CASES IN LEGTECH

1. GR no. 131909
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131909. February 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL,

Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK
ODIAMAR, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Odiamar was charged with rape, and in a bid to secure temporary liberty, he filed a motion
praying that he be released on bail. Despite the peoples opposition to the same, the lower court
granted the motion. The People then filed a Motion to Recall and Invalidate the Order of Release
on Bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt against Odiarnar was strong. The lower court,
however, denied the same, and the Court of Appeals sustained the denial. Hence, the instant
appeal.
Odiamar was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right, depending
on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This means that even though there is a reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused, if on an examination of the entire record, the presumption is great
that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.
Here, the lower courts Order failed to include some significant factors and circumstances
which, to the mind of the Court, are strong, clear and convincing. Further, the lower court
misapplied some doctrines in criminal law, abusing its discretion and showing manifest bias in
favor of Odiamar in determining which circumstances are to be considered in supporting its
decision as to his guilt. It must be noted that after the conduct of two preliminary investigations,
no bail was recommended in the information. Such recommendation constitutes clear and strong
evidence of guilt of the accused. Also, the lower court did not strictly comply with jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of its discretion. The courts granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution which is a complete compilation of all the pieces of
evidence presented during the hearing proper. Here, however, the enumeration in the said
summary was incomplete.
Hence, the Order of Release on Bail was void, having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT TO BAIL; WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS
STRONG; DETERMINATION THEREOF. Accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by
the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. As such, bail is discretionary and not a
matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of
 guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court
would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would
unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DISCRETION. By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of
whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or Evident proof in this connection
has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a weliguarded dispassionatejudgment to the conclusion
that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be
punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are
such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear and convincing to an unbiased
judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion Even though there is a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused
is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. (Italics supplied) In other words, the test is not whether the
evidenced establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great
presumption of guilt. As such, the court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are
present which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OBSERVATION OF THE COURT IN CASE AT BAR. This Court has observed
that the lower courts order failed to mention and include some significant factors and circumstances which to the
mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony on the psychiatric
examination of the victim as well as the findings thereof which should have been considered and included as it
was given by an expert witness. Further, the unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-respondent is an
implied admission of guilt which should have been noted as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as
admissible evidence against the party making it. Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of
evidence and testimonies and misinterpreting the medical findings, this Court has likewise observed that the
lower court misapplied some doctrines in criminal law. There was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of
complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been taken into
consideration. Further, after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, no bail was recommended in the
information. Such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION THEREOF.From Our observations, the lower court abused its
discretion and showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to
be considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be
remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, is not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the
exercise of the judges individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that
its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion
on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in
granting or denying bail said; But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided
by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDELINES; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. Aside from the
apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces of evidence are to be considered,
the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As
reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalang, discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and
the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and
justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. The present Constitution, as previously adverted to,
provides that in crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not a matter of
right. This Court has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court
laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo which outlined the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation; (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its discretion; (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
 summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Italics supplied) (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied. Based on the above-cited
procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or
digest of a text or statement.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ON SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE; REASONS THEREOF. There are two corollary
reasons for the summary. First, the summary of the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing proper,
thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally
recognized as having been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of
evidence in the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be tantamount
to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they were not
considered at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for due process means
not only giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider every piece
of evidence presented in their favor. Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is the basis for the judges
exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will
the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based
on his discretion. (Italics supplied)
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT WHEN INCOMPLETE. The summary should necessarily be a
complete compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower
court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While
conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete
enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a
summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A
summary: that is incomplete is not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin, the absence of a summary
in the order would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an
incomplete summary would like to be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a
semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, said order was considered defective and voidable. As such, the
order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated.

VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; IN AN INDICTMENT FOR A CAPITAL

OFFENSE, ACCUSED NOT ENTITLED THERETO WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. In
an indictment for a capital offense, the accused is not entitled to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, and it
is the duty of the judge to hear the parties and to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented. When
the judge views the evidence of guilt in such a capital offense not to be strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter
of sound discretion on his part.
2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; WHEN
AVAILABLEThe extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are not open when the question
is whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound discretion. These special reliefs are available only
when the judge has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his
decision or order such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or completely acting on bias and whim. Even
assuming that the judge has erred in his judgment, so long as grave abuse of discretion is not evident in his action,
the aforesaid exceptional remedies are not warranted. Abuse of discretion must be such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment and must be such so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion and hostility.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
 Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA GR.
No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders[2] of the lower court
granting accused-respondents Motion for Bail and denying petitioner Peoples Motions to Recall
and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995 and to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995
confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he
be released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial
evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court
is constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick
Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00. (Italics supplied)

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was
strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty.
Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.

The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition reasoning thus:

We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find
that the claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of
his jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not
inclined to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent courts exercise of its
discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not
find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the respect to be
accorded the findings of facts of the trial court, which had the advantage (not
available to Us) of having observed first-hand the quality of the autoptic proference
and the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses
on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of the
accused. Differently stated, in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons,
We are not prepared to supplant the exercise of the respondent courts discretion with
that of Our own.
 Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the
following sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A
SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE
PROVING RESPONDENTS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting accused-
respondents application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence presented
during the hearing. Said order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by
the accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by
the prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be
presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man
and woman. Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such
presumption. It is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape
prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the
untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful
doubts. It has the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an
indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in
the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so,
because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino,
G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the offense
of rape the facts and circumstances occuring either prior, during and subsequent
thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission thereof by
the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do
presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the
instant case, the facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the
commission thereof were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such,
they deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6,
Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to
wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by
the accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 oclock
from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy
ride. In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to the
Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same
municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said
jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going
down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows
voluntariness on the part of the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court
her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an
insight into the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495). And it is
only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout where it shall be
believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly so, because
the aphorism that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with the common
experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases
involving prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and
even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that
there (was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar and
companions allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small
cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the prosecution,
however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it
present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would
cause dizziness.Rightly so, because administration of narcotics is covered by Art. 335,
par. 2 Revised Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the Revised
Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden of proof rests with the
prosecution but it failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the
offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged
offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on
her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the
head of the accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended
party was no longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence has been
presented to show that the offended party suffered an injury much less any part of her
pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there was an overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the offended party (People v.
Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in
the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the
parties and their relation to each other (People v. Erogo, 102077 January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 oclock in the early
morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latters
companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy,
without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief
regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the
house of Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the testimony
of the offended party shall not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free
from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended by the party accused though
innocent (People v. Francisco G.R. No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes
necessary, therefore, for the courts to exercise the most painstaking care in
scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-
30619, March 29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr.
Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among
others, that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have
been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year,
prior to the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by
repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party
might have experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an
expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court, Moran, op.cit, vol 5, 1963, ed.
pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander
of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov.
Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said
physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such,
there were contradictions on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People
v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by the accused
subsequent to the commission of the act, it is immaterial. As such, it has no probative
value.

The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from
failing to include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial court also misapplied some
well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the
following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:
First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of
rape against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino,
247 SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on
her psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and
symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and
symptoms. These abnormal psychological manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte,
are traceable to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of

guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by

intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.

Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, no bail was
recommended in the information constitutes clear and strong evidence of the guilt of
(all) the accused (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].

Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that
respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and
dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.

Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her
lament, torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and
complained about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her
and her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille are
positive statements which, under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials
put forth by respondent (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).

Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
lacerations suffered by Cecille might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6)
months or even a year prior to the examination (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995)
thus implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly
misplaced.

Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell how old is an old hymenal laceration
because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the
size of the vagina she could not point the exact cause (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9,
1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments
for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime (People v.
Echegaray, 257 SCRA 561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical
examination of the victims genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful
prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature. (People
v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).

Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr. Decena positively testified that the
wounds could have been caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim (Page 6,
TSN, December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecilles testimony (quoted in the Order at
page 9) that respondent burned her right side of the stomach thrice.

The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the instant
petition.
The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics supplied)

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with
its rule-making powers,[3] the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the
following provision:

Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable

by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[4](Italics supplied)

In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.[5] As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter
of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore, dependent on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the
purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of
judicial discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to
exercise judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong.[6] Proof evident or Evident proof in this connection has been held to
mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion
that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will
probably be punished capitally if the law is administered.[7] Presumption greatexists when the
circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is
strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of
any other conclusion.[8]Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an
examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense,
bail should be refused.[9] (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt
but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is
ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show
evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.[10]
This Court has observed that the lower courts order failed to mention and include some
significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and
convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of
the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as
unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content
as well as depressive signs and symptom.[11] This particular testimony should have been considered
and included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of
compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which should have been noted
as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible evidence against the party
making it.[12]
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this Court
has likewise observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the
lower court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with
common experience and observation of mankind.
According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she
willingly went with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the scene
of the crime, complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise,
never protested nor cried while they were on their way to accused-respondents house. Because of
those findings, the lower court doubted the credibility of complainant and stated that the crime of
rape is not to be presumed and that sexual acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be
consensual. In overcoming such presumption, much depends on the credibility of the complainant.
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of
complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been taken
into consideration. The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is more
credible:

It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to
drink gin with the help of his friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her
mouth (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew
smoke into her face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she
attempted to leave the place, she was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends
(Pages 6-7, TSN, November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun
(Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).

The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must
be viewed in light of the victims perspective and the offenders physical condition
(People v. Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter
submits herself against her will because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v.
Ramos, 245 SCRA 405 [1995])

In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the incident in
question. At her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her
tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots of gin must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and
deprived of will or reason. The resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived
Cecille of reason, will and freedom must be viewed in light of her perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule
because in rape cases, submission does not necessarily imply volition. (Querido , 229
SCRA 745 [1994])

It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of accused-
respondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the
trial court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to go with
them in the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That
she agreed to accompany them for a joy ride does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts
later committed against her person.
Second, the lower court stated that force and violence in the offense of rape are relative terms,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. The lower
court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually a consensual act since
the prosecution was unable to show that complainant suffered any injury nor show any evidence
that her pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there any evidence that accused-respondent exerted
overpowering and overbearing moral influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it readily
concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending credence to
complainants allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered weak and
dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby facilitating
the commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the prosecution, in order to prove the
elements of force or intimidation to show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or pants
were torn. Her testimony to that effect would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still
exerted efforts to corroborate Cecilles claim by presenting the examining physician who testified
that Cecille suffered hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately,
however, the lower court chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.
In addition, the lower court doubted complainants allegation that she was forced to smoke a
small cigarette, presumably marijuana, due to the fact that the prosecution failed to present any
portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that
inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause the said offended party to suffer weakness
and dizziness. Said ratiocination is trifling and unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as
complainant categorically asserted that what made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the
cigarette and the intoxicating effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke alone. In
any case, complainant could not be expected to produce that portion of that so-called small
cigarette. Moreover, one does not need an expert witness to testify on what is common knowledge
- that four shots of gin have a weakening and dizzying effect on the drinker, especially one as
young as the fifteen-year old complainant.
More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower courts
misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies which
would have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could indeed have been raped. The
following pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order are indications of
misleading findings:
First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after
complainants physical examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended
party is already experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining physician had testified that
the hymenal lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months or even a year prior to the
examination. Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that Dr. Decena also testified that she
cannot tell how old is an old hymenal laceration because she cannot indicate when an old laceration
was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she could not point the exact cause.
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with concern and agrees
with petitioner, in accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration
is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the
crime. Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victims genitalia is not
an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely
corroborative in nature.[13] And contrary to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal
laceration is not conclusive proof that one is experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the cigarette
burns indicated that the lesions near complainants umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably,
however, the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that
the wounds could have been caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim which corroborates
Cecilles testimony that respondent burned her right side of the stomach thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abused its discretion and
showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to
be considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it
must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according
to Basco v. Rapatalo[14] is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within
reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judges
individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that its exercise
be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation
of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: But discretion when
applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule,
not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded
indicate that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This
irregularity is even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines
cited to support the grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help but observe that the lower
court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not
strong by its non sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular
disregard of vital prosecution evidence and strained interpretation, if not misinterpretation, of
criminal law doctrines.
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainants
allegation that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts, (2)
the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological manifestations
which are traceable to the rape incident, and (3) the unrebutted offer of compromise, are indications
of the strength of the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent.
Lending credence to petitioners case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary
investigations, no bail was recommended in the information. According to Baylon v. Sison,[15] such
recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces
of evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of discretion.As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalang,[16] discretion is
guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules
which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are
deemed to be part of the laws of the land.
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not a matter of right. This Court has
reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down
the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo[17]which outlined the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Italics supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
 Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.[18] A
summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement.[19]
There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary of the evidence in the
order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the
evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and
most importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in the summary
presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be tantamount to not
giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they were
not considered at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for
due process means not only giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for
the Court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.[20] Second, the summary of
the evidence in the order is the basis for the judges exercising his judicial discretion. Only after
weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his
discretion.[21](Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete compilation
or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower court
cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the
summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration
was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the
prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a
reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summary that is incomplete is
not a summary at all.According to Borinaga v. Tamin,[22] the absence of a summary in the order
would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an
incomplete summary would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained
or be given a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang,[23] said order was considered defective
and voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the
resolution dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated
March 24, 1995 in Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion. The court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of Roderick
Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the disposition
of said case. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., please see Dissenting Opinion.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Justices Antonio M. Martinez (now Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) and Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros.
[2]
Penned by Judge Alfredo Cabral of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 30.
[3]
Article VIII, Sec. 5, Par. (5) of the 1987 Constitution.
[4]
Rule 14, Rules of Court.
[5]
Republic Act No. 7659, An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Laws, and For Other Purposes.
[6]
Montalbo v. Santamaria, 54 Phil. 955 [1930].
[7]
8 CJS p. 70.
[8]
See Note 7 citing Ford v. Dilley, 156 N.W. 513.
[9]
See Note 7, pp. 71-72.
[10]
Supra.
[11]
Petition, Rollo, p. 19.
[12]
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995).
[13]
Supra, p. 21.
[14]
269 SCRA 220 (1997).
[15]
243 SCRA 284, [1995].
[16]
196 SCRA 44 (1991).
[17]
See note 14.
[18]
People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [1968].
[19]
The Oxford Companion to the English Language, Tom McArthur; Oxford University Press, 1992.
[20]
Ginete v. CA, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998.
[21]
See note 20.
[22]
Supra.
[23]
See note 16.
[24]
Borinaga v. Tamin, 226 SCRA 206 (1993).

SOURCE: SC Judicary
 2. GR no. L-69654

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE,
PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and MACARIO
PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.

G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVII,
QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R.
No. 69564 is the automatic review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari of said decision, the
recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his fate." 1

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard
Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty"
with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan,
Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22,
1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized by the
Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:

One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, * was
formerly a co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation
owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from
the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the
incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8,
tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).

At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00
in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening
after he was relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by
Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of
Colonel Samson drinking beer with three companions, one of whom he later
Identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.

After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply as he usually does after office hours, accompanied by his 13-year
old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober
at his post. At the office, the two children watched a television program, as their
father proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the
Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door
of the gate. Appellant Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then
after Abuyen had talked with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to wait outside,
while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9,
1983].

At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her
husband and two children. On her way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was
wide open with the appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate
was opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot coming from the
direction of the garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the
appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to
contact her husband through the intercom. But since the intercom was out of order,
she hurriedly went outside and met appellant Escober who volunteered the
information "that he was not hit." [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].

Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the
gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her
(sic) daughter Tiffany was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic)
daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E' fun of blood. He also observed that
everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms drawers opened. Later, he found
out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36,
tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as
their children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her
eldest son drove a second one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded
children inside the two cars, they were brought to the Chinese General Hospital
where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp.
13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator
Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate the incident. And, since the victims
were already brought to the Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed
thereto. When he arrived at the hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the
victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a cursory examination of the victim
 and indicated on two separate sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab
wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he
proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera
and a police photographer, who arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn,
July 5, 1983].

Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E")

which the former said was found beside the pool of blood inside the room where the
incident happened. In the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the
drawers inside the office of Vicente Chua were forcibly opened with its (sic) contents
scattered. Upon subsequent interview with Vicente, he likewise learned that cash
amounting to P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-
13, Ibid].

Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant

Escober, the security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who
voluntarily gave his version of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober,
the written statements of the victims' parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were
also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively). Thereafter, Francisco referred on
December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the result of his investigation to the City Fiscal
who wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations: "Detained the
accused all prima facie case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No
bail recommended. [pp. 13-23, Ibid].

Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the
appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily Identified by the victims'
mother, Una Chua, as one of those she saw standing at the open gate of their
compound during the night of the incident on December 2 (sic), 1982. Another
statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on December 10, 1982 from the victims'
mother to supplement the previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also
taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit
"K") and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects who
claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4] companions,
including the herein two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant
Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under custodial investigation and voluntarily
and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit "M") wherein he did not only admit his
participation in the commission of the crime, but also implicated appellant Juan
Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal,
Police Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y
Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante
Bato, alias Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two appellants
were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. 2

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his defense. His
testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:

Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective
Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at
Joyce St. Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina
Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he reported for work. When his
companion left and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary
work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the guardhouse dirty and also
because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it.
There was a janitor but the security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As
security guard, he had a gun but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he
was cleaning the guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte
arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to, and two men
[also accused named Does as they are also still at large] entered and one man [co-
accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was not able to talk to Alorte alias
Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a gun at Escober
and also a knife and they said they would kill him. He does not know the man who
aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because he Alorte used to be his co-guard
at Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pick-
up car inside the garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte
and his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the
real name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the
man who was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the
courtroom and he pointed to the person who answered by the name of Macario
Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing
because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun
was in the locker. He was not able to get that gun when these four men entered
because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker
because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4
months. He does not know why Alorte did not continue his work there. After 5
minutes, after the two men went up the office, they came down and talked to the man
guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able to avoid it
and after that, the four men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pickup and he
heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs.
Chua at the house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed. So
Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called him, Alorte
and his companions were no longer at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left.
Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he, together, returned to Vising
Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could
not understand him because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and
got the car, parked it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the
office, he was bringing his son and placed him at the parked car of the office. When
Chua returned to the office (after he called Escober) and came back out, Escober
saw him with his son and placed him at the balcony. The two children who were
stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only two cars at the driveway.
Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they went. After that,
he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call
the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave him a
directory and asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but
he told Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes,
the police came and after that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other
policemen not in uniform also arrived. They interviewed Escober and forced him to
go with them to the police precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had
not then arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard the
Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought Escober to
the precinct to get his statement and there the police was forcing him to adroit he
was the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he told them do not
know everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together with Abuyen
Alorte inside the garage is not true because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that
 their children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua
was finding (sic) to call him (Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the
investigator was typing something. Escober could recall/remember only his
signature. He Identified his statement, Exhibit I for the defense, Exh. F for the
prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his. He knows the
police who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober was at the
precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3, 1983, the
date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is
found in his Brief as follows:

PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-
35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of Monumento." In the
afternoon of 3 December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation
of fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a place near Abonce Beer House;
ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions whom he introduced all his relatives;
after several drinks, he was requested to join the group to proceed to another place
for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a
high gate' because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11,
November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and the security
guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused Escober as the security guard) opened the
door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed PUNZALAN "to
wait for him outside;" and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions
entered the compound (TSN, pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).

PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while
waiting he heard the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then about to enter the
premises but he met ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with
blood stains in their arms;' that ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started
running and he followed them; that in response to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE
stated that he stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a taxi and he was
brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov. 9,
1983)

PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the Monuments

market. No lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation despite the fact that
he informed the police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor
was he informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that
he was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place
near Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was presented
for his signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many statements thereon are
not correct that he nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and
was forced to sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water therapy
and he could not endure the pain, when they gave (him) the electric shock
treatment;" and that the portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are those Identified
as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his
manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing
the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the
prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as
counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration
for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of
pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated
November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic
review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE

DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT

PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE
OTHERS ACTED "AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION"
CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE
THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE
GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS
CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART;
SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST
BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE
WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER 'PETITIONER)
REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE
WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING PETITIONER

TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984. 5

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R.
No. 69564.

