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G.R. Nos.

L-16185-86 May 31, 1962

TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA and ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y
TUASON,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Judicial Guardian, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, trustee-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO M. PEREZ, judicial guardian-appellant.

Araneta and Araneta for trustee-appellee.


Alfonso Felix, Jr. for judicial guardian-appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed
Perez Y Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not the trustee, J. Antonio Araneta —
hereinafter referred to as the appellee — may be allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm, Araneta &
Araneta, of which he is a member, for services rendered to him, in his aforementioned capacity as such
trustee, in several judicial proceedings, whereas G.R. No. L-16186 concerns the question whether the
purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the appellee for the benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial
approval. Both questions were decided by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in the
affirmative. Hence, this appeal by Antonio M. Perez — hereinafter referred to as the appellant — as
guardian of the person of said minors.

With respect to G.R. No. L-16185, it appears that the law firm Araneta & Araneta, through its assistant,
Atty. Francisco T. Papa, had rendered services, as counsel for the appellee, in connection with the following:

1. The approval of his accounts for January to March, 1956, which were objected to by the appellant.
Said objection was, on October 19, 1956, overruled by the lower court, the action of which was
affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-11788, on May 16, 1958, on appeal taken by appellant.

2. The appellee's accounts for April to June, 1957; which were approved by the lower court on July
13, 1957, despite appellant's objection thereto. Although appellant appealed to the Supreme Court,
he, subsequently, withdrew the appeal.

3. In 1958, appellant instituted CA-G.R. No. 22810-R of the Court of Appeals for a writ
of certiorari and mandamus against the appellee and the lower court, the latter having sustained the
action of the appellee in withholding certain sums from the shares of the minors aforementioned in
the net income of the trust estate for July to September, 1957, in view of the appellant's refusal to
reimburse to said estate identical sums received in the form of allowances for the period from April
to June, 1957, in excess of the shares of said minors in the net income for that period. After
appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on June 25, 1958, dismissing said
petition.

The lower court authorized the payment of P5,500.00 for the services thus rendered by Araneta & Araneta,
which appellant assails upon the ground that, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:

When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.

that the services above referred to inured to the benefit, not of the trust estate, but of the trustee; that the
amount of the award is excessive; and that the lower court should have required the introduction of evidence
on the extent of the services rendered by the aforementioned law firm before making said award.

Appellant's pretense is untenable. Said Section 7 of Rule 86 refers only to "executors or administrators" of
the estate of deceased persons, and does not necessarily apply to trustees. It is true that some functions of the
former bear a close analogy with those of the latter. Moreover, a trustee, like, an executor or administrator,
holds an office of trust, particularly when, as in the case of appellee herein, the trustee acts as such under
judicial authority. Hence, generally, the policy set forth in said Section 7 of Rule 86 — basically sound and
wise as it is — should be applicable to trustees. The duties of executors or administrators are, however, fixed
and/or limited by law, whereas those of trustee of an express trust — like that which we have under
consideration — are, usually, governed by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, if established by
contract (Art. 1441, Civil Code of the Philippines). Besides, the duties of trustees may cover a much wider
range than those of executors or administrators of the estate of deceased persons. Again the application of
Section 7 of Rule 86 to all trusteeships without distinction may dissuade deserving persons from accepting
the position of trustee and consequently have a deterrent effect upon the establishment of trusts, at a time
when a sizeable part of the burden to undertake important and even essential activities in advanced and/or
developing communities or states, particularly in the field of education, science and social welfare, is borne
by foundations or other similar organizations based upon the principles of trust. We believe it, therefore, to
be the better policy to acknowledge the authority of courts of justice to exercise a sound judgment in
determining, in the light of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case, whether or not a trustee shall
be allowed to pay attorney's fees and charge the same against the trust estate, independently of his
compensation as a trustee.

In the case at bar, considering that the appellee was merely defending himself in the proceedings that
required the services of counsel; that in each case the stand taken by the appellee was upheld by the court;
that the will creating the trust and designating the appellee as trustee explicitly grants him the right to collect
for his services such reasonable fees; that, in view of the nature of the relations between the trustor and the
trustee, on the one hand, and the trustor and appellant on the other, there can be little doubt but that the
trustor would have sanctioned the payment of the attorney's fees involved in this incident; and that it may
have been more costly for the trust estate to engage the services of a law firm other than that of Araneta &
Araneta, we are not prepared to hold that the lower court has erred in authorizing the payment of said
attorney's fees by herein appellee.

