G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that
URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-
NAZARIO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno)
assails the Resolution 2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en
banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec
First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified
him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from
running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of
action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following
the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby
suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation
Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000
allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil
rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote
and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing. After due proceedings,
the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified
from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion
for reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of
the First Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en
banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from
running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of
probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence
but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local
office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local
Government Code take precedence over the case of Baclayon v.
Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a much
later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the
Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their
sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an
exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law
which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly
constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec,
the Office of the Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre
v.
conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the
candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating
his arguments and pointing out material differences between his case
and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a conclusion
favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v.
Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law,
an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that
case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction
and only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not have
been eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted
probation within the period specified therefor. He never served a day
of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application
of the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
[Emphasis supplied.]
....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on
whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of which Moreno was
convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under
the first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of whether
Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was never
raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground relied
upon by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed
resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a local
elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from probation
after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense
punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and
Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the crime of Arbitrary
Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the
crucial issue being whether Moreno’s sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our
pronouncement therein that the grant of probation does not affect
the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which
petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance
which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two
(2) years after serving sentence" should have been interpreted and
understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who
have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,)
in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Court’s declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code, we should add, ought to be considered
an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to
probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial
Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that
the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did
so only after failing in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough
at first glance. The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its
general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This
seemingly clear and unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a
controversy worthy of this Court’s attention because the Comelec, in
the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of
the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their
sentence because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been
disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged sentence having
been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing
defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon
Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer
is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the
accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for
the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot
be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the
Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of
probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended
the real issue in this case. They focused on the fact that Moreno’s
judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application for
probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been
served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply
applying the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced
by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one
(1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served
their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we
reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not
likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging
Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides
that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore
to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and
to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense
for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally
discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were
restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code which gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our
conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code
afford us no clue as to the intended meaning of the phrase "service of
sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those
who have been granted probation. The Court’s function, in the face
of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the
Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et
concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is
granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it
provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and
one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have
been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became
applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable
offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to
treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government
Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v.
Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated
disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is
presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on
the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding public
office. That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of
the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to
disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should
be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While
the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the
Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later
statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that
broadens the scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the
Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct. We
rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at
the time of his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He
claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Barangay
Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation
calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that "it
would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
Commission on Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005 and the
Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as all
other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in
accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied
petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the
owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez,
while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo
Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as
a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left
clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained
injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three
months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical
Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court
of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused
voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical
Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a
principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to
which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating
circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor
in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify
the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00
representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of
P200.00 which complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital,
to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to
pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his
desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the
accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's
counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to
afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not
only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability
that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor,
however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the
private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant
praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00,
compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P
5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial
court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil
liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served
upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the
insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return. Thus,
complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was
denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the
appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo
Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana"
and not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said
order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to
raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said
court rendered its decision which has become final and executory and
the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA
275, which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed
against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no
other function than to render a decision based on the indemnity
award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even
if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision."
Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies
that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in
the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in
order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said
employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be
validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a)
the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary
to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the
complainant did not arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but
from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not
be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said
owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the
same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was
given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article
100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be
applied to the present case, the former being an action involving
culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such
a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should
be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is
quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the
other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-
aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual
nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability
of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action
for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the
employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1)
that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and
(3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA
156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these
requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been
deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one
wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil
Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be
enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the
criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be
determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution
proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case
of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the
enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part
of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which
an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no
question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law
which may be involved in the execution."
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily
liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on
appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no
mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already
discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for
recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is
clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is
not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed
upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied
from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de
Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following
pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant
employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion
between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon
the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also
with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated
in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function
than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the
criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and
independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly
prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to
grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be
to amend its decision which has already become final and executory
cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the
basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of
the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a
separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be
enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does
not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent
upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but
only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the
employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employee's insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion
for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a
quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger
jitney. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of
the Philippines assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784, reversing the Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Manila and dismissing the
criminal case for slight physical injuries against respondent on the
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-
accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant
Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of
the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached.
The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated
August 11, 1999.2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against
herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the
preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a
Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of
an Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation
was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant
City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval
cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only
on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the
ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period
of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is,
on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the
offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari,
but the RTC denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of
the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June
22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed,
the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended
party filed a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999.
Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by
the time the Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as
follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of
ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively terminated the
proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP
or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego, to act on the resolution is
extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late
as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with
the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into
the next year. To use once again the language of Article 91 of the
RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much
more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The
offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with
the court on June 20, 2000. x x x3 (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed
Orders of both courts below and Criminal Case No. 344030-CR,
entitled: "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, -versus- Clemente
Bautista and Leonida Bautista, Accused," is ordered DISMISSED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the
foregoing CA Decision. The Court gives due course to the petition
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision of the CA before the filing of herein
petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP
effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive period
for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However,
the sole issue for resolution in this case is whether the prescriptive
period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s
recommendation to file the proper criminal information against
respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philipppine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an
information against respondent, the period of prescription began to
run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of
the prescriptive period.6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the
City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent
is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing
the information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly
prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held
in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate
the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be
invoked by the petitioner in the present petition considering that the
delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial
in court but in the filing of the Information after the City Prosecutor
had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to
file the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as
to the delay in the filing of the information. The Court will not be
made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the
offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by
the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information
in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors’ apparent lack of a sense
of urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the
more appropriate course of action should be the filing of an
administrative disciplinary action against the erring public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-103990 is
hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of
herein Decision for appropriate action against the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting
aside of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines
and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.3
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that
respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine
Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two
Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were
dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against private complainant before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a
"Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial
Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC
of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay
recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending
the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private
complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation
was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No.
127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773
in the amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of
₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges
involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa
Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were
raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability
has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the
motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The
criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC.
The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03
February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court
itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was
worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two
counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed
when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the
appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to
proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the
petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by
requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the
petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001
Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation
of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of
prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to
[respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this
period that the [respondent] was notified by the private
[complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the
five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private
respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended,
four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her
complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper
court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the
said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the
proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are
‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of
the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance
with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal
ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both
ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for
review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No.
3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No.
3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions,
whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. 10 It
submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it
relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have
interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,12 the CA
allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding
the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court
ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with
the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the
allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases
for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that
the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to
comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a
certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of
service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the
complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense
charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied
upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised
Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime
imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably
a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended.
She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses
covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and
offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such
offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to
attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the
12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is
refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached
to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA
decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the
proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA
reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent
had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as
amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law
reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years
in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive
period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely
for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by
the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et.
al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to
cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more
distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special
laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The
ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.18 is not controlling in special laws. In
Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v.
CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special
laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that
investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period
because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by
the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,24 which
is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been
charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do
not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics
or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter
part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of
presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within
which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the
fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted
by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against
respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of
Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the
ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to
suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the
criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case
for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the
prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April
1, 20131 and April 23, 20132 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En bane, respectively, in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a
Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he
prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City
of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada’s (former President Estrada) disqualification to run
for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al."
The dispositive part of the graft court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the
prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and
accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence
and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as
long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the
forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven
Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos (₱545,291,000.00), with
interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (₱200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos
(₱189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned,
deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay
Mansion" located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the
said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise,
the hold-departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby
recalled and declared functus oficio.4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by
way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said
pardon states:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who
have reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six
and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by
the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and
imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in
full, including all writs and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in
pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before
his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this
pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October,
in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received
and accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his
handwritten notation thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy7 for the position of President. During that time, his
candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09-
024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA No.
09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as Presidential Candidate"
filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA No. 09-104 (DC),
a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as
President due to Constitutional Disqualification and Creating
Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou
Estrada. In separate Resolutions8 dated January 20, 2010 by the
COMELEC, Second Division, however, all three petitions were
effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the
Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by
former President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be
voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration
thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections,
however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the
second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought
recourse to this Court and filed a petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v.
Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in a
Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that
former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured
into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time
vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a
Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before
the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC).
Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former
President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of
his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases
supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial
cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and
SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution
affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy further.
Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to
reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring
categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has
already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled
matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was
denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing
the present petition. She presented five issues for the Court’s
resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON WAS NOT
CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN
AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF
PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND
THAT THE CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY
RESOLVED IN THE CASES OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-
028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO,
JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104
(DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON NEITHER
RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL
ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY
RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT
DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS
PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC
OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION
FOR PLUNDER.14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada
was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next
day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents
for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case.
His motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution15 dated June 25,
2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President
Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by
the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with
313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful
winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the
petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only one essential
question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof. The
"acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof
the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what
impelled former President Arroyo to pardon former President
Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended. And
any breach thereof, that is, whenformer President Estrada filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for President and Mayor of the City of Manila,
he breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence
x x x and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position]
of Manila."16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon
which former President Estrada mustbe disqualified from running for
and holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in
Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues
that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude;
such that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and
hold public elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however,
Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to make available to
former President Estrada the exception provided under Section 12 of
the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or
plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible
requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory
penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases
supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not
enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such pardon
carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of
Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without
categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights
are restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal."17 In
other words, she considers the above constraints as mandatory
requirements that shun a general or implied restoration of civil and
political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices
Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the
right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of
conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be
left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be
statedin express, explicit, positive and specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal
reckons that "such express restoration is further demanded by the
existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the
pardon x x x indubitably indicating that the privilege to hold public
office was not restored to him."19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public
respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of whether or not the
pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to
run for public office had already been passed upon by public
respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-
024, 09-028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its
standing pronouncement and declare [former President Estrada]
disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the
absence of any new argument that would warrant its reversal. To be
sure, public respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in
taking judicial cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known
toit and which can be verified from its own records, in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the courts’
discretionary power to take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, orare capable of unquestionable demonstration,
or ought to be known to them because of their judicial functions."20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent
that [former President Estrada’s] conviction for plunder disqualifies
him from running as mayor of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC],
the subsequent grant of pardon to him, however, effectively restored
his right to run for any public office."21 The restoration of his right to
run for any public office is the exception to the prohibition under
Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to
the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., the express restoration/remission of a particular right to be
stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid
interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be
stretching too much the clear and plain meaning of the aforesaid
provisions."22 Lastly, taking into consideration the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon granted to former President Estrada, the OSG
supports the position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon and cannot therefore serve to restrict its effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions."24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following
significant arguments to defend his stay in office: that "the factual
findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body
mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the conduct
of the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the pardon, the
effects thereof, and the eligibility of former President Estrada to seek
public elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this Honorable
Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an absolute pardon and
thereby restored to his full civil and political rights, including the right
to seek public elective office such as the mayoral (sic) position in the
City of Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of Salvacion A.
Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was erroneously cited by
both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x x reveal
that there was no discussion whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the
Monsanto case as to the alleged necessity for an expressed
restoration of the ‘right to hold public office in the pardon’ as a legal
prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual special disqualification;"
that moreover, the "principal question raised in this Monsanto case is
whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher
former position without need of a new appointment;" that his
"expressed acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon
extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a
mere rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for
President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code "cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of the
pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with the
requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was
categorically stated in the said document that he was "restored to his
civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it must
be construed favorably in favor of the grantee; 25 and that his
disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the
hundreds of thousands of Manileños who voted for him.26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for disqualification filed
by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No.
13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for
and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a
grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes
that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor
of Manila inthe May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to
hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended
to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it
(pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his
(former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for public
office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to
and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former
President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section
5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of
executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by
the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the
only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain
to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted
in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were
decided under the 1935 Constitution,wherein the provision granting
pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with
what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then
unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing
that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus,
it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the
exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and
may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only
when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s
power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation,
was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve
out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the
form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be
enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a
law. The following is the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of
the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to
introduce an amendment on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of
corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation.
I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of
corrupt practices may include a very little offense like stealing ₱10;
second, which I think is more important, I get the impression, rightly
or wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the
premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and dishonest and,
consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this
Article seems to contribute towards the creation of an anti-President
Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but no
corresponding power except to declare martial law. Therefore, I
request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of
Commissioner Davide because of the fact that similar to the
provisions on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of
that Commission is required before executive clemency isgranted
because violations of the election laws go into the very political life of
the country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it
is also necessary to have that subjected to the same condition
because violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of such
magnitude as to affect the very economic systemof the country.
Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will be the
Congress that will provide for the classification as to which
convictions will still require prior recommendation; after all, the
Congress could take into account whether or not the violation of the
Corrupt Practices Law is of such magnitude as to affect the economic
life of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of dollars. But I
assume the Congress in its collective wisdom will exclude those petty
crimes of corruption as not to require any further stricture on the
exercise of executive clemency because, of course, there is a whale of
a difference if we consider a lowly clerk committing malversation of
government property or funds involving one hundred pesos. But then,
we also anticipate the possibility that the corrupt practice of a public
officer is of such magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial
portion of the treasury, and then he goes through all the judicial
processes and later on, a President who may have close connections
with him or out of improvident compassion may grant clemency
under such conditions. That is why we left it to Congress to provide
and make a classification based on substantial distinctions between a
minor act of corruption or an act of substantial proportions. SR. TAN.
So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the
word "violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction
because "GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it
purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially
an executive power, and that is precisely why it is called executive
clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to delete, an
exception is being made. Congress, which is the legislative arm, is
allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits
the power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of the
President to grant executive clemency by limiting the power of
Congress to only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes
more serious than these. Under this amendment, Congress cannot
limit the power of executive clemency in cases of drug addiction and
drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that can endanger
the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside from
the fact that it is a derogation of the power of the President to grant
executive clemency, it is also defective in that it singles out just one
kind of crime. There are far more serious crimes which are not
included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit
that the pardoning power is anexecutive power. But even in the
provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it is
required that there be a favorable recommendation by the
Commission on Elections for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that
and as a member of the Committee, has explained in the committee
meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this particular
provision. May we call on Commissioner Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We
have just approved the Article on Accountability of Public Officers.
Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a public trust, and all
government officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives
and to act with patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the
concept that a public office is a public trust, the violation is itself a
violation not only of the economy but the moral fabric of public
officials. And that is the reason we now want that if there is any
conviction for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which, in effect, is a violation of the public trust character of the
public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender, unless
some limitations are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the
convicting court, but the Committee left it entirely to the legislature
to formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish
between grave and less grave or serious cases of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time,
since we have strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public
Officers, to accompany it with a mandate that the President’s right to
grant executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to
the concept of a public office may be limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by
deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and
arguing before this Constitutional Commission that we are
emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this provision to me
is another clear example of that. So, I speak against this provision.
Even the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind
of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment
by deletion because I am in sympathy with the stand of Commissioner
Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should remember that
above all the elected or appointed officers of our Republic, the leader
is the President. I believe that the country will be as the President is,
and if we systematically emasculate the power of this presidency, the
time may come whenhe will be also handcuffed that he will no longer
be able to act like he should be acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular
line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the
approval of proposals, but now I find that the proposal of
Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other
crimes which cast a bigger blot on the moral character of the public
officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost
absolute power of our Chief Executive in deciding whether to pardon,
to reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered by the court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and
after him will be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The
Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-Graft Court, so if this is
allowed to stay, it would mean that the President’s power togrant
pardon or reprieve will be limited to the cases decided by the Anti-
Graft Court, when as already stated, there are many provisions inthe
Revised Penal Code that penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits
the consideration of the exercise of executive clemency, usually under
Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will recommend such
exercise of clemency. And so, I am in favor of the amendment
proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence
in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip
more powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted
in our society, we extend probation to them while in this case, they
have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we
can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended
to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they
would be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more
vicious killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this
opprobrium and punishment under the new Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit
this to the floor and also because of the objection of the main
proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the Commissioners
should vote on this question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment
of Commissioner Tan to delete the last sentence of Section 17
appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand. (Several
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised
their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the
amendment is approved.30 (Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to
pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the
said Articles contain specific textual commands which must be strictly
followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from
the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory
penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases
supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as
proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat
or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive
clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should
be no departure.31 It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President
Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal
that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights
of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to
former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal
provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge
or diminish the President’s power to extend clemency. He opines that
they do not reduce the coverage of the President’s pardoning power.
Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form.
They only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned
with areas where or the instances when the President may grant
pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise
such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to
intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes
to include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and
to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly.
Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To
belabor the point, the President retains the power to make such
restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it.32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that
Congress may dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her
power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their
respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the
essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained in
our system of government which "ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme
in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere."33 Moreso, this fundamental principle must be observed if
noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal
and coordinate branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive
Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should
be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive
clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly
strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import
of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and
duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal
provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to
define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said
provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does
notcarry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the
President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It
still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive
clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus,
Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided
upon by the President on the penalties imposedin accordance with
law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the
principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code,
it is indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification
were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized
by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as
follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided,
That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country
of which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens. (Emphases supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
to which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of
said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of
the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the Court
unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective office as a
political right, to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their
right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply there
with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered
ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her
political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for
and hold any elective office in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public
elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence,
the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to
former President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than
to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he
regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the right to seek
elective office.
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain
meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal
requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could
be in derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the
principle that the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected
by legislative action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36 to justify her argument that an absolute
pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has
been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has been remitted.
This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the
learned views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P.
Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof the controlling
doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land. On the
contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto,
penned by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no
statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced
application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in
effect require the President to use a statutorily prescribed language
in extending executive clemency, even if the intent of the President
can otherwise be deduced from the text or words used in the pardon.
Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here is consistent with,
and not contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for
any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President
Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but
it provides for an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President
Estrada’s conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for the
elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section
40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted
to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek
public elective office. This is made possible by reading Section 40(a)
of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the
LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a
legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to
candidates running for local elective positions is not unprecedented.
In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the Court acknowledged
the aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may
be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day
after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later
than the date of proclamation.38 The pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos
case is quoted as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of
Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since
the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by
prision mayor, a petition under Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly
filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on
Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to
petitioner.39 (Emphasis supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make
the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term
"civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates
that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."40 Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they
are not part of the operative language of the statute.41 In this case,
the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope
of the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of
COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia Padaca’s separate concurring
opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA
No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of
preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January
2010 Resolution did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal
raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause"
or preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that
"Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office." On this contention, the undersigned
reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular
paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute
nature of the pardon extended by former President Arroyo to herein
Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional and
customary usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of
preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses on statutes. The Court
stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely
an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin
of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional
on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the
former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the
pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an
integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained
to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on
former President Estrada’s decision torun for President in the May
2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the political
party of former President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and
acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore
him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by
the President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence
available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review
ofthe four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an iota of
intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation,
proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that
the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office
will result ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court,
what it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at
the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a
condition to the efficacy orto delimit the scope of the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas
Clausewas one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself
does not provide for the attendant consequence of the breach
thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern the resultant effect of
an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine
which civil or political rights were restored if the Court were to take
the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of
former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
The aforequoted text ofthe executive clemency granted does not
provide the Court with any guide asto how and where to draw the line
between the included and excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for
resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on the condition
that former President Estrada will not seek janother elective public
office, but it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon – whether
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as
to have restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that
the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite
the statement that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to
his civil and political rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored
to former President Estrada all his civil and political rights except the
rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage and
to hold public office. He adds that had the President chosen to be so
expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office,
she should have been more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear – the pardon
granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was
not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and
plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a
settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission
of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as excluding the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There
appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the term "full
political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone without any
qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is
"partial" and not "full" defies one’s understanding. More so, it will be
extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored
by the pardon, when the text of the latter is silent on this matter.
Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the
absence of the qualifying word "full" when the pardon restored the
"political rights" of former President Estrada without any exclusion or
reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the
absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which
to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the
pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst
actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial of due
process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in
matters falling within its domain.43
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or
the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must
be patent and gross.44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and
gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it
unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention,
which substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention
are DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission
on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013
of the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC),
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194068 July 9, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 27 May 2010 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01806. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 67,
Binangonan, Rizal, which found Benjie Consorte y Franco (appellant)
guilty of Murder, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and directed him to indemnify the heirs of Elizabeth Palmar
(Elizabeth) the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱29,500.00 as actual damages. The CA, however, modified the
judgment of the trial court in that, in addition to actual damages,
appellant was further directed to pay moral and exemplary damages
in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 and ₱25,000.00, respectively.
The Antecedents
As found by the CA, the facts ofthe case are as follows:
x x x [Appellant] was a former conductor of Elizabeth Palmar’s jeepney
plying [the route of] Antipolo, Teresa and Morong, Rizal. Sometime in
June 2000, Elizabeth’s residence was robbed and several personal
belongings[,] including cash[,]were taken. Appellant was the only one
who had access [to the] house, aside from [Elizabeth’s] family. So
[Elizabeth’s] brother x x x tailed appellant and found outthat the latter
pawned her tv [sic] set to Frederic Francisco. She then sued appellant
for robbery. x x x A hearing was scheduled on January 23, 2001, but
on the night of January 22, 2001, Elizabeth was murdered.
On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeth’s husband, instructed
Rolando Visbe to haul feeds from Morong, Rizal and deliver them to
their piggery in x x x Binangonan, Rizal. Ashe [was driving] the
jeepney, Rolando saw Elizabeth together with her 14-year old
daughter Myrna and [her] 3-year old nephew "Big Boy." They went
with him to deliver the feeds to [Binangonan]. On their way back to
Morong, Rolando noticed appellant[,] who was wearing a hat.When
they got near him, Rolando slowed down and asked appellant where
he was going. Appellant did not reply. Rolando veered to the right
toavoid hitting appellant. In the process, the jeepney ran over a stone,
lost its balance, and rolled [into] a ditch. While struggling to release
the vehicle, Rolando heard a gunshot. He looked around and saw
appellant standing near the jeepney’s left rear, holding a handgun.
Appellant immediately fled. He (Rolando) then heard Myrna x x x
shouting "Ninong, may dugo si Nanay!" They rushed Elizabeth to
Angono District Hospital. But due to her fatal gunshot wound on the
forehead, she died x x x.
Aneline Mendoza, a resident of Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that
on January 22, 2001, around 8:45 pm while on her way home, a
stranger greeted her "magandang gabipo." He was carrying
something wrapped in a black cloth which looked like a gun. She was
somewhat frightened so she let him walk ahead of her. She saw him
turn to a corner. Immediately after she entered her house, she heard
a gunshot. She opened her window and saw the stranger, standing by
the side of the jeepney. The [stranger] immediately ran toward the
direction of Elizabeth’s house. She also heard the driver saying
"Putang ina, sinong bumaril?"2
Appellant was arrested the following day in Morong, Rizal while
attending the hearing of the robbery case against him.3 He was
charged with murder under an Information which reads: That on or
about the night of the 22 nd day of January 2001 in the Municipality
of Binangonan, Province ofRizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a deadly weapon (hand gun), withintent to kill and by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Elizabeth V. Palmar on the vital part of her body, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wound which directly caused her death. 4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him. Trial thereafter ensued, during which, appellant interposed the
defense of alibi. He claimed that at around 8 or 9 o’clock in the
evening of 22 January 2001, he was at his brother’s house in Antipolo.
He had dinner with his brother’s family and left at 10 o’clock in the
evening, after his brother gave him ₱100.00 as fare. His sister-in-law
corroborated his statement, testifying that appellant was at their
house on the questioned date from 5 to 10 p.m.
The Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found that the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution leaves no doubt that it was indeed appellant who shot
Elizabeth. According to the RTC:
Against the eyewitness testimony who [sic] positively identified the
[appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime, the alibi of the defense
will die. x x x
Other than himself[,] the accused presented only two witnesses, her
[sic] sister-in-law and the forensic chemist. As for the testimony of her
[sic] sister-in-law, she could not reason out why, the [appellant] who
is gainfully employed as a tricycle driver would beasking for a one
hundred peso fare, just to appear at the hearing [the following day].
Her answers are full of open ends, which give [her testimony] little
credence.
The testimony of the Forensic chemist is also not conclusive. She
testified that the [appellant] testednegative for powder burns. On
crossexamination, she testified that the lack or presence of nitrates in
the hands of the [appellant] could be affectedby several factors, like
cloth or coverings on the hand that fired the gun; gun fired at a
downward direction; wind velocity; efficiency of the gun; and finally[,]
the kind of gun used[,] whether automatic or pistol.
xxxx
In a line of cases, the rulings on the weight and conclusiveness of [the]
presence and absence of gunpowder in [sic] the hands of the accused
is dependent entirely on the evidencepresented [by] the prosecution
as a whole. Absence or lack of trace of gunpowder in [sic] the hands
of the apparent shooter does not necessarily equate that he did not
fire a gun. This defense will not defeat what the two witnesses for the
prosecution saw on the night of the shooting.5
x x x On the element of treachery, the rulings has [sic] been consistent
that in order for the court to appreciate treachery it must be
established by the prosecution that the victim did not have any
opportunity to defend themselves (sic), or that the attack was so
sudden or immediate that the victims were in no position to defend
or protect themselves.
xxxx
In the case at bar, [appellant] took advantage of the situation when
he shot the unsuspecting victim. The unexpected attack on the victim
rendered her unable and unprepared todefend herself by reason of
the suddenness and severity of the attack. [The] [f]acts [of this] case
show that the victim [had] her back [to] her assailant when attacked,
[and] she was not aware of any danger on her part. She was likewise
cuddling a baby in [sic] her lap when the shot was fired. Clearly[,] she
was in no position to make any defense.
The eyewitness testimony likewise sufficiently established that
[appellant] consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack[.] [A]ccused was armed and stealthily performed the
criminal act at nighttime at an unexpected time whilethe victim was
defenseless. x x x Add to this scenario the fact that on January 23,
2005 [sic], the [appellant] and [the] victim will meet at the Municipal
Trial Court hearing for the robbery case filed by the victim. Thisonly
shows that the [appellant] took into consideration these factors[,]
hence he was bent on committing the crime on the day prior to the
robbery hearing. [Appellant] therefore has set the time frame within
when (sic) to commit [the] crime, and on the said day x x x he did not
resist in perpetrating the crime. There is no other construction in this
picture other that [sic] the fact [that] the shooting was treacherous
and well planned.6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that appellant’s attack on
the credibility of prosecution witnesses Rolando Visbe and Aneline
Mendoza has no merit. The CA pointed out that:
x x x Rolando and Aneline never wavered in their respective
testimonies regarding appellant’s presence in the situs criminis and
his possession of the gun before and after the fatal shooting of
Elizabeth Palmar. Although Visbe may have shouted "x x x, sinong
bumaril?", it did not mean he did not recognize appellant. It was
simply an instinctive reaction of one who heard a gunshot in the
middle of nowhere and saw his companion fatally wounded. At any
rate, Rolando did not ask any further question when right after the
shooting, he saw appellant holding a gun beside the jeepney he was
driving. Rolando saw appellant twice that night and it was not
improbable for him to remember appellant. Precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before his eyes, Rolando
remembered with a high degree of reliability appellant’s identity.
xxxx
True, Rolando and Aneline did not see appellant actually fire the gun
on Elizabeth, but the circumstances surrounding the incident
unerringly point to him as the perpetrator, viz:
First. Appellant had an axe to grind against Elizabeth for filing a
robbery case against him. Elizabeth got murdered the night before
the initial hearing of the case;
Second. Rolando saw appellant near the jeepney’s left rear, holding a
gun, right after he heard a gunshot;
Third. Right before the incident, Aneline saw appellant holding
something in his hand wrapped in a black cloth, which looked like a
gun;
Fourth. Immediately after Aneline entered her house, she heard a
gunshot and when she peeped through the window, she saw
appellant standing by the side of the jeepney where Elizabeth’s
lifeless body was sprawled. Shortly after, Aneline saw appellant
running towards the direction of Elizabeth’s house. x x x;
Fifth. Notably, appellant himself did not accuse Rolando and Aneline
of any [ill] motive to falsely testify against him and cause his
damnation for such a serious crime of murder. Although he claims
their loyalty belonged to the victim and her family, loyalty does not
equate with perjury, let alone, persecution of an innocent peron [sic].
Settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why the prosecution witnesses should
testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious
offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
xxxx
Appellant, nonetheless, claims that the negative result of the paraffin
test done on him isproof of his innocence.
On this score, suffice it to state that the only thing a paraffin test can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites
on the hand. From this test alone, it cannotestablish that the source
of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of firearm.7 x x x
The CA likewise concurred with the trial court with respect to its
finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
According to the CA, the trial court correctly found that the two
elements of treachery, which are: (1) the employmentof means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of
the means of execution,are present in this case. In addition to the
foregoing, the CA granted moral and exemplary damages to the heirs
of Elizabeth, aside from the civil indemnity and actual damages
previously granted by the trial court.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal but modify the award of damages.
Both the CA and the trial court haveexhaustively discussed the merits
of the case at bench and concur on their findings and conclusions. In
this connection, it bears repeating that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court.8 The rule is that, the findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on such findings are accorded respect, if not, conclusive
effect. This specially holds true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, as in the case at bar, said findings are generally
binding upon us. We find no compelling reason in this case to depart
from the general rule.9
In the first place, appellant relies on alibi for his defense. As invariably
held by this Court, however, alibi is an inherently weak defense and
has always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility
with which it can be concocted.10 Indeed, denial is an intrinsically
weak defense which must be buttressed withstrong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility.11 For alibi to prosper, appellantmust
prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was
committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminisat the time of its commission.12 In the case at bench, the
defense failed to present convincing evidence to reinforce appellant’s
denial and alibi. It is significant to note that the distance between
Binangonan (the scene of the crime) and Antipolo (where appellant
claimed hewas at the time of the incident in question) is only about
twenty (20) kilometers.
In People v. Bation,13 this Court held that there was no physical
impossibility for the appellant to be atthe scene of the crime,
considering that appellant was merely twenty-six (26) kilometers
away from said scene. In People v. Ignas,14 the distance was even
much farther:
x x x the defense admitted that the distance between La Trinidad,
Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which can be
negotiated in 4 or 5 hours. Clearly, it was not physically impossible for
appellant to be at the locus criminisat the time of the killing. Hence,
the defense of alibi must fail.
"Physical impossibility in relation toalibi takes into consideration not
only the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and
the place where accused maintains he was, but more importantly, the
accessibility between these points. In this case, the element of
physical impossibility of appellant’s presence that fateful night at the
crime scene has not been established."15
More importantly, the Court gives even less probative weight to a
defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. One
can easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives to
corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an accused
whose defense is alibi, as in this case, courts have more reason to view
such testimony with skepticism.16
In any case, the positive identification of the appellant by witnesses
destroys the defense of alibi.1âwphi1 Alibi warrants the least
credibility, or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses.17 Absent
any ill motive on the part of witnesses, their positive identification of
the appellantas the perpetrator of the crime prevails over the defense
of denial or alibi.18
Here, two witnesses established appellant’s presence at the scene of
the crime and the fact that he had, in his possession at that time, a
gun. While, as pointed out by the CA, the said witnesses did not
actually see appellant fire the gun at Elizabeth,the circumstances
surrounding the incident, as enumerated by the CA, "unerringly
points to him as the perpetrator."
Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of
the crime. But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime
is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.19 The lack
of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against
the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the
appellant’sparticipation in the crime through credible and sufficient
circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the appellant committedthe imputed crime, the latter should be
convicted.20In the case at bar, those circumstances were enumerated
by the CA in its decision, as follows:
First. Appellant had an axe to grind against Elizabeth for filing a
robbery case against him. Elizabeth got murdered the night before
the initial hearing of the case;
Second. Rolando saw appellant near the jeepney’s left rear, holding a
gun, right after he heard a gunshot;
Third. Right before the incident, Aneline saw appellant holding
something in his hand wrapped in a black cloth, which looked like a
gun;
Fourth. Immediately after Aneline entered her house, she heard a
gunshot and when she peeped through the window, she saw
appellant standing by the side of the jeepney where Elizabeth’s
lifeless body was sprawled. Shortly after, Aneline saw appellant
running towards the direction of Elizabeth’s house. x x x;
Fifth. Notably, appellant himself did not accuse Rolando and Aneline
of any [ill] motive to falsely testify against him and cause his
damnation for such a serious crime of murder. Although he claims
their loyalty belonged to the victim and her family, loyalty does not
equate with perjury, let alone, persecution of an innocent peron [sic].
Settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why the prosecution witnesses should
testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious
offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
"[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i)
there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the
inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. All the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in this
case."21
Anent the amount of damages, we sustain the grant of actual
damages in the amount of ₱29,500.00, the same being supported by
official receipts. We likewise affirm the CA’s award of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages to the heirs of the victim in addition to civil indemnity.
The grant of moral damages is mandatory in cases of murder and
homicide without need of allegation and proof other thanthe death
of the victim.22
In conformity with current jurisprudence, however, we increase the
amount of civil indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.23 Civil
indeminity is given without need of proof other than the fact of death
as a result of the crime and proof of appellant’s responsibility for
it.24 We also increase the award of exemplary damages granted by the
CA from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 consisted with prevailing
jurisprudence.25
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 2010
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01806 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased
from PS0,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (2) that the amount of exemplary
damages is increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. An interest, at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded in this case from the date of finality of this
judgment until they are fully paid.26
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @
"PORDOY," Accused-Appellants.
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision1 dated 18 June 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the
Decision2 dated 30 September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-
910, finding herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao"
(Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @
"Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder,
thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3
Hernando P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of ₱
50,000.00 each as moral damages and ₱ 50,000.00 each as civil
indemnity for the death of each of the said victims. Similarly,
appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees,
as well as the costs of the suit.
Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel),
Brigido Abais @ "Bidok" (Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro),
Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun"
(Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @
"Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel),
Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and
other John Does, were charged in an Amended Information3 dated 3
October 2001 with the crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named appellants and their co-accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed
with assorted high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident
premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in strength
and in numbers, and with intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the persons of the following, namely:
1. PO3 Dela Cruz, Philippine National Police (PNP);
2. T/Sgt. Dacoco, Philippine Army (PA);
3. Private First Class (PFC) Haron Angni, PA;
4. PFC Gador4 Tomanto, PA;
5. Juanito Ibunalo;
6. Mosanif5 Ameril;
7. Macasubar6 Tandayao;
8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;7 and
9. Jun Palanas
by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered
firearms thereby inflicting upon the persons of PO3 De la Cruz, T/Sgt.
Dacoco, PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo,
Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao gunshot wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of the death of PO3 De la Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco and the serious wounding of said PFC Haron Angni,
PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba
Tandayao that without the medical assistance would have caused
their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan and Jun Palanas were
not hit.8
When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their
counsel de parte9 and counsel de oficio,10respectively; and their co-
accused Samuel, likewise assisted by counsel de oficio,11 all entered
separate pleas of
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case,
however, remained at large. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Discharge Accused Samuel To Be Utilized As State
Witness,12 which the court a quo granted in an Order dated 12
February 2003.13 Also, upon motion of the prosecution, the court a
quo issued another Order dated 17 March 2003,14 directing the
release of Samuel from detention following his discharge as state
witness.
As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba
Tandayao (Macasuba), Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor
Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina Dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police
Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni
(PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer 4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4
Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring (SPO1 Suaring),
Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police
Officer 4 Emmie Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo
(Juanito), Senior
Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan (Mayor Tawan-tawan), testified for the prosecution.
The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the
aforesaid prosecution witnesses is as follows:
On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
together with his security escorts composed of some members of the
Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to
wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela
Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun,
respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. In the afternoon, the
group went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow
pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818
driven by Juanito. Sitting at the passenger seat of the aforesaid vehicle
was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were Mosanip,
Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito.
Those seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion
of the said yellow pick-up service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni
were sitting beside each other facing the right side of the road while
PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both seated behind PFC
Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road.15
At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their
aforenamed co-accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok
2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on the left side
of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed
by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting shed
while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides
of the road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed.
Then, appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the
vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.16
A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching towards the direction of Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants
and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle
using high-powered firearms.
Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and
PFC Tomanto, who was then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the
yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the right
side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16
armalite rifle.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro,
Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the
ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito to keep on driving
to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the
army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
detachment in Curva, Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor
Tawan-tawan then asked assistance therefrom.17
Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran
towards the house of Samuel’s aunt located, more or less, 10 meters
away from the site of the ambush to get their bags and other stuff.
The house of Samuel’s aunt was the place where appellants and their
co-accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed appellants
and their co-accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants
and their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan,
Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte.18
On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-
tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others
suffered injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head
by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on his shoulder that almost
severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and left sides
of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left
shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head and
left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured.19
All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to
Bontilao Country Clinic in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were
later transferred to Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga,
Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however, died before reaching the hospital
while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed at
Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days before he was
transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City, and then in a hospital in Manila and Quezon City. PFC Angni
stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital before
he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was
confined for one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna
Hospital in Quezon City and was confined therein for two (2)
months.20
On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members
of the CAFGU went back to the site of the ambush but appellants and
their co-accused were no longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano,
Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal Police Station, Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside the Salvador
Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he
came to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed
prompting him and his troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor
Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano that appellant Wenceslao was
one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano and his
troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed
Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied
any involvement in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found
Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow police officers arrested
him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police
of Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal
Jail in Lanao del Norte.
Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the
CAFGU, PNP and the rest of the troops who were at the scene of the
crime, found a trail of footprints believed to be from the culprits. They
conducted a hot pursuit operation towards Barangay Lindongan,
Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and their co-
accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-
16 armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4
Medrano then sent a Spot Report and a follow-up report about the
ambush. He did not, however, reveal the identity of appellant
Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao
could be arrested at the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also
informed the provincial headquarters about the incident through a
radio message.21
The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring,
member of PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that
there were electrical supplies and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1 Suaring, together with
Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a certain SPO4
Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they
found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
canal, which is 30 meters away from the house of Samuel’s aunt.
These were photographed.22
Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received
a call from Barangay Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon)
that a black backpack was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, which is two (2) kilometers away from the highway.
Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon went to the
location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack an army
camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one
fragmentation grenade cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these
to the police station in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned
it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar.23
On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying
appellants and their co-accused as the persons responsible for the
ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. Samuel was,
thereafter, incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.24
On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush,
appellant Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was
arrested on 20 December 2001 while working in Puting Bato in Sapad,
Lanao del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who effected the arrest
of the appellants.25
Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant
Wenceslao presented as witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey
Paninsuro (Jeffrey), Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy
Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master
Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on the other
hand, did not present any witness other than himself.
Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their
house with his family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their
house to clean the pigsty and feed the pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m.,
Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a military personnel,
arrived to get a copy of the election returns of the 15 May 2001
elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate.
He told them that he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them
to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who has a copy. At that
time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside the house while his
wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them.
After 10 minutes, his visitors left.26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao
heard gunfire coming from the direction of the house of Mayor
Tawan-tawan. His nephew, Jeffrey, approached and informed him
that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter’s group were ambushed.
After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This
time the bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their house.
He then instructed Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report
the said incident and to ask help from the members of the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.27
When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did
not know where his wife and the rest of the women, who were in their
house, went after the gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he
walked barefooted and unarmed towards Camp Allere. There he saw
M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former regarding the incident
happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain Esmeralda
(Capt. Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the
Philippine Army, arrived. He also approached and informed Capt.
Esmeralda about the incident in their house. Capt. Esmeralda then
ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch
appellant Wenceslao’s wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. A six-by-six truck returned to Camp Allere carrying
appellant Wenceslao’s wife and relatives.28
On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with
his wife and daughter, slept in his father’s house located, more or less,
100 meters away from Camp Allere and stayed there for five (5) days.
Appellant Wenceslao’s wife then requested for transfer to their son’s
house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer sleep
because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to their
son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for
eight (8) days. During that period of time, he did not hear of any case
filed against him. No policemen even bothered to arrest him. His wife,
however, was still afraid, so they left the house of their son and
moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there
until he was arrested on 29 August 2001.29
Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take,
more or less, a 15 minute-vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the site of the ambush in San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to Camp Allere it would
only take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant Wenceslao
also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way
back in the 1998 elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same
locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan but he lost. On both occasions,
he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same political
party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998,
appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with
illegal possession of firearm.30
Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda,
who are appellant Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece, respectively,
corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony on all material points.
They all denied that appellant Wenceslao has something to do with
the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. Nonetheless,
Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles
for hire plying the route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa.31
Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s
testimony with respect to the fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together
with Jacob Pepito and a certain member of the army intelligence
group, went to the house of appellant Wenceslao to get the election
returns. However, he could not recall anything unusual that happened
while he was in the house of appellant Wenceslao. They left the house
of appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no unusual incident
happened thereafter. Rudy similarly revealed that he did not go inside
the house of appellant Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob Pepito
and a member of the army intelligence group inside their vehicle
parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters from the house
of appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the
conversation between appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a
member of the army intelligence group.32
Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001, while he was at the legislative hall in
Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to secure the canvass of the
elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla informing
them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of
appellant Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called
them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte. As they passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, they
stopped to get some information from the police officers therein.
They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They
arrived at Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he
saw appellant Wenceslao waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla.
Appellant Wenceslao then requested that his family and some
personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt. Esmeralda
ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant
Wenceslao’s house. Upon reaching the house of appellant
Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao’s wife
came out from the nearby house. Then they ordered her to board a
six-by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of appellant
Wenceslao in the latter’s house.33
M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June
2001, while he was at their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, his detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt.
Quijano, called and informed him through radio that an ambush
incident happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the
incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the
latter about the said ambush incident. He, thereafter, prepared a
perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt. Quijano,
the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After
about 15 minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at
Camp Allere.
M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around
3:00 p.m., he saw appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside
Camp Allere near Km. Post one. Appellant Wenceslao then informed
him of the strafing incident in his house. When their commanding
officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the former.
Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte.34
Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he
was also in his house in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
attending to his wife and children because his wife had just given birth
in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst
somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by
some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived
and informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house. 35
Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June
2001, he and his family transferred to the house of his parents-in-law
at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he
heard rumors that the supporters of Atty. Umpa, the political rival of
Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being
persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa’s supporters, he got scared,
prompting him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there
until the following morning and then he left alone for Ozamis City,
Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3) months.
Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where
he worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was
arrested on 20 December 2001.36
Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an
instance that Atty. Umpa was harassed or intimidated by the group of
Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed that only Atty. Umpa’s supporters
were harassed. He also revealed that prior to the ambush incident,
there was never an instance that he was threatened by the group of
Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpa’s supporters
were being harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because
others were already harassed.37
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom
were victims of the ambush, to be credible, categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and consistent, coupled with their
positive identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of
the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them,
vis-à-vis the defense of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the
trial court rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005 finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and
imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court’s Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered finding herein appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, and the
Court hereby sentences them to suffer the indivisible prison term of
reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late
PO3 Dela Cruz the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and
another sum of ₱ 50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex
delicto; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt. Dacoco
the sum of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages plus ₱ 50,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto; and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-
Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as
attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and
the Garand pouch are hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm and
Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao
del Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the appellantsshall
be credited to them and deducted from their prison term provided
they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant Wenceslao was arrested on 29 August 2001 and
detained since then up to the present. While appellant Ricardo was
arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since then up to the
present.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the part of the prosecution to prosecute the case against
the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said accused are
apprehended.38 [Emphasis supplied].
Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial
court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal, 39 and,
thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs.
In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT
ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO FALSELY IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY TO APPELLANT WENCESLAO;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON
MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO
AND RICARDO] FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT THESE WITNESSES HAD NO
IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS;
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE
MILITARY MEN WHO ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE
WITNESSES;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT WENCESLAO
ABSCONDED AND IN IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE;
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WENCESLAO
OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF
DOUBTFUL VERACITY;
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF
[APPELLANT WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE
NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.40
While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of
error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
RICARDO DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.41
On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed
Decision affirming appellants’ conviction of the crime charged. The
Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record disclosed that the
alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant Wenceslao refer only
to minor matters. The same did not damage the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni,
Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor
and trivial points serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the prosecution
witnesses positively identified appellants in open court as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged
inconsistencies, as well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed
by the appellants. Denial is a negative and self-serving assertion that
cannot overcome the victim’s affirmative, categorical and convincing
testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must be established
by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
and not merely assert that he was somewhere else. As in the present
case, the trial court took judicial notice of the distance of seven (7)
kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants
reside, and San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush
incident took place. Appellants, therefore, could not successfully
invoke alibi as a defense because it was not physically impossible for
them to have been at the scene of the crime. 42 The Court of Appeals
then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are
DENIED, and the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.43
Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the
Court of Appeals to this Court via Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire. In lieu thereof, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation45 stating that it will no longer file a
supplement to its Consolidated Appellee’s Brief46 dated 14 December
2006 there being no transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the appellate court’s Decision was rendered.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental
Briefs,47 which were a mere rehash of the arguments already
discussed in their respective Appellant’s Briefs48 submitted before the
appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief, appellant Wenceslao
reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed
reversible errors when they decided a question of substance which is
not in accord with established facts and the applicable laws.49 He,
once again, enumerated the following errors committed by the
appellate court, thus:
I.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they
ruled that the inconsistencies committed by the prosecution
witnesses are on minor and trivial points when these inconsistencies
are indicative of the innocence of appellant Wenceslao;
II.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative
of innocence of appellant Wenceslao the fact that the authorities did
not include in the police report the name of appellant Wenceslao and
did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within a couple
of months from the date of the ambush;
III.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when they deliberately refused or failed to consider and appreciate
the testimonies of the military officers who are neutral, impartial, and
objective witnesses;
IV.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to
consider the evidence for the defense despite the clear and
unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity;
V.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately
misinterpreted the facts and misapplied the laws regarding "flight" as
an alleged indication of guilt;
VI.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant
Wenceslaobased on jurisprudence on "alibi" which are not applicable
in the case at bar50 [Emphasis and italicized omitted].
Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would show these are
tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which are badges of lies and
dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their credibility.
The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as
follows: (1) whether PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were already with
Mayor Tawan-tawan from Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao
del Norte, and vice-versa, or they merely hitched a ride in Mayor
Tawan-tawan’s vehicle on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched
a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle; (3) the officer from whom PFC
Tomanto and PFC Angni got permission in order to go home to
Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni allegedly knew appellant
Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and he even
saw appellant Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush,
yet, he did not mention the name of the former in his affidavit; (5)
Mayor Tawan-tawan should have mentioned the name of appellant
Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush incident when
he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano should
have included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports
he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should
have immediately caused his arrest if he truly participated in the
ambush incident; (7) it would no longer be necessary to discharge
Samuel and to make him as state witness if the victims of the ambush
incident, indeed, saw the perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if
appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers, Samuel would not
have failed to mention the former in his sworn statement.
Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated
inconsistencies only proved that he has no participation in the
ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. The declaration
of his innocence is thus called for.
Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him.
The motive was to remove him, being the only non-Muslim leader, in
the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who has the courage to
challenge the reign of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an
act of revenge against him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during
the 1998 elections. As to Samuel’s motive, appellant Wenceslao
claims that it was for self-preservation, freedom, leniency and some
other consideration. Evidently, after Samuel’s testimony, the latter
was released from jail.
Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on
5 June 2001 as can be gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla
and Sgt. Garsuta.
Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an
indication of guilt. He justified his temporary absence from his
residence by stating that it was because of the traumatic experience
of his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was riddled
with bullets by lawless elements without any cause.
With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily
on the determination of credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on
matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth. 51 Moreover, credibility, to
state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the trial court. In the
absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on
the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal.52 A careful perusal of the records of this case revealed that
none of these circumstances is attendant herein.
The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the
trial court places this case under the rule that factual findings are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No
reason has been given by appellants to deviate from the factual
findings arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e.,
Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor
Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June 2001 ambush incident. As
such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on that fateful
day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant
Wenceslao on the right side of the road and in a squatting position
firing at them with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni,
having seated behind the driver and on the rear (open) portion of the
yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both facing the right side
of the road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction
how appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-
16 armalite rifle while they were traversing the road of San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify appellant Ricardo, Pedro,
Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the
perpetrators of the ambush.
It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in
broad daylight, such that it would not be impossible for Macasuba and
PFC Angni to have seen and identified their assailants, particularly
appellant Wenceslao, who was once chief of Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice elected vice-mayor
of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and
appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte.53
The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally
confirmed by Samuel, an accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his
testimony before the open court, narrated how appellants and their
co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo,
Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed
in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves
in a diamond position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited
for the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and
executed the ambush from the moment the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting
shed.
Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities
of the appellants and their co-accused as the perpetrators of the
ambush because he was near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely five
(5) meters away therefrom. This is aside from the fact that appellants
and their co-accused were the very same people who brought him to
the site of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused likewise
stayed for a long period of time in the house of Samuel’s aunt prior to
the ambush incident and Samuel is very well-acquainted with these
people for he himself resided therein.54
Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution
witnesses, Macasuba, PFC Angni and Samuel, have firmly established
the identities of appellants as the perpetrators of the ambush. In
addition, their testimonies on who and how the crime was committed
were characterized by the trial court as simple and candid. Even their
answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical.
Such simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only prove that
they were telling the truth, thus, strengthening their credibility as
witnesses.
Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant
Wenceslao that allegedly cast doubt on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them frivolous, trivial, minor,
irrelevant and have nothing to do with the essential elements of the
crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple frustrated murder
and double attempted murder. In the same manner, they do not
detract from the fact that Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which
includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were ambushed by appellants
and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the yellow pick-
up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. And, said ambush resulted in the death
of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito.
It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to
minor details or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility
as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the
witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency,
which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground
to reverse a conviction.55
Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel’s failure to name appellant
Wenceslao in their affidavits/sworn statements as one of the
ambushers does not necessarily render their testimonies implausible
and unworthy of belief.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony
given in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness. An
affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open
court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given
during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in
sworn statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a
variety of reasons. More so, because of the partial and innocent
suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiant’s statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by
the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses’
direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior
to their extrajudicial statements.56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to
immediately disclose the name of the culprit does not necessarily
impair his or her credibility.57
A meticulous perusal of Samuel’s sworn statement reveals that he
categorically mentioned therein the name of appellant Wenceslao as
one of the ambushers. In his sworn statement, Samuel specifically
stated that during the ambush, he saw appellant Wenceslao at the
other side of the road, just a few meters away from the bridge, who,
at that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise firing towards the
group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.58
Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant
Wenceslao in open court as one of those responsible for the ambush
of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.59 Such open court declaration
is much stronger than their affidavits/sworn statements.
Mayor Tawan-tawan’s failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name
of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush
and SPO4 Medrano’s failure to include the name of appellant
Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police
Office of the PNP would not inure to appellant Wenceslao’s benefit.
As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when
Mayor Tawan-tawan and SPO4 Medrano met at the scene of the
crime, the former immediately told the latter that appellant
Wenceslao was one of the ambushers. 60This belied the claim of
appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4
Medrano that he (appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers.
Also, SPO4 Medrano provided an explanation61 for his failure to state
in his Spot Reports the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the
ambushers. And, even granting that his explanation would not have
been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medrano’s failure to mention appellant
Wenceslao’s name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of
the prosecution. More especially because appellant Wenceslao was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not
negate the fact that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni,
indeed, saw appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime. To
note, appellants were not the only persons accused of the crime; they
were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido,
Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to
the victims of the ambush, especially those who have died by reason
thereof, all persons responsible therefor must be penalized. Since
Samuel knew all those who have participated in the ambush incident,
his testimony as to the other accused in this case is material to
strengthen the case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately,
the other accused in this case remained at large until now.
As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:
x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of
the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one
pointing to herein appellant Wenceslao as one of those who
participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of the testimonies of
the two prosecution eyewitnesses – Macasuba and Samuel – to the
effect that appellant Ricardo was among the people who perpetrated
the said ambush.
The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The
simplicity and candidness of their testimonies only prove that they
were telling the truth. Their answers to questions were simple,
straightforward and categorical; spontaneous, frank and consistent.
Thus, a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and
consistently is a credible witness.62
Appellant Wenceslao’s allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part
of prosecution witnesses, including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.
The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of
appellant Wenceslao that the motive of the prosecution witnesses in
testifying against him was to remove him as the only non-Muslim
leader in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and that it was
an act of revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998
elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence
to support his aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court
of Appeals, "mere allegation or claim is not proof. Each party must
prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it must be emphasized
that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who won
the mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor
Tawan-tawan, who emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the
losing candidate, appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao
failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses.
It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are
moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not
so moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight
and credit.63
To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the
ambush. Being the aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what
had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to falsely accuse
someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very
unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent
person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural
interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the
victims themselves, in securing the conviction of the guilty would
deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for
otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity.64
Contrary to appellant Wenceslao’s assertion, this Court is convince
that his and appellant Ricardo’s flight from the scene of the crime
immediately after the ambush is an evidence of their guilt. It is
noteworthy that after the ambush incident, appellant Wenceslao
immediately left his residence and moved to his father’s house, then
to his son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to
Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested.
Appellant Ricardo did the same thing. From his residence in
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his parents-
in-law’s house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental,
and thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until
he was arrested on 20 December 2001. If appellants were truly
innocent of the crime charged, they would not go into hiding rather
they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go by the
biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the
righteous are as bold as a lion."65
Appellants’ respective explanations regarding their flight fail to
persuade this Court. It bears emphasis that after the alleged strafing
of appellant Wenceslao’s house, all he did is to move from one place
to another instead of having it investigated by the authorities. Until
now, the alleged strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that
strafing incident truly happened, he would be much eager to know
who caused it in order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant
Ricardo, on the other hand, was allegedly afraid of being persecuted
for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-tawan’s political
rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid
claim of appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be
given any considerable weight.
In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, coupled with their positive identification of
appellants as among the perpetrators of the ambush, appellants’
defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper.
As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently
weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellants committed
the crime.66 For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place
must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that appellants were
somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the
approximate time of its commission.67 Unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law.68 A mere denial, like alibi, is
inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.69
In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their
respective houses in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the
ambush incident happened and they have no involvement
whatsoever in the commission thereof.
To corroborate appellant Wenceslao’s testimony, the defense
presented Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant
Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece, respectively. This Court,
however, cannot give credence to the testimonies of these defense
witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslao’s relatives, their testimonies
are rendered suspect because the former’s relationship to them
makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake.
The defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the
appellant himself and his relatives, and not by credible persons.70 This
Court further quote with conformity the observation made by the trial
court, viz:
FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for herein
appellant Wenceslao were shattered by the testimony of Rudy,
another witness for appellant Wenceslao, who categorically told the
Court that during the time he and his companions Jacob Pepito and a
certain Romy were in the house of appellant Wenceslao in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took
place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they left
the house of appellant Wenceslao at about 2:45 in the afternoon.
The foregoing testimony of Rudy clearly imparts that the visit of Rudy
and his companions to the house of appellant Wenceslao, if any,
happened on another date. This will be so because if appellant
Wenceslao and his closely related witnesses are telling the truth that
Jacob Pepito, Rudy and Romy were in the house of appellant
Wenceslao talking about the said election returns during that fateful
afternoon, then definitely, Rudy should have had known of the
ambush incident, said incident being spreaded throughout or shall we
say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June 2001.
If the ambush incident occurred on the day Rudy and his companions
visited appellant Wenceslao, then, no doubt that Rudywill tell the
Court about it. But his testimony was otherwise.71 [Emphasis
supplied].
In the same breath, appellant Ricardo’s defense of denial and alibi
cannot be given any evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated.
Appellant Ricardo never presented any witness to support his claim
that he was simply inside their house attending to his wife and
children during the time that the ambush incident happened. This
Court reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no
weight in law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused
which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the
former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to
greater evidentiary weight.72
Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the
scene of the crime in the afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by
the trial court and the appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, where both appellants’ reside, is only about seven (7)
kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the
ambush took place.73
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that, indeed, appellants were among the perpetrators
of the ambush against Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
Prosecution witnesses’ categorical, positive and straightforward
testimonies, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants’ defense
of bare denial and alibi.
As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate
court, convicted appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder. This Court believes, however,
that appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this
case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the
appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
inapplicable.
Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets
discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two security
escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid
of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].
Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the
commission of the crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of
cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. There are two (2)
conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape."74
The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did
not allow the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco,
any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The attack was executed
by appellants and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to
make the defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it is
very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when they
waylaid their unwary victims.75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however,
cannot be appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery.76
Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of
evident premeditation, the circumstance cannot likewise be
appreciated. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution
must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender
clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the
determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof,
sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.77 None of these elements could be gathered from the
evidence on record.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni
and Juanito, although they were injured during the ambush and were
all hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their
injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely
medical assistance accorded to them, they would have
died.78 However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes
committed against the aforenamed victims were simply less serious
physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did
not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not mean that no
crime has been committed against them. The latter were just
fortunate enough not to have sustained any injury on the occasion
thereof. Since appellants were motivated by the same intent to kill,
thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito,
Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should be held guilty of
attempted murder.
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would
determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for the
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which explicitly states that:79
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed,
however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender
they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic
example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of
two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine
that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.80
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the
circumstances present in this case do not fit exactly the description of
a compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and
wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of
firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants
and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two
security escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and
injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of
their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one
bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at
the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez,81 each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming
each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.82
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a
single act but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of
the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply
for it speaks only of a "single act."
There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code despite the fact that several acts were performed
by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the
death and/or injuries to their victims.
In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of
their leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several
victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there held that the killing
was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part
of the accused to fire at each and every victim separately and
distinctly from each other.
If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal
impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However, "single criminal
impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no
evidence at all showing the identity or number of persons killed by
each accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing,
thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the
accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons
killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused
guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each
of them responsible for 50 deaths.84
Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as
this Court held in People v. Remollino,85 the Lawas doctrine is more of
an exception than the general rule.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it.
It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once
established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally
liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the
absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may
be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the
offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not
matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs
the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.86
The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged
conspiracy, among others. Although the trial court did not directly
state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the
concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1)
appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed
located on the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2)
appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves
on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the aforesaid
yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up
service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-
accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing
and wounding of the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-
accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt to get their bags and
other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and
(6) appellants and their co-accused fled.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated
actuations of the appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts
were coordinated. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle
with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. They were motivated by a single criminal impulse ─ to kill the
victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons
had a common purpose and were united in its execution.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at
the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility.87
With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and
their co-accused had assumed joint criminal responsibility ─ the act of
one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually
hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes
immaterial. Collective responsibility replaced individual
responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of
determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,88 People v. Abella,89 People v.
Garcia90 and People v. Pincalin,91 this Court also applied Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code even though several acts were performed by
the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.
In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive
days inside the national penitentiary between the members of two
gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates
were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were then convicted for the crime
of multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in the commission of
the crime was duly proven. There was, however, no discussion why
the accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate
crimes.
In a similar case of People v. Abella,93 involving the massacre of
certain prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar
riot that occurred in the national penitentiary on 16 February 1958
(subject of De los Santos), all the accused were also convicted for the
complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime. This Court
applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the ruling in
the said case is predicated on the theory that "when for the
attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various
acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense,"
a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although
conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where
a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their
individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a
single act – the act of execution – giving rise to a complex offense. The
felonious agreement produces a sole and solidary liability: each
confederate forms but a part of a single being."94
People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual
background as De los Santos and Abella. They were the third and
fourth cases, respectively, of prison riots resulting to the killing of
convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national penitentiary. In
Garcia, the accused were convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused
were convicted for the complex crime of double murder and
frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court found conspiracy to have
attended the commission of the crime.
In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin,
this Court, gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases
were covered by the rule that "when for the attainment of a single
purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such
acts must be considered as only one offense, a complex one."
Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons with
a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving
rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal
impulse may constitute a single complex offense.97
We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine,
contrary to Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where
several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended
the commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already
clarified that: nonetheless, this Court further held that "in other cases
where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not
involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the
killings would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by Mr.
Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases."98
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions
to the general rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn
by the peculiar circumstance of the cases.
It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad,99 this Court, once
again, applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code although the
circumstances of the case were not the same as in Lawas, De los
Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court departed from
the general rule.
In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused
unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims.
Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando),
survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. Accused were convicted for
the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We
there held that the case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas and Abella, it was pronounced that
although several independent acts were performed by the accused, it
was not possible to determine who among them actually killed
Rolando; and that there was no evidence that the accused intended
to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly
from each other. On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a
single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a whole, we
repeated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a
single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving
rise to a single complex offense.100
The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.
The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in
Pincalin, thus: where several killings on the same occasion were
perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be
applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate
offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners or it
was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella
would not apply.
To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining
the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was
not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be
attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be held liable for
separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the
number of persons actually killed by each of them.
Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all. It is as though each one performed the act of each one of the
conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the
deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts
prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48
depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase
"a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." This
is not an original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101 the
Court already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v.
Tabaco,102 clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, this Court further stated in Hon. Pineda that "to apply the first
half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act;
singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."103
With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder.
As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for
each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63104 of the Revised
Penal Code.105
Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder.
The penalty prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to
death, should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article
51106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61, 107 in
relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is
prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium period
pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64108 of the Revised Penal
Code.109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of
attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon the
appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, for each count of attempted murder.
As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following
damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.110
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a
result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be
indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any evidence
or proof thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is also
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder.111 Therefore, the
trial court and the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in
the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of
₱ 50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. In this case, treachery may no longer be
considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already taken
as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior
strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary
damages was already absorbed in the treachery. 112However, in
People v. Combate,113 this Court still awards exemplary damages
despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter similar
conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter
future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of ₱
30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of each
deceased victims is proper.114 The said amount is in conformity with
this Court’s ruling in People v. Gutierrez.115
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts
covering the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other
expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate
damages may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim’s
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot
be proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code.116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount
was not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court similarly awards ₱
25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased
victims.117
The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni
and Juanito, are also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary
damages.
Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the
wounds inflicted upon the aforesaid victims would naturally cause
physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar
injuries.118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral damages in the
amount of ₱ 40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court’s ruling in
People v. Mokammad.119
The award of ₱ 25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is
beyond doubt that these victims were hospitalized and spent money
for their medication. As to Macasuba, although he was not confined
in a hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that he also spent for the treatment
of the minor injuries he sustained by reason of the ambush. However,
they all failed to present any receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could
not be denied that they suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only
prudent to award temperate damages in the amount of ₱ 25,000.00
to each of them.1âwphi1
The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito are awarded
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱ 30,000.00 to conform to
current jurisprudence.120
This Court likewise affirms the award of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as
attorney’s fees, as well as costs of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-
tawan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants
are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of
attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count; (3) other
than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the
trial court and the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in the
amount of ₱ 30,000.00 and ₱ 25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of
each deceased victims; and (4) appellants are also directed to pay,
jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni
and Juanito the amount of ₱ 40,000.00 each as moral damages, ₱
25,000.00 each as temperate damages and ₱ 30,000.00 each as
exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40106 March 13, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
ERNESTO GARCIA, RICARDO RODRIGUEZ, GEORGE BURDETT,
ROMEO MARANAN, REYNALDO ARNALDO and AMADOR
ATIENZA, defendants whose death sentences are under automatic
review.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General N.P. de Pano, Jr. and
Solicitor Oswaldo D. Agcaoili for appellee.
Raymundo A. Armovit for defendants.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another murder case involving the killing of prisoners by other
prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal where feuding
gangs used to stage vendettas and rumbles.
There is no question as to the corpus delicti At about eight o'clock in
the morning of Good Friday, April 9, 1971, some prisoners of
dormitory 4-C, while themselves in front of building IV, were
feloniously attacked by other prisoners who used improvised bladed
weapons.
Four, prisoners, namely, Samuel Diaz, Augusta de Guzman, de Villa
and Salvador Alcontin, were mortally wounded and died later in the
hospital while two prisoners, Josefino So and Abdul Amking Jr., were
wounded.
Diaz, 25, sustained twenty-five stab wounds of which fifteen were on
the back. De Villa, 22, had stab wounds in the lumbar region, neck,
abdomen and chest. De Guzman, 24, suffered four frontal stab
wounds one of which penetrated his heart and three stab wounds on
the back one of which perforated his left lung. Alcontin 30, had four
stab wounds on his side, back and forearm. Amking was stabbed in
the lumbar region while Joaquin So had a stab wound on the left arm
and on the back near the shoulder and abrasions on the knees.
The assailants were Emesto Garcia, Ricardo Rodriguez, George
Burdett, Romeo Maranan, Reynaldo Arnaldo and Amador Atienza.
(The case of the seventh assailant, Ricardo Yamba who was given an
indeterminate sentence, is not under review.)
Some victims were stabbed near the water tank and others near the
dormitories. The victims were members of the Oxo gang while the
assailants were members of the Sputnik gang. The assailants took part
in the riot after they learned that Joseph Casey, a member of their
gang, had been stabbed.
The assailants surrendered voluntarily to the prison guards with their
weapons except Arnaldo who left his weapon at the scene of the
crime. In the afternoon of that day when the killings were
perpetrated, the assailants executed separate confessions which
were sworn to before the Assistant Director of Prisons (Exh. H to N).
They recounted in their interlocking confessions how the assaults
were perpetrated.
The prison guard-investigator reported that the seven prisoners who
executed confessions were the culprits (Exh. G). He testified on the
voluntariness of their confessions.
On May 26, 1973, or more than two years after the incident, the seven
assailants were charged in court in a single information with "multiple
murder and double frustrated murder".
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by a counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty. But when the case was called for trial, all the
accuse (except Arnaldo), manifested through a new counsel de oficio
that they were withdrawing their former plea of not guilty. When re-
arraigned, the six accused entered a plea of guilty.
Then, on November 17, 1973, after the information was amended by
changing the date of the commission of the crime, the accused,
assisted by three new counsels de oficio, were rearraigned and they
pleaded not guilty.
However, at the hearing on September 6, 1974, when the defense
counsel was going to present his evidence, he apprised the court that
the accused would change their plea of not guilty to that of guilty and
that they would present evidence to prove that there was no
conspiracy. The court did not act on that manifestation. There was no
rearraignment.
Immediately after that manifestation, the accused presented their
evidence. But instead of merely proving lack of conspiracy, the
accused tried to show that they defended themselves against the
supposed aggression committed by the members of the Oxo gang.
As condensed by counsel de oficio in this Court, the version of the
accused was that in the morning of April 9, 1971, while they and the
other prisoners, numbering around one hundred fifty, were taking a
sunbath at the plaza in front of dormitory 4-C, the prisoners from the
adjoining brigades suddenly appeared in the area and attacked the
accused and their companions.
The alleged raiders belonged to the Oxo gang. The accused and their
companions were alerted to the attack because the prisoners in the
upper stories of the dormitories shouted that the Oxos were coming
and they allegedly threw into plaza bladed weapons (matalas).
There followed a tumultuous affray wherein the accused allegedly
acted in self-defense. The arrival of Constabulary soldiers who fired
their guns into the air ended the bedlam and mayhem (pp. 3-4, Brief).
The trial court rejected that version of the accused. It found that the
accused, all convicted prisoners serving sentences and members of
the Sputnik gang, took advantage of the occasion when the members
of the Oxo gang were taking a sunbath and assaulted them on the
pretext that a member of the Sputnik gang had been stabbed by a
member of the Oxo gang.
The trial court characterized the claim of self-defense as an
afterthought. It noted that the changes of plea made by the accused
indicated a guilty conscience. It convicted them of four murders and
double frustrated murder and sentenced each of the six accused to
four death penalties and one indeterminate sentence of eight years
and one day of prision mayor as maximum, to ten years of prision
mayor as maximum, to pay solidarily to the heirs of the dead victims
eighty thousand pesos as indemnity and twelve thousand pesos to the
victims in the frustrated murder case.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review of the death
penalty. The learned counsel de oficio, designated to present the side
of the accused, contends that their extrajudicial confessions were
taken under duress in the course of custodial interrogation and in
violation of their right against self-incrimination. Counsel invokes
Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 694.
The ruling in the Miranda case is now found in section 20 of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973.
Section 20 provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against hint. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section of this shall be inadmissble in
evidence.
Paragraph 18 of the Bill of Rights of the old Constitution
(corresponding to section 20) contained only the provision against
self-incrimination. It does not mention the rights of the accused
during custodial interrogation. But article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code supplemented paragraph 18 by providing that "in every case,
the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
and shag be allowed, upon his request to communicate and confer at
any time with his at, attorney or counsel" (As amended by Republic
Act No. 1083).
We have held that the innovations introduced in section 20 have no
retroactive effect and that they apply only to confessions obtained
after the effectivity of the new Constitution (Magtoto vs. Manguera,
L-37201-02, Simeon vs. Villaluz, L-37424, and People vs. Isnani, L-
38929, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4). Hence, section 20 does not apply
to this case.
It should be noted that shortly after the stabbing incident and on the
same day when it occurred, Abraham de las Alas, an investigator,
submitted a report wherein he stated that the seven accused,
together with Casey, were the prisoners who stabbed the victims
(Exh. V).
About twenty-two months after the incident or on February 8, 1973,
when the accused were in the office in the New Bilibid Prison of
Francisco M. Guerrero, the special prosecutor conducting the
preliminary investigation, the accused ratified their confessions and
waived their rights to counsel and to present evidence, as shown in
their signed statement (Exh. W) which reads:
... aming tinatalikdan o ipina-uubaya ang aming karapatan na
nagkaroon ng tagapagtanggol at magpahayag ng aming panig ukol sa
nasabing usapin.
