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SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA vs.

ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN


G.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015
FACTS:The petitioners-spouses Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Sonkin (Sps. Sonkin) are
adjoining landowners. The property owned by the Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in
elevation than that owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property).
The Sps Sonkin constructed a house on their property using a portion of the partition wall as part of
the wall of the master’s bedroom and bathroom.

Thereafter, the Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of their property making it even higher
than that of the Sonkin Property. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from
the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as
well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that
Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had
dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded.

Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The CA on appeal ruled that while the act of the Sps Vergara in elevating their property was the
proximate cause of the water seepage, the Sps. Sonkin were guilty of contributory negligence in
building their house directly abutting the perimeter wall. Thus, it deleted the actual damages
ordered by the RTC. It nevertheless awarded the Sonkins moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Hence this appeal by the Sps Vergara.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps Sonkin are entitled to moral damages
HELD: NO. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection.

The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps.
Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the
perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is nevertheless
guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under
the National Building Code, but also for disregarding the legal easement (to receive water from
higher estates) constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally
bear their own loss.

In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to delete the award
of moral damages in their favor. While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
they are only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, Petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG,
Respondents.
Facts:In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon
at Tambo,Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to
roam aroundIligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.At around past
10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, theytraversed the
highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy.Sto. Rosario, they figuredin an
accident with a Tamarawjeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by
ReynaldoGamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The
incident resulted inthe instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.Respondents, the heirs of
Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminaryattachment against the
petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to includethe claim by Joel
Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle.On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the
courta quorendered a decision in favor of the Castillonheirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20% in
view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claimof Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he
is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the realparty in interest. Accordingly, his
complaint is dismissed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?( Lambert insists that the
negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate deathand therefore she is
not liable for damages.)

Held:Yes.The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account


of thevictim’s negligence.
Article 2179 reads as follows:

When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recoverdamages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injurybeing the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigatethe damages to be awarded.The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that
a plaintiff who is partly responsible for hisown injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his ownnegligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only
for the damages actually caused by hisnegligence.

The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on


thecircumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the
mishap: (1)was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamarawjeepney; (3)
has imbibed oneor two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.

These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to
Sergio, contributed to the sameresult. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and
determined in terms ofpercentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant toRakes v. AG & P, the heirs
of Ray Castillon shallrecover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by theprivate respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989

Facts:A rig driven by appellant bumped an old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St.,
Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's rig was following another
at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was
approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep
down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road.
The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just
closed his store in market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw
the incident right before him, shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when
the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped
the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant
went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was
unconscious, and the food and viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The
victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours
later. ). The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged.

Issue:Whether the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident
which led to her death.

Ruling:The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed
through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the
effects of his own negligence.
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO, respondents.
FACTS: the plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on the course of the trip from
Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant BerfolCamoro. It was registered
under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando
Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to
turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the
vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to
his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he suffered
injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. (Exh. "D"). Because of his shock and injuries, he
went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. Upon
his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries,
and also requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for
the watch. In spite of the efforts of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for P 852.70
could no longer be found.

Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed breach of contract against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon
and BerfolCamoro in city court of cebu. Respondent said such was beyond the control of the
respondents taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly
used at the time it blew up. Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and
against the respondents. Judge Leonardo B. Canares court of first instance cebureversed the
judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a
fortuitous event.
ISSUE: WON it was FORTITOUS? NO

HELD: The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was
running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner
that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its
right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at
the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat
and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still
visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was
presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were
taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden
blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled
by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was
caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and
legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the
safety of passengers at all times. Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects.
Southern College vs C.A.

Facts:Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner
owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road.On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in
the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila.Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of
the roofing of private respondents house.After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the
destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna.Pertinent aspects of the latters Report dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the
area and the general direction of the wind.Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road,
receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those
located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.Another factor and
perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper
anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete
roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.Still, there are
other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to
the roof beams.
It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of
persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a structural
hazard.

Issue: Whether Southern College can use Article 1174 of the civil code as a defense against damages.
Holding: No,The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which
defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.Escriche
elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted.Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that Fortuitous events may be produced by two general
causes: (1)by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and(2)by the act of man,
such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.In order that
a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.An act of
God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not
trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.When a persons negligence concurs with an act of
God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing
that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.When the
effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man whether it be from active
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full
credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject school buildings roofing had no
sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds.Based on such
finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to
private respondents.After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court
believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.After a
careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this
rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.There is no question that a
typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is
unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care.In order to be exempt from liability
arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human
participation amounting to a negligent act.In other words, the person seeking exoneration from
liability must not be guilty of negligence.Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which
naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others.It may be the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,or the omission to
do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged
Decision is REVERSED.The complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial
court a quo is ordered DISMISSED and the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 in said case is
SET ASIDE.Accordingly, private respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioner any amount or
property received by them by virtue of said writ.
AFIALDA v. HISOLE CASE DIGEST

FACTS: Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses Hisole as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending the animals, he was gored by one of them
and later died as a consequence of his injuries.
Plaintiff (elder sister of deceased) seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may
cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

ISSUE: whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.

