AIAA Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit AIAA 2008-6867

18 - 21 August 2008, Honolulu, Hawaii

Airplane Upsets: Old Problem, New Issues*

A. A. Lambregts†, G. Nesemeier‡, J. E. Wilborn§, and R. L. Newman**
Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind Avenue South, Renton, Washington 98057

Loss-of-control (LOC) accidents remain a major type of accidents to transport airplanes.

Recent high profile accidents, such as American 587 in New York have emphasized the im-
portance of identifying trends and developing strategies for preventing such mishaps. We re-
viewed fifteen years of LOC accidents to transport airplanes. We found seventy-four acci-
dents including 3241 fatalities. Major areas of concern are 27 stall accidents, 20 accidents
with ice contaminated airfoils, and eight spatial disorientation accidents. Ten accidents were
exacerbated by faulty pilot recovery technique. These areas appear promising for accident
prevention.

Nomenclature
AOA Angle-of-attack
CFIT Controlled flight into terrain
LOC Loss of control
VMC Minimum control speed (with engine-out)
-max Maximum angle-of-attack commanded by full aft stick in Airbus airplanes
-prot Angle-of-attack triggering Airbus alpha protection flight control law

I. Introduction

A. Background
Loss of control (LOC) accidents remain a major type of accidents to transport aircraft. The Boeing summary of
commercial jet transport accidents1 lists 19 (out of 89 total accidents) fatal LOC accidents to worldwide commercial
jet airplanes. This is second only to the 20 controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accidents. If we add windshear or
thunderstorm accidents, the total of 19 LOC accidents becomes 22. In recent years, the addition of electronic means
to prevent CFIT accidents has reduced the percentage of these. At this point, the industry hasn’t yet incorporated
widespread LOC prevention.
Recent high-profile accidents, such as American Flight 587 in New York, have emphasized the importance of
studying LOC accidents and upsets. This paper reports a review of LOC accidents with the goal of identifying trends
and developing strategies for preventing these mishaps.
B. Definition of “Upset”
The generally accepted industry definition of an aircraft upset is any event with
Pitch exceeding +25/-10 degrees,
Bank angle exceeding ±45 degrees, or
Inappropriate airspeed.2 3 4
This definition is not entirely satisfactory. In particular, the use of fixed pitch and bank values is inappropriate
over a wide variation of altitudes. Thirty degrees of bank might be controllable at low altitude, but could lead to con-
trol problems at high altitude. The A-320 accident to Armavia Flight 967 at Sochi had a pitch attitude of only -5 de-

*
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent official agency policy.
†
Chief Scientist and Technical Advisor for Control Systems, ANM-113N, Member AIAA
‡
Senior Aerospace Engineer, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, ANM-130S, Senior Member AIAA
§
Project Officer, Transport Standards Staff, ANM-113
**
Aerospace Engineer, Transport Standards Staff, ANM-111, Associate Fellow AIAA

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This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
grees, well within the limits described above. Nevertheless at the low altitude with no clear surface features apparent,
this attitude was certainly not normal and resulted in an accident with 113 fatalities.
For this reason, we prefer attitude limits based on normal or abnormal operations. An upset is any uncommanded
or inadvertent event with an abnormal
Aircraft attitude,
Rate of change of aircraft attitude,
Acceleration,
Airspeed, or
With an inappropriate flight trajectory
An obvious complexity to this definition is the requirement to determine from the phase of flight and aircraft type
those attitudes, etc. that are “abnormal.” Nevertheless, we feel that this added complexity is worth the effort.

II. Approach
We reviewed “upset” accidents for the past fifteen years. We confined the review to accidents to scheduled air-
line operators (such as US Part 121 operators or scheduled US Part 135 operators) using Transport and Commuter
Category airplanes. We reviewed both foreign and domestic operators. Accidents during engine-out ferry* and test
flights were excluded.
This review used four online databases: the National Transportation Safety Board5, Aviation Safety Network6,
Australian Transport Safety Bureau7, and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board8 databases. We also reviewed
the database by Dorsett9 which includes accidents from many countries. The keywords used were “loss of control,”
“upset,” “unusual attitude,” or “stall.” For the NTSB search, operating rules were restricted to Parts 121, 125, 129,
and 135. Accidents resulting from midair collisions (e. g., Gol Flight 1907), criminal or deliberate activities (e. g.,
Egyptair Flight 990), in-flight fire (e. g., Swissair Flight 111) or pilot incapacitation (e. g., Helios Flight 522) were
culled from the list. Part 135 accidents involving light airplanes were also excluded. The reader is reminded that the
purpose of this review is not to determine a “score” for one type of accident or another. It is to discover trends
1. Use of multiple sources
During this review, we found that discussions with other agencies and with manufacturers were hampered by the
identification used for accident and incident data. It is customary in the US to refer to accidents by airline and flight
number or by the city. Often the city is a suburb of the ultimate destination, such as Aliquippa, Pennsylvania for an
accident on approach to Pittsburg.
Foreign authorities and investigation agencies usually use the aircraft registration, while manufacturers usually
refer to the manufacturer’s serial number or the line number. These two schemata do provide unique references to a
particular airplane, although a given airplane may have different registrations during its lifetime.
The use of multiple identifications may hamper searches using more than one database. While we have included
the familiar (at least in the USA) airline and flight number in this paper, we recommend future studies use aircraft
registration as the identification schema.
2. Additional upset data
We found some historical upset accidents and incidents during the search. These events were not included in Ta-
ble A because they occurred outside the 1993-2007 time period under study. Because they may add to the discussion,
they are listed in the Appendix in Table B.