On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS

CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS
DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE
THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN-
INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW,

PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR
THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT

COMMITTED;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE

GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;

THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS

COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING
THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND. 6

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to the form
and substance of the decision under review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is
null and void for it does not conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973
Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had
been transcribed.

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed
single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions. It reads:

The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of Robbery with

Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others,
that on or about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation again persons robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering
the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City and taking therein
P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of said robbery employed personal
violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and
inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate
deaths, to the damage of their heirs.

Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua,
Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V.
Lucero and Dr. Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense
evidence consisted of the testimonies of the two named accused above and some
exhibits, contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.

In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties,
the arguments and authorities cited therein, this Court finds that the material
allegations of the above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y
Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of Robbery
with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable cooperation as defined in
article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating circumstances, and attended by aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of the crime, taking
advantage of number and superior strength, treachery, in band, among others, and
that the defenses and excuses of the accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory
and uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others,
are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused Juan Escober in
 opening the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-
accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of
suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober,
and volunteering the information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober
regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide was replete with
contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted being fetched by, going with and talking
to, immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as
lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some
drinks, not to get drunk admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve better to
commit the crime planned.

WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan,
Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the amended
information, this Court holding firmly that when a hired security guard opens the
compound under his protection to four men who turn out to be robbers and
murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and meets with said
malefactors immediately before the commission of the offense and stands guard at
the gate and flees with said malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to
exculpate and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, which
the named accused failed to do, but succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth
with their rediculous (sic) justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent
and helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of being held-up at
gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing garbage and being fired at but
not getting hit but not knowing so many vital details a truthful witness would certainly
not forget, among others, thus that this court after a total appreciation of all the
evidence on record is convinced that there being apple (sic) circumstances present
that could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for the most heinous (sic)
crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the said accused Juan
Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided by
Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is
DEATH and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their victims
compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral
damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. 7

Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based ...

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the
respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the
Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits
supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was
allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what
"vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have
been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery,
in band, "among others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480,

reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular Government 15 Phil.
168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v.
Millora, 3 Phil. 458:

Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and
proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issue raised in
litigation, inasmuch as when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial
controversy, it is impossible to administer justice, to apply the law to the points
argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in
an action suit, the circumstances of each question raised, and the nature and
condition of the proofs furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision
the facts alleged by the contending parties which he finds to have been proven. The
conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion he has formed on the issues raised;
then only can be intelligently set forth the legal grounds and considerations proper in
his opinion for the due determination of the case.

As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization of
the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically
impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently and
logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial court.

Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-
judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously
took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of stenographic
notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings personally taken by
them. For this is what respondent judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the transcript of the
stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the
review of the case suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit
to this Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.

Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More
than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts.
Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court in the
case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:

At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude
displayed by the trial court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by the
rendition of a decision, the body of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less
than three typewritten pages, double-spaced and wide-margined. While brevity
should characterize a court's decision and length is not necessarily determinative of
its quality, the lower court in deciding this murder case nonetheless should
have outlined in greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both
prosecution and the defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the
evidence on record and the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the court's
decision.

This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the
decision. The issues raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted
 testimony, the nature of a dying declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery
and superior strength. The issues raised are quite serious and they deserved better
treatment. [Emphasis supplied].

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of
Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court a
quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all
evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now
before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-
appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 8

The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation in the
crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during
the incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan. These
acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his
having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the
gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The
prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion
and that Escober's version of the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.

After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes
an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if
the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged
mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same would not constitute
sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that
could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a
security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to
exclude from the premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate
reason for getting in. For it must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew
Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact, even
Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with
Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound
thus:

20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang

beses mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong
pinagguaguardiayahan?

S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una

noong buwan ng Septyembre at pangalawa noong buwan November
1982.

21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang

babae at hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical
Supply. 9
The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was
a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that
"... it is not a common experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the
stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with
malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be
rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he
were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10

Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour
as found by the trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a
ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the need for immediate
escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same could have
been done to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from
Escober.

That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are further
bolstered by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and
extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986, submitted by
the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of
Macario Punzalan's statement reads:

FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay

matagal ng magkakilala?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung

Alorte.

FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]

FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa?

Kung mayroon pa?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni

Abuyen ni Alorte.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

 FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir,
kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong
talaga ang utak eh. 11

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua
ng bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay
kumatok ako at binuksan naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko
muna siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay
bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya.
Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito.
Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako
naman ay pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang
nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an
pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya
tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo
na kami ... 12

These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators and therefore may
ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is
not even responsive to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which it
was given lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This
statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E scober although
the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him. That
Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere
ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its
execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity
in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and
pass on the blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is
indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a
sense of justice and fairness. Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was
this sense of justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial confession.

Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that he was a
co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would want to inform and assure his superior who is
presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the
prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of logic and reason.

The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the
testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at the garage where the shot
sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a
meter behind.
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina
Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave
her statement on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So, soon
after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when she attributed
the blame on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted
in the tragic event.

Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's
narration of the situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other
interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony was of the same tenor,
i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This
was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at
which point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held
captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who
was not walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having seen.
She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which
was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua,
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult for her
to determine for certain the distance between Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was
merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.

Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared
that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were
nagmamadali [in a hurry]." 13This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the impression
gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element
of speed injected into the 'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/
Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the crime, and tills can be
interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.

The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty
as co-principal in the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the
accused and the actual killers, must be shown, and the same degree of proof
required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of
the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the crime itself. 14

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and [2] that his acts during the
commission of the crime, such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the
gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the prosecution's
reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding his actuations during the
incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved 15 and its corollary rule that
the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. 16

Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and his having
opened the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A
less discerning mind could have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two
hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.

We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to remain
silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on
the merits.

Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the for lowing:

PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG

PILIPINAS.

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa

isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG
PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at
pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng
Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng

salaysay kung hindi mo nais.

2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong

mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng
paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na
kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.

3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring

gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.

4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para

ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.

Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at

mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang
Batas ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang malaya at
kusang loob ng salaysay?

Sagot — Opo.

Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang

abogado na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin

or gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban
sa iyong sarili?

Sagot— Opo.
 Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo
magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?

Sagot— Opo.

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.

Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial
statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to our mind, indicates the
lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The Identical manner by
which the police sought to inform Escober and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant
disregard for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level,
educational background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to see to it that Punzalan
really understood what was being told, considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2
Elementary level. The so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more
than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of the
fundamental law as to give a semblance of compliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by
the police respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the
impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the
court proceedings, not during the custodial investigation.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's
extrajudicial statement cannot be considered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact
that it was done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid. 19 Needless to say, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 20

With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary
investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an absence of preliminary
investigation, should have been raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and
consistent in ruling that:

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired

into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the
information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or
require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs. Casiano, I
SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper procedure since the 'absence of such
investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it
defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The
right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity
of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in
order that such investigation could be conducted.

... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this
view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court
but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is
frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial courts, not an
appellate court. 21
While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to appoint a
counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such
failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against
Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of
Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor
and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having
knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have
suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony
regarding Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was
merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the
prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery and we are
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three
companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of
crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the
scene of the crime with his companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the
police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate his
knowledge of the plan.

While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and
as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims, he cannot evade
responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has
been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from
confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused- appellant Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a) holding that the 1-1/2 page, single-spaced,
decision of the trial court presided by Judge Oscar Leviste, sentencing the accused at bar to the
supreme penalty of death without specification of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon
which his conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls short of the constitutional requirement
that every decision of a court of justice clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based; (b) acquitting the accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with homicide on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c ) finding the other accused
Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of robbery
with homicide and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.

a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole Court en banc is unanimous as to the utter
failure of the trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to conform to the mandatory constitutional requirement
that a decision must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Normally, in such cases,
the case would have to be remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment that does
conform to the constitutional mandate but the Court, since all the briefs have been filed, opted to
review the record and the evidence and to render judgment accordingly in order to avoid further
delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;

b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its judgment finding the accused Macario
Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, even as it
reaffirms the settled doctrine in Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as conspirators in the
commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty as principals of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic principle that once a
conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the actual mode of participation in a
crime of any of the accused, whether he be a lookout posted outside the scene of the robbery, is of
no moment, since the act of one conspirator is the act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine of
the Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalag and most recently affirmed in the
1987 case of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr. Justice Feliciano in Ms scholarly separate opinion;
and

c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the Court is confined to the case of accused Juan
Escober with ten members voting to acquit him and four members dissenting from his acquittal. On
my part, I have given him the benefit of the doubt and voted for his acquittal. The superior and
immutable rule is that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of
the constitutional presumption of his innocence, which presumption must prevail unless overturned
by clear, competent and credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main opinion of the
Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan, the evidence as to the existence of a conspiracy between
the accused Juan Escober and the robbers-killers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery
appears to be inadequate and therefore failed to produce the required moral certainty of his guilt.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him completely.

I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the complicity of Juan Escober in the robbery and in
the killing of two children while the robbery was underway. It is an easy task after a crime has been
consummated for us to surmise how the mind of an accused should have operated during crucial
moments and to state how an accused should have behaved to avoid the possibility of his being
implicated as a co-principal and conspirator. Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and
according to predictable patterns of behaviour in real life. The minds of ordinary persons (and I see
nothing special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused security guard), seldom behave in
predictable ways. Seemingly negligent or even inexplicable behaviour is not necessarily a badge of
guilt. Not every security guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed can be accused of
complicity in a crime even if evil persons choose that particular moment of indiscretion to barge into
the premises. I agree with Justice Fernan that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan
Escober has not been proved with the degree of certainty required under our penal laws.

I would also like to make some observations about the Court's apparently unqualified adherence to
the precedent in the 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalad (9 Phil. 1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to
1927 cited in the separate opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator should not necessarily or
automatically be found guilty of everything that happens while the crime, object of the conspiracy, is
being committed.

It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to prevent the other crime committed on the
occasion of the principal crime, object of the conspiracy, he would be guilty as a principal in the
complex crime or other crime even if he had absolutely no part in it. I may have no statistics to prove
it but I believe that conspiracy improperly handled could send more innocent persons to jail than any
other principle in criminal law.For instance, many accused persons protesting they had nothing to do
with a crime have been convicted of malversation or estafa simply because the documents
evidencing the crime somehow passed their hands. A person who is in a stupor or is simply not
paying any attention during a drinking party where the details of a robbery, car-napping, or murder
are planned could, in the hands of a brilliant prosecutor, be convicted of the resulting crime and all
its consequences.

I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of robbery with homicide. My observations are
simply aimed at an unqualified adherence to the principle that the accused must always endeavor to
prevent the other crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew nothing about. Or that he
must run away and leave his companions before the second crime is committed. Every case must
be judged on its separate facts and notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a person may
still be acquitted of the other crime about which he had no knowledge at all For instance, if the
innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had been the children of Punzalan, certainly he
cannot be held guilty of parricide. Or if a band of robbers rape a woman inside a house not knowing
he is the wife of their look-out, the rule on all conspirators being equally responsible for all the
consequences or happenings during the commission of the planned crime should not apply. The
precedents from Macalalad are impressively cited by my teamed colleague, but I believe all judges
should still be cautioned to look beyond the unqualified rule and ascertain carefully whether the
lookout or anybody else similarly situated should be automatically convicted for something about
which he was completely ignorant. The consequences of sending an innocent person to j ail for a
crime where he had no participation are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an
unqualified rule.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting :

With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion written by Mr. Justice Fernan to the extent
that it would acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon the other hand, like to add somewhat to the
reference made in the majority opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is correctly held
liable for robbery with homicide.

We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober.

The prosecution theory, as found by the majority opinion, was that Juan Escober was a principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. According to the majority opinion,
the prosecution sought to prove that Escober joined in the community of design, a conspiracy, which
was shown in respect of the other accused, by referring to the following particular acts of Escober:

[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-
conspirators;

[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Abuyen, the alleged mastermind,
after the gun shot; and

[3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit.

The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand gun by Abuyen was a mere ritual designed to
avoid or deflect suspicion from Escober and that Escober's version of the incident [was] too replete
with contradictions "to merit belief"

The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the malefactors by Escober was absolutely
indispensable for the commission of the crime of robbery and for the killing of the two (2) children of
Mr. and Mrs. Vicente Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of opening a gate upon
hearing a knock is, of course, an innocent gesture. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
Escober was a security guard; that he had seen and recognized Abuyen through the peephole in the
pedestrians' gate before opening that gate; and surely the least that can be expected of a security
guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he must exclude from the premises being guarded
persons who have not demonstrated any lawful reason for wanting to enter such premises. If one
assumes that Escober had not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at the very least utterly reckless
for him to have opened the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact that Escober was
acquainted with Abuyen was no justification for letting Abuyen and his gang come in. Upon the other
hand, the circumstance that Escober knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that Escober
was indeed part of the criminal conspiracy if Escober was totally unacquainted with Abuyen, that
probability would not of course exist It must further be noted that Escober himself, who had
thoughtfully left his gun in a locker before opening the gate of the compound, 1 did not claim that he
had been coerced by Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the compound.2 If he had
in fact been forced into opening the gate by Abuyen and company, it would have been the simplest
and most natural thing in the world for him to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy,
however, conveniently explained later that he had pointed his gun at Escober, almost apologetically,
after Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and the other malefactors into the
compound.

Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and thereupon turning to the garage from whence
the sound of the shot came, she saw Abuyen walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter
behind. 3 It must not escape notice there was no suggestion by any witness that Escober was
then chasing and trying to capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to his duties might be
expected at least to try to do. The majority opinion does try to suggest that because Mrs. Lina Chua,
in the separate trial of Abuyen, had said that Abuyen and Escober were warning towards the gate;
they were in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be regarded as 'indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte
Escober himself had not claimed that he had somehow summoned his courage and sought to
capture Abuyen immediately after Abuyen had, according to Escober, fired a shot at him but had
missed. Thus, the suggested interpretation would seem unreal and excessively generous to
Escober. There was also no evidence that Escober was trying to flee or hide himself from Abuyen.
The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to be believed at all, was that Escober was
acting in concert with Abuyen, presumably to facilitate the escape of Abuyen and his companions.
Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the prosecution. The majority opinion, however,
rejects totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as suffer[ing] from inaccuracy and as being susceptible to
other interpretations" in the premises, when "taken in conjunction with the extrajudicial confession of
Abuyen." It must be observed, with respect, that the majority opinion so discarded Mrs. Chua's
testimony upon the totally speculative ground that it is not contrary to human psychology and
experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua having lost two (2) of her children to the robbers, would in seeking
vengeance deliberately and baselessly implicate Escober in the robbery and the killings as a
"sacrificial lamb." There appears no basis for this speculation at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs.
Chua's testimony runs counter to the prevailing jurisprudence which has been summed up in the
following terms in People v. Roxas:

... Neither is the relationship of Victorino and Paterno to the deceased sufficient to
render their testimony doubtful nor enough to discredit their credibility. The credibility
of witnesses cannot be assailed as prejudiced simply because of their close relation
to the victim. For it is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased
would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by
blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent. 4

It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had fired a shot, presumably in the air, in order to
create the impression that Escober was not part of the conspiracy. Escober claimed that the shot
had been fired at him while he was inside the van in the garage, and advised Mrs. Chua that he had
not been hit by the shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this connection is that if the robbers
had really wanted to kill Escober in order to prevent Escober's later Identifying them, there was
absolutely nothing to prevent them from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua had been
stabbed to death brutally to prevent them from Identifying the robbers; yet, if E scober is to be
believed, the robbers made no more than a token, half hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an
adult male and a security guard, would not Identify them. Escober was not even tied up and blind-
folded. It is hence difficult to appreciate the "keen observation" of Escober's counsel that Escober
would be the "stupidest person on earth" if he allowed himself "to be shot by a gun—to avoid
suspicion that he was in cahoots with the malefactors." Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No
bullet hole was found in the van where Escober claimed to have been crouching when Abuyen shot
at him. 6 Upon the other hand, a shot fired in the air can only be regarded as a cheap method for
supporting a profession of innocence on the part of Escober. Escober's counsel was simply begging
the question.

In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon statements made by co-accused Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon an extrajudicial statement of Abuyen
(accused in a separate criminal case) to support the position that the gun play was not mere play-
acting and that Escober was not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements coming from
Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be taken with great caution. For it must be recalled that the
testimony of accomplices—principals confederates or conspirators — while admissible and
competent, comes from a "polluted source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice Malcolm cautioned, such
testimony must be "scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not
corroborated,credibility is affected." 7 It should also be pointed out that the statement of Punzalan
adduced in this connection in the majority opinion, appears disjointed and totally unrelated to the
question in response to which it was given. The statement of Punzalan, in other words, would
appear, not spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority opinion) but rather to have been
deliberately thrown in for the purpose of exculpating Escober. Thus:

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

 FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin

ni Abuyen ni Alorte.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir,
kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen sapagkat iyon pong
talaga ang utak eh. (Emphasis supplied)

To accept and to accord full credence to statements of proven conspirators to all appearances
designed to avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who had made the robbery and double
homicide possible to begin with, while rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua solely
because she was the mother of the slain children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If one
must, without requiring proof, impute a 'sense of justice and fairness' to Abuyen from whose mind
the conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms were splattered with the blood of the two (2)
young children of Mrs. Lina Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to assume casually that Mrs. Lina
Chua was bereft of that same 'sense of justice and fairness."

While each of the acts of Escober cited by the prosecution might not, considered in isolation from the
others, be sufficient to show participation in the common criminal design, it is submitted that where
those acts are considered together, and viewed in the light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and their other
two companions did, and did not do, they constitute more than adequate basis for not overturning
the conclusion of the trial court that Escober was guilty. After all, it was not this Court but the trial
judge who examined all the evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his conclusion, even if
too cryptically set down on paper, must be given great weight.

We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion finds guilty of robbery with homicide. There
is no question that Punzalan participated in the common design to commit robbery. He acted as
lookout for the gang of robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house which was ransacked and where
the victims were slain; unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual stabbing of the two (2)
innocent children of Vicente and Lina Chua. Even so, the majority opinion, stressing that Punzalan's
participation in the conspiracy to commit robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him
responsible for robbery with double homicide.

Because the above rule on this matter and its underlying ratio have not always been well understood
and because a handful of decisions of this Court contain language or have reached results which, at
first glance, may seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it should be useful to examine in
some detail the development of that rule and to mark out its present scope and shape.

The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously reaffirmed by the Court en banc most
recently in People v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June 1987) in the following terms:
 The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong was shot to
death during the robbery. We have repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide
resulted during or because of the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident,
robbery with homicide is committed; it is only the result obtained, without reference or
distincttion as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. (People vs. Guiapar,
No. L-35465, May 31,1984,129 SCRA 539, 553554 [1984].) Further, whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime are also guilty as
principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did
not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored
to prevent the homicide. (Id., 554, citing: People vs. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [19261;
and U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 [1907].) In this instance, the evidence on record is
bereft of any showing that any of the accused tried to prevent the killing of Felix
Larong. What is shown instead is that they merely stood watching and did nothing
when one of their companions shot the victim. (T.s.n. session of October 21, 1974,
29; Deposition, Id., 3, 5.) Additionally, the term 'homicide' in robbery with homicide
should be understood as a generic term and includes murder. (People vs. Revotoc,
No. L-37425, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 22 [1981]. )

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)

The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated upon as long ago as 8 October 1907 in U.S. v.
Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:

... While it does not appear that this defendant [Fructizoso Esguerra] himself struck
the fatal blow which caused the death of Rufino Calderon he must be adjudged guilty
as principal of the complex crime of robbery with homicide with which he is charged,
it having been proved that he was present, ad.ded, abetted, and took part therein.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution fully establishes the guilt of the
defendant as a principal in the commission of the robbery, and, even were we to
disregard his confession, which he repudiated at the trial of' the case, and wherein he
admitted he was present at the killing of Rufino Calderon, we would, nevertheless, be
compelled to find him guilty of the crime of robo con homicide (robbery with
homicide). The supreme court of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the Penal Code
touching the complex crime of robo con homicidio has frequently decided that, where
the complex crime has been committed, all those who look part as principals in the
commission of the robbery are guilty as principals in the commission of the crime of
robo con homicidio, unless it appears that the endeavored to prevent the unlawful
killing. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872, and
June 19, 1890. See also Viada, vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356).