RULING: No. The animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was
paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by
the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
PLAINTIFF’s ASSUMPTION OF RISK
FACTS:The Court had occasion to rule when the doctrine of assumption of risk was not available
against a person who braved a typhoon to save her property. a strong typhoon by the code name
"Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its
wake.After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased
Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio
Yabes, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she
was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a
Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a
ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side
by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased screamed
"Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from
doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came
out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from
her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
The heirs of the deceased filed an action for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE:WON assumption of risk will apply in this case?

HELD:NO. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the
case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable
presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he
must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another
is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property
(Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place
where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect
her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages
as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence
Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes
FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of
Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for
damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:


Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of
Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According
to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for
him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as
soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people
around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him
to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister,
Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr.
Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since
the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr.
Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate
consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to
finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly
kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the
request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to
know what happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim
who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in
requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel
industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence,
petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code.
POLO S. PANTALEON, PETITIONER, VS.AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife, daughter and son joined an escortedtour of Western
Europe in October of 1991. The tour group arrived in Amsterdam in the afternoon of 25 October 1991,
thesecond to the last day of the tour. As the group had arrived late in the city, theyfailed to engage
in any sight-seeing so they agreed that they would start early thenext day to see the entire city
before ending the tour.The following day, the last day of the tour, the group arrived at the Coster
DiamondHouse. The group had agreed that the visit to Coster should end by 9:30 a.m. toallow enough
time to take in a guided city tour of Amsterdam.

While at Coster, Mrs. Pantaleon decided to purchase some diamond pieces worth a total of
US$13,826.00. Pantaleon presented his American Express credit card to the sales clerk to pay for this
purchase. He did this at around 9:15 a.m. The sales clerk swiped the credit card and asked Pantaleon
to sign the charge slip, which was then electronically referred to AMEX's Amsterdam office at 9:20
a.m. The clearance took too long and at 9:40am, Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel thesale to
avoid further delaying and inconveniencing the tour group. At around 10:00a.m, 30 minutes after
the tour group was supposed to have left the store, Costerdecided to release the items even without
respondent’s approval of the purchase. Due to the delay, however, the city tour of Amsterdam was
to be canceled due to lack of remaining time. The spouses Pantaleon allegedly offered their apologies
but weremet by their tourmates with stony silence and visible irritation. Mrs. Pantaleon endedup
weeping, while her husband had to take a tranquilizer to calm his nerves. Two more instances
similar to the Castor incident happened when they proceeded to the United States after the trip to
Europe. Again, Pantaleon experienced delay in securing approval for purchases using his American
Express credit card when he wanted to purchase golf equipment in the amount of US$1,475.00 at the
Richard Metz Golf Studio in New York on October 30, 1991. Another delay occurred when he wanted
to purchase children's shoes worth US$87.00 at the Quiency Market in Boston.
After coming back to Manila, Pantaleonsent a letterdemanding an apology for the"inconvenience,
humiliation and embarrassment he and his family thereby suffered"for respondent’s refusal to
provide credit authorization for the aforementionedpurchases.
Respondentrefused to give an apology, sent a letter stating among others that thedelay in
authorizing the purchase from Coster was attributable to the circumstancethat the charged purchase
of US $13,826.00 "was out of the usual charge purchasepattern established."
Dissatisfied with this explanation, Pantaleon filed an action for damages against the credit card
company with the Makati City RTC which he won. The CA however reversed the award of damages
in favor of Pantaleon, holding that respondenthad not breached its obligations to petitioner for the
delay was not attended by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Respondent "had exercised diligent
efforts to effect the approval" of thepurchases, which were "not in accordance with the charge
pattern" petitionerhad established for himself.
ISSUE:Whether respondent AMEX has committed a breach of its obligations and is liable for
damages.

RULING:Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved “within seconds,” there
really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit
card company to approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one specifically contracted
upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently unreasonable length of time to approve or
disapprove a credit card purchase.

The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s purchase, but
the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even
assuming that AmEx’s credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment,
we see no reason why it could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for the delay, and
duly advised him that resolving the same could take some time.

The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred delay, but
because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual
attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a deadline for the completion of
that purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling
companions – gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernest Kramer, Jr. and
Marta Kramer was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near the
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel (M/V
Asia Philippines) owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. Due to the collision, F/B Marjolea sank,
taking along its fish catch. The captains of both vessels filed a protest with the Board of Marine
Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard for the purpose of determining the proximate cuase of the
maritime collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the collision was due to the
negligence of the employees of private respondent (Trans-Asia). On the basis of such decision, the
Philippine Coast Guard, on April 29, 1982, suspended M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer. On May 30,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for damages in the RTC,
Pasay City. Private respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription based on Art. 1146 of the
Civil Code which provides, ‘An action based upon quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years from
the day the quasi-delcit was committed. The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of the Board’s
resolution that there was a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, hence,
the prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the
negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. On appeal to the CA,
the said court reversed the RTC’s decision and granted the MTD, hence the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:Whether a complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent
arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING:Yes. QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON


OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ELEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION. — In Español vs. Chairman,
Philippine Veterans Administration, his Court held "The right of action accrues when there exists a
cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only
when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has
arisen . . ." It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or
takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the
plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON A QUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4)
YEARS. — Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the
collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision.

ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
COUNTED FROM DAY OF COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF DETERMINATION BY AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. — In this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels
the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved
party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry,
that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action
for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners,
agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of
petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was
filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.

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