A.
FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
ANTONIO C. MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The petition before the Court for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul
respondent Sandiganbayans resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the
informations filed against him for malversation. Petitioner likewise prayed for temporary
restraining order to restrain the Sandiganbayan from further hearing the cases.
We deny the petition.
The facts are as follows:
From December, 1986 to January 1988, petitioner was the Officer-in-Charge and
Acting City Mayor of Caloocan City. As such, he received cash advances from the city
government which were earmarked for specific projects. Specifically, petitioner received
on or about December 24, 1986, cash advance of P100,000.00, under Disbursement
Voucher No. 32734; on or about January 27, 1987, cash advance of P145,000.00, under
Disbursement Voucher No. 201; on or about January 29, 1987, cash advance of
P300,000.00, under Disbursement Voucher No. 223; and on or about July 23, 1987, cash
advance of P200,000.00, under Disbursement Voucher No. 1877.
For failing to liquidate the cash advances despite demands by the City Treasurer,
on June 1, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Francisco L. Ilustre, Jr., filed with the
Sandiganbayan four (4) separate informations[1] for malversation of public funds against
petitioner. The informations were similarly worded except for the dates, voucher number,
amount involved and specific projects. The information in Criminal Case No. 22791 reads
as follows:
That on or about December 24, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in Caloocan
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Antonio
Martinez, a public officer being then the OIC-Acting Mayor of Caloocan City, who having
received cash advance under Disbursement Voucher No. 3273 in the amount of
P100,000.00 from the city government of Caloocan to defray expenses in connection with
special activities entailing civic and political organizations and as such making him an
accountable officer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
misappropriate and convert for his personal use and benefits the aforesaid amount of
P100,000.00, and despite demand made by Norberto E. Azarcon, OIC, Office of the
Treasurer, directing him to settle and/or liquidate the same, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the Philippine Government in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On March 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
informations alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under Article 217,
Revised Penal Code and that there was no prima facie evidence against him.
On April 18, 1996, the Ombudsman filed an opposition to the motion to quash
maintaining that the law presumed that failure on the part of a public officer to liquidate
the cash advance he received after demand therefor by a duly authorized officer constitutes
malversation of public fund and hence, there existed probable cause for the filing of the
informations.
On May 27, 1996, petitioner filed a reply to the opposition trying to refute the
arguments of the Ombudsman.
On June 10, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution[3] denying the motion to
quash for obvious lack of merit.
On July 26, 1996, petitioner was arraigned before the Sandiganbayan, and he
entered a plea of not guilty.
On September 26, 1996, petitioner filed the present recourse.
On October 21, 1996, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on
the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, and to deny
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order.
On January 30, 1997, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Special
Prosecutor, filed its comment. On March 19, 1997, the Court resolved to require petitioner
to file a reply to the comment of the Special Prosecutor. On June 19, 1997, petitioner filed
his reply in which he reiterated that the prosecution had not established a prima facie case
and consequently, respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in not
quashing the informations.
On August 27, 1997, the Court required respondents to file a rejoinder, which the
respondent People of the Philippines filed on October 16, 1997.
As stated at the outset, we deny the petition.
The issue is whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners motion to quash the informations filed against him on the ground that
the informations do not charge an offense and that there was no prima facie case.
It is an admitted fact that as acting mayor of Caloocan City in 1986 to 1988,
petitioner received cash advances from the city government in the amounts of
P100,000.00, P145,000.00, P300,000.00, and P200,000.00, respectively, for specific
projects, and that the City Treasurer subsequently made demands on him to submit a
liquidation of the cash advances. Petitioner failed to do so, and hence, there is a prima
facie presumption under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that he had malversed the
funds to his personal use and benefit.[4]
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners motion to quash the
informations. From such denial, the appropriate remedy is not an appeal[5] or review on
certiorari brought to a higher court. The remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the merits,
and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.[6]
Furthermore, the petition may also be dismissed because petitioner had been
arraigned on July 26, 1996, after the court denied his motion to quash. There is no showing
that he objected to entering a plea because he wanted to question the denial of the motion
to quash before a superior court. By entering his plea, petitioner waived all objections
which are grounds of a motion to quash.[7] The exceptions thereto have no application.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
B. THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CASE HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED:
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G.
NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
IMELDA R. MARCOS, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended,[1] in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 265[2] were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig (herein Branch 158-Pasig). Said Informations
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92 were amended prior
to arraignment.[3]
After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the People thru
herein petitioner, Panel of Prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Solicitor General filed separate motions for consolidation of the three (3) Informations
pending before Branch 158-Pasig with the 21 other cases pending before RTC Branch 26-
Manila (herein Branch 26-Manila).[4] The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that the
indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is related to the transaction
complained of in criminal cases 91-101732, 91-101734 and 91-101735 pending before
Branch 26-Manila[5] and that these two groups of cases (the Pasig and Manila cases) relate
to a series of transactions devised by then President Ferdinand Marcos and private
respondent to hide their ill-gotten wealth.[6] The RTC of Pasig granted the motion for
consolidation provided there is no objection from the presiding judge of Branch 26-
Manila.[7] Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re-raffled and re-
assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan
wherein the three informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92)
were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92-107943 and 92-107944.
Then, without private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to
quash the informations, respondent judge issued an order dated July 20, 1992 requiring
petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed
on the ground that it violates private respondents right against ex post facto law.[8] In that
order, respondent judge said that a check with official publications reveals that CB Circular
960 is dated 21 October 1983 (x x x) and that said regulatory issuance was imperfectly
published* in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official Gazette.[9] Respondent judge
concluded that since the date of violation alleged in the information was prior to the date
and complete publication of the Circular charged to have been violated, the information in
this case appears peremptorily dismissible, for to apply the Circular to acts performed prior
to its date and publication would make it an ex post facto law, which is a violation of the
Constitution.[10]
On the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution
to show cause why the two other criminal informations (92-107943 and 92-107944) should
not be dismissed on the ground that private respondents right to double jeopardy was
violated.[11] It is respondent judges posture that based on the Solicitor-Generals allegations
in its Motion for Consolidation filed in Branch 58-Pasig that the three cases form part of a
series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila, all
these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge further stated that to
separately prosecute private respondent for a series of transaction would endow it with the
functional ability of a worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.[12] Thus, accused
would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy. In the two orders, respondent judge
likewise said that the dismissal of the three seemingly unmeritorious and duplicitous cases
would help unclogged his docket in favor of more serious suits.[13] The prosecution
complied with the twin show cause orders accompanied by a motion to inhibit respondent
judge.
On August 6, 1992, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for
consolidation (embodied in the prosecutions compliance with the show cause orders) of
the three informations with those pending before Branch 26-Manila on the ground that
consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of civil procedure has no counterpart in criminal
procedure, and blamed the panel of prosecutors as apparently not conversant with the
procedure in the assignment of cases. As additional justification, respondent judge stated
that since he is more studious and discreet, if not more systematic and methodical, than
the prosecution in the handling of cases, it would be unfair to just pull out the case when
he had already studied it.[14]
The next day, August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an 8-page order dismissing
criminal case no. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto
law.[15] In a separate 17-page order dated August 10, 1992, respondent judge also
dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the
prosecution of private respondent was part of a sustained political vendetta by some people
in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondents
right against double jeopardy.[16] From his disquisition regarding continuing, continuous
and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further
ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases before Branch 26-
Manila had placed private respondent in double jeopardy because of the three cases before
his sala.
The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent
judge denied in a single order dated September 7, 1992 containing 19 pages wherein he
made a preliminary observation that:
(T)he very civil manner in which the motions were framed, which is consistent with the
high ideals and standards of pleadings envisioned in the rules, and for which the panel
should be commended. This only shows that the Members of the panel had not yielded to
the derisive, panicky and intimidating reaction manifested by their Department Head
when, after learning the promulgation of the orders dismissing some of Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos cases, Secretary Drilon went to the media and repeatedly aired
diatribes and even veiled threats against the trial judges concerned.
By the constitutional mandate that A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence (Sec 7[3], Art. VIII, judges are
precluded from being dragged into running debates with parties-litigants or their counsel
and representatives in media, yet by reason of the same provision judges are mandated to
decide cases in accordance with their own independent appreciation of the facts and
interpretation of the law. Any judge who yields to extraneous influences, such as
denigrating criticisms or threats, and allows his independence to be undermined thereby,
leading to violation of his oath of office, has no right to continue in his office any minute
longer.
The published reaction of the Hon. Secretary is to be deplored, but it is hoped that he had
merely lapsed into impudence instead of having intended to set a pattern of mocking and
denigrating the courts. He must have forgotten that as Secretary of Justice, his actuations
reflect the rule of law orientation of the administration of the President whom he represents
as the latters alter ego.[17] (emphasis supplied).
The dispositive portion of the order denying the motions for reconsideration
provides:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds no valid reason to
reconsider the dismissals heretofore decreed, and the motions for reconsideration are
consequently denied for manifest lack of merit.[18]
Obviously dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari,
where the primary issue raised is whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal
and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to
that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latters right
against ex post facto law and double jeopardy.
Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to
quash the complaint or information. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information
at any time before entering a plea or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash
can be entertained by the court except under the circumstances mentioned in Section 8 of
Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus motion rule. In the case at at bench, private respondent
pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash. As such, she is deemed to have
waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which she may have properly
and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant to Section 8 of Rule
117 which provides:
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in his motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no
offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or
penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of this
Rule. (emphasis supplied)
It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the
accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio
initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion
contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the
best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information.
Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the
case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right
to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and
impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who
in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for
reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of
authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance
with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that
of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to
overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself.
To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause order would
result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in effect, acts as
counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one
person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but
also of the prosecution.
That the initial act to quash an information lodged with the accused is further
supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117 which states that:
Section 2. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It
shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the Court shall consider
no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged.
Section 8. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads (Emphasis supplied).
Section 2 requires that the motion must be signed by accused or his counsel;
Section 3 states that the accused may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence
if the accused do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the judge was mentioned.
Section 2 further, ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any ground other
than those stated in the motion which should be specify(ied) distinctly therein. Thus, the
filing of a motion to quash is a right that belongs to the accused who may waived it by
inaction and not an authority for the court to assume.
It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving
a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion
and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or not
mentioned in the motion. Other than that, grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in
the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of filing thereof,
it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on considerations of other
grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the rationale
that the right to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming
to wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-
blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the
cause.
With these, the rule clearly implies the requirement of filing a motion by the
accused even if the ground asserted is premised on lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Besides, lack of jurisdiction should be evident from the face of the information WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the two orders dated
or complaint to warrant a dismissal thereof. Happily, no jurisdictional challenge is January 20, 1990, as well as the orders dated August 7, 1992, August 10, 1992 and
involved in this case. September 7, 1992 all issued by respondent judge are hereby REVERSED AND SET
Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a criminal ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
charge, yet contrary to the findings of respondent judge, the grounds of ex post facto law SO ORDERED.
and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are not applicable.
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption
of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court.[19] To rule that the CB Circular
is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private
respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower
courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless
directly assailed in an appropriate action.
With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the
same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy
connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first[20] or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.[21] In this case, it is
manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated.
Section 7, Rule 117 provides:
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x.[22]
Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before
a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)
when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[23]
Other than the Solicitor-Generals allegation of pending suits in Branch 26-Manila,
respondent judge has no other basis on whether private respondent had already been
arraigned, much less entered a plea in those cases pending before the said Branch. Even
assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to those cases in Branch
26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three informations pending
in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Precisely, those Branch 26-Manila
cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the time
respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Private respondent was not
convicted, acquitted nor the cases against her in Branch 26-Manila dismissed or otherwise
terminated which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy
to attached. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of private C. THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CASE HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
respondent under the three informations pending Branch 56-Manila would violate the PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
formers right against double jeopardy.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005]
MELBAROSE R. SASOT AND ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT OF OF
APPEALS, and REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 1, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal
prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch
1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.[1]
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against
petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair
competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI stated that NBA Properties,
Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the United States of
America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA
basketball teams such as USA BASKETBALL, CHICAGO BULLS, ORLANDO
MAGIC, LOS ANGELES LAKERS, ROCKETS, PHOENIX SUNS, BULLETS,
PACERS, CHARLOTTE HORNETS, BLAZERS, DENVER NUGGETS,
SACRAMENTO KINGS, MIAMI HEAT, UTAH JAZZ, DETROIT PISTONS,
MILWAUKEE BUCKS, SEATTLE SONICS, TORONTO RAPTORS, ATLANTA
HAWKS, CAVS, DALLAS MAVERICKS, MINNESOTA TIMBERWOLVES, and
LOS ANGELES CLIPPERS. These names are used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts,
sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment products, which
are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered
that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of
counterfeit NBA garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners
prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of
NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro,
Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney-in-fact, and to act for and
on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative
complaints, among others.[3] The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by
Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County
Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B.
Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New York, authenticated the
certification.[4] Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998,
before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.[5]
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie
S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners for
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.[6] The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named
accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale
Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the appearance of NBA
names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the goods
offered by them are those of NBA to the damage and prejudice of the NBA
Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the NBA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
following grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED[8]
In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed
Weltss complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before
the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal.[9] They
also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is not a
registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been using the business name
ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC. since 1972, and their designs are original and
do not appear to be similar to complainants, and they do not use complainants
logo or design.[10]
The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his
Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy
of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it.
Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense
even without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged
is a public crime.[11]
The trial court sustained the prosecutions arguments and denied petitioners
motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999.[12]
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision dated
January 26, 2000.[13] According to the CA, the petition is not the proper remedy in
assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised therein should
be raised during the trial of the case on the merits.[14] The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings
with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the
CA.[16]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, with issues raised as follows:
1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE
(sic) TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION.
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN
BEHALF OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF
DIRECTORS.
3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND
WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS
ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE
ACCUSED.
5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION.[17]
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the NBA
Properties, Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal
because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the
investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed to show
any board resolution showing his authority to institute any action in behalf of the
company, and that the NBAs trademarks are not being actually used in the
Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be protected by
Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend that they have not committed
acts amounting to unfair competition.[18]
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its
Amended Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for reasons
stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000.[19]
The petition must be denied.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.[20] The
proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his
motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered,
to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[21] Thus, petitioners should
not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead,
they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their
motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances[22] in the
present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should
be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition.
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the
Information filed against petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or the person of the accused,[23] their arguments focused
on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, complainants capacity
to sue and petitioners exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair
competition.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in
force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the
grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainants capacity to sue as grounds
for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the
respondent, it is accompanied by complainants affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence
or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before
Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the
absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid.[24] Want
of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the
defendant on the merits.[25]
In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary
Public Nicole Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed
and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998,[26] duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears
to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that
complainants representative will present the authenticated notarized original in
court,[27] and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on
hand.[28] It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in
turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.[29]
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which
the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:
(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the investigation
conducted from April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997, and the subsequent search and
seizure of several items from petitioners establishment;[30]
(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro,
Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping the illegal
manufacture, distribution and sale of fake products bearing the NBA trademark,
and in prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid factory;[31] and
(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of the
Pinkerton Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by Prosecution
Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to their findings that petitioners were found to be
manufacturing, printing, selling, and distributing counterfeit NBA garment Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
products.[32]
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public
prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.[33]
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code[34] is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the
State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The
complainants capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,[35] a case akin to the present dispute,
as it involved the crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against manufacturers of
garments bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner, the Court
succinctly ruled that:
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded
this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging
Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary
investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information
shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the
petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is
essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the
injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity
to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case.
We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution
upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no D. THAT THE OFFICER WHO FILED THE INFORMATION HAD NO
standing to sue. AUTHORITY TO DO SO:
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts
for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we
are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City
and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.
international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to DECISION
which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our national PUNO, J:
interest to do so.[36] (Emphasis supplied) For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an
Lastly, with regard to petitioners arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior written authority or
entitled to protection under Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be
patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition for dismissed after the accused has entered his plea under the information.
the reason that their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule
complainants, and they do not use complainants logo or design, the Court finds 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to declare as null and void the Orders
that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February 26,
trial on the merits of the case. 2002[1] and April 3, 2002[2] which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of People vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied
this case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24) where petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings with The antecedent facts are undisputed.
reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a)
in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known
as the Social Security Act, in an information which reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor,
Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as proprietor of Saballegue
Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St., Peafrancia Ave., Naga
City for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A.
8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga,
Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the
proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums
due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P6,533.00), Philippine Currency,
representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to
December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the
amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and
28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by
letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and
prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO
State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases
in Region V[3]
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by
the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law and under oath as
officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has
been committed, that the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of
the information is with the prior authority and approval of the Regional State
Prosecutor.[4]
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City
presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24,
2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case
was set for pre-trial.[5] Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss[6] on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written
authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Court.[7]
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition,[8] against
which the accused filed a rejoinder.[9] The People filed a reply to the rejoinder[10]
on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply[11] was filed by the accused on
January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court
believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance
with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has
not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file
a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express
provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte,
182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of the
officer who filed the information and on jurisdiction at the same time, pertinent
portions run as follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash,
and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the information.
The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions
of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Now, the
objection to the respondents actuations goes to the very foundations of
jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity
of the nature noted in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence,
or even by express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist the
City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS cases by the
Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V,
then that authority may be given to other than the City Prosecutor. The Court finds
this contention to be devoid of merit. The Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter
ego of the Secretary of Justice but a mere subordinate official and if ever the
former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority by the Secretary of
Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) what has been delegated
cannot be redelegated.