III. Results
Seventy-fouraccidents and incidents were identified and are listed in Table A in the Appendix. There were 42
hull loss accidents and 3241 fatalities. Table I summarizes the data.
Generally, the decision to include or exclude a particular accident was immediately obvious. The classic spiral
dive accidents are representative of such obvious choices. Examples include the B-737s at Sharm el Sheikh (Flash
Airlines Flight 604) and the Makassar Strait, Indonesia (Adam Air Flight 574).
Three other accidents, however, point out difficulties in categorizing accidents. Two were the A-320 accidents
following missed approaches in Bahrain (Gulf Air Flight 072) and in Sochi (Armavia Flight 967); the third was a
takeoff accident in Zurich by a Citation business jet. In these cases the pilots were misled by illusions† and flew the

*
However, normal ferry flights and training flights were included.
†
Such as the somatogravic illusion10 which occurs when an forward acceleration is interpreted as an increase in aircraft pitch
attitude.

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airplanes into the surface. We classified these accidents as Upset/misjudged flight path caused by spatial disorienta-
tion and not as CFIT.*
Table I: Summary of Upset and Loss-of-Control Events to Transport Airplanes
Cause Number Fatalities
Aerodynamic Stall
includes 9 involving contaminated airfoil
27 848
6 autopilot-induced stalls
only common factor is no envelope protection
Flight Control System
includes 7 flight control malfunctions or failures
6 autopilot malfunctions or failures
16 604
(excluding autopilot induced stalls)
3 flight control software issues
Spatial Disorientation
includes 5 classic spiral dives
8 630
only common factor is no envelope protection
3 upset/misjudged flight path
Contaminated Airfoil
8 200
excludes 9 stalls which are included above
Atmospheric Disturbance
6 477
includes 3 wake vortex encounters
Other 6 122
Undetermined 4 380
Total 75 3261

IV. Discussion
Table II shows the data grouped by related descriptions. As we group the events into related causes and factors,
several patterns emerge.

A. Stalls
There were twenty-seven stalls with 848 fatali- Table II: Patterns in Upset Accidents
ties in our fifteen year sample. They are more or Type of Event Number Fatalities
less evenly split among the various phases of flight Stalls
with turboprop stalls slightly more likely in descent 27 848
15 Eight jet models
and jet stalls slightly more in climb and cruise. (36%) (26%)
12 Five prop models
None of the reported stalls were on airplanes Contaminated Airfoils (Ice)
equipped with fly-by-wire envelope protection. 12 Booted airplanes
1. Autopilot-induced stalls 20 294
1 Heated airfoil
There were six reported instances of autopilots (27%) (9%)
2 Unprotected airfoil
flying the airplane into a stall. In autopilot-induced 5 On takeoff
stalls, the autopilot attempts to maintain a vertical Spatial Disorientation
speed profile or a selected altitude in a thrust- 8 630
5 Classic spiral dive
limited situation. If the airplane slows to the point (11%) (19%)
3 upset/misjudged flight path
that the drag increases with decreasing speed (the
so-called backside of the power curve), autopilots without airspeed protection will continue to command more and
more up elevator which will ultimately lead to a stall. The effect is exacerbated by any maneuvering to change course
or to avoid traffic or weather.
While there were six reported cases in our sample, Ferrante reports forty-two occurrences of autopilot stalls to
MD-80s.† Twenty-two of his cases were reported by the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System11 with the rest

* In a classic CFIT accident, the crew flies a perfectly good airplane into terrain because of a lack of awareness of the terrain’s
proximity. In these accidents, the crew knew they were close to the surface but failed to maintain a positive climb angle – in
short, they misjudged their trajectory.
†
Olivier Ferrante, BEA, unpublished data

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reported elsewhere. We chose not to use anonymous data reporting because of the difficulties in verifying the data.
Only two of Ferrante’s occurrences were found in our review of the accident databases (Spirit Airlines Flight 970
and West Caribbean Flight 967).
2. High altitude stalls
Most stalls occurred at low altitude. Only four reported stalls occurred above FL250. Two MD-80s and one B-
757 at FL330, and one CL-600 at FL410. Incidentally, the two MD-80 and the CL-600 stalls were all autopilot-
induced. The B-757 stall involved an erroneous airspeed indicator.

