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OF
LAWS
DIGESTS
AND
NOTES1
the
action
of
the
claimants.
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
Condition
No.
14
subverts
the
public
policy
on
transfer
of
venue
of
proceedings
of
this
nature,
since
the
same
will
prejudice
rights
and
interests
of
innumerable
passengers
from
different
places
of
the
country
who,
under
Condition
No.
14,
IV.
JURISDICTION
AND
CHOICE
OF
LAW
will
have
to
file
suits
against
Sweet
Lines
only
in
the
City
of
Cebu.
ALG:
But
the
lawyers
are
neither
of
low
income
nor
less
literate.
GR:
A
state
does
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
absence
of
some
reasonable
basis
for
exercising
it,
whether
the
proceedings
are
in
rem,
quasi
in
rem,
or
in
FACTS:
personam.
To
be
reasonable,
the
jurisdiction
must
be
based
on
some
minimum
Respondents
Atty.
Leovigildo
Tandog
and
Rogelio
Tiro,
bought
tickets
for
contacts
that
will
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
Voyage
90
at
the
branch
office
of
petitioner,
Sweet
Lines
Inc.,
a
shipping
justice.
company
transporting
inter-‐island
passengers
and
cargoes,
at
Cagayan
de
Oro
City.
Tandog
and
Tiro
were
to
board
Sweet
Lines’
vessel,
M/S
"Sweet
Hope"
EXC
1:
Principle
of
Forum
Non
Conveniens—A
court,
even
though
it
has
bound
for
Tagbilaran
City
via
the
port
of
Cebu.
jurisdiction,
will
not
entertain
the
suit
if
it
believes
itself
to
be
seriously
inconvenient
forum,
provided
that
a
more
convenient
forum
is
available
to
Upon
learning
that
the
vessel
was
not
proceeding
to
Bohol
(since
many
plaintiff.
passengers
were
bound
for
Surigao),
Tandog
and
Tiro,
per
advice,
went
to
the
branch
office
for
proper
relocation
to
M/S
"Sweet
Town".
Because
the
said
*Most
convenient
forum:
vessel
was
already
filled
to
capacity,
they
were
forced
to
agree
"to
hide
at
the
1.
The
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to
it
cargo
section
to
avoid
inspection
of
the
officers
of
the
Philippine
Coastguard."
2.
It
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
the
facts
3.
It
has
or
is
likely
to
have
the
power
to
enforce
its
decision
(principle
of
Tandog
and
Tiro
alleged
that
they
were
exposed
to
the
scorching
heat
of
the
effectiveness)
sun
and
the
dust
coming
from
the
ship's
cargo
of
corn
grits
during
the
trip
and
that
the
tickets
they
bought
at
Cagayan
de
Oro
City
for
Tagbilaran
were
not
honored
and
they
were
constrained
to
pay
for
other
tickets.
Hence,
they
sued
CHOICE
OF
FORUM
Sweet
Lines
for
damages
and
for
breach
of
contract
of
carriage
in
the
alleged
sum
of
P10,000.00
before
CFI
of
Misamis
Oriental.
1.
SWEET
LINES
INC.
V.
TEVES
Sweet
Lines
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaint
on
the
ground
of
improper
venue
based
on
the
condition
printed
at
the
back
of
the
tickets:
14.
It
is
hereby
agreed
DOCTRINES:
GR:
Venue
may
be
changed
or
transferred
from
one
province
to
and
understood
that
any
and
all
actions
arising
out
of
the
conditions
and
another
by
agreement
of
the
parties
in
writing,
based
on
Rule
4,
§3,
of
the
Rules
provisions
of
this
ticket,
irrespective
of
where
it
is
issued,
shall
be
filed
in
the
of
Court.
competent
courts
in
the
City
of
Cebu.
The
motion
was
denied.
MR
was
filed
but
was
also
denied.
Hence,
this
instant
petition
for
prohibition
for
preliminary
EXC
#1:
Such
an
agreement
will
not
be
held
valid
where
it
practically
negates
injunction,
'alleging
that
the
respondent
judge
Teves
has
departed
from
the
accepted
and
usual
course
of
judicial
proceeding"
and
"had
acted
without
or
in
excess
or
in
error
of
his
jurisdiction
or
in
gross
abuse
of
discretion.
1
Digests
lifted
from
the
3C
2012-‐2013
case
digests.
Edited
and
annotated
according
to
class
discussion.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
1
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
ISSUE:
May
a
common
carrier
engaged
in
inter-‐island
shipping
stipulate
thru
a
Also,
it
should
also
be
stressed
that
these
companies
are
franchise
holders
of
condition
printed
at
the
back
of
passage
tickets
to
its
vessels
that
any
and
all
certificates
of
public
convenience
and
therefore,
posses
a
virtual
monopoly
actions
arising
out
of
the
contract
of
carriage
should
be
filed
only
in
a
particular
over
the
business
of
transporting
passengers
between
the
ports
covered
by
province
or
city,
in
this
case
the
City
of
Cebu,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
others?
their
franchise.
They
may
thus
dictate
their
terms
of
passage,
leaving
passengers
with
no
choice
but
to
buy
their
tickets
and
avail
of
their
vessels
and
HELD:
facilities.
There
was
a
valid
contract
of
carriage
entered
into
by
Sweet
Lines
and
Tandog
and
Tiro,
the
best
evidence
thereof
is
the
passage
tickets.
All
the
essential
Lastly,
bulk
of
those
who
board
these
inter-‐island
vessels
come
from
the
low-‐
elements
of
a
valid
contract
(consent,
cause
or
consideration
and
object)
are
income
groups
and
are
less
literate,
and
who
have
little
or
no
choice
but
to
present.
avail
of
petitioner's
vessels.
However,
in
this
case,
with
respect
to
the
14
conditions
printed
at
the
back
of
2.
Condition
No.
14
subverts
the
public
policy
on
transfer
of
venue
of
the
passage
tickets,
these
are
commonly
known
as
"contracts
of
adhesion,"— proceedings
of
this
nature,
since
the
same
will
prejudice
rights
and
interests
certain
contracts
where
almost
all
the
provisions
of
which
have
been
drafted
of
innumerable
passengers
from
different
places
of
the
country
who,
under
only
by
one
party—the
validity
and/or
enforceability
of
which
will
have
to
be
Condition
No.
14,
will
have
to
file
suits
against
Sweet
Lines
only
in
the
City
of
determined
by
the
peculiar
circumstances
obtaining
in
each
case
and
the
Cebu.
nature
of
the
conditions
or
terms
sought
to
be
enforced.
For,
although
venue
may
be
changed
or
transferred
from
one
province
to
In
recognition
of
the
character
of
contracts
of
this
kind,
the
protection
of
the
another
by
agreement
of
the
parties
in
writing,
based
on
Rule
4,
§3,
of
the
disadvantaged
is
expressly
enjoined
by
the
NCC:
Art.
24.
In
all
contractual
Rules
of
Court,
such
an
agreement
will
not
be
held
valid
where
it
practically
property
or
other
relations,
when
one
of
the
parties
is
at
a
disadvantage
on
negates
the
action
of
the
claimants.
The
philosophy
underlying
the
provisions
account
of
his
moral
dependence,
ignorance
indigence,
mental
weakness,
on
transfer
of
venue
of
actions
is
the
convenience
of
the
plaintiffs
as
well
as
his
tender
age
and
other
handicap,
the
courts
must
be
vigilant
for
his
protection.
witnesses
and
to
promote
the
ends
of
justice.
In
line
with
that,
the
court
ruled
that
Condition
No.
14
should
be
held
as
void
Considering
the
expense
and
trouble
a
passenger
residing
outside
of
Cebu
City
and
unenforceable
for
the
following
reasons:
would
incur
to
prosecute
a
claim
in
the
City
of
Cebu,
he
would
most
probably
decide
not
to
file
the
action
at
all.
The
condition
will
defeat
the
ends
of
justice.
1.
It
is
unjust
and
unfair
to
bind
passengers
to
the
terms
of
the
conditions
printed
at
the
back
of
the
passage
tickets.
On
the
other
hand,
Sweet
Lines
has
branches
or
offices
in
the
respective
ports
of
call
of
its
vessels
and
can
afford
to
litigate
in
any
of
these
places.
Hence,
the
There
is
an
acute
shortage
in
inter-‐island
vessels
plying
between
the
country's
filing
of
the
suit
in
the
CFI
of
Misamis
Oriental
will
not
cause
inconvenience
or
several
islands,
and
with
that,
the
facilities
they
offer
leave
much
to
be
prejudice
Sweet
Lines.
desired,
thus,
passengers
literally
scramble
to
whatever
accommodations
may
be
availed
of,
even
through
circuitous
routes,
and/or
at
the
risk
of
their
Public
policy
is
that
principle
of
the
law,
which
holds
that
no
subject
or
citizen
safety
and
this
was
precisely
the
experience
of
Tandog
and
Tiro.
Under
these
can
lawfully
do
that
which
has
a
tendency
to
be
injurious
to
the
public
or
circumstances,
it
is
hardly
just
and
proper
to
expect
the
passengers
to
against
the
public
good.
Under
this
principle,
the
freedom
of
contract
or
private
examine
their
tickets
for
conditions
that
may
be
printed
much
charge
them
dealing
is
restricted
by
law
for
the
good
of
the
public.
with
having
consented
to
the
conditions,
so
printed,
especially
if
there
are
a
number
of
such
conditions
in
fine
print,
as
in
this
case.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
2
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
2.
HSBC
V.
SHERMAN
over
all
disputes
arising
under
this
guarantee.”
The
company
failed
to
pay
its
G.R.
No.
72494
|
August
11,
1989
obligation.
Thus,
HSBC
demanded
payment
but
for
failure
to
pay,
HSBC
filed
the
above-‐mentioned
complaint.
Doctrines:
GR:
Choice
of
forum
should
govern.
EXC
#2:
When
due
process
demands
that
the
choice
of
forum
be
liberally
Private
respondents
filed
a
MTD
on
the
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
construed.
subject
matter
and
over
their
persons.
The
trial
court
denied
the
MTD,
ruling
that
there
is
nothing
in
the
Guarantee
which
says
that
the
courts
of
Singapore
A
State
does
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
absence
of
some
reasonable
basis
for
shall
have
jurisdiction
to
the
exclusion
of
the
courts
of
other
countries
or
exercising
it,
whether
the
proceedings
are
in
rem,
quasi
in
rem,
or
in
personam.
nations
and
that
jurisdiction
over
the
persons
of
defendants
is
acquired
by
To
be
reasonable,
the
jurisdiction
must
be
based
on
some
minimum
contacts
service
of
summons
and
copy
of
the
complaint
on
them.
There
has
been
a
valid
that
will
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice.
service
of
summons
on
both
defendants
and
in
fact
the
same
is
admitted
when
said
defendants
filed
a
'Motion
for
Extension
of
Time
to
File
Responsive
The
defense
of
private
respondents
that
the
complaint
should
have
been
filed
in
Pleading.’
Private
respondents
then
filed
before
CA
a
petition
for
prohibition
Singapore
is
based
merely
on
technicality.
They
did
not
even
claim,
much
less
with
preliminary
injunction
and/or
prayer
for
a
restraining
order.
CA
rendered
a
prove,
that
the
filing
of
the
action
here
will
cause
them
any
unnecessary
decision
granting
the
injunction
stating
that:
“The
loan
was
obtained
by
a
trouble,
damage,
or
expense.
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
no
showing
that
HSBC
company
incorporated
in
Singapore.
The
loan
was
granted
by
the
filed
the
action
here
just
to
harass
private
respondents.
Singapore
Branch
of
HSBC.
The
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
was
also
concluded
in
Singapore.
The
loan
was
in
Singaporean
dollars
and
the
repayment
thereof
Av:
Respondent
must
allege
and
prove
that
the
filing
of
the
action
in
the
forum
also
in
the
same
currency.
The
transaction,
to
say
the
least,
took
place
in
1.
will
cause
unnecessary
trouble,
damage,
or
expense
on
his
part
and
that
2.
it
Singporean
setting
in
which
the
law
of
that
country
is
the
measure
by
which
was
filed
to
harass
him.
that
relationship
of
the
parties
will
be
governed.”
FACTS:
ISSUE:
A
complaint
for
collection
of
a
sum
of
money
was
filed
by
Hongkong
and
Whether
Philippine
courts
have
jurisdiction
over
the
suit.
Shanghai
Banking
Corporation
(HSBC)
against
private
respondents
Jack
Robert
Sherman
and
Deodato
Reloj,
before
the
RTC
QC.
HELD:
Yes.
While
it
is
true
that
"the
transaction
took
place
in
Singaporean
setting"
and
In
1981,
Eastern
Book
Supply
Service
PTE,
Ltd.
(company),
a
company
that
the
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
contains
a
choice-‐of-‐forum
clause,
the
incorporated
in
Singapore
applied
with,
and
was
granted
by,
the
Singapore
very
essence
of
due
process
dictates
that
the
stipulation
be
liberally
branch
of
HSBC
an
overdraft
facility.
As
a
security
for
the
repayment
of
sums
construed.
One
basic
principle
underlies
all
rules
of
jurisdiction
in
International
advanced
through
the
aforesaid
overdraft
facility,
private
respondents
and
a
Law:
A
State
does
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
absence
of
some
reasonable
certain
Robin
de
Clive
Lowe,
all
of
whom
were
directors
of
the
company,
basis
for
exercising
it,
whether
the
proceedings
are
in
rem
quasi
in
rem
or
in
executed
a
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
in
favor
of
HSBC
whereby
the
former
personam.
To
be
reasonable,
the
jurisdiction
must
be
based
on
some
agreed
to
pay,
jointly
and
severally,
on
demand
all
sums
owed
by
the
minimum
contacts
that
will
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
COMPANY
to
petitioner
BANK
under
the
aforestated
overdraft
facility.
The
substantial
justice.
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
provides
that:
“This
guarantee
and
all
rights,
obligations
and
liabilities
arising
hereunder
shall
be
construed
and
determined
The
instant
case
presents
a
very
odd
situation.
In
the
ordinary
habits
of
life,
under
and
may
be
enforced
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
Republic
of
anyone
would
be
disinclined
to
litigate
before
a
foreign
tribunal,
with
more
Singapore.
We
hereby
agree
that
the
Courts
of
Singapore
shall
have
jurisdiction
reason
as
a
defendant.
However,
in
this
case,
private
respondents
are
Philippine
residents
(a
fact
which
was
not
disputed
by
them)
who
would
rather
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
3
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
face
a
complaint
against
them
before
a
foreign
court
and
in
the
process
incur
Although
the
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
prepared
by
HSBC
is
a
contract
of
considerable
expenses,
not
to
mention
inconvenience,
than
to
have
a
adhesion
and
that
consequently,
it
cannot
be
permitted
to
take
a
stand
Philippine
court
try
and
resolve
the
case.
The
defense
of
private
respondents
contrary
to
the
stipulations
of
the
contract,
substantial
bases
exist
for
HSBC’s
that
the
complaint
should
have
been
filed
in
Singapore
is
based
merely
on
choice
of
forum,
as
discussed
earlier.
technicality.
They
did
not
even
claim,
much
less
prove,
that
the
filing
of
the
action
here
will
cause
them
any
unnecessary
trouble,
damage,
or
expense.
