Merida v People (Natural Resources)

MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST OFFICERS)

G.R. No. 158182
June 12, 2008

FACTS:

on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24
December 1998, 7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the
meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with
the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from
Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written
authorization signed by Calix's wife.

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into
lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property
and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the
lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A
larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an
investigation on the matter.

* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting],
gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang,
Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims
ownership.

* CA: affirmed trial court.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on
a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and

YES, DENR has jurisdiction.

[NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires
complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]

Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials,
shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file
the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized
officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a
private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not
conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report."

At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from
filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case
falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

YES.

Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied
cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions
bind him.

3) Is the narra tree timber?

YES.

The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber,"
includes "lumber" or "processed log."

In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or certain "stand age"
or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with a similar task of
having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is
punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its
ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common
acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree
saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot
be considered timber.

Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for
carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
C A S E D IGES T: MU S TA N G LU MBER V S . C A
11:03 AM

G.R. No. 104988

Mustang Lumber vs. CA
June 18, 1996

Petitioner lumber corporation assailed the nature of the seizure of its lumber products by respondents.

RULING:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not mentioned in express
terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised Forestry Code) must be
understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a processed log or timber.
The court said that since the law makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, neither should
we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with
the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls
under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of
the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that Secretary
Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since petitioner’s
license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized
articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

 AMADO TAOPA vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008

Corana, J.:

FACTS:

The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut
113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species without any authority and/or legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest, and thereby arrested its, driver, Placido
Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to
petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber, Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison
were charged for violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes. They pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. After trial, RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed
to CA, Cuison was acquitted but Taopa’s conviction was affirmed. However, a petition was filed by Taopa seeking his
acquittal from the charges against him alleging that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the owner of the seized
lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705.

HELD:

The RTC and CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa’s house and that Taopa and Ogalesco
were accompanying the truck drive by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa’s
exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck.

Thus, the court was convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber, Sec. 68 PD No. 705, as
amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC for the penalties imposed on violators. Violation of Sec. 68, PD No.
705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting, and possessing timber or other
forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The actual market
value of the 113 pcs of lumber was P67, 630.00. Following Article 310 in relation to 309, the imposable penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20
years plus as additional period of four years for the excess of P47, 630.00. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC.
 PEOPLE V. QUE

G.R. No. 120365

December 17, 1996

Ponente: Puno

FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging,
received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on
said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson
Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it
contained coconut slabs, but inserted therein where sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show a
permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68, which penalizes the
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the particular documents
necessary to make the possession legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the
enactment of said E.O. – YES.

Held: Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and regulations which were
already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the
law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws
and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Thus Que’s possession
of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.

Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that
the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is
legal. There are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is
immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of
forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal
source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents as malum prohibitum.
 CALUB V. CA
G.R. No. 115634
April 27, 2000
Ponente: Quisumbing

FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the
vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed
a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised
Forestry Code). Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted recovery of possession to them via replevin.
Upon petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle
pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place
said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or
his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the
conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on
that matter, added the appellate court.

The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. Additionally,
respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’
failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing
of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could
not be considered in custodia legis

ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. – YES.

RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could
evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was
allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report
of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the
DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners,
again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load
was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation
order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in
our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise
Paat v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997, 266 SCRA 167
Facts:
Private Respondent Vicente Guzman’s trucks was seized by the DENR because the driver could not produce
the required documents for the products found in the truck. Consequently, the truck was confiscated
and Guzman was given 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited in favor of the DENR. Guzman failed to do so. Thus, the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR sustained the confiscation of the truck.
Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but it was denied. Subsequently, the case was brought
to the DENR Secretary pursuant to the stipulation in the letter that if denied, it should be considered as
an appeal to the Secretary. Pending resolution of the appeal, Guzman filed a suit for replevin against the
petitioners. In turn, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss assailing that there was no cause of action
for Guzman’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion and granted
a writ of replevin. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which sustained the
trial court’s order. Hence, the petitioners filed this appeal.

Issues:
(1) Whether there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
(2) Whether the Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances transporting illegal forest products.
(3) Whether the seizure of the truck was illegal considering the fact that the Executive Director
admitted that the truck was not used in the commission of the crime.

Ruling:
(1) Yes. Guzman failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
By virtue of Guzman’s letter of reconsideration “[i]t was easy to perceive then that the private
respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him,
they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in
the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek the court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of
their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceeding.”

(2) Yes. Administrative officers of the DENR have the power and authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products.
Section 68-A of PD No. 705 gives them authority to perform such acts. “The phrase in the law
which states ‘to dispose of the same’ is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor
of the government in the construction of statutes.” The only limitation is that it should be made “in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”

(3) No. The confiscation was legal.

The private respondents misinterpreted the intention of the petitioners. What the petitioners
meant when they stated that the truck was not used in the commission of the crime is that it was not
used in the commission of the crime of theft. “Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck
was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of PD No. 705 as
amended by EO No. 277.” EO No. 277 provides that “the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing,
or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.”