B. Contaminated airfoil
There were twenty events accounting for 294 fatalities. These included nine stalls and six other loss-of-control
cases during up-and-away flight. Of these, twelve happened to airplanes equipped with pneumatic boots and one to a
turboprop equipped with heated wings. Two incidents were pilot-induced oscillations caused by ice accretion on
unprotected flap airfoils during approach to landing.
During the same time period, there were five attempted takeoffs with ice or frost on the airfoils. No distinction
should be made between booted or heated wings for takeoff accidents since neither type of ice-protection system will
remove ice during a takeoff.
The numbers of fatalities is low in proportion to the number of events because the typical airplane involved is
generally a smaller transports and business jets with fewer occupants.
C. Spatial disorientation
There were eight spatial disorientation events with 632 fatalities.
1. Classic spiral dive
In January 2004, Flash Airlines Flight 604 crashed in a spiral dive shortly after takeoff from Sharm el Sheikh,
Egypt. This accident brought attention to a misconception that spatial disorientation was a general aviation or mili-
tary problem only. The review shows a number of spiral dive upsets to transport airplanes. A number of models,
some with alerts for excessive bank angle, are represented in the list. The only common factor seems to be the ab-
sence of envelope protection. Many fly-by-wire designs incorporate envelope protection which effectively limits the
bank angle with no pilot input to less than ~35 degrees – avoiding the divergent spiral mode.
2. Misjudged flight path
A less common form of spatial disorientation is the somatogravic illusion – an illusion of an extreme pitch up
caused by a forward acceleration during a missed approach. This illusion was cited as a factor in the Gulf Air Flight
072 at Bahrain.12 The somatogravic illusion was also mentioned in the similar accident to Armavia Flight 967 at So-
chi, but could not be positively confirmed. The pitch attitude was approximately -10 degrees at Bahrain and -5 de-
grees at Sochi. At the low altitudes with no visible surface features, these pitch attitudes and the resulting flight path
angles were fatal to the airplanes and occupants. A similar accident, although during takeoff, happened to Cessna
CE-560, HB-VLV, at Zurich.
Normally, fly-by-wire with envelope protection is thought to be an absolute mitigation for spatial disorientation
accidents. While this is true for the classic spiral dive, it provides limited or no protection the low altitude soma-
togravic illusion.
D. Recovery technique
Pilot recovery technique was faulted in eleven occurrences
with 1107 fatalities as shown in Table III. These included five Table III. Incidents with Faulty Recoveries
improper stall recoveries and four improper spiral dive recov- Faulty Recovery Number Fatalities
eries. The typical recovery problem seems to be excessive Spiral Dives 5 506
angle-of-attack.13 Pilots in the failed spiral dive recovery typi- Stalls 5 336
cally apply excessive back elevator, in one case pulling 3.8 g’s Wake Vortex Encounter 1 265
until the airframe failed (Adam Air Flight 574). Total 11 1107
Stall recovery techniques seem to also exhibit a reluctance
to reduce back pressure on the elevator which of course tends to prolong the stall condition. Even some flight control
malfunctions are adversely affected by excessive back pressure – during the accident to USAir 427, the crew was
applying up-elevator all the way to the ground. Gawron et al.13 stated that one recurring theme was the “difficulty of
reducing the angle of attack to enhance aerodynamic performance”.