For the rest, it is well settled that "a trustee may be indemnified out of the trust estate for his expenses in
rendering and proving his accounts and for costs and counsel fees" in connection therewith (54 Am. Jur.
415-416), apart from the fact that the nature of the professional services in question appeared in the records
before the lower court and that the amount of P5,500 fixed by the same as compensation for such services is
not excessive.

Referring now to G.R. No. L-16186, it appears that from July to September, 1958, the appellee had bought
for the trust estate, through a broker (Pedro Nolasco da Silva & Co.), a total of 118 common shares of stock
of the Philippine-American Drug Co. at P100 each, and that, upon submission of appellee's accounts for said
period, appellant objected to the items of expenses relative to the acquisition of said common shares, upon
the ground that the investment therein is "unwise in that (the operation of) said company has not, to our
knowledge, proved profitable and unlawful in that it is actually an act of self-dealing between the trustee and
the beneficiaries of the trust", because the former (appellee) is, also, a stockholder of said company. After
the introduction of the evidence of both parties, the lower court overruled the objection and approved said
accounts.

It is not disputed that appellee holds, in his individual capacity, 199 out of 30,000 common shares of stock
of the Philippine-American Drug Co., whereas his children own 270 out of 5,000 preferred shares of stock
of the same enterprise. As a consequence, the interest of appellees and his children in said company is not
such as to warrant the charge that the purchase of 118 common stocks for the trust estate amounts to self-
dealing by the appellee with himself. What is more, said purchase by the trustee may be considered as an
indication that he had displayed in the management of the trust estate the same interest he had in the
protection of his own property.

Upon the other hand, it has, also, been established that the book value of each of said 118 common shares of
stock, purchased by the trustee at P100 each, is P202.80; that in 1954 the Philippine-American Drug Co. had
paid a cash dividend of 6%, side from declaring a 33-1/3% stock dividend for its common shares; and that 6-
½ % and 4% cash dividends were paid in 1955 and 1957, respectively. Furthermore, the statement of
accounts of the company for the years 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957, satisfied the lower court that the
enterprise "is financially stable and sound". Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the investment in
question is unwise.

Appellant's allegation to the effect that shares of stock of the San Miguel Brewery pay higher returns, even if
true, does not establish his pretense. Whether an investment is good or not does not depend upon the
general, abstract possibility of better investments. Again, one factor that should be taken into account is the
degree of influence that the investor may have upon the management of the enterprise concerned, which
appellee admittedly has in the Philippine-American Drug Co., but which it is not claimed he wields in the
San Miguel Brewery Co.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is so
ordered.

Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.


Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurs in the result.

\
G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967

GERTRUDES F. CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,


vs.
LUIS D. CUAYCONG, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Benito C. Jalandoni and M. S. Gomez for plaintiffs-appellants.


Hilado and Hilado for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Eduardo Cuaycong, married to Clotilde de Leon, died on June 21, 1936 without issue but with three brothers
and a sister surviving him: Lino, Justo, Meliton and Basilisa. Upon his death, his properties were distributed
to his heirs as he willed except two haciendas in Victorias, Negros Occidental, devoted to sugar and other
crops — the Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod both known as Hacienda Bacayan. Hacienda Bacayan is
comprised of eight (8) lots — No. 28, covered by T.C.T. No. T-22130; Nos. 8, 17, 18 & 135, covered by
T.C.T. No. T-22131; Nos. 21, 22, 23, covered by T.C.T. No. 22132 — all of which are titled in the name of
Luis D. Cuaycong, son of Justo Cuaycong.

Lino Cuaycong died on May 4, 1937 and was survived by his children Paz, Carolina, Gertrudes, Carmen,
Virgilio, Benjamin, Praxedes and Anastacio. Praxedes Cuaycong, married to Jose Betia, is already deceased
and is survived by her children Jose Jr., Jesus, Mildred, Nenita and Nilo, all surnamed Betia. Anastacio
Cuaycong, also deceased, is survived by his children Ester, Armando, Lourdes, Luis T., Eva and Aida, all
surnamed Cuaycong.

Meliton and Basilisa died without any issue.

On October 3, 1961, the surviving children of Lino Cuaycong: Gertrudes, Carmen, Paz, Carolina, Virgilio;
the surviving children of Anastacio: Ester, Armando, Lourdes, Luis T., Eva and Aida; as well as Jose, Jr.,
Jesus, Mildred, Nenita, Nilo, all surnamed Betia, children of deceased Praxedes Cuaycong Betia, filed as
pauper litigants, a suit against Justo, Luis and Benjamin Cuaycong1 for conveyance of inheritance and
accounting, before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 6314), alleging among
others that:

1. Eduardo Cuaycong had on several occasions, made known to his brothers and sisters that he and his wife
Clotilde de Leon (died in 1940) had an understanding and made arrangements with Luis Cuaycong and his
father Justo Cuaycong, that it was their desire to divide Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod among his brothers
and sister and his wife Clotilde.