Accepting as true the exculpatory statements of the accused in his repudiated

confession, it does not appear therefrom that he made any genuine effort to prevent
the murder of Rufino Calderon.

xxx xxx xxx 8

(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until 1925 when U.S. v. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493
(1925) was decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice Romualdez wrote, for the Court:

The liability of the other appellants Andres Pasquin Placido Heusca Vicente
Caballero and Alejandro Picate, consist in having conspired and taken part in the
robbery. They must not be held responsible for the homicide which was not the
subject matter of their conspiracy and in which they did not have any intervention, for
it was performed by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper punishment, therefore, for
them is the penalty for robbery in band within the limits of which the trial court has
imposed upon them. 9

But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated from Macalalad, the Supreme Court went
back to the Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the Court, through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked
and applied the Macalalad rule without even mentioning the deviation in Basisten:

xxx xxx xxx

In the first place it may be said that the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause clearly shows that the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and must therefore be punished in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code. It is clearly established that the
appellants, together with an armed band of more than four persons, committed a
robbery and that on the occasion of such robbery a homicide was committed. The
crime which they committed therefore falls clearly within the provisions of said article.
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, July 13, 1871; 3 Viada, Commentaries on
the Penal Code, p. 347.) Whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all principals in the commission of the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 10

From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied and re-applied many times by the Court.
The following list does not purport to be exhaustive:

1. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558 (1940);

2. People v. de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365 (1952);

3. People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953);

4. People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 (1955);

5. People v. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. L-8919,28 September 1956; 52 O.G. 6532

(1956);

6. People v. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371 (1958);

7. People v. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534 (1960);

8. People v. Flores de Garcia, 111 Phil. 393 (1961); and

 9. People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807 (1962).

In 1967, People v. Pelagic, 11 was decided. Here, U.S. v. Basisten, was indeed cited by the Court. A
close scrutiny of the facts in Pelagio will, however, show that the result there reached does not really
represent a departure from the Macalalad rule which, as noted above, had been reiterated many
times since the 1925 Basisten case.

Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a particular house in G. Villanueva St., Pasay
City. Only Pelagio and three (3) others actually carried out the robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as
the lookout and posted himself at the gate of the house; two (2) others actually entered the victim's
premises; the fourth was ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the getaway. The robbery
was carried out as planned. But, when the two (2) robbers who had gone up the house came down
and out into the street, they failed to find Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the next
block where they found the fourth conspirator waiting for them inside a taxi. The two (2) robbers
boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave, however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite
direction and blocked the taxi's way. A man alighted from the jeepney and started towards the taxi.
One of the robbers recognized the man as a police officer and ordered his companions to shoot
which they did, killing the police officer. Pelagio later explained to his associates that he had fled
before the two (2) robbers had completed their job because he, Pelagic, had seen someone slip out
of the house being robbed apparently to summon the police. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme
Court modified the conviction of Pelagio from robbery with homicide to simple robbery. The Court
said:

Even the decision under appeal recites that when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo
hurried out of the victim's house after the robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled
from his lookout post because the pair, Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at
the gate where the was supposed to have stationed himself. To be sure, the said
decision itself renders the account that it was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked
together from the said house to the corner of Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets
where then they saw Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi and that it was
only when these three had taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to leave,
that the shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was committed,
therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least intervention or participation
as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far as the records
disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is
no evidence that homicide besides was determined by them when they plotted the
crime. All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for
the said killing. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) ...

Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the robbery, had abandoned the conspiracy and
dissociated himself from his co-conspirators even while the robbery was still in process and certainly
before the unfortunate policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were about to escape in a taxi.
Because of such abandonment and dissociation, the conspiracy, whatever may have been the
subject thereof, was over and done with, so far as concerned Pelagio. Abandonment and
dissociation are clear equivalents of efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad, would
exculpate one from liability for the homicide but not for the robbery.

It may be observed that very soon after Pelagic, the Supreme Court resumed application and
reiteration of the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.:

(1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968);

 (2) People v..Pujinio, 27SCRA1186(1969);

(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974);

(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976);

(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977);

(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977);

(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694 (1977);

(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979);

(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981);

(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982);

(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982);

(12) People Lot Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984);

(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539 (1984); and

(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 (1986).

Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by promulgating Pelagio, as Mr. Justice
Antonio had mistakenly supposed in his concurring opinion in People v. Adriano. 12 Examination of
the cases listed above will show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it originated in a case
involving a band (en cuadrilla), has in fact not been limited by the Court to situations where a band
was present. Indeed, the great majority of the above cases are conspiracy cases where the technical
elements of a band 13 were absent.

We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v. Adriano, 15 which also need to be considered. A close
examination of the facts will show that Abalos and Adriano do not represent true departures from the
1907 Macalalad rule.

In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long drinking bout with two (2) other comrades
got into a taxi and directed the driver to take all four of them to the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela,
Bulacan, in the early hours of the morning. Abalos was seated beside the driver; the other three (3)
were in the back seat. Two (2) of the four (4) comrades got off before reaching the subdivision,
Abalos and Mendiola then directed the driver to enter the subdivision. Abalos signalled Mendiola that
he would hold up the driver. Abalos drew out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at the
same time demanded the driver's earnings and boxed him three (3) times on the back. The driver
refused to surrender his earnings and apparently tried to fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's
resistance, plunged his seven and a half inch blade through the driver's right cheek. Unnerved by the
sudden, profuse bleeding of the, wounded driver, Abalos and Mendiola hastily left the taxicab,
forgetting all about the driver's earnings, and fled. The taxi driver suffered a massive hemorrhage
which brought on death. Abalos and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of attempted robbery
with homicide. The Supreme Court through then Mr. Justice Aquino upheld the conviction of Abalos
but found Mendiola guilty only of attempted robbery, citing in this connection U.S. v. Basisten. The
reference to Basisten in this case, however, appears quite unnecessary for the Court had explicitly
found a few pages that there in fact was no conspiracy at all, whether for robbery (holdup) or for
homicide. Mr. Justice Aquino wrote:

As already noted [Abalos] said in his confession that he was intoxicated when he
stabbed the cab driver, he and his companions had been ng continuously sometimes
before the crime was prepetrated. Intoxication mitigates his liability. It was not
habitual nor intentional (Article 15, Revised Penal Code). The holdup was not the
offspring of planning and deliberation. It was a fatal improvisation dictated by an
impromptu impulse. 16 (Emphasis supplied).

Since there was neither conspiracy the presence of a band, there was in point of fact no occasion for
application of the doctrine of Macalalad nor of the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were
simply principals by direct participation in the attempted robbery.

People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of five (5) security guards of the Rice and Corn
Administration. The security guards were hacked with an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the
floor. The malefactors numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial court found four (4) guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide. The precise question before the Court was whether the decision of
the trial court holding four (4) persons, including one Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of robbery with
homicide and sentencing them to death should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo should be
held guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six (6) justices plus one (1) concurring justice held that
Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple robbery. Six (6) other members of the Court voted for
affirmance in toto of the trial court's judgment. 17 The facts in Adriano as found by the Court showed
that there were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of robbery, which included Leonardo
Bernardo and all the other malefactors; 18 another, smaller, one for the commission of the multiple
murder, which did not include Leonardo Bernardo. The per curiam decision read, in relevant part:

... The awareness that just one of them being known and arrested would lead to the
apprehension of the other participants in the robbery, the common design of
liquidating the possible witnesses to avoid the grim possibility of their being all
brought before the bar of justice entered the minds of those specifically named
above, and moved to act accordingly. Quite obviously Mariano Domingo did nothing
to prevent the killing which he himself hinted at as the next practical move to take
following the consummation of the robbery. The conspiracy Lo hill, born of the
exigency of the situation, therefore clearly involved Apolonio Adriano, Mario San
Diego, Mariano Domingo and possibly Pedro Miranda who is yet to be apprehended.
Their respective acts clearly were directed to the same object and for the same
purpose. Once the conspiracy is established, which may be done by mere
circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is not so easily obtainable (People vs.
Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285; People vs. Mejia, 55
SCRA 453; People vs. Carino, 55 SCRA 516; People vs. Cadag, 2 SC RA 388), the
conspirators are all liable as co-principals, regardless of the extent and character of
their respective participation in the commission of the crime (People vs. Candado, 84
SCRA 508; People vs. Phones, 84 SCRA 167).

The Court, however, finds Leonardo Bernardo seemingly unaware of the intention to
kill the guards. The Idea of killing them arose only when Mariano Domingo called the
attention of Apolonio Adriano to his being known by the guards, being one of them.
By that time the robbery had been consummated, the jeep driven by him (Leonardo
Bernardo) with Plate No. J-14362, was already loaded with bags and carton boxes
containing the stolen money...
 ... It was clearly only at the spur of the moment, so to speak, that Mariano Domingo
and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San Diego and Pedro Miranda, thought of
having to kill the guards, entirely without the knowledge of Leonardo
Bernardo... 19 (Emphasis supplied.)

Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller and later conspiracy (to kill the five guards)
within the larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of the Rice and Corn Administration), he was found
guilty of robbery only and his sentence reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. Thus, the result
reached in Adriano is compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.

What may be stressed, in resume is that the result reached by the Court in respect of the accused
Punzalan is in line with the rule first elaborated in U.S. v. Macalalad (1907) and most recently
reaffirmed in People v. Pecato (1987,). U.S. v. Basisten, a case whose rule was over-turned the very
next year after it was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That the Court has today affirmed once
more the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine evidences its discriminating regard for settled rules.

That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is important for another reason. To have
disregarded Macalalad-Pecato would have come too close to discarding the basic rule on
conspiracy, that is, once a conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the concrete
modality of participation in a crime becomes secondary for determination of liability — "the act of one
is the act of all." To require affirmative proof that the subject of the conspiracy in this case embraced
not just robbery but also the double homicide, is to lose sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the
nature of things, is almost always only indirectly or circumstantially shown, by proof of concerted
acts rather than by e.g., a written plan of action. To require such affirmative proof would also be to
impose a very heavy (and quite unnecessary) burden on our law enforcement agencies, a burden
which under present circumstances of rampant violent crime and severely limited governmental
resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law on conspiracy is infused, in important degree,
with the objective of deterring conspiracies to commit crimes and the implementation of such
conspiracies. A man's capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a conspiracy to commit
crime (whether or not a band, in the technical sense of Article 296, Revised Penal Code,
materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal group is greater than the sum total of the
particular acts of the individual members of the group. The result here reached by the Court in
respect of Punzalan may be seen to reinforce the capability of our law to achieve that objective of
deterrence.

Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about holding a man, who knowingly joins a
conspiracy to commit a crime, responsible for all the crimes which are causally connected with the
conspiracy. 20 No one complains about the same rule in tort law. One who joins a criminal conspiracy
in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co- conspirators; he merges his will into the
common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast
his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that a co-conspirator may get
rattled, that a victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and fight back, or that something else may go
awry, and third persons may get killed or injured in the course of implementing the basic criminal
design. To free himself from such liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the
conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or
dissociate himself from the conspiracy.

I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court that both Juan Escober and Macario Punzalan, Jr. are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery with homicide and that
accordingly, both should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to Idemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages to such heirs in the
amount of P200,000.00.
Melencio-Herrrera, Sarmiento, and Padilla, concur and dissent:

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a) holding that the 1-1/2 page, single-spaced,
decision of the trial court presided by Judge Oscar Leviste, sentencing the accused at bar to the
supreme penalty of death without specification of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon
which his conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls short of the constitutional requirement
that every decision of a court of justice clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based; (b) acquitting the accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with homicide on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c ) finding the other accused
Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of robbery
with homicide and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.

a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole Court en banc is unanimous as to the utter
failure of the trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to conform to the mandatory constitutional requirement
that a decision must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Normally, in such cases,
the case would have to be remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment that does
conform to the constitutional mandate but the Court, since all the briefs have been filed, opted to
review the record and the evidence and to render judgment accordingly in order to avoid further
delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;

b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its judgment finding the accused Macario
Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, even as it
reaffirms the settled doctrine in Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as conspirators in the
commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty as principals of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic principle that once a
conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the actual mode of participation in a
crime of any of the accused, whether he be a lookout posted outside the scene of the robbery, is of
no moment, since the act of one conspirator is the act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine of
the Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalag and most recently affirmed in the
1987 case of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr. Justice Feliciano in Ms scholarly separate opinion;
and

c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the Court is confined to the case of accused Juan
Escober with ten members voting to acquit him and four members dissenting from his acquittal. On
my part, I have given him the benefit of the doubt and voted for his acquittal. The superior and
immutable rule is that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of
the constitutional presumption of his innocence, which presumption must prevail unless overturned
by clear, competent and credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main opinion of the
Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan, the evidence as to the existence of a conspiracy between
the accused Juan Escober and the robbers-killers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery
appears to be inadequate and therefore failed to produce the required moral certainty of his guilt.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him completely.

I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the complicity of Juan Escober in the robbery and in
the killing of two children while the robbery was underway. It is an easy task after a crime has been
consummated for us to surmise how the mind of an accused should have operated during crucial
moments and to state how an accused should have behaved to avoid the possibility of his being
implicated as a co-principal and conspirator. Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and
according to predictable patterns of behaviour in real life. The minds of ordinary persons (and I see
nothing special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused security guard), seldom behave in
predictable ways. Seemingly negligent or even inexplicable behaviour is not necessarily a badge of
guilt. Not every security guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed can be accused of
complicity in a crime even if evil persons choose that particular moment of indiscretion to barge into
the premises. I agree with Justice Fernan that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan
Escober has not been proved with the degree of certainty required under our penal laws.

I would also like to make some observations about the Court's apparently unqualified adherence to
the precedent in the 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalad (9 Phil. 1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to
1927 cited in the separate opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator should not necessarily or
automatically be found guilty of everything that happens while the crime, object of the conspiracy, is
being committed.

It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to prevent the other crime committed on the
occasion of the principal crime, object of the conspiracy, he would be guilty as a principal in the
complex crime or other crime even if he had absolutely no part in it. I may have no statistics to prove
it but I believe that conspiracy improperly handled could send more innocent persons to jail than any
other principle in criminal law.For instance, many accused persons protesting they had nothing to do
with a crime have been convicted of malversation or estafa simply because the documents
evidencing the crime somehow passed their hands. A person who is in a stupor or is simply not
paying any attention during a drinking party where the details of a robbery, car-napping, or murder
are planned could, in the hands of a brilliant prosecutor, be convicted of the resulting crime and all
its consequences.

I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of robbery with homicide. My observations are
simply aimed at an unqualified adherence to the principle that the accused must always endeavor to
prevent the other crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew nothing about. Or that he
must run away and leave his companions before the second crime is committed. Every case must
be judged on its separate facts and notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a person may
still be acquitted of the other crime about which he had no knowledge at all For instance, if the
innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had been the children of Punzalan, certainly he
cannot be held guilty of parricide. Or if a band of robbers rape a woman inside a house not knowing
he is the wife of their look-out, the rule on all conspirators being equally responsible for all the
consequences or happenings during the commission of the planned crime should not apply. The
precedents from Macalalad are impressively cited by my teamed colleague, but I believe all judges
should still be cautioned to look beyond the unqualified rule and ascertain carefully whether the
lookout or anybody else similarly situated should be automatically convicted for something about
which he was completely ignorant. The consequences of sending an innocent person to j ail for a
crime where he had no participation are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an
unqualified rule.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting :

With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion written by Mr. Justice Fernan to the extent
that it would acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon the other hand, like to add somewhat to the
reference made in the majority opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is correctly held
liable for robbery with homicide.

We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober.

The prosecution theory, as found by the majority opinion, was that Juan Escober was a principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. According to the majority opinion,
the prosecution sought to prove that Escober joined in the community of design, a conspiracy, which
was shown in respect of the other accused, by referring to the following particular acts of Escober:

[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-
conspirators;

[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Abuyen, the alleged mastermind,
after the gun shot; and

[3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit.

The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand gun by Abuyen was a mere ritual designed to
avoid or deflect suspicion from Escober and that Escober's version of the incident [was] too replete
with contradictions "to merit belief"

The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the malefactors by Escober was absolutely
indispensable for the commission of the crime of robbery and for the killing of the two (2) children of
Mr. and Mrs. Vicente Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of opening a gate upon
hearing a knock is, of course, an innocent gesture. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
Escober was a security guard; that he had seen and recognized Abuyen through the peephole in the
pedestrians' gate before opening that gate; and surely the least that can be expected of a security
guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he must exclude from the premises being guarded
persons who have not demonstrated any lawful reason for wanting to enter such premises. If one
assumes that Escober had not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at the very least utterly reckless
for him to have opened the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact that Escober was
acquainted with Abuyen was no justification for letting Abuyen and his gang come in. Upon the other
hand, the circumstance that Escober knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that Escober
was indeed part of the criminal conspiracy if Escober was totally unacquainted with Abuyen, that
probability would not of course exist It must further be noted that Escober himself, who had
thoughtfully left his gun in a locker before opening the gate of the compound, 1 did not claim that he
had been coerced by Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the compound.2 If he had
in fact been forced into opening the gate by Abuyen and company, it would have been the simplest
and most natural thing in the world for him to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy,
however, conveniently explained later that he had pointed his gun at Escober, almost apologetically,
after Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and the other malefactors into the
compound.

Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and thereupon turning to the garage from whence
the sound of the shot came, she saw Abuyen walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter
behind. 3 It must not escape notice there was no suggestion by any witness that Escober was
then chasing and trying to capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to his duties might be
expected at least to try to do. The majority opinion does try to suggest that because Mrs. Lina Chua,
in the separate trial of Abuyen, had said that Abuyen and Escober were warning towards the gate;
they were in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be regarded as 'indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte
Escober himself had not claimed that he had somehow summoned his courage and sought to
capture Abuyen immediately after Abuyen had, according to Escober, fired a shot at him but had
missed. Thus, the suggested interpretation would seem unreal and excessively generous to
Escober. There was also no evidence that Escober was trying to flee or hide himself from Abuyen.
The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to be believed at all, was that Escober was
acting in concert with Abuyen, presumably to facilitate the escape of Abuyen and his companions.

Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the prosecution. The majority opinion, however,
rejects totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as suffer[ing] from inaccuracy and as being susceptible to
other interpretations" in the premises, when "taken in conjunction with the extrajudicial confession of
Abuyen." It must be observed, with respect, that the majority opinion so discarded Mrs. Chua's
testimony upon the totally speculative ground that it is not contrary to human psychology and
experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua having lost two (2) of her children to the robbers, would in seeking
vengeance deliberately and baselessly implicate Escober in the robbery and the killings as a
"sacrificial lamb." There appears no basis for this speculation at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs.
Chua's testimony runs counter to the prevailing jurisprudence which has been summed up in the
following terms in People v. Roxas:

... Neither is the relationship of Victorino and Paterno to the deceased sufficient to
render their testimony doubtful nor enough to discredit their credibility. The credibility
of witnesses cannot be assailed as prejudiced simply because of their close relation
to the victim. For it is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased
would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by
blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent. 4

It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had fired a shot, presumably in the air, in order to
create the impression that Escober was not part of the conspiracy. Escober claimed that the shot
had been fired at him while he was inside the van in the garage, and advised Mrs. Chua that he had
not been hit by the shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this connection is that if the robbers
had really wanted to kill Escober in order to prevent Escober's later Identifying them, there was
absolutely nothing to prevent them from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua had been
stabbed to death brutally to prevent them from Identifying the robbers; yet, if E scober is to be
believed, the robbers made no more than a token, half hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an
adult male and a security guard, would not Identify them. Escober was not even tied up and blind-
folded. It is hence difficult to appreciate the "keen observation" of Escober's counsel that Escober
would be the "stupidest person on earth" if he allowed himself "to be shot by a gun—to avoid
suspicion that he was in cahoots with the malefactors." Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No
bullet hole was found in the van where Escober claimed to have been crouching when Abuyen shot
at him. 6 Upon the other hand, a shot fired in the air can only be regarded as a cheap method for
supporting a profession of innocence on the part of Escober. Escober's counsel was simply begging
the question.