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E. Flight Controls
While flight control and autopilot problems caused thirteen events with 604 fatalities, the causes were varied and
no particular pattern is apparent. There were four cases of autopilot-commanded upsets. Two of these were caused
by the flight crew attempting to override the autopilot causing abnormal trimming to occur. There were two cases of
out-of-trim conditions. Other upsets were caused by flight control failures, such as a rudder hardover (US Air Flight
427) or an inadvertent loss of a slat (China Eastern Flight 583)
1. Pitch-up in cruise
One incident deserves special comment. On 2 October 2000, a Turkish Airlines A-340, TC-JDN, was eastbound
at FL360 over the North Atlantic.14 The aircraft entered a region of turbulence resulting in variations in pitch, air-
speed, and altitude. On one particularly vigorous fluctuation, the airplane’s Mach number increased briefly to 0.87
which automatically disengaged the autopilot. There were continuing speed fluctuations. The autothrottles were dis-
engaged five seconds after the autopilot disengaged. Ten seconds after autopilot disengagement, the angle-of-attack
reached -prot. This resulted in a change in the flight control laws to protect the airplane from stalling. The AOA
protection law uses the fore-and-aft motion of the sidestick to command the angle-of-attack between -prot at neutral
sidestick to -max at full aft sidestick. Any forward sidestick motion cancels the AOA protection. Since no sidestick
commands were made for some additional 18 seconds, the flight control system was essentially holding -prot. The
result was a pitch-up to 15 degrees nose up. The airplane gained approximately 2400 ft. In this case, the flight con-
trol software was attempting to limit angle-of-attack (envelope protection) but triggered a fairly significant pitch and
altitude excursion. While the incident report was primarily concerned about traffic conflicts, we believe it is also an
example of envelope protection causing an upset.
2. Redundancy issues
In 2 August 2005, A B-777, Malaysia Flight 124 suffered an upset during climb at FL380. The crew received
multiple alerts and pitched up gaining 3000 ft. The crew was able to disconnect the autopilot and regain enough con-
trol to land the airplane. The cause was a faulty accelerometer. The FAA issued an airworthiness directive to ensure
the flight control software does not use known faulty sensors. In 1991, a military V-22 suffered a loss of control
when an accelerometer failed after the flight had been dispatched with an inoperative one. Most modern fly-by-wire
systems use a multiplicity of sensors with failure management designed into the system. However, this permits latent
faults to exist. These two incidents point out the need for careful attention to minimum equipment list requirements.
F. Comparison with Historical Accidents
During the accident review, we found some pre-1993 accidents which are not included in the previous results.
While this search was not as thorough as the fifteen year search, it serves to identify any trends or changes in recent
years. Table B (in the Appendix) lists the specific accidents.
Table IV compares these earlier upsets with Table IV: Comparison Between Recent and Earlier Upset Incidents
the 1993-2007 search. Because the search was Cause Pre-1993 1993 to 20077
not as thorough, we used percentage rather than Number Percent Percent
actual numbers. Relatively speaking, the recent Aerodynamic Stall 7 16% 36%
list of incidents shows more stall, flight control, Atmospheric Disturbance 7 16% 8%
and icing incidents. The earlier list shows more Spatial Disorientation 5 12% 11%
VMC-loss-of-control and airframe incidents. The VMC Loss-of-control 5 12% 3%
Instrument Failure 5 12% 1%
fatality numbers may be skewed because of the Airframe Failure 5 12% 1%
large numbers of casualties resulting from three Flight Control System 4 9% 22%
airframe failures: Japan Flight 123, Turkish Contaminated Airfoil 1 2% 11%
Flight 981, and American Flight 191. Other/Undetermined 4 9% 8%
Total 43
There also appear to be fewer classical spiral
dive disorientation accidents, although the mis-
judged flight trajectory was represented in the earlier list.
There were more VMC loss-of-control accidents in the earlier list including three training accidents. The use of
simulators for crew training is the likely reason for fewer such accidents today.
G. Relevant research
Calspan Corporation conducted NASA and FAA sponsored research to investigate the effect of acrobatic experi-
ence, airline-upset simulator training, and in-flight upset training on the ability of pilots to recover from a number of
accident scenarios.2 13 The initial results indicated the effectiveness of a dedicated in-flight upset training, but the

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program was not extended to evaluate how long the training would remain effective or when the best point in a pi-
lot’s career for such training..
The FAA is currently sponsoring research to address some of the accident scenarios. Some of this work was an
outcome of the accident to American 587 in New York. We are in the second year of a piloted simulation study to
examine pilot use of rudders during aggressive recoveries from rolling upsets15. This study is being conducted by
Hoh Aeronautics in the NASA Vertical Motion Simulator at Ames Research Center.
The FAA sponsored IATA to conduct a worldwide survey of line pilots. The results are still being analyzed, but
indicate that overuse of the rudder may be more common that previously thought.*
While envelope protection appears to be a viable technique to prevent spiral dives or stalls, it is not apparent how
to apply this to existing non-fly-by-wire airplanes. The FAA is sponsoring Sensis Corporation to determine the feasi-
bility and benefits of envelope protection to general aviation airplanes and whether this can be retrofitted to existing
airframes. If this general aviation program appears promising, a planned follow-on will evaluate retrofit applications
for transport airplanes.

V. Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn.
First, upset/loss-of-control accidents are not problems confined to general aviation or military fighters. LOC inci-
dents happen, often with catastrophic results, to transport airplanes in scheduled service.
Second, upsets and LOC are not phenomena of yesteryear; rather, they continue to occur on a regular basis.
Third, there is no “silver bullet” that will solve all such accidents. Envelope protection will not help the icing
losses of control nor will it prevent proprioceptive illusions, such as the somatogravic illusions. Even the most com-
mon upset, a stall, amounts to less than a third of the incidents. There needs to be parallel approaches to address pre-
vention and recovery from these upsets. In particular, the use of prevention – envelope protection – appears to be
very effective.

Appendix
Table A: List of Upset Accidents, 1993-2007
Date Model Regis. Loc Flight Description Phase Fat Cause
5May07 B-737 5Y-KYA FKKD KQA 507 Crashed in a spiral; right Initial 114 Disorientation
roll to 35deg; then right climb
aileron; pilot call for auto-
pilot
17Mar07 CE-500 N-511AT KBVY Rolled ""steeply"" to right - Landing – Contaminated
- rime ice; boots not used" flare airfoil
1Jan07 B-737 PK-KKW DHI 574 Troubleshooting; loss of Cruise 102 Disorientation
situation awareness – upset
29Oct06 B-737 5N-BFK DNAA ADK 053 Windshear; apparent stall; Initial 96 Stall
trim full nose up. 35 deg climb
alpha
22Aug06 Tu-154 RA-85185 PLK 612 Lost control in severe tur- Cruise 170 Atmospheric
bulence disturbance
3May06 A-320 EK-32009 URSS RNV 967 Crew applied excessive Missed 113 Disorientation
nose down pitch commands approach
2Jan06 SF-340 N-380AE SIM 3008 Upset during icing encoun- Climb Stall
ter; autopilot-induced stall
19Dec05 G-73T N-2969 KMPB CHK 101 Right wing separated Initial 20 Airframe Fail-
Climb ure
22Oct05 B-737 5N-BFN BVU 210 Crashed after takeoff Climb 117 Undetermined
5Sep05 B-737 PK-RIM WIMM MDL 091 Crashed after takeoff Initial 145 Undetermined
climb
5Sep05 B-737 PR-BRY BRB 907 Uncommanded bank (58 Cruise Autopilot
deg right wing down) by
autopilot
16Aug05 MD-80 HK-4374X WCW 708 Speed decay @ FL330; Cruise 160 Stall
autopilot-induced stall
1Aug05 B-777 9M-MRG MAS 124 Pitch-up caused by fault Climb Flight controls
sensors

