1 [SPL] PROBATION

KGM2016

Amandy vs. People

May 23, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Amandy alias “DIanak” was on bail for violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972)-
possession of dried leaves of marijuana and cigarette wrappers. He pleaded guilty and invoked
drunkenness as mitigating circumstances. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 yrs and 1 day.

ISSUE: WoN BP 78 was expressly repealed by PD 1990

HELD: YES.

Grant or denial of application for probation does not rest solely on the offender ’ s
potentiality to reform but also on the absence of demands of justice and public interest.
To base the grant of probation on this contention alone would be erroneous because the law clearly
declares who are entitled to probation and who are not. Moreover, the grant or denial of the
application for probation does not rest solely on the offender’s potentiality to reform but also on
the observance of demands of justice and public interest (Tolentino v. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92).
These are expressed in statutes enacted by the lawmaker. The arguments of the petitioner are more
properly directed to a trial court’s exercise o discretion in granting or denying probation to
applicants who fall within the coverage of the law, and not to a court which refuses to apply the
benefits of a law to persons excluded by that same law.

Reason for removal of one day from the original

six years and one day .—The removal of one day from the original six years and one day
, is to benefit only those offenders convicted of less grave felonies as defined in Art. 9
of the Revised Penal Code. The questioned section on P . D. 1990 would not have struck
out one day in unequivocal terms if the intention was not to exclude those convicted of
the next higher felonies from its coverage. The contention, therefore, of the petitioner that
B. P . 76 and P . D. 1990 operate on different subjects, the latter allegedly referring to
persons who appeal the judgment of conviction being disqualified from
availing of the benefits of probation while B. P . 76 specifically dealing with the extension
of benefits of probation to those sentenced to a maximum
penalty of 6 years and 1 day , is devoid of merit.

Even if a convicted person falls within the classes

of those qualified for probation, the grant of probation is not automatic or ministerial;
Probation is a privilege and its grant rests upon the court’ s
discretion.—It may also be stated that even if a convicted person falls within the classes
of those qualified for probation, the grant of probation is not
automatic or ministerial. Probation is a privilege and its grant rests upon the discretion of
the court. The discretionis exercised primarily for the benefit of society as a whole and
only secondarily for the personal advantage of the accused.

Denial of the probation application in this particular case is further justified by the gravity
of the drug menace and by the increase of the penalty for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act which bring it outside the range of probationable offenses. Again,
 2 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

the punishment of drug pushers and drug users is a matter of legislative policy .

Baclayon vs. Mutia

April 30, 1984
TEEHANKEE, J.:

Baclayon, a school teacher , was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation.
Penalty: 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum period to 2 years and 4
months of prision correccional in its minimum period (w/ aggravating circumstances)

ISSUE: WoN probation may include a condition that prohibits a school teacher from practicing
her profession
HELD: NO

Conditions which a court may impose on a probationer classified into mandatory or general
and special or discretionary . The latter should be exercised realistically and purposively to
rehabilitate the probationer.—The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer
may be classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary . The mandatory
conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law , require that the probationer
should

(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified
by said officer .

Special or discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same Section
10 of the Probation Law , which the courts may additionally impose on the probationer
towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration, however, is
not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate
practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer ’ s constitutional rights are not
jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation
of the probationer when viewed in their specific individual context. It should, however, be
borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be
realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
self-respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their
application and each case should be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the problems,
needs and capacity of the probationer . The very liberality of the probation should not
be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

Court may not impose as a condition for grant of probation that probationer should not
continue her teaching profession.
—Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only profession she knows and as such she
possesses special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as District Guidance
Coordinator and always designated as District-in-Charge whenever the District Supervisor is
out of town. She is usually selected to represent her district in seminars, meetings and
 3 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

conferences. She also excelled in her study of Child Study and Development. It also
appears that she is an outstanding member of the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council,
having served as Physical Education & Girl Scout Field Advisor of the District, Adviser
of the District Girl Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of the District Federated Girl Scout
Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource person in District and Division Level Girl
Scout encampments and re-elected Board Member of the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout
Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive the students and
the school in general the benefits that may be derived from her training and expertise.
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the
discretion of the court, this discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Equal regard to
the demands of justice and public interest must be observed. In this case, teaching has
been the lifetime and only calling and profession of petitioner . The law requires that she
devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her
from engaging in teaching would practically prevent her from complying with the terms of
the probation.