In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon statements made by co-accused Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon an extrajudicial statement of Abuyen
(accused in a separate criminal case) to support the position that the gun play was not mere play-
acting and that Escober was not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements coming from
Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be taken with great caution. For it must be recalled that the
testimony of accomplices—principals confederates or conspirators — while admissible and
competent, comes from a "polluted source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice Malcolm cautioned, such
testimony must be "scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not
corroborated,credibility is affected." 7 It should also be pointed out that the statement of Punzalan
adduced in this connection in the majority opinion, appears disjointed and totally unrelated to the
question in response to which it was given. The statement of Punzalan, in other words, would
appear, not spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority opinion) but rather to have been
deliberately thrown in for the purpose of exculpating Escober. Thus:

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin

ni Abuyen ni Alorte.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir,
kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen sapagkat iyon pong
talaga ang utak eh. (Emphasis supplied)

To accept and to accord full credence to statements of proven conspirators to all appearances
designed to avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who had made the robbery and double
homicide possible to begin with, while rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua solely
because she was the mother of the slain children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If one
must, without requiring proof, impute a 'sense of justice and fairness' to Abuyen from whose mind
the conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms were splattered with the blood of the two (2)
young children of Mrs. Lina Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to assume casually that Mrs. Lina
Chua was bereft of that same 'sense of justice and fairness."

While each of the acts of Escober cited by the prosecution might not, considered in isolation from the
others, be sufficient to show participation in the common criminal design, it is submitted that where
those acts are considered together, and viewed in the light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and their other
two companions did, and did not do, they constitute more than adequate basis for not overturning
the conclusion of the trial court that Escober was guilty. After all, it was not this Court but the trial
judge who examined all the evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his conclusion, even if
too cryptically set down on paper, must be given great weight.

We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion finds guilty of robbery with homicide. There
is no question that Punzalan participated in the common design to commit robbery. He acted as
lookout for the gang of robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house which was ransacked and where
the victims were slain; unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual stabbing of the two (2)
innocent children of Vicente and Lina Chua. Even so, the majority opinion, stressing that Punzalan's
participation in the conspiracy to commit robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him
responsible for robbery with double homicide.

Because the above rule on this matter and its underlying ratio have not always been well understood
and because a handful of decisions of this Court contain language or have reached results which, at
first glance, may seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it should be useful to examine in
some detail the development of that rule and to mark out its present scope and shape.

The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously reaffirmed by the Court en banc most
recently in People v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June 1987) in the following terms:

The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong was shot to
death during the robbery. We have repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide
resulted during or because of the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident,
robbery with homicide is committed; it is only the result obtained, without reference or
distincttion as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. (People vs. Guiapar,
No. L-35465, May 31,1984,129 SCRA 539, 553554 [1984].) Further, whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime are also guilty as
principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did
not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored
to prevent the homicide. (Id., 554, citing: People vs. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [19261;
and U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 [1907].) In this instance, the evidence on record is
bereft of any showing that any of the accused tried to prevent the killing of Felix
Larong. What is shown instead is that they merely stood watching and did nothing
when one of their companions shot the victim. (T.s.n. session of October 21, 1974,
29; Deposition, Id., 3, 5.) Additionally, the term 'homicide' in robbery with homicide
should be understood as a generic term and includes murder. (People vs. Revotoc,
No. L-37425, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 22 [1981]. )

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)

The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated upon as long ago as 8 October 1907 in U.S. v.
Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:

... While it does not appear that this defendant [Fructizoso Esguerra] himself struck
the fatal blow which caused the death of Rufino Calderon he must be adjudged guilty
as principal of the complex crime of robbery with homicide with which he is charged,
it having been proved that he was present, ad.ded, abetted, and took part therein.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution fully establishes the guilt of the
defendant as a principal in the commission of the robbery, and, even were we to
disregard his confession, which he repudiated at the trial of' the case, and wherein he
admitted he was present at the killing of Rufino Calderon, we would, nevertheless, be
compelled to find him guilty of the crime of robo con homicide (robbery with
homicide). The supreme court of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the Penal Code
touching the complex crime of robo con homicidio has frequently decided that, where
the complex crime has been committed, all those who look part as principals in the
commission of the robbery are guilty as principals in the commission of the crime of
 robo con homicidio, unless it appears that the endeavored to prevent the unlawful
killing. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872, and
June 19, 1890. See also Viada, vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356).

Accepting as true the exculpatory statements of the accused in his repudiated

confession, it does not appear therefrom that he made any genuine effort to prevent
the murder of Rufino Calderon.

xxx xxx xxx 8

(Emphasis supplied.)

The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until 1925 when U.S. v. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493
(1925) was decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice Romualdez wrote, for the Court:

The liability of the other appellants Andres Pasquin Placido Heusca Vicente
Caballero and Alejandro Picate, consist in having conspired and taken part in the
robbery. They must not be held responsible for the homicide which was not the
subject matter of their conspiracy and in which they did not have any intervention, for
it was performed by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper punishment, therefore, for
them is the penalty for robbery in band within the limits of which the trial court has
imposed upon them. 9

But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated from Macalalad, the Supreme Court went
back to the Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the Court, through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked
and applied the Macalalad rule without even mentioning the deviation in Basisten:

xxx xxx xxx

In the first place it may be said that the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause clearly shows that the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and must therefore be punished in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code. It is clearly established that the
appellants, together with an armed band of more than four persons, committed a
robbery and that on the occasion of such robbery a homicide was committed. The
crime which they committed therefore falls clearly within the provisions of said article.
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, July 13, 1871; 3 Viada, Commentaries on
the Penal Code, p. 347.) Whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all principals in the commission of the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 10

From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied and re-applied many times by the Court.
The following list does not purport to be exhaustive:

1. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558 (1940);

2. People v. de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365 (1952);

3. People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953);

 4. People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 (1955);

5. People v. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. L-8919,28 September 1956; 52 O.G. 6532

(1956);

6. People v. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371 (1958);

7. People v. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534 (1960);

8. People v. Flores de Garcia, 111 Phil. 393 (1961); and

9. People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807 (1962).

In 1967, People v. Pelagic, 11 was decided. Here, U.S. v. Basisten, was indeed cited by the Court. A
close scrutiny of the facts in Pelagio will, however, show that the result there reached does not really
represent a departure from the Macalalad rule which, as noted above, had been reiterated many
times since the 1925 Basisten case.

Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a particular house in G. Villanueva St., Pasay
City. Only Pelagio and three (3) others actually carried out the robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as
the lookout and posted himself at the gate of the house; two (2) others actually entered the victim's
premises; the fourth was ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the getaway. The robbery
was carried out as planned. But, when the two (2) robbers who had gone up the house came down
and out into the street, they failed to find Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the next
block where they found the fourth conspirator waiting for them inside a taxi. The two (2) robbers
boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave, however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite
direction and blocked the taxi's way. A man alighted from the jeepney and started towards the taxi.
One of the robbers recognized the man as a police officer and ordered his companions to shoot
which they did, killing the police officer. Pelagio later explained to his associates that he had fled
before the two (2) robbers had completed their job because he, Pelagic, had seen someone slip out
of the house being robbed apparently to summon the police. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme
Court modified the conviction of Pelagio from robbery with homicide to simple robbery. The Court
said:

Even the decision under appeal recites that when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo
hurried out of the victim's house after the robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled
from his lookout post because the pair, Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at
the gate where the was supposed to have stationed himself. To be sure, the said
decision itself renders the account that it was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked
together from the said house to the corner of Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets
where then they saw Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi and that it was
only when these three had taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to leave,
that the shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was committed,
therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least intervention or participation
as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far as the records
disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is
no evidence that homicide besides was determined by them when they plotted the
crime. All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for
the said killing. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) ...

Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the robbery, had abandoned the conspiracy and
dissociated himself from his co-conspirators even while the robbery was still in process and certainly
before the unfortunate policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were about to escape in a taxi.
Because of such abandonment and dissociation, the conspiracy, whatever may have been the
subject thereof, was over and done with, so far as concerned Pelagio. Abandonment and
dissociation are clear equivalents of efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad, would
exculpate one from liability for the homicide but not for the robbery.

It may be observed that very soon after Pelagic, the Supreme Court resumed application and
reiteration of the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.:

(1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968);

(2) People v..Pujinio, 27SCRA1186(1969);

(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974);

(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976);

(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977);

(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977);

(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694 (1977);

(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979);

(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981);

(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982);

(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982);

(12) People Lot Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984);

(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539 (1984); and

(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 (1986).

Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by promulgating Pelagio, as Mr. Justice
Antonio had mistakenly supposed in his concurring opinion in People v. Adriano. 12 Examination of
the cases listed above will show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it originated in a case
involving a band (en cuadrilla), has in fact not been limited by the Court to situations where a band
was present. Indeed, the great majority of the above cases are conspiracy cases where the technical
elements of a band 13 were absent.

We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v. Adriano, 15 which also need to be considered. A close
examination of the facts will show that Abalos and Adriano do not represent true departures from the
1907 Macalalad rule.

In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long drinking bout with two (2) other comrades
got into a taxi and directed the driver to take all four of them to the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela,
Bulacan, in the early hours of the morning. Abalos was seated beside the driver; the other three (3)
were in the back seat. Two (2) of the four (4) comrades got off before reaching the subdivision,
Abalos and Mendiola then directed the driver to enter the subdivision. Abalos signalled Mendiola that
he would hold up the driver. Abalos drew out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at the
same time demanded the driver's earnings and boxed him three (3) times on the back. The driver
refused to surrender his earnings and apparently tried to fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's
resistance, plunged his seven and a half inch blade through the driver's right cheek. Unnerved by the
sudden, profuse bleeding of the, wounded driver, Abalos and Mendiola hastily left the taxicab,
forgetting all about the driver's earnings, and fled. The taxi driver suffered a massive hemorrhage
which brought on death. Abalos and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of attempted robbery
with homicide. The Supreme Court through then Mr. Justice Aquino upheld the conviction of Abalos
but found Mendiola guilty only of attempted robbery, citing in this connection U.S. v. Basisten. The
reference to Basisten in this case, however, appears quite unnecessary for the Court had explicitly
found a few pages that there in fact was no conspiracy at all, whether for robbery (holdup) or for
homicide. Mr. Justice Aquino wrote:

As already noted [Abalos] said in his confession that he was intoxicated when he
stabbed the cab driver, he and his companions had been ng continuously sometimes
before the crime was prepetrated. Intoxication mitigates his liability. It was not
habitual nor intentional (Article 15, Revised Penal Code). The holdup was not the
offspring of planning and deliberation. It was a fatal improvisation dictated by an
impromptu impulse. 16 (Emphasis supplied).

Since there was neither conspiracy the presence of a band, there was in point of fact no occasion for
application of the doctrine of Macalalad nor of the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were
simply principals by direct participation in the attempted robbery.

People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of five (5) security guards of the Rice and Corn
Administration. The security guards were hacked with an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the
floor. The malefactors numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial court found four (4) guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide. The precise question before the Court was whether the decision of
the trial court holding four (4) persons, including one Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of robbery with
homicide and sentencing them to death should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo should be
held guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six (6) justices plus one (1) concurring justice held that
Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple robbery. Six (6) other members of the Court voted for
affirmance in toto of the trial court's judgment. 17 The facts in Adriano as found by the Court showed
that there were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of robbery, which included Leonardo
Bernardo and all the other malefactors; 18 another, smaller, one for the commission of the multiple
murder, which did not include Leonardo Bernardo. The per curiam decision read, in relevant part:

... The awareness that just one of them being known and arrested would lead to the
apprehension of the other participants in the robbery, the common design of
liquidating the possible witnesses to avoid the grim possibility of their being all
brought before the bar of justice entered the minds of those specifically named
above, and moved to act accordingly. Quite obviously Mariano Domingo did nothing
to prevent the killing which he himself hinted at as the next practical move to take
following the consummation of the robbery. The conspiracy Lo hill, born of the
exigency of the situation, therefore clearly involved Apolonio Adriano, Mario San
Diego, Mariano Domingo and possibly Pedro Miranda who is yet to be apprehended.
Their respective acts clearly were directed to the same object and for the same
purpose. Once the conspiracy is established, which may be done by mere
circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is not so easily obtainable (People vs.
Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285; People vs. Mejia, 55
 SCRA 453; People vs. Carino, 55 SCRA 516; People vs. Cadag, 2 SC RA 388), the
conspirators are all liable as co-principals, regardless of the extent and character of
their respective participation in the commission of the crime (People vs. Candado, 84
SCRA 508; People vs. Phones, 84 SCRA 167).

The Court, however, finds Leonardo Bernardo seemingly unaware of the intention to
kill the guards. The Idea of killing them arose only when Mariano Domingo called the
attention of Apolonio Adriano to his being known by the guards, being one of them.
By that time the robbery had been consummated, the jeep driven by him (Leonardo
Bernardo) with Plate No. J-14362, was already loaded with bags and carton boxes
containing the stolen money...

... It was clearly only at the spur of the moment, so to speak, that Mariano Domingo
and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San Diego and Pedro Miranda, thought of
having to kill the guards, entirely without the knowledge of Leonardo
Bernardo... 19 (Emphasis supplied.)

Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller and later conspiracy (to kill the five guards)
within the larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of the Rice and Corn Administration), he was found
guilty of robbery only and his sentence reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. Thus, the result
reached in Adriano is compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.

What may be stressed, in resume is that the result reached by the Court in respect of the accused
Punzalan is in line with the rule first elaborated in U.S. v. Macalalad (1907) and most recently
reaffirmed in People v. Pecato (1987,). U.S. v. Basisten, a case whose rule was over-turned the very
next year after it was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That the Court has today affirmed once
more the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine evidences its discriminating regard for settled rules.

That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is important for another reason. To have
disregarded Macalalad-Pecato would have come too close to discarding the basic rule on
conspiracy, that is, once a conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the concrete
modality of participation in a crime becomes secondary for determination of liability — "the act of one
is the act of all." To require affirmative proof that the subject of the conspiracy in this case embraced
not just robbery but also the double homicide, is to lose sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the
nature of things, is almost always only indirectly or circumstantially shown, by proof of concerted
acts rather than by e.g., a written plan of action. To require such affirmative proof would also be to
impose a very heavy (and quite unnecessary) burden on our law enforcement agencies, a burden
which under present circumstances of rampant violent crime and severely limited governmental
resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law on conspiracy is infused, in important degree,
with the objective of deterring conspiracies to commit crimes and the implementation of such
conspiracies. A man's capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a conspiracy to commit
crime (whether or not a band, in the technical sense of Article 296, Revised Penal Code,
materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal group is greater than the sum total of the
particular acts of the individual members of the group. The result here reached by the Court in
respect of Punzalan may be seen to reinforce the capability of our law to achieve that objective of
deterrence.

Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about holding a man, who knowingly joins a
conspiracy to commit a crime, responsible for all the crimes which are causally connected with the
conspiracy. 20 No one complains about the same rule in tort law. One who joins a criminal conspiracy
in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co- conspirators; he merges his will into the
common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast
his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that a co-conspirator may get
rattled, that a victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and fight back, or that something else may go
awry, and third persons may get killed or injured in the course of implementing the basic criminal
design. To free himself from such liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the
conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or
dissociate himself from the conspiracy.

I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court that both Juan Escober and Macario Punzalan, Jr. are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery with homicide and that
accordingly, both should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to Idemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages to such heirs in the
amount of P200,000.00.

Melencio-Herrrera, Sarmiento, and Padilla, concur and dissent:

Footnotes

1 P. 3, Petition, Rollo in G.R. No. 69658.

* Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte was subsequently apprehended, tried and
convicted by the same trial court. His appeal is also before this Court.

2 Pp. 4-10, Consolidated Brief, p. 376, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564.

3 Pp. 100-103, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564.

4 Pp. 163-165, Rollo, in G.R. No. 69564.

5 Pp. 10-11, Rollo, G.R. No. 69658.

6 Pp. 167-168, Rollo, G.R. No. 69564.

7 Pp. 608-609, Original Records Vol. 1.

8 Sec. 16, Article IV, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution,

9 Exh. "A", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.

10 Pp. 38-39, G.R. No. 69658, Rollo.

11 Pp. 64-66, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Volume 3, Underscoring supplied.

12 Pp. 154 and 171, G.R. No. 69658, Rollo.

13 Tsn, August 1, 1986, p. 132.

14 People vs. Sabilano, 132 SCRA 83.

15 Sec. 19, Art. IV 1973 Constitution.

16 People vs. Bihasa, 130 SCRA 62; People vs. Castelo, 133 SCRA 667 and People
vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92.

17 Exh. "M", pp. 22-23, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Vol. 3.

18 Exh. "F". P. 7, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Vol. 3.

19 People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465; People vs. Pascual, Jr., 109 SCRA 192 and
People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169.

20 Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 20.

21 Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349.

22 People vs. Encipido 146 SCRA 478.

23 See People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1.

24 People vs. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807; People vs. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88; People vs.
Pujinio 27 SCRA 1186; People vs. Puno, 56 SCRA 659-1 People vs. Berberino, 79
SCRA 694; People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233; People vs. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571;
People vs. Solis, 128 SCRA 217; People vs Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178.

Feliciano, J. concurring and dissenting

1 Original TSN, p. 4, 3 October 1983.

2 Id., pp. 10-11, 24 October 1983.

3 Id., pp. 2-3, 5 December 1983.

4 73 SCRA 583 at 590 (1976); underscoring supplied. See also People v. Ruiz, 93
SCRA 739 (1979) and People v. Puesca, 87 SCRA 130 (1978).

5 Original TSN, p. 22, 16 August 1983.

6 Id., p., 17, 25 November 1983.

7 U.S. v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 at 610 [1918]. See also U.S. v. Ambrosia 17 Phil. 295
[1910] and people v. Alto, 26 SCRA342 [1968].

8 9 Phil. I at 6 (1907). See also U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil. 189 (1905) which anticipates
the Macalalad case.

9 47 Phil. 493 at 495-496 (1925).

10 49 Phil, 389 at 396 (1926).

11 20 SCRA 153 (1967).

12 Mr. justice Antonio wrote:

"Although in People v. Rogel. 4 SCRA 807, this Court abandoned: the ruling in
people vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) and reverted to the former doctrine
enunciated d in U.S. v. Macalalad 9 Phil. 1, reiterating the rule that whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consc equence or on the occasion of a robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery will also be
held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they
did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared that they
endeavored to pr event the homicide, this Court abandoned that rule in the
subsequent case of People v. Pelagic, 20SCRA 153.In that case, this Court reverted
to People v. Basisten, supra, and held that where the appellant conspired to commit
robbery and he acted as lookout during the commission of the robbery, but after the
robbery was consummated and as the other conspirators were leaving the scene of
the crime, they encountered a policeman whom they killed, the lookout is guilty only
of robbery with intimidation and not of robbery with homicide. As the Court stated
therein:

.... When the homicide was committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have
had the least intervention or participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for
the said killing. So far as the records disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on
the commission of robbery; there is no evidence that homicide besides was
determined by them when they plotted the crime. All these warrant the exclusion of
Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for the said killing (People v. Basisten, et al.,
47 Phil. 493). Considering that those who actually participated in the robbery were
only three, Pancho Pelagio included, and only one of them was armed, the same
evidently was not in band Art 296, Revised Penal Code). This being the case, then it
would indeed be irregular or questionable to hold Pancho Pelagio similarly
responsible as Caymo and Balmeo for the killing of Pat. Trinidad. Under the code, it
is only when the robbery is in band that all those present in the commission of the
robbery may be punished, for any of the assaults which its members might commit.
... (At pp. 159-160).

