Can international organizations contribute to global governance in peace and security affairs?

Since the end of the Cold War, Western states have put a great effort in cooperating with the aim of
creating security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the world, based on
multilateral international organizations. Despite the current institutional paralysis in the West, of
which Washington’s reluctant leadership of NATO and the EU’s impotent response to the so-called
refugee crisis are two of the most striking examples, we should remember that during the 1990s
most Western policymakers believed that “institutions”, coupled with the spread of democracy and
capitalism across the globe, “are a key means of promoting world peace” (Mearsheimer 1995, p. 5).
This enthusiasm for international organizations as guarantors of peace and security in the global
system was grounded on the idea that institutions are a powerful force for stability. In order to
understand this position, we will summarize in the following paragraphs the main institutionalist
theories.

According to Mearsheimer (1995, p. 15), broadly speaking there are three institutionalist theories,
and each offers a different perspective about how institutions help prevent war and foster stability.
Proponents of the first one –liberal institutionalism– contend that institutions provide the key to
overcoming the problem of cheating, which they consider the main inhibitor of international
cooperation, by creating rules that constrain states’ self-interests. These sets of norms are typically
laid out in international agreements, “and are usually embodied in organizations with their own
personnel and budgets” (Mearsheimer 1995, p. 9). The second theoretical perspective –collective
security– argues that the threat of war can be greatly reduced if states adopt three anti-realist norms,
namely 1) Rejecting “the idea of using force to change the status quo”; 2) Not acting on the basis of
one’s own narrow self-interest when dealing with states that violate the fist norm, and 3) Trusting
each other “to renounce aggression and to mean that renunciation”. These principles lay at the basis
of NATO. Finally, the third approach –critical theory– is predicated on the assumption that “ideas
and discourse are the driving forces behind state behavior”, an that “the way to revolutionize
international politics is to change drastically the way individuals think and talk about world
politics”. In this regard, international organizations can mold states’ preferences by promoting new
normative frameworks. All these three theories, in short, have in common that they conceive of
international institutions as facilitators of cooperation between self-interested states.

Realist theory, on the other hand, maintains that international organizations are nothing more than a
mere reflection of national interests and the distribution of power in the system. As a result, realist
scholars argue, these institutions do not constrain powerful states in any significant way. In this
sense, Mearsheimer (1995, p. 7) concludes that “institutions have minimal influence on state
behavior” because they are based on “the self-interested calculations of the great powers”.
According to Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 3-8), realist theories are not able to provide a convincing
answer as to why international organizations are prominent participants in many critical events in
international politics. For example, at the beginning of their paper these authors point out that
“when the Security Council sought to learn the extent of chemical, biological, and nuclear arms in
Iraq, it did not rely on U.S. forces”. Instead, “it dispatched inspectors from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)”. In addition, Abbott and Snidal call attention to the fact that “when the
international community sought to maintain the suspension of combat in Bosnia, it did not rely only
on national efforts. It sent in peacekeeping units under the aegis of the UN and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)”. In order to understand why do states so frequently use international
organizations as vehicles of cooperation, Abbott and Snidal draw from multiple approaches in
International Relations theory. From this complex theoretical background, they identify “two
functional characteristics that lead states, in appropriate circumstances, to prefer IOs to alternate
forms of institutionalization”: centralization and independence.

What do these two concepts mean? Let us start by defining the former. According to Abbott and
Snidal (1998, p. 9), international organizations are centralized in the sense that they have “a
concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective
activities”. States create international organizations with the aim of reducing the overall costs of
direct state interaction, given the fact that these institutions “provide a stable negotiation forum,
enhancing iteration and reputational effects” and, as a consequence, allowing for a faster response
to sudden developments in the international arena (Abbott and Snidal 1998, p. 10). Moreover, these
institutions’ specialized organizational structure opens a much more neutral and depoliticized space
in which global powers can discuss tough issues “without the intrusion of high politics”. This
argument could help explain why even the US relies on the IAEA when it comes to dealing with
nuclear energy. That does not mean, of course, that international organizations enjoy absolute
independence from states. In fact, Abbott and Snidal acknowledge that such venues frequently
mirror the global distribution of power. However, “they may also constitutionalize protection for
weaker states and hold the powerful accountable to fixed rules and procedures”. As an example of
this principle, we can mention the voting system of the EU Council, whereby even the smallest
member state can block a decision from being taken on those matters which are considered to be
sensitive, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EU membership.
The second concept which, according to Abbott and Snidal, distinguishes international
organizations from other international institutions is independence or “the authority to act with a
degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres” (1998, p. 9). When international
organizations are endowed with high levels of centralization and independence, they have a greater
capacity to “shape understandings, influence the terms of state interactions, elaborate norms, and
mediate or resolve member states’ disputes”. By pooling resources, facilitating joint production
endeavors, building an identity as neutral actors, embodying a particular community of states, and
having the capacity, though limited, to enforce norms, international organizations emerge as key
actors which can decisively contribute to global governance in international peace and security
affairs. In this regard, Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 15) point out: “Perhaps the best example of
interstate joint production is the NATO military alliance. Common war plans, specialization of
military tasks, joint exercises, common equipment and interchangeable parts, and, of course, the
conduct of battle are examples of teamwork par excellence. NATO’s integrated command –
operating hierarchically on behalf of member states as residual claimants– organizes, monitors, and
disciplines participants in the joint activities of the alliance, probably the most successful in
history”. Even though NATO was created under the leadership of the US as a response to the
Warsaw pact, it has developed over time the capacity to intervene as a relevant actor in peace and
security matters in Europe.

Another relevant example of an international organization contributing to global governance in this

realm is the European Union. Despite the fact that the Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP) still falls under the EU’s intergovernmental pillar, which means that member states are the
main responsible actors for decision-making, since 2002 the EU has launched several military
operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. These missions have boosted EU’s actorness in international
peace and security affairs. More concretely, Operation Artemis (May-September 2003), which was
aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions in the Ituri region of the north-
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, meant a leap forward for the Union, given that it is
considered the first autonomous EU operation outside the European continent1. Despite these
achievements, we should not forget that the CSDP is still largely intergovernmental in nature and
that the EU’s capacity to take military action is very limited in scope.

As we have seen, international organizations can play a major role in global peace and security
governance. As Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 29) conclude, “by taking advantage of the centralization
and independence of IOs, states are able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a

1 http://europavarietas.org/files/cerpesc07af022008en.pdf
decentralized basis. In some circumstances, the role of IOs extends even further to include the
development of common norms and practices that help define, or refine, states themselves”. Even
though states try to control international organizations by not allowing them too much autonomy,
these institutions can end up having a huge impact on the nature and performance of the
international system.

Víctor González Descarga

Universitat Ramon Llull – School of Communication and International Relations
Master’s degree in International Relations – Global Governance Module

Sources:

ABBOTT, K. W. and SNIDAL, D. (1998), “Why states act through formal international
organizations”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (1): 3-32

MEARSHEIMER, J. J. (1995), “The false promise of international institutions”, International

Security, 19 (3): 5-49