2. With the consent of his wife, Eduardo had asked his brothers and sister to pay his wife P75,000 (the
haciendas were worth P150,000) and then divide equally the remaining one-half share of Eduardo.

3. The brothers and sister failed to pay the 1/2 share of Clotilde over the two haciendas which were later
acquired by Luis Cuaycong thru clever strategy, fraud, misrepresentation and in disregard of Eduardo's
wishes by causing the issuance in his name of certificates of title covering said properties.

4. As the two haciendas were the subject of transactions between the spouses and Justo and Luis Cuaycong,
Eduardo told Justo and Luis, and the two agreed, to hold in trust what might belong to his brothers and sister
as a result of the arrangements and deliver to them their share when the proper time comes.

5. That as far back as 1936 Lino demanded from Justo and Luis his share and especially after Eduardo's and
Clotilde's death, the plaintiffs demanded their shares.

6. That their demands had been refused and in 1960 during the estate proceedings of Praxedes Escalon,
deceased wife of Luis D. Cuaycong, the latter fraudulently made it appear that the plaintiffs had nothing to
do with the land; that Luis Cuaycong had possessed the lands since June 21, 1936 from which time he
should be made to account for the plaintiffs' share; and that P1,500 attorney's fees should be paid in their
favor.

Luis D. Cuaycong on October 20, 1961 moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of unenforceability
of the claim under the statute of frauds, no cause of action (Rule 8, Sec. 1 [f] of the Rules of Court), and bar
of causes of action by the statute of limitations (Rule 8, Sec. 1[e]). Subsequently, opposition thereto, answer
and reply were filed; the plaintiffs also sought to have Benjamin Cuaycong declared in default for his failure
to answer.

On December 16, 1961, the Court of First Instance ruled that the trust alleged, particularly in paragraph 8 of
the complaint, refers to an immovable which under Article 1443 of the Civil Code may not be proved by
parole evidence. Plaintiffs were given 10 days to file an amended complaint mentioning or alleging therein
the written evidence of the alleged trust, otherwise the case would be dismissed.

Later, on December 23, 1961, the court decreed that since there was no amended complaint filed, thus, no
enforceable claim, it was useless to declare Benjamin Cuaycong in default.

Plaintiff thereafter manifested that the claim is based on an implied trust as shown by paragraph 8 of the
complaint. They added that there being no written instrument of trust, they could not amend the complaint to
include such instrument.

On January 13, 1962, the court dismissed the case for failure to amend the complaint; it further refused to
reconsider its order denying the motion to declare Benjamin Cuaycong in default, stating that such a default
declaration would be of no purpose.

Failing in their efforts to have the dismissal reconsidered, plaintiffs appealed to Us. The resolution of the
appeal hinges on whether the trust is express or implied.

Paragraph 8 of the complaint state:

That as the said two haciendas were then the subject of certain transactions between the spouses
Eduardo Cuaycong and Clotilde de Leon on one hand, and Justo and Luis D. Cuaycong on the other,
Eduardo Cuaycong told his brother Justo and his nephew, defendant Luis D. Cuaycong, to hold in
trust what might belong to his brothers and sister as a result of the arrangements and to deliver to
them their shares when the proper time comes, to which Justo and Luis D. Cuaycong agreed.

The plaintiffs claim that an inplied trust is referred to in the complaint which, under Article 1457 of the Civil
Code, may be proved by parole evidence.

Our Civil Code defines an express trust as one created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, and an
implied trust as one that comes into being by operation of law.2 Express trusts are those created by the direct
and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or will or by words evidencing an intention to create
a trust. On the other hand, implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, in dependently of the particular intention
of the parties.3Thus, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express; if the intent to establish a
trust is to be taken from circumstances or other matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied.
From these and from the provisions of paragraph 8 of the complaint itself, We find it clear that the plaintiffs
alleged an express trust over an immovable, especially since it is alleged that the trustor expressly told the
defendants of his intention to establish the trust.lawphil Such a situation definitely falls under Article 1443
of the Civil Code.

Appellants point out that not only paragraph 8 should be considered but the whole complaint, in which case
they argue that an implied trust should be construed to exist. Article 1453, one of the cases of implied trust,
is also cited: "When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for
or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit is
contemplated." Said arguments are untenable, even considering the whole complaint. The intention of the
trustor to establish the alleged trust may be seen in paragraphs 5 and 6.4 Article 1453 would apply if the
person conveying the property did not expressly state that he was establishing the trust, unlike the case at bar
where he was alleged to have expressed such intent. Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing
the complaint.

Besides, even assuming the alleged trust to be an implied one, the right alleged by plaintiffs Would have
already prescribed since starting in 1936 When the trustor died, plaintiffs had already been allegedly refused
by the aforesaid defendants in their demands over the land, and the complaint was filed only in 1961 —
more than the 10-year period of prescription for the enforcement of such rights under the trust.lawphil It is
settled that the right to enforce an implied trust in one's favor prescribes in ten (10) years.5 And even under
the Code of Civil Procedure, action to recover real property such as lands prescribes in ten years (Sec. 40,
Act 190).

And for the above reasons, We agree that it was pointless to declare Benjamin Cuaycong in default,
considering that without a written instrument as evidence of the alleged trust, the case for the plaintiffs must
be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Benjamin Cuaycong was made a defendant because her refused to sue as a plaintiff.
2
Article 1441.
3
89 C.J.S. 722, 724.
4
"(5) — That on several occasions during the later years of Eduardo and Lino Cuaycong, the former
made known to the latter and to their brothers and sister, that he and his wife, Clotilde de Leon, who
died in 1941, had an understanding and made arrangements with defendant Luis D. Cuaycong and
his father, Justo Cuaycong, that it was their (Eduardo's and Clotilde's) wish and desire, that Hdas.
"Sta. Cruz," and "Pusod" above-referred to, should be divided between the brothers and sister of
Eduardo Cuaycong, namely, Justo, Meliton, Lino and Basilisa, all surnamed Cuaycong, and his wife,
Clotilde de Leon;

"(6) — That pursuant to such wish and desire and arrangements, the said Eduardo Cuaycong, with
the knowledge and consent of his wife, Clotilde de Leon, and as an agreement with the latter to
effectuate their wish and desire had directed his brothers and sister to pay his wife the sum of
P75,000.00, the value of the two haciendas above-mentioned being P150,000.00, and then divide the
same among themselves share and share alike; or, at all events, should his brothers and sister fail to
do just that, they should divide only the one-half (1/2) portions proindiviso thereof appertaining to
him (Eduardo) in the conjugal properties;
5
Gonzales v. Jimenez, L-19073, Jan. 30, 1965.
[G.R. No. L-59879. May 13, 1985.]

PATRICIO SINAON and MARIA, FRANCISCA and JOSE, all surnamed SINAON, Petitioners, v.
ANDRES SOROÑGON, ANASTACIA PARREÑO, SOLEDAD PARREÑO, ANA PARREÑO,
MARCELINA, CLARITA, RUFINO and MANUEL, all surnamed ARELLANO, SIMPLICIO
SOMBLINGO and BRIGIDA SOMBLINGO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Neil D. Hechanova, for Petitioners.

Benjamin P. Sorosogon for Respondents.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is whether an action for reconveyance of a registered five-hectare land, based on
implied trust, would lie after the supposed trustees had held the land for more than forty years.

According to the documentary evidence consisting of public documents and tax records, Judge (later Justice)
Carlos A. Imperial in a decree dated March 4, 1916 adjudicated to Canuta Soblingo (Somblingo), a widow,
Lot No. 4781 of the Sta. Barbara, Iloilo cadastre with an area of 5.5 hectares. OCT No. 6178-A was issued
in 1917 to Canuta (Exh. 6 and 7 or B).

In 1923 Canuta sold the lot to the spouses Patricio Sinaon and Julia Sualibio for P2,000 (Exh. 8). TCT No.
2542 was issued to the Sinaon spouses (Exh. 9 or C). It is still existing and uncancelled up to this time. Julia
was the granddaughter of Canuta.chanrobles law library

The lot was declared for tax purposes in Sinaon’s name (Exh. 3). The Sinaon spouses and their three
children paid the realty taxes due thereon (Exh. 1 to 5-C). They have possessed the land as owners from
1923 up to this time or for more than half a century.

Canuta was one of the five children of Domingo Somblingo, the alleged original owner of the lot when it
was not yet registered. His other four children were Felipe, Juan, Esteban and Santiago. The theory of
respondents Soroñgon, Et Al., which they adopted in their 1968 second amended complaint (they filed the
action in 1964) is that Canuta and the Sinaons were trustees of the lot and that the heirs of Domingo’s four
children are entitled to a 4/5 share thereof.

That theory was sustained by the trial court and the Appellate Court. The trial court ordered the Sinaons to
convey 4/5 of Lot No. 4781 to respondents Soroñgon, Et. Al. It decreed partition of the lot in five equal
parts. The Sinaons appealed to this Court. The respondents did not file any brief.

We hold that after the Sinaons had appeared to be the registered owners of the lot for more than forty years
and had possessed it during that period, their title had become indefeasible and their possession could not be
disturbed. Any pretension as to the existence of an implied trust should not be countenanced.

The trustors, who created the alleged trust, died a long time ago. An attempt to prove the trust was made by
unreliable oral evidence. The title and possession of the Sinaons cannot be defeated by oral evidence which
can be easily fabricated and contradicted. The contradictory oral evidence leaves the court sometimes
bothered and bewildered.

There was no express trust in this case. Express trusts concerning real property cannot be proven by parol
evidence (Art. 1443, Civil Code). An implied trust "cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a
Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof" (Suarez v. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303; Salao v. Salao, L-
26699, March 16, 1976, 70 SCRA 65, 83).

Even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs’ action was clearly barred by prescription (Salao v.
Salao, supra, p. 84).

Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims
from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts
have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses (53
C.J.S. 903). See Teves Vda. de Bacong v. Teves and CA, G.R. No. 50143, October 24, 1983, 125 SCRA
137; Ramos v. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Gallanosa v. Arcangel, L-29300, June
21, 1978, 83 SCRA 676 and Sinco v. Longa, 51 Phil. 507.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

It was not necessary for the Sinaons to plead prescription as a defense because there is no dispute as to the
dates. There was no factual issue as to prescription (Chua Lamko v. Dioso, 97 Phil. 821, 824; Ferrer v.
Ericta, L-41767, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 705).

At any rate, the Sinaons invoked in the lower court the ruling laid down in Gerona v. De Guzman, 120 Phil.
149, 153 that an action for reconveyance of realty, based upon a constructive or implied trust resulting from
fraud, may be barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is reckoned from the issuance of the title
which operates as a constructive notice (Diaz v. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266-267; J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42, 46-47; Lopez v. Gonzaga, 119 Phil. 424, 437).

The supposed trust in this case, which is neither an express nor a resulting trust, is a constructive trust
arising by operation of law (Art. 1456, Civil Code). It is not a trust in the technical sense (Gayondato v.
Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil 244).*

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the complaint is dismissed. The
receivership is terminated. The receiver is directed to wind up his accounts. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Justice Concepcion, Jr. did not take part.

Endnotes:

* It was only in 1964 that plaintiffs, now respondents Soroñgon, Et Al., woke up. They had to amend their
complaint twice because they were not sure of the facts. They were not able to state with certainty
Domingo’s surviving descendants Teodulfo Somblingo, their first witness, and his four brothers, alleged
grandchildren of Santiago, Domingo’s son, were not joined as plaintiffs (29 tsn, July 29, 1969).

Respondents Soroñgon, Et. Al. alleged in paragraph 5 of their complaint that Canuta Somblingo was made a
trustee because she "was educated." This is false because she was illiterate as shown in the deed of sale,
Exhibit 8. They at first alleged that Canuta died without issue. They later discovered that Canuta was
survived by the Sinaon petitioners who were her great-grandchildren.

According to Francisca Sinaon, a college graduate, Teodulfo Somblingo, who testified that he was a co-
owner of the land, was a hired laborer, one of 15 laborers, who used Patricio Sinaon’s carabao in plowing
the land (111, 130-2, 135 tsn Feb. 15, 1971). Even after the case was filed, Teodulfo continued to work as a
thresher (136). Simplicio Somblingo, the husband of plaintiffs’ witness, Cornelia Somblingo, was also a
hired laborer (112).
The trial court observed that the Sinaons did not present any evidence to dispute the oral testimony that the
lot came from Domingo Somblingo. What the court overlooked is that the plaintiffs did not present
trustworthy and convincing evidence that Domingo originally owned the lot at all.

Canuta Somblingo-Umadhay, the registered owner, had four children named Presentacion, Rufina, Elena
and Fructuoso. As already noted, the land was purchased by Canuta’s granddaughter, Julia, and her husband,
Patricio Sinaon. The trial court denied Sinaon’s motion for new trial which was designed to give him a
chance to prove that he and the Umadhays had sufficient means to acquire the disputed lot (108-109, Record
on Appeal).

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