Bukod dito ay aming ipinahahayag ang aming kusang loob na pag-
amin nang kasalanan sa nasabing usapin.
If they had been maltreated and if their confessions were not
voluntary, they could have complained to Prosecutor Guerrero about
the alleged maltreatment.
Counsel de oficio contends that the lower court erred in rejecting the
defendants' pleas of self-defense and in not entering an exculpatory
verdict. These contentions are premised on the invalidity of the
defendants' extrajudicial confessions.
We have reached the conclusion that the confessions of the accused
should be accorded full probative value. On the basis of those
confessions, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
The killings of the four victims were correctly characterized by the trial
court as murders in view of the suddenness of the assaults. The
accused employed means and methods which insured the
consummation of the killings without any risk to themselves arising
from any defense which their unarmed and hapless victims might
have made. Indeed, the accused did not suffer any injuries. Their
victims were not able to retaliate or to defend themselves.
As correctly observed by counsel de oficio, the wounds sustained by
Amking and So did not affect any vital organ and could not have
caused their death (7 tsn January 23, 1974). So, the crime as to them
is only attempted murder.
As the accused are quasi-recidivists, the death penalty, as the
maximum penalty for murder, should be imposed on them
conformably with article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
We have stated that the trial court treated the four killings as four
separate offenses and imposed four death penalties on each of the
six accused. It regarded the double frustrated murder as only one
offense and imposed on each of the herein six accused only one
indeterminate sentence.
We hold that the four murders and the double attempted murder
should be considered as a complex offense. The assailants were co-
conspirators as shown by the simultaneousness of their assaults. They
belonged to the same Sigue-Sigue Sputnik (SSS) gang and harbored a
common hostility to the members of the Oxo gang. They were
impelled by the same motive which was to inflict injury on the six
victims, members of the Oxo gang.
This case is covered by the rule that when for the attainment of a
single purpose, which constitutes an offense, various acts are
executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a
complex one.
In other words, when a conspiracy animates several persons with a
single purpose, their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are
treated as a single act, the act of execution, which gives rise to a
complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and
solidary liability (People vs. Abella, L-32205, August 31, 1979 and
cases cited therein).
The trial court regarded the imposition of the death penalties as
"clearly excessive" considering the conditions in the national
penitentiary where "riots caused by gang rivalries were rampant. It
recommended to the Chief Executive, through the Secretary of
Justice, that the death penalties be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
The observation of the trial court as to the existence of gang rivalries
is a matter of judicial notice. In fact, aside from the four killings
involved in this case, which were perpetrated at about eight-forty-
five in the morning of Good Friday, April 9, 1971, three other incidents
took place in succession on that same morning.
Thus, at about ten-five on that morning, a prisoner named Mario
Basada was kill in dormitory 11-B-1 by another prisoner. At ten-
twenty, prisoner Joseph Bautista was killed in dormitory 12-D by two
prisoners. And then at eleven-twenty-five prisoners Victoriano Abril
and Florentino Tilosa were killed in Brigade 6-A by three prisoners and
prisoner Leonardo Francisco was stabbed.
So, on that Good Friday, eight prisoners were killed by their fellow
prisoners (Exh. V, pp. 168, Record).
The personal circumstances of the accused may show why in this case
justice should be tempered with compassion.
Garcia, 27 when he testified, single, was a former helper in a welding
shop. He is a native of Plaridel, Bulacan. When he was twelve years
old, his mother died. He has seven brothers. His father is still alive. He
reached first year high school. He was previously convicted of
homicide.
When Garcia testified, the trial judge asked him whether he
confirmed his lawyer's manifestation that the accused were willing to
plead guilty. Garcia replied: "If our sentence will not be death but only
life, even how many life sentences, we will admit or plead guilty, your
Honor" (2 and 6 tsn September 6, 1974).
Rodriguez, 32, married with three children, a resident of Makati, Rizal,
was a former horse trainer. His father died when he was seven years
old; his mother died when he was twenty-five years old. He was
previously convicted of robbery. He has six brothers. His mother used
to be the principal of the element school at Tejeros, Makati.
Burdett, 36, married, was convicted of robbery when he was twenty-
seven years old. He is an only child. His parents are still living. He lived
with his mother. His father, a television repairman, has stayed in
Hawaii for several years and made rare visits to his family here.
Maranan, 25, married, came from Socorro, Oriental Mindoro. He has
no educational attainment. He does not know how to read. He knows
only how to sign his name. He was convicted of frustrated murder in
1968. His father was the chief of police of the town. He has a brother
and a sister. When he was sixteen he ran away from home.
Arnaldo, 26, single, was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal. He reached
Grade two. He had previously stabbed someone. For that offense, he
has been serving sentence in the national penitentiary. He has some
mental illness (sumpong) or epilepsy. He was confined in the prison
hospital.
Atienza, 24, married, a laborer, was formerly a resident of Paco,
Manila. He reached first year high school.
Considering the conditions in the New Bilibid Prison as well as the
personal circumstances of the six accused and following the
precedents laid down in People vs. De los Santos, L-190678, July 30,
1965, 14 SCRA 702 and People vs. Abella, supra, the death penalty
imposable in this case should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is set aside. Each of the six
accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay solidarily an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to each set of heirs of the four
dead victim 9, one thousand pesos to Joaquin So and another one
thousand pesos to Abdul Amking Jr. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38755 January 22, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE PINCALIN, RODOLFO BELTRAN, EDUARDO EMPLEO and
ALEJANDRO JANDOMON, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another convict-against-convict murder case involving
prisoners in the national penitentiary. As shown in People vs. Garcia,
L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497, at around eight-forty-five in
the morning of Good Friday, April 9, 1971, certain Visayan prisoners,
members of the Oxo gang, were killed by their fellow-prisoners from
Luzon, members of the Sigue- Sigue Sputnik (SSS) gang.
To avenge those killings, the herein accused, Jose Pincalin, Rodolfo
Beltran, Eduardo Empleo and Alejandro Jandomon, all Visayans
(except Beltran) and members of the Oxo and Happy-Go-Lucky gangs,
conspired at about ten o'clock in the morning of that same Good
Friday to kill some of their fellow- prisoners in dormitory 6-A of the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa Rizal, who were members of the
Sputnik gang.
They agreed that Pincalin would kill Leonardo Francisco that Beltran
and Empleo would kill Victorino Abril, and that Jandomon would kill
Florentino Tilosa. The accused armed themselves with improvised
bladed weapons known among prisoners as matalas.
About an hour later, the accused proceeded to implement the
objective of the conspiracy. While Abril was seated on his bed
watching someone who was making a basket Beltran and Empleo
approached him frontally and stabbed him Abril fell on the floor.
While in that position, Empleo stabbed him six times while Beltran
stabbed him five times.
The second victim, Tilosa was standing near the door of the dormitory
when Jandomon stabbed him on the right side of his body. As Tilosa
resisted, Jandomon stabbed him repeatedly until he collapsed on the
floor.
The third victim, Francisco, was standing near a wall facing the prison
hospital and, as he heard Abril asking why he was assaulted when he
had not done anything wrong, Francisco was stabbed by Pincalin in
the abdomen near the waist. Fransisco avoided further assaults from
Pincalin by climbing a window.
Afterwards, Pincalin, Empleo, Beltran and Jandonion surrendered
with their weapons to a prison inspector named Manalac and a prison
guard named Pantua. On that same day they executed separate
extrajudicial confessions in Tagalog which were sworn to before the
Assistant Director of Prisons.
The autopsy disclosed that Tilosa, 37, a native of Mulanay, Quezon,
suffered six gaping stab wounds in the chest and abdomen two of
which penetrated his right lung and liver, and two stab wounds in the
left forearm, or eight stab wounds in all.
Abril, 34, a native of Barrio Veronica, San Pablo City, sustained five
gaping stab wounds in the chest, one of which penetrated his left
lung, a gaping incised wound in the right leg, and abrasions in the
chest and wounds in the back and arms, or fourteen stab wounds in
all.
Francisco, 48, a native of Cavite City sustained a serious stab wound
in the lumbar region of the abdomen which was sutured Later, a
surgical operation was performed on Fransisco.
About seventeen months after that killing, or on September 5, 1972,
a special prosecutor filed an information against the four accused,
charging them with murder and frustrated murder, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation and alleging that they
perpetrated the offenses while serving sentences in the national
penitentiary. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty.
The main evidence against the accused consisted of their ex- extra-
judicial confessions. Francisco A. Cometa, Jr., the prison guard
investigator who took the confessions and made a written report of
the incident dated May 6, 1971, testified on the voluntariness of the
confessions and confirmed his report that the four accused were
responsible for the two killings and the wounding of Francisco and
that gang rivalry motivated the assaults.
Cometa Identified the four accused in the course of his testimony.
Cometa also Identified the affidavits of Francisco and Lamberto
Mapalad, a convict and alleged eyewitness who implicated the
accused in the assaults. However, Francisco and Mapalad did not
testify. Hence, their affidavits are hearsay.
At the trial, the four accused repudiated their confessions Jandomon,
37, a native of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, denied that he and his
co-accused assaulted the three victims herein. He admitted that he
was a member of the Happy-Go-Lucky gang. He allegedly signed his
confession because he was confined in a room without breakfast and
lunch up to ten-thirty in the evening of April 9, 1971. He signed
because he was hungry. Cometa allegedly said that if he did not sign
the confession he would not be allowed to go home.
Jandomon said that he could not read his confession because he does
not know how to read. He was not formally investigated. He does not
remember whether he appeared before the Assistant Director of
Prisons to swear to his confession. He admitted that he was not
mauled by the investigator We were not mauled by Cometa", 12 tsn
March 20, 1974).
Accused Beltran, 29, a native of Pasay City, a tubercular who finished
Grade five, testified that he did not know how Abril and Tilosa were
killed. He denied that he entered into a conspiracy with Pincalin,
Jandomon and Empleo to assault the victims. He said that he was
investigated by Cometa. He admitted that he signed his confession
because he trusted Cometa who assured him that he could go home
(umuwi) after signing it. At about nine o' clock in the morning of April
9, 1971, he was taken to the investigation room by Cometa and made
to face the wall. He declared that Cometa did not maltreat nor
intimidate him.
Accused Empleo, 32, a native of Bacolod City, who finished Grade one,
declared that he did not know who killed Abril and Tilosa. He was not
interrogated by Cometa. He could not have read qqqs confession
because he does not know how to read. He signed it because he was
hungry and dizzy. He did not kill Abril and Tilosa. He admitted that he
was not maltreated nor intimidated by Cometa. He was a member of
the Happy-Go- Lucky gang. He said that the enmity between Tagalogs
and Visayans was a common phenomenon in Muntinlupa.
Pincalin, 27, a native of Samar, who finished Grade two, testified that
he had no participation in the assaults committed on April 9, 1971. He
denied having executed any confession However, he admitted his
signature and thumbmark in his confession. He said that he was not
interrogated by Cometa He admitted that he was not maltreated by
Cometa. He said that he did not belong to any gang in 1971 but in
1974 he was a member of the Batang Samahan ng Way-Leyte. He said
that Beltran was his "boy" (bata).
All the four accused admitted on the witness stand that they were
serving sentences for different crimes when the assaults in question
were perpetrated.
By way of rebuttal, Cometa testified that the four accused were given
their lunch at four twenty-five in the afternoon of April 9, 1971. He
took the confessions in the following manner:
Before I proceeded to the investigation proper, I interviewed them
(the four accused) one by one verbally. After that, I went to the
brigade and looked for an eyewitness but I was not able to find an
eyewitness that day.
I talked to them and asked them whether the other (their) confessions
were true or not and they insisted that they were confessing to the
truth. So that was the time I proceeded to the investigation proper.
(22 tsn March 26, 1974).
The trial court convicted the four accused of murder, which it
regarded as a complex crime qualified by treachery and aggravated
by evident premeditation and quasi-recidivism. Applying article 160 In other cases where several killings on the same occasion were
of the Revised Penal Code, it sentenced each of them to one death perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be
penalty and ordered them to pay solidarily to the heirs of the two applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate
deceased victims, Abril and Tilosa, an indemnity of twenty thousand offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some
pesos. decided cases.
The trial court also convicted the four accused of frustrated murder WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is set aside. The accused,
and sentenced each of them to an indeterminate penalty of Pincalin, Empleo and Jandomon, are each sentenced to reclusion
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as perpetua and to pay solidarily to each set of heirs of the victims, Abril
minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to and Tilosa, an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to Francisco
pay solidarily an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos. an indemnity of six thousand pesos. Costs de oficio.
The accused did not appeal from that decision. The case was elevated SO ORDERED.
to this Court for automatic review of the death penalty.
Accused Beltran died in prison of tuberculosis on May 7, 1977. Hence,
his criminal liability was extinguished. Resolution of November 17,
1977.)
Counsel de oficio, who was designated to present the side of the
accused in this review, contends that the guilt of the accused was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He observed that the investigation
conducted by Cometa was haphazard and in adequate. The case
hinges on the probative value of the confessions of the accused.
After taking into account the testimony of the investigator on the
voluntariness of the confessions, the fact that, admittedly the accused
signed their confessions without any maltreatment or intimidation
and that there is no reason why the investigator would falsely impute
to them the commission of two murders and one frustrated murder
by fabricating their confessions, we have reached the conclusion that
the confession should be regarded as conclusive proof of their guilt.
The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the lower court erred
in imposing the death penalty, considering the inhuman congestion in
the national penitentiary, as described by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in
People vs. De los Santos, L-19067-68, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 702, 712.
We find that the four accused are guilty of the complex crime of
double murder and frustrated murder aggravated by quasi-
recidivism. This case is governed by the rule that when for the
attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense various
acts are executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense,
a complex one (People vs. Penas 66 Phil. 682).
In other words, where a conspiracy animates several persons with a
single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving
rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal
impulse may constitute a single complex offense. (People vs. Abella,
L-32205, August 31, 1979.)
