Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Manila

FOURTEENTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CA-G.R. CR No. 38203

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Members:

GARCIA, R.R. J., Ch.

DIMAGIBA, L.R. &
- versus - INTING, H.J.P.B., JJ.

Promulgated:
ANDY RAGEL Y OBLIAN, May 2, 2017
Accused-Appellant. _________________

D ECISION *

INTING, J.:

Before Us is an appeal1 from the December 11, 2015 Decision 2 of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 270, Valenzuela City in Crim.
Case No. 1126-V-15 for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act (RA)
7610.

The Information3 charging accused-appellant with violation of

Section 5(b) of RA 7610 reads:

The undersigned Senior Asst. City Prosecutor

accuses ANDY RAGEL y OBLIAN of the crime of
“Violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610”, committed
as follows:

* MODIFIED : Pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in People vs. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19
September 2006, wherein the High Court resolved to withhold the real name of the victim- survivor and
shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-
survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of their
immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. Thus, the name of the victim shall appear as
“AAA” and the mother as “BBB”.
1 Rollo, pp. 24-34.
2 Records, pp. 154-162.
3 Records, p. 1.
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 2 of 10
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That on or about August 9, 2015, in Valenzuela

City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of
his moral ascendancy over minor complainant by
reason of his fourteen [14] years age gap over minor
complainant, through coercion, undue influence and
deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with minor
[AAA], 15 years old,
(DOB: September 29, 1999), (complainant/victim),
with lewd design, thereby subjecting the said minor to
sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned
her intrinsic worthy and dignity as a human being,

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Valenzuela City, August 10, 2015.

On arraignment4, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime

charged. Trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

AAA (the victim) testified that she is fifteen

(15) years old; and that accused-appellant, who is 28-year-old, is her
boyfriend. She met him in September 2015 through text messages in her
cell phone. At first, she was discouraging him from texting her because
she had a boyfriend then. But later, when her relationship with her then
boyfriend cooled off, she started to entertain accused-appellant. On April
14, 2015, she proposed to accused-appellant to be his girlfriend. In June
2015, she personally met accused-appellant for the first time. They
proceeded to a park in Navotas. They met again, twice, in July wherein
they would proceed thereafter to accused-appellant's house.

The victim further testified that one evening, she and accused-
appellant went to the latter's workplace in Aurora, Cubao and stayed there
until 9:00 in the morning of the following day. Afterwards, they went to
accused-appellant's place. Later on, they proeceeded to the house of
accused-appellant's friend where they had a drinking spree. After the
drinking spree, they went back to accused-appellant's house. At that time,
she was already very dizzy. Accused-appellant offered to take her home,
but she refused as she did not want to go home yet because she and her
4 Records, p. 28.
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 3 of 10
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mother had a misunderstanding. She then convinced accused-appellant to

bring her back to his house. There, she and accused-appellant slept in the
living room where they had sexual intercourse.

The victim furthermore testified that on August 9, 2015, at around

3:00 in the afternoon, she was at her house after having arrived from the
church. Accused-appellant texted her that he was coming over. She
thought he was joking and told him that she was busy. Accused-appellant
was then very persistent. Accused-appellant arrived at her house between
3:00 and 3:30 in the afternoon. She let him inside her bedroom. She did
not inform her mother that accused-appellant was in their house because
her mother and sibling were busy preparing to leave for the hospital.
When the victim and accused-appellant were left alone in the house, they
had sexual intercourse in her bedroom. A few hours later, her parents
arrived and found out that accused-appellant was in their house. At that
time accused-appellant was taking a shower and his clothes were
scattered on the floor.

The victim likewise testified that accused-appellant initially told

her that he was 19 years old, but later on he said he was 25 years old.
However, at the police station, she found out that he was 28 years old.5

BBB, the victim's mother, testified that upon coming home

from the hospital on August 9, 2015, she entered the victim's room and
saw clothes belonging to a male person. She called out to the victim, who
was then at the bathroom. When the victim came out of the bathroom, she
saw therein accused-appellant.6

Medico-legal officer, PCI Jocelyn P. Cruz, testified that she

conducted physical and genital examination on the victim, and her
finding was that there was a laceration of hymen at 5 o'clock position.7

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant admitted that he was at the victim's house on

August 9, 2015; and that they had sexual intercourse on that day. He,
however, denied deceiving the victim and averred that their sexual
intercourse was consensual. He even promised to marry her before having
5 TSN, September 7, 2015, pp. 4-23 and 34.
6 TSN, September 11, 2015 pp. 3-4.
7 TSN, September 21, 2015, pp. 3-6
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 4 of 10
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sex with her on that day.8

On December 11, 2015, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of

violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. The fallo of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,

judgement (sic) is hereby rendered finding accuesd
(sic) ANDY RAGEL y OBLIAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 4 months, as
minimum to 10 years, as maximum imprisonment. He
is also directed to indemnify [the victim] moral
damages in the amount of Php50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

Aggrieved, accused-appellant interposes the present appeal with

the following lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S ADMISSION THAT SHE WAS
NOT FORCED BY THE ACCUSED APPELLANT
TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH HIM.10

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.

– Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed
8 TSN, October 5, 2015, pp. 3-4 and 7.
9 Records, p. 162.
10 Rollo, p. 29.
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 5 of 10
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to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual

abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or

lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxxx

Thus, the elements of the foregoing offense are the following: (a)
the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child, whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age.11

Here, the existence of the first and third elements is undisputed.

Record discloses that accused-appellant had succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the victim who was still a minor at the time. Thus, the
only bone of contention lies in the presence of the second element. On
this note, the defense submits that the victim could not be considered as a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the
incidents do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence" on
accused-appellant's part.

The argument is untenable.

As correctly stated by the RTC, “RA 7610 was meant to advance

the state policy of affording [special] protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and
other conditions prejudicial to their development”.12

Specifically with regard to the second element, i.e., that the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, the case of People v. Larin13 explains:

11 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005.

12 Records, p. 159.
13 G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998.
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 6 of 10
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A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected

to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
xxxx

It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation

in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation,
engages in lascivious conduct. (Italics Ours)

Section 5 of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual

intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse."14 In this way, the law serves as an effective deterrent
to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their
development.15

Sexual intercourse under the coercion or influence of any adult

exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation
which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. 16
“[T]he term [influence] means the [improper] use of power or trust in
any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's
[objective.] Meanwhile, [coercion] is the [improper] use of . . . power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields [it.]”17

In view of the foregoing, We find that accused-appellant's

actuations may be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the
purview of Section 5 of RA 7610.

First, the most crucial element is the victim's minority. It is

undisputed that the victim was only 15 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, hence, is considered a child under the law. 18
14 Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013.
15 Id.
16 People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25, 2009
17 Supra note 15.
18 Section 3 of RA 7610 provides:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. —

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition xxxx
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 7 of 10
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The victim was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import
of her actions, thus, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of
adults, as in this case.

Now, in cases involving a violation of Section 5 of RA 7610,

jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial19; as such, the argument
that the victim consented to the sexual intercourse with accused-appellant
remains irrelevant. The case of Malto v. People20 is largely instructive on
this point:

For purposes of sexual intercourse and

lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610,
the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse
with another person.

The language of the law is clear: it seeks to

punish "[t]hose who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in

cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an
evil that is proscribed.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under

our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of
her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.

The harm which results from a child's bad

decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the
19 Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007.
20 Id.
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 8 of 10
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law should protect her from the harmful consequences

of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly
consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender
herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a
law which seeks to afford her special protection against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise,
sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or
even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as
fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child
is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

Second, coupled with the victim's minority, is accused-appellant's

seniority. Records indicate that accused-appellant was 28 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense and, therefore, 13 years older than
the victim. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed
accused-appellant in a stronger position over the victim so as to enable
him to force his will upon the latter.21

Third, accused-appellant's act of promising the victim that he

would marry her meant to influence the victim to set aside her
reservations and eventually give in to having sex with him, with which he
succeeded.

Hence, considering that accused-appellant's acts constitute

"coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law, and that the
victim indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with
accused-appellant due to the same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the
subject offense exists.

Finding all elements to be present, We sustain accused-appellant's

conviction for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.

However, We modify the penalty.

For sexual intercourse committed with a child exploited in

prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA
7610, the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to

21 Supra note 15.

CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 9 of 10
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reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law,

accused-appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.22

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant shall

be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by RA 7610. The penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the
range of which is from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. On
the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken from
the penalty prescribed under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which
is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The
minimum, medium, and maximum term of it are as follows:

i) minimum - 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years

and 4 months;
ii) medium – 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years; and
iii) maximum - reclusion perpetua.23

In this case, the trial court imposed on accused-appellant an

indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 4 months, as minimum, to 10 years,
as maximum. The minimum term imposed is correct because it is within
the range of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the
penalty next lower in degree to that imposed by RA 7610. But the
maximum term thereof is wrong. The maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere from 14 years, 8 months and one day to
reclusion perpetua. We, thus, impose on accused-appellant the
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for his violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

Accordingly, the December 11, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 270, Valenzuela City, in Crim. Case No. 1126-V-15 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon accused-appellant for

22 People v. Bon, G.R. No. 149199, January 28, 2003.

23 People v. Leonardo y Dantes, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010.
CA-G.R. CR No. 38203 Page 10 of 10
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violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 should be 17 years, 4 months and 1

day of reclusion temporal. The moral damages awarded shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

HENRI JEAN PAUL B. INTING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RAMON R. GARCIA LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

RAMON R. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Fourteenth Division