Trinidad. Under the code, it is only when the robbery is in band that all those present
in the commission of the robbery may be punished, for any of the assaults which its
members might commit. ... (At pp. 159-160).

This ruling in Pelagic, therefore, appears applicable to the case of Leonardo

Bernardo, hence my concurrence.' (95 SCRA at 125-126; underscoring supplied)

13 See Article 296, Revised Penal Code and Article 504, Penal Code of the
Philippine Islands.

14 57 SCRA 330 (1974).

15 95 SCRA 107 (1980).

16 57 SCRA 338 (1974).

17 These were: Teehankee, Aquino, Santos, Abad Santos, and Melencio- Herrera,
JJ. Barredo J., agreed with Aquino, J., with respect to the [liabilities] of the appellants'
 but voted for the imposition of life imprisonment in view of 'the unusually long
detention of appellants after their conviction by the lower courts.

18 See 95 SCRA at 112-113.

19 95 SCRA 107 at 121 and 122 (1980).

20 The notion of causality has been referred to by the Supreme Court of Spain in,
e.g., its decision of 23 February 1872 in the following terms:

... —E] Tribunal Supreme ha declarado que siendo ambos procesados autores del
robo lo son igualmente el homicidio que ocurrio en el mismo acto, al tiempo de ser
perseguidoes por el interfector; porque este ultimo delito esta de tal manera
enlazado con el de robo que a no haber mediado este ni los robados hubieran
pedido auxilio, rii al prestarselo el tercero hubiese sido muerto como lo fue y que por
consiguiente habiendo tomado parte directa en al ejecucion del robo ambos
procesados, son autores uno y otro segun el articulo 13 del Codigo Penal, y por lo
riiismo responsables los dos de todas las consecuencias de su accion. (S. de 30 de
abril de 1872, Gaceta de 1. de julio.)"—as quoted in People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, at
10 (1955).

Source: Lawphil.net

3. 251 SCRA 101

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995

MAXIMINO GAMIDO y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification1petitioner Maximino B. Gamido's conviction by the Regional Trial Court on eleven
counts of having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner was accused in
11 cases of forging the signature of the President of the Philippines in the following documents and
making it appear that the documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the
Philippines:

1. Criminal Case No. 85-40361 — Special Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Confidential

Presidential Representative dated November 30, 1984;2

2. Criminal Case No. 85-40362 — Memorandum/Order No. 1489 informing all Heads of Ministries,
Bureaus, Instrumentalities of the Government, and Government Controlled Corporations and others
on the existence of Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) dated July 29,
1985;3

3. Criminal Case No. 85-40363 — Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Presidential Regional

Executive Assistant and Executive Director of the PRAMS dated November 7, 1983;4

4. Criminal Case No. 85-40364 — Memorandum to Land, Air and Navigation Transportation
Operators in the Philippines dated July 11, 1985;5

5. Criminal Case No. 85-40365 — Memorandum Order to all Heads of Ministries, Bureaus,
Government Corporations, Government Agencies and Instrumentalities, and Government Controlled
Corporations dated July 29,
1985;6

6. Criminal Case No. 85-40366 — Memorandum Order No. 1480 — To: Hon. Maximino B. Gamido,
Presidential Regional Executive Assistant/Executive Director PRAMS-PREMO dated November 23,
1984;7

7. Criminal Case No. 85-40367 — Memorandum/Circular to all Operators: (1) Transportation; (2)
Shipping Transportation; (3) Air Line Transportation dated November 30, 1984;8

8. Criminal Case No. 85-40368 — A letter addressed to President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru the
Minister of the Budget, submitting the required STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)
specifying the functions and duties of PRAMS personnel and their salaries allegedly approved by the
President on November 23, 1984;9

9. Criminal Case No. 85-40369 — Executive Order No. 820 Creating the Presidential Regional
Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) in all Regions of the Philippines dated October 11, 1983; 10

10. Criminal Case No. 85-40370 — Special Presidential Certification dated September 9,
1985; 11 and

11. Criminal Case No. 85-40371 — Presidential Permission for Free of Fare (sic) in any
Transportation in the Philippines dated February 28, 1985. 12

The prosecution was made under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:

Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
forging the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any person who shall forge the Great Seal of the
Government of the Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of the Chief
Executive.
It appears that on March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C. Tuvera issued Memorandum
Circular No. 1281 13 which read:

INFORMING ALL HEADS OF MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT

CORPORATIONS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REGIONAL ASSISTANT MONITORING
SERVICES (PRAMS) WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

The Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) is a non-existent

agency within the Office of the President. Its alleged Executive Director, Mr.
Maximino B. Gamido is likewise not connected, in any capacity, with this Office.

It is gathered that personnel from the PRAMS have been using Presidential
directives, particularly Executive Order No 819; Memorandum Order No. 811; and
Memorandum Circular No. 1278, to support its fraudulent activities. These issuances,
however, refer to the creation, designation/appointment, and operationalization of the
Presidential Regional Monitoring Officer (PREMO) System, the duly authorized
regional monitoring arm of the Office of the President, which is charged to provide
the President with the information on development in the region.

Furthermore, Mr. Gamido has not been given any authorization to sign for and on
behalf of the President of the Philippines. As such, all memorandum/directives issued
by Mr. Gamido on behalf of the Office of the President are fraudulent. All
memorandum/directives issued by alleged PRAMS personnel are likewise fraudulent.

By
Authori
ty of
the
Preside
nt:

JUAN
C.
TUVER
A

Preside
ntial
Executi
ve
Assista
nt

Following the issuance of this memorandum, the Presidential Security Command and the Office of
the President, through the Malacañang Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO), investigated
petitioner.
On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer, petitioner
appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed
them in his (petitioner's) presence.

The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the
Malacañang Records Office (MRO), testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in
his office and that the signatures thereon did not appear to be those of the former President.

For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the Presidential Regional Assistant
Monitoring Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by then President Marcos and that his
appointment and the related documents, subject of the prosecution, had been signed by the former
President in petitioner's presence.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in finding the petitioner guilty, held:

The defense put up by the accused, that all the subject documents were actually
signed by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his office at Malacañang, and in
the presence of said accused, is as preposterous as it is unbelievable, the said
defense, besides being completely negated and belied by the established facts (that
subject documents, do not exist in the Malacañang Records Office, and therefore,
are spurious) is an imposition on human belief and all sense of propriety. Further, the
accused does not appear to the Court, and has not shown himself, to be of such
stature as to enjoy the privilege of having the former Chief Executive sign documents
in his presence. Moreover, the testimony of the accused in support of his defense is
totally untrustworthy and unreliable.

On the basis of the foregoing factual and legal considerations, the Court is
convinced, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the felony of the forging the signature
of the President, as defined and penalized under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal
Code, was committed by the accused on eleven (11) counts.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime forging the signature of the Chief Executive, and/or violation of Art. 161 of the
Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases, or a
total of eighty (80) years up to one hundred fifty-four (154) years, with costs against
the accused.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals 14 affirmed with the modification already
noted on the margin of this opinion.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming his
conviction for the following reasons:

(1) The fact that the documents in question are not on file in the Malacañang Records Office does
not ipso facto prove that they are forged but only that they were lost or destroyed.
(2) The lone prosecution witness, Melquiades T. dela Cruz, is incompetent to testify that the
documents were forgeries since there is no evidence to show that he had seen then President
Marcos sign documents. Indeed, this witness could not say with certainty that the signature on each
of the 11 documents was not that of President Marcos.

(3) No handwriting expert was presented in court to give an opinion as to the genuineness of
President Marcos' signatures.

(4) The Court of Appeals and the RTC committed the fallacy of "argumentum ad elenchi" in
concluding that the signatures in the documents were forgeries from the documents' "unusual format
and atrocious grammar" when these documents were not offered to prove their appearance and
grammar.

(5) Assuming these defects in format and grammar, there is no forgery since the documents could
not have deceived any person.

(6) A writing or instrument in order to constitute a forgery must possess some apparent legal efficacy
(36 Am. Jur. 2d 690), and if PRAMS is a non-existent entity as Memorandum Circular No. 1281
declared, then the documents executed under it cannot acquire such "apparent legal efficacy."

(7) Assuming further that the signature of former President Marcos on the document creating the
PRAMS was a counterfeit (Exh. C), the criminal liability of the author thereof absorbed all acts of
forgery committed under the fictitious office, because there was only one intent, i.e. to discharge the
imagined functions of a non-existent office.

(8) Assuming that the signatures of then President Marcos in the documents were spurious,
petitioner, the possessor of the documents, must be exempted from criminal responsibility because
no person of sound mind would make it appear that the President created an office and appointed
him to that office.

The petition has no merit.

First. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacañang Records Office, testified that his office
did not have a record of the documents. For his part Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared
the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent and its alleged Executive
Director, herein petitioner, as not in any capacity connected with the Office of the President. From
these premises it is rational to conclude that the documents in question, which purport to have been
signed by then President Marcos, are bogus documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals
correctly found petitioner to be the author of the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and
user of a falsified document is the forger thereof . 15

Second. Petitioner contends that Melquiades T. dela Cruz was incompetent to testify as to whether
the signatures on the documents, purporting to be those of President Marcos, were forgeries
because there is no showing that he had witnessed President Marcos signing his name.

What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of President Marcos and that the
signatures on the documents in question were not those of President Marcos. 16 This is sufficient to
establish the signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, §22 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is
not required that the person identifying the handwriting of another must have seen the latter write the
document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting to be his [the subject's]
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has been record custodian at Malacañang for so many
years; it is inconceivable he had not acquired familiarity with the signature not only of President
Marcos but of other Presidents under whom he had served.

There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of the challenged
signatures. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is not a highly technical
issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular
biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on
the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an
opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned
document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of such signatures." 17 Here, as the trial court observed, "the forgeries were not
only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly discernible to the naked eye or mere
ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from their appearance. . . . " 18

Third. Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that forgery could not be said to exist since the
documents, because of their "unusual format, atrocious grammar, and misspelled words" could not
have defrauded or deceived anyone, and that moreover they lack apparent legal efficacy." That is
not so. If the documents were fanciful or whimsical, as for example, a commission appointing
petitioner mayor of a mythical kingdom, the forgery could simply be dismissed as a spoof. But as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the Office of the President had to issue a memorandum
denouncing the legality of PRAMS because of the possibility that the less wary would be deceived,
especially because that the documents pertaining to it bear the Great Seal and were typed on
stationary which have the appearance of official stationery of the Office of the President.

Fourth. Petitioner also argues that he should have been charged under only one information
because there was only one intent "to discharge the imagined functions of a non-existent office." The
argument has no merit. The documents in this case were forged on different dates. One act was not
done to commit another. There is therefore no basis for considering the various acts as constituting
only one crime of forgery.

Fifth. As a last-ditch effort of sorts to escape criminal liability, petitioner claims that since "no person
of sound mind would [make] it appear that the Chief Executive created an office for him and
appointed him thereto," he must be exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. This, again, is not necessarily so since the purpose may be to deceive others.
Moreover, this defense now invoked should have been raised below. At all events, the presumption
is in favor of sanity. 19 In this case there is no evidence to show that petitioner was insane at the time
he committed the acts for which he is being prosecuted.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's petition for review and petition for bail pending appeal are DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The RTC sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for each of the 11 criminal cases, or a total of 88 years up to 154 years,
with costs. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence by imposing on petitioner the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of the 11
criminal cases.

2 Exh. F.

3 Exh. M.

4 Exh. G.

5 Exh. H.

6 Exh. J.

7 Exh. L.

8 Exh. N.

9 Exh. K.

10 Exh. C.

11 Exh. D.

12 Exh. E.

13 Exh. JJ.

14 Gutierrez, J., ( ponente), with Imperial and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurring.

15 Caubang v. People, 210 SCRA 377 (1992).

16 TSN, January 7, 1987, pp. 15-22.

17 Alcon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833 (1988).

18 RTC decision, p. 10, Rollo, p. 34.

19 People v. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 (1922).

 4. 577 SCRA 509

THIRD DIVISION

LINA PEALBER, G.R. No. 178645

Petitioner,
Present:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

QUIRINO RAMOS, LETICIA

PEALBER, and BARTEX Promulgated:
INC.,
Respondents. January 30, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision[1] dated 15 December 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 69731. Said Decision reversed and set aside the Decision[2] dated 19
January 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Branch 2, in
Civil Case No. 3672, which declared petitioner Lina Pealber the owner of the
Bonifacio property subject of this case and ordered respondent spouses Quirino
Ramos and Leticia Pealber to reconvey the same to petitioner.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are set forth hereunder.

Petitioner is the mother of respondent Leticia and the mother-in-law of

respondent Quirino, husband of Leticia. Respondent Bartex, Inc., on the other hand,
is a domestic corporation which bought from respondent spouses Ramos one of the
two properties involved in this case.
On 18 February 1987, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Deeds and Titles, Reconveyance, Damages, [with]
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction against the
respondents.[3] It was docketed as Civil Case No. 3672.

First Cause of Action

Firstly, petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of a parcel
of land situated in Ugac Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, with an area of 1,457 sq.m.
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43373[4] of the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan, registered in petitioners name. A residential
house and a warehouse were constructed on the said parcel of land which petitioner
also claimed to own (the land and the improvements thereon shall be hereinafter
referred to as the Ugac properties). Petitioner averred that in the middle part of
1986, she discovered that TCT No. T-43373 was cancelled on 13 May
1983 and TCT No. T-58043[5] was issued in its stead in the name of respondent
spouses Ramos. Upon verification, petitioner learned that the basis for the
cancellation of her title was a Deed of Donation of a Registered Land, Residential
House and Camarin,[6] which petitioner purportedly executed in favor of respondent
spouses Ramos on 27 April 1983. Petitioner insisted that her signature on the said
Deed of Donation was a forgery as she did not donate any property to respondent
spouses Ramos. When petitioner confronted the respondent spouses Ramos about
the false donation, the latter pleaded that they would just pay for the Ugac properties
in the amount of P1 Million. Petitioner agreed to the proposition of the respondent
spouses Ramos.

Subsequently, around 10 January 1987,[7] petitioner found out that the

respondent spouses Ramos were selling the Ugac properties to respondent Bartex,
Inc. Petitioner then sent her son, Johnson Paredes (Johnson),[8] to caution respondent
Bartex, Inc. that respondent spouses Ramos were not the lawful owners of the said
properties. Johnson was allegedly able to convey petitioners caveat to a
representative of respondent Bartex, Inc. Petitioner also warned respondent spouses
Ramos not to sell the Ugac properties anymore, otherwise, she would file the
necessary action against them. The respondent spouses Ramos then assured her that
they would do no such thing. As a precaution, petitioner executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim over the Ugac Properties on 19 January 1987 and caused the same to
be annotated on TCT No. T-58043 on the same day. Despite petitioners warnings,
respondent spouses Ramos still executed in favor of respondent Bartex, Inc. a Deed
of Absolute Sale[9] over the Ugac properties on 12 January 1987 for a total price
of P150,000.00. As a result, TCT No. T-58043 in the name of respondent spouses
Ramos was cancelled and TCT No. T-68825[10] in the name of respondent Bartex,
Inc. was issued on 20 January 1987.

Petitioner contended that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent

spouses Ramos in favor of respondent Bartex, Inc. did not convey any valid title, not
only because respondent Bartex, Inc. was a buyer in bad faith, but also because
respondent spouses Ramos did not own the Ugac properties. Thus, petitioner prayed
for the declaration of nullity of (1) the Deed of Donation of a Registered Land,
Residential House and Camarin purportedly executed by petitioner in favor
respondent spouses Ramos; (2) TCT No. T-58043, issued in the name of respondent
spouses Ramos; (3) the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the respondent spouses
Ramos in favor of respondent Bartex, Inc.; and (4) TCT No. T-68825, issued in the
name of respondent Bartex, Inc. Should petitioners prayer not be granted, petitioner
sought in the alternative that respondent spouses Ramos be ordered to pay the
assessed value of the Ugac properties, which was about P1.5 Million. Petitioner
further prayed that TCT No. T-43373, in her name, be declared valid and active.

Second Cause of Action

 Secondly, petitioner claimed that for many years prior to 1984, she operated
a hardware store in a building she owned along Bonifacio St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. However, the commercial lot (Bonifacio property) upon which the
building stood is owned by and registered in the name of Maria Mendoza (Mendoza),
from whom petitioner rented the same.

On 22 March 1982, petitioner allowed respondent spouses Ramos to manage

the hardware store. Thereafter, in 1984, Mendoza put the Bonifacio property up for
sale. As petitioner did not have available cash to buy the property, she allegedly
entered into a verbal agreement with respondent spouses Ramos with the following
terms:

[1.] The lot would be bought [by herein respondent spouses Ramos] for and in
behalf of [herein petitioner];

[2.] The consideration of P80,000.00 for said lot would be paid by [respondent
spouses Ramos] from the accumulated earnings of the store;

[3.] Since [respondent spouses Ramos] have the better credit standing, they would
be made to appear in the Deed of Sale as the vendees so that the title to be
issued in their names could be used by [them] to secure a loan with which
to build a bigger building and expand the business of [petitioner].

In accordance with the above agreement, respondent spouses Ramos allegedly

entered into a contract of sale[11] with Mendoza over the Bonifacio property,[12] and
on 24 October 1984, TCT No. T-62769[13] covering said property was issued in the
names of respondent spouses Ramos.

On 20 September 1984, respondent spouses Ramos returned the management

of the hardware store to petitioner. On the bases of receipts and disbursements,
petitioner asserted that the Bonifacio property was fully paid out of the funds of the
store and if respondent spouses Ramos had given any amount for the purchase price
of the said property, they had already sufficiently reimbursed themselves from the
funds of the store. Consequently, petitioner demanded from respondent spouses
Ramos the reconveyance of the title to the Bonifacio property to her but the latter
unjustifiably refused.

Petitioner insisted that respondent spouses Ramos were, in reality, mere

trustees of the Bonifacio property, thus, they were under a moral and legal obligation
to reconvey title over the said property to her. Petitioner, therefore, prayed that she
be declared the owner of the Bonifacio property; TCT No. T-62769, in the name of
respondent spouses, be declared null and void; and the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Cagayan be directed to issue another title in her name.

On 2 March 1987, respondent spouses Ramos accordingly filed before the

RTC their Answer[14] to petitioners Complaint. As regards the first cause of action,
respondent spouses Ramos alleged that petitioner, together with her son, Johnson,
and the latters wife, Maria Teresa Paredes, mortgaged the Ugac properties to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on 19 August 1990 for the amount
of P150,000.00. When the mortgage was about to be foreclosed because of the
failure of petitioner to pay the mortgage debt, petitioner asked respondent spouses
Ramos to redeem the mortgaged property or pay her mortgage debt to DBP. In
return, petitioner promised to cede, convey and transfer full ownership of the Ugac
properties to them. Respondent spouses Ramos paid the mortgage debt and, in
compliance with her promise, petitioner voluntarily transferred the Ugac properties
to the former by way of a Deed of Donation dated 27 April 1983. After accepting
the donation and having the Deed of Donation registered, TCT No. T- 58043 was
issued to respondent spouses Ramos and they then took actual and physical
possession of the Ugac properties. Respondent spouses Ramos asserted that
petitioner had always been aware of their intention to sell the Ugac properties as they
posted placards thereon stating that the said properties were for sale. Respondent
spouses Ramos further averred that petitioner also knew that they finally sold the
Ugac properties to respondent Bartex, Inc. for P150,000.00. Thus, respondent
spouses Ramos maintained that petitioner was not entitled to any reimbursement for
the Ugac properties.

With regard to petitioners second cause of action involving the Bonifacio

property, respondent spouses Ramos contended that they were given not only the
management, but also the full ownership of the hardware store by the petitioner, on
the condition that the stocks and merchandise of the store will be inventoried, and
out of the proceeds of the sales thereof, respondent spouses Ramos shall pay
petitioners outstanding obligations and liabilities. After settling and paying the
obligations and liabilities of petitioner, respondent spouses Ramos bought the
Bonifacio property from Mendoza out of their own funds.

Lastly, even if petitioner and respondent spouses Ramos belonged to the same
family, the spouses Ramos faulted petitioner for failing to exert efforts to arrive at
an amicable settlement of their dispute. Hence, respondent spouses Ramos sought,
by way of a counterclaim against petitioner, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, for allegedly filing a false, flimsy and frivolous complaint.
 On 27 April 1987, respondent Bartex, Inc. filed before the RTC its own
Answer to petitioners Complaint, alleging, inter alia, that when a representative of
the corporation inquired about the Ugac properties for sale, respondent spouses
Ramos presented their owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-58043, together with
the tax declarations covering the parcel of land and the buildings thereon.Respondent
Bartex, Inc. even verified the title and tax declarations covering the Ugac properties
with the Register of Deeds and the Office of the Municipal Assessor as to any cloud,
encumbrance or lien on the properties, but none were found. Respondent spouses
Ramos were then actually occupying the Ugac properties and they only vacated the
same after the consummation of the sale to respondent Bartex, Inc. Respondent
Bartex, Inc. claimed that the sale of the Ugac properties by respondent spouses
Ramos to the corporation was already consummated on 12 January 1987, and the
documents conveying the said properties were by then being processed for
registration, when petitioner caused the annotation of an adverse claim at the back
of TCT No. T-58043 on 19 January 1987.As respondent Bartex, Inc. was never
aware of any imperfection in the title of respondent spouses Ramos over the Ugac
properties, it claimed that it was an innocent purchaser in good faith.

Trial of the case thereafter ensued.

On 19 January 2000, the RTC promulgated its decision, ruling on petitioners

first cause of action in this wise:

On the first cause of action, the Court finds the testimony of [herein
petitioner] Lina Penalber (sic) denying her execution of the deed of donation
over the Ugac property in favor of [herein respondent spouses] Quirino Ramos
and Leticia Penalber-Ramos (sic) insufficient to support the said cause of
action. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face
(Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248) and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow
the presumption of truth in the recitals contained in a public document executed
with all legal formalities (People vs. Fabro, 277 SCRA 19). Hence, in order to
contradict the facts contained in a notarial document and the presumption of
regularity in its favor, these (sic) must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant (Calahat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 241
SCRA 356). In the case at bench, [petitioner] claims that she did not execute the
deed of donation over the Ugac property in favor of [respondent spouses
Ramos]. Such denial, by itself, is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
regularity of the notarial deed of donation and its entitlement to full faith and
credit. While it is true that, generally, the party who asserts the affirmative side of
a proposition has the burden of proof, which in this instance is (sic) the [respondent
spouses Ramos] who are asserting the validity of the deed of donation, [respondent
spouses Ramos] can merely rely on the above-stated presumption given to notarial
documents and need not present any evidence to support their claim of validity and
due execution of the notarized deed of donation. On the other hand, [petitioner],
in addition to her allegation that she did not execute any such deed of donation
in favor of [respondent spouses Ramos] should have had her allegedly falsified
signature on the deed of donation examined by qualified handwriting experts
to prove that, indeed, she did not execute the same. Her failure to do so results
in the failure of her cause.[15] (Emphasis ours.)

With respect to petitioners second cause of action, the RTC adjudged that:

On the second cause of action, the Court finds the evidence

preponderantly in favor of the [herein petitioner]. The evidence on record
shows that when [petitioner] allowed [herein respondent spouses Ramos] full
management of the hardware store located on the Bonifacio property in March,
1982 (sic) an inventory of the stocks in trade in the said store was made showing
stocks worth P226,951.05* and when she got back the store from [respondent
spouses Ramos] on September 1984, another inventory was made [on] the stocks
in trade in the said store showing, stocks worth P110,005.88* or a difference
of P116,946.17.* The only reason for an inventory having been made when the
hardware store was turned over to [respondent spouses Ramos] was, to the
mind of the Court, for the latter to account for the sales of such stocks. And to
arrive at the net amount due to [petitioner], all that is needed to be done is to deduct
the value of the stocks present at the store when management was returned to
[petitioner] in September 1984 from the value of the stocks found in the hardware
store when said management was given to [respondent spouses Ramos] in
1982. [Petitioner] claims that the purchase price for the Bonifacio property was to
be taken from the proceeds of sales from the hardware store which, as the evidence
on record stands[,] shows a balance in her favor of more
than P116,000.00. [Respondent spouses Ramos] contend that said amount was
expended to pay off [petitioners] obligations to her suppliers. The record, however,
is totally silent on how much and when [respondent spouses Ramos] paid said
alleged obligations of [petitioner] or even who were the said suppliers thus
paid. That [petitioner] and [respondent spouses Ramos] agreed that the
amount due [petitioner] from the proceeds of the sales of her stocks in the
hardware store would be applied to the purchase price of the Bonifacio
property is supported by the fact that [petitioner] did not ever ask for an
accounting of said proceeds, despite the fact that as early as September, 1984
(sic) she already knew that her stocks left by her in March, 1982 (sic) was
already sold by [respondent spouses Ramos] and that there was a difference
of P116,000.00 plus which was due to her.[16] (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

 1. Finding the evidence on record insufficient to prove the [herein
petitioners] first cause of action, and, hence, dismissing the same;

2. On the second cause of action, in favor of the [petitioner] and

against the [herein respondent spouses Ramos];

2.1 Declaring the [petitioner] the owner of Lot 2-B of subdivision

plan PST-2-01-019316 (sic) with an area of 195 square meters situated along
Bonifacio Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; and

2.2 Ordering the [respondent spouses Ramos] to reconvey to the

[petitioner] the said property (Bonifacio property).

With costs de oficio.[17] (Emphasis ours.)

On 22 February 2000, respondent spouses Ramos filed with the RTC a Motion
for Reconsideration[18] of the afore-mentioned decision, assailing the ruling of the
RTC on petitioners second cause of action on the ground that the alleged express
trust created between them and petitioner involving the Bonifacio property could not
be proven by parol evidence. In an Order[19] dated 17 July 2000, the RTC denied
respondent spouses Ramos Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit,
ratiocinating that respondent spouses Ramos failed to interpose timely objections
when petitioner testified on their alleged verbal agreement regarding the purchase of
the Bonifacio property. As such, respondent spouses Ramos were deemed to have
waived such objections, which cannot be raised anymore in their Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC then reiterated its finding that petitioners evidence
clearly established her second cause of action. Additionally, the RTC held that the
requirement that the parties exert earnest efforts towards an amicable settlement of
the dispute had likewise been waived by the respondents as they filed no motion
regarding the same before the trial.

On 24 July 2000, respondent spouses Ramos elevated their case to the Court
of Appeals, insofar as the ruling of the RTC on petitioners second cause of action
was concerned.[20] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69731.

On 15 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision

in favor of respondent spouses Ramos.

Finding merit in the appeal, the appellate court observed that the second cause
of action involved not only the petitioner and her daughter, but also her son-in-law,
who was not covered by the term family relations under Article 150 [21] of the Family
Code. Therefore, Article 151[22] of the Family Code, requiring the exertion of earnest
efforts toward a compromise, did not apply as the impediment arising from the said
provision was limited only to suits between members of the same family or those
encompassed in the term family relations under Article 150.

The Court of Appeals also declared that petitioner failed to prove her claim
with the required quantum of evidence. According to the Court of Appeals:
It appears that before management of the store was transferred to [herein
respondent spouses Ramos], a beginning inventory of the stocks of the hardware
store was made by [herein petitioners] other children showing stocks amounting to
Php226,951.05. After management of the hardware store was returned to
[petitioner], a second inventory was made with stocks amounting to Php110,004.88
showing a difference of Php116,946.15. Contrary, however, to the finding of the
trial court, We find that said inventory showing such difference is not
conclusive proof to show that the said amount was used to pay the purchase
price of the subject lot. In fact, as testified by Johnson Paredes, son of [petitioner]
who made the computation on the alleged inventories, it is not known if the goods,
representing the amount of Php116,946.17, were actually sold or not. It may have
been taken without actually being sold.

It is a basic rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by

evidence, are not equivalent to proof. As between [petitioners] bare allegation of a
verbal trust agreement, and the deed of absolute sale between Maria Mendoza and
[respondent spouses Ramos], the latter should prevail.

Although oral testimony is allowed to prove that a trust exists, contrary to

the contention of [respondent spouses Ramos], and the court may rely on parol
evidence to arrive at a conclusion that an express trust exists, what is crucial is the
intention to create a trust. While oftentimes the intention is manifested by the
trustor in express or explicit language, such intention may be manifested by
inference from what the trustor has said or done, from the nature of the transaction,
or from the circumstances surrounding the creation of the purported trust.

However, an inference of the intention to create a trust, made from

language, conduct or circumstances, must be made with reasonable certainty. It
cannot rest on vague, uncertain or indefinite declarations. An inference of
intention to create a trust, predicated only on circumstances, can be made only
where they admit of no other interpretation. Here, [petitioner] failed to
establish with reasonable certainty her claim that the purchase of the subject
lot was pursuant to a verbal trust agreement with [respondent spouses
Ramos].[23] (Emphasis ours.)
 Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is

hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated 19 January 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Branch 2, with respect to the second cause of
action or the Bonifacio Property in Civil Case No. 3672 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the
second cause of action of [herein petitioners] complaint.[24]

On 12 January 2007, petitioner sought reconsideration[25] of the foregoing

Decision, but it was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution[26] dated 31 May
2007.

To have the ruling of the Court of Appeals overturned, petitioner brought her
case before us through the instant Petition, raising the following issues: (1) whether
the existence of a trust agreement between her and respondent spouses Ramos was
clearly established, and (2) whether such trust agreement was valid and enforceable.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner is raising questions of fact in the

instant Petition. Be it noted that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law must be entertained. A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [27] When
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the
query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence considering mostly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the
situation, questions or errors of fact are raised.[28] The rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45, however, admits of certain
exceptions,[29] among which is when the findings of the trial court are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture. As will be discussed further, we find
the afore-mentioned exception to be applicable in the present Petition, thus,
warranting a departure from the general rule.

In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in
equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another, but the word trust is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and
responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts.[30] A person who establishes a
trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed is known as the trustee;
and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the
beneficiary.[31] There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the beneficiary
(cestui que trust) as regards certain property, real, personal, money or choses in
action.[32]

Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by

the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by
operation of law.[33] Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.[34] No particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is
clearly intended.[35] However, in accordance with Article 1443 of the Civil Code,
when an express trust concerns an immovable property or any interest therein,
the same may not be proved by parol or oral evidence.[36]

In the instant case, petitioner maintains that she was able to prove the
existence of a trust agreement between her and respondent spouses Ramos. She calls
attention to the fact that respondent spouses Ramos could not account for
the P116,946.15 difference in the beginning inventory and the second inventory of
the stocks of the hardware store, and they failed to present proof to support their
allegation that the amount was used to pay the other obligations of petitioner. As
respondent spouses Ramos never denied the existence of the P116,946.15
difference, petitioner contends that they have the burden of proving where this
amount had gone, if indeed they did not use the same to buy the Bonifacio
property. Petitioner asserts that given the respondent spouses Ramos failure to
discharge such burden, the only conclusion would be that they did use the amount
to purchase the Bonifacio property.

Petitioner further alleges that based on the verbal agreement between her and
respondent spouses Ramos, a trust agreement was created and that the same is valid
and enforceable. Petitioner claims that she is the trustor for it was she who entrusted
the Bonifacio property to respondent spouses Ramos as the trustees, with the
condition that the same be used to secure a loan, the proceeds of which would be
used to build a bigger building to expand petitioners business. Petitioner maintains
that a trust agreement was clearly intended by the parties when petitioner left the
management of the hardware store to respondent spouses Ramos, with the agreement
that the proceeds from the sales from said store be used to buy the lot upon which
the store stands. The respondent spouses Ramos assumption of the management of
the hardware store and their eventual purchase of the Bonifacio property indubitably
shows that respondent spouses Ramos honored their obligation under the verbal
agreement. Such being the case, it behooved for the respondent spouses Ramos to
hold the Bonifacio property for petitioners benefit.

Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.

It bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of proving her cause of action
in the instant case and she may not rely on the weakness of the defense of respondent
spouses Ramos. Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. Preponderance of evidence[37] is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.[38] Therefore, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment. For
the plaintiff, the burden of proof never parts.[39] For the defendant, an affirmative
defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause
of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e., an avoidance of
the claim.[40]

From the allegations of the petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 3672, the
alleged verbal trust agreement between petitioner and respondent spouses Ramos is
in the nature of an express trust as petitioner explicitly agreed therein to allow the
respondent spouses Ramos to acquire title to the Bonifacio property in their names,
but to hold the same property for petitioners benefit. Given that the alleged trust
concerns an immovable property, however, respondent spouses Ramos counter that
the same is unenforceable since the agreement was made verbally and no parol
evidence may be admitted to prove the existence of an express trust concerning an
immovable property or any interest therein.

On this score, we subscribe to the ruling of the RTC in its Order dated 17 July
2000 that said spouses were deemed to have waived their objection to the parol
evidence as they failed to timely object when petitioner testified on the said verbal
agreement. The requirement in Article 1443 that the express trust concerning an
immovable or an interest therein be in writing is merely for purposes of proof, not
for the validity of the trust agreement. Therefore, the said article is in the nature of a
statute of frauds. The term statute of frauds is descriptive of statutes which require
certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The statute does not deprive the parties
of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely
regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable. [41] The
effect of non-compliance is simply that no action can be proved unless the
requirement is complied with. Oral evidence of the contract will be excluded upon
timely objection. But if the parties to the action, during the trial, make no objection
to the admissibility of the oral evidence to support the contract covered by the statute,
and thereby permit such contract to be proved orally, it will be just as binding upon
the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.[42]

Per petitioners testimony,[43] the Bonifacio property was offered for sale by its
owner Mendoza. Petitioner told respondent spouses Ramos that she was going to
buy the lot, but the title to the same will be in the latters names. The money from the
hardware store managed by respondent spouses Ramos shall be used to buy the
Bonifacio property, which shall then be mortgaged by the respondent spouses Ramos
so that they could obtain a loan for building a bigger store. The purchase price
of P80,000.00 was paid for the Bonifacio property. On 20 September 1984, the
respondent spouses Ramos returned the management of the store to
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner allowed her son Johnson to inventory the stocks of
the store. Johnson found out that the purchase price of P80,000.00 for the Bonifacio
property was already fully paid. When petitioner told the respondent spouses Ramos
to transfer the title to the Bonifacio property in her name, the respondent spouses
Ramos refused, thus, prompting petitioner to file a complaint against them.

Similarly, Johnson testified[44] that on 22 March 1982, petitioner turned over

the management of the hardware store to respondent spouses Ramos. During that
time, an inventory[45] of the stocks of the store was made and the total value of the
said stocks were determined to be P226,951.05. When respondent spouses Ramos
returned the management of the store to petitioner on 20 September 1984, another
inventory[46] of the stocks was made, with the total value of the stocks falling
to P110,004.88. The difference of P116,946.16 was attributed to the purchase of the
Bonifacio property by the respondent spouses Ramos using the profits from the sales
of the store.

A careful perusal of the records of the case reveals that respondent spouses
Ramos did indeed fail to interpose their objections regarding the admissibility of the
afore-mentioned testimonies when the same were offered to prove the alleged verbal
trust agreement between them and petitioner. Consequently, these testimonies were
rendered admissible in evidence. Nevertheless, while admissibility of evidence is
an affair of logic and law, determined as it is by its relevance and competence,
the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, still depends on judicial
evaluation.[47] Thus, despite the admissibility of the said testimonies, the Court
holds that the same carried little weight in proving the alleged verbal trust agreement
between petitioner and respondent spouses.

Petitioners allegations as to the existence of an express trust agreement with

respondent spouses Ramos, supported only by her own and her son Johnsons
testimonies, do not hold water. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, a
resulting difference of P116,946.15 in the beginning inventory of the stocks of the
hardware store (before management was transferred to respondent spouses Ramos)
and the second inventory thereof (after management was returned to petitioner), by
itself, is not conclusive proof that the said amount was used to pay the purchase price
of the Bonifacio property, such as would make it the property of petitioner held
merely in trust by respondent spouses Ramos. Such a conclusion adopted by the
RTC is purely speculative and non sequitur. The resulting difference in the two
inventories might have been caused by other factors and the same is capable of other
interpretations (e. g., that the amount thereof may have been written off as business
losses due to a bad economic condition, or that the stocks of the store might have
been damaged or otherwise their purchase prices have increased dramatically, etc.),
the exclusion of which rested upon the shoulders of petitioner alone who has the
burden of proof in the instant case. This petitioner miserably failed to do. The fact
that respondent spouses Ramos never denied the P116,946.15 difference, or that
they failed to present proof that they indeed used the said amount to pay the other
obligations and liabilities of petitioner is not sufficient to discharge petitioners
burden to prove the existence of the alleged express trust agreement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69731 dated 15 December
2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

*
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago per Raffle dated 21 January 2009.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Ramon M.
Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 76-86.
[2]
Penned by Judge Orlando D. Beltran; rollo, pp. 45-49.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-7.
[4]
Id. at 8-10.
[5]
Id. at 11-12.
[6]
Id. at 13-14.
[7]
In the original Complaint, the year stated was 1986. However, this was changed to 1987 in an Amended Complaint
(Records, pp. 81-87) filed by petitioner on 7 July 1988 with leave of court.
[8]
In her testimony before the RTC, petitioner stated that she was not legally married to her deceased husband so she
and her children used her maiden surname Pealber. (TSN, 8 July 1988, p. 27) As regards the surname of her
son, Johnson Paredes, petitioner explained that his surname was derived from a sponsor to his baptism, a
certain Col. Paredes, who requested that petitioners son be named after the said sponsor. (TSN, 10 November
1988, p. 12).
[9]
Records, pp. 15-16.
[10]
Id. at 17-18.
[11]
Id. at 171.
[12]
The original and the amended Complaints were silent as to the date of the sale but a reading of the Deed of Sale
reveals that the same was executed on 27 April 1984. (Records, p. 171.)
[13]
Records, p. 19.
[14]
Id. at 24-35.
[15]
Id. at 330-331.
*
In accordance with Exh. H-30, Exh. I-23, and Exh. I-23-A, Folder of Exhibits, it appears that the correct amount
should read as P226,951.04 (Exh. H-30), P110,004.88 (Exh. I-23) and P116,946.16 (Exh. I-23-A).
[16]
Id. at 331.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id. at 332-338.
[19]
Id. at 348-349.
[20]
Although respondent Bartex, Inc. was named as one of the petitioners in CA-G.R. CV No. 69731, it appears that
it has not actively participated in the proceedings, since its interest concerns only the first cause of action.
[21]
ART. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood.
[22]
ART. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 84-85.
[24]
Id. at 85.
[25]
Id. at 87-93.
[26]
Id. at 95-96.
[27]
Binay v. Odea, G.R. No. 163683, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 255.
[28]
Secretary of Education v. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr., G.R. No. 164748, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 452, 460.
[29]
The exceptions are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record. (Rosario v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 139233, 11 November 2005, 474
SCRA 500, 506, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 834, 846 (1998].)
[30]
Ramos v. Ramos, 158 Phil. 935, 949-950 (1974).
[31]
Art. 1440, Civil Code.
[32]
Pacheco v. Arro, 85 Phil. 505, 514-515 (1950).
[33]
Art. 1441, Civil Code.
[34]
Ramos v. Ramos, supra note 30 at 950.
[35]
Art. 1444, Civil Code.
[36]
Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.
[37]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. -- In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
[38]
Ong v. Yap, G.R. No. 146797, 18 February 2005, 452 SCRA 41, 49-50.
[39]
DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies v. Radio Mindanao Network, Inc., G.R. No. 147039, 27 January
2006, 480 SCRA 314, 322.
[40]
Id. at 322-323.
[41]
The purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations, depending for their
existence on the unassisted memory of witnesses, by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions
to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. The statute is satisfied or, as it is often stated,
a contract or bargain is taken within the statute by making and executing a note or memorandum of the
contract which is sufficient to state the requirements of the statute. (Litonjua v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
148116, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 478, 492.)
[42]
Conlu v. Araneta, 15 Phil. 387, 391 (1910).
[43]
See TSN, 8 July 1988, pp. 16-23.
[44]
See TSN, 7 September 1989.
[45]
Exhibits H, H-1 to H-37, Folder of Exhibits.
[46]
Exhibits I, I-1 to I-22, Folder of Exhibits.
[47]
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (Vol. 2, 10th ed., 2004), p. 677.
 5. 608 SCRA 521

SECOND DIVISION

MOF COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 172822

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
SHIN YANG BROKERAGE
CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondent. December 18, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The necessity of proving lies with the person who sues.

The refusal of the consignee named in the bill of lading to pay the freightage on the
claim that it is not privy to the contract of affreightment propelled the shipper to sue for
collection of money, stressing that its sole evidence, the bill of lading, suffices to prove that
the consignee is bound to pay. Petitioner now comes to us by way of Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 praying for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA)
judgment that dismissed its action for sum of money for insufficiency of evidence.

Factual Antecedents
 On October 25, 2001, Halla Trading Co., a company based in Korea, shipped
to Manila secondhand cars and other articles on board the vessel
Hanjin Busan 0238W. The bill of lading covering the shipment, i.e., Bill of Lading No.
HJSCPUSI14168303,[2] which was prepared by the carrier Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd.
(Hanjin), named respondent Shin Yang Brokerage Corp. (Shin Yang) as the consignee and
indicated that payment was on a Freight Collect basis, i.e., that the consignee/receiver of
the goods would be the one to pay for the freight and other charges in the total amount
of P57,646.00.[3]

The shipment arrived in Manila on October 29, 2001. Thereafter, petitioner MOF
Company, Inc. (MOF), Hanjins exclusive general agent in the Philippines, repeatedly
demanded the payment of ocean freight, documentation fee and terminal handling charges
from Shin Yang. The latter, however, failed and refused to pay contending that it did not
cause the importation of the goods, that it is only the Consolidator of the said shipment,
that the ultimate consignee did not endorse in its favor the original bill of lading and that
the bill of lading was prepared without its consent.

Thus, on March 19, 2003, MOF filed a case for sum of money before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC Pasay) which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 206-03 and raffled to Branch 48. MOF alleged that Shin Yang, a regular client,
caused the importation and shipment of the goods and assured it that ocean freight and
other charges would be paid upon arrival of the goods in Manila. Yet, after Hanjin's
compliance, Shin Yang unjustly breached its obligation to pay. MOF argued that Shin
Yang, as the named consignee in the bill of lading, entered itself as a party to the contract
and bound itself to the Freight Collect arrangement.MOF thus prayed for the payment
of P57,646.00 representing ocean freight, documentation fee and terminal handling
charges as well as damages and attorneys fees.

Claiming that it is merely a consolidator/forwarder and that Bill of Lading No.

HJSCPUSI14168303 was not endorsed to it by the ultimate consignee, Shin Yang denied
any involvement in shipping the goods or in promising to shoulder the freightage. It
asserted that it never authorized Halla Trading Co. to ship the articles or to have its name
included in the bill of lading. Shin Yang also alleged that MOF failed to present supporting
documents to prove that it was Shin Yang that caused the importation or the one that
assured payment of the shipping charges upon arrival of the goods in Manila.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On June 16, 2004, the MeTC of Pasay City, Branch 48 rendered its Decision[4] in favor of
MOF. It ruled that Shin Yang cannot disclaim being a party to the contract of affreightment
because:

x x x it would appear that defendant has business transactions with plaintiff. This is evident
from defendants letters dated 09 May 2002 and 13 May 2002 (Exhibits 1 and 2, defendants
Position Paper) where it requested for the release of refund of container deposits x x x. [In]
the mind of the Court, by analogy, a written contract need not be necessary; a mutual
understanding [would suffice]. Further, plaintiff would have not included the name of the
defendant in the bill of lading, had there been no prior agreement to that effect.

In sum, plaintiff has sufficiently proved its cause of action against the defendant
and the latter is obliged to honor its agreement with plaintiff despite the absence of a written
contract.[5]

The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and

against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff as follows:

1. P57,646.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid,
2. P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and
3. the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirmed in toto the Decision
of the MeTC. It held that:

MOF and Shin Yang entered into a contract of affreightment which Blacks Law Dictionary
defined as a contract with the ship owner to hire his ship or part of it, for the carriage of
goods and generally take the form either of a charter party or a bill of lading.

The bill of lading contain[s] the information embodied in the contract.

 Article 652 of the Code of Commerce provides that the charter party must be in writing;
however, Article 653 says: If the cargo should be received without charter party having
been signed, the contract shall be understood as executed in accordance with what appears
in the bill of lading, the sole evidence of title with regard to the cargo for determining the
rights and obligations of the ship agent, of the captain and of the charterer. Thus, the
Supreme Court opined in the Market Developers, Inc. (MADE) vs. Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court and Gaudioso Uy, G.R. No. 74978, September 8, 1989, this
kind of contract may be oral. In another case, Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Company
of North America, 12 SCRA 213 the contract of affreightment by telephone was
recognized where the oral agreement was later confirmed by a formal booking.

xxxx

Defendant is liable to pay the sum of P57,646.00, with interest until fully paid, attorneys
fees of P10,000.00 [and] cost of suit.

Considering all the foregoing, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Court a quo.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Seeing the matter in a different light, the CA dismissed MOFs complaint and refused to
award any form of damages or attorneys fees. It opined that MOF failed to substantiate its
claim that Shin Yang had a hand in the importation of the articles to the Philippines or that
it gave its consent to be a consignee of the subject goods. In its March 22,
2006 Decision,[8] the CA said:

This Court is persuaded [that except] for the Bill of Lading, respondent has not presented
any other evidence to bolster its claim that petitioner has entered [into] an agreement of
affreightment with respondent, be it verbal or written. It is noted that the Bill of Lading was
prepared by Hanjin Shipping, not the petitioner. Hanjin is the principal while respondent is
the formers agent. (p. 43, rollo)

The conclusion of the court a quo, which was upheld by the RTC Pasay City, Branch 108
xxx is purely speculative and conjectural. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures
or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence
obtainable under the circumstances. Litigation cannot be properly resolved by
suppositions, deductions or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth
must have to be determined by the hard rules of admissibility and proof (Lagon vs. Hooven
Comalco Industries, Inc. 349 SCRA 363).
 While it is true that a bill of lading serves two (2) functions: first, it is a receipt for the goods
shipped; second, it is a contract by which three parties, namely, the shipper, the carrier and
the consignee who undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations
(Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. vs. Phil. First Insurance Co., Inc., 383
SCRA 23), x x x if the same is not accepted, it is as if one party does not accept the
contract. Said the Supreme Court:

A bill of lading delivered and accepted constitutes the contract of carriage[,] even
though not signed, because the acceptance of a paper containing the terms of a
proposed contract generally constitutes an acceptance of the contract and of all its
terms and conditions of which the acceptor has actual or constructive notice
(Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. vs. CA, 286 SCRA 257).

In the present case, petitioner did not only [refuse to] accept the bill of lading, but it likewise
disown[ed] the shipment x x x. [Neither did it] authorize Halla Trading Company or
anyone to ship or export the same on its behalf.

It is settled that a contract is upheld as long as there is proof of consent, subject matter and
cause (Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston, 374 SCRA 396). In the case at bar,
there is not even any iota of evidence to show that petitioner had given its consent.

He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence (Luxuria Homes Inc. vs. CA, 302 SCRA 315).

The 40-footer van contains goods of substantial value. It is highly improbable for petitioner
not to pay the charges, which is very minimal compared with the value of the goods, in
order that it could work on the release thereof.

For failure to substantiate its claim by preponderance of evidence, respondent has not
established its case against petitioner.[9]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a

Resolution[10] dated May 25, 2006. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners Arguments

In assailing the CAs Decision, MOF argues that the factual findings of both the MeTC and
RTC are entitled to great weight and respect and should have bound the CA. It stresses that
the appellate court has no justifiable reason to disturb the lower courts judgments because
their conclusions are well-supported by the evidence on record.
MOF further argues that the CA erred in labeling the findings of the lower courts as purely
speculative and conjectural. According to MOF, the bill of lading, which expressly stated
Shin Yang as the consignee, is the best evidence of the latters actual participation in the
transportation of the goods. Such document, validly entered, stands as the law among the
shipper, carrier and the consignee, who are all bound by the terms stated therein. Besides,
a carriers valid claim after it fulfilled its obligation cannot just be rejected by the named
consignee upon a simple denial that it ever consented to be a party in a contract of
affreightment, or that it ever participated in the preparation of the bill of lading. As against
Shin Yangs bare denials, the bill of lading is the sufficient preponderance of evidence
required to prove MOFs claim. MOF maintains that Shin Yang was the one that supplied
all the details in the bill of lading and acquiesced to be named consignee of the shipment
on a Freight Collect basis.

Lastly, MOF claims that even if Shin Yang never gave its consent, it cannot avoid
its obligation to pay, because it never objected to being named as the consignee in the bill
of lading and that it only protested when the shipment arrived in the Philippines,
presumably due to a botched transaction between it and Halla Trading Co. Furthermore,
Shin Yangs letters asking for the refund of container deposits highlight the fact that it was
aware of the shipment and that it undertook preparations for the intended release of the
shipment.

Respondents Arguments

Echoing the CA decision, Shin Yang insists that MOF has no evidence to prove that it
consented to take part in the contract of affreightment. Shin Yang argues that MOF
miserably failed to present any evidence to prove that it was the one that made preparations
for the subject shipment, or that it is an actual shipping practice that
forwarders/consolidators as consignees are the ones that provide carriers details and
information on the bills of lading.

Shin Yang contends that a bill of lading is essentially a contract between the shipper
and the carrier and ordinarily, the shipper is the one liable for the freight charges. A
consignee, on the other hand, is initially a stranger to the bill of lading and can be liable
only when the bill of lading specifies that the charges are to be paid by the consignee. This
liability arises from either a) the contract of agency between the shipper/consignor and the
consignee; or b) the consignees availment of the stipulation pour autrui drawn up by and
between the shipper/ consignor and carrier upon the consignees demand that the goods be
delivered to it. Shin Yang contends that the fact that its name was mentioned as the
consignee of the cargoes did not make it automatically liable for the freightage because it
never benefited from the shipment. It never claimed or accepted the goods, it was not the
shippers agent, it was not aware of its designation as consignee and the original bill of
lading was never endorsed to it.

Issue

The issue for resolution is whether a consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading,
is bound by the stipulations thereof. Corollarily, whether respondent who was not an agent
of the shipper and who did not make any demand for the fulfillment of the stipulations of
the bill of lading drawn in its favor is liable to pay the corresponding freight and handling
charges.

Our Ruling

Since the CA and the trial courts arrived at different conclusions, we are constrained to
depart from the general rule that only errors of law may be raised in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and will review the evidence
presented.[11]

The bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor and the carrier without
the intervention of the consignee. However, the latter can be bound by the stipulations of
the bill of lading when a) there is a relation of agency between the shipper or consignor and
the consignee or b) when the consignee demands fulfillment of the stipulation of the bill of
lading which was drawn up in its favor.[12]

In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that once the
bill of lading is received by the consignee who does not object to any terms or stipulations
contained therein, it constitutes as an acceptance of the contract and of all of its terms and
conditions, of which the acceptor has actual or constructive notice.

In Mendoza v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,[14] the consignee sued the carrier for
damages but nevertheless claimed that he was never a party to the contract of transportation
and was a complete stranger thereto.In debunking Mendozas contention, we held that:
x x x First, he insists that the articles of the Code of Commerce should be applied; that he
invokes the provisions of said Code governing the obligations of a common carrier to make
prompt delivery of goods given to it under a contract of transportation. Later, as already
said, he says that he was never a party to the contract of transportation and was a complete
stranger to it, and that he is now suing on a tort or a violation of his rights as a stranger
(culpa aquiliana). If he does not invoke the contract of carriage entered into with the
defendant company, then he would hardly have any leg to stand on. His right to prompt
delivery of the can of film at the Pili Air Port stems and is derived from the contract of
carriage under which contract, the PAL undertook to carry the can of film safely and to
deliver it to him promptly. Take away or ignore that contract and the obligation to carry
and to deliver and right to prompt delivery disappear. Common carriers are not obligated
by law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to
prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation. Said
rights and obligations are created by a specific contract entered into by the parties. In the
present case, the findings of the trial court which as already stated, are accepted by
the parties and which we must accept are to the effect that the LVN Pictures Inc. and
Jose Mendoza on one side, and the defendant company on the other, entered into a
contract of transportation (p. 29, Rec. on Appeal). One interpretation of said finding
is that the LVN Pictures Inc. through previous agreement with Mendoza acted as the
latter's agent. When he negotiated with the LVN Pictures Inc. to rent the film
'Himala ng Birhen' and show it during the Naga town fiesta, he most probably
authorized and enjoined the Picture Company to ship the film for him on the PAL
on September 17th. Another interpretation is that even if the LVN Pictures Inc. as
consignor of its own initiative, and acting independently of Mendoza for the time
being, made Mendoza a consignee. [Mendoza made himself a party to the contract
of transportaion when he appeared at the Pili Air Port armed with the copy of the
Air Way Bill (Exh. 1) demanding the delivery of the shipment to him.] The very
citation made by appellant in his memorandum supports this view. Speaking of the
possibility of a conflict between the order of the shipper on the one hand and the order of
the consignee on the other, as when the shipper orders the shipping company to return or
retain the goods shipped while the consignee demands their delivery, Malagarriga in his
book Codigo de Comercio Comentado, Vol. 1, p. 400, citing a decision of the Argentina
Court of Appeals on commercial matters, cited by Tolentino in Vol. II of his book entitled
'Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines' p. 209, says
that the right of the shipper to countermand the shipment terminates when the
consignee or legitimate holder of the bill of lading appears with such bill of lading
before the carrier and makes himself a party to the contract. Prior to that time he is
a stranger to the contract.

Still another view of this phase of the case is that contemplated in Art. 1257,
paragraph 2, of the old Civil Code (now Art. 1311, second paragraph) which reads
thus:

Should the contract contain any stipulation in favor of a third

person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he has given notice of his
acceptance to the person bound before the stipulation has been revoked.'
 Here, the contract of carriage between the LVN Pictures Inc. and the
defendant carrier contains the stipulations of delivery to Mendoza as consignee. His
demand for the delivery of the can of film to him at the Pili AirPort may be regarded
as a notice of his acceptance of the stipulation of the delivery in his favor contained in
the contract of carriage and delivery. In this case he also made himself a party to the
contract, or at least has come to court to enforce it. His cause of action must
necessarily be founded on its breach.[15] (Emphasis Ours)

In sum, a consignee, although not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the
shipper and the carrier, becomes a party to the contract by reason of either a) the
relationship of agency between the consignee and the shipper/ consignor; b) the
unequivocal acceptance of the bill of lading delivered to the consignee, with full knowledge
of its contents or c) availment of the stipulation pour autrui, i.e., when the consignee, a
third person, demands before the carrier the fulfillment of the stipulation made by the
consignor/shipper in the consignees favor, specifically the delivery of the goods/cargoes
shipped.[16]

In the instant case, Shin Yang consistently denied in all of its pleadings that it
authorized Halla Trading, Co. to ship the goods on its behalf; or that it got hold of the bill
of lading covering the shipment or that it demanded the release of the cargo. Basic is the
rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts it, not upon him who
denies, since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of
it.[17] Thus, MOF has the burden to controvert all these denials, it being insistent that Shin
Yang asserted itself as the consignee and the one that caused the shipment of the goods to
the Philippines.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence,[18] which means evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.[19] Here, MOF failed to meet the
required quantum of proof. Other than presenting the bill of lading, which, at most, proves
that the carrier acknowledged receipt of the subject cargo from the shipper and that the
consignee named is to shoulder the freightage, MOF has not adduced any other credible
evidence to strengthen its cause of action. It did not even present any witness in support of
its allegation that it was Shin Yang which furnished all the details indicated in the bill of
lading and that Shin Yang consented to shoulder the shipment costs. There is also nothing
in the records which would indicate that Shin Yang was an agent of Halla Trading Co. or
that it exercised any act that would bind it as a named consignee. Thus, the CA correctly
dismissed the suit for failure of petitioner to establish its cause against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 22, 2006 dismissing petitioners complaint and the Resolution dated May 25,
2006 denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Per Special Order No. 775 dated November 3, 2009.

Additional member per Special Order No. 776 dated November 3, 2009.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-38.
[2]
Id. at 79.
[3]
Id. at 80.
[4]
Id. at 90-94; penned by Judge Estrellita M. Paas.
[5]
Id. at 93.
[6]
Id. at 94.
[7]
Id. at 103-104; penned by Judge Priscilla C. Mijares.
[8]
Id. at 40-45; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and
Arturo G. Tayag.
[9]
Id. at 43-44.
[10]
Id. at 48.
[11]
Wallem Phils. Shipping Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Inc., 445 Phil. 136, 149 (2003).
[12]
See Sea-Land Service v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 237 Phil. 531, 535-536 (1987).
[13]
349 Phil. 925, 933 (1998).
[14]
90 Phil. 836, 846 (1952).
[15]
Id. at 845-847.
[16]
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1311, 2nd paragraph: If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a
third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A
mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person.
[17]
Acabal v. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528, 541 (2005).
[18]
New Testament Church of God v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 330, 333 (1995).
[19]
Condes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161304, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 339, 352.

6. 684 SCRA 470

7. 648 SCRA 573

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

ANTONINO MONTICALBO, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197

Complainant, [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]

Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

 NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

JUDGE CRESCENTE F.
MARAYA, JR.,

Regional Trial Court,

Promulgated:
Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte,

Respondent.
April 13, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24,
2008 filed by complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge
Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian, Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave
abuse of authority thru false representation.[1]
Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a
sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before
the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC).[2]

The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the
ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to
prosecute the case.[3] The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of
complainant Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason,
he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court.[4]

Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-
89.[5] He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal,
which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008.[6]

In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having
been filed out of time. He stated that:

Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern

the proceedings of this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading. Being a prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of
appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since
the appealed Order was received by counsel for the defendants-appellants
on February 13, 2008, the notice of appeal, not a motion for
reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of 15 days which
lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was filed on March
31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and the appealed Order
has become final and executory. The lapse of the appeal period deprives the
 courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164
SCRA 347).[7]

Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent

judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the
said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and
corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his
questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from
plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then
Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the
Board and President of the said cooperative.[8] Complainant further avers that he
personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo
and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial
court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6,
2008 and September 10, 2008.[9]

In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent

judge refutes all the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that
he decided to dismiss complainants appeal because it was filed out of time under the
Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise of the
appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion.[10] Secondly, he
argues that complainants accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless and that
the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in
an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the appeal in the
case.[11] Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any drinking spree with his
staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from drinking
alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because he
has to refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons.[12]
The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and
referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for
raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation.[13]

On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and
Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED

from the charge of grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation
of a non-existent case by the respondent Judge in his assailed order of
dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly
on his esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is
therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY
WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.[14]

The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

Grave Misconduct and Bribery

In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents

actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.[15] In the absence of such proof, the decision or order in
question is presumed to have been issued in
[16]
good faith by respondent judge. This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v.
Judge Suan,[17] where the Court explained:

The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly

indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the
 stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a
judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless
he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge.[18]

In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality
cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just because the
judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant.[19] What
constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of Sampiano v. Judge
Indar:[20]

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it

imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest
or ill-will for ulterior purposes.Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[21]

Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment
or order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it
was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved party. [22] Well-
established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests on
the complainant, who must be able to
support and prove by substantial evidence his accusations against
respondent.[23] Substantial evidence, the quantum of proof required in administrative
cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[24] Failure of the complainant to substantiate his
claims will lead to the dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit
because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has
regularly performed his duties will prevail.[25]
In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to buttress
his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if
complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in drinking
sprees with court employees during office hours. Contrary to complainants
statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was attending to his cases
during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking sessions.

Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.[26] Complainant miserably failed to
substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged
hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no
other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit.

Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or
omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the
peoples faith in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court
employee against any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has no
basis in fact or law.[27] As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case
of Francisco v. Leyva,[28]

This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing

discipline upon employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however,
neither will we hesitate to shield the same employees from unfounded suits
that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.[29]
Gross Ignorance of the Law

Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown
that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad
faith.[30] In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption.[31]

Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his
counterclaim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading and will not toll the running of the period to appeal. To support his
argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit set in
the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Complainant is mistaken.

A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly

shows that complainants claim is covered by the said rule which reads:

Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases

xxx

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the

total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or Two hundred
 thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila,
exclusive of interest and costs.

Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as
amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed the
ceiling at P100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in charging that
respondents knowledge of law fell so short and that he was remiss in his obligation
to be familiar with the law which even law students these days know such x x x.[32]

For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words carefully
and refrain from hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in this instance,
he is obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of insulting language and
unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer to accord due respect to the
courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer
shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge
erred in issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith.[33] A judge is not required
to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial office untenable
for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of
justice can be infallible.[34] As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to
disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were
accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations.[35]
 The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The
filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other
judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary to
such actions.[36] With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis[37] is
instructive:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against

errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of
its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which
may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or
after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which
may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special
civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary

proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary
or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as
well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry
into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened,
or closed.[38]

Citation of non-existent case

 The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-
existent case Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No.
85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 in his questioned Order.

A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been
promulgated by the Supreme Court.

Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, CA

G.R. And, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the Court of
Appeals. This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and integrity
expected of those occupying respondents judicial position. A judge must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.[39] The Code of Judicial
Conduct also demands that he be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.[40]

While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that
it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
duties.[41] As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards of
competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his
position.[42] The case of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: A judge
should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a
manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.[43]

It is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the incorrect
citation of the said case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He should be
admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially as it pertains to the proper
execution of his office.
 Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been
reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is

hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge
is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his functions and
duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
 Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
Id. at 9-11.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at. 2.
[5]
Id. at 12.
[6]
Id. at 15.
[7]
Id. at 16.
[8]
Id. at 3.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id. at 22.
[11]
Id. at 23.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 38.
[14]
Id. at 45.
[15]
Ang v. Judge Asis, 424 Phil. 105, 115 (2002).
[16]
Planas v. Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 300 (2005), citing Osorio v. Judge Dizon, et al, 469 Phil. 819 (2004).
[17]
458 Phil. 11 (2003).
[18]
Id. at 23, citing Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000); Rallos v. Gako, Jr., 385 Phil. 4 (2000).); Calleja v.
Santelices, 384 Phil. 595 (2000); Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176 (1995).
[19]
Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 27, 44.
[20]
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 597.
[21]
Id. at 613, citing Planas v. Judge Reyes, 492 Phil. 288 (2005).
[22]
Supra note 15 at 116, citing Naval v. Panday, 341 Phil. 656 (1997).
[23]
Planas v. Judge Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 301 (2005), citing Ong v. Judge Rosete, 484 Phil. 102 (2004).
[24]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18, 2011.
[25]
Ever Emporium, Inc. v. Judge Maceda, 483 Phil. 323, 339 (2004), citing Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals Associate Justices Eubolo G. Verzola, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Mario L. Guaria III, 480 Phil. 1
(2004); Leonides T. Cortes v. Sandiganbayan Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and
Rodolfo G. Palattao, 467 Phil. 155 (2004).
[26]
De Jesus v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 171491, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 341, 350, citing Manalabe v. Cabie, A.M.
No. P-05-1984, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 582, 589; Adajar v. Develos, 512 Phil. 9(2005); Ong v. Rosete, 484 Phil. 102
(2004); Datuin, Jr. v. Soriano, 439 Phil. 592(2002).
[27]
Sarmiento v. Salamat, 416 Phil. 684, 694 (2001), citing Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC Br. 117, Pasay City,
353 Phil. 190 (1998).
[28]
Francisco v. Leyva, 364 Phil. 1, 4 (1999).
[29]
Id.
[30]
Ora v. Judge Almajar, 509 Phil. 595, 601 (2005), citing Joaquin v. Madrid, 482 Phil. 795 (2004).
[31]
Ocampo v. Bibat-Palamos, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1655, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 480 487.
[32]
Rollo, pp. 3 and 28.
[33]
Supra note 18, citing Castaos v. Escao, Jr., 251 SCRA 174 (1995).
[34]
Tan v. Judge Adre, 490 Phil. 555, 562 (2005), citing Villanueva-Fabella v. Lee, 464 Phil. 548 (2004).
[35]
Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, 395 Phil. 352, 365 (2000), citing Guerrero v. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 (1998).
[36]
Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 27, 42 citing Bello v. Diaz, 459 Phil. 214
(2003).
[37]
341 Phil. 299 (1997).
[38]
Id. at 312.
[39]
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
[40]
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[41]
Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 48, 56.
[42]
Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1702, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 542, 553.
[43]
Id. at 552, citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron, 358 Phil. 12 (1998) and Capuno v. Jaramillo, A.M.
No. RTJ-98-944, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 212, 232.
 8. 682 SCRA 1
9. 654 SCRA 301

THIRD DIVISION

VICTORIA CLARAVALL, assisted G.R. No. 152695

by her husband, LORETO
CLARAVALL,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., *

- versus - VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ricardo lim, ROBERTO LIM, and July 25, 2011
ROGELIO LIM,

Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
1

March 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38859. The assailed CA Decision affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 17, in Civil Case No.
2

2583.

The instant petition arose from a Complaint for Consolidation of Ownership of Real
Properties filed by herein respondents against herein petitioner, alleging as follows:
xxxx

3. That sometime on December 3, 1976, the defendant, with the marital

consent of her husband, executed a DEED OF SALE WITH THE
RIGHT OF REPURCHASE SELLING AND CONVEYING unto the
plaintiffs the following described properties, to wit:

A COMMERCIAL LOT located in the Centro

of Ilagan, Isabela x x x.

A DWELING HOUSE with a ground area of 108 square

meters, more or less, constructed with wooden materials
and with G.I. roofing, erected on the above-described
commercial lot x x x.

4. That the consideration of the sale is TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency paid by the
plaintiffs to the defendant;
 5. That the condition of said sale is that the defendant reserved the right
to repurchase, within two (2) years from said date, said commercial lot
and dwelling house by paying and returning unto the plaintiffs the
purchase [price] of P250,000.00 stipulated in the Deed, a copy of which
is hereto attached and made part hereof marked Annex A; that within
[six] (6) months before the expiration of the date of repurchase, the
defendant is under obligation to give plaintiffs written notice that she is
in a position to repurchase said properties before the expiration of said
period; and for failure to give such notice, the plaintiffs who
are vendees-a-retro shall automatically become the absolute owners
thereof upon the expiration of said period;

6. That defendant never gave written notice to plaintiffs that she was in a
position to repurchase said commercial lot and dwelling house as
described above; neither did defendant offer to repurchase the same upon
the expiration of said period; and that after notifying the defendant that
she may still repurchase said properties three months after the expiration
of said period, she failed to repurchase the same;

7. That considering that the dwelling house is already an old house and
has depreciated a lot, the purchase price of the building and house
indicated in the deed justly represents the fair market value of said
properties;

8. That considering that the defendant failed to repurchase the dwelling

house and commercial lot described in paragraph 3 hereof on or before
December 3, 1976, the plaintiffs are now entitled to the consolidation of
their ownership of the same.

xxxx 3

In her Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner denied the material allegations of the
Complaint and raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses:

1 That on December 3, 1976, the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into
a contract of sale with right of repurchase over the properties mentioned
and described in the deed x x x for a consideration and/or price of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), x x x;

2 That after the plaintiffs have paid to the defendant One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), out of the stipulated consideration and/or
price of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), the former
demanded and/or required upon the latter as additional obligation to
require her brother-in-law, Francisco alias Enrique
alias Igme Claravall from whom the dwelling house was bought by her
in 1967, to execute another deed of sale over the same dwelling house in
their (plaintiffs') favor, with right of repurchase of the former;

3 That upon the failure and/or refusal of the defendant to comply with
the additional obligation imposed upon her by the plaintiffs mentioned in
the next preceding paragraph, the latter also refused and/or failed to pay
their balance of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), to the
former, although said plaintiffs, on the occasions of their refusal to pay
said balance, promised to the defendant that should she win her case then
pending before the Court of Appeals, involving another bigger
residential lot, with a very much bigger and concrete house thereon, also
situated in Centro, Ilagan, Isabela, the former shall be ready and willing
to cancel the said contract of sale with right of repurchase and instead
and/or in lieu thereof, to execute with the latter, another contract of sale
with right of repurchase over said bigger residential lot with a bigger and
concrete dwelling house thereon, for a consideration and/or price of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), in addition to the One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) already paid by them under the
deed, x x xand for a longer period of five (5) years within which to
repurchase;

4 That when the defendant refused to agree to the promise and/or

proposal of the plaintiffs mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, the
latter insisted on their refusal to pay their balance of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) x x x;

5 That by reason of the refusal of the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant

their balance of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), and/or for
having retained the same for themselves, the latter, on December 1,
1978, executed a Cautionary Notice, addressed to the Register of Deeds
 and Provincial Assessor of Isabela, registering and/or manifesting her
opposition to any consolidation of ownership which may be made by the
plaintiffs in connection with the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase
x x x;

6 That considering the fact that the plaintiffs, as vendees, retained for
themselves One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), which is a part
of the consideration and/or price of the contract of sale with right of
repurchase and that the defendant, as vendor, retained possession of the
properties sold, the document executed by and between the parties
plaintiffs and defendant on December 3, 1976, x x x, is consequently
presumed to be a mere equitable mortgage;

x x x x.4

After the issues were joined, trial on the merits ensued.

On August 5, 1991, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant:

1. Declaring the plaintiffs to be the absolute owners of the

commercial lot and dwelling house described in par. 3 of
the Complaint;

2. Declaring the defendant to have waived her right to

repurchase said properties;
 3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees
of P2,000.00; and

4. Ordering the defendant to pay costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Aggrieved by the judgment of the RTC, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.

On March 18, 2002, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC.

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT
OF THE DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE,
REMAINED WITH PETITIONER VICTORIA CLARAVALL, AS
LESSOR, TO ENRIQUE CLARAVALL, AS LESSEE;

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT BY CLEAR INFERENCE RESPONDENTS
EXTENDED THE PERIOD OF PETITIONER VICTORIA H.
CLARAVALL TO EXERCISE HER RIGHT TO REPURCHASE THE
PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE DEED OF SALE
WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE (EXHIBIT A);

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT BY THE UNASSAILABLE RECEIPTS,
RESPONDENTS PAID ONLY ONE HUNDRED [FIFTY]
 THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS AND REFUSED TO PAY THE
BALANCE OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS;

D. THE RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE (EXH. A) IS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE; AND

E. EVEN ASSUMING THAT EXHIBIT A IS A BONA FIDE DEED OF

SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE, THE RESPONDENT
COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONER
VICTORIA CLARAVALL'S RIGHT TO EXERCISE HER RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE TIME OF
FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1606 OF THE CIVIL
CODE. 6

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the well-settled rule that, in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised
by the parties and passed upon by this Court. This restriction of the review to
7

questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the second sentence of which provides that the petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, which the Court
8

finds to be absent in the instant case, it does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial. Perforce, the findings of fact by the CA, affirming that of the RTC, are
9

conclusive and binding on the Court. In the instant case, a perusal of petitioner's first
10

four assigned errors would readily show that the issues raised are factual in nature;
thus, necessitating a review of the evidence presented by the parties. Without doubt,
the following questions raised in the instant petition, to wit: (1) whether the property
subject of the instant case is in the possession of petitioner; (2) whether petitioner's
right to repurchase is extended; (3) whether respondents were only able to pay a
portion of the purchase price for the subject property, and (4) whether the subject deed
of sale with right of repurchase is actually an equitable mortgage, are all questions of
fact which are beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.
Even granting, arguendo, that the foregoing issues of fact can be validly raised in the
instant petition, the Court still finds petitioner's arguments to be without merit.

Echoing her arguments raised before the CA, petitioner's bone of contention in the
present petition is that the contract she entered into with respondents is an equitable
mortgage, claiming that: (1) she remained in possession of the subject property; (2)
her right to repurchase has not yet expired; and (3) respondents retained a portion of
the purchase price. Petitioner argues that, under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, these
11

circumstances indicate that her contract with respondents is an equitable mortgage.

However, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the CA
and the RTC that petitioner failed to substantiate her claims and that the subject
contract is, in fact, one of sale with right of repurchase.

The CA correctly held as follows:

The person in actual possession of the property at the time of the

execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase was
Enrique Claravall, a lessee of the dwelling unit located on the
commercial lot. In the case of Ignacio vs. CA, the Supreme Court held
the transaction between the petitioner and respondent to be a sale with a
right to repurchase observing that private respondents have not been in
actual possession of the subject property. They had been leasing it out at
the time the deed was executed. x x x
xxxx
The fact that plaintiff instituted the action for consolidation of ownership
five months after December 3, 1978, the expiry date of the right to
repurchase, should not be construed as an extension of the period for
defendant to exercise her right to repurchase the subject property. Any
extension for the exercise of the right to repurchase must be expressly
provided in another document to give rise to the presumption of
equitable mortgage, and not merely implied from any act or omission. 12
The Court likewise quotes, with approval, the disquisition of the RTC disposing of the
issue on respondents' supposed failure to pay the full amount of the purchase price,
thus:

Admittedly, there is no dispute as to the existence and due execution of

the Contract embodied in said Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2. However,
defendant [herein petitioner] anchored her evidence on the theory that
although she had affixed her signature on said Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase as could be gleaned in the aforesaid exhibits, the
consideration of P250,000.00 has not yet been fully paid by plaintiffs.
This argument is obviously defective and will only merit scant
consideration by the Court. The circumstances obtaining in the instant
case argue against such contention. The Contract is, undeniably,
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law and as
correctly observed by plaintiffs, its contents are clear and couched in
unambiguous terms which would leave no room for interpretation. x x x

Likewise, the Court cannot just lose sight of the fact that the signature of
defendant's husband Loreto Claravall, showing his marital conformity to
the same, will certainly negate such claim for the balance of P100,000.00
as defendant would insist. Besides, there are two competent witnesses,
namely, Gaudencio Talaue, defendant's driver herself and Estenelie B.
Salvador. These witnesses could have been utilized by defendant to
buttress her theory had her story been based on facts and the truth.
Failing this, the Court can hardly rely on her oral claim[s] which are
obviously inconclusive and incredible, if not purely conjectural. By
affixing her signature therein, defendant is now estopped in plainly
denying having received the whole amount as exactly stated.

Furthermore, even without going deeper into the evidence presented by

the parties, defendant's theory is highly inconceivable, considering the
value of the property and the big amount of money involved therewith.
The Court is not inclined to believe that a vendor-a-retro would affix her
signature therein if the consideration thereof is fixed but not yet fully
 paid, much less if said balance as hereto claimed involves a big amount
of money. Suffice it to say that had plaintiffs still under obligation to pay
the balance of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, as theorized
by the defendant, the latter would certainly have initiated an action to
recover the balance or rescind the contract altogether. Unfortunately, not
even a single proof demanding the balance, if any, was adduced by the
defendant. As a matter of fact, even the letters sent by defendant to
plaintiffs on June 2, 1978 and November 27, 1978 (Exhibits 4 and 5,
defendant) did not mention, much less disclose, any claim to that effect
other than defendant's intention to repurchase said properties.

xxxx

Concededly, while the defendant served plaintiffs written notice of her

desire to repurchase said properties, defendant never made any tender of
payment of the repurchase price representing the amount of the sale she
received from plaintiffs at the time the contract was executed on
December 3, 1976. x x x
xxxx 13

Indeed, petitioner failed to present any competent evidence, documentary or

otherwise, to prove her claim that the subject contract is an equitable mortgage and
not a sale with right of repurchase. It is settled that the party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. In fact, it appears from all
14

indications that petitioner's claim of equitable mortgage is simply an afterthought

subsequent to her realization that she cannot repurchase the subject property within
the period stipulated in her contract with petitioners. It is plainly a ploy to resurrect a
right which has already expired.

With respect to the last assigned error, the Court's discussion in Felicen, Sr. v.
Orias, as reiterated in the subsequent cases of Heirs of Vda. de Macoy v. Court of
15

Appeals and Agan v. Heirs of the Spouses Andres Nueva and Diosdada Nueva, with
16 17
respect to the rationale behind the provisions of Article 1606 of the Civil Code, is
18

instructive, to wit:
Article 1606 is intended to cover suits where the seller claims that the
real intention was a loan with equitable mortgage but decides otherwise.
The seller, however, must entertain a good faith belief that the contract is
an equitable mortgage. In Felicen, Sr., et al. v. Orias, et al., cited by
petitioner, the Court explained:
The application of the third paragraph of Article 1606 is
predicated upon the bona fides of the vendor a retro. It
must appear that there was a belief on his part, founded on
facts attendant upon the execution of the sale with pacto de
retro, honestly and sincerely entertained, that the
agreement was in reality a mortgage, one not intended to
affect the title to the property ostensibly sold, but merely to
give it as security for a loan or obligation. In that event, if
the matter of the real nature of the contract is submitted for
judicial resolution, the application of the rule is meet and
proper: that the vendor a retro be allowed to repurchase the
property sold within 30 days from rendition of final
judgment declaring the contract to be a true sale with right
to repurchase. Conversely, if it should appear that the
parties agreement was really one of sale transferring
ownership to the vendee, but accompanied by a reservation
to the vendor of the right to repurchase the property and
there are no circumstances that may reasonably be accepted
as generating some honest doubt as to the parties intention,
the proviso is inapplicable. The reason is quite obvious. If
the rule were otherwise, it would be within the power of
every vendor a retro to set at naught a pacto de retro, or
resurrect an expired right of repurchase, by simply
instituting an action to reform the contract known to him
to be in truth a sale with pacto de retro into an equitable
mortgage. As postulated by the petitioner, to allow herein
private respondent to repurchase the property by applying
said paragraph x x x to the case at bar despite the fact that
the stipulated redemption period had already long expired
when they instituted the present action, would in effect alter
or modify the stipulation in the contract as to the definite
 and specific limitation of the period for repurchase (2 years
from the date of sale or only until June 25, 1958) thereby
not simply increasing but in reality resuscitating the expired
right to repurchase x x x and likewise the already
terminated and extinguished obligation to resell by herein
petitioner. The rule would thus be made a tool to spawn,
protect and even reward fraud and bad faith, a situation
surely never contemplated or intended by the law.

This court has already had occasion to rule on the proper

interpretation of the provision in question. In Adorable
v. Inacala, where the proofs established that there could be
no honest doubt as to the parties intention, that the
transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de
retro, the Court adjudged the vendor a retro not to be
entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article
1606.

As earlier discussed, the Court finds no error in the conclusions reached by both the
CA and the RTC that the unmistakable and definite intention of petitioner and
respondents was that the transaction they entered into is one of sale with right of
repurchase. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to the reprieve provided for under the
third paragraph of Article 1606 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated March 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38859, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

 Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 1042 dated July 6, 2011.

1Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., concurring.

2Penned by Judge Senen O. Casibang.

3Records, pp. 1-2.

4Id. at 14-16.

5Id. at 202.

6Rollo, pp. 28-29.

7Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171406, April 4, 2011; Anita Monasterio-Pe and
the Spouses Romulo and Editha Pe-Tan v. Jose Juan Tong, herein represented by his attorney-in-fact, Jose
Y. Ong, G.R. No. 151369, March 23, 2011; Spouses Moisesand Clemencia Andrada v. Pilhino Sales
Corporation, represented by its Branch Manager, Jojo S. Saet, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011.

8 (a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. (cited in Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, supra).

9Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, supra note 7.

10Id.

11Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases:

(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;

(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;

(6) In any case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure
the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise
shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.

12Rollo, pp. 55-56.

13Id. at 81-83.
14Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 162868, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 171, 193; Atienza v. De Castro, G.R.
No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593, 602.

15240 Phil. 550, 553-555 (1987).

16G.R. No. 95871, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 244, 254-255.

17463 Phil. 834, 843-844 (2003).

18Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence of an express agreement, shall last four years from
the date of the contract.

Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years.

However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time the final judgment
was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.