*
Robert C. Jones, FAA, unpublished data

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Date Model Regis. Loc Flight Description Phase Fat Cause
27May05 DHC-8 C-GZKH CYYT Stalled in VS mode, icing Climb Stall
conditions
16Feb05 CE-560 N-500AT KPUB Icing induced stall Descent Stall
28Nov04 CL-600 N-873G KMTJ GLB 073 Stall during takeoff in icing Initial 3 Stall
conditions climb
21Nov04 CL-600 B-3072 ZBOW CES 5210 Takeoff with frost on wing; Initial 55 Stall
stalled shortly after rotation climb
14Oct04 CL-600 N-8396A FLG 3701 Double engine flame-out Cruise 2 Stall
following non-standard
climb to FL 410; autopilot
VS mode led to aerody-
namic stall
18Jun04 SF-340 VH-KEQ Stall during descent follow- Descent Contaminated
ing Icing encounter airfoil
3Jan04 B-737 SU-ZCF HESH FLS 604 Loss of control. spiral dive Climb 148 Disorientation
into water
23Dec03 LR-24 N-600XJ Uncontrolled flight Into Climb 2 Undetermined
terrain
3Oct03 CV-580 ZK-KFU AFN 642 Stalled during severe icing Cruise 2 Stall
encounter
8Jul 03 B-737 ST-AFK HSSP SUD 139 Failed to climb on single Missed 116 Undetermined
engine missed approach approach
23Apr03 BE-99 C-FDYF CYPA Detached actuator, pitch up Approach Flight controls
to near vertical
8Jan03 BE-1900 N-233YV KCLT AMW 5481 Loss of pitch control during Initial Flight controls
takeoff climb
21Dec02 ATR-72 B-22708 TNA 791 Stalled during descent Descent 2 Stall
while on autopilot
7Dec02 A-320 C-GJVX CYYZ ACA 457 Roll PIO @ 140AGL, firm Approach Contaminated
landing airfoil
7Dec02 A-320 C-GIUF CYYZ ACA 1130 Roll PIO @ 50AGL, go Approach Contaminated
around airfoil
20Oct02 B-757 TF-FII KBWI ICE 662 Instrument problem, stall in Climb Stall
climb @ FL330
28Jun02 SF-340 VH-OLM YBTH HZL 185 Inflight upset due to air- Approach Contaminated
frame icing airfoil
14Jun02 A-340 C-GHLM EDDF ACA 875 Noisy glideslope, pitch to Approach Autopilot
27 deg during GS capture
4Jun02 MD-80 N-823NK NKS 970 Engine roll-back @ FL330; Cruise Stall
autopilot-induced stall
4May02 BAC111 5N-ESF EXW 4226 Reportedly stalled Cruise 149 Stall
4Jan02 CL-600 N-90AG EGBB Takeoff with frost on wing; Initial 5 Stall
stalled shortly after rotation climb
20Dec01 CE-560 HB-VLV LSZH EGU 220 Loss of altitude and crash Initial Disorientation
following takeoff climb
12Nov01 A-300 N-14053 KJFK AAL 587 Wake vortex encounter Climb 265 Atmospheric
disturbance
4Jul01 Tu-154 RA-85845 UIII VLK 352 F/O allowed speed to decay Approach 145 Stall
during 360 on final: stall
19Mar01 E-120 N-266CA KPBA COM 5054 Stall in icing conditions Descent Stall
27Dec00 E-135 N-721HS KORD EGF 970 Excessive nose up trim -- Initial Flight controls
jammed stabilizer climb
26Oct00 CL-600 N-958CA COM Wake vortex encounter Cruise Atmospheric
disturbance
2Oct00 A-340 TC-JDN THY Pitchup to +15 deg with Cruise Flight controls
2400 ft altitude excursion
23Aug00 A-320 A40-EK OBBI GFA 072 Descent into sea: soma- Missed 143 Disorientation
togravic illusion approach
30Mar00 B-767 N-182DN KJFK DAL 106 Upset during climb Climb Disorientation
27Feb00 B-747 G-BDXL BAW 179 Autopilot induced pitch Descent Autopilot
upset to 5 deg ANU
16Feb00 DC-8 N-8079U KMHR EWW 17 Elevator failure at lift-off Takeoff 3 Flight controls
31Jan00 MD-80 N-963AS ASA 261 Loss of control and impact Cruise Flight controls
with water
10Jan00 SF-340 HB-AKK LSZH SWR 498 Loss of control during Climb 10 Disorientation
initial climb

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Date Model Regis. Loc Flight Description Phase Fat Cause
22Dec99 B-747 HL-7451 EGSS KAL 8509 Known problem with ADI; Climb 4 Instrument
upset during climb failure
18Oct99 SF-340 SE-LES GAO 750 Autopilot-induced Stall
stall/icing
7Apr99 B-737 TC-JEP THY 5904 Crashed after takeoff Climb 6 Stall
11Nov98 SF-340 VH-LPI KDA Icing-induced stall Holding Stall
16Jun98 SF-340 SE-LEP GAO 758 Autopilot-induced Stall
stall/icing
16Feb98 A-300 B-1814 RCTP CES 676 Pitch up on go-around Approach 203 Autopilot
12May97 A-300 N-90070 KPBI AAL 903 Inflight loss of control Descent Stall
9Jan97 E-120 N-265CA KDTW COM 3272 Uncontrolled collision with Descent 29 Stall
terrain following icing
6Feb96 B-757 TC-GEN MDPP ALW 301 Crew mishandled erratic Climb 189 Stall
airspeed indicator
13Dec95 An-24 YR-AMR LIPX RMV 166 Contaminated airfoil; over- Initial 49 Contaminated
loaded climb airfoil
27Apr95 A-320 N-331NW KDCA NWA 352 PIO in Config 3 @ 200 ft Visual Flight controls
AGL. approach
max bank 30 deg
13Dec94 JS-32 N-918AE KRDU FLG 3379 Uncontrolled collision with Approach 15 Vmc:--loss-of-
terrain; incorrect engine control
failure procedures
11Dec94 B-737 N-681MA MRK 308 Abrupt autopilot pitchup Climb Autopilot
during climb @ FL120
31Oct94 ATR-72 N-401AM KORD SIM 4184 Inflight icing encounter and Holding 68 Contaminated
abrupt lateral departure airfoil
8Sep94 B-737 N-513AU KPIT USA 427 Abrupt lat/dir departure; Descent 132 Flight controls
uncontrolled collision with
terrain
2Jul94 DC-9 N-954VJ KRDU USA 1016 Windshear; lost control on Missed 37 Atmospheric
missed approach approach disturbance
29Jun94 MD-11 N-1752K AAL 901 Upset caused by inadver- Cruise Inadvertent
tent seat movement control input
26Apr94 A-300 B-1816 RJNN CAL140 Crew overrode A/P leading Approach 264 Autopilot
to an excessive nose high
pitch and subsequent stall
22Mar94 A-310 F-OFQS AFL 593 Unqualified pax at controls Cruise 75 Other
8Mar94 B-737 VT-SIA VIDP RSH Engine out training flight; Initial 8 VMC: -- loss-of-
student applied wrong climb control
rudder
7Jan94 JS-41 N-304UE KCMH ACA 291 Stall and loss of control on Approach 5 Stall
final approach
15Dec93 IAI-1124 N-309CK KSNA Wake vortex encounter Approach 5 Atmospheric
disturbance
18Aug93 DC-8 N-814CK MUGM CKS 808 Uncontrolled collision with Visual Stall
terrain approach
29Apr93 E-120 N-24706 JEK 2733 Autopilot-induced stall Climb Stall
7Apr93 B-757 C-FOOA Turbulence encounter and Cruise Atmospheric
in-flight upset disturbance
6Apr93 MD-11 B-2171 CES 058 Inadvertent in-flight slat Cruise 2 Flight controls
deployment
5Mar93 F-100 PH-KXL LWSK PMK 301 Lost control on initial Initial 83 Contaminated
climb resulting from ice on climb airfoil
wing
4Mar93 ATR-42 N-99838 KEWR BTA 3444 Icing/turbulence upset Approach Contaminated
airfoil