Therefore, the four accused should each be sentenced to death, as
was done by the trial court. However, following the precedent
established in the De los Santos and Abella cases as well as in
the Garcia case, which involved four murders and double attempted
murder committed on the same day when the double murder and
frustrated murder in this case were committed, the death penalty
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In the De los Santos case, which like this case arose due to the virulent
and continuing feud between members of the Sigue-Sigue and Oxo
gangs, there was a riot in the morning of Sunday, February 16, 1958,
in the national penitentiary. Five prisoners were killed. On
the following day, a similar riot occurred Four prisoners were killed.
For the killing of the nine prisoners, the fourteen accused (originally
46 were charged in two separate cases), only one reclusion
perpetua was imposed.
It should be noted that the killings in this case were
the fourth incident which transpired on Good Friday, April 9,. 1971.
Thus at past eight o'clock in the morning of that day, four prisoners
were killed (Garcia case). Then at ten-fiveon that same morning, one
prisoner was killed. At ten-twenty-five, two prisoners were killed and
at eleven-twenty-five, the two killings involved in this case were
perpetrated (96 SCRA 505).
G.R. Nos. L-19067-68 July 30, 1965
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDILBERTO DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., defendants,
ANTONIO MARCOS, FRANCISCO FLORES, FELIX JASON, EDILBERTO
DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN ARMOBIT, ALEJANDRO MACASO,
CARLOS REBANO, JOSE GARCHITORENA, CIPRIANO CASTRO, JOSE
CRUZ, JR., MARCIAL AMA, ALFREDO PERALTA, CONRADO BELEN
and BENIGNO CASULLA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Fidel A. Santiago for defendants-appellants Flores and De los Santos.
Raymundo A. Armovit for defendant-appellant Benjamin Armobit.
Ananias C. Ona for other defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), in
its Criminal Cases Nos. 7703-7704, imposing the death penalty on
fourteen (14) inmates of the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal,
for the crime of multiple murder.
Originally indicted in the two cases were forty-five (45) and forty-six
(46) prisoners, respectively. On agreement of the parties, the cases
were jointly tried, and, in due course, the cases against some inmates
were dismissed, other defendants were acquitted, while fourteen
(14) were convicted, namely: Antonio Marcos, Francisco Flores, Felix
Jason, Edilberto de los Santos, Benjamin Armobit, Alejandro Macaso,
Carlos Rebaño, Jose Garchitorena, Cipriano Castro, Jose Cruz, Jr.,
Marcial Ama, Alfredo Peralta, Conrado Belen and Benigno Casulla.
The impressions of the trial judge, Hon. Andres Reyes. of the situation
obtaining in the penitentiary (he made an ocular inspection and held
sessions there) were described by him in the decision, as follows:
The whole compound was a scene of one big congestion, made more
repulsive by the fact that as one enters its steel gates which lead to
the cell buildings, the smell of human flesh and perspiration owing to
the congestion contaminates the air. The overflow of prisoners in
each cell was no ordinary one total count shown by the prison records
reveals that there were 8,304 prisoners all packed up in the six prison
buildings which were supposed to house only a little more than 5,000
inmates at it, full capacity. In Brigade 1-B of Building I alone, 263
prisoners were all packed up in a cell house which can take only a load
of 116 prisoners. In Brigade 1-D, the bartolina just beneath Brigade 1-
B, there were 350 prisoners as compared to its capacity of only 33
inmates.
The cell of Brigade 1-B was a big hall-like structure with six or five
grilled gates and a narrow corridor on its right side. Inside the cell
were triple decked steel buildings all lined up one after another such
that they occupy the whole cell itself. These arrangements were good
only for 116 prisoners at most. What happened when 350 prisoners
were all made to live within this cagelike confines is unimaginable.
There was hardly any space for anyone to move; more so in Brigade
1-D, which houses the bartolina, where a two-man cell was filled with
ten or more prisoners. The beddings certainly will not accommodate
everybody. A lot of prisoners had to sleep — if they sleep at all — on
the cold cement floor. The whole cell itself is one big sleeping, dining,
living, toilet and drainage room where some of the inmates, finding
no space, had to live, sleep and eat in the toilet and drainage rooms
of the cell houses. In the bartolina, conditions were even worse. The
prisoners were actually sleeping and stepping over each other like a
bunch of canned sardines. And what is more, the food allowances
were no allowances at all. Each prisoner has an allocation of thirty
centavo, worth of food per day — it is needless to speculate on what
a ten-centavo meal could do. The prisoners were given each two or
three pairs of clothing, for the cleaning and washing of which they
were made responsible. It is hardly possible, however, to do any
washing under the obtaining conditions. Those who were fortunate
enough to receive gifts in food and clothing from friends or relatives
were hardly able to touch or make use of them for fear that the rage
of the less fortunate among the inmates would be turned against
them.
Hardened criminals were mixed with light offenders. Extortions and
all sorts of crimes were being committed sometimes right under the
very noses of the guards who, to top it all, could not maintain even a
semblance of order and/or discipline as they were so outnumbered
and themselves afraid that they might also be stabbed or liquidated.
Because of these situation, helpless, inmates by reason of their
physical build have been abused and could not complain for fear of
reprisal.
All these contributed to augment the growing feeling of the inmates
that they are living in a world of outcasts where only the mighty and
the strong survive, where hope of redemption is illusory and where
life has been subjected to the law of the jungle or the law of the
survival of the fittest.
And so like all humans with little sense of order left in their mind, they
formed themselves into bands or into groups and finally into big
organizations upon which each and every member looked for
protection, security and, most important of all, for food and means of
survival. The bold and outspoken assumed leadership of the gang. At
first there were many of these groups, popular among them were the
Flower gang, the Tira-Tira gang and the Rose Tattoo gang. But as time
went on after discipline continued to be lax, these small organizations
started to foment rivalries among themselves until finally these small
gangs grouped themselves into two big organizations and called
themselves the Sigue-sigue and the Oxo gangs.
None of the witnesses of the prosecution as well as the accused
themselves could tell with certainty the significance or meaning of the
words sigue-sigue and oxo, but the evidence is clear that the Sigue-
sigue organization counted with the support of inmates coming from
Luzon particularly from the Tagalog regions, while the Oxo was
generally composed of inmates coming from the South or the Visayas.
The enmity and rivalry that grew between the two big organizations
became worse as time went on. A reading of the consolidated incident
report prepared by inspector Meliton Geronimo OYCZ, security and
custodian of the New Bilibid Prisons as received by the Court during,
the ocular inspection conducted in the penitentiary, shows that as
early as 1957 cases of stabbing, assault and all sorts. of crime
frequently happened whenever the members of these two
organization, came in contact with each other. As time went on the
incident became more frequent indicating thereby that the situation
was going out of control. By January, 1958 the die has been cast; the
rivalry that persisted between the two organizations has grown to
enormous proportions. Almost daily free-for-all fights occurred
between the two rival organizations. Killing became almost a daily
occurrence ... .
On 17 January 1958, the Sigue-Sigues held a meeting where they
decided to liquidate their rivals. They met again on the night of 15
February 1958, and decided that the next day, a Sunday, would be the
appointed day.
Thus, pandemonium broke loose in the penitentiary at between eight
and nine o'clock on Sunday morning, 16 February 1958, when the
Sigue-Sigues staged a riot against their enemies. This started with a
commotion on the upper floor of the cell house. A mass of about 150
prisoners, many of whom were armed with improvised weapons,
forcibly opened the door to the cell house, liberated their companions
from their individual cells and then opened the cells where the Oxos
were, took them out by force or deception, and then clubbed and
stabbed them to death one after the other. Five (5) died when the riot
was quelled.
At about the same time on the following day, 17 February 1958,
another riot, carried out in the same fashion as the day before,
accounted for four (4) more deaths.
Two drums of weapons, consisting of icepicks, sharpened instruments
improvised from nails and parts of a steel drum, and wooden and iron
clubs made from broken windows and beds (tarima) were collected
from the site after each day's riot,
The findings of the medical officers of the Bureau of Prisons on the
corpses of the nine (9) victims portray eloquently the shocking extent
of the carnage, brutality, and cannibalism of these riots.
The findings on those who died on the 16th of February, 1958 are as
follows:
Cresenciano Borromeo
(1) Lacerated wound of the scalp 6 inches in length with a crack of the
skull and brain substance coming out.
(2) Right ear amputated.
(3) Lacerated wound of the right eyebrow 8 inches in length and 2
cms. in depth.
(4) Bruises at both right and left legs.
Cause of death: Fracture of skull.
Martin Dorado
(1) Two lacerated wounds of the head 4 cms. in length 1 cm. in depth.
(2) Nine punctured wounds of the chest two cms. in length, five of
which are penetrating, 4 puncturing the lungs, one cutting the big
blood vessels.
(3) Lacerated wound of the left hand 3 cms. in length, one cm. in
depth. Cause of death: Internal hemorrhage from multiple fatal
wounds of the chest.
Pablo Callares
(1) Lacerated wound left front temporal region 4 inches in length and
fracture of the skull;
(2) Punctured wound right scapular region 2 cms. in length 3 cms. in
depth;
(3) Bruises — right arm, left hand and abdomen;
(4) Bruises at left and right knees;
(5) Punctured wound left leg 2 cms. in length 3 cms. in depth position
portion;
Cause of death: Fracture of skull.
Marcelino Javier Baltazar
(1) Lacerated wound of the head occipital region 3 inches in length 1
cm. in depth;
(2) Lacerated wound of the left eyelids 4 cms. in length 2 cms. in
depth;
(3) Lacerated wound of the mouth left angle 4 cms. in length 3 cms.
in depth;
(4) Lacerated wound at the left parotid region 4 cms. in length 2 cms.
in depth;
(5) Lacerated wound left mandibular region 4 cms. in length 2 cms. in
depth;
Cause of death: Cerebral contusion due to head blow.
Jesus Garcia Dizon
(1) Lacerated wound left occipital parietal region 5 inches in length 1
cm. in depth with cracked skull;
(2) Lacerated wounds right eye upper lid parallel to each other 4 cms.
in length 1/2 cm. in depth each;
(3) Lacerated wound behind left ear 3 inches in length 1/2 cm. in
depth;
(4) Punctured wound left chest 1-1/2 cms. in length 5 cms. in depth
penetrating the left lungs:
(5) Presence of bruises on both left and right hands;
(6) Punctured wound left forearm 1-1/2 cms. in length 3 cms. in
depth;
Cause of death: Fracture of the skull.
The findings on those who died on the 17th of February, 1958 are also
as follows:
Francisco Manalo
(1) Head — 7 wounds lacerated & fractured;
(2) Neck — 1 wound lacerated 5 inches long;
(3) Abdomen — 10 wounds stab and penetrating;
(4) Left hand — 1 wound lacerated;
(5) Left thigh — 1 wound thru and thru.
Ernesto Cruz alias Matias
(1) Head — burned
(2) Neck — 1 wound stab 1 inch
(3) Chest — 1 wound stab 1 inch
(4) Abdomen — 2 wounds stab 1 inch
(5) Lower extremities — both burned.
Alfredo Gabieta
(1) Head — beheaded
(2) Chest — 4 wounds stab
(3) Abdomen — 7 wounds cut
(4) Pelvic region — wounds cut
(5) Tabia febula — 1 wound lacerated.
Porfirio Sanchez
(1) Head — 11 wounds with lacerated big round chin, right ear (2-1
/2) inches
(2) Neck — 3 wounds 1-1/2 inches
(3) Chest — 10 wounds 1 inch stab
(4) Abdomen — 6 wounds 1 inch stab
(5) Right thigh — 7 wounds 1 inch.
Ernesto Cruz, alias Matias, and Alfredo Gabieta met their death
differently from the others.
Ernesto Cruz was one of those who joined in the attack. After the door
of their intended victims was opened, Cruz was pulled inside and
killed by the inmates therein. Enraged by this incident and by the
refusal of the inmates to come out of their cell, the attackers gathered
pieces of wood and newspapers, poured gas and set the cell on fire,
thus burning the head and lower extremities of the dead Ernesto Cruz.
Alfredo Gabieta, also known as "Pilay," came out voluntarily from his
cell after receiving assurance that he was not an enemy. Upon coming
out, however, he was clubbed, smack on the face, stabbed, placed on
a bench and beheaded kempeitai-style. Alfredo Peralta, alias "Shane,"
took the severed head by the hair, took it to a typewriter of the
warden and pretended to investigate it, after which Peralta ran with
the head to the fire escape and from there threw it to his companions.
The meetings on 17 January 1958 and 15 February 1958 of the Sigue-
Sigues and the conduct of the riots — the mass movement of the mob,
the timing, the generally uniform manner in the killings, the
obedience to, and execution of, the commands or instructions of the
leaders — are direct proofs of the existence of a conspiracy.
Apart from the medical testimony, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses with respect to the participation of each of the
accused in the conspiracy and in the commission thereof: Leon
Catbagan, Joventino Garces, Marcelino Quirabo, Sotero Bautista, and
Isidoro Lizardo, all serving terms in the penitentiary, and Francisco
Roxas, keeper-in-charge of the cell house.
The credibility of these witnesses is the only issue.
Catbagan's testimony is assailed because, when he was presented as
a defense witness about six months after he testified for the
prosecution, he recanted his previous testimony against the accused,
on the excuse that he was maltreated by prison authorities. The
recantation and the excuse cannot be believed: his sworn testimony
as a prosecution witness remained clear and straightforward for four
(4) session days, on 5, 11, 12, and 30 June 1958, without detectable
hint of untruth or fabrication, or lack of voluntariness.
That this prisoner's testimony for the prosecution was spontaneous
also appears from certain details of that testimony. He pointed out
that one of the ring leaders was a prisoner who had since been
released; and that he was able to talk to a guard and reveal what he
knew, without danger to himself, by employing the ruse of insulting
the guard. On the other hand, when much later he recanted his
previous statements, he was vague, sought support from an
employee who had since gone A.W.O.L., and refused to enter into
details unless all those whom he hid previously implicated were
present to hear him; and the reason given for his recantation (that he
was about to complete serving his term) was wholly unsatisfactory,
for this reason already existed when he first testified. Since
Catbagan's original testimony was corroborated by other witnesses
and evidence for the prosecution, we can see no error in the trial
court's refusal to accept his recantation; particularly since the trial
judge had opportunity to closely observe the behavior of the witness
on both occasions.
