FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 207629, October 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL VILLALBA Y DURAN AND RANDY

VILLALBA Y SARCO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is the Decision1 dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00844-MIN, which affirmed, with modifications as to the amount of damages imposed, the Judgment[2 dated
February 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 11736,
finding accused-appellants Arnel Villalba y Duran (Arnel) and Randy Villalba ySarco (Randy) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the murder of Maximillian Casona y Lacroix (Maximillian).

In the Information dated May 1, 2006 filed with the RTC, accused-appellants were charged as follows: chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

That on or about the 29th day of April 2006 at 2:30 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Capitol Avenue,
near Gaisano Mall, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab one MAXIMILLIAN CASONA Y LACROIX, with the use of an ice
pick, hitting the latter at his left breast and left portion of his stomach, which directly caused his death
incurring damages which maybe proven in Court.3 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on August 8, 2006.4 chanroblesv i rtual lawlib rary

At the pre-trial conference held on July 19, 2007,5 the parties stipulated only as to the time and place of the
stabbing incident, i.e., at around 2:00 in the early morning of April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall in
Butuan City. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of three persons who witnessed the stabbing incident:
Maximillian's widow Josephine B. Casona (Josephine),6 Homer Ferdinand B. Hermosura (Homer),7 and
Frederick L. Apolinario (Frederick).8 The prosecution also called to the witness stand the physicians who
attended to Maximillian before his death, namely, cardiologist Dr. Annalisa A. Gonzalez (Gonzalez)9 and
surgeon Dr. Edesio C. Urag (Urag).10 Last to testify for the prosecution was Police Inspector (P/Insp.)
Inocencio T. Amora (P/Insp. Amora),11 the investigator assigned to the case and the apprehending officer of
accused-appellants.

The documentary exhibits of the prosecution consisted of the respective Sworn Statements, all dated May 1,
2006, of Josephine, Homer, and Frederick;12 the police blotter entry dated April 29, 2006 which reported
Maximillian's stabbing and death;13 the police blotter entry dated April 30, 2006 which reported the
subsequent arrests of accused-appellants for illegal gambling and concealment of deadly weapon;14the
Affidavit of Apprehension dated April 30, 2006 jointly executed by P/Insp. Amora, Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 3 Antonio A. Claros, Police Officer (PO) 3 Rey Gabrielle B. Maderal, and PO2 Judan Q. Alvizo;15 three
photographs depicting Frederick's identification of accused-appellants as Maximillian's assailants;16 a sketch
and description of the puncture wounds found on Maximillian's body prepared by Dr. Urag;17 Maximillian's
Certificate of Death;18 and the hospital and burial expenses in the total amount of P55,225.60 incurred by
Josephine.19 These exhibits were all admitted in evidence by the RTC in its Order dated February 29,
2008.20chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary

The prosecution's evidence established the following version of events: cralawlawl ibra ry

Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students at Moff s Restaurant and Cocktail
Lounge along JC Aquino Avenue in Butuan City on the night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian was accompanied
by his wife Josephine and their friends Frederick, Homer, and Homer's wife Marilou.

Around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine begged Maximillian that they already go home.
Josephine reminded Maximillian of the lateness of the hour and of the great amount of liquor that he had
already consumed. Maximillian still did not want to leave, but Josephine insisted. Angry, Maximillian rushed
out of the restaurant and headed towards the direction of the Gaisano Mall in Butuan City. Josephine asked
Frederick to catch up with Maximillian. Josephine, Homer, and Marilou then trailed about 10 meters behind
Maximillian and Frederick.

When they turned the corner of JC Avenue and Capitol Drive, Maximillian and Frederick chanced upon
accused-appellants and their girlfriends, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group did not know
each other prior to the early morning of April 29, 2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered accused-appellants to
wear their shirts, and then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is that?" referring to accused-
appellant Arnel's girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told accused-appellant Arnel, "Brod, don't mind him. He
is a little bit drunk." Accused-appellant Arnel replied, "That was nothing, Kuya." However, Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel continued to stare at each other. Moments later, Maximillian tried to get hold of
accused-appellant Arnel's left arm but the latter was able to wave away Maximillian's hand. Accused-

1
appellant Randy blocked Maximillian's way and held Maximillian's hand/s as accused-appellant Arnel hit
Maximillian on the chest and abdomen. At this point, it appeared to eyewitnesses Frederick, Josephine, and
Homer that Maximillian was just being boxed by accused-appellant Arnel. Frederick tried to break the
scuffle, as Josephine and Flomer, who were only five meters away, came running to help. Accused-
appellants stepped back and then ran away. Despite telling Josephine that he was stabbed, Maximillian still
chased accused-appellants, with Frederick and Homer at his heels. Stones were thrown their way but none
of them were hit. All of a sudden, Maximillian fell to the ground. Josephine checked Maximillian's body yet
found no blood or wound. Assuming that Maximillian was simply drunk and in pain because of the fist fight,
Josephine, with the help of Frederick and Homer, brought Maximillian home on board a motorized "trisikad."
During the ride home, Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily. However, when they were already
at their house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had no more pulse and his eyes had turned white. Josephine,
again with Frederick and Homer, rushed Maximillian to Manuel J. Santos Hospital.

Maximillian arrived at the hospital at around 3:00 in the morning of April 29, 2006. Dr. Gonzalez, the
attending physician at the emergency room, noticed that Maximillian was already unresponsive and had no
more heartbeat. Dr. Gonzalez performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was able to revive Maximillian.
Dr. Gonzalez conducted close physical examination of Maximillian's body and discovered two hardly visible
stab wounds located at the latter's left chest and abdomen. Dr. Gonzalez immediately referred Maximillian to
Dr. Urag, a surgeon.

As a result of his own examination, Dr. Urag reported that Maximillian's stab wounds both had a lateral
width of about 3-5 mm, and that the stab wound on Maximillian's chest penetrated the pericardium of his
heart, which caused the entry of fluid into the said organ. The delay in the discovery of the fatal chest
wound and the lack of hospital facilities rendered it too late to save Maximillian. Resultantly, Maximillian died
of "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest secondary to Pericardial Tamponade secondary to penetrating stab wound left
chest." Dr. Urag called Maximillian's wounds as puncture wounds, which could be caused by any sharp
instrument or bladed weapon, or even nails.

Josephine reported Maximillian's stabbing and death to the police on April 29, 2006. P/Insp. Amora, then the
Chief of the General Investigation Section of the Butuan City Police Office, took charge of the investigation
of Maximillian's case. P/Insp. Amora conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime and was able
to identify accused-appellants as the suspects. The following day, April 30, 2006, P/Insp. Amora came upon
information that accused-appellants were in P-l Barangay Imadejas Subdivision, Butuan City. P/Insp. Amora
proceeded to the given location and there found accused-appellants playing and betting on a game of cards.
The police immediately arrested accused-appellants for illegal gambling and brought them to the police
station. Upon being informed of accused-appellants' arrest, Josephine and Frederick arrived at the police
station and identified accused-appellants as Maximillian's assailants.

Accused-appellants testified in their own defense.

Accused-appellant Arnel21 while admitting his presence at the time and scene of the crime, narrated a
different version of the events surrounding Maximillian's stabbing.

According to accused-appellant Arnel, at around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, he was with his
girlfriend Jenny and friends Johndale and Tata in the vicinity of Gaisano Mall, waiting for a tricycle. When
Jenny was about to board a tricycle, four persons, who all looked drunk, came out of a store. One of these
four persons, who turned out to be Maximillian, approached and asked accused-appellant Arnel how much
was the girl he was with. Maximillian's crude remark angered Jenny, who immediately left with Tata, on
board the tricycle. A companion of Maximillian approached accused-appellant Arnel and requested him to
bear with Maximillian who was already drunk. Accused-appellant Arnel expressed that he understood the
situation. However, Maximillian suddenly blocked the way of accused-appellant Arnel and Johndale.
Maximillian punched accused-appellant Arnel, hitting the latter on the neck, just below his left ear. Johndale
was able to run away. Accused-appellant Arnel asked Maximillian why the latter hit him. Instead of
answering the question, Maximillian threw back another question, asking if accused-appellant Amel was
brave. Accused-appellant Arnel looked for a stone to throw at Maximillian to fend off the latter, but saw
none. What accused-appellant found and grabbed as a weapon to defend himself was a barbeque stick,
about six inches long. Accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian once with the barbecue stick on the left
side of the body, after which, the barbecue stick broke. When stabbed, Maximillian did not show any
reaction but just walked away from accused-appellant. At that point, Maximillian's three companions also
began to attack accused-appellant Arnel. After their attack, Maximillian's three companions left. Accused-
appellant Arnel sat down for a while near Gaisano Mall, then went home. The following day, accused-
appellant Arnel was apprehended by the police. Accused-appellant Arnel was surprised to learn from the
police that Maximillian had died. Accused-appellant Arnel insisted that he had no intention of killing
Maximillian and denied any knowledge of how Maximillian sustained the second stab wound. Accused-
appellant Arnel further clarified that it was his friend Johndale, not his cousin accused-appellant Randy, who
was with him when he encountered Maximillian the early morning of April 29, 2006.

Accused-appellant Randy22 narrated on the witness stand that he was at his house in Barangay Doongan
with his wife and children in the early morning of April 29, 2006. Accused-appellant Randy knew nothing
about Maximillian's stabbing and death. Accused-appellant Randy was with his wife at the house of a traffic
aide called Puspus in Lower Doongan when he was accosted by the police. The police asked accused-
appellant Randy for the whereabouts of his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. When accused-appellant Randy
answered that he did not know, the police immediately arrested him and brought him to the police station.
At the police station, the police promised that they would drop the charges against accused-appellant Randy
if the latter would reveal where accused-appellant Arnel was. Accused-appellant Randy thus told the police
that accused-appellant Arnel was in Pareja Subdivision. Accused-appellant Arnel was indeed found and

2
arrested in Pareja Subdivision and was also brought to the police station. Accused-appellants were then
presented before a witness to Maximillian's stabbing. The witness was wearing a cap and a cover on his
face. The witness first pointed only at accused-appellant Arnel, but after some coaching from the police, the
witness also pointed at accused-appellant Randy.

On February 18, 2010, the RTC promulgated its Judgment convicting accused-appellants as charged. The
trial court found that the prosecution had duly established the essential elements of murder, and rejected
the uncorroborated claim of self-defense of accused-appellant Arnel and defenses of denial and alibi of
accused-appellant Randy. The trial court held that Maximillian's killing was murder given the presence of the
qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery, but not evident premeditation. The
RTC sentenced accused-appellants thus: chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Arnel Villalba and Randy Villalba guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength, with no mitigating circumstance.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, banning the imposition of the death penalty, said accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The accused are further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Maximillian Casona the amounts of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00)
PESOS as civil indemnity, TWENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages, FIFTY[-
]FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY[-]FIVE PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P55,225.60) as actual
damages, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, and TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS as attorney's fees.23 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Accused-appellants appealed their conviction before the Court of Appeals, based on the following
grounds: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

[I] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY
AND EVIDENT PREM[E]DITATION

[II] THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE TFIE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

[III] THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EXISTENCE OF SELF-DEFENSE ON
THE PART OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARNEL VILLALBA.24

On September 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision affirming the conviction of
accused-appellants for murder. Like the RTC, the appellate court gave scant consideration to accused-
appellants' unsubstantiated defenses. The appellate court likewise agreed with the finding of the RTC that
treachery attended Maximillian's killing, reasoning thus: chan robl esvirt uallawl ibra ry

The court a quo for its part, had this to say about its finding of treachery: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden
and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173197, April 24,
2007).

Thus, there was treachery when accused Randy Villalba held the hand of the victim who was drunk while his
co-accused Arnel Villalba simultaneously boxed and stabbed the deceased, thereby insuring its execution to
kill the victim without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder (Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code).
We agree with the court a quo.

Jurisprudence abounds in holding that an altercation between the victim and the accused immediately before
the attack upon the victim does not necessarily negate the presence of treachery. This was reiterated
in People v. Jabian [G.R. No. 132913-14, April 4, 2001], viz: chanRo blesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

Accused-appellant Jabian's suggestion that an argument between the parties preceded the slaying as
testified to by Ruel Lipalam, coupled with the fact that the attack was frontal, as shown by location of the
wound, and that therefore the killing of Jose Sammy was not sudden or unexpected as to negate a finding of
treachery, cannot be sustained. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Thus, it has been held that the fact that the attack was preceded by a fight, or even when the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person does not negate treachery. In this case, accused-appellant Jimmy
Magaro held both arms of the victim behind his back, effectively rendering the latter incapable of defending
himself while the other accused stabbed him in the chest. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the
victim was "a virtual
sitting duck when stabbed by Jabian because he was hand clasped by Magaro in order to be so stabbed,
without any risk whatsoever to the two accused arising from any useful defense which Jose Sammy might
make."
In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that treachery attends the killing of a person
who is drunk, unarmed, has no opportunity to defend himself and the attack is sudden.

In the case at hand, it was established by the prosecution witnesses that appellant Randy held an

3
intoxicated Maximillian while appellant Arnel stabbed him. Consequently, at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in the position to defend himself. Clearly then, the court a quo's finding of treachery is
justified. At the same time, this collaborative manner of the attack supports the finding of conspiracy.25 cralawredCha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The Court of Appeals though modified the amount of damages awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals' decision reads: chan roble svi rtu allawlib rary

FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in Criminal Case No. 11736 finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS;

1. Moral damages are awarded in the increased amount of Php75,000; chanrob leslaw

2. Exemplary damages are awarded in the increased amount of Php30,000; and

3. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from April 29, 2006 up to the finality of this
Decision, and interest at 12% per annum on these damages from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid shall likewise be paid by accused- appellants to the heirs of Maximillian Casona.26

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective supplemental briefs[27 but the parties
manifested that they had already exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals.28 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibrary

Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable for the resulting death of
Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense. Accused-appellant also argues that treachery
cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the prosecution admits that
provocation and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation between accused-appellant Arnel
and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.

Accused-appellant Randy insists on his alibi, i.e., that he was at home with his family and not in the
company of accused-appellant Arnel on April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall.

The Court finds partial merit in the instant appeal.

At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People v. Gerolaga29: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details of appealed cases with
meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great
respect by appellate tribunals, still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to ensure
that the trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the innocence of the
accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the doctrine that all doubts must be
resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons than to unjustly punish
an innocent one.

The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds bases to downgrade accused-appellant
Arnel's crime from murder to homicide and to absolve accused-appellant Randy of any criminal liability for
Maximillian's death.

The Court begins with the undisputed facts: Maximillian and Frederick, followed by Josephine, Homer, and
Marilou, chanced upon accused-appellant Arnel, his girlfriend Jenny, and two other companions, somewhere
along Capitol Drive, near the vicinity of Gaisano Mall in Butuan City, at around 2:30 in the morning of April
29, 2006. These two groups did not know each other prior to April 29, 2006. Maximillian addressed an
insulting remark towards Jenny causing tension between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel. A scuffle
ensued between the two men and accused-appellant Arnel eventually stabbed Maximillian on the chest with
a sharp instrument, causing a puncture wound that penetrated Maximillian's heart and ultimately caused
Maximillian's death.

Prosecution witnesses Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both accused-appellants at the police
station soon after accused-appellants' arrest. The same prosecution witnesses, together with Homer, would
again positively identify both accused-appellants in open court during trial. Hence, accused-appellant
Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing was duly established. Accused-appellant
Randy was not able to attribute any ill motive on the part of the three prosecution witnesses that could have
impelled them to testify against him. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand, under
the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith and credence. It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial,
especially when neither alibi nor denial is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[30 Nonetheless,
accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing does not necessarily
mean that the former should bear criminal liability for the latter's death, as the Court will subsequently
discuss herein.

The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian's murder, alleging that accused-appellants,
acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of superior strength, treachery, and/or evident
premeditation, stabbed Maximillian with an icepick.

4
On conspiracy

Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of
the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is
not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his
part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim.31
chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall,
Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful early morning of
April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The events swiftly
happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to
Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's
stabbing of Maximillian.

The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to grab the
latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's
way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's
left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither
of these witnesses was able to describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was
impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court has serious
doubts that accused-appellant Randy so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab
and kill Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely
stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof
that accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with
him or that accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.

In fact, there is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellant Arnel used in stabbing Maximillian.
None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw accused-appellant use an ice pick or any other weapon.
Josephine, Homer, and Frederick did not even know that Maximillian was stabbed, believing that he was just
punched by accused-appellant Arnel.

For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted that he used only a
barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick, with a sharp end, could cause a puncture
wound consistent with that which killed Maximillian. That accused-appellant Arnel used a barbecue stick he
found in the area as weapon shows that he acted instantaneously and spontaneously in stabbing
Maximillian, thus, further negating the possibility that he conspired with accused-appellant Randy to commit
the stabbing.

On the qualifying circumstances for murder

The prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the alleged circumstances which
would qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder.

The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, already found that there was no evident premeditation. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.32 As the Court already discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the events leading to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel
happened swiftly and unexpectedly, with accused-appellant Arnel instantaneously and spontaneously
stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick he found in the area. Accused-appellant Arnel clearly had no
opportunity for cool thought and reflection prior to stabbing Maximillian.

Unlike the RTC and the Court of Appeals, however, the Court finds no treachery in accused-appellant Arnel's
stabbing of Maximillian. That accused-appellant Randy was present or that Maximillian was unarmed and
drunk at the time of the stabbing are not sufficient to constitute treachery. Neither do said circumstances
constitute abuse of superior strength.

Treachery is defined under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as follows: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing the means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Based on the above definition, two conditions must be present in order to constitute treachery: (1) the
employment of such means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate, and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Jurisprudence,
however, has qualified that the suddenness of the attack, the vulnerability of the position of the victim at

5
the time of the attack, or even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the
attack as treacherous, to wit: chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the
victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an advantageous
position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless. The means
employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been
consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and
at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim. For the
rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the part of the latter. Treachery is never
presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have
been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.33 (Emphasis supplied.)

The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the Court once more
emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took place on April 29, 2006 when Maximillian's group
unexpectedly came upon accused-appellants' group. The tension and physical violence between Maximillian
and accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal exchange, to a physical scuffle, and then to the
stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel. Accused-appellant Arnel merely found a barbecue stick
in the area which he used to stab Maximillian. The barbecue stick could hardly be a weapon of choice and
accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it only in desperation. Moreover, it cannot be said that Maximillian
did not expect at all some form of attack from accused-appellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked accused-
appellant Arnel by making a crude remark about the latter's girlfriend, then grabbing accused-appellant
Arnel's arm, and taunting accused-appellant Arnel if he was brave. It would appear that Maximillian was, in
fact, spoiling for a fight. In addition, as the Court previously observed herein, it cannot simply assume in the
absence of proof that accused-appellant Randy held Maximillian's hand/s to prevent the latter from
retaliating as accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian. Accused-appellant Randy could just as well be
holding Maximillian's hand/s to stop Maximillian from further attacking accused-appellant Arnel during the
scuffle. Lastly, the Court is unconvinced that accused-appellant Arnel took advantage of Maximillian's
drunken state. No clear and convincing evidence has been presented to show the degree of Maximillian's
intoxication or if it had even affected his strength and intelligence.

As for abuse of superior strength, it is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there
were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim.
The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage.34 chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

In the case at bar, Maximillian was with Frederick when they first chanced upon accused-appellants, an even
match of two against two, therefore disputing any allegation of inequality of forces between the two sides.
Moreover, given the doubts as to accused-appellant Randy's actual participation in the stabbing, it cannot be
said that the two accused-appellants had used their combined strength against Maximillian to ensure the
latter's death.

Without any qualifying circumstance, the stabbing and death of Maximillian is a homicide rather than a
murder.

The respective criminal liabilities of accused-appellants

In the absence of conspiracy, the respective criminal liability of accused-appellants would depend on the
precise participation of each in the crime.

Accused-appellant Arnel had already admitted to stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick, which
eventually caused the latter's death. Unless he is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court his claim of
self-defense as a justifying circumstance, accused-appellant Arnel's conviction for the crime of homicide
becomes inevitable.35 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to
prove the elements of that claim, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.36 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Accused-appellant Arnel failed to establish the unlawful aggression of Maximillian at the time he stabbed the
latter.

Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to
the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of
the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression.37 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

In this case, accused-appellant Arnel's contemplated threat to his life or limb when he stabbed Maximillian
was not real or imminent. Maximillian merely uttered insulting remarks to accused-appellant Arnel and the

6
latter's girlfriend, Jenny. Accused-appellant Arnel even admitted that Frederick, Maximillian's companion,
immediately intervened and apologized for Maximillian's unruly conduct. Granting that Maximillian did punch
accused-appellant Arnel and hit the latter below his left ear, accused-appellant Arnel could have simply hit
Maximillian back. Instead, accused-appellant Arnel used a barbeque stick to stab Maximillian on the chest,
which was evidently not commensurate, and well overboard, as compared to the aggression exhibited by
Maximillian to him.

The penalty prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could
be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that the minimum should
be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. In the instant case, the Court sentences accused-appellant Arnel to imprisonment of eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As to the civil indemnity and damages, based on current jurisprudence, the Court orders accused-appellant
Arnel to pay Maximillian's heirs the amount of Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos and
Sixty Centavos (P55,225.60) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral
damages, and another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Absent any evidence that accused-appellant Randy acted with criminal intent in holding Maximillian's hand/s
at about the same time that accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian, the Court absolves accused-
appellant Randy of any criminal and civil liability for Maximillian's death.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of accused-appellants is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The Court finds accused-appellant ARNEL VILLALBA y DURAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Maximillian
Casona the amounts of P55,225.60 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and another
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date
of finality of this decision until fully satisfied.

The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant RANDY VILLALBA y SARCO on the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, CJ., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

7
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127811. April 29, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs., ISIDRO

COMESARIO y DACASIN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 2 May 1989, at ten in the evening, seven-year old Reynaldo Fernandez was
found dead near the bank of Oraan Creek in Brgy. Lelemaan, Manaoag,
Pangasinan. His neck was slashed. He drowned. He had been missing as early as
twelve noon that day. At first his parents thought that he was out playing in his
grandmothers house. When dusk came, however, Reynaldo still could not be found.
Rodolfo and Emilia Fernandez, parents of the victim, could not think of somebody
else other than accused-appellant Isidro Comesario y Dacasin as the perpetrator of the
crime.Emilia narrated that sometime in February 1989 accused-appellant paid her a
nocturnal visit at their house while her husband was away in the fields. Accused-
appellant allegedly offered to sell rice but when Emilia refused to buy for lack of money,
accused-appellant countered that they could have sex instead. Accused-appellant then
shoved his hardened penis against Emilia. Scared, Emilia jumped out of her house.
On 28 April 1989 or three (3) days before Reynaldo was killed, Rodolfo caught
accused-appellant cutting his mongo plants. An altercation ensued during which
accused-appellant got so angry that he ran after Rodolfo with scythe in hand. Accused-
appellant then threatened to kill Rodolfo or any member of his family. In the morning of
2 May 1989 Rodolfo saw accused-appellant Isidro Comesario holding a scythe and
walking towards Oraan Creek.
With this backdrop, Emilia and Rodolfo could not help concluded that it was
accused-appellant who killed their son Reynaldo.
Prosecution witness Napoleon Veloria testified that at around ten-thirty in the
morning of 2 May 1989, while he was in the vicinity of Oraan Creek, he saw accused-
appellant dragging a boy with his left hand while holding a scythe in his right. He did not
recognized Reynaldo although the boy was wearing a striped t-shirt and blue short
pants. Accused-appellant appeared to be angry while the boy was crying. Napoleon
thought that the two (2) were just siblings. He did not see the actual killing as he only
learned about the death of Reynaldo the following day. Nevertheless, he believe
accused-appellant was the killer as he was the last person seen together with the
victim.
On 22 November 1989 accused-appellant was charged with murder.
On his part, accused-appellant averred that at the time of the incident, he was
helping in the construction of their house together with his father and brothers. He only
left their house to gather grass for their farm animals. He did not go far though as there
was enough supply nearby.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the court below found accused-appellant
guilty as charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. In this appeal accused-
appellant maintains his innocence and asserts that the circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution was too meager to support his conviction.

8
 Doctrinally, an accused is presumed innocent. This presumption prevails unless
overturned by competent and credible proof. To sustain a conviction, the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt must be considered in
his favor. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a
conviction.[1]
Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial
evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more
than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[2] The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that
can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author
of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that there should be an even
greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness
of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the
accused.[3] Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all other, as the guilty person.[4]

In a nutshell, the evidence for the prosecution is that accused-appellant had motive
to kill Reynaldo; he allegedly felt bad when his advances were spurned by Emilia; three
(3) days before the killing, accused-appellant had an altercation with the father of the
victim; and, in the morning of 2 May 1989 accused-appellant was seen dragging a boy
with his left hand while holding a scythe in his right towards Oraan Creek. The lone
witness for the prosecution who allegedly saw the boy dragged could not recognize
him. All he could say was that the boy was wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue
short pants.
We believe that under all these circumstances taken together accused-appellant
should be acquitted.
First. An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. He need not proved what is
legally presumed. If he so desires he may present evidence on his behalf, but no matter
how weak it is, he still deserves an acquittal. This is because the prosecution must not
rely on the weakness of the evidence for the defense but on the strength of its own
evidence. Unless the prosecution has successfully overturned the presumption of
innocence, acquittal is inevitable.
Second. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There
must be moral certainty in our unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who
committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant. The conviction of the accused-appellant having been
based on very tenuous grounds, our judicial conscience cannot rest easy if we sustain
his conviction by the court below.
Third. Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a
conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may
reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor. [5] The elements constituting the
crime must be shown.

Fourth. The invocation of circumstantial evidence is misplaced. As already adverted

to, for circumstantial evidence to be validly invoked there must be more than one
circumstance. In the instant case, the prosecution only presented a single circumstance
and that was when Napoleon Veloria supposedly saw accused-appellant dragging a boy
wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue short pants towards Oraan Creek. From ten
in the morning until ten in the evening of 2 May 1989 when the lifeless body of Reynaldo
was found near Oraan Creek, there was a paucity of evidence. We cannot decipher a
pattern out of this single strand of circumstance as to support the conclusion that it was
accused-appellant who killed Reynaldo.From this angle alone, it is already clear that
circumstantial evidence cannot be successfully availed of.

9
 Last. We are not implying that accused-appellant did not commit the crime. All we
are saying is that when measured against the required quantum of evidence in criminal
cases, the case for the prosecution has miserably failed in all aspects. Simply put, if we
are to be guided by the established rules of evidence, we can safely say that the guilt of
accused-appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. We find occasion then to
reiterate what we have said in People v. Masalihit:[6]

Before we condemn x x x the crime must first be positively established and

that the accused is guilty sans any scintilla of doubt. This is elementary and
fundamental in our criminal justice systems. Any suspicion or belief that that
accused is guilty no matter how strong cannot substitute for the quantum of
evidence that is required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant should not be punished for the failure of the prosecution to dispose
of its burden to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish
his guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has always stood by the
rule that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, finding accused-appellant ISIDRO COMESARIO Y DACASIN guilty
murder is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for gross insufficiency of evidence;
consequently, he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is ordered IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED FROM CUSTODY unless lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this Decisions
and to report to this Court the action taken hereon immediately but not later than five (5)
days from receipt hereof.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1] People v. Berroya, G.R. No. 122487, 12 December 1997, 283 SCRA 121, 122-123.
[2] Sec, 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
[3] People v. Payawal, G.R. No. 113945, 16 August 1995, 247 SCRA 431.
[4] People v. Geron, G.R. No. 113788, 17 October 1997, 281 SCRA 36, 37.
[5] People v. Manambit, G.R. 72744-45, 18 April 1997, 271 SCRA 345.
[6] G.R. No. 124329, 14 December 1998.

10
 SYNOPSIS
This is an appeal filed by appellant seeking the reversal of the decision rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder based on circumstantial evidence and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, accused-
appellant maintained his innocence and asserted that the circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution was too meager to support his conviction.
The appeal was meritorious. The Court ruled that the invocation of circumstantial
evidence is misplaced. As already adverted to, for circumstantial evidence to be
validly invoked, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance. In the
instant case, the prosecution only presented a single circumstance and that was when
Napoleon Veloria supposedly saw appellant dragging a boy wearing a striped t-shirt
and a pair of blue short pants towards Oraan Creek. From ten in the morning until ten
in the evening of May 2, 1989 when the lifeless body of Reynaldo was found near
Oraan Creek, there was a paucity of evidence. The Court cannot decipher a pattern
out of this single strand of circumstance as to support the conclusion that it was
appellant who killed Reynaldo. From this angle alone, it is already clear that
circumstantial evidence cannot be successfully availed of. In sum, the prosecution
miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the crime charged as the
conviction of appellant was based on tenuous grounds. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court was reversed and set aside for gross insufficiency of evidence
and herein appellant was acquitted of the crime charged.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MERE POSSIBILITY OF GUILT IS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT
A CONVICTION. -- Doctrinally, an accused is presumed innocent. This presumption prevails unless
overturned by competent and credible proof. To sustain a conviction, the guilt of the accused must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt must be considered in his favor. Evidence showing a mere possibility of
guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction.
2. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; EXPLAINED. -- Accused-appellants conviction by the trial
court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that
there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing
to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is
purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the
prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less
than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; MOTIVE; PROOF OF MOTIVE, NO MATTER HOW
STRONG, NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. -- Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not
sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may
reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor. The elements constituting the crime must be
shown.
4. ID.; ID.; GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. -- We are not implying that accused-appellant did not commit the crime. All we are saying is that
when measured against the required quantum of evidence in criminal cases, the case for the prosecution has
miserably failed in all aspects. Simply put, if we are to be guided by the established rules of evidence, we can
safely say that the guilt of accused-appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. We find occasion then
to reiterate what we have said in People v. Masalihit: Before we condemn x x x the crime must first be
positively established and that the accused is guilty sans any scintilla of doubt. This is elementary and
fundamental in our criminal justice systems. Any suspicion or belief that that accused is guilty - no matter how
strong cannot substitute for the quantum of evidence that is required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Accused-appellant should not be punished for the failure of the prosecution to dispose of its burden to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish his guilt of the accused beyond

11
reasonable doubt. This Court has always stood by the rule that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to
convict an innocent one.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.

12
 SECOND DIVISION

March 8, 2017

G.R. No. 205745

CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and BREGIDO MALA CAT, JR., Petitioners
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Pride, when unchecked, can waste our youth and cause the forfeiture of all meaning in life, even in
the most inconsequential things: in this case, a basketball game.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of
establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on
relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
acquittal must follow as a matter of course.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45,2 praying that the assailed May 31,
2012 Decision3and January 14, 2013 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27951
be reversed and set aside, and that petitioners be acquitted of the offense of which they are
charged.

The Court of Appeals' assailed Decision affirmed the April 24, 2003 Decision5 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 37, which found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals' assailed January 14, 2013 Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. (Malacat) were charged with frustrated murder, as follows:

That on December 17, 1995, at about 6:00 [o]'clock in the morning at Zone 3, San Simon, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with intent to kill, attack, assault[,] box and struck one Rolando 0. Bahian with a
stone and hitting the latter's head and several parts of his body, thereby inflicting injuries[,] to wit:
"Depressed Fracture, Open frontal bone, left, and advised for surgery,["] thus performing all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of Murder, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of some cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to the said offended party which prevented his death.6

Upon arraignment, all three accused, now petitioners, pleaded not guilty.7 Trial then ensued.8

Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution: the offended party, Rolando Bahian (Bahian);
Kagawad Leonardo Abalde (Kagawad Abalde) of Barangay San Simon, Cagayan de Oro City;
Barangay Captain Reynaldo Yafiez (Barangay Captain Yafiez); Dr. Percy H. Arreza (Dr. Arreza) of
the Cagayan de Oro City Hospital; and Dr. John Mata (Dr. Mata), the surgeon who tended to
Bahian.9

13
According to the prosecution, on December 16, 1995, at about 6:00 p.m., Bahian went to the house
of Kagawad Abalde.10 Bahian recounted to Kagawad Abalde a violent altercation between him and
the petitioners in the course of a basketball game earlier that afternoon.11 Bahian claimed that Salisi
had committed a foul against him, making him fall to the ground.12 He complained to the referee and
this infuriated Salisi. In response, he threatened Salisi, telling him that "he would just get even with
him."13 Malacat heard his threat and positioned himself to punch Bahian. Bahian, however, dodged
the blow.14 Daayata then came, pointing a gun at Bahian.15 Bahian then backed off and pleaded that
they should not fight as they were friends.16

Kagawad Abalde advised Bahian to bring the matter to the attention of Barangay Captain Y afiez.17

Accordingly, the following morning, Bahian and Kagawad Abalde made their way to Barangay
Captain Yafiez' house.18 While on their way, they were blocked by petitioners.19 Daayata hit Bahian
on the left part of his chest.20Bahian staggered and fell onto a parked jeep.21 Salisi then hit Bahian
with a stone on the left side of his forehead, causing Bahian to fall to the ground.22 While Bahian was
lying prostrate on the ground, petitioners boxed and kicked Bahian.23 Kagawad Abalde tried his best
to get Bahian away but to no avail.24 All he could do was to shout for help.25 Daayata then poked a
gun at Bahian, Malacat unsheathed a bolo, and Salisi wielded an iron bar.26

Barangay Captain Yafiez rushed to the scene.27 There, Bahian lay on the ground as Kagawad
Abalde tried to ward off his attackers.28 Barangay Captain Yafiez shouted to petitioners to
stop.29 Shortly after, they retreated.30 Barangay Captain Yafiez and Kagawad Abalde then brought
Bahian to Barangay Captain Yafiez' house, and later to Cagayan de Oro City Hospital.31

Upon examination, Dr. Arreza made the following findings on Bahian: "depressed fracture, open
frontal bone, left."32

Bahian was noted to have possibly died, if not for the timely medical intervention.33 Dr. Mata
subsequently performed surgery on Bahian.34

The defense offered a different version of events. Apart from the three petitioners, it offered the
testimonies of Delfin Yafiez (Delfin),35 Rodolfo Yafiez (Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata (Danzon) and
Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ).36

Petitioners Salisi and Malacat claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente Daayata
(Vicente), brother of petitioner Daayata, in the morning of December 17, 1995.37 Bahian arrived,
together with Kagawad Abalde, and called for Salisi to come out.38 When Salisi acceded, Bahian
challenged him to a fight and threw the first punch that started a scuffle.39 In the course of the melee,
Bahian took a swing for Salisi, who ducked, causing Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on
the pavement and hit his head.40 Kagawad Abalde then drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened
to kill him.41

For his part, petitioner Daayata claimed that he was in his house, some 50 meters away from
Vicente's house when the incident recalled by petitioners Salisi and Malacat transpired.42 He rushed
to Vicente's house upon hearing a commotion.43 There, he saw Bahian and Kagawad Abalde, who
was pointing a gun at Malacat.44

All three (3) petitioners claimed that it was not until an hour after the incident that Barangay Captain
Yafiez arrived.45They also acknowledged that an altercation did take place during a basketball game
the day before, or on December 16, 1995.46 They added however, that in the evening of December
16, while they were on their way home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his house, where he
challenged them to a fight.47 Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.48

In its Decision49 dated April 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City
found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of its
Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi,
and Br[e]gido Malacat, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder
committed against Rolando Bahian, and they conspired in committing the crime, and, accordingly,
each of the said accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of nine (9) years of
prision mayor medium as the minimum term to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal medium as
the maximum term.

14
Moreover, all the three accused are sentenced and ordered (1) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and
severally the sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Pesos (₱57,000.00) by way of reimbursement for the
expenses he incurred for medicines; (2) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and severally the sum of
Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00) for the income that

Rolando Bahian could have earned for two (2) years as a farmer; (3) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly
and severally the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) by way of moral damages; and (4) to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.50

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court's conclusions. It affirmed the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court, but replaced the award of actual damages to temperate
damages amounting to ₱25,000. The Court of Appeals also deleted the award for loss of earning
capacity, there being no proof in support of it. It also awarded ₱20,000 as civil indemnity. The
dispositive portion of its assailed May 31, 2012 Decision51 read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated April 24, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37 of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 96-266 is hereby AFFIRMED as
to the penalty imposed with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages.

All three (3) accused-appellants, CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALIS[I] and BREGIDO
MALACAT, JR., are ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando Bahian the following amounts:

1. Php20,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. Php30,000.00 as moral damages; and

3. Php25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition,53 where
they insist on their version of events. They emphasize several factual details and maintain that they
did not initiate an assault on Bahian. They assert that Bahian sustained the injury on his forehead
through his own fault; thus, they could not be held liable for acting with intent to kill Bahian.

On July 24, 2013, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its Comment.54 It insisted that it was supposedly improper for this Court to re-evaluate the
factual findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in the context of the present
Rule 45 Petition.55 Apart from pleading the nature of a Rule 45 Petition, the five (5)-page Comment
devoted a singular paragraph to arguing that the positive identification of the petitioners as Bahian's
supposed attackers must prevai1.56

On May 12, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply,57 noting that respondent failed to directly confront the
factual issues they had raised.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated murder.

Petitioners seek relief from this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is basic that Rule 45 petitions may only raise pure questions of law,58 and that
the factual findings of lower courts are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. Still, there are
recognized exceptions permitting this Court to overturn the factual findings with which it is
confronted. These exceptions are:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

15
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record .59

Specifically concerning criminal cases, this Court has stated that "in exceptional circumstances, such
as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters ... this Court will re-calibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]."60

A careful review of this case and of the body of evidence that was available for the Regional Trial
Court's perusal reveals that there has been a gross misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, we reverse and acquit petitioners Capistrano
Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr.

II

The defense points out several facts, which lend greater plausibility to its claim that the possibly fatal
injury sustained by Bahian on his forehead was not inflicted by any of the petitioners, and that
petitioners did not initiate an assault against Bahian. Negating the fact of the alleged perpetrators'
assault and infliction of a potentially fatal injury negates the corpus delicti of the offense charged.

First, it appears that the location where the altercation occurred between Bahian and Kagawad
Abalde, on the one hand, and petitioners, on the other, is not as plain and austere as the
prosecution made it seem. The prosecution merely claimed that Bahian and Kagawad Abalde were
on their way to Barangay Captain Yafiez's house when they were suddenly blocked and assaulted
by petitioners.61 However, it was actually settled during trial - consistent with the defense's contention
- that the confrontation took place in the vicinity of the house of vicente.62

This detail does not intrinsically weigh in favor of either the prosecution or the defense. For indeed, it
may simply have been necessary to pass by Vicente's house en route to Barangay Captain Yafiez's
house and, consistent with what the prosecution claimed, that it may have merely been the spot
where Bahian's attackers chose to launch their assault. But while specificity of location may
ultimately be inconsequential to the prosecution's case, it is the genesis of the defense's case. As
the defense asserts, the altercation was precipitated by Bahian and Kagawad Abalde's arrival
outside Vicente's residence, where Bahian then called out and challenged Salisi.63

Second, while the prosecution painted a picture of a relentless assault that lasted for as much as 30
minutes64 - with petitioners supposedly not content with Bahian falling onto a parked jeep, but even
attacking him until he lay on the pavement, and thereafter still continuing to punch and kick him 65

- Bahian's "medical certificate showed no injury other than that on [his] forehead."66

"Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses."67 They have been characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which
rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence."68 Thus, in People v. Vasquez,69 this Court refused
to undiscemingly lend credence to the incriminating assertions of prosecution witnesses as to an
alleged mauling, and stated that "[t]his Court cannot be persuaded by the prosecution's claim of

16
perpetrati on of physical violence in the absence of any marked physical injuries on the various parts
of the victim's face and body."70

As the defense correctly points out, if the prosecution's assertion of a relentless assault were true,
the greater probability was that Bahian must have been "black and blue all over."71 Quite contrary to
the sort of physical evidence that a purported relentless and prolonged assault should have
reasonably yielded, however, there was but one injury that Bahian was noted to have sustained.

Third, Bahian himself was noted to have admitted that his head injury was "caused by [him] hitting
the edge of the concrete pavement." As the following excerpt from Bahian's cross-examination
reveals:72

Q - And on February of 1995, your forehead was operated on by a certain Dr. John Mata, is that
correct?

A- Yes.

Q - And you told Dr. Mata that the wound on your forehead was caused by you hitting the edge of
the concrete pavement, is that correct?

A - Yes, I told him a lie so that I could be treated.

Q - But nobody in the German Doctors told you that you would not be operated if that was caused by
a stone or in a fight?

A- He asked me the reason why I got this injury?

Q-And then?

A - Then I told him the reason how I got this injury.

Q - That you hit the edge of the concrete pavement?

A- Yes.

Q-And that was the first time you talked to him before the operation?

A- Yes.

Q - The first time you talked to him, you lied to him?

A - Yes, I told a lie because I wanted to be operated.73 (Citations omitted)

As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, it is true that the prosecution has sought to extenuate the
weight of Bahian's admission by having him explain that he only lied to Dr. Mata because otherwise,
"he would not have been admitted to the hospital and his injury would have not been operated
on."74 However, even this extenuating explanation does not completely diminish the significance of
his admission.

As the same excerpt from Bahian's cross-examination indicated, nobody intimated to Bahian that he
would not have been operated on if his injury arose from a violent altercation. Confronted with this
detail, Bahian never offered a direct response, and instead appeared to have evaded the question.
He merely reiterated that, "Yes, I told a lie because I wanted to be operated."75 Thus, the defense's
revelation that Bahian's alleged lie was not predicated on a rational basis stands unrefuted.

Moreover, in the present Petition, the defense points out the curious parallelism between, on the one
hand, the admission or otherwise lie made by Bahian to Dr. Mata, and on the other hand, the
defense's main contention that Bahian sustained a head injury through his own fault:

There is no showing that petitioners knew that complainant told his doctor that he hit his head on the
edge of the concrete pavement. They came to know of it only when they heard him admit it on cross-

17
examination. And yet, that's exactly what they have always been asserting right from the very start,
even during the preliminary investigation, or long before they heard him say it on the witness stand.

It is too much of a coincidence that petitioners and the complainant should say exactly the same
thing, that he hit his head on the edge of the concrete pavement - unless it is true.76

Finally, several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have belied the
prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun, a bolo and an iron
bar, respectively.

The most compromising of these witnesses is the prosecution's own, Barangay Captain Yañez. He
categorically stated that he was well in a position to "see or identify if they were armed."77 Ultimately,
however, his observation was to the contrary:

Q - They were armed or not?

A- Who?

Q - The three of them?

A - I could see or identify if they were armed.

Q - Nobody brought a bolo?

A - When I arrived there, I did not see anybody holding a bolo.

Q - Nobody brought a steel pipe?

A - I have not seen.

Q - You did not see anybody holding a gun?

Q - No.78 (Citation omitted)

Danzon, a defense witness whom the prosecution never bothered to cross-examine, stated:

Q - Tell us what was that unusual incident all about?

A - What I could say is that: I heard noise outside and because I was watching them, I saw Kag.
Abalde holding a gun pointing upward and I saw Rolando Bahian already wounded on his
face.79 (Citation omitted)

Two (2) other defense witnesses - Rosemarie and Delfin -were noted to have made the same
observations.80

III

Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the immense
responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very
conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne, not by a mere
abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:

18
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon
the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course,
that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
1âwphi1

reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course,
mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the
weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.81 (Citations
omitted)

The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral
certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While
not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of events,
they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.

They cast doubt on whether the complainant and his companion were actually stopped in their tracks
to be assaulted, and support the possibility that they may have instead deliberately intended to bring
themselves to Vicente's house to provoke or challenge one (1) of the petitioners.

They also cast doubt on whether the complainant was relentlessly assaulted, with the specific
purpose of ending his life; whether the ostensible fatal blow was dealt to complainant by one (1) of
the petitioners or was dealt upon him by his own violent imprudence; and whether petitioners had
actually brandished implements for maiming and killing.

Not only do these doubts persist, details disclosed by the prosecution itself - taken together with how
the defense accounted for the events of December 16 and 17, 1995 - demonstrate the dubiety of the
prosecution's claims.

As Bahian himself recalled to Kagawad Abalde, it was he who threatened Salisi that "he would just
get even with him."82 By his own recollection too, he acknowledged that it was only upon his
utterance of that threat that Malacat and Daayata responded with correlative aggression. He
conceded having been put in a situation where he had to back off. By his own recollection, the clash
between him and petitioners could have ended there, yet it did not. It appears that, rather than letting
the better part of reason and modesty prevail, Bahian elected to make good on his threat to
eventually just get even with his adversaries. Along the way, it even appears that he enlisted the aid
of Kagawad Abalde, whose participation in the clash in the morning of December 17, 1995, as the
defense recounted, was not as a pacifier but also as an aggressor. Unfortunately for Bahian, it
appears that his own hubris and lack of fighting prowess not only prolonged his quarrel, but even
brought him potentially fatal physical harm.

Taking off from the events in the basketball game of December 16, 1995, the prosecution unravelled
a narrative of petitioners' supposed vindictiveness. Yet the contrary is apparent. The confluence of
Bahian's admissions of a prior altercation, his self-issued threat, how he was constrained to desist,
and his own account to Dr. Mata of how he sustained his injury, as well as the glaring dissonance
noted by the defense and backed by physical evidence, demonstrate how the prosecution has fallen
far too short of discharging its burden of proving petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

19
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No.
27951 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Any amount they each paid by way of a bail bond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Designated as Fifth Member per S.O. No. 2416-U dated January 4, 2017.

1
Rollo, pp. 4-23.

2
1997 Rules of Court

3
Rollo, pp. 100-116. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan
Manahan and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Pedro B. Corales of
the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.

4
Id. at 125-129. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and
concurred in by Associate Justices Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and Marie Christine
Azcarraga-Jacob of the TwentyFirst

Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.

20
5
Id. at 24-42. The Decision was penned by Judge Jose L. Escobido of Branch 37, Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City.

6
Rollo, p. 24.

7
Id. at 102.

8
Id.

9
Id.

10
Id.

11
Id. at 102-103.

12
Id. at 103.

13
Id.

14
Id.

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Id.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Id.

22
Id.

23
Id.

24
Id.

25
Id. at 104.

26
Id.

27
Id.

28
Id.

29
Id.

30
Id.

31
Id.

32
Id.

33
Id.

34
Id.

21
35
Id. at 12.

36
Id. at 105.

37
Id.

38
Id.

39
Id.

40
Id.

41
Id. at 106.

42
Id.

43
Id.

44
Id.

45
Id.

46
Id.

47
Id.

48
Id.

49
Id. at 24-42.

50
Id. at 41-42.

51
Id. at 100-116.

52
Id. at 115.

53
Id. at 4-23.

54
Id. at 145-149.

55
Id.

56
Id. at 149.

57
Id. at 161-163.

58
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Marasigan y De Guzman v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016

59

<http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/january2016/20131
O.pdt> 5-6 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Cirtek Employees Labor Union-
Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., 665 Phil. 784, 789-790 (2011) [Per J.
Carpio-Morales, Third Division].

22
60
People of the Philippines v. Esteban, G.R. No. 200290, June 9, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer .html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/june2014/200920
.pdt> 6 [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

61
Rollo, p. 103.

62
Id. at 6.

63
Id. at 105.

64
Id. at 13 and 17.

65
Id. at 103.

66
Id. at 13.

67
People v. Sacabin, 156 Phil. 707, 713 (1974) [Per J. Fernandez, Second Division].

People v. Vasquez, 345 Phil. 380, 395 (1997) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First
68

Division], citing People v. Uycoque, 316 Phil. 930, 942 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second
Division].

69
345 Phil. 380 (1997) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division].

70
Id. at 395.

71
Rollo, p. 14.

72
Id. at 9.

73
Id. at 8-10.

74
Id. at 109.

75
Id. at 10.

76
Id. at 10.

77
Id. at 13.

78
Id. at l2-13.

79
Id. at 12.

80
Id.

81
Macayan, Jr. y Malana v. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/march2015/17
5842.pdt> 7-8 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing CONST., art. Ill, sec. 1; CONST., art.
Ill, sec. 14 (2); People of the Philippines v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996) [Per J.
Romero, Second Division]; and Basilio v. People of the Philippines, 591 Phil. 508, 521-522
(2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

82
Rollo, p. 103.

23
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 187497

PHILIPPINES, Present:
Appellee,
CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
BRION,
MELANIO GALO alias DODO and SERENO,
EDGAR, alias ALDO, alias REYES, and
YOCYOC, alias DODO, alias PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.
JIMMY, alias JOSEPH, alias
DINDO, and alias G.R.,
Accused, Promulgated:

EDWIN VILLAMOR alias TATA, October 12, 2011

Appellant.
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the appeal from the November 21, 2008
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00224-MIN. The
CA sustained (with modification) the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19,
Digos City, Davao del Sur, whose decision[2] found Edwin Villamor alias Tata
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and imposed on him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

In an Information dated May 9, 2001, the prosecution charged the appellant

and eight (8) other co-accused[3] with the crime of murder. Out of the nine (9)
accused, only the appellant was apprehended, while the others remained at
large. The appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4] During
the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Jose Valderama;
Francisco Anuada; Demencita Matutis; Leonora Resuelo; Barangay Captain

24
Estremos Acyo; and Rodolfo Doong. For the defense, the appellant was presented
as witness.

Jose, a relative of the victim Ruben Resuelo, Sr., recalled that he was
outside his house in Sitio Caran-caran, Goma, Digos City, Davao del Sur, in
the afternoon of October 9, 2000, when the appellant, Melanio Galo, and three
(3) other men armed with Garand and M14 Armalite rifles passed by, and walked
behind the hog-tied Resuelo, Sr.[5] He went to his aunts house
in Barangay Dulangan, and reported what he saw. After learning of Resuelo, Sr.s
death, he concluded that the appellant and his companions were responsible for his
death.[6]

Francisco narrated that at midnight of October 9, 2000, he was sleeping in

his house in Camalig when two armed (2) men woke him up, and borrowed a guna
(bolo) from him; they also told him that they would bury Resuelo, Sr.s body. They
then warned him of the consequences if the appellants body would be discovered.
While walking on his farm the next day, Francisco saw a shallow grave with a
hand protruding from the soil; he also saw three (3) men near the grave. He
requested them to transfer the body to another place as he might be implicated in
the crime.[7] On October 11, 2000, he discovered that the body had been buried at
another portion of his farm. He reported the matter to Barangay Captain Acyo, and
accompanied him to the place where the body had been buried. Thereafter, he
assisted the barangay officials and some residents in digging out the
body.[8] Francisco likewise testified that Resuelo, Sr.s face bore substantial damage
and that his arms and feet were hog-tied.

Demencita testified that on the evening of October 3, 2000, the appellant

and eight (8) other armed persons went to her house, and asked if they could stay
there for the night. The appellant and Melanio stayed there until October 9, 2000,
while their companions transferred from one house to another. On the evening of
October 9, 2000, she learned that Resuelo, Sr. had been missing after the latters
children asked her about their fathers whereabouts.[9]

Leonora, the victims wife, testified that at 6:00 a.m. of October 11, 2000,
her son, Ruben Resuelo, Jr., arrived at her house and informed her that Resuelo, Sr.
had been missing since October 9, 2000. Leonora and her two other children
immediately went to Sitio Caran-caran, Goma, Digos City, to search for Resuelo,
Sr. She failed to locate him, leading her to inform Barangay Captain Acyo that her
husband had been missing. Barangay Captain Acyo called for a meeting, and then
requested his constituents to disclose any information they might have regarding
Resuelo, Sr.s whereabouts. During this meeting, Nonito Calvo acknowledged that
a man had been buried at Franciscos vegetable farm. Barangay Captain Acyo and
his men proceeded to Franciscos farm, dug up the body, and brought it to

25
the barangay hall for identification. According to Leonora, her husbands body bore
seven stab wounds.[10]

Barangay Captain Acyos testimony was aptly summarized by the RTC, as

follows:

He was informed that Edwin Villamor surrendered in Kiblawan in

connection with the death of Resuelo. At the request of Edwins mother, he went
to see Edwin Villamor when he was detained in the Provincial Rehabilitation
Center (PRC). Edwin denied being involved in the killing of Resuelo stating that
the perpetrators were his companions[,] namely: Aldo, Melanio Galo, Edgar, alias
Yokyok, alias Jimmy or Joseph, alias Dodo and alias G.R. Edwin said he was in
Kamalig when Resuelo was killed. Asked why he surrendered, Edwin told him he
was tired hiding in the mountains. Edwin admitted to him of being a member of
the NPA.[11]

In his defense, the appellant confirmed that he was once a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA) assigned in Camandag, Makilala, but left the organization in
May 2001. He denied any participation in Resuelo, Sr.s death, and maintained that
he was in Makilala at the time of the incident. In April 2001, he surrendered to
the barangay captain of Balugan, who, in turn, brought him to the chief of police.
The chief of police presented him to Cotabato Governor Manny Piol, who offered
him and six (6) other surrendered rebels livelihood projects.[12] After some time, he
went to the office of Davao del Sur Governor Roger Llanos to secure a
recommendation letter for a job in Makilala, but the police arrested him. He denied
any participation in the death of Resuelo, Sr. when Barangay Captain Acyo visited
him in jail.[13]

The RTC, in its September 25, 2003 decision, found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to pay the victims
heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as actual damages. It likewise
ordered the case against the other accused to be archived, subject to reinstatement
upon their arrest.[14]

On appeal, we endorsed this case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[15] After careful deliberations, the CA, in
its November 21, 2008 decision, affirmed the RTCs decision with modification,
ordering the appellant to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

The CA held that all the elements of circumstantial evidence have been established
to uphold the appellants conviction. According to the CA, viz.:

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence constitutes an unbroken

chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused-

26
 appellant as the author of the crime. First, Jose Valderama saw accused-appellant
and four (4) other persons together with the hog-tied victim pass by his house
in Sitio Caran-caran in the afternoon of October 9, 2000. Second, Demencita
Matutis testified that accused-appellant and his companions stayed at her house
in Sitio Caran-caran from October 3 to October 9, 2000. Third, Francisco Anuada
testified that the body of Ruben was buried in his farm on the night of October 9,
2000 by several armed men. Fourth, Estremos Acyo, the Barangay Captain of
Goma, testified that accused-appellant implicated his co-accused as responsible
for the killing of Ruben. Lastly, accused-appellant admitted to be a member of the
New Peoples Army and they were actively operating in the area of Davao del
Norte and sometimes even in the area of Davao del Sur.[16] (italics ours)

The CA further ruled that Joses and Demencitas testimonies negated the
appellants defenses of denial and alibi.

In his brief,[17] the appellant argues that the courts a quo erred in convicting him of
the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He maintains that the circumstantial evidence against him for
murder was weak.

THE COURTS RULING

We uphold the appellants conviction for murder.

The prosecution established the appellants

guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Preliminarily, we note that the lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar
the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the
appellants participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence[18] that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed
the imputed crime,[19] the latter should be convicted.

According to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[20] In this regard, we give great weight to the findings of fact
made by the RTC, as upheld by the CA,[21] viz.:

(a) the appellant and eight other armed people stayed at Demencitas
house in Sitio Caran-caran on October 3, 2000, but only the appellant
and Melanio stayed there until the early morning of October 9, 2000;

(b) the appellant, Melanio, and three (3) others, who were armed with
Garand and M14 Armalite rifles, passed by Joses house
27
 in Sitio Caran-caran in the afternoon of October 9, 2000, and were
walking behind the hog-tied Resuelo, Sr.;

(c) Resuelo Sr. was never seen alive again;

(d) two armed men borrowed a bolo from Francisco at midnight of

October 9, 2000, and told him that they would bury Resuelo, Sr.s
body;

(e) Francisco saw Resuelo, Sr.s body buried in his farm on October 10,
2000, and requested the three persons whom he saw near the shallow
grave to transfer the cadaver to another place;

(f) Francisco saw the victims body buried in another portion of his farm
on October 11, 2000, and reported the matter to the barangay captain;

(g) Resuelo, Jr. reported to Leonora on October 11, 2000 that Resuelo,
Sr. had been missing since October 9, 2000;

(h) Leonora informed Barangay Captain Acyo that her husband had been
missing for two days;

(i) Nonito told Barangay Captain Acyo during a meeting that a man was
buried at Franciscos farm; and

(j) Resuelo, Jr., Barangay Captain Acyo, and some barangay officials
went to Franciscos farm on October 11, 2000, and exhumed the
victims body.

The combination of these ten (10) circumstances constitutes an unbroken

chain leading to the inescapable conclusion[22] that the appellant is guilty for the
crime of murder.[23]

First, Joses testimony sufficiently establishes that Resuelo, Sr. was last
seen alive with the appellant and his companions. Jose unequivocally stated that
he saw the appellant and his companions with Resuelo, Sr. walk in front of his
house on the day of the murder. Jose positively declared that he saw the victim
hog-tied at the time. This was in the afternoon of October 9, 2000.

Second, Demencitas unequivocal statements that the appellant and his co-
accused Melanio stayed at her house on October 3, 2000 and left only in the
morning of October 9, 2000, the day of the murder confirm the appellants
presence in the locality at the time of the murder. He was next seen in the same

28
locality by Jose, this time with the hog-tied victim, in the afternoon of the same
day.

Third, Franciscos testimony establishes the immediate aftermath of the

murder. Not only did the armed men borrow a bolo from him at midnight of
October 9, 2000, they also told him that they would bury Resuelo, Sr.s body and
warned him not to dig it up from its buried site. In the morning of October 10,
2000, he confirmed the presence of the dead body on his property when he saw
the shallow grave and the victims hand protruding from it. When the body was
disinterred from where the armed man had transferred it (the lower portion of
Franciscos property), Francisco clearly identified the victim as Resuelo, Sr. The
disinterred body not only showed significant damage to its face and wounds on
its armpit; the victims hands and feet were also hog-tied.

Fourth, Franciscos testimony that Resuelo, Sr.s body was buried in his
farm was corroborated by Nonitos testimony that he saw someone being buried
in the same place where Resuelo Sr.s body was found.

Thus, the evidence presented shows a sequence of events that can only
lead to the conclusion that the armed men of which the appellant was one of
them killed and buried the victim Resuelo, Sr. The sufficiency of the presented
evidence to prove the appellants guilt is fully supported by jurisprudence.

In People v. Solangon,[24] we convicted accused Ricardo Solangon on the

strength of circumstantial evidence. In Solangon, even though no direct
evidence was presented to prove that the accused (alleged to have been
members of the NPA) actually killed the victim, we still upheld the conviction.

In People v. Oliva,[25] we upheld the conviction of the accused based on

circumstantial evidence. In Oliva, the victim was abducted from his home, was
last seen alive in the custody of the accused, and was hog-tied with coralon
rope. Although no one saw the actual killing, we held that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In yet another case People v. Corfin[26] we upheld the conviction of the accused
based on evidence showing that: (1) the accused was the last person seen with the
victim; (2) the accused and the victim were seen together near a dry creek; (3) the
accused was seen leaving the place alone; and (4) the body of the victim was later
found in the dry creek.

All these cases show that the Court, when presented with sufficient
circumstantial evidence, will not shirk from upholding an accuseds conviction
for murder.There are more than enough reasons to similarly act in this case
where the law and the attendant facts, considered in relation to one another, lead
29
to the single conclusion that the appellant participated in the killing of Resuelo,
Sr.

The appellants alibi was clearly negated

by the testimonies of Jose and Demencita

The defense anchors its theory on the alibi that the appellant was not
in Sitio Caran-caran at the time of the murder. However, the RTC and the CA
correctly refused to give credence to this defense in light of Joses and
Demencitas testimonies.

We reiterate the principle that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and

crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.[27] Further,
in People of the Philippines v. Herminiano Marzan, we held that [d]enial is
negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the appellant was at
the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim.[28]

In this case, Jose unequivocally testified that he saw the appellant at the
vicinity of Caran-caran on October 9, 2000, the day of the murder. More
importantly, Jose testified that he saw the appellant, together with four (4) other
men, walking with Resuelo, Sr. while the latter was hog-tied on the day of the
murder. Joses testimony not only establishes a strong circumstance to establish
the appellants culpability since the victim was last seen with the appellant and
his companions but also strongly negates the appellants alibi that he was not in
Caran-caran at the time of the murder. To be sure, Demencita not only saw the
appellant and his companions in Caran-caran but she also allowed them to stay
in her house until the morning of October 9, 2000, the day of the murder. The
appellants alibi necessarily crumbles in light of these two clear and positive
testimonies.

In sum, we find no cogent reason not to support the decision of the

CA. The appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and clearly merits the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law. As for damages, the CA awarded the following
amounts: (1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; (2) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and (3) P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages. To conform to recent jurisprudence,[29] the amounts to be awarded
are, as follows: (1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P30,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.[30]

30
 WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the November
21, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00224-MIN.
Appellant Edwin Villamor is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law. In conformity with
recent jurisprudence, we MODIFY the amounts to be awarded, as
follows: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00
as exemplary damages; and P30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

31
 Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*
Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, per Special
Order No. 1114 dated October 3, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 5-22; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice Michael
P. Elbinias and Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 21-27; penned by Judge Hilario I. Mapayo.
[3]
Melanio Galo alias Dodo and Edgar, alias Aldo, alias Yocyoc, alias Dodo, alias Jimmy, alias Joseph, alias Dindo,
and alias G.R.
[4]
Rollo, p. 7.
[5]
TSN, August 12, 2002, pp. 9-11 and 13.
[6]
Id. at 14-16.
[7]
TSN, June 19, 2002, pp. 8-12.
[8]
Id. at 12-16.
[9]
TSN, August 12, 2002, pp. 31-38.
[10]
TSN, March 13, 2002, pp. 5-9.
[11]
CA rollo, p. 23.
[12]
TSN, March 10, 2003, pp. 5-8.
[13]
Id. at 8-10.
[14]
Supra note 2.
[15]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[16]
Supra note 1, at 15-16.
[17]
CA rollo, pp. 37-51.
[18]
People v. Solangon, G.R. No. 172693, November 21, 2007, 537 SCRA 746.
[19]
People v. Villarino, G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 372.
[20]
See e.g. People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834, 869-870 (2002).
[21]
People of the Philippines v. Arnold Castro y Yanga, G.R. No. 194836, June 15, 2011.
[22]
People of the Philippines v. Herminiano Marzan y Olonan, G.R. No. 189294, February 21, 2011.
[23]
People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares, G.R. No. 175330, January 12,
2010, citing Bastian v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160811, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 43, 55.
[24]
G.R. No. 172693, November 21, 2007, 537 SCRA 746.
[25]
402 Phil. 482 (2001).
[26]
G.R. No. 131478, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 504.
[27]
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78, 91; and Velasco v. People, G.R. No.
166479, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 664-665.
[28]
People of the Philippines v. Herminiano Marzan y Olonan, supra note 22.
[29]
People of the Philippines v. David Maningding, G.R. No. 195665, September 14, 2011.
[30]
People v. Narzabal, G.R. No. 174066, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 772.

32
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144090. June 26, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL

MAGUING y SALIGUMBA, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the identity of the appellant is not established beyond reasonable doubt,
acquittal necessarily follows. Conviction for a crime rests on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence, never on the weakness of that of the defense.