Accessory penalties are deemed suspended once probation-application is given due

course.—Respondents contend that petitioner ’ s final
conviction carries with it the accessory penalties in addition to the principal penalty of
imprisonment; and since petitioner was sentenced to arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, she must likewise suffer the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. This cannot apply to petitioner, however,
because she was granted probation. The imposition of her sentence of imprisonment was
thereby suspended and necessarily , the imposition of the accessory penalties was
likewise thereby suspended.

An order placing defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence” but is rather in effect

a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
“interlocutory judgment” in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.

Bala vs. Mart Inez

January 29, 1990
SARMIENTO, J

Bala was found guilty of the crime of falsification of public document by substituting the picture
of one woman in her passport with that of another. indeterminate penalty of not less than ONE
(1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DA Y and not exceeding THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS
& TWENTY -ONE (21) DA YS of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P1, 800. 00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
 4 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

Bala was granted probation and was also allowed to transfer residence from Manila to Makati.
His period of probation has expired but his probation officer has not yet submitted a report on his
conduct. Thereafter, the People (Fiscal) filed a motion to revoke probation alleging that Bala has
violated the terms of his probation. Bala opposed the motion contending that his probation has
already been terminated.
The probation officer filed a motion to terminate probation and attached his progress report
thereto.

ISSUE: WoN probation may be revoked by the court after the probation period has already expired
HELD: YES. Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court,
contrary to the petitioner ’ s submission.

Section 16 of PD 968 (PD 1990 eff January 15, 1985 is not yet applicable because it cannot be
given retroactive effect as it will be prejudicial to the accused)
Sec. 16. T ermination of Probation.—After the period of probation and upon consideration
of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the
court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.

Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation.
Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation
law . Probation is not co-terminous with its period. There must first be issued by the
court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation
officer . Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed
the period set in the law . This is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer . In
the instant case, a review of the records compels a revocation of the probation without the
need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after all, would only be an exercise
in futility If we render justice now , why should we allow the petitioner to further delay
it.

Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible society. Precisely he was granted
probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope—
hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and
narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed. A major role is played by the
probation officer in the release of the probationer because he (probation officer) is in the
best position to report all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical
condition of the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and community
resources that he may avail himself of when necessary . Indeed, it is the probation officer
who primarily undertakes the supervision and reform of the probationer through a
personalized, individualized, and community-based rehabilitation program for a specific
period of time. On the basis of his final report, the court can determine whether or not
the probationer may be released from probation.
 5 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

*Bala’s probation has been been revoked by the SC for just cause because he continued falsifying
documents and was in fact ordered to be arrested by the RTC, SC ordered Bala’s arrest so he may
serve his original sentence.

*there can be NO deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year
and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an
order placing the defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence,” but is in effect a suspension of
the imposition of the sentence. It is not a final judgment but an “interlocutory judgment”
in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision
of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated.

Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred

by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special enjoyment of
a good or exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law to some
persons. Accordingly , the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court.
This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society , and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. If the probationer has proven to be unrepentant,
as in the case of the petitioner , the State is not barred from revoking such a privilege.
Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if probation is not revoked.

Bernardo vs. Balagot

November 10, 1992
CRUZ, J:

Bernardo contends he is entitled to probation although he had previously appealed his

conviction, because these alternative remedies were allowed under the law then in force.
The People disagree, arguing that his application for probation is governed by the
amendment to the said law and he could elect thereunder only either of the two remedies
and not both. Bernardo was convicted of estafa and sentenced on September 5, 1984 to 1
year , 8 months and 21 days of prision corr eccional as minimum to 2 years, 11 months
and 10 days of prision corr eccional medium as maximum, with the accessory and other
penalties.
Applied for probation: 2/3/1986
PD 1990: promulgated 10/5/1985 eff: 1/15/1986
ISSUE: WoN probation may be granted if the applicant has already appealed (WoN PD 1990
applies)
HELD: No. PD 1990 is already applicable to the case.

+ the favorable recommendation of the probation officer is at best merely persuasive upon
the courts in the consideration of the application for probation. Both the law and
jurisprudence are clear on this point. As for the fact that the petitioner is a first offender ,
this does not necessarily entitle him to the approval of his application, although it is a factor to
be taken into account by the court. Finally , the policy of liberality he invokes cannot prevail
against the categorical provisions of the law, which clearly call for the denial of his application.
 6 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

Colinares vs. People

December 13, 2011
ABAD, J.

Arnel was convicted of homicide but he appealed contending that he only acted in self defense and
in the alternative, he was only guilty of attempted homicide which is subject to probation.

ISSUE: WoN an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court
HELD: YES

While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right
to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege.
The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the
Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty , it is still up to
the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case.

It is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals “from the judgment of
conviction” is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting
opinion’ s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’
s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe
penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’ s judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’
s judgment—even if this has been found in error . And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court’ s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to
apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs,
the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? 

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v . Court of Appeals that the probation
law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he canavail
himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
Francisco and this case.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.

*The victim did not die and the medical proof showed that the injuries sustained were not fata.
Thus Arnel was convicted only of Attempted Homicide.

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

 7 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

April 6, 1995
BELLOSILLO,J.:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender . It

essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit
his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law
expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to
wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal,
the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies
for probation as an “escape hatch” thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’ s affirmance
of his conviction. Consequently , probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity ,
contrition and remorse.

ISSUE: WoN Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his
conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the
penalties imposed
HELD: NO

Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency
or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the
offense of which he stands convicted.
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all. Accordingly , the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the
court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society , and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to

divest the state or its government of any of the latter ’ s prerogatives, rights or remedies,
unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them

Sec. 4 of the Probation Law , as amended, clearly mandates that “no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction”

Therefore, that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express
mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation Law , as amended, which opens with a negative clause, “no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
 8 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

+) At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were

already pr obationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to educe the penalties to
within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found
guilty of severaloffenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of
the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his
eligibility for , nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct
from each other , and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law ,
i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise
specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties
imposed, taken separately , are within the probationable period.

+)Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to r educe or even correct the penalties imposed by
the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more.

+)The application for pr obation was filed way beyond the

period allowed by law. This is vital and crucial. From the records itis clear that the
application for probation was filed “only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had
been issued x x x (and)almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision” of the R
TC
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on the proposition that an application for probation
may yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction
already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence

Accordingly , considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats

appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his
conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and
in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety
of the penalties imposed on him, and finally , he filed an application for probation outside
the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the
instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

Llamado vs. Court of Appeals

June 29, 1989
FELICIANO, J.

The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner’ s application for probation which
was filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the records of
the case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued
the notice to file Appellant’ s Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellant’ s
Brief had been sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals but before actual filing
of such brief, is barred under P .D. No. 968, as amended

HELD: NO

The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The
Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case except for execution
 9 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016

of judgment. Moreover , having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
is not at liberty
casually to attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the
argument is mooted by the conclusion that we have reached, that is, that petitioner ’ s right to
apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

MORENO V COMELEC

A disqualification case was filed against Moreno from running for the position of Punong
Barangay due to his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention for which he was granted
pardon.
Local Govt Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence

ISSUE: WoN Moreno served his sentence thereby making him disqualified from running
HELD: NO, therefore he may run

An order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather , in effect, a

suspension of the imposition of sentence.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified
from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public
office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly , the period within which a per
is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the
Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of
the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed
in the probation order .

Thus, those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which,
we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be
disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of
ineligibility under Se 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
10 [SPL] PROBATION
KGM2016