The observation of this Court is that the testimony of each
prosecution witness, when not corroborating another, dovetails into
the narrative of the others, such that, taken together, the completed
whole generates belief even unto its parts. The inconsistencies or
faults in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are minor, but
uncommon, and do no damage to the substance of the evidence. It
would have been extraordinary indeed if in the observation and
narration of rapidly changing events of high emotional content no
inconsistencies had developed.
That the Court a quo acquitted some accused also implicated by the
witnesses of the prosecution, because it felt that the incriminating
evidence lacked adequate corroboration, does not establish that the
testimony was false or fabricated. It merely emphasizes a
commendable caution in weighing the proof in a capital case.
The involvement of each one of the fourteen (14) remaining accused
is as follows:
Antonio Marcos
He is the recognized leader of the Sigue-Sigue gang; presided over the
meetings on 17 January and 15 February 1958; was seen sharpening
instruments; gave the instructions to raid the cell house and
threatened those who would not follow; was seen opening the door
of Brigade 1-D, the cell house; clubbed and/or stabbed Cresenciano
Borromeo and another victim; set fire to the cell where Matias was
killed; opened the cell door of Quirabo, an Oxo and a prosecution
witness.
Francisco Flores
Armed with a sharp instrument, he was seen coming from the upper
floor, opened the cell door of Pablo Callares, then clubbed and
stabbed him; did the same to Jesus Dizon and Marcelino Javier
Baltazar and another victim. He is one of the leaders of the gang and
gave the order to retreat: "Nandiyana mga guardia, magsi-akyat na
kayo" (the guards have arrived; go upstairs).
Felix Jason
He is another leader of the Sigue-Sigue gang; attended its meetings;
was seen sharpening instruments on 15 February 1958; participated
in the clubbing and stabbing of Jesus Dizon, Marcelino Javier Baltazar,
alias Tikboy and Martin Dorado. He possessed the power to pardon
certain supposed enemies.
Edilberto de los Santos
Armed with an iron pipe, he was seen among the mob coming from
the upper floor to the cell house; shouted to open the door of the
Oxos; joined in the clubbing, stabbing, and beheading of Gabieta and
in the clubbing and stabbing of Callares. He gave the command in
front of the cell where Matias was killed: "If we cannot enter, we burn
them." He attended the meetings of the Sigue-Sigues and was seen
sharpening a weapon on 15 February 1958.
Benjamin Armobit
A member of the top brass of the gang; he attended both meetings,
was one of those who attacked Gabieta.
Alejandro Macaso
He joined the rampage and participated in the clubbing and stabbing
of Porfirio Sanchez and Cresenciano Borromeo. He pulled Dorado
from his cell.
Carlos Rebaño
He is one of the leaders of the gang and attended one of its meetings.
He clubbed and stabbed Gabieta and helped in beheading him; also
clubbed Dorado. He released his companions in the cell house before
the attack on the Oxo started.
Jose Garchitorena
He clubbed both Callares and Dizon and joined in the beheading of
Gabieta. He was one of those who opened the cells of their
companions in order to release them.
Cipriano Castro
He brought out Callares from his cell and clubbed him; he clubbed also
another victim.
Jose Cruz, Jr.
He was seen with an ice-pick coming from the upper floor to the cell
house; opened the door of the cell of Callares; joined in clubbing and
stabbing him; he also clubbed and stabbed Dizon and Baltazar.
Marcial Alma
He was confined in the cell house but was released by the rioters who
came from upstairs. He took part in the clubbing and stabbing of
Callares and Gabieta.
Alfredo Peralta
He admitted in open court his participation in the decapitation of
Gabieta in the manner hereinafter narrated.
Conrado Belen
He is a Sigue-Sigue member and was among those who came from the
upper floor of and to the cell house. He entered and participated in
the burning of cell 10 — where Matias was burned. He clubbed
Baltazar.
Benigno Casulla
He took part in clubbing and stabbing Porfirio Sanchez and Jesus
Dizon.
In view of the limited distance which is but a stone's throw from the
place where the crimes were committed to the place where the
accused-appellants claim to have been at the time of commission,
their common defense of alibi is incredible.
The evidence compels us to agree with the trial court that the
accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder. But the members of the Court cannot in conscience concur
in the death penalty, imposed, because they find it impossible to
ignore the contributory role played by the inhuman conditions then
reigning in the penitentiary, vividly described by the trial Judge in his
decision. It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison
cells, that taxed facilities beyond measure and the starvation
allowance of ten centavos per meal for each prisoner, must have
rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of the unfortunate inmates,
and predisposed them to all sorts of violence to seize from their
owners the meager supplies from outside in order to eke out their
miserable existence. All this led inevitably to the formation of gangs
that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately to pitiless
gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the inability
of the outnumbered guards to enforce discipline, and which
culminated in violent riots. The government cannot evade
responsibility for keeping prisoners under such subhuman and
dantesque conditions. Society must not close its eyes to the fact that
if it has the right to exclude from its midst those who attack it, it has
no right at all to confine them under circumstances that strangle all
sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of animals, and convert
a prison term into prolonged torture and slow death.
WHEREFORE, and there being no sufficient number of votes as
required by law, the death penalty imposed on appellants is
automatically reduced to life imprisonment. The civil indemnity and
costs fixed by the appealed decision are affirmed.
G.R. No. L-14008 September 30, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRIZON REMOLLINO, alias EMING, defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
Trizon Remollino alias Eming was prosecution for the crime of
multiple under the following information:
The undersigned accuses Trizon Remollino, alias "Eming" of the crime
of Multiple Murder, committed as follows:
That on the 13th day of March, 1958 in the evening, in barrio Bacag,
Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill
and armed with a carbine, Serial No. 6791173, did, then and there
willfully and feloniously fire at and shoot successively and at short
interval Isabelo Nozuelo, Carlos Nozuelo, Francisco Sepnio, Jacinto
Sepnio, Santos Moreno and Epifanio Bascos, thereby inflicting mortal
wounds on the different parts of the bodies of his victims causing their
death as a consequence.
Before arraignment, the accused, through counsel, offered to enter a
plea of guilty to the lesser offense of multiple homicide. The trial court
allowed the accused to plead guilty to multiple homicide on the basis
of which the said court rendered judgment, as follows:
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused Trizon Remollino alias Eming,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of sextuple homicides,
and hereby imposes upon said accused to suffer the penalty or not
less than eight (8) years of prision mayor to not more than fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each and
everyone of the three (3) homicidal acts, but in no case shall the
accused suffer more than the maximum total penalty of forty (40)
years under par. 4, Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code; and to
indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased Isabelo Nozuelo, Carlos
Nozuelo, Francisco Sepnio, Jacinto Sepnio, Santos Moreno and
Espifanio Bascos, in the sum of P4,000.00 with costs against the
accused.
This Court refrains from imposing further penalties for the three (3)
other deceased in view of the prohibition contained in par. 4, Art. 70
of the Revised Penal Code.
Under the belief, however, that the penalty imposed is not correct,
the said accused appealed directly to this Court alleging that the trial
court erred: (1) In imposing upon him three separate penalties for the
several homicides charged in the above information; and (2) In
refusing to apply the provisions of Article 48 and paragraph 5 of
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
In other words, appellant contends that Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code on penalty for complex crimes which provides: "When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period" (As amended by Act No. 4000), should
have been imposed. The display of erudition by counsel as to the
philosophy and spirit which animate the penal provision in question,
fails, however, to convince us that Article 48 is applicable to the
present case. From the allegations of the information, which
appellant admitted with his plea of guilty, there can be no doubt that
he shot six persons successively and at short intervals and that the
deaths of said persons where the result of six separate acts. It can not
be contended with any degree of plausibility that only one shot or
single act had killed the six victims. Our jurisprudence is replete with
precedents sustaining that acts, such as the one before us, should
constitute separate crimes.
But when the acts are wholly different, not only to themselves, but
also because they were directed against two different persons, as
when one fires his revolver twice in succession, killing one person and
wounding another (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil., 56), or when two persons
are killed one after the other, by different acts, although these killing
were the result of a single criminal impulse (People vs. Alfinado, 47
Phil., 1), the different acts must be considered as distinct crimes. So
also, raping a girl and killing her afterwards constitute two distinct
offenses which must be punished separately (People vs. Matela, 58
Phil., 718; 1 Reyes, L.B. Criminal Law, p. 382)
In the case of People vs. Jose Pardo, et al., 79 Phil., 568, the Supreme
Court held:
But the trial court erred in holding that the offenses in question
constitute a complex crime. The two murders were not the result of a
single act. The death of Captain Burchfield was produced by shot
different from that which killed Francisco Cañete. It will a recalled that
two shots were fired, and this made additionally clear by the other
fact that two holes were found in the wall, about foot apart, and that
a slug lodged in the left leg of Burchfield while another bullet was
found not far from the prostrate body of Francisco
Cañete.1awphîl.nèt
In People vs. Layos, 60 Phil., 232, this Court said:
It is noted, however, the trial court did not consider such findings
strictly in conformity with the law inasmuch as it considered the act
committed by the appellant as merely constituting the complex crime
of double homicide when such is not the case, taking into
consideration the spirit and text of Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code.
According to said Article in order that the crime may be considered
double homicide it is necessary that it be the result of a single act, as
in the case of killing two persons at the same moment with the single
stroke of the bolo or with a single shot.
'Our conclusion is that the defendant-appellant is guilty of two
separate crimes of murder. (People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967)'
In the case of People vs. Meliton Buyco, 80 Phil., 58, this Court said:
. . . The Supreme Court of Spain held in its judgement of January 27,
1876, that one who, after a dispute, discharges four shots from a
pistol, mortally wounding with the first one of the combatants and
inflicting with the second physical injuries upon another, should be
punished for the said crimes separately in accordance with Art. 88 of
the Spanish Penal Code upon the ground that, although the shots
were fired successively, they did not constitute
one single but two diverse acts, for the two different persons at
whom they were directed (II Viada, 5th ed. pp. 633- 634). The same
Tribunal in its judgment of Feb. 7, 1879, held that a person who,
posting himself in front of four individuals, fires four shots with a
pistol saying: "toma tu, toma tu," wounding two of them, is guilty of
four different crimes of discharge of firearm against a determinate
person, to complex with that of physical injuries, since the four shots
were produced by four distinct acts (II Viada, 5th ed. p. 636).
Where an accused began firing with his .45 caliber automatic pistol at
a crowd gathered in front of a church, and when the crowd rushed
inside the church the accused followed and continued firing at
random until he was seized and overpowered, and disarmed by an
Army sergeant who happened to be there, as a result of which firing
two persons died and one seriously wounded who, however
recovered due to medical aid, three separate crimes were committed.
(People vs. Basarain, G.R. No. L-6690, May 24, 1955).
Accused was prosecuted for killing two persons. Sixteen wounds were
inflicted on one and five wounds on the other. Held: In order that a
crime may be considered double homicide, in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code, it is necessary that it be
the result of a single act, as in the case of killing two persons at the
same moment with a single stroke of the bolo or with a single shot.
The homicide perpetrated by the herein defendant on a woman and
on another person did not constitute a single act but two distinct acts
committed at different times. The former's death was the result of
sixteen wounds inflicted upon her by the appellant and that of the
latter was likewise the result of the five wounds which he inflicted
upon her immediately afterwards. (People vs. Layos, 60 Phil., 224).
(Crim. Procedure, Padilla, p. 107, 1959 Ed.)
The evidence presented by the prosecution in this case was strong
enough to convict the accused who shot to death two brothers. One
of the questions raised in the appeal was the lower court's decision in
convicting the accused for the crime of double murder and not for
complex crime. Held: A complex crime is committed when two
persons are killed as result of the same murderous act of the accused.
When each one of the two deceased was killed by different and
separate sets of shots fired, receptively, through two independent
sets of acts of the accused, each one aimed exclusively at a victim, for
each victim killed there is a separate and independent crime of
murder. (People vs. Ordonio, 82 Phil. 324). (Crim. Procedure, Padilla,
p. 107, 1959 Ed.)
Of course, appellant cited the case of People vs. Lawas, G.R. Nos. L-
7618-7620, in support of his cause. We are of the opinion, however,
that the ruling in said case is predicated upon the peculiar
circumstances surrounding the same, and it should not be applicable
to the one at bar. Verily, the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception
than the general rule. In the Lawas case we held each of the
appellants guilty only of the complex crime of homicide,
notwithstanding the fact that about fifty persons were killed. The
evidence in said case revealed that the killings were the result of a
single impulse, in obedience to the order of the appellants' leader to
fire, which ceased only when the said leader gave an order to stop
firing. There was no evidence at all to show the number of persons
killed by each appellant. It was not possible to hold each appellant
responsible for each death he actually caused, because there was no
way to determine who were the particular persons killed by each
appellant. That is why this Court in said case Commented: "So even if
we were induced to hold each appellant responsible for each and
every death caused by him, it is impossible to ascertain the individual
death caused by each and everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find
the appellants guilty of only one offense, that of multiple homicide,
for which penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum". In the
case at bar, the appellant alone killed all the six victims, one after the
other, with one shot each.
Counsel submits that had the trial court appreciated the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and obfuscation, the penalty should
have been reduced by one degree. Since the maximum penalty of 14
years and 8 months of reclusion temporal has imposed upon
appellant for each homicide and the same is within the minimum of
the penalty fixed for the crime, there being no aggravating
circumstance to consider, it is logical to conclude that the trial court
appreciated the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty. As to
obsfuscation, it appears that appellant had not offered evidence to
prove any other mitigating circumstance than the plea of guilty.
It is to be noted that the trial court sentenced the appellant in each of
three (3) homicidal acts, without specifying for which of the six (6)
homicides they were intended. Appellant should be sentenced, as we
do hereby sentence him, to suffer the same penalty in each of the
other three (3) crimes he had committed, and to pay an indemnity to
heir of each of the six cases, in the sum of P6,000.00.
Holding, therefore, that the appellant Trizon Remollino alias Eming is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six separate homicides, and
modified in sense just indicated, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellant.