BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.

881

OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the "Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines."

Section 2. Applicability. - This Code shall govern all election of public officers and, to the extent
appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites.

Section 3. Election and campaign periods. - Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the
Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.

The period of campaign shall be as follows:

1. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election - 90 days;

2. Election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa and Local Election - 45 days;

and

3. Barangay Election - 15 days.

The campaign periods shall not include the day before and the day of the election.

, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides as follows:

“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years
after serving sentence;”

Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he was granted probation
by the MTC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.

Held:

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals
in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the
said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that
property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property
as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree,
both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for
gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society”
in a manner “contrary to xxx accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is
so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio
Indebiti.

2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s
conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In
fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. (G.R. No.
121592, July 5, 1996)