Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

The social contagion of incremental and entity trait beliefs

Edward Burkley a,⁎, Jessica Curtis b, Thomas Hatvany a
a
Oklahoma State University, United States
b
Arkansas State University, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This study examined if people's own beliefs regarding the malleability of traits is influenced by the beliefs of sur-
Received 30 July 2016 rounding others. Consistent with the idea of social contagion, people who read a vignette of someone espousing
Received in revised form 28 November 2016 an incremental view (i.e., perceive traits as malleable) were more likely to endorse an incremental view them-
Accepted 29 November 2016
selves than those who read a vignette of someone with an entity view (i.e., perceive traits as fixed). Results indi-
Available online xxxx
cated this contagion effect is not domain specific and can spread from one skill domain (e.g., athletics) to another
Keywords:
(e.g., mathematics). Furthermore, others who espoused an incremental view were perceived to be more inspiring
Implicit theories and therefore more likely to serve as positive role models than those who espoused an entity view. Overall, these
Incremental beliefs results provide a bridge between the largely disparate literature areas of implicit trait beliefs, social contagion,
Entity beliefs and role models and indicate one potential source for the origination of these trait beliefs.
Social contagion © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Role models

1. Introduction
Imagine you are reading an interview with a highly successful ath-
lete. When asked what his skills were like as a child, he states that he
had a natural aptitude for sports and that he thinks athletic skills are
something you have to be born with. Now instead imagine reading
the same article but the interviewee states that as a child, he was not
very skilled at sports, that he had to work hard to improve his abilities,
and that he thinks you can change and improve your athletic skills over
time. How would reading these articles impact your own beliefs about
whether traits are fixed or malleable? How inspired would you feel
after reading one article versus the other?
These examples demonstrate the difference between entity and in-
cremental trait beliefs (Dweck, 1999). The former represents an entity
perspective – the belief that traits are fixed at birth and do not change
much over time. Conversely, the latter represents an incremental per-
spective – the belief that traits are malleable and improvable over the
lifetime. A wealth of research has examined the consequences of these
beliefs, finding they have a strong impact on motivation (Dweck,
1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). However, less is known regarding the
causes or origins of these beliefs.
The present work examines a unique potential source of people's
trait beliefs: the views of others. Consistent with social contagion theory
(Le Bon, 1903; Levy & Nail, 1993), we examined if trait beliefs are “con-
tagious” in that they may spread from one person to another. Thus, we
tested if exposure to a person who purports a particular belief leads
⁎ Corresponding author at: 116 North Murray, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater,
OK 74048, United States.
E-mail address: ed.burkley@okstate.edu (E. Burkley).
people to adopt this belief for themselves. We also sought to examine
the boundaries of this effect by examining if the contagion process is do-
main specific. That is, does exposure to a person who purports a belief in
one domain (e.g., athletics) impact a person's own beliefs in a different
domain (e.g., mathematics)? Lastly, we sought to bridge the trait belief
and role model literature by examining whether people who espouse a
particular belief are more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as
a role model. Prior research indicates that successful others are more
likely to serve as role models if people view their success as attainable
(Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Because an incremental perspective frames
the success as more attainable than an entity perspective, we examined
if people would be more inspired when exposed to a person espousing
an incremental belief.
1.1. Incremental versus entity trait beliefs
According to Dweck's (1999) implicit personality theories model,
people differ in their lay beliefs about the malleability of personal attri-
butes. Entity people believe they are either born with abilities or not and
that no amount of work will enable them to improve. Instead, incre-
mental people believe their abilities are developed through education
and practice and that they can always improve. Differences in these
trait beliefs are important because they have been shown to strongly in-
fluence behavior (for reviews, see Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett,
1988). Because entity individuals believe their traits are unchanging,
they view failure as an indication of low ability. This attribution pro-
duces negative emotions and leads to task avoidance, as well as reduced
expectations, effort, persistence, and performance. Conversely, incre-
mental individuals view failure as an indication of lack of effort. This at-
tribution produces feelings of optimism, leads to attempts at self-

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.11.063
0191-8869/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
46 E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
improvement, and results in sustained or enhanced expectations, effort,
persistence and performance. For these reasons, people who hold an in-
cremental perspective are typically more successful than people who
hold an entity perspective (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For
example, Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (2007) found that junior
high students who believed intelligence was malleable showed an up-
ward trajectory in math grades over two years, whereas those who be-
lieved intelligence was fixed showed a flat trajectory.
Given the many benefits of an incremental perspective, researchers
tried to examine ways to systematically alter these implicit beliefs.
Such inductions of trait beliefs not only allow researchers to examine
causal relationships, they also give clues as to the potential origins of
such beliefs. The earliest study that attempted to alter trait beliefs did
so via feedback in the form of praise (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Results
indicated that children who were praised in an entity way (e.g., “You
must be smart at these problems”) were more likely to adopt an entity
perspective of intelligence, whereas those who were praised in an incre-
mental way (e.g., “You must have worked hard at these problems”)
were more likely to adopt an incremental perspective. However, the
most common technique used to alter trait beliefs in the literature is
through the explicit presentation of scientific data that supposedly
demonstrates how traits are either fixed or malleable (e.g., Aronson,
Fried, & Good, 2002; Burkley et al., 2014; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997;
Heslin, Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck,
1998). For example, Levy et al. (1998) presented participants with a fic-
titious scientific article that reported on case studies, intervention pro-
grams and longitudinal data that suggested personality was either
fixed (titled “Personality, Like Plaster, Is Pretty Stable Over Time”) or
malleable (titled “Personality is Changeable and Can Be Developed”).
Results indicated that people who read the fixed article adopted an en-
tity perspective whereas those who read the malleable article adopted
an incremental perspective. A similar approach has been used to alter
beliefs about intelligence (Aronson et al., 2002), personality traits
(Chiu et al., 1997), general abilities (Heslin et al., 2005), math abilities
(Burns & Isbell, 2007), and natural beauty (Burkley et al., 2014).
Although praise and scientific data may reflect two factors that influ-
ence people's trait beliefs, we believe another possible source—one that
is more indirect but just as influential—is the perspective of others. Spe-
cifically, we assert that trait beliefs are likely to spread from one person
to another, such that exposure to another's beliefs can influence your
own. This assertion is consistent with the notion of social contagion.
1.2. Social contagion
Social contagion refers to the spreading of thoughts, emotions, and
behaviors from one person (“initiator”) to another (“recipient”; Levy &
Nail, 1993). Unlike other forms of social influence that involve a clear in-
tention on the part of the initiator to impact the recipient (e.g., persua-
sion, obedience), social contagion is thought to occur in a more indirect
manner (Levy & Nail, 1993). Historically, social contagion was examined
primarily in terms of behaviors (e.g., aggression; Bandura, 1973; Le Bon,
1903; Wheeler & Caggiula, 1966) and emotions (Le Bon, 1903; Sullins,
1991).
More recently, researchers have examined how thoughts also have a
tendency to spread from person to person (Lynch, 1996). The conta-
gious nature of thoughts (sometimes referred to as memes; Dawkins,
1976) has been demonstrated for a wide range of cognitive processes,
including beliefs, motivations, memories, and goals (e.g., Aarts,
Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Lynch, 1996; Radel, Sarrazin, Legrain, &
Wild, 2010; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Wild & Enzle, 2002).
For example, Radel et al. (2010) examined how intrinsic motivation
can spread from teacher to student. In their study, students learned
that their teacher was either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated to
demonstrate a learning activity. After listening to the lecture, those stu-
dents (“first-generation learners”) then served as teachers for another
student (“second-generation learners”) regarding the information
they had learned in the activity. The results indicated a chain of social
contagion. First-generation learners who thought their teacher was in-
trinsically motivated demonstrated greater intrinsic motivation them-
selves. Furthermore, the second-generation learners who were taught
by first-generation learners who thought their teacher was intrinsically
motivated also demonstrated greater intrinsic motivation.
To date, no studies have examined if trait beliefs spread from person
to the person in a similar manner. We sought to address this gap in the
literature by examining if people exposed to a person who purports
having a particular belief are more likely to adopt this belief for
themselves.
1.3. Role models
Because we believed that people who attributed their success to in-
cremental reasons would encourage others to adopt this incremental
belief, we also expected such people would be more likely to be viewed
as a role model compared to those who attributed their success to entity
reasons. This prediction was based on the role models literature that
demonstrates how successful people have the ability to be both inspir-
ing and deflating (e.g., Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Mussweiler, 2003;
Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). According to Lockwood and Kunda
(1997), the primary factor that determines which outcome will occur
is the perceived attainability of the upward comparison's success.
In support of this assertion, research demonstrates that factors
which promote the belief that one could obtain the same outcome as
the successful other tend to increase the likelihood that the successful
other will serve as an inspiring role models (Lockwood & Kunda,
1997; Suls et al., 2002). One factor known to impact perceived attain-
ability is having enough time to achieve the success. For example,
Lockwood and Kunda (1997) found that first-year college students
were inspired by a successful graduating senior, whereas fourth-year
students were deflated. This pattern presumably occurred because the
first-year students perceived the other's success as attainable because
they still had enough time to achieve it whereas the fourth-year stu-
dents did not. More relevant to the current discussion, a second factor
that impacts perceived attainability is the participant's trait beliefs. Peo-
ple with an incremental view of intelligence are more inspired by a suc-
cessful other than those with an entity view (Hoyt, Burnette, & Innella,
2012; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).
In addition to the participant's trait beliefs, we assert that another
factor that may convey attainability is the successful other's trait beliefs.
When successful others espouse an incremental belief, they encourage
the perception that others can also attain their same level of success if
they work hard enough. As such, we predicted that successful others
who espouse an incremental belief would be more inspiring role models
than those who espouse an entity belief.
1.4. Present study
The goal of the present study was twofold. First, we sought to exam-
ine if trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they spread from one person
to another. Based on prior evidence of social contagion for other types
of thought, we predicted that people exposed to a person who espouses
an incremental belief would be more likely to adopt this belief for them-
selves than people exposed to a person who espouses an entity belief.
Second, we sought to test the boundaries of this effect by examining
whether the contagion is domain specific. Specifically, we examined if
exposure to a person who purports a belief in one domain (e.g., athlet-
ics) would impact a person's own beliefs in a different domain (e.g.,
mathematics). Because social contagion effects tend to be indirect and
far reaching (Wild & Enzle, 2002), we predicted trait beliefs would
spread from one domain to another. However, there is reason to believe
this may not happen. Prior work indicates that people's own beliefs tend
to be domain-specific, such that the same person may hold an entity
belief about one domain and an incremental belief about another
 E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Because there
is theoretical support both for and against the idea of domain spreading,
our study serves as a “critical test” of these two competing possibilities.
To test this first prediction, we chose to focus specifically on partici-
pants' trait beliefs regarding mathematics (Burkley, Parker, Stermer, &
Burkley, 2010; Burns & Isbell, 2007; Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012;
Shively & Ryan, 2013). Focusing on a domain-specific trait belief (rather
than a general belief) allowed us to determine if trait beliefs in this par-
ticular domain would be equally influenced by a successful other's trait
beliefs regarding the same domain (mathematics) or a different domain
(athletics). Furthermore, research has shown that trait beliefs regarding
math have important real-world implications (Burkley et al., 2010;
Burns & Isbell, 2007; Luo, Lee, Ng, & Ong, 2014; Rattan et al., 2012).
For instance, Burkley et al. (2010) found that women who held an entity
belief about math were more likely to disengage from the math domain
following failure whereas those with an incremental belief were not.
Thus, seeking out new ways to encourage women to adopt an incre-
mental math belief may be helpful in reducing the gender gap common-
ly seen in the STEM sciences.
A second goal of the present work was to bridge the trait belief and
role model literatures by examining if people who espouse a particular
trait belief are more inspiring. Prior research indicates that successful
others are more likely to serve as role models if observers view their
success as attainable (Hoyt et al., 2012; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Be-
cause an incremental perspective frames the success as more attainable
than an entity perspective, we predicted that people would be more in-
spired when exposed to a person espousing an incremental belief. To
date, this prediction has not been tested directly. However a study by
Buunk (2006) within the relationship domain found that couples ex-
posed to a successful married couple who attributed their success to
hard work experienced more positive affect than those exposed to a
couple who did not attribute their success to hard work. This suggests
that when successful people emphasize their effort in achieving their
successes (i.e., espouse an incremental belief), they are more likely to
serve as positive role models for others. Our study was designed to di-
rectly test this prediction.
2. Method
2.1. Participants and design
One hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students (120 women;
75% White, mean age = 18.99, SD = 1.50) from a large Southwestern
university participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The
study utilized a 2 (domain: athletic vs. mathematic) × 3 (target's belief:
control vs. entity vs. incremental) factorial design.
2.2. Procedure and measures
2.2.1. Target's trait beliefs manipulation
All participants read an excerpt of a magazine article that supposedly
depicted an interview with a successful target named Malcolm Baron.
Based on random assignment, participants in the athletic condition
read an article supposedly featured in a sports magazine that featured
an interview with a “successful and highly respected American soccer
player.” Participants in the mathematic condition read an article suppos-
edly featured in a money magazine that featured an interview with a
“successful and highly respected American real estate developer.” Par-
ticipants in the control condition read an interview in which the target
only mentioned his career accomplishments.
Additionally, participants in the entity condition read an interview in
which the target mentioned his career accomplishments and indicated
he had always been successful in this domain, espousing that his skills
were not something that could be changed. Instead, participants in the
incremental condition read an interview in which the target mentioned
his career accomplishments and indicated he had not always been
47
successful in this domain, espousing that his skills were something he
improved upon with effort and practice.
2.2.2. Manipulation check of target's trait beliefs about math
After reading the interview, participants indicated the extent they
thought the target in the interview held an entity or incremental view
of math. Recall that our prediction was that trait beliefs espoused by
the target in one domain would spread to a new domain; however, an
alternative explanation is that our manipulation of the target's espousal
may unintentionally communicate that the target believes all traits are
entity- or incremental-based. To ensure this was not the case, we
included these manipulation check items. Specifically, participants
answered two questions about the target's beliefs about math (i.e., To
what extent does Mr. Baron believe that math skills can be improved
upon?; To what extent does Mr. Baron believe that math skills can
change over time?). Ratings were made on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much so) scale. The two items (r = 0.76) were then averaged together
to create a composite, with higher scores indicating a more incremental
view.
2.2.3. Participants' trait beliefs about math
After some filler items, participants completed a three-item measure
of their own trait beliefs regarding the math domain (Burkley et al.,
2010; e.g., You can learn new things, but you can't really change your
basic math ability). Ratings were made on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9
(strongly agree) scale. However, to make comparisons to the target's be-
lief measure easier, the items were reverse scored such that agreement
implied a more incremental view of math. These items (α = .77) were
averaged to form a composite score.
2.2.4. Perceived inspiration
Participants also completed a three-item assessment of the extent
that they found the target inspiring (e.g., To what extent did you feel in-
spired by the article?; Would you like to someday be like Mr. Baron?).
Ratings were made on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) scale. The
items (α = .81) were averaged to create a composite, with higher
scores indicating greater inspiration.
3. Results
All data were analyzed using a 2 (domain: athletic vs. mathemat-
ic) × 3 (target's belief: control vs. entity vs. incremental) factorial anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA).
3.1. Manipulation check of target's trait beliefs about math
There was a significant main effect of domain, F(1, 155) = 13.61,
p b .001, η2p = 0.08, and a main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) =
35.36, p b .001, η2p = 0.31. However, as expected, this was qualified
by a significant interaction, F(2, 155) = 19.98, p b .001, η2p = 0.21. In
the athletic domain, there were no significant differences in perceived
trait beliefs across the control, entity and incremental conditions, F(2,
155) = 1.43, p = .24. Conversely, in the mathematics domain, there
were significant differences, F(2, 155) = 45.28, p b .001. Participants
in the incremental condition perceived the target held a greater incre-
mental view (M = 6.60, SD = 0.74) than those in the control condition
(M = 2.88, SD = 1.54), p b .001, d = 3.08, who in turn perceived the tar-
get held a greater incremental view than those in the entity condition
(M = 2.12, SD = 1.44), p = .05, d = 0.51. The fact that there were no
differences in the athletic conditions confirms that our manipulation
specifically altered the target's beliefs about math, rather than uninten-
tionally communicating the target's beliefs about all traits.
48 E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
3.2. Participant's trait beliefs about math
As expected, the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect
of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 3.39, p = .04, η2p = 0.04. Planned contrasts
revealed that regardless of the domain, participants in the incremental
condition held a more incremental view (M = 6.61, SD = 1.30) than
those in the entity condition (M = 5.65, SD = 1.99), t(158) = 2.55,
p = .01, d = 0.57 (Figure 1). Furthermore, participants in the incremen-
tal condition held a marginally more incremental view than those in the
control condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.89), t(158) = 1.81, p = .07, d =
0.39. However, participants in the entity condition did not significantly
differ from those in the control condition, t(158) = 0.94, p = .39. This
pattern demonstrates evidence of a social contagion effect and the fact
that it emerged in both athletic and mathematic domains (i.e., only a
main effect of target's belief) indicates that, as expected, this contagion
effect is not domain-specific.
3.3. Perceived inspiration
Only the two main effects were significant. First, there was a signif-
icant main effect of domain, F(1, 155) = 10.75, p b .001, η2p = 0.07,
such that participants in the math domain were more inspired by the
successful target (M = 3.74, SD = 1.60) than those in the athletic do-
main (M = 3.20, SD = 1.49). This may have occurred because our col-
lege student sample likely perceives math successes as more
attainable than professional athletic successes. Second, there was a sig-
nificant main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 29.24, p b .001, η2p =
0.27. Planned contrasts revealed that regardless of the domain, partici-
pants were more inspired in the incremental condition (M = 4.36,
SD = 1.32) than the entity condition (M = 2.42, SD = 1.37),
t(158) = 2.32, p = .02, d = 1.44 (Figure 2). Participants in the incre-
mental condition were also more inspired than those in the control con-
dition (M = 3.73, SD = 1.39), t(158) = 6.80, p b .001, d = 0.46, who in
turn were more inspired that those in the entity espousing condition,
t(158) = 5.18, p b .001, d = 0.95. Thus, participants were more inspired
by a successful other who espoused an incremental view than an entity
view.
4. Discussion
Consistent with the concept of social contagion (Levy & Nail, 1993),
we found that trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they spread from one
person to another. People who read a vignette of someone espousing an
Fig. 1. Participants' trait beliefs about math as a function of the target's espoused view.
Higher scores represent a more incremental view. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
Fig. 2. Perceived inspiration of the target as a function of the target's espoused view and
success domain. Higher scores represent greater inspiration. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
incremental view were more likely to endorse an incremental view
themselves compared to those who read a vignette of someone espous-
ing an entity view. Furthermore, our results indicated this contagion ef-
fect does not appear to be domain specific and can spread from one
domain to another. Thus, reading about an athlete espousing an entity
view of athletic skills led people to adopt an entity view regarding
their own math skills. This contagious spreading of trait beliefs helps ex-
plain why these beliefs are often shared within groups or cultures (Choi,
Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999).
We also found that people who espouse an incremental view are
more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as positive role
models than people who espouse an entity view. This pattern is consis-
tent with research indicating that the more attainable another's suc-
cesses are perceived to be, the more likely they are to serve as positive
role models (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).
4.1. Implications, limitations and future directions
Although a great deal of research has examined the consequences of
entity versus incremental beliefs, only a few studies have examined po-
tential sources or causes of these beliefs (e.g., praise, scientific informa-
tion). Importantly, the present study adds to this work by suggesting
that people in our social environment can have an important impact
on our own beliefs. In everyday life, we are constantly bombarded
with statements regarding others' trait beliefs: Beyoncé espoused an en-
tity perspective of her beauty when she sang, “I woke up like this;” Mi-
chael Jordon espoused an incremental perspective of his athletic skills
when in a Nike commercial he stated, “Maybe I led you to believe that
basketball was a God-given gift and not something I worked for every
single day of my life;” Regardless of which perspective is expressed
and in what domain, what is clear from the present work is that these
statements have sway on our own beliefs. Although the impact of others
is more indirect than the factors shown to impact trait beliefs in prior re-
search, our work suggests they are just as influential. And when it comes
to real world interactions, people's own trait beliefs are probably more
likely to come from indirect, social sources than from the direct presen-
tation of scientific data that has typically been studied in the literature.
Thus, people who want to serve as positive role models and inspire
others, whether they be teachers, coaches, managers or parents, should
emphasize an incremental perspective when communicating to their
audience.
Although the present work provides an important bridge between
the largely disparate literature areas of implicit trait beliefs, social conta-
gion, and role models, several questions remain. First, this study's sam-
ple was composed predominantly of women. Future research should
 E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
examine if the gender of the participant has an impact on these re-
sponses. Second, this study only examined the contagion effects that
occur when observing a successful other's comments. It may be that peo-
ple are less likely to adopt another's beliefs if the initiators are instead
espousing a reason for their failure. Future research should explore
this potential boundary to the contagion effect. Third, it is likely that cer-
tain variables may moderate the likelihood that trait beliefs will spread
from one person to another. For example, prior work on other forms of
contagion indicates that people are more likely to adopt another's per-
spective if they feel a sense of connection with the initiator. Factors
known to increase this sense of connection include shared similarities,
an overlap between the self and other, and actively taking the other
person's perspective (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Goldstein &
Cialdini, 2007). Future research should explore if these and other factors
increase or decrease the likelihood that trait beliefs will spread from
person to person. Finally, it is possible that there are other unexplored
potential consequences that occur from this contagion effect. For in-
stance, it may be that reading about someone with an incremental per-
spective not only inspires people but actually facilitates them to
perform better on a relevant task. Future research should explore this
and other potential implications from the present work.
References
Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursu-
ing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 23–37.
Aronson, J., Fried, C. B., & Good, C. (2002). Reducing the effects of stereotype threat on Af-
rican American college students by shaping theories of intelligence. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 113–125.
Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.
Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence
predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an in-
tervention. Child Development, 78, 246–263.
Burkley, M., Burkley, E., Stermer, P. S., Andrade, A., Bell, A. C., & Curtis, J. (2014). The ugly
duckling effect: Examining fixed versus malleable beliefs about beauty. Social
Cognition, 32, 466–483.
Burkley, M., Parker, J., Stermer, P. S., & Burkley, E. (2010). Trait beliefs that make women
vulnerable to math disengagement. Personality and Individual Differences, 48,
234–238.
Burns, K. C., & Isbell, L. M. (2007). Promoting malleability is not one size fits all: Priming
implicit theories of intelligence as a function of self-theories. Self and Identity, 6,
51–63.
Buunk, A. (2006). Responses to a happily married other: The role of relationship satisfac-
tion and social comparison orientation. Personal Relationships, 13, 397–409.
Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories of per-
sonality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 19–30.
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Varia-
tion and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 47–63.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality and development.
Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. (1988). A social cognitive approach to motivation and person-
ality. Psychological Review, 95, 256–273.
Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and
reactions: A world from two perspectives. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 267–285.
Dweck, C. S., Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (1993). Implicit theories: Individual differences in the
likelihood and meaning of dispositional inference [Special issue: On inferring person-
al dispositions from behavior]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 644–656.
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype ex-
pression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 78, 708–724.
Goldstein, N. J., & Cialdini, R. B. (2007). The spyglass self: A model of vicarious self-percep-
tion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 402–417.
Heslin, P. A., Latham, G. P., & VandeWalle, D. M. (2005). The effect of implicit person the-
ory on performance appraisals. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 842–856.
Hoyt, C. L., Burnette, J. L., & Innella, A. N. (2012). I can do that: The impact of implicit the-
ories on leadership role model effectiveness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
38, 257–268.
Le Bon, G. (1903). The crowd: A study of the popular mind (4th imprinting). London: T. Fish-
er Unwin (Originally published: Psychologie des foules, 1895).
Levy, D. A., & Nail, P. R. (1993). Contagion: A theoretical and empirical review and recon-
ceptualization. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 119, 233–284.
Levy, S., Stroessner, S., & Dweck, C. (1998). Stereotype formation and endorsement: The
role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1421–1436.
Lockwood, P., & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars and me: Predicting the impact of role
models on the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 91–103.
Luo, W., Lee, K., Ng, P. T., & Ong, J. X. W. (2014). Incremental beliefs of ability, achievement
emotions and learning of Singapore students. Educational Psychology, 34, 619–634.
Lynch, A. (1996). Thought contagion: How belief spreads through society. New York: Basic
Books.
Mueller, C. M., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Intelligence praise can undermine motivation and
performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 33–52.
Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and conse-
quences. Psychological Review, 110, 472–489.
Radel, R., Sarrazin, P., Legrain, P., & Wild, T. C. (2010). Social contagion of motivation be-
tween teacher and student: Analyzing underlying processes. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 102, 577–587.
Rattan, A., Good, C., & Dweck, C. S. (2012). “It's ok—Not everyone can be good at math”:
Instructors with an entity theory comfort (and demotivate) students. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 731–737.
Roediger, H. L., Meade, M. L., & Bergman, E. T. (2001). Social contagion of memory.
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 8, 365–371.
Shively, R. L., & Ryan, C. S. (2013). Longitudinal changes in college math students' implicit
theories of intelligence. Social Psychology of Education, 16, 241–256.
Sullins, E. S. (1991). Emotional contagion revisited: Effects of social comparison and ex-
pressive style on mood convergence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17,
166–174.
Suls, J., Martin, R., & Wheeler, L. (2002). Social comparison: Why, with whom, and with
what effect? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 159–163.
Wheeler, L., & Caggiula, A. R. (1966). The contagion of aggression. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 2, 1–10.
Wild, T. C., & Enzle, M. E. (2002). Social contagion of motivational orientations. In E. L.
Deci, & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of self-determination research (pp. 141–157).
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.