ESTRADA V ESCRITOR

Aug 4, 2003| Puno, J.: | AM P-02-1651

Petitioner: Alejandro Estrada
Respondent: Soledad Escritor
Summary:Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of
Las Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose
F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living
with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually
begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman,
died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.  Estrada is not related
to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite.   According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society
where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs.  After ten years of living together, she executed on July
28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by
the congregation.  Such declaration is effective when legal impediments
render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.  Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been
a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed
by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three
witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.        6. Deputy Court Administrator referred the case to Executive Judge Maceda.
FACTS:
1. In a sworn letter-complaint, Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes of RTC
branch 253, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
Escritor, court interpreter of said court, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of 18-20 y/o. Estrada is not related
to Escritor or to her partner.
2. He filed charges against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnished the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
3. Escritor moved for the inhibition of Judge Coibes from hearing her case to
avoid suspicion and bias as she previously filed an administrative
complaint against him. This was denied
4. Estrada confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality against
respondent because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice, he learned
that she was living with a man not her husband and she has a child with
this man. This prompted him to write to Judge Choices as he believed that
employees of the Judiciary should be respectable and Escritor’s live-in
arrangement did not command respect.
5. Respondent admitted that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She also admitted that
she has been living with Luciano Quilapio (married man) without the
benefit of marriage for 20 years. But as a member of the religious sect
know as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible society,
their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In
fact, after 10 years of living together, she executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” 1 Escritor’s partner executed a similar pledge.
In the course of Judge Maceda’s investigation, Escritor again testified that
her congregation allows her conjugal arrangement with Quiliapo and it
does not consider it immoral.

1 “document, signed by the elders of the Congregation, that gives the Christian Congregation view that the couple has put themselves on record before God and
man that they are faithful to each other. As if that relation is validated by God. Allows marital relationship and cohabitation of couples who cannot marry yet
(consenting adults) because of some legal impediment. Binding until legal impediment ceases. by the time it ceases, couple should submit themselves to proper
public authorities to solemnize their marriage.”
7. The witnesses presented by Escirtor testified that indeed, insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and her partner and they remain members
in good standing in the congregation.
8. Estrada contends that even assuming arguendo that the declaration is valid
and binding in the congregation, it serves only their internal purpose.
Their religious belief, however, cannot override the norms of conduct
required by law for government employees. To rule otherwise would
create a dangerous precedent as the who cannot legalize their live-in
relationship can simply join Jehovah’s Witnesses and use their religion as
a defense against legal liability.
9. Deputy Court Administrator concurred findings of J. Maceda but departed
from his recommendation to dismiss the complaint. Former found that
Escritor’s defense of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant dismissal
of the charge of immorality, he recommended a suspension for 6 months
without pay.
ISSUE: WoN RESPONDENT SHOULD BE FOUND GUILTY OF THE
ADMIN. CHARGE OF “GROSS AND IMMORAL CONDUCT” ( sub-issue:
WoN respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception
from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government
employees are held administratively liable)
RULING: The case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case
where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means
the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom.
RATIO:
1. Respondent is charged with committing a gross and immoral conduct
under Book V, Title 1, Chap 6 of Revise Admin Code.2 Respondent, in
layman’s terms, invokes the religious beliefs and practices and moral
standards of her religion in asserting that her conjugal arrangement with a
2 (b) the following are ground for disciplinary actions…xxx…(5) disgraceful and immoral conduct
man nit her legal husband does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct, someheow she impliedly invokes religious freedom under Art
III, Section 5 of the Constitution.
2. STRICT NEUTRALITY V. BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY ( 2 main
standards used by the Court in deciding religion clause cases):
- SN or strict separation of the tamer version of strict neutrality or
separation. BN or sometimes called accommodation.
- Separation protects the principle of church and state with rigid
reading of the principle while BN protected religious realities, tradition and
established practice with a flexible reading of the principle.
- Separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s
tendency to press reletlessly towards a more secular society. “Jefferson’s wall
of separation” requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. While it is not hostile to religion, it is strict in holding that religion
may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental
action. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. The Court
has repeatedly declared that religious freedom means government neutrality in
religious matters and the Court has also repeatedly interpreted this policy of
neutrality to prohibit government from acting except for secular purposes and
in ways that have primarily secular effects. The wall employed here meant to
protect the State from the Church
- BN gives room for accommodation, the “wall”employed here was
meant to protect the Church from the State, unlike what was employed in
“jefferson’s wall of separation” It is congruent to the sociological proposition
that religion serves a function essential to the survival of society itself, thus
there is no human society without one or more ways of performing the
essential function of religion. With religion looks upon with benevolence and
not hostility BN allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are gov. policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but allow individuals and groups to exercise religion without any
hindrances. Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.