In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June
22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan addressed to
Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit
and to append the following NOTATION after the certification in the Information
for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and
the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region V is authorized to dispose
of the case without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS
Regional Manager as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the
Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City appended the above-quoted
notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the
conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are
filed. The Court, however, believes that the filing of this Information must be in
conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule
112.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court hereby
resolves to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[12]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special
prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle SSS cases
within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information
involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city
prosecutor. [13] Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuo[14] and Secretary Hernando Perez[15] were offered as proof to show that State
Prosecutor Tolentinos authority to file the information was recognized. In
response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion for
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a mere scrap
of paper. [16]
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which
reads:
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V, and it appearing that
the same has failed to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for
being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago
Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner attributes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent judge, viz:[18]
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE
REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE
WORD MAY IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT
MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY
IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN INHIBITION OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN
INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN
INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER
TO FILE THE INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment[19] in compliance with
this Courts Resolution dated September 23, 2002.[20] It opines that the dismissal
of the information is mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Private respondent contends that:[21] 1) the instant petition was filed out of time;
2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and
3) the City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit himself from handling SSS cases
nor signing the information.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the motion
for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it was filed eighteen days
after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first questioned order.
Respondent has overlooked that the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday.
Hence, petitioners last day to file the motion for reconsideration was on the next
working day after Good Friday, April 1.[22]
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper,
the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll the running of the
reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the
present case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. As stated at the outset, this
is an original petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that (a) pro forma motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.
(emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in the case at
bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the
receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En Banc Resolution A.M.
No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60)- day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated
February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002.[23] A motion for reconsideration was timely
filed on April 1, 2002[24] which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing in an
Order dated April 3, 2002.[25] This second questioned order was received by
petitioner on April 11, 2002.[26] A motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari was filed on April 18, 2002.[27] A motion for leave to file and
admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May 29,
2002.[28] Having been filed within the reglementary period, petitioners motion for
leave to file the instant petition was granted in this Courts Resolution dated July
15, 2002.[29]
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval
of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing
the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial
prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended that the Regional State
Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from
handling SSS cases.[30] Petitioner cites the letter of Regional State Prosecutor
Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional Director in Naga City dated June 6, 1997[31]
and copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A[32] and 2001-033[33] dated July 14,
1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of State
Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner
relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[34] and Sanchez v. Demetriou,
et al.[35] to prop up its contention that given the designation of State Prosecutor
Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the filing and prosecution of
the information in the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State
Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State
Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control of the
Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules
and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city
fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his
region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals
within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be
necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction
of the regional office.
2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting
officers within his region and submit his recommendation thereon to the Secretary
of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate recommendation
to the Office of the President: Provided, that where the Secretary of Justice finds
insufficient grounds for the filing of charges, he may render a decision of dismissal
thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the
region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Justice who
shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies
and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but
without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports
and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and
inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance
of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such
agencies but may not increase or add to them.[36] This is distinguished from the
power of supervision and control which includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs.[37]
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of
administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct
the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most,
he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state
prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the
special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the Secretary of Justice.
They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the
regional state prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed
with the authority to file an information without the prior written authority or
approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No.
1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the
creation of positions of additional counsel to assist provincial and city fiscals
in the discharge of their duties, positions of Special Counsels may be
created by any province or city, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city funds. The
Secretary of Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon
recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal and regional state
prosecutors concerned, either on permanent or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed
not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the lowest rank or grade
of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned. (emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,[38] Defining the authority, duties and
responsibilities of regional state prosecutors, then Acting Secretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state prosecutors (which
included Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for Region V) to, among others,
(i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice,
specific criminal cases filed within the region. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary
of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute
SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged letter
of commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not
amount to a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter
of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan
in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his authority to prosecute
them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State Prosecutors attention to DOJ
Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all important cases of the SSS
should be referred to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.[39] Thus,
Regional State Prosecutor Turingan cannot be considered a special prosecutor
within the meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word may is permissive. Hence, there are cases when
prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too
simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word may is mandatory or directory
depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the
permissive word may should be read together with the other provisions in the
same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted
provision shows that the word may is mandatory. It states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward
the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,
or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the
resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately
inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief
state prosecutor should have been obtained, we shall now resolve the more
important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or
chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the information
that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand
illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to paragraph 3, Section 4
of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
(emphasis supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority
or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an
infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection
anytime even after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the
motion to dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v.
Ibaez, et al.[40] where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash,
and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the informations.
The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long line of
uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondents actuations goes to the
very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[41]
(emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of
the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the
case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint
or information.[42] Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject
matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the
case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional requirement
upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been ruled that in the absence
of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal offense.[43] In our
jurisdiction, we have similarly held that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more
courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of procedure and not
jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been
exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made
when the proper complaint or information is filed with the court having
jurisdiction over the crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of the court to
try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to
exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or
subscribe to the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule
106 of the Rules of Court. [44] (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case,
Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation in the Office of the
Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel to
assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases involving city government officials or
employees. Pursuant to his appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information against
Pedro Villa for falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subidos authority to file the
information was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for appointment
under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may
appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent
person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting
attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might
be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.[45]
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in Lo Cham vs.
Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al.,
(47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in those cases, the appointees were officials or
employees in one or another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of
Justice, and were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of
Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions.
Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the Department of Interior, more
particularly in the City Mayors office. For this reason, he belongs to the class of
persons disqualified for appointment to the post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either
an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so manifest from a bare
reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude
construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the appointment or
designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary
of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power of supervision. An appointee
from a branch of the government outside the Department of Justice would owe
obedience to, and be subject to orders by, mutually independent superiors having,
possibly, antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the case at hand for
illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention be required
elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor while he was discharging
his duties as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of Justice would be helpless to
stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or state of affairs so undesirable,
not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the administration of
justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the
person who filed the information is disqualified from being a special prosecutor
under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has
been extended to various cases where the information was filed by an
unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.,[46] the Court held that it is a fundamental principle that when on its face the
information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured
nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an information
with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft
and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash the information on the ground that
the crime charged did not constitute a Marcos crony related crime over which the
PCGG had authority to investigate and file an information. The Court found that
the crime alleged in the information was not among those which PCGG was
authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then President
Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and void. Of similar import
is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[47] where we ruled that the information
having been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally
flawed. We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a
defect that could not be cured.
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[48] we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The
accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal
possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters
of the arresting officers was located. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an
information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. We invalidated the
information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction,
as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial
jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required
by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[49]
Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[50] It is a valid information signed
by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The accuseds
plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said
information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the
information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[51]
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information
contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under which Villa was decided,
the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on the matter.[52]
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant
fails to move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto, he
shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to
quash except (1) when the complaint or information does not charge an offense
or (2) the court is without jurisdiction of the same. (emphasis ours) Among the
enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the same Rule was
(t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the information. With only the above two
exceptions provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made the Villa
ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information, jurisdiction is
not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes
introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on unauthorized filing of
information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules.[53]
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information was also a ground for a motion to quash under these
rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to
quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but enumerated the following exceptions to the
waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
(c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the accused has
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged. Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers
to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case as in Villa
where the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of
the officer who filed the information. Still, despite the enumeration, the Court
continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore-cited Cruz and Cudia
cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the filing officer as among the
grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the
1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver,
namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under the
regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above-
cited Romualdez case. With the enumeration of the four exceptions, which was
almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not
intend to abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated
exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so under the enumerated
exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine
enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice
designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a
prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the
information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without
authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a
jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is DENIED. The respondent courts orders dated February 26, 2002
and April 3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized
officer.
SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez. Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
E. THAT IT DOES NOT CONFORM SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PRESCRIBED
FORM
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO DESUYO
alias "TONY," accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger sister Aisalyn
one late night in September 1996 when she was awakened by someone caressing
her breasts. She opened her eyes and saw her father, accused Antonio Desuyo,
crouching before her. He was naked except for his underpants to cover his private
parts. Instinctively, she begged her father not to touch her, reminding him that she
was his daughter. But he paid no heed; instead, he removed her underwear while
threatening to kill her should she make any noise. He mounted her, forced his
penis into her vagina and gyrated his hips against hers. She wept as she continued
to beg him to desist from his fiendish assault on her virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did
not tell her mother about the incident; instead, she kept the ignominy and pain to
herself.
Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town and she did
not want to give her any trouble. Neither did she inform her relatives who lived
nearby. She feared for her life as her father had threatened to kill her should she
speak to anyone about what he had done to her.
The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost
everyday from September 1996 to August 1997. His assaults on her virtue were
always followed by threats on her that she would be killed should she report these
to her mother. The sexual abuses of her father were so often that Maricel lost
count.
On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already accustomed
to, she would be roused from her sleep by her father fondling her private parts.
Again, he undressed her and unleashed his lechery on her. It was meant to be the
last. In her young and impressionable mind, Maricel vowed that it would not
happen to her again.