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
no
showing
that
HSBC
filed
the
action
here
just
to
CHOICE
OF
LAW
harass
private
respondents.
Further,
the
parties
did
not
thereby
stipulate
that
only
the
courts
of
3.
BELLIS
V.
BELLIS
Singapore,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
the
rest,
has
jurisdiction.
Neither
did
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐23678
|
June
6,
1967
clause
in
question
operate
to
divest
Philippine
courts
of
jurisdiction.
In
International
Law,
jurisdiction
is
often
defined
as
the
right
of
a
State
to
DOCTRINE:
Whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
involved
in
our
exercise
authority
over
persons
and
things
within
its
boundaries
subject
to
System
of
legitimes,
Congress
has
not
intended
to
extend
the
same
to
the
certain
exceptions.
Thus,
a
State
does
not
assume
jurisdiction
over
travelling
succession
of
foreign
nationals.
Article
16,
a
specific
provision,
must
prevail
over
sovereigns,
ambassadors
and
diplomatic
representatives
of
other
States,
and
Article
17,
a
general
one.
foreign
military
units
stationed
in
or
marching
through
State
territory
with
the
permission
of
the
latter's
authorities.
This
authority,
which
finds
its
source
in
Av:
Thus,
even
if
under
Article
17,
the
prohibitive
law
on
deprivation
of
legitimes
the
concept
of
sovereignty,
is
exclusive
within
and
throughout
the
domain
of
cannot
be
rendered
null
or
ineffective
by
laws
promulgated
in
Texas,
Article
16
the
State.
A
State
is
competent
to
take
hold
of
any
judicial
matter
it
sees
fit
by
(which
provides
that
CIAO
should
be
governed
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
making
its
courts
and
agencies
assume
jurisdiction
over
all
kinds
of
cases
whose
succession
is
under
consideration)
should
prevail.
brought
before
them.
FACTS:
While
in
the
main,
the
motion
to
dismiss
fails
to
categorically
use
with
Amos
Bellis
was
a
citizen
and
resident
of
Texas
at
the
time
of
his
death.
He
exactitude
the
words
'improper
venue'
it
can
be
perceived
from
the
general
had
5
legitimate
children
with
his
first
wife,
Mary
Mallen,
whom
he
divorced.
thrust
and
context
of
the
motion
that
what
is
meant
is
improper
venue,
The
He
had
3
legitimate
daughters
with
his
second
wife,
Violet,
who
survived
him,
use
of
the
word
'jurisdiction'
was
merely
an
attempt
to
copy-‐cat
the
same
word
and
another
3
illegitimate
children
with
another
woman.
Before
he
died,
he
employed
in
the
guarantee
agreement
but
conveys
the
concept
of
venue.
At
executed
2
wills—the
first
one
disposing
of
his
Texas
properties,
the
other
any
rate,
this
issue
is
now
of
no
moment
because
the
Court
holds
that
venue
disposing
his
Philippine
properties.
In
his
will,
which
he
executed
in
the
here
was
properly
laid
for
the
same
reasons
discussed
above.
Philippines,
he
directed
that
after
all
taxes,
obligations,
and
expenses
of
administration
are
paid
for,
his
distributable
estate
should
be
divided,
in
trust,
The
respondent
Court
likewise
ruled
that:
“In
a
conflict
problem,
a
court
will
in
the
following
order
and
manner:
a)
$240,000.00
to
his
first
wife
Mary
Mallen
simply
refuse
to
entertain
the
case
if
it
is
not
authorized
by
law
to
exercise
b)
$120,000.00
to
his
three
illegitimate
children
Amos
Bellis,
Jr.,
Maria
Cristina
jurisdiction.
And
even
if
it
is
so
authorized,
it
may
still
refuse
to
entertain
the
Bellis,
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
or
$40,000.00
each,
and
c)
After
foregoing
the
two
case
by
applying
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens.”
However,
whether
a
items
have
been
satisfied,
the
remainder
shall
go
to
his
seven
surviving
children
suit
should
be
entertained
or
dismissed
on
the
basis
of
the
principle
of
forum
by
his
first
and
second
wives.
non
conveniens
depends
largely
upon
the
facts
of
the
particular
case
and
is
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.
Thus,
the
CA
should
not
Maria
Cristina
Bellis
and
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
filed
their
respective
oppositions
have
relied
on
such
principle.
to
the
project
of
partition
on
the
ground
that
they
were
deprived
of
their
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legitimes
as
illegitimate
children
and,
therefore,
compulsory
heirs
of
the
However,
it
is
evident
that
whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
deceased.
involved
in
our
System
of
legitimes
(that
is
the
public
policy
that
a
compulsory
heir
cannot
be
deprived
of
his
legitime),
Congress
has
not
intended
to
extend
The
lower
court
issued
an
order
overruling
the
oppositions
and
approving
the
the
same
to
the
succession
of
foreign
nationals.
For
it
has
specifically
chosen
executor’s
final
account,
report
and
administration,
and
project
of
partition.
to
leave,
inter
alia,
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
to
the
decedent's
Relying
upon
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
it
applied
the
national
law
of
the
national
law.
Specific
provisions
must
prevail
over
general
ones.
A
provision
in
decedent,
which
in
this
case
did
not
provide
for
legitimes.
a
foreigner's
will
to
the
effect
that
his
properties
shall
be
distributed
in
accordance
with
Philippine
law
and
not
with
his
national
law,
is
illegal
and
void,
ISSUE:
for
his
national
law
cannot
be
ignored
in
regard
to
those
matters
that
Article
Whether
such
illegitimate
children
of
Bellis
be
entitled
to
successional
rights
10—now
Article
16—of
the
Civil
Code
states
said
national
law
should
govern.
HELD:
4.
TAYAG
V.
BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED
No.
The
said
illegitimate
children
are
not
entitled
to
their
legitimes.
Under
Texas
law,
there
are
no
legitimes.
Even
if
the
other
will
was
executed
in
the
DOCTRINE:
Benguet
Consolidated
is
a
domestic
corp.
subject
to
the
unrestricted
Philippines,
his
national
law,
still,
will
govern
the
properties
for
succession
even
jurisdiction
of
the
local
courts.
Its
shares
of
stocks
are
not
immune
from
lawful
if
it
is
stated
in
his
testate
that
it
shall
be
governed
by
the
Philippine
law.
court
orders.
The
actual
situs
of
shares
of
stock
is
in
the
Philippines,
the
corporation
being
domiciled
here.
Art.16,
Par.
2
renders
applicable
the
national
law
of
the
decedent,
in
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
with
regard
to
four
items:
(a)
the
order
of
FACTS:
succession,
(b)
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
(c)
the
intrinsic
validity
of
Idonah
Perkins
died
in
New
York
and
left
stock
certificates
covering
32,000
provisions
of
will,
and
(d)
the
capacity
to
succeed.
shares
of
Benguet
Consolidated
under
the
possession
of
County
Trust
Co.
of
New
York,
the
domiciliary
administrator
of
the
estate.
ART.16
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
of
the
country
to
where
it
is
situated.
Ancillary
administration
proceedings
were
instituted
in
Manila
and
Renato
Tayag
was
later
appointed
as
ancillary
administrator.
A
dispute
arose
between
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
the
domiciliary
and
ancillary
administrator
as
to
who
was
entitled
to
the
the
order
of
successions
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
possession
of
the
stock
certificates.
So
that
claims
of
Perkins’
local
creditors
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
could
be
satisfied,
the
lower
court
ordered
the
domiciliary
administrator
to
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
surrender
the
stock
certificates
but
the
domiciliary
refused
to
comply.
This
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
prompted
the
ancillary
administrator
to
petition
to
the
court
that
the
stock
country
wherein
said
property
may
be
found.
certificates
be
considered
lost
and
cancelled,
and
that
Benguet
be
ordered
to
issue
new
certificates
to
it.
The
CFI
granted
the
petition.
From
such
order,
As
a
counter-‐argument,
appellants
invoked
Art.
17,
Par.
3,
of
the
Civil
Code,
Benguet
Consolidated
appealed
contending
that
it
cannot
be
declared
lost
stating—
because
they
are
in
actual
existence
and
is
in
the
possession
of
Country
Trust
in
New
York.
Prohibitive
laws
concerning
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
those
which
have
for
their
object
public
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
ISSUE:
shall
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
Whether
the
lower
court
had
the
power
to
issue
the
questioned
order?
by
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
a
foreign
country.
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HELD:
contacts
between
Phil.
law
and
Phil.
courts
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
Yes.
The
power
of
the
ancillary
administrator
to
gain
control
and
possession
of
relationship
between
the
parties
on
the
other.
all
the
assets
of
the
decedent
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Philippines
is
undisputed.
The
administration
extends
to
all
assets
of
the
decedent
within
the
FACTS:
state
where
it
was
granted
and
the
administrator
of
one
state
has
no
power
Pakistan
Intl
Airlines
(PIA)
executed
2
separate
contracts
of
employments
in
over
assets
in
another
state.
Manila,
one
with
Farrales
and
the
other
with
Mamasig.
The
pertinent
portions
of
the
contract
state
that
(1)
the
agreement
is
for
a
period
of
3
years,
but
can
The
court
has
the
authority
to
require
that
the
ancillary
administrator’s
be
extended
by
the
mutual
consent
of
the
parties;
(2)
notwithstanding
anything
authority
over
the
stock
certificates
be
respected.
Benguet
Consolidated
is
a
to
contrary
as
herein
provided,
PIA
reserves
the
right
to
terminate
this
domestic
corp.
subject
to
the
unrestricted
jurisdiction
of
the
local
courts.
Its
agreement
at
any
time
by
giving
the
EMPLOYEE
notice
in
writing
in
advance
shares
of
stocks
are
not
immune
from
lawful
court
orders.
The
actual
situs
of
one
month
before
the
intended
termination
or
in
lieu
thereof,
by
paying
the
shares
of
stock
is
in
the
Philippines,
the
corporation
being
domiciled
here.
EMPLOYEE
wages
equivalent
to
one
month's
salary;
(3)
this
agreement
shall
be
construed
and
governed
under
and
by
the
laws
of
Pakistan,
and
only
the
Courts
Since
the
domiciliary
persistently
refuses
to
deliver
that
owned
by
the
of
Karachi,
Pakistan
shall
have
the
jurisdiction
to
consider
any
matter
arising
decedent
to
the
ancillary,
there
was
nothing
arbitrary
in
considering
them
as
out
of
or
under
this
agreement.
lost
and
requiring
issuance
of
new
certificates
in
lieu
thereof.
1
year
and
4
months
before
the
expiration
of
the
contracts
of
employment,
PIA
Benguet’s
contention
that
its
by-‐laws
should
be
followed
requiring
a
final
court
sent
separate
letters
to
Mamasig
and
Farrales,
advising
them
that
their
services
resolution
on
ownership
first
before
issuance
of
a
new
certificate
is
also
as
flight
stewardesses
would
be
terminated.
Farrales
and
Mamasig
filed
a
without
merit.
There
is
no
question
of
ownership
since
Country
Trust
did
not
complaint
for
illegal
dismissal
and
non-‐payment
of
company
benefits
and
even
appeal.
Even
assuming
it
did,
the
command
of
a
court
decree
prevails
bonuses.
PIA
contended
that
F
&
M
were
habitual
absentees
and
had
the
habit
over
a
by-‐law.
of
bringing
in
from
abroad
sizeable
quantities
of
personal
effects.
5.
PAKISTAN
INTERNATIONAL
AIRLINES
V.
OPLE
ISSUE:
Whether
the
provisions
in
the
contract
that
the
agreement
shall
be
governed
CHOICE
OF
LAW
by
the
laws
of
Pakistan
and
that
only
the
courts
of
Karachi,
Pakistan
shall
have
jurisdiction
over
any
controversy
arising
out
of
the
agreement,
may
be
given
DOCTRINE:
GR:
Lex
loci
intentionis
governs.
effect
EXC:
(1)
When
the
contract
is
a
labor
contract
because
it
is
imbued
with
public
HELD:
interest
and
(2)
when
there
are
multiple
substantive
contacts
between
Phil.
No.
The
first
clause
cannot
be
invoked
to
prevent
the
application
of
Phil.
labor
laws
and
courts
and
the
parties.
laws
and
regulations
to
the
subject
matter
of
the
case.
The
ER-‐EE
relationship
between
PIA
and
F&M
is
affected
with
public
interest
and
the
applicable
Phil.
The
first
clause
cannot
be
invoked
to
prevent
the
application
of
Phil.
labor
laws
laws
and
regulations
cannot
be
rendered
illusory
by
the
parties
agreeing
upon
and
regulations
to
the
subject
matter
of
the
case.
The
ER-‐EE
relationship
some
other
law
to
govern
their
relationship.
The
second
clause
cannot
also
be
between
PIA
and
F&M
is
affected
with
public
interest
and
the
applicable
Phil.
invoked
because
the
circumstances
of
the
case
shows
multiple
substantive
laws
and
regulations
cannot
be
rendered
illusory
by
the
parties
agreeing
upon
contacts
between
Phil.
law
and
Phil.
courts
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
some
other
law
to
govern
their
relationship.
The
second
clause
cannot
also
be
relationship
between
the
parties
on
the
other:
contract
was
executed
and
invoked
because
the
circumstances
of
the
case
shows
multiple
substantive
partially
performed
in
the
Phils.,
F&M
are
Filipino
citizens
and
PIA
is
licensed
to
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do
business
in
the
Phils.,
and
F&M
were
based
in
the
Phils.
in
between
their
next
flight
to
LA,
the
mother
and
daughter
couldn’t
be
accommodated
because
flights.
All
the
above
contacts
point
to
the
Philippine
courts
and
administrative
it
was
fully
book.
They
were
constrained
to
book
in
another
flight
and
agencies
as
a
proper
forum
for
the
resolution
of
contractual
disputes
between
purchased
2
tickets
from
American
Airlines
at
$918.
the
parties.
The
challenged
portion
of
the
employment
agreement
cannot
be
given
effect
so
as
to
oust
Philippine
agencies
and
courts
of
the
jurisdiction
In
the
Philippines,
petitioners
filed
an
action
for
damages
based
on
breach
of
vested
upon
them
by
Philippine
law.
Finally,
and
in
any
event,
PIA
did
not
contract
of
air
carriage
before
the
RTC
Makati.
The
RTC
ordered
the
airline
undertake
to
plead
and
prove
the
contents
of
Pakistan
law
on
the
matter;
it
company
to
pay
the
ticket
costs,
as
well
as
moral
damages
and
attorney’s
fees.
must
therefore
be
presumed
that
the
applicable
provisions
of
the
law
of
Pakistan
are
the
same
as
the
applicable
provisions
of
Philippine
law.
However,
the
CA
held
that
moral
damages
are
recoverable
only
where
there
is
fraud
or
bad
faith
(in
a
breach
of
contract
of
carriage).
Since
it
is
a
matter
of
As
to
the
dismissal
of
Farrales
&
Mamasig,
they
were
illegally
dismissed
and
are
record
that
overbooking
of
flights
is
a
common
and
accepted
practice
of
entitled
to
3
years
backwages
without
qualification
or
deduction.