3. A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.
4. The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
5. The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by
maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There
is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to
the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General”.
6. In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government
be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the
Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot
simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the “compelling state interest” test. Thus, case is remanded.
OPINIONS:
Bellosillo:
1. The Jehovah’s Witnesses is one of the respected congregations of
Christians in the country. It counts among its members upright and
productive citizens whose views on morality cannot be disregarded.
Consequently, when the elders of the religion affixed their imprimatur on
the Declaration. they validated the moral legitimacy of respondents
informal conjugal partnership. First and foremost, the appropriate
judge of respondent’s morality is her own church and this task cannot
be assigned to any other institutions i society if any religious
congregation is to have any purpose at all.
2. The primary question should therefore be whether the evidence shows
both disgrace and immorality at the same time. Absent any evidence
confirming the presence of disgrace and immorality, the wrongdoing is
not committed and concomitantly there is no occasion to delve heavily on
religious freedom.
VITUG:
3. It might be deduce that moral laws are justified when they (1) they seek to
preserve moral value upheld by society; (2) when the morality imposed on
certain case are true and correct. Moral laws are unstudied only to the extent
that they directly or indirectly serve to protect the interests to the larger
society, and it is also where their rigid application would serve to obliterate
the value which society seeks to uphold, or defeat the purpose for which they
are enacted, would a departure be justified.
DISSENTING:
Ynares-Santiago
4. The degree of morality required of every employer or official in the public
service has been consistently high, and the rules are particularly strict when
the respondent is a Judge or a court employee.
5. We must be concerned not with the dogmas or rules of any church or
religious sect but with the legal effects under the CSC Law of an illicit or
adulterous relationship characterized by the fact to the case.
6. Religious standards alleged to be those of the sect to which respondents
belongs cannot shield her from the effects of the law, and neither can he illicit
relationship condoned on the basis of a written agreement approved by their
religious community.
7. The strengthening of marriage ties and the concomitant hostility ti
adulterous or illicit marital relations is a primary governmental concern. It has
nothing to do with a particular religious affiliations of those affected by
legislation in this field. The relations, duties, obligations and consequences of
marriage are important to the morals and civilization of people and to the
peace and welfare of society. Any attempt to inject freedom of religion in an
effort to exempt oneself from CSC rules relating to the sanctity of the
marriage must fail.
CARPIO:
8. Escritor’s conduct is that of a concubine under Article 334 of RPC
outlawing concubinage. She may not be subjected to disciplinary sanction for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Her religious beliefs, no
matter how sincere, cannot exempt her from the said law.
9. The wall of separation between the Church and the State is no defense
against the State’s police power over conduct constituting concubinage,
bigamy, polygamy.
ESTRADA v ESCRITOR
2006 PROCEEDING | PUNO, J.:
- It is at this point then that we examine the report and documents submitted
by the hearing officer of this case, and apply the three-step process of the
compelling state interest test based on the evidence presented by the
parties, especially the government.
- having previously established the preliminary conditions required by the
compelling state interest test, i.e., that a law or government practice
inhibits the free exercise of respondents religious beliefs, and there being
no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of her faith to claim the
exemption based on the free exercise clause, the burden shifted to the
government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling
secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that
objective.
OSG’s Evidence and Argument
Note: The OSG merely offered the following as exhibits and their
purposes:
A. EXHIBIT A-OSG AND SUBMARKING The September 30, 2003 Letter
to the OSG of Bro. Raymond B. Leach, Legal Representative of the Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society of the Philippines, Inc. PURPOSE: To show
that the OSG exerted efforts to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondents claimed religious belief and practice.
B. EXHIBIT B-OSG AND SUBMARKING The duly notarized certification
dated September 30, 2003 issued and signed by Bro. Leach.
PURPOSES: (1) To substantiate the sincerity and centrality of
respondents claimed religious belief and practice; and (2) to prove
that the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, being a purely
internal arrangement within the congregation of the Jehovahs
Witnesses, cannot be a source of any legal protection for
respondent.
1.The OSG contends that the State has a compelling interest to override
respondents claimed religious belief and practice, in order to protect marriage
and the family as basic social institutions. The Solicitor General, quoting the
Constitution and the Family Code, argues that marriage and the family are so
crucial to the stability and peace of the nation that the conjugal arrangement
embraced in the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness should not be
recognized or given effect, as it is utterly destructive of the avowed
institutions of marriage and the family for it reduces to a mockery these
legally exalted and socially significant institutions which in their purity
demand respect and dignity.
2. The Solicitor General also argued against respondents religious freedom on
the basis of morality, i.e., that the conjugal arrangement of respondent and her
live-in partner should not be condoned because adulterous relationships are
constantly frowned upon by society; and that State laws on marriage, which
are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the religious beliefs and
practices of any church, religious sect or denomination on marriage. Verily,
religious beliefs and practices should not be permitted to override laws
relating to public policy such as those of marriage.
ISSUE: WoN RESPONDENT SHOULD BE FOUND GUILTY OF THE
ADMIN. CHARGE OF “GROSS AND IMMORAL CONDUCT” - NO. The
state could not penalized respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion.
RULING: ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DISMISSED
RATIO:
3 STEP PROCESS OF COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST:
First, Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free
exercise of religion? The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious
belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in Ballard and
Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimants belief is ascertained to avoid the
mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation.
Second, the court asks: Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to
justify this infringement of religious liberty? In this step, the government has
to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the state and that they are
compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those
objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.
Third, the court asks: Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state? The analysis
requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate
state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to
achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious
liberties.
Again, the application of the compelling state interest test could result to
three situations of accommodation: First, mandatory accommodation
would result if the Court finds that accommodation is required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Second, if the Court finds that the State may, but is not
required to, accommodate religious interests, permissive accommodation
results. Finally, if the Court finds that that establishment concerns prevail
over potential accommodation interests, then it must rule that the
accommodation is prohibited.
1. Free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys
a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights, in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough
to contend that the states interest is important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in
specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of
right by itself.
2.Thus, it is not the States broad interest in protecting the institutions of
marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice that
must be weighed against respondents claim, but the States narrow interest in
refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondents faith
finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to
what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are
granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
3.With respect to charging respondent with conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and we reiterate that the dissent offends due process as
respondent was not given an opportunity to defend herself against the charge
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Indeed, there is no
evidence of the alleged prejudice to the best interest of the service.
4. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was illegal per se because,
by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad,
improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience, the Solicitor General
failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests
5.Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has
chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as
possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to
prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited
above which established the sincerity of respondents religious belief and the
fact that the agreement was an internal arrangement within respondents
congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are bereft
of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means
the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to
respondents religious freedom.
6.Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state
interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom -
may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so
the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.