On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to relate her
ordeal to a police officer who lived nearby. She bravely narrated to Police Officer
Tito Ganggalang and his wife Riza her sordid tale which was actually a
confirmation of what was already circulating around their neighborhood. She
admitted that her father had been sexually abusing her for close to a year already.
Emboldened by the encouragement she received from sympathetic neighbors,
she next confided to Luisa Galit, Maricels maternal aunt, who could only
commiserate with her.
Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who upon
examination found Maricel to have several old hymenal lacerations in her vaginal
area. Thereafter, they repaired to the municipal hall where Maricel instituted a
complaint against her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, for having repeatedly
raped her.
In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal
trial court judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness from his daughter
and promised to leave her alone should she withdraw the charge she filed against
him. Maricel vehemently refused as her father grovelled for forgiveness.[1] As a
consequence, an Information was filed against the accused Antonio Desuyo alias
"Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter Maricel.
Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations. According to her,
ever since her mother worked in a faraway town, her father was dauntless and
unrelenting in sexually abusing her night after night within the confines of their
home. She felt pain and cried everytime her father would forcibly insert his penis
into her vagina; however she kept her ordeal to herself as she was afraid of him.
After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive that she
might get pregnant. Her father however was unperturbed and simply dismissed
her fears by telling her not to worry. A year after the first forced coition, Maricel
decided to end her tribulation by unburdening her grief to neighbors who readily
sympathized with her. She felt relieved after seeing her father locked up behind
bars.[2]
The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed however that he
raised singlehandedly his two (2) daughters Maricel and Aisalyn as his wife was
serving another household in a distant town. According to him, despite his
guidance, Maricel turned out to be a wayward daughter who entertained suitors at
an early age. Once, his daughter Aisalyn confided to him that Maricel was
corresponding with a boy from another barrio. He immediately searched through
her bag and found a letter intended for a certain Jerry. Incensed by his daughter's
behavior he mauled her expecting that she would atone for her mistakes.
However, instead of mending her ways, Maricel ran away from home and instituted
this unfounded charge for rape against him. He presented in evidence Maricel's
supposed letter to Jerry as well as a letter from his wife pledging her love and
support. He averred that Maricel was being inveigled by his sister-in-law Luisa and
the latter's boyfriend Boy into tormenting him for reasons which he could not
fathom.[3]
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the accused.
Solely on account of Maricel's testimony, the court a quo found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced
him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, and to indemnify the offended party
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.[4]
Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for "multiple
rape" essentially on two (2) grounds, namely, that the Information is defective and
that the court a quo erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish the age of Maricel with certainty.[5]
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against him is
deficient since by merely stating that the sexual assaults were repeated "within
the month of September 1996 up to August 18, 1997,"[6] it failed to state the exact
dates when the alleged rapes were committed. Quoting heavily from the early case
of US v. Diacho,[7] accused asserts that unless he is informed of the precise "day,
or about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived of the opportunity to defend
himself."[8]
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment
that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness
is a motion for bill of particulars. The records show that the accused never asked
for a bill of particulars in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[9]
The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when
the alleged crime was committed or for the quashal of the Information on the
ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form[10] deprives
him of the right to object to evidence which could lawfully be introduced and
admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently
charges the accused with a definite crime.[11] It is indeed too late in the day for the
accused to raise this issue because objections to matters of form or substance in
the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. At any rate, it is settled
that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an essential element thereof
and need not be stated in the information.[12] The Court has sustained the following
dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient for purposes of complying
with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit: "from November 1990 up to July
21, 1994,"[13] "sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto,"[14] "on or about and sometime in the year 1988,"[15]
"sometime in the year 1987"[16] and "before and until October 15, 1994."[17] In any
event, a review of the evidence presented by the prosecution more than
establishes the guilt of the accused for the rape of his daughter.
For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely preposterous, that
Maricel, a guileless barrio lass, would concoct a story of rape against her very own
father, taking into mind the societal humiliation and personal devastation which
such a charge entails. More so, no serious motive, apart from the beatings which
she supposedly suffered in the hands of the accused, was offered to satisfactorily
explain why Maricel would come out and undergo legal scrutiny of the unfortunate
encounters with her father. Thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a straightforward,
spontaneous and consistent manner. Although Maricel expounded only on the first
and last instances of rape, failing thus to give an accurate account of the other
sexual violations, her testimony in its entirety was forthright, clear and free from
any contradictions.
Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as her relatives
about her ordeal is consistent with reason. It must be remembered that Maricel
depended on the accused for existence and protection as her mother lived far. As
to her total obedience to her father and the stoic silence she kept about her
sufferings, these were all brought about by her genuine fear of a man who on
account of his moral ascendancy needed no weapon to instill such terror in her.[18]
Maricel was convinced of a potential yet real danger posed by a beast
masquerading as the family's paladin.
Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before the trial
court that he wrote his parents-in-law sometime in March 1998 to ask for their
forgiveness. Antonio likewise acknowledged when cross-examined that he
begged for Maricel's mercy before the municipal trial judge in the course of the
preliminary examination. No compelling reason was offered by the defense to
explain Antonio's incriminating declarations. Verily, these are judicial admissions
which no man in his right mind would make unless they were true.
The court a quo convicted the accused of "multiple rape" without stating
the counts of rape involved. The records however show that the prosecution
established beyond doubt that accused was guilty of two (2) counts of rape.
Although Maricel insists that she had been raped almost everyday from
September 1996 to August 1997 she was only able to relate with clarity two (2) of
the rapes, the first forced coition sometime in September 1996, and the last on 14
August 1997. She positively narrated in detail the surrounding circumstances of
the sexual assaults committed against her on those two (2) occasions. Indeed, her
recollection of these two (2) rapes was very vivid, leaving no doubt about its
credibility and truthfulness.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two (2) counts
of rape has been conclusively established; however, the death penalty was
erroneously imposed. Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659, death shall be imposed if "the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent x x x of the
victim."
In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with rape alleges
that Maricel is the fourteen (14)-year old daughter of the accused. However, it is
significant to note that other than the testimony of Maricel, no independent proof
was presented to show that she was a minor and that she was the daughter of the
accused. Although Maricel's relationship with the accused was not contested, nor
her age refuted, proof of age and relationship is critical considering the gravity of
the penalty to be imposed upon the accused.[19]
It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation to the
accused when properly alleged in the information and proved beyond reasonable
doubt during trial elevate the crime of simple rape to qualified rape and warrant
the imposition of the extreme penalty of death. As such, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for the penalty
of death to be upheld. In fine, the minority of the victim as well as her relationship
with the accused must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself;
contrarily, the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish the victim's age
and relationship with the accused is fatal and consequently bars conviction for
qualified rape.[20]
Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by the trial court
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the award of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity should be modified and adjusted to P50,000.00 since the penalty
is likewise lowered to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,
accused Antonio Desuyo should also be ordered to pay Maricel Desuyo
P50,000.00 as moral damages even if there was no proof presented as basis
therefor since the anguish and pain that complaining witness endured are plainly
evident.[21]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San Jose,
Southern Leyte, finding accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony" guilty of "multiple
rape" in its qualified form and ordering him to pay complaining witness Maricel
Peru Desuyo P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, is MODIFIED. The accused is instead
found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape and, accordingly, sentences him to
reclusion perpetua for each count. In addition to paying Maricel Peru Desuyo civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, instead of P75,000.00, for each count of
rape, accused is further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 also for each count. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
F. THAT MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE IS CHARGED EXCEPT WHEN WHEN A
SINGLE PUNISHMENT FOR VARIOUS OFFENSES IS PRESCCRIBED BY
LAW
G.R. No. L-13484 May 20, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOMINADOR CAMERINO, MANUEL PAKINGAN, CRISANTO SARATAN,
BIENVENIDO OSTERIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for
appellant.
Avelino A. Velasco for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Dominador Camerino and eighty-six others were accused before the Court of First
Instance of Cavite of the crime of sedition, said to have been committed on or
about and during the period comprised by and between the months of October,
1953, to November 15, 1953 and for sometime prior thereto; under an information
charging conspiracy among the said accused in having allegedly perpetrated for
political and social ends, insistent, repeated and continuous acts of hate, terrorism
and revenge against private persons, leaders, members and sympathizers of the
Nacionalista Party in the town of Bacoor, Cavite, and frustrating by force, threats
and violence, and intimidation the free expression of the popular will in the election
held on November 10, 1953. The information described in detail the manner in
which the alleged seditious acts were performed, specifying the dates and the
places where they were committed and the persons who were victims thereof,
under fourteen different overt acts of sedition. Before arraignment, forty-eight of
the
eighty-seven accused, headed by Dominador Camerino, filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming in support thereof that
they had been previously convicted or been in jeopardy of being convicted and/or
acquitted of the offense charged in other cases of the same nature before the
court.