Table B: List of Upset Accidents, prior to 1993

Date Model Registr Loc Flight Description Phase Fat Cause
7Dec92 MD-11 B-150 CAL 012 Turblence/Loss of portions of Cruise Amospheric
elevators Distubance
22Mar92 F-28 N-466US KLGA USA 405 Takeoff and stall in icing Initial 27 Stall
conditions Climb
15Feb92 DC-8 N-794AL KTOL ATI 805 Captain takeover/SD recovery Approach 4 Disorientation
too late

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18Sep91 CV-580 CF-ICA Classic spiral, in-flight Cruise 2 Disorientation
breakup
11Sep91 E-120 N-33701 BTA 2574 Tail deice boots departed, Cruise 14 Airframe Fail-
pitchover to -3.5g ure
5Apr91 E-120 N-270AS KNEA ASO 2311 Propeller failure Descent 13 Airframe Fail-
ure
11Feb91 A-310 D-AOAC UUEE IF Crew overrode autopilot Missed Stall
Approach
19Jul89 DC-10 N-1819U KSUX UAL 232 Loss of hydraulics/flight Cruise 111 Flight Control
controls System
10Mar89 F-28 C-FONF CYHD ONT 1363 Takeoff with contaminated Initial 24 Contaminated
wings Climb airfoil
9Feb88 JS-31 N-823JS KSGH JSA VMC loss of cotrnol on train- Go 3 VMC Loss of
ing flight Around Control
4Mar87 C-212 N-160FB KDTW NWA 2268 Inflight use of beta/assymetric Approach 9 Pilot Tech-
thrust nique
12Aug85 B-747 JA8119 JAL 123 Loss of primary flight con- Cruise 520 Airframe (excl
trols because of aft bulkhead FCS)
failure
19Feb85 B-747 N-4522V CAL 006 In-flight upset Cruise Autopilot
21Jan85 L-188 N-5532 KRNO GAL 203 Stalled during return to air- Initial 70 Stall
port climb
30May84 L-188 N-5523 KCLE ZAN 931 "Upset caused by instrument Cruise 4 Instrument
failure inflight breakup" failure
9Jul82 B-727 N-4737 KMSY PAA 759 Crash on takeoff in micro- Iinitial 153 Atmospheric
burst climb disturbance
13Jan82 B-737 N-62AF KDCA FLZ 90 Stall on takeoff, Collision Initial 78 Stall
With 14th Street Bridge climb
11Nov79 DC-10 XA-DUH AMX 945 Autopilot-induced stall @ Climb Stall
FL298; in vertical speed
mode
25May79 DC-10 N-110AA KORD AAL 191 Lost engine/pylon; flight Initial 273 Airframe (excl
control problems climb FCS)
4Apr79 B-727 N-840TW TWA 841 In-flight upset Cruise Pilot technique
1Jan78 B-747 VT-EBB VABB AIC 855 Loss of control during climb; Climb 213 Instrument
bad attitude indicator failure
28Apr77 HS-125 N-40PC lost control overstressed Cruise Instrument
airframe" failure
13Oct76 B-707 N-730JP SLET LLB Crash on takeoff Initial 116 Vmc-loss-of-
climb control
7Aug75 B-727 N-88777 KDEN CAL Crash on takeoff in wind Initial Atmospheric
shear climb disturbance
1Dec74 B-727 N-274US NWA 6231 Pitot icing and loss of control Climb 3 Stall
3Mar74 DC-10 TC-JAV LFPO THY 981 Loss of control Climb 345 Airframe (excl
FCS)
18Jun72 HS-121 G-ARPI EGLL BEA 548 Stall from failure to maintain Climb 118 Stall
speed and premature droop
retraction
30May72 DC-9 N-3305L KDFW DAL 9570 Wake vortex encounter Approach 4 Atmospheric
- Final disturbance
8Sep70 DC-8 N-4865T KJFK TIA 893 uncommanded pitch up" Takeoff 11 Flight controls
5Jul70 DC-8 CF-TIW CYYZ ACA 621 "Premature spoiler deploy- Landing - 109 Loss-of-control
ment lost control on go flare
around"
24Jun69 CV-880 JA-8028 KMW JAL 090 Engine-out training Takeoff 3 Vmc-loss-of-
H control
18Jan69 B-727 N-7434U KLAX UAL 266 Loss of electrical system Climb 37 Instrument
failure
27Dec68 CV-580 N-2045 KORD NOR 458 Loss of control on missed Missed 28 Spatial disori-
approach approach entation
3May68 L-188 N-9707C BNF 352 subsequent structural over- Cruise 85 Atmospheric
load" disturbance
20Dec67 DC-8 N-802E KMSY DAL 9877 Crash short of runway Landing 18 Vmc-loss-of-
control
27Oct65 V-951 G-APEE EGLL BEA Entered steep dive following Missed 36 Spatial disori-
missed approach approach entation
25Feb64 DC-8 N-8607 KMSY EAL 304 ADI gearing a factor" Climb 58 Atmospheric
disturbance

9
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
12Feb63 B-720 N-724US KMIA NWA 705 Loss of control in turbulence Climb 43 Atmospheric
disturbance
21Dec61 DH-106 G-ARJM LTAC BEA Steep pitch up after TO; bad Initial 27 Instrument
horizon indicator climb failure
17Jun61 L-188 N-137US KORD NWA 706 Ailerons mis-rigged; loss of Initial 37 Flight controls
lateral control climb
15Aug59 B-707 N-7514A KCTO AAL "Crash near Peconic River Traffic 5 Vmc-loss-of-
Airport pattern control
3Feb59 B-707 N-712PA PAA 115 Inflight upset -- coffin corner Cruise Other
28Aug58 DC-6 N-575 KMSP NWA 537 Failed to climb after takeoff Initial Spatial disori-
climb entation

References
1
Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents: Worldwide Operations 1959-2006, Boeing Commercial Air-
plane Group, 2004
2
J. A. Kochan, J. E. Priest, and M. Moskal, “Human Factors Aspects of Upset Recovery Training,” paper presented at 17th
Annual European Aviation Safety Seminary, Warsaw, 14-16 March 2005
3
B. Wainwright, L. Rockliff, J. Cashman, T. Melody, D. Carbaugh, M. Cariker, and D. Forsyth, Aerodynamic Principles of
Large-Airplane Upsets, Airbus and Boeing white paper, 2002
4
R. L. Sumwalt, “Airplane Upset Recovery Training: A Line Pilot’s Perspective,” Flight Safety Digest, July-August 2003,
pp. 1-18
5
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp; last queried 30 July 2008
6
http://aviation-safety.net/database/; last queried 30 July 2008
7
http://www.atsb.gov.au; last queried 29 July 2008
8
http://www.tsb.gc.ca; last queried 29 July 2008
9
R. Dorsett, Aircraft Accident Reports on DVD, distributed by Flight Simulation Systems, 2006
10
F. H. Previc and W. R. Ercoline (eds.), Spatial Disorientation in Aviation, Reston, Virginia: American Institute of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics, 2004
11
MD80 Series Aircraft Stall Incidents, NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Search Request 6712, December 2005
12
A. H. Rupert, B. J. McGrath, and F. E. Guedry, “Gulf Air Flight GF-072 Perceptual Study,” Appendix E to Accident Report
on Gulf Air Airbus A320-212 (A40-EK), Night Landing, 2001
13
V. Gawron, B. A. Berman, R. K. Dismukes, and J. Peer, “Airplane Upset Recovery Raining: A Research Report Summary,”
Flight Safety Digest, July-August 2003, pp. 19-32
14
Proximity Incident Between Airbus A340 and A330, AAIB Bulletin No. 6/2001, 2001
15
R. H. Hoh, P. Desrochers, and T. K. Nicoll, Piloted Simulation Study to Develop Transport Aircraft Rudder Control Sys-
tem Requirements, Hoh Aeronautics TR-1137-4, April 2007

10
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics