she felt so confused. When she got to the office, petitioner made several
telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. Not finding
any, petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed
hesitation if a physical examination would include hugging her but petitioner assured her that he was
only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja
Street so that people would not see them on board the same car together. Soon, at the designated
place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to
be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so
in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and
she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt
assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held
her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she
exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his
right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her
to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually,
raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered
her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the
research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from
the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for
her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the money he gave her
but she did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and instructed
her to return it. In the morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to
petitioner but she was not able to see him until about one oclock in the afternoon. She tried to give back
the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she attempted to
slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was
suffering from some psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for
counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21
December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so
stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due to post
trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28 November 1995 he had
a couple of people who went to see him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin
Yee, who was a boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his
daughter Juliet who expressed her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was
no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really had the power to appoint city
personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident happened, he was in a
meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when
Juliet said she went to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was
scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao. He submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for
sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie
Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999,
penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of
Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO
of the crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3
and 7 of the same Act, properly known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way
of moral damages; Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and
to pay the cost of suit.[2]

In the instant recourse, it is contended that -

I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of
Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law and presumption of
innocence on account of the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction. [3]

The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:

SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.

Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant,
a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to
show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her
in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all started from
there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:

x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would be a part of a
research, accused asked complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be
seen.Accused assured her that with her cooperation in the research, she would gain knowledge from
it. As complainant looked upon the accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal guidance,
she agreed to undergo the physical examination. At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the
interview and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same
day, December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, but did not proceed
immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance,
as she was confused and at a loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once inside, accused called up a certain
Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept a registered
nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when the latter prevailed upon her to
stay because he would call one more hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again accused
told her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused
renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning Program where
there would be physical examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out of
the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if she would agree to the
offer. Complainant told him she would not agree because the research included hugging. He then
assured her that he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been
subjected to such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to
the research, for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and would gain
knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a tomboy, she answered in the
negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he would first play bowling, and later proceed with
the research (physical examination). On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to
the clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But accused
instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for people to
see them riding in a car together. She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja
St. as instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was
instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside the car, he called her attention why she was in a
pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated side by side, the accused held her pulse
and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he would go home for a while to put on his bowling
attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car and asked her if she has taken a bath. She
explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car,
accused directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her
legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but
she protested.He then instructed her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half
of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed her legs. He told
her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as
instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka! because he tried to insert his hand into her
panty. Accused then held her abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of
endearment), and let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the traditional way of making
the young respect their elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and
uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her
breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar
while silently asking God what was happening to her and asking the courage to resist accuseds physical
advances. After a short while, she asked him if there could be a right place for physical examination
where there would be many doctors. He just exclaimed, so you like that there are many doctors! Then
he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to kiss her, she answered that she
has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated. Finally, she informed him that she
would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that complainant was entertaining malice
and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what happened. He
then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination.She was about to open
the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant instantly parried his
hand with her bag.[4]

While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to
reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the
municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have
conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed,
petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for
his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan
were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago
Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were
said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner, i.e., that he was at
a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:

There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence adduced by the
defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by witness
Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.

First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna Maagad. The
Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. 3-A and 3-B) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of
the meeting, Exh. 5, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs.
3-A and 3-B certify that the officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita
Rozabal.
Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how was she able to
personally bring the same in court when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted
during her testimony that she retired from the government service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna
Maagad could not still be the custodian of the logbook when she testified.

And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the attendance of those who
attended was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their
names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia
Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was
passed around to attending individuals inside the conference room. [5]

Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, [6] no cogent reasons
having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses
is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive
and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an opportunity that is
denied the appellate court.[7]
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the
Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
complainant but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help obviate
the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to
be the result of passion or undue prejudice, [8] and it must always reasonably approximate the extent of
injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be recompensed for her mental
anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally
and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant
experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent
against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions. [9]
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799, finding
Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under
Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of
six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages
are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount
of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively, moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 BACSIN v WAHIMAN

Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,

Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary
school student of the petitioner.

AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand. [2] Once
inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his
table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled
her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt afraid. [3] A classmate of
hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling
incident did happen just as AAA related it. [4]

Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February 12, 1996 by
Regional Director Vivencio N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC. [5]

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was
handing AAA a lesson book.[6] He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three
seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint. [7]

Resolution of the CSC

In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct
(Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him from the service. [8]Specifically, the CSC found the
petitioner to have committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in Resolution No. 99-0273
dated January 28, 1999.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51900.

Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:

1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and the Honorable
Civil Service Commission to magnify the accidental touching incident on August
16, 1995;
 2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the evidence on
record; and

3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of

removal.[9]

In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioners right to due
process, and based on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was
no violation of that right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with disgraceful and
immoral conduct and misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved
petitioners guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

The Issues Before Us

The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present petition:

1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment,

grave misconduct, which was different from or an offense not alleged in the formal
charge filed against him at the inception of the administrative case.

2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and

misconduct as charged by complainant, whether or not the penalty of dismissal
from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and applicable rulings.

3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the

offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater offense.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as Grave
Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from that specified in the formal charge which was
Misconduct. He further argues that the offense of Misconduct does not include the graver offense of
Grave Misconduct.

This argument is unavailing.

As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:

The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted
with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is
apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation
of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. [10]
 It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which
was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such
charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case.

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act
of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument
of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala,[11] it
was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But
it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act
of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section
3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed (w)hen
the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee
or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her. [12] It cannot then
be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found
the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is
basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are
binding upon the Court.

Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal charge, it must be
discussed whether or not petitioner is indeed guilty, as found by the CA and CSC, of Grave
Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct. From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear
that there is misconduct on the part of petitioner. The term misconduct denotes intentional wrongdoing
or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. [13]

We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest. [14] The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students
is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any
way be construed as a case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a
revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and molding
of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians while in school. Petitioner has
violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his
unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his office.
 Petitioners second argument need not be discussed further, as he was rightly found guilty of
grave misconduct. Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases,
Grave Misconduct carries with it the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the penalty
imposed on petitioner is in accordance with the Rules.

Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[15] These elements are present in this case, where petitioner was properly informed of
the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.

A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not be allowed,
under any circumstance, to practice this noble profession. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900 is hereby AFFIRMED.