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed written opposition to the motion, saying that
although it was alleged in the information that the accused had been charged with
various crimes under different and separate informations, that would not place
them in double jeopardy, because those previous charges were being specified in
the information only as a bill of particulars for the purpose of describing in detail
the offense of sedition, but not to hold the defendants liable for punishment under
said separate and different specifications; in other words, the specifications
describing separate crimes were alleged in the information merely to complete the
narration of facts which constitute the crime of sedition.
Later, all the accused filed a supplemental motion to quash, raising as additional
grounds that more than one offense was charged, and that the criminal action or
liability of said defendants had been extinguished.
On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the
motion to quash and dismissing the information on the grounds:(1) that the
information charged more than one offense, (2) that it was vague, ambiguous and
uncertain, (3) that it described crimes for which some of the accused had either
been convicted or acquitted, and (4) some violation of the election law described
in the specification had already prescribed. A motion for reconsideration filed by
the Fiscal was denied. The Government is appealing from that order of dismissal,
as well as the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
In determining the present appeal, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first
ground of the dismissal of the information by the trial court, namely, multiplicity of
offenses, that is to say, that the information allegedly charged more than one
offense. We agree with the Provincial Fiscal and the Solicitor General representing
the Government that the accused herein were being charged only with one
offense, namely, that of sedition, defined in Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 202, and penalized under Article 140 of
the same code. the fourteen different acts or specifications charging some or all
of the accused with having committed the offenses charged therein, were included
in the information merely to describe and to narrate the different and specific acts
the sum total of which constitutes the crime of sedition. Different and separate acts
constituting different and separate offenses may serve as a basis for prosecuting
the accused to hold them criminally liable for said different offenses. Yet, those
different acts of offenses may serve merely as a basis for the prosecution of one
single offense like that of sedition. For instance, one may be accused of sedition,
and at the same time be prosecuted under another information for murder or
homicide as the case may be, if the killing was done in pursuance of and to carry
out the acts constituting sedition. In case of the People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64,
this Tribunal said:
The nearest analogy to the two crimes of murder and sedition growing out of
practically the same facts, which can be found in the American authorities, relate
to the crimes of assault and riot or unlawful assembly. A majority of the American
courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot and the offense of
assault and battery are distinct offense; and that conviction or an acquittal for
either does not bar a prosecution for other offense, even though based on the
same acts. (Freeland vs. People (1855), 16 Ill., 380; U.S. vs. Peaco (1835), 27
Fed. Cas., 477; People vs. Vasquez (1905), 9 Puerto Rico, 488; contra, State vs.
Lindsay (18868), 61 N.C., 458.)
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as
murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against
persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime
directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437.)
Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in
the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion
unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice
aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly
distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not
alone are the offenses eonomine different, but the allegations in the body of the
informations are different. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and
tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of
legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons
of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city
of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary,
conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely
wounded three others. The crimes of the murder and serious physical injuries were
not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could
not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.
In the case of U.S. vs. Cernias, 10 Phil., 682, this Court held that while it is true
that each of those acts charged against the conspirators was itself a crime, the
prosecutor in setting them out in the information did no more than to furnish the
defendants with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the
trial, not only as a basis upon which to be found an inference of guilt of the crime
of conspiracy but also as evidence of the extremely dangerous and wicked nature
of that conspiracy.
The charge is not defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in
different modes prescribed by law for its commission, or the felony is set forth
under different counts specifying the way of its perpetuation, or the acts resulted
from a single criminal impulse. Neither is there duplicity when the other offense
described is but an ingredient or an essential element of the real offense charged
nor when several acts are related in describing the offense. (Padilla: Criminal
Procedure Annotated, 1959 ed., p. 101).
In the case of People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil., 621, the defendant therein was
convicted on a plea of guilty of physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Based on the same facts, he was also accused of having caused public
disturbance. The plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused was rejected
on the ground that the two offenses were not the same, although they arose from
the same act.
Following the reasoning of the trial court that more than one offense was charged,
the trial court should have ordered that the information be amended, or if that was
not possible, that a new information be filed.
Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to quash
but may not defer it till the trial of the case on the merits. In sustaining the motion,
the court may order the filing of a new information or may dismiss the case. In the
new information, the defects of the previous information may be cured. For
instance, if the motion to quash is sustained on the ground that more than one
offense is charged in the information, the court may order that another information
be filed charging only one offense. But the court may or may not issue such order
in the exercise of its discretion. The order may be made if the defects found in the
first information may be cured in a new information. If the order is made, the
accused, if he is in custody, should not be discharged, unless otherwise, admitted
to bail. But if no such order is made, or, having been made, the prosecuting
attorney fails to file another information within the time specified by the court, the
accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless he is also in custody for another
charge, or if is out on bail, the bail must be exonerated. In such event, however,
the fiscal is free to institute another criminal proceeding since such ground of
objection is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778-779).
In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more
than one offense but only that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and
different criminal acts attributed to the defendants, it was not the purpose or
intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the present
proceedings, but merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying
different offenses which as a whole, supposedly constitute the crime of sedition.
Consequently, we believe that the information is valid.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders are hereby set aside and the case is
hereby remanded to the trial court of further proceedings, without pronouncement
as to costs.
G. THAT THE CRIMINAL LIABIILITY OR ACTION HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004]
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN
(Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior
to plea and trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether as a motion
to quash or motion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the
administration of justice and unduly burden the court system. Grounds not
included in the first of such repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and
can no longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential
relatives who intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract
or application with the Government. This provision is not vague or impermissibly
broad, because it can easily be understood with the use of simple statutory
construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this be
challenged on the basis of the overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness doctrines,
which apply only to free-speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the November 20, 2001[2] and the March 1, 2002[3] Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The
arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as
scheduled.[4]
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft
court] charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,[5]
as amended. The Information reads:
That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said
[petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the
Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil
degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for
the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene
directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the
majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its
ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including
structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-
expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island
Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program
for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Contrary to law.
On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT claiming that no valid preliminary investigation was
conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could
be said to have been conducted, the same was null and void having been
undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.
On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an
order giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On January
21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the
Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
order.
On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U.
Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the
reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case.
Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the
recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and
directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second MOTION TO
QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT.
On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION
TO DISMISS. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and
admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF
[PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE
INSTANT CASE; AND
B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND
PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS
VIOLATED
III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
[PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PRESCRIPTION[6]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except
the third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its previous
Resolutions.[7] In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that
Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the basic
law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been committed on
or about 1975, the amended provision was inapplicable to him.[8]
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary
investigation was not violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation.[9]
It further held that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the Information had set forth the
essential elements of the offense charged.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:
Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear and
incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vagueness
violates the due process right of an individual to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him;
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the
due process right of an individual to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved;
C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him was violated;
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated
during the preliminary investigation stage in the following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case No. 13736;
and
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partial
investigator.
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is
immune from criminal prosecution.
And
II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner[s] x x x right to equal protection of
the laws.[12]
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act
3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there
was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from
criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time
in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his
December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to
Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to
quash.[13] We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges the denial
of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner
could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration
been turned down, the next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition
for certiorari[14] -- if there was grave abuse of discretion -- which should be filed
within 60 days from notice of the assailed order;[15] or (2) to proceed to trial without
prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same
questions before the proper appellate court.[16] But instead of availing himself of
these remedies, he filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 19, 2001.
Impropriety of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantial distinction between a motion to quash and a motion to
dismiss. Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such
motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity
of proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is generally used in criminal proceedings
to annul a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily
used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our
Rules of Court use the term motion to quash in criminal,[17] and motion to dismiss
in civil, proceedings.[18]
In the present case, however, both the Motion to Quash and the Motion to Dismiss
are anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The
hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second
motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or
different, by installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there
would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial would never commence. A
second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and unduly burdens
the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first motion
to quash are generally deemed waived.[19] Petitioners Motion to Dismiss violates
this rule.
Constitutionality of
the Challenged Provision
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed
outright. However, given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and
corruption, the Court will nevertheless address the other issues on their merit.
Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal
statute, on the ground that the act constituting the offense is allegedly vague and
impermissibly broad.
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth[20] and the vagueness[21]
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory
is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
xxxxxxxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,
the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional. As has been pointed out, vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant.[22] (underscoring supplied)
To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity.[23] While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad,[24] the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec[25] decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally,
Santiago v. Comelec[26] held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional
because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass
acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual case
and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:[27]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-
by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes,
described as a manifestly strong medicine to be employed sparingly and only as
a last resort. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged.[28]
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be
examined only as applied to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be
declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President
of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene,
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior
to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has
been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to
any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of
such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval
of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but
depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations
issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or
in the exercise of a profession.
Petitioner also claims that the phrase to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government is vague and
violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against
him.[29] He further complains that the provision does not specify what acts are
punishable under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be
presumed innocent.[30] We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid.[31] On the party challenging its validity weighs
heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[32] Any reasonable doubt
about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[33]
To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v.
