Adoption

Castro vs. Gregorio

The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and
consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a
spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be
personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified
through constructive service.

Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8
whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9

Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to
parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is
his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15

the trial court approved the adoption

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005. 30 They allege that
Rosario’s affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege
that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their
mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to
be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose’s
driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate
children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. 34

the Court of Appeals denied the petition.

While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the
appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of
the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the hearing."35

They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also
the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent was never secured from
Joanne.44

Issue: Whether or not the trial court grant of adoption should be annulled

Held: The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only
the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption.
The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 58

The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must
first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the
requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained,
Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. In
Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:

SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required: . . . .

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)

The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective
siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love
and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.

It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old
at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to
be valid.

To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were
childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was
never obtained, the adoption was not valid.

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.1âwphi1
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to
ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this
case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.

Cang vs. CA
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that
the latter has abandoned them?

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three
children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph
Anthony,

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times
and places" to petitioner. 7

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he
divorced his American wife and never remarried.

Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
"evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the
United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights"

Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he
could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."

the Regional Trial Court of Cebu hereby granted and approved.

RTC Social Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:

Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And abandonment of a child by its
(sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic)
adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be
allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:

Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted.
It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
 Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to
the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent,
and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if the child is in the
custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the
proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if the
child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption
shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written
consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient
to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this
Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for
adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking.

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.

In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban."

The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or
interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children." 23

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
mail and catered to their whims.

The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 47

The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not,
of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When
a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in
 a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.

whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their
adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there
cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated
earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based
on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.

Tomasa Vda. De Jacob vs. CA

Tomasa Vda. De Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased
by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.

Pedro Pilapil claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya,
CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor
of Pedro Pilapil.

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo
idefendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding
judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature - A handwriting examination was conducted by
Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13)
specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He
pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in handwriting
characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the "standard" signature" and
concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT
written by one and the same person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI
Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32)
specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by
Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities
of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics
between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption
was indeed genuine.

Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty.
Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and
authentic.
 Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining
his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."4

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature
of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on
the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The
appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert,
for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion
of the trial court . . . "

Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. 7

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. 50 This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged
adoption is a sham.

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when
shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.

The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the
time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he
even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent has not
presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly
made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused
pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information.
Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown
by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. 46 In the same vein, no proof
was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records
Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, 48 issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together,
these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA

petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the correction of the minor's first name
"Midael" to "Michael."

The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto
and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living
with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were
married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from
"Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and
innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction
of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons.

According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of
names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he
argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in the notice
published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the
minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.

On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC

whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for
adoption.

Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child.

The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be
adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so
that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits
that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael
C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with
the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to
give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That
purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.

For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C.
Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so.

Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this Rule provides:

§3 Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,

the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable
party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. 7 As he was not impleaded in this case
much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for
the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.8

Reyes vs. Mauricio

Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan,

annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties..
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was
the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that
from 1936 until his death in May 1994,

Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to
eject respondents from the subject property.

Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to
maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property. Respondents
likewise demanded payment of damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract
executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.3

As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio.1avvphi1
Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole
compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a
legal heir.18

We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the
status of Leonida in the instant petition.19

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose.

the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, and not through collateral attack.23

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In
Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for
the settlement of a decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared that the
legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose
and cannot be subject to collateral attack.27

Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for
annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.

In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2
that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname

the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption - Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name?

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name –

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the
Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of
the child’s mother as his middle name

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.16
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA
8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia)
as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family
Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.

Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.27

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children
to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately,
on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under Republic Act
No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.

At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. 7
Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioner’s husband
Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had
remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code.

whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children
to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children
are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from
each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet
the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for
at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the
petitions with her husband.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no
longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los
Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial
decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That
being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that
since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.

Nery vs. Sampana

This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
(Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery
believe that the petition was already filed.

Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage
and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery
paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they
could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage
contract, which they would use for her adoption.

Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was
already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing.
Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos,
Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her
presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that
the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.

Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption and
discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery
met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but
said that he would deduct the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be
deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the
reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.

Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status
and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that
"if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien]
could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage
contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy
(certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged
that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation –

Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and
for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment
and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short
of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the
certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he
suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption
could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.11

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the
petition.1âwphi1 He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption.
Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the money given him, in
violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.12

Bartolome vs. SSS

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the
following day.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under
PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La
Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits
sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As
culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s
grandfather, Cornelio Colco

Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City
dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. 8 Consequently, as argued by the
agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC
reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has
already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:

Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s
legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree
severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate
parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary

Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis
supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is
patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j)
of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
"legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not
distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the
phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary
beneficiaries."

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor
Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority
over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption
decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a

personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a
novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds
for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of
adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate
of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too

should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched
from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s
death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the
adopted child.