The Case

Michael Maguing y Saligumba appeals the December 1, 1997 Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal Case No. 93-
9911. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Michael Maguing GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder charged in the Information, as qualified by
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and hereby sentences the
accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs
of Crisanto Saul for the death of the latter the amounts of P50,000.00 x x x; actual
damages of P41,000.00 for burial expenses; and moral damages of P100,000.00; and
to pay the costs. [2]

The Information[3] dated August 18, 1993, charged appellant in these words:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1993, in the Municipality of Cainta, Province
of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating with a certain John Doe whose true
[name] and whereabout[s] is unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another,
both of them armed with guns, with intent to kill and by means of treachery did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully, feloniously shoot one Crisanto Saul thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot wound which directly caused his death. [4]

During his arraignment on February 8, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel de oficio,[5] pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] After a trial on the merits, appellant
was found guilty of murder.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions
version of the facts in this manner:

33
On August 12, 1993, around 11:30 p.m., spouses Crisanto and Evelyn Saul were in
the house of the Jamias couple (Aniceto and Angelita) located at Block 29, Lot 28,
Kabisig Floodway, Cainta, Rizal. With them were Honoria Ontanillas and Nestor
Jamias. The group was talking animatedly concerning the deployment abroad of
Honorio Ontanillas as well as Crisantos deployment on the last week of that month of
August. In the course of their conversation, two (2) masked intruders suddenly
appeared from the door. One of the intruders pointed a gun at the temple of Crisanto
then a shot rang out. Crisanto slumped on the floor. Evelyn was shoved inside a room
by Aniceto Jamias and a scuffle ensued between the second intruder and the rest of
the group of the Jamiases. The second intruder was subdued.Evelyn vividly recalled
that the gunman who shot her husband had the letter M tattooed between his thumb
and forefinger.

Post mortem examination conducted on the corpse of Crisanto Saul showed that the
cause of his death was penetrating gunshot wound, left eye. (Citations omitted)
[7]

Version of the Defense

Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts simply as follows:

Accused Michael Maguing interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that on August
12, 1993, he together with a certain Alex, Tetet and Dante were in the house of his
uncle, Reynaldo Tanco, doing some repair works. They started working at 8:00 oclock
in the morning and finished their job at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, they
engaged in a drinking session until 7:30 in the evening. They then took their dinner
and watched television. After his companions left, he stayed in the house of his uncle.

The foregoing testimony of the accused was corroborated by Reynaldo Tanco and
Alex Agustin. [8]

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to establish
appellants criminal liability for murder. It gave full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses -- especially the wife of the victim. She was allegedly able to see
the actual shooting and to identify the assailant through the tattoo mark on his right
hand.
Hence, this appeal.[9]

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:
I

The trial court erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the
identification of the accused-appellant as the alleged perpetrator of the offense
charged was not clear, positive and convincing.

34
 II

The trial court erred in giving credence to the incredible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence adduced by the accused-
appellant which was corroborated on material points.

III

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged
notwithstanding the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

IV

On the assumption that the accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder instead of homicide. [10]

Simply stated, the main issue is the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Positive Identification Required

to Sustain a Conviction

In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the
commission of the crime and (2) the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime.[11]Cursory identification does not suffice to convict the accused. What is
needed is positive identification made with moral certainty as to the person of the
offender.[12] Verily, the critical consideration in this appeal is whether the identity of the
assailant was sufficiently established by the prosecution.
At the outset it must be noted that the assailants wore masks, which completely
covered their faces during the entire course of the shooting. The prosecution never
denied this vital piece of information at any stage of the proceedings. Further, even the
trial court took cognizance of this fact. Given this factual premise, the prosecution had
the task of showing that one of the masked assailants and appellant were one and the
same person. Regrettably, it failed to discharge this task.

Masked Man
Unrecognized by Witnesses

First, not having had any chance at all to see the face of the masked gunman, none
of the eyewitnesses was able to recognize or give a definite description of him later on.
Thus, their act of positively pointing to the accused as the assailant during the police
lineup and the trial was the result of pure speculation and was contrary to human
knowledge and common experience.
35
 In recent cases, this Court has upheld the validity of the identification of masked
assailants by prosecution witnesses, but only because of peculiar circumstances that
served as reliable bases for pointing to the accused as the culprits.
In People v. Mante,[13] the accused was convicted because the
yellow sando (undershirt), which he had used to mask his face, was the same apparel
he was wearing when he was seen by witnesses in the vicinity of the crime scene prior
to the killing. In People v. Nang,[14] appellants were deemed to have been positively
identified, because the mask worn by one of them accidentally dropped from his face in
the course of a struggle with the victim. In the same vein, we ruled in People v.
Sotto[15] that the prosecution witness had positively identified the masked assailant,
because the two of them were previously known to each other. The witness was
therefore familiar with the body contour and movements of the accused. Moreover, the
gun used in the shooting belonged to the latter. He also tested positive for powder burns
after undergoing a paraffin test.
Indubitably, the identification of the accused in the aforecited cases was based on
significant facts and on circumstantial evidence other than the prosecution witnesses
self-serving declarations or statements.
In the present case, it was not established that the prosecution witnesses had
previously known appellant or were familiar with his voice, gestures and
mannerisms. Neither was it shown that the mask he was wearing was dislodged from
his face, so as to allow thereby a reasonable view or even a slight glimpse of his facial
features.

Unreliable Basis
for Identification

Second, the prosecutions basis for identifying the assailant was belatedly
established, unsubstantiated, uncorroborated and therefore unreliable.
From the testimony of Prosecution Witness Evelyn Saul, it is clear that in identifying
the assailant, her only point of reference was the tattoo on his right hand. Nonetheless,
she audaciously declared that she was able to recognize the assailant, who was
wearing a mask the whole time, as herein appellant. She testified as follows:
Q: So, there were 5 persons present [on] x x x August [12] 1993 at 11:30 P.M.?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: What were you and your husband doing at the residence of Mrs. Angelita Jamias?
A: We were talking because her cousin has just had a medical examination and he was
about to leave on that coming Saturday while my husband [was] going to leave on
the last week of August.
Q: So, what this group, you and your husband and Mrs. Jamias and a brother of Mrs.
Jamias and who else?
A: Honorio.
Q: Is he also with your group?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: Cousin Honorio Ontanillas did anything unusual happen?
A: While we were talking then suddenly entered two armed men. And they entered the
house and one of them poked a gun to my husband.
Q: How many person entered?
A: Two (2), [maam].

36
ATTY. OLEDAN
Q: Did they [enter] x x x to a door?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: And how did they enter, they just entered slowly or what?
A: They suddenly entered forcibly and then I just had transferred to the seat near my
husband.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, you said the two armed men forcibly entered and immediately one proceeded,
what did the one do?
A: One of them entered through the other door because there were two doors.
Q: Now, what did the one who entered the place where you were did? What did the
one who entered exactly where you and your husband and the others were seated
[did]?
A: The man who entered through the door poked a gun to my husbands left temple
while the other man entered to the other door.
Q: Now when this man who poked a gun on the left side temple and pointed near the
eyelid of your late husband what happen[ed]?
A: I was pushed inside by Mr. Aniceto Jamias and when I was pushed inside there was
already a shot.
Q: And did you know where did the shot come from?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: Where?
A: When he entered there was already a shot.
Q: Was it the same man who poked the gun who shot your husband?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: Aside from you, you said that Mr. Jamias pushed you in the room, is that true?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: What about the others, what happened to them?
A: They also went inside the room. Mr. Jamias, myself, my husband and the [gunmen]
were the ones who were left.
Q: So, what else happened after that?
A: There was already a commotion while we were inside and I was trying to peep to
see my husband if he was already dead and Mr. Jamias was able to wrestle from
the other gunman the gun by self defense.
Q: What happened to the gunman who shot your husband?
A: There were shooting at the door, because they were trying to enter the room.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Did you see the gunman who shot your husband?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: If he is around the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: Will you please point him out.
INTERPRETER:

37
 Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom who when asked gave the name
Michael Maguing.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Q: Was there any particular mark this gunman have that you specifically can recall?
A: He has a tattoo in his right hand with letter m.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Your Honor, the accused has a tattoo on his right hand with letter m between his
thumb and his forefinger.[16] (Italics supplied)
On cross-examination, she candidly admitted that the gunman indeed had a mask
on.
Q: After the crime took place you reported the matter to the police?
A: After the incident police arrived and we were brought to the police station.
Q: And you [told] the police about the incident that transpired on that day?
A: Yes, [maam].
Q: What was your description of the accused?
A: I stated that he has a mask on, he is a big man but I recall on the second time that
he had [an] initial marked letter M in his hand.[17] (Italics supplied)
We note that Evelyn mentioned noticing the tattoo only during the second time. By
second time she meant August 16, 2002, when the followup investigation was
conducted and her Sworn Testimony[18] executed. The initial investigation was conducted
on August 13, 1993, or the day following the shooting incident.[19] During both
investigations, particularly during a police lineup, she pointed to
appellant as the killer. Surprisingly, she made no reference to any tattoo or identification
mark on his person during either of these investigations. It was only in open court that
she mentioned the tattoo for the first time.
We find it strange why in her Sworn Testimony taken only a few days after the
killing, this witness did not even refer to any supposedly noticeable identification mark or
tattoo on the gunman. Neither did she disclose the fact that the assailant was wearing a
mask. It seems that she deliberately omitted this information to make it appear that she
had a clear and positive view of the killer.
Verily, it is baffling why the information about the tattoo was completely disregarded
in the Sworn Testimony, only to be used during trial as the sole determining factor to
establish the identity of the killer. The material omissions therein gravely affect her
credibility as to her identification of the accused.[20]
It is beyond comprehension how she could have failed to mention an important
factual detail such as the tattoo, especially in the initial stages of the investigation, when
she knew that it was the only means by which her identification of the assailant could be
substantiated. We cannot repeat often enough that for evidence to be believed, it must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must itself be
credible.[21] Thus, it must also be reasonable and in accord with human experience;
failing to be so, it must be rejected.[22]

Discrepancies and Inconsistencies

in the Testimonies of Witnesses

Third, the eyewitness testimonies as to the identification of appellant are replete

with irreconcilable inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities pertaining to material
facts. When they contradict themselves on a vital question such as the identity of the

38
offender, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly
disregarded.[23] Consequently, their credibility is seriously impaired,[24] the veracity of their
claim is negated,[25] and their probative value greatly diminished -- if not rendered
useless altogether. On the whole, the impression they create is that they were feigned
or fabricated.
While Evelyn spoke much of the supposedly ostentatious tattoo on the assailants
hand, nowhere in the testimony of the corroborating witnesses was there any mention of
it. In fact, Prosecution Witness Angelita Jamias, who was also present during the
shooting, denied having seen it, much less the person who had shot the victim.
This denial notwithstanding, Angelita conveniently and casually pointed to appellant
as the killer, even as she admitted her inability to recognize him then. Moreover,
contrary to Evelyns narration, her claim was that she saw three killers instead of just
two. She testified as follows:
Q: And on the evening at 11:30, you said [that] there were persons who entered, who
came in first? Were there [persons] who came first or they came in inside this
[terrace] through that door?
A: They entered all at the same time at the side of the [terrace].
Q: You mean to say they entered all of the three?
A: There is a gate in this sketch so they entered to this gate, 3 persons.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What about the third person, where did he enter?
A: He entered to the portion [of the] marked door.
Q: Did you come to know who was this person who entered to this door?
A: I did not [notice] him.
Q: Did you come to know who he was?
A: I cannot recognize him.
Q: Will you please look around the courtroom who is that person if he is around?
A: Yes, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when asked x x x gave the
name Michael Maguing.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Witness pointed to the accused.
Q: When the accused entered this door, what did he do?
A: I did not exactly notice.
Q: You mean to say he just entered, he did not do anything?
A: I saw him entered but I did not see what he did but he entered inside.[26] (Italics
supplied)
Upon inquiry from the trial court, Angelita affirmed her statements and categorically
denied having seen the person who had shot the victim. She further testified thus:
COURT:
You did not see the victim from the very moment when he was shot?
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not know how the victim was shot?

39
 A: No, sir.
Q: Neither do you know who shot him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Neither did you see who shot him?
A: No, sir.[27] (Italics supplied)
When the testimonies of key witnesses cannot cohere to form a positive depiction of
the criminal act as well as its perpetrator, the inevitable conclusion is that one or more
of them must be lying and merely concocting a story.[28]
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court acquitted the accused because of the
inconsistent testimonies and contradictory statements of the alleged eyewitnesses to
the crime. The story of one of them was obviously fabricated to feign credibility, thus
exposing even further her predilection to prevaricate. The Court ruled in this wise:

Inconsistencies on negligible details do not destroy the truth of a witness testimony, so

long as they refer only to collateral or incidental matters. But by no means can the
inconsistencies and contradictions in Merdelyns testimony be characterized as trivial
or insignificant. Her propensity to make contradictory statements reflects her own
uncertainty as to the actual events leading to her fathers death. It is clear that she
speaks not from memory or experience. She cannot even give a definite chronology of
the events that transpired before her father was killed. We are convinced that she was
simply fashioning her story and making spur-of-the-moment improvisations in an
attempt to render her testimony credible. Instead of so doing, she exhibited a
disposition to fabricate that makes her testimony unworthy of belief and credence. [30]

By and large, the only piece of evidence linking appellant to the crime is the tattoo,
which one of the eyewitnesses claimed was identical to the one she had seen on the
assailants right hand. As explained above, such testimony hardly serves as reliable
basis for identifying the assailant. Thus, the trial courts conviction based on the
uncorroborated claim of Evelyn Saul -- that she recognized appellant as the assailant by
the tattoo on his right hand -- must be regarded as erroneous and set aside.
When the records are bereft of any indication that an eyewitness has given a
description that will enable an anonymous person to point to the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime, the court cannot judge whether a correct and proper
identification has been made.[31]
To be sure, the identification of appellant as the assailant in this case cannot in any
way be considered positive and credible.[32] It is a settled rule that when the identification
is doubtful, inconclusive or unreliable, an acquittal is called for.[33] The doubtful
identification of the accused herein, when taken with the absence of any other evidence
showing his guilt, justifies his acquittal.[34]

When Positive Identification

Does Not Prevail Over Alibi

In passing, we shall discuss the jurisprudential rule regarding the

defense of alibi vis--vis the positive identification made by a credible witness. Although
such defense is inherently weak, the prosecution is not released from its burden of
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [35] More important, before
a court can apply the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi, it is necessary to
first establish beyond question the credibility of the eyewitness as to the
identification of the accused.[36] In the present case, such credibility was not

40
established. Hence, there can be no positive identification to speak of, and no
application of the aforementioned rule.
The defense of alibi becomes irrelevant when the prosecution fails to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [37] A conviction for the crime of murder
cannot be based on the appellants inherently weak defenses of denial and
alibi.[38] Rather, guilt should be premised on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.

While the defenses of denial and alibi are concededly weak, appellants conviction
cannot be based thereon. It is a well-settled doctrine that it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to uphold the Peoples cause based on the strength of its own evidence on
the guilt of the accused. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show to the court
to the point of moral certainty that the accused indeed committed the offense
charged. In the case at hand, the prosecution, armed with evidence secured by police
investigators, failed to discharge its appointed task of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.Hence, by constitutional mandate, appellant deserves
exoneration. [39]

In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is whether the court
reasonably doubts, not the innocence, but the guilt of the accused.[40] Unless the identity
of the culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt to the exclusion of all others, the
charge must be dismissed on the ground that the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not been overcome.[41] While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean absolute certainty, it connotes that degree of proof which, after an investigation of
the whole record, produces in an unprejudiced mind the moral certainty that the
accused is culpable.[42]
In this case, the quantum of proof required to justify a conviction for a criminal
offense was not satisfied by the prosecution. Thus, the Court has no option but to
uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.[43]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in
Criminal Case No. 93-9911 is hereby REVERSED. Appellant is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt and is ordered RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision
forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date
appellant was actually released from confinement, or of the reasons why he could not
be freed therefrom. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 23-50. Penned by Judge Francisco A. Querubin.
[2]
Id., p. 50.
[3]
Id., p. 7. The Information was signed by 4th Assistant Prosecutor Lucila A. Tiongson.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Atty. Bonifacia V. Garcia of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).
[6]
See Order dated February 8, 1994; records, Vol. I, p. 24.
[7]
Appellees Brief, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 139-140. Signed by Assistant Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega
and Amy C. Lazaro and Solicitor Romeo R. Ramolete.

41
[8]
Appellants Brief, pp. 3-4; id., pp. 95-96. Signed by Attorneys Amelia G. Garchitorena, Elpidio C.
Bacuyag and Maximo B. Usita Jr. of PAO.
[9]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on October 28, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of
appellees Brief. Appellants Brief was received on June 18, 2002. No reply brief was filed within
the reglementary period.
[10]
Appellants Brief, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 93-94. Original in upper case.
[11]
People v. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, June 8, 2000.
[12]
People v. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660, February 29, 2000.
[13]
312 SCRA 673, August 18, 1999.
[14]
289 SCRA 16, April 15, 1998.
[15]
341 Phil. 184, July 8, 1997.
[16]
TSN, April 11, 1994, pp. 4-8.
[17]
TSN, April 19, 1994, p. 10.
[18]
Records, Vol. I, p. 6.
[19]
Id., p. 5.
[20]
People v. Balinad, 340 SCRA 27, September 7, 2000.
[21]
People v. Ramos, 365 SCRA 477, September 20, 2001.
[22]
People v. Almazan, 365 SCRA 373, September 17, 2001.
[23]
People v. Aranas, 345 SCRA 377, November 22, 2000.
[24]
People v. Malacura, 346 SCRA 781, December 4, 2000.
[25]
People v. Decillo, 341 SCRA 591, October 2, 2000.
[26]
TSN, June 27, 1994, pp. 4-5.
[27]
TSN, July 6, 1994, pp. 5-6.
[28]
People v. Sevilla, 339 SCRA 625, September 5, 2000; People v. Roche, 330 SCRA 91, April 6, 2000.
[29]
332 SCRA 570, May 31, 2000.
[30]
Id., pp. 592-593, per Mendoza, J.
[31]
People v. Caedo, 335 SCRA 81, July 5, 2000.
[32]
People v. Saturno, 355 SCRA 578, March 28, 2001.
[33]
People v. Cabiles, 341 SCRA 721, October 3, 2000; People v. Giganto Sr., 336 SCRA 294, July 20,
2000.
[34]
People v. Ragay, 342 Phil. 785, August 11, 1997.
[35]
People v. Salazar, 346 SCRA 735, December 4, 2000.
[36]
People v. Mansueto, 336 SCRA 715, July 31, 2000; People v. Crispin, 327 SCRA 167, March 2, 2000.
[37]
People v. Gonzales, 341 SCRA 688, October 3, 2000.
[38]
People v. Sinco, 355 SCRA 713, March 30, 2001.
[39]
Id., p. 728, per Kapunan, J.
[40]
Rueda Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 341, November 29, 2000; People v. Malbog, 342 SCRA 620,
October 12, 2000.
[41]
People v. Malacura, supra.
[42]
People v. Mariano, 345 SCRA 1, November 17, 2000.
[43]
People v. Velarde, GR No. 139333, July 18, 2002; People v. Bravo, 318 SCRA 812, November 22,
1999.

42
In an Information[3] dated January 11, 2005, appellant was charged with murder,
committed as follows:

That on December 20, 2004 at about 9:00 oclock in the evening [in]
Brgy. G. del Pilar, municipality of Bulan, province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of night time, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and
stab one EDWIN GELUA thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds
on the stomach which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of
his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Angelita Gelua

(Angelita), Edwin Geluas (Edwins) wife; Dr. Andrew A. de Castro (Dr. De
Castro), Edwins attending physician; Salvador Gelua (Salvador); and Ruel Garlan
(Ruel).

Angelita testified that, on December 20, 2004, at about 9:00 p.m., Edwin had
a drinking spree with Salvador and Samson Gepiga at their home in Barangay G.
del Pilar, Bulan, Sorsogon. At some point during the said spree, Edwin went out of
the house to answer the call of nature. Angelita was standing by the main door
while Edwin urinated when appellant suddenly appeared and stabbed Edwin with a
machete. She immediately brought Edwin to Bulan Municipal Hospital; and then
transferred him to SorsogonProvincial Hospital, where Edwin died.[4]

Dr. De Castro found the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest, stab

wound, and hypovolemic shock.[5] He explained that Edwin sustained a stab
wound on the right upper quadrant with laceration, the part of the intestine
coming out, and damaged the following abdominal organs, i.e., perforated lesser
curvature of [the] stomach was thru and thru; perforated second part of [the]
duodenum, thru and thru; lacerated middle colic artery behind the stomach with
extensive bleeding; lacerated mesenteric vessels; and perforated ileum, thru and
thru.[6] Dr. De Castro opined that, based on the location of the stab wound, the
victim was in front of the assailant face to face with the latter when
attacked. However, it was also possible that the assailant was at the back of the
victim by hitting the anterior part from behind holding the patient.[7]

Salvador corroborated the testimony of Angelita. He testified that, on December

20, 2004, at around 9:00 p.m., he was having a drinking spree with Edwin at the
latters house.Edwin went out of the house to urinate. -----------
43
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