PIA’s
right
to
airlines
in
the
US
and
is
specifically
allowed
under
the
Code
of
Federal
procedural
due
process
was
observed
as
it
was
given
the
opportunity
to
submit
Regulations
by
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Board,
no
fraud
nor
bad
faith
could
be
a
position
paper
and
present
evidence.
Also,
the
provisions
of
the
employment
imputed
on
respondent
TWA.
TWA
was
remiss
in
not
informing
petitioners
that
contract
must
not
be
contrary
to
law,
morals,
good
customs,
public
order,
the
flight
was
overbooked.
But
there
was
no
bad
faith
in
placing
the
petitioners
public
policy.
The
employment
contract
prevents
security
of
tenure
of
F&M
in
the
waitlist
along
with
48
passengers.
from
accruing.
ISSUE:
6.
ZALAMEA
VS.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
AND
TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES
Whether
there
was
bad
faith
on
the
part
of
TWA,
considering
that
TWA
G.R.
No.
104235
|
November
18,
1993
contends
that
overbooking
of
flights
is
a
common
and
accepted
practice
in
the
US
DOCTRINE:
The
principle
of
lex
loci
contractus
which
require
that
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
airline
ticket
was
issued
should
be
applied
by
the
court
where
HELD:
(1)
the
passengers
are
residents
and
nationals
of
the
forum
and
(2)
the
ticket
is
Yes,
there
was
fraud
or
bad
faith.
The
US
law
or
regulation
allegedly
issued
in
such
State
by
the
defendant
airline.
authorizing
overbooking
has
never
been
proved.
Foreign
laws
do
not
prove
themselves
nor
can
the
courts
take
judicial
notice
of
them.
Like
any
other
FACTS:
fact,
they
must
be
alleged
and
proved.
Written
law
may
be
evidenced
by
an
Petitioner-‐spouses
Zalamea
and
their
daughter
purchased
3
airline
tickets
from
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
the
Manila
agent
of
TransWorld
Airlines
for
a
flight
to
NY-‐LA.
The
tickets
were
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied
with
a
certificate
that
at
a
discount
of
75%
and
the
daughter
was
a
full
fare.
such
officer
has
custody.
The
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
an
embassy
or
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice-‐consul,
or
consular
agent
or
While
in
NY,
they
received
a
notice
of
the
reconfirmation.
On
the
appointed
by
any
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
date,
they
checked
in
at
10am
for
their
11am
flight
but
were
placed
on
the
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
waitlist.
The
daughter
appeared
as
No.
13
on
the
waitlist
while
the
two
Zalameas
were
listed
as
No.
34,
showing
a
party
of
two.
Out
of
the
42
names,
TWA
relied
solely
on
the
statement
of
its
customer
service
agent,
Ms.
Lather,
in
the
first
22
names
were
eventually
allowed
to
board,
including
the
father.
The
her
deposition.
Aside
from
such,
there
is
no
official
publication
of
said
code
others
weren’t
able
to
fly.
As
it
were,
those
holding
full-‐fare
tickets
were
given
presented
as
evidence.
Respondent
court’s
finding
that
overbooking
is
allowed
first
priority.
The
father
later
discovered
that
he
was
holding
his
daughter’s
full-‐ has
no
basis.
fare
ticket.
Those
with
discounted
tickets
were
denied
boarding.
Even
in
the
Even
if
the
claimed
U.S.
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
exist,
the
same
isn’t
CONFLICT
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applicable
in
accordance
with
the
principle
of
lex
loci
contractus
which
require
that
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
airline
ticket
was
issued
should
be
Aniceto
claims
that
upon
their
arrival
at
the
LA
Airport
for
their
flight,
they
applied
by
the
court
where
the
passengers
are
residents
and
nationals
of
the
proceeded
to
United's
counter
where
they
were
attended
by
Linda.
Linda
forum
and
the
ticket
is
issued
in
such
State
by
the
defendant
airline.
Since
the
examined
their
tickets,
punched
something
into
her
computer
and
then
told
tickets
were
sold
and
issued
in
the
Philippines,
the
applicable
law
would
be
them
that
boarding
would
be
in
fifteen
minutes.
When
the
flight
was
called,
Philippine
law.
the
Fontanillas
proceeded
to
the
plane.
To
their
surprise,
the
stewardess
at
the
gate
did
not
allow
them
to
board
the
plane,
as
they
had
no
assigned
seat
Even
on
the
assumption
that
overbooking
is
allowed,
respondent
TWA
is
still
numbers.
They
were
then
directed
to
go
back
to
the
"check-‐in"
counter
where
guilty
of
bad
faith
in
not
informing
its
passengers
beforehand
that
it
could
Linda
subsequently
informed
them
that
the
flight
had
been
overbooked
and
breach
the
contract
of
carriage
even
if
they
have
confirmed
tickets
if
there
was
asked
them
to
wait.
The
Fontanillas
tried
to
explain
to
Linda
the
special
overbooking.
Respondent
TWA
should
have
incorporated
stipulations
on
circumstances
of
their
visit.
However,
Linda
told
them
in
arrogant
manner,
"So
overbooking
on
the
tickets
issued
or
to
properly
inform
its
passengers
about
what,
I
can
not
do
anything
about
it."
Subsequently,
three
other
passengers
these
policies
so
that
the
latter
would
be
prepared
for
such
eventuality
or
with
Caucasian
features
were
graciously
allowed
to
baord,
after
the
Fontanillas
would
have
the
choice
to
ride
with
another
airline.
TWA
was
also
guilty
of
not
were
told
that
the
flight
had
been
overbooked.
The
plane
then
took
off
with
informing
its
passengers
of
its
alleged
policy
of
giving
less
priority
to
discounted
the
Fontanillas’
baggage
in
tow,
leaving
them
behind.
tickets.
The
Fontanillas
then
complained
to
Linda,
who
in
turn
gave
them
an
ugly
stare
7.
UNITED
AIRLINES
V.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
rudely
uttered,
"it’s
not
my
fault.
It’s
the
fault
of
the
company.
Just
sit
down
and
wait."
When
Mr.
Fontanilla
reminded
Linda
of
the
inconvenience
DOCTRINE:
According
to
the
doctrine
of
lex
loci
contractus,
as
a
general
rule,
being
caused
to
them,
she
bluntly
retorted,
"Who
do
you
think
you
are?
You
the
law
of
the
place
where
a
contract
is
made
or
entered
into
governs
with
lousy
Flips
are
good
for
nothing
beggars.
You
always
ask
for
American
aid."
respect
to
its
nature
and
validity,
obligation
and
interpretation.
This
has
been
After
which
she
remarked
"Don’t
worry
about
your
baggage.
Anyway
there
is
said
to
be
the
rule
even
though
the
place
where
the
contract
was
made
is
nothing
in
there.
What
are
you
doing
here
anyway?
I
will
report
you
to
different
from
the
place
where
it
is
to
be
performed,
and
particularly
so,
if
the
immigration.
You
Filipinos
should
go
home."
Such
rude
statements
were
made
place
of
the
making
and
the
place
of
performance
are
the
same.
in
front
of
other
people
in
the
airport
causing
the
Fontanillas
to
suffer
shame,
humiliation
and
embarrassment.
The
chastening
situation
even
caused
the
The
fact
of
rewriting
airplane
tickets
does
not
change
the
nature
of
the
original
younger
Fontanilla
to
break
into
tears.
After
some
time,
Linda,
without
any
contract
of
carriage
entered
into
by
the
parties
in
the
place
where
it
was
issued.
explanation,
offered
the
Fontanillas
$50.00
each.
She
simply
said
"Take
it
or
leave
it."
This,
the
Fontanillas
declined.
The
Fontanillas
then
proceeded
to
the
FACTS:
United
Airlines
customer
service
counter
to
plead
their
case.
The
male
Aniceto
Fontanilla
purchased
from
United
Airlines,
through
the
Philippine
employee
at
the
counter
reacted
by
shouting
and
left
without
saying
anything.
Travel
Bureau
in
Manila
three
"Visit
the
U.S.A."
tickets
for
himself,
his
wife
and
his
minor
son
Mychal
for
four
routes.
All
flights
had
been
confirmed
previously
On
the
other
hand,
the
United
Airlines
claims
that
the
Fontanillas
did
not
by
United
Airlines.
The
Fontanillas
then
proceeded
to
the
US
as
planned.
While
initially
go
to
the
check-‐in
counter
to
get
their
seat
assignments
for
the
flight.
there,
Aniceto
bought
two
additional
coupons
for
his
family
at
United's
office
in
They
instead
proceeded
to
join
the
queue
boarding
the
aircraft
without
first
Washington
Dulles
Airport.
After
paying
the
penalty
for
rewriting
their
tickets,
securing
their
seat
assignments
as
required
in
their
ticket
and
boarding
passes.
the
Fontanillas
were
issued
tickets
with
corresponding
boarding
passes
with
Having
no
seat
assignments,
the
stewardess
at
the
door
of
the
plane
instructed
the
words
"CHECK-‐IN
REQUIRED,"
set
to
leave
from
Los
Angeles
to
San
them
to
go
to
the
check-‐in
counter.
When
the
Fontanillas
proceeded
to
the
Francisco.
check-‐in
counter,
Linda
Allen,
the
United
Airlines
Customer
Representative
at
the
counter
informed
them
that
the
flight
was
overbooked.
She
booked
them
CONFLICT
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AY
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on
the
next
available
flight
and
offered
them
denied
boarding
compensation.
foreign
statute
of
limitations.
Linda
vehemently
denies
uttering
the
derogatory
and
racist
words
attributed
to
her
by
the
Fontanillas.
EXC
TO
THE
EXC
TO
THE
EXC:
The
court
of
the
forum
will
not
enforce
any
foreign
claim
obnoxious
to
the
forum's
public
policy.
The
incident
prompted
the
Fontanillas
to
file
case
for
damages
before
the
RTC
of
Makati
however
the
latter
dismissed
the
complaint.
On
appeal,
the
CA
ruled
A
"borrowing
statute"
directs
the
state
of
the
forum
to
apply
the
foreign
statute
in
favor
of
the
Fontanillas.
Hence,
United
Airlines
sought
redress
with
the
SC.
of
limitations
to
the
pending
claims
based
on
a
foreign
law.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether
the
CA
erred
in
applying
US
laws
in
the
case
at
bar
On
June
6,
1984,
Bienvenido
M..
Cadalin,
Rolando
M.
Amul
and
Donato
B.
Evangelista,
in
their
own
behalf
and
on
behalf
of
728
other
overseas
contract
HELD:
workers
(OCWs)
instituted
a
class
suit
by
filing
an
"Amended
Complaint"
with
Yes.
The
court
held
that
the
CA
erred
in
applying
the
laws
of
the
US
as
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration
(POEA)
for
money
claims
Philippine
law
is
the
applicable
law.
Although,
the
contract
of
carriage
was
to
arising
from
their
recruitment
by
AIBC
and
employment
by
BRII.
be
performed
in
the
US,
the
tickets
were
purchased
through
United's
agent
in
Manila.
It
is
true
that
the
tickets
were
"rewritten"
in
Washington,
D.C.
BRII
is
a
foreign
corporation
with
headquarters
in
Houston,
Texas,
and
is
however,
such
fact
did
not
change
the
nature
of
the
original
contract
of
engaged
in
construction;
while
AIBC
is
a
domestic
corporation
licensed
as
a
carriage
entered
into
by
the
parties
in
Manila.
service
contractor
to
recruit,
mobilize
and
deploy
Filipino
workers
for
overseas
employment
on
behalf
of
its
foreign
principals.
According
to
the
doctrine
of
lex
loci
contractus,
as
a
general
rule,
the
law
of
the
place
where
a
contract
is
made
or
entered
into
governs
with
respect
to
its
The
amended
complaint
principally
sought
the
payment
of
the
unexpired
nature
and
validity,
obligation
and
interpretation.
This
has
been
said
to
be
the
portion
of
the
employment
contracts,
which
was
terminated
prematurely,
and
rule
even
though
the
place
where
the
contract
was
made
is
different
from
the
secondarily,
the
payment
of
the
interest
of
the
earnings
of
the
Travel
and
place
where
it
is
to
be
performed,
and
particularly
so,
if
the
place
of
the
making
Reserved
Fund,
interest
on
all
the
unpaid
benefits;
area
wage
and
salary
and
the
place
of
performance
are
the
same.
Hence,
the
court
should
apply
the
differential
pay;
fringe
benefits;
refund
of
SSS
and
premium
not
remitted
to
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
airline
ticket
was
issued,
when
the
passengers
are
SSS;
refund
of
withholding
tax
not
remitted
to
the
BIR;
penalties
for
committing
residents
and
nationals
of
the
forum
and
the
ticket
is
issued
in
such
State
by
prohibited
practices;
as
well
as
the
suspension
of
the
license
of
AIBC
and
the
the
airline.
accreditation
of
BRII.
8.
CADALIN
V.
POEA
ADMINISTRATOR
ISSUE:
G.R.
No.
L-‐104776
|
December
5,
1994
1.
Whether
it
is
the
Bahrain
law
on
prescription
of
action
based
on
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
(1
year)
or
a
Philippine
law
on
prescription
that
shall
be
DOCTRINE:
GR:
A
foreign
procedural
law
will
not
be
applied
in
the
forum.
the
governing
law.
2.
Whether
the
prescriptive
period
governing
the
filing
of
the
claims
is
3
years,
EXC:
Law
on
prescription
of
actions
is
sui
generis
and
may
be
viewed
procedural
as
provided
by
the
Labor
Code
or
10
years,
as
provided
by
the
NCC.
or
substantive
depending
on
its
characterization.
3.
Whether
it
is
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts,
which
became
the
law
of
the
parties,
or
the
Amiri
Decree,
which
is
more
favorable
and
beneficial
to
the
EXC
TO
THE
EXC:
The
characterization
is
irrelevant
when
the
country
of
the
workers,
that
shall
be
enforced.
forum
has
a
"borrowing
statute."
The
country
of
the
forum
will
apply
the
CONFLICT
OF
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AV
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HELD:
application
in
this
jurisdiction
of
Sec.
156
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976.
1.
Philippine
law
will
govern.
Art.
156
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
The
courts
of
the
forum
will
not
enforce
any
foreign
claim
obnoxious
to
the
provides:
A
claim
arising
out
of
a
contract
of
employment
shall
not
be
forum's
public
policy.
To
enforce
the
one-‐year
prescriptive
period
of
the
Amiri
actionable
after
the
lapse
of
one
year
from
the
date
of
the
expiry
of
the
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
as
regards
the
claims
in
question
would
contravene
the
contract.
public
policy
on
the
protection
of
labor.
The
1987
Constitution
emphasized
that:
The
state
shall
promote
social
justice
in
all
phases
of
national
As
a
general
rule,
a
foreign
procedural
law
will
not
be
applied
in
the
forum.
development
(Sec.
10).
The
state
affirms
labor
as
a
primary
social
economic
Procedural
matters,
such
as
service
of
process,
joinder
of
actions,
period
and
force.
It
shall
protect
the
rights
of
workers
and
promote
their
welfare
(Sec.
18).
requisites
for
appeal,
and
so
forth,
are
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
forum.
The
State
shall
afford
full
protection
to
labor,
local
and
overseas,
organized
and
This
is
true
even
if
the
action
is
based
upon
a
foreign
substantive
law.
unorganized,
and
promote
full
employment
and
equality
of
employment
opportunities
for
all
(Art.
XIII,
Sec.
3).
However,
a
law
on
prescription
of
actions
is
sui
generis
in
Conflict
of
Laws
in
the
sense
that
it
may
be
viewed
either
as
procedural
or
substantive,
2.
3
years.
The
claimants
are
of
the
view
that
the
applicable
provision
is
Art.
depending
on
the
characterization
given
such
a
law.
1144,
NCC,
which
provides:
The
following
actions
must
be
brought
within
ten
years
from
the
time
the
right
of
action
accrues:
(1)
Upon
a
written
contract;
(2)
Thus
in
Bournias
v.
Atlantic
Maritime
Company,
the
American
court
applied
the
Upon
an
obligation
created
by
law;
(3)
Upon
a
judgment.
statute
of
limitations
of
New
York,
instead
of
the
Panamanian
law,
after
finding
that
there
was
no
showing
that
the
Panamanian
law
on
prescription
was
NLRC,
on
the
other
hand,
believes
that
the
applicable
provision
is
Art.
291
of
intended
to
be
substantive.
Being
considered
merely
a
procedural
law
even
in
the
LC,
which
in
pertinent
part
provides:
Money
claims-‐all
money
claims
arising
Panama,
it
has
to
give
way
to
the
law
of
the
forum
on
prescription
of
actions.
from
employer-‐employee
relations
accruing
during
the
effectivity
of
this
Code
shall
be
filed
within
three
(3)
years
from
the
time
the
cause
of
action
accrued,
However,
the
characterization
of
a
statute
into
a
procedural
or
substantive
otherwise
they
shall
be
forever
barred.
law
becomes
irrelevant
when
the
country
of
the
forum
has
a
"borrowing
statute."
Said
statute
has
the
practical
effect
of
treating
the
foreign
statute
of
The
claims
in
the
cases
at
bench
all
arose
from
the
employer-‐employee
limitation
as
one
of
substance.
A
"borrowing
statute"
directs
the
state
of
the
relations,
which
is
broader
in
scope
than
claims
arising
from
a
specific
law
or
forum
to
apply
the
foreign
statute
of
limitations
to
the
pending
claims
based
from
the
collective
bargaining
agreement.
The
contention
of
the
POEA
on
a
foreign
law.
While
there
are
several
kinds
of
"borrowing
statutes,"
one
Admin,
that
the
3-‐year
prescriptive
period
under
Art.
291
of
the
LC
applies
form
provides
that
an
action
barred
by
the
laws
of
the
place
where
it
accrued,
only
to
money
claims
specifically
recoverable
under
said
Code,
does
not
find
will
not
be
enforced
in
the
forum
even
though
the
local
statute
has
not
run
support
in
the
plain
language
of
the
provision.
against
it.
Sec.
48
of
our
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
is
of
this
kind,
which
provides:
If
by
the
laws
of
the
state
or
country
where
the
cause
of
action
arose,
the
action
3.
The
overseas-‐employment
contracts
should
be
read
as
adopting
the
is
barred,
it
is
also
barred
in
the
Philippines
Islands.
provisions
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
as
part
and
parcel
thereof.
NLRC
applied
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976,
which
provides
for
greater
benefits
Sec.
48
has
not
been
repealed
or
amended
by
the
NCC.
Art.
2270
of
said
Code
than
those
stipulated
in
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts
of
the
claimants.
It
repealed
only
those
provisions
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedures
as
to
which
were
was
of
the
belief
that
"where
the
laws
of
the
host
country
are
more
favorable
inconsistent
with
it.
There
is
no
provision
in
the
NCC,
which
is
inconsistent
with
and
beneficial
to
the
workers,
then
the
laws
of
the
host
country
shall
form
or
contradictory
to
Section
48
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
part
of
the
overseas
employment
contract."
It
quoted
with
approval
the
observation
of
the
POEA
Administrator
that
"...in
labor
proceedings,
all
However,
n
the
light
of
the
1987
Constitution,
however,
Section
48
cannot
be
doubts
in
the
implementation
of
the
provisions
of
the
Labor
Code
and
its
enforced
ex
proprio
vigore
(by
its
own
force)
insofar
as
it
ordains
the
implementing
regulations
shall
be
resolved
in
favor
of
labor."
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
10
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
A
basic
policy
of
contract
is
to
protect
the
expectation
of
the
parties.
Such
party
AIBC
and
BRII
claimed
that
NLRC
acted
capriciously
and
whimsically
when
it
expectation
is
protected
by
giving
effect
to
the
parties'
own
choice
of
the
refused
to
enforce
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts,
which
became
the
law
applicable
law.
The
choice
of
law
must,
however,
bear
some
relationship
to
the
of
the
parties.
They
contend
that
the
principle
that
a
law
is
deemed
to
be
a
part
parties
or
their
transaction.
There
is
no
question
that
the
contracts
sought
to
of
a
contract
applies
only
to
provisions
of
Philippine
law
in
relation
to
contracts
be
enforced
by
claimants
have
a
direct
connection
with
the
Bahrain
law
executed
in
the
Philippines.
because
the
services
were
rendered
in
that
country.
The
overseas-‐employment
contracts,
which
were
prepared
by
AIBC
and
BRII
N.B.:
Benefits:
OT
pay-‐25%
daytime,
50%
nighttime;
Work
on
rest
day
pay-‐
themselves,
provided
that
the
laws
of
the
host
country
became
applicable
to
150%;
Holiday
pay-‐150%;
1
year
continuous
service-‐21
days
leave;
5
years
said
contracts
if
they
offer
terms
and
conditions
more
favorable
that
those
continuous
service-‐28
days;
30
days
termination
notice
or
compensation
stipulated
therein.
It
was
stipulated
in
said
contracts
that:
equivalent
to
the
amount
of
wages
payable
to
the
worker.
...the
benefits
provided
to
Employee
hereunder
are
substituted
for
and
9.
ASIAVEST
MERCHANT
BANKERS
V.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
in
lieu
of
all
other
benefits
provided
by
any
applicable
law,
provided
of
G.R.
No.
110263
|
July
20,
2001
*Division
decision
course,
that
total
remuneration
and
benefits
do
not
fall
below
that
of
the
host
country
regulation
or
custom,
it
being
understood
that
should
DOCTRINES:
GR:
Upon
proving
through
evidence
the
existence
and
authenticity
applicable
laws
establish
that
fringe
benefits,
or
other
such
benefits
of
the
foreign
judgment,
said
foreign
judgment
enjoys
presumptive
validity
and
additional
to
the
compensation
herein
agreed
cannot
be
waived,
the
burden
then
fell
upon
the
party
who
disputes
its
validity
to
prove
otherwise.
Employee
agrees
that
such
compensation
will
be
adjusted
downward
so
that
the
total
compensation
hereunder,
plus
the
non-‐waivable
benefits
Requisites
for
recognizing
a
valid
judgment
rendered
by
foreign
tribunals:
[FSP]
shall
be
equivalent
to
the
compensation
herein
agreed.”
(1)
it
is
convincingly
shown
that
there
has
been
an
opportunity
for
a
full
and
fair
hearing
before
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction;
(2)
that
the
trial
upon
regular
Any
ambiguity
in
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts
should
be
interpreted
proceedings
has
been
conducted,
following
due
citation
or
voluntary
against
AIBC
and
BRII,
the
parties
that
drafted
it.
The
interpretation
of
obscure
appearance
of
the
defendant
and
under
a
system
of
jurisprudence
likely
to
words
or
stipulations
in
a
contract
shall
not
favor
the
party
who
caused
the
secure
an
impartial
administration
of
justice;
and
(3)
that
there
is
nothing
to
obscurity
(Art.
1377,
NCC).
indicate
either
a
prejudice
in
court
and
in
the
system
of
laws
under
which
it
is
sitting
or
fraud
in
procuring
the
judgment.
The
parties
to
a
contract
may
select
the
law
by
which
it
is
to
be
governed.
In
such
a
case,
the
foreign
law
is
adopted
as
a
"system"
to
regulate
the
relations
A
foreign
judgment
is
presumed
to
be
valid
and
binding
in
the
country
from
of
the
parties,
including
questions
of
their
capacity
to
enter
into
the
contract,
which
it
comes,
until
a
contrary
showing,
on
the
basis
of
a
presumption
of
the
formalities
to
be
observed
by
them,
matters
of
performance,
and
so
forth.
regularity
of
proceedings
and
the
giving
of
due
notice
in
the
foreign
forum.
Instead
of
adopting
the
entire
mass
of
the
foreign
law,
the
parties
may
just
FACTS:
agree
that
specific
provisions
of
a
foreign
statute
shall
be
deemed
Asiavest
Merchant
Bankers,
a
corporation
organized
under
the
laws
of
incorporated
into
their
contract
"as
a
set
of
terms."
By
such
reference
to
the
Malaysia,
initiated
a
collection
suit
before
the
High
Court
of
Malaya
in
Kuala
provisions
of
the
foreign
law,
the
contract
does
not
become
a
foreign
contract
Lumpur
against
Philippine
National
Construction
Corporation
(PNCC),
a
to
be
governed
by
the
foreign
law.
The
said
law
does
not
operate
as
a
statute
corporation
duly
incorporated
and
existing
under
Philippine
laws.
Asiavest
but
as
a
set
of
contractual
terms
deemed
written
in
the
contract
sought
to
recover
the
indemnity
of
the
performance
bond
it
had
put
up
in
favor
of
PNCC
to
guarantee
completion
of
the
Felda
Project
and
the
non-‐payment
of
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
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ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
the
loan
it
extended
for
the
completion
of
another
project.
The
High
Court
of
and
their
successors
in
interest
by
a
subsequent
title.
The
judgment
may,
Malaya
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
Asiavest.
however,
be
assailed
by
evidence
of
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
In
addition,
under
Sec.
Following
unsuccessful
attempts
to
secure
payment
from
PNCC
under
the
3(n),
Rule
131
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
a
court,
whether
in
the
Philippines
judgment,
Asiavest
initiated
a
complaint
before
the
RTC
to
enforce
the
or
elsewhere,
enjoys
the
presumption
that
it
was
acting
in
the
lawful
exercise
of
judgment
of
the
High
Court
of
Malaya.
PNCC
moved
to
dismiss
the
case
its
jurisdiction.
Hence,
once
the
authenticity
of
the
foreign
judgment
is
proved,
contending
that
the
foreign
judgment
should
be
denied
recognition
or
the
party
attacking
a
foreign
judgment,
is
tasked
with
the
burden
of
enforcement
for
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice,
collusion
and/or
fraud,
overcoming
its
presumptive
validity.
Hence,
once
the
authenticity
of
the
and
there
is
a
clear
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
The
RTC
and
CA
dismissed
the
case.
foreign
judgment
is
proved,
the
party
attacking
a
foreign
judgment,
is
tasked
with
the
burden
of
overcoming
its
presumptive
validity.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
foreign
judgment
should
be
given
recognition
and
enforcement
in
In
the
instant
case,
Asiavest
sufficiently
established
the
existence
of
the
money
the
Philippines.
judgment
of
the
High
Court
of
Malaya
by
the
evidence
it
offered.
Vinayak
Prabhakar
Pradhan,
as
sole
witness,
testified
that
he
is
in
active
practice
of
the
HELD:
law
profession
in
Malaysia;
that
the
writ
of
summons
was
served
on
PNCC
and
Yes.
Generally,
in
the
absence
of
a
special
compact,
no
sovereign
is
bound
to
on
Cora
S.
Deala,
its
financial
planning
officer;
that
certain
Messrs.
entered
give
effect
within
its
dominion
to
a
judgment
rendered
by
a
tribunal
of
their
conditional
appearance
for
PNCC
questioning
the
regularity
of
the
service
another
country;
however,
the
rules
of
comity,
utility
and
convenience
of
of
the
writ
of
summons
but
subsequently
withdrew
the
same
when
it
realized
nations
have
established
a
usage
among
civilized
states
by
which
final
that
the
writ
was
properly
served;
that
the
matter
was
then
heard
before
the
judgments
of
foreign
courts
of
competent
jurisdiction
are
reciprocally
High
Court
of
Kuala
Lumpur
in
a
series
of
dates
where
PNCC
was
represented
respected
and
rendered
efficacious
under
certain
conditions
that
may
vary
in
by
counsel;
and
that
the
end
result
of
all
these
proceedings
is
the
judgment
different
countries.
sought
to
be
enforced.
In
addition,
Asiavest
offered
the
following
documentary
evidence:
(a)
A
certified
and
authenticated
copy
of
the
Judgment
promulgated
In
this
jurisdiction,
a
valid
judgment
rendered
by
a
foreign
tribunal
may
be
by
the
Malaysian
High
Court,
etc.
recognized
insofar
as
the
immediate
parties
and
the
underlying
cause
of
action
are
concerned
so
long
as:
(1)
it
is
convincingly
shown
that
there
has
Having
thus
proven
through
evidence
of
the
existence
and
authenticity
of
the
been
an
opportunity
for
a
full
and
fair
hearing
before
a
court
of
competent
foreign
judgment,
said
foreign
judgment
enjoys
presumptive
validity
and
the
jurisdiction;
(2)
that
the
trial
upon
regular
proceedings
has
been
conducted,
burden
then
fell
upon
the
party
who
disputes
its
validity,
herein
PNCC,
to
following
due
citation
or
voluntary
appearance
of
the
defendant
and
under
a
prove
otherwise.
system
of
jurisprudence
likely
to
secure
an
impartial
administration
of
justice;
and
(3)
that
there
is
nothing
to
indicate
either
a
prejudice
in
court
and
in
the
PNCC
failed
to
sufficiently
discharge
the
burden
that
fell
upon
it–to
prove
by
system
of
laws
under
which
it
is
sitting
or
fraud
in
procuring
the
judgment.
clear
and
convincing
evidence
the
grounds,
which
it
relied
upon
to
prevent
enforcement
of
the
Malaysian
High
Court
judgment.
The
reasons
or
grounds
A
foreign
judgment
is
presumed
to
be
valid
and
binding
in
the
country
from
relied
upon
by
PNCC
in
preventing
enforcement
and
recognition
of
the
which
it
comes,
until
a
contrary
showing,
on
the
basis
of
a
presumption
of
Malaysian
judgment
primarily
refer
to
matters
of
remedy
and
procedure
taken
regularity
of
proceedings
and
the
giving
of
due
notice
in
the
foreign
forum.
by
the
Malaysian
High
Court
relative
to
the
suit
for
collection
initiated
by
Under
Sec.
50(b),
[now
Sec.
48]
Rule
39
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
which
petitioner.
Needless
to
stress,
the
recognition
to
be
accorded
a
foreign
was
the
governing
law
at
the
time
the
instant
case
was
decided,
a
judgment,
judgment
is
not
necessarily
affected
by
the
fact
that
the
procedure
in
the
against
a
person,
of
a
tribunal
of
a
foreign
country
having
jurisdiction
to
courts
of
the
country
in
which
such
judgment
was
rendered
differs
from
that
of
pