RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:
 October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
 December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local
Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao
del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
 November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the
petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
 Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A.
No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new
province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly
deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the
law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC.
 May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge
the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
 July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on
the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was
before and not after the resolution of this case.
 September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an
exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before
the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal
interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.
 October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD:
 Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a
full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an
express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and
transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.
 The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government
unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into
account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified
by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services
to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances
which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should
not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
 Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the
spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would
defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court
ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID.
According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of
viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and
land area, are provided for.”
“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and
Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR.”
xxx “There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land
area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer
that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC –
and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity
of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
FACTS: On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 was signed into law. In effect, the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela was converted into an independent component city. On July 4, 1994, the people of
Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted to amend R.A. No. 7720. It changed the
status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said act on the ground that there was a lacking provision
in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
However, the respondents maintain that said act was constitutional. Further, they contend the standing
of petitioners and the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
In his reply, Solicitor General contends that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city to a component city. It did not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi?
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the said petition?
3. Whether or not Republic Act No. 8528 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
1. YES. The petitioners have standing with regards to the issue, because they sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The mayor, Mr. Miranda, will now be under administrative supervision of the
Provincial Governor. All the mayor’s executive orders are to be reviewed. His powers as mayor are to
be limited by the act. The other petitioners are to sustain direct injury as well. As residents and voters
in the city of Santiago, their right to be heard in the conversation of their city is to be trampled by not
holding a plebiscite with regards to the issue.
2. YES. Pursuant to Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the court has the duty to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Clearly, there exists a
justiciable issue because petitioners in light of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution have a
right to approve or disapprove R.A.No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. Further, it is
within the jurisdiction of the court to assess whether a law passed by Congress comply with the
Constitutional requirements.
3. YES. Upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7720, it upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city. Consequently, it required the approval of its people
through a plebiscite called for the purpose. In the same way, upon the enactment of R.A. No.
8528, it downgraded the status of their city. So, there is a more compelling reason to require a
plebiscite in accordance to Section 10, Article X of the1987 Constitution. 1 Which is further reiterated
in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) and Rule II, Article 6, paragraph
(f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.2 It is clear that the
said enactments have substantially alter the status of Santiago City which in effect resulted in a
material change in the local government unit that eventually created a change in the political and
economic rights of its people. Only the Congress has the power over such matter. Hence, R.A. No.
8528 is unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to comply with the requisite of holding an actual
plebiscite.
The changes that will result in the downgrading of Santiago City from being an independent component city, to a
component city cannot be characterized as insubstantial: taxes collected from the city will be shared with the
province, resolutions and ordinances will have to be reviewed by Provincial Board, City Government’s share will be
diluted since certain portions will accrue to the Provincial Government. Downgrading it, without the involvement of
the people, will run against the spirit of Sec 10 Art X of the 1987 Constitution.
Having significant changes introduced to the political and social climate of the province would need a plebiscite for it
to push through, according to Rule II Art 6 Par F1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code, because that gravity of changes already amount to a ‘conversion’. Even the principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991 agrees that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory, since it promotes autonomy to the
local government units.
Dispositive: Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law
PADILLA VS. COMELEC
Summary: A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted and the voters
rejected its creation. The governor questioned the result and challenged the inclusion of the
voters of the mother municipality in the plebiscite.
Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected—Section 10, Article X, 1987
Constitution.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of
Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its
approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all
the voters of the Municipality of Labo—the parent unit of the new municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court
to set aside the result arguing that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not include the parent political unit—the
Municipality of Labo.
Issues: Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?
Ruling:
Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is
contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political
units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such
political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as
those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was concluded
that respondent COMELECdid not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the
resolution.
 MARIANO VS COMELEC
Facts: Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief, assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality
of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Petitioners
contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides
with Section 8 Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate
existence of the new city will restart the term of the present municipal elective making it
favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for
adding a legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be
any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of
the municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.