Executive Secretary,[34] the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was
explained by this Court thus:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[35]
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption.
This Court has previously laid down the test for determining whether a statute is
vague, as follows:
x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[36] But the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first
may be saved by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second whenever directed against such activities.[37] With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice.[38] It must be stressed,
however, that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details
in advance as in all other statutes.[39]
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,[40] in which the Court said that there
was nothing vague about a penal law that adequately answered the basic query
What is the violation?[41] Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are
evidentiary matters that the law itself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the
uniqueness of every case.[42]
The question What is the violation? is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA
3019, as follows:
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; and
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the government.
Applicability of
Statutory Construction
As to petitioners claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the
Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through
simple statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used
in a statute will not render the law void for vagueness, if the meaning can be
determined through the judicial function of construction.[43] Elementary is the
principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.
x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[44]
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression
of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act x x x.
x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[45]
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words.[46] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed.[47]
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation,
which is to to come between.[48] Criminally liable is anyone covered in the
enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner
in any business, transaction, contract or application with the government. As we
have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how
such acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon those
details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a
ground to quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial.
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any
event, the overbreath and void for vagueness doctrines are not applicable to this
case.
Second Issue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner
further contends that the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague,
because it does not specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly
performed.[49] Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.[50] The
pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a
bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion
shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details
desired.
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to
enable the court to pronounce judgment. [51] The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the
information.[52]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
information,[53] matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to
the nature of the offense -- need not be averred.[54] Whatever facts and
circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined by reference to
the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.[55]
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements
of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the
allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as
to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed
are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation
when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayans
Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.[56] Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,[57] he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to a
preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both as complainant and as
investigator.[58]
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to
conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge in cases in which it was the agency that had
gathered evidence and subsequently filed the complaint.[59] On that basis, this
Court nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the
transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the
Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present
Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary
investigation. However, he was accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan
suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The
procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayans actions are in accord also with Raro v. Sandiganbayan,[60]
which held that the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not
warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already been filed,
the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while
the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed.[61]
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.[62] Such issue should be
disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his
Motion within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party may
not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that raises the same issue
and the same arguments.
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is
utterly unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense
was committed during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975. He argues
that when the Information was filed on July 12, 1989,[63] prescription had already
set in, because the prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is
only ten (10) years from the time the offense was allegedly committed. The
increase of this prescriptive period to fifteen (15) years took effect only on March
16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.[64]
Act No. 3326, as amended,[65] governs the prescription of offenses penalized by
special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned
the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.[66] In
Republic v. Desierto, the Court explained:
This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case,
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the
Philippines were charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of
RA No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover the
so-called Behest Loans, where the Philippine Government guaranteed several
foreign loans to corporations and entities connected with the former President
Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet prescribed, this Court ruled that:
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
xxxxxxxxx
People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In
the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral
or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires
that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription
begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature
of the constitutive act or acts. (Italics supplied)
There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the
present one which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First, both
cases arose out of seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both were
discovered only after the government created bodies to investigate these
anomalous transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for violations of RA No.
3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the
respondents conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the alleged
violations hidden from public scrutiny.
This Courts pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite
relevant and instructive as to the date when the discovery of the offense should
be reckoned, thus:
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved
party, to have known the violations committed at the time the questioned
transactions were made because both parties to the transactions were allegedly
in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government. The alleged anomalous
transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution
when one of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was
ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question the
legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the counting of the prescriptive
period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which could
have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987
when the initiatory complaint was filed.[67]
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general
rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the crime
cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the
aggrieved party, with knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged
intervention was made. The accused is the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale involving a private
corporation, the majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President
Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question
the legality of the sale or would even have thought of investigating petitioners
alleged involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation[68] of PCGG[69]
and its exhaustive investigations that the alleged crime was discovered. This led
to the initiation on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint against former President
Marcos and petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Consequently, the filing of the Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the
prescriptive period of ten years from the discovery of the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served
as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of former
President Marcos.[70] He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution,
as amended, which we quote:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure.
xxxxxxxxx
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to
petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while
the alleged crime happened in 1975. In Estrada v. Desierto,[71] this Court
exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to determine the
extent of its applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-
sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in
office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his
immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts
of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other
trespasser.
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.[72] On the contrary, it acted
prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence WHEREFORE, the Petition
is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED
H. THAT IT CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHCH, IF TRUE, WOULD CONSITUTE
LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150610. March 25, 2004]
FEDERICO A. POBLETE, BIENVENIDO C. POBRE, JUANITO GALANG,
RICARDO FLORES, SALVADOR OLAES, LEO V. PADILLA AND PEDRO
PATERNO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUSTICES EDILBERTO G.
SANDOVAL, GODOFREDO L. LEGASPI and RAOUL V. VICTORINO, in their
capacity as Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division,
HEDLIZA C. ANTHONY, ROSALINDA M. ESPIRITU, ANDREA D. VIASON,
JOSEPHINE N. RANCE, and MARITES C. MIRAFLOR, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for certiorari are the Sandiganbayan October 10, 2001
Resolution[1] denying petitioners Motion to Quash the first amended information
filed against them, and November 8, 2001 Resolution[2] granting the prosecutions
Motion to Admit the second amended information.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 27, 1999, the officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng
Pulborista, Inc., a non-stock, non-profit, non-government organization based in
Barangay Pulborista, Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite, filed a complaint[3] before the
Office of the Ombudsman against the following municipal officials of Kawit for 1995
to 2001: Mayor Federico Poblete, Vice-Mayor Rodrigo Caimol, and Sanggunuang
Bayan (SB) Members Bienvenido C. Pobre, Juanito Galang, Ricardo Flores,
Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Cherry Rosario Nolasco, Doe Padilla (who was
later identified as Leo Padilla), and Peter Doe (who was later identified as Hernan
Jamir).
The complaint alleged that the officials caused the registration of foreshore land
located in Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of Kawit and
subsequently sold the same to a corporation, FJI Property Developers, Inc.,
notwithstanding that under Commonwealth Act No. 141, specifically, Title III,
Chapter [8], Section 59[4] in relation to Section 61,[5] the land is inalienable and
cannot be disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease.
The complaint further averred that the sale of the land caused undue prejudice
and injury to poor people, especially the indigent families who claimed it as
communal fishing grounds since time immemorial, and gave private parties
unwarranted benefits, the contract or transaction being manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government and the public.
The respondents to the complaint jointly filed a Counter-affidavit[6] and a
Memorandum[7] contending that the land was legally and validly reclaimed; that
the certificate of title was obtained in accordance with existing laws and
regulations; that the sale and transfer were approved by the Commission on Audit;
that there is no communal fishing ground in Kawit; and that Commonwealth Act
No 141 is inapplicable to the case.
In a related move, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations and on Environment and Natural Resources conducted on February
7 and 14, 2000 an inquiry in aid of legislation following a September 27, 1999
privilege speech of Senator Ramon B. Revilla entitled Cavite Land Scam bearing
on the questioned sale of the land. [8]
The Senate subsequently approved the above-said Committees Report No. 227[9]
disclosing that the questioned lot is foreshore, and that bad faith attended its
registration and titling with the use of falsified documents, and thus recommending
the prosecution of the municipal officials.
By Order[10] of March 30, 2000, the Ombudsman directed the filing of an
information against the mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).
The necessary information[11] was thus filed against said officials including herein
petitioners, which was raffled to herein public respondent, 2nd Division,
Sandiganbayan.
All the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation[12] which the Sandiganbayan
denied by Order[13] of April 28, 2000 on the ground that it had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over their persons as they had not yet posted bonds nor surrendered.
Except for Hernan Jamir, the rest of the accused filed anew a Motion for
Reinvestigation,[14] averring that they voluntarily surrendered on May 2, 2000
before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite and posted cash bonds of twenty
thousand each[15].
The Ombudsman Prosecutor, by Comment/Opposition[16] to the Motion for
Reinvestigation, contended that the motion was filed out of time and the grounds
relied thereon are evidentiary in nature which could be resolved during trial. To
this Comment, the accused filed their Reply.[17]
In an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information[18] to which the accused filed
their Comment[19], the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the information
by inserting the number of the lot under controversy, Lot 4431, and the amount of
P123,123,123.00 representing the price paid by FJI Property Developers Inc. for
it.
By Resolution[20] of October 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Information on the ground that the Motion to Admit it was presented before
arraignment and the amendments were mere matters of form. In the same
resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation on the
ground that it was filed out of time, and the matters raised therein could hardly be
considered as newly discovered evidence and would be better ventilated during
the trial of the case as defense evidence.
All the accused, except Hernan Jamir and Rosario Cherry Nolasco, filed an
Omnibus Motion[21] (for reconsideration of the Resolution dated October 17, 2000
and/or to Quash the Amended Information), to which the prosecution filed its
Comment and Opposition.[22] Thereafter, the accused filed their Reply[23] to the
Prosecutions Comment and Opposition.
By Resolution of July 6, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds Omnibus
Motion.[24]
In the meantime or on July 12, 2001, the accused-herein petitioner Bienvenido C.
Pobre was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.[25]
On July 23, 2001, the accused filed a Motion to Quash[26] the Amended Information
on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and the
information contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification.
As the Ombudsman approved on August 31, 2001 a Memorandum[27]
recommending further amendments to the information, the prosecution filed on
September 14, 2001 a Motion to Admit Amended Information[28] (second Amended
Information).
For lack of merit, the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution[29] of October 10, 2001,
denied the Motion to Quash the first amended information.
By a subsequent Resolution[30] issued on November 8, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
granted the Motion to Admit the second Amended Information.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
In determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the Resolution of October 10, 2001, it is necessary to re-examine the
grounds invoked by petitioners in their Motion to Quash the first Amended
Information.
Petitioners Motion to Quash is anchored on Sections 3(a) and 3(h) of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
xxx
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification;
The test for the correctness of the ground under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense as
defined by law[31] without considering matters aliunde.
The information sought to be quashed is hereinbelow quoted verbatim:
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosector, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses Federico Poblete, Rodrigo Caimol, Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito Galang,
Ricardo Flores, Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Rosario Nolasco, Leo Padilla and
Hernan Jamir, of Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997 or prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FEDERICO
POBLETE, then Municipal Mayor, in conspiracy with then Vice Mayor, RODRIGO
CAIMOL and SB Members BIENVENIDO POBRE, JUANITO GALANG,
RICARDO FLORES, PEDRO PATERNO, SALVADOR OLAES, ROSARIO
CHERRY NOLASCO, LEO PADILLA and HERNAN JAMIR, taking advantage of
their official positions, with evident bad faith, and manifest partiality to FJI Property
Developers, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefits to FJI Property Developers, Inc. and cause undue injury to
the local fishermen and the government sold a foreshore land, Lot 4431 through
the passage of SB Resolution No. 3-97, Series of 1997 authorizing the sale of the
land situated in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite in favor of FJI Property Developers, Inc.
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS
(P123,123,123.00) with the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, represented by then
mayor FEDERICO POBLETE as vendor, despite full knowledge, and in complete
disregard, of the legal prohibition under Sections 159 and 61, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, against the disposition through sale of foreshore, and notwithstanding
the warning of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on
the prohibition against the lease of foreshore lands along Manila Bay towards
Cavite and Bataan.[32] (Underscoring supplied).
The information thus charges petitioners with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019, to wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practice of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices of government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Under settled jurisprudence, the following elements need to be proven in order to
constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, viz:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his
official duty in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave
any party unwarranted benefit, advantage or reference to such parties.[33]
Contrary to petitioners position, the information need not state the manner by
which the injury to the local fisherfolk or the government came about or the extent
by which they exhibited partiality, bad faith or negligence in the enactment of SB
Resolution 3-97[34] authorizing the sale of foreshore land, it being sufficient that
the information alleges that petitioners acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, and took advantage of their public positions by passing SB Resolution No.
3-97 despite the legal prohibition provided under the law, thereby causing undue
injury to the local fishermen and the government.
Anent the second ground of the Motion to Quash, it is erroneous for petitioners to
argue that the payment of the amount of P123,123,123.00 by FJI Property
Developers, Inc. for the lot in question, which enriched the coffers of the
government,[35] was a legal excuse and justification to free them from criminal
liability. For if the elements of the offense violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 are proven, the proffered excuse is immaterial.
The grounds bases of petitioners in the Motion to Quash the first Amended
Information being unwarranted, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the Resolution of October 10, 2001 denying the same.
Contending that the Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its Resolution of November 8, 2001, petitioners argue that it failed to
consider Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused,
their co-accused co-petitioner Bienvenido C. Pobre having already been
arraigned[36] under the first Amended Information and cannot thus be made to re-
plead to the second Amended Information without his constitutional right to double
jeopardy being violated. Petitioners moreover argue that they and their co-
accused having been charged of acting in concert, they cannot be convicted on
the basis of different informations.
The crux of the issue therefore hinges on whether the amendments in the second
Amended Information are mere matters of form which do not prejudice the rights
of the accused.
The second Amended Information is hereinbelow quoted verbatim:
That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
public officials, Federico Poblete, then Municipal Mayor, Rodrigo Caimol, then
Vice Mayor and Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito Galang, Ricardo Flores, Pedro
Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Rosario Cherry Nolasco, Leo Padilla and Hernan Jamir,
then Sangguniang Bayan Members, all of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, while
in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to
their office, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
cause undue injury to the Government and local fishermen of the Municipality of
Kawit, Cavite in the following manner: the said accused public officials maliciously
sold a foreshore land described as Lot 4431 through the passage of Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 3-97, Series of 1997 authorizing the sale said land situated
in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite in favor of FJI Property Developers, Inc. in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS
(P123,123,123.00) Philippine Currency, despite their full knowledge, and in
complete disregard, of the legal prohibition under Sections 159 in relation to
Section 61, Commonwealth Act No. 141, prohibiting the disposition through sale
of foreshore land thereby giving unwarranted benefits to FJI Property Developers,
Inc. to the damage and injury to the Government in the aforementioned amount.
(Underscoring in the original)
While petitioners cite People v. Casey[37] which laid down the test in determining
whether an amendment is a matter of form or substance, to wit:
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by an amendment has been said
to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the new form as in
the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment
to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto,
which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose
the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section
13, Rule 110 (now Section 14) of the Revised Rules of Court,
they fail to show how or why the amendments may be considered as matters of and their degree of participation, which should be appreciated, are properly the
substance which will prejudice their rights as accused. subject of trial on the merits rather than on a motion to quash.[42]
An objective appraisal, however, of the second Amended Information shows that As for the propriety or impropriety of the filing of the information by the
the amendments are merely formal for they do not touch upon the recital of facts Ombudsman, this Court may not pass. Neither may it independently make a
constituting the offense charged nor on the determination of the jurisdiction of the factual finding of whether there was indeed irregularity in the conduct of the
court. Instead, the amendments merely involve deletions, transpositions and re- preliminary investigation. For petitioners are not, in the present petition, assailing
phrasings, thereby raising the same issue and the same operative facts already the denial by the Sandiganbayan of their Motion for Reinvestigation.
found in the first Amended Information. Petitioners having failed to substantiate the grounds they invoked in their Motion
As laid down by this Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds to Quash the first Amended Information, and it having been established that the
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new amendments introduced in the second Amended Information are mere matters of
and material facts[38], and merely states with additional precision something which form, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing Resolutions of October 10, 2001 and November 8, 2001.
essential for conviction for the crime charged.[39] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The second Amended Information, while adding the word public officers, does not SO ORDERED.
introduce a new and material fact as the accused in the first Amended Information
were referred to as either the Mayor, Vice-Mayor or Members of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Likewise, in the second Amended Information, the phrase while in the
performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their
office, conspiring and confederating with each other is but a clearer restatement
of the phrase in conspiracy and taking advantage of their official positions found
in the first Amended Information.
Section 14, Rule 110 moreover provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases where the accused have already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of
a compliant or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information.[40]
The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended
Information which are also alleged in the first Amended Information does not
change the basic theory of the prosecution, thus creating no material change or
modification in the defenses of the accused.
Contrary to petitioners position, it having been established that the questioned
amendments are merely formal, there is no longer any need for accused
Bienvenido Pobre to be re-arraigned on the second Amended Information.[41]
Petitioners additionally argue that the Sandiganbayan failed to consider the
irregularity in the preliminary investigation which they have been harping upon,
the particulars of which were stated in their Motion for Reinvestigation that Lot No,
4431 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3115 was no longer foreshore
as it had already evolved into a landmass and was ripe for titling, and that a portion
of OCT No. 0-3115 was alienated in accordance with law.
Clearly, petitioners allegations are factual and evidentiary in nature which may
best be considered as matters of defense to be ventilated in a full-blown trial. Lack
of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is not one of the grounds
for a motion to quash. A motion to quash should be based on a defect in the
information, which is evident on its face. The guilt or innocence of the accused,

I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
[G.R. No. 136264. May 28, 2004]
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. VICENTE Q. ROXAS, IRENE AGBADA-CRUZ, SIXTO
AGBADA CRUZ, MERCEDES ARISTORENAS and ROMEO GOMEZ and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA for brevity) dated November 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43884,
denying Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyacs petition for certiorari and ruling that the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 227) of Quezon City (RTC for brevity) was correct in
denying petitioners motion to quash the information charging petitioner with
falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
The antecedent facts as borne out by the records of the case are accurately
narrated in the CA Decision dated November 13, 1998, thus:
An information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18037 at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner along with
some others. That information reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses LOURDES ANGELES,
ESTRELLA MAPA, ATTY. PONCIANO R. GUPIT, and ATTY. REYNALDO P.
DIMAYACYAC of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT (under
Article 172, first and last paragraph in relation to Article 171 paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of 1986, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the act of
falsification of public documents, by then and there falsifying or causing the
falsification of the following documents, to wit:
a) Certification dated March 10, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Fernando
Dizon, Record Management Analyst of the Bureau of Land, Central Office, Manila;
(b) Report dated May 5, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Jose Mariano, Chief
Record Management Division of Bureau of Land, Central Office, Manila; and
(c) Sales Certificate and Deed of Assignment allegedly issued by the Bureau of
Land in favor of Lourdes Angeles; that despite the fact that said accused knew all
the time that said documents are fake and spurious used the same in the Petition
for Reconstitution of Records of the technical description of Lots Nos. 755, 777,
778 and 783 of the Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. 14, Decree No. 667, GLRO
Record No. 5975 and the issuance of Title thereto filed by Estrella Mapa over and
involving the aforesaid lots in Land Registration Case docketed as LRC Case No.
3369 (86) before Branch 99, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and that by virtue
of said falsification and the use of the same as evidence in Court Honorable
Presiding Judge Godofredo Asuncion issued an order dated June 30, 1986
granting said petition, and pursuant thereto the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
issued Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 348156, 348291 and 348292 in the
name of Estrella Mapa thereby embracing and/or encroaching the portions of the
properties belonging to Romeo D. Gomez, Sixto Agbada, Irene Agbada-Cruz and
Mercedes Aristorenas whose properties were embraced and included in the said
Transfer Certificates of Titles and in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2)
grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to
do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information.
Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned.
By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T. Dayaw of Branch 80 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to whose sala Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037
was raffled, holding that the grant or denial of Motion to Dismiss whether the
accused is arraigned or not is discretionary on the part of the Court, it citing People
vs. IAC, L-66939-41, January 10, 1987, granted the petitioners motion to quash
upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed.
More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18037 or on October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the
same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for falsification of public
documents docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-49988
and 49989. The Informations arose from the questioned acts of falsification
subject of the earlier quashed information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037.
Petitioner later filed with Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the
informations were raffled a motion for the quashal thereof on the ground of double
jeopardy, citing Section 3(h) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner argued at the court a quo that he would be placed in double jeopardy
as he was indicted before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996, public respondent, Judge Vicente
Q. Roxas of Branch 227 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the two (2)
informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually lodged, held that the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 involved a different document as
that involved in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 which had already been quashed.
Resolution of the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
49989 was stayed pending the submission by petitioner of the documents required
by the court a quo. Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 and ordered petitioners
arraignment, he holding that said case did not place petitioner in double
jeopardy.[2]
Herein petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied his
petition stating in its Decision that since the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-
91-18037, on petitioners motion, was quashed on the ground that more than one
offense was charged pursuant to Sec. 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court,[3] he is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another Information for
an offense included in the charge subject of the Information in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18037.[4]
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari assigning the following errors of the
CA, to wit:
I. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in disregarding the legal doctrine
that THERE IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY, in the case now pending before
Respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas;
II. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not adhering to the decisions
of this Honorable Supreme Court, as well as to applicable jurisprudence on the
matter;
III. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not taking into account that
based on the Manifestation and Motion (To Grant Petition) In Lieu of Comment
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the ORDER of dismissal of Honorable
Judge Benigno T. Dayaw in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 on August 23, 1991
has become final and executory; and
IV. That the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals ERRED in concluding that
an ORDER sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense, as it has no legal basis.[5]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
petitioner, by filing the motion to quash and refusing to withdraw it after he was
arraigned, is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy, as his
motion to quash constituted his express consent for the dismissal of the
information. However, the OSG advances the view that the criminal case against
herein petitioner may be dismissed for the inordinate delay in the conduct of
preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing the proper information, which is
a violation of the accuseds constitutional right to due process of law and to speedy
disposition of cases.
Private respondent complainant Irene Agbada-Cruz, in turn, submits that the Court
of Appeals committed no error since the dismissal or quashal of an information is
not a bar to another prosecution except when the motion to quash is based on the
ground that (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished or that (2) the
accused has previously been convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception. - An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in Section 3, sub-sections (f) and (h) of this Rule.
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
the person of the accused;
(c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
(f) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;
(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal
excuse or
justification; and
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or
in jeopardy of being
convicted, or
acquitted of the
offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private respondent Cruz argues that since the previous information was
quashed on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged, the subsequent filing of a
proper information is, therefore, not barred.
In their Memorandum, private respondents-complainants Romeo Gomez and
Mercedes Aristorenas contend that (1) jeopardy does not attach where the
dismissal of the information was effected at the instance of the accused; and (2)
there was no violation of petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case since
he never raised this issue in the trial court nor in the appellate court, hence, his
silence should be interpreted as a waiver of said right to a speedy trial.
The issues boil down to (1) whether or not the prosecution of petitioner under the
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 would constitute double
jeopardy, considering that when the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037
was previously quashed, he had already been arraigned, and (2) whether or not
petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been
violated.
With regard to the first issue, we are in accord with the ruling of the CA that not all
the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. In People vs. Tac-
An,[6] we enumerated the elements that must exist for double jeopardy to be
invoked, to wit:
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
Was the duplicitous information a valid indictment? We answer in the affirmative.
In People vs. Bugayong,[7] we ruled that when an appellant fails to file a motion to
quash within the time prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
he is thus deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. In People vs.
Manalili,[8] we held that an accused, who fails to object prior to arraignment to a
duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged
therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such
component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional
guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he
or she is being charged. Verily, a duplicitous information is valid since such defect
may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be convicted of
as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during trial.
The validity of the information having been established, we go on to examine
whether the other requisites for double jeopardy to attach are present. In the
present case, although there was a valid indictment before a competent court and
petitioner, as the accused, had already been arraigned therein, entering a valid
plea of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, is not present.
It should be noted that the termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was upon
motion of petitioner who, on April 1, 1991, filed with the court an Urgent Motion to
Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23, 1991. In Sta. Rita vs.
Court of Appeals,[9] we held that the reinstatement of criminal cases against the
accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the
information by the trial court had been effected at his own instance when the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. In this
case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous criminal case against
petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner
is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal. There could
then be no double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e.,
that the dismissal be without accuseds express consent, is not present.
As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations docketed as Q-93-
49988 and Q-93-49989 constitutes a violation of petitioners constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of cases,[10] we rule in the negative. We are not convinced
by the OSGs assertion that the cases of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan[11] or
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,[12] are applicable to the case before us. We see
differently. There is no factual similarity between this case before us and the cases
of Tatad and Angchangco.
In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the termination
of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its
resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that political motivations played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process[13] against then
Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In the Angchangco case, the criminal complaints
remained pending in the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years despite
the respondents numerous motions for early resolution and the respondent, who
had been retired, was being unreasonably deprived of the fruits of his retirement
because of the still unresolved criminal complaints against him. In both cases, we
ruled that the period of time that elapsed for the resolution of the cases against
the petitioners therein was deemed a violation of the accuseds right to a speedy
disposition of cases against them.
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the
accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad case. There is no showing that
petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the two-year period
before the filing of the proper informations, unlike in the Angchangco case where
petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an unreasonably long
time. Thus, the circumstances present in the Tatad and Angchangco cases
justifying the radical relief granted by us in said cases are not existent in the
present case.
We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan[14] where we held that:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the determination
of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, we shall examine how such aforementioned factors affected herein
petitioners right.
As to the length of delay, it is established that the prosecution did not take any
action on petitioners case for two years. From the time that Criminal Case No. Q-
91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the prosecution failed to effect the
very simple remedy of filing two separate informations against petitioner until
October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the refiling of the proper
informations. However, the prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain
the circumstances that may have caused such delay precisely because petitioner
never raised the issue of the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the
case. There is nothing on record to show what happened during the two-year lull
before the filing of the proper informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained that
peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay was vexatious, capricious and
oppressive, and therefore, a violation of petitioners constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner never asserted his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. The only ground he raised in assailing the
subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected to double
jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to light the issue on petitioners right to
a speedy disposition of his case, and only when the case was brought to the
appellate court on certiorari. Even in this petition before us, petitioner did not raise
the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Again, it was only the
OSG that presented such issue to us in the Brief for the State which was only then
adopted by petitioner through a Manifestation dated August 3, 1999. We are not
convinced that the filing of the informations against petitioner after two years was
an unreasonable delay. Petitioner himself did not really believe that there was any
violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him.
The case which is more in point with the present one before us is Dela Pea vs.
Sandiganbayan[15] where we ruled that petitioner therein, for failing to assert their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases, was deemed to have waived such right
and thus, not entitled to the radical relief granted by the Court in the cases of Tatad
and Angchangco. The factual circumstances surrounding herein petitioners case
do not demonstrate that there was any violation of petitioners right to a speedy
disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order issued pursuant to our Resolution dated January 17,
2000 is hereby LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 227)
is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with petitioners arraignment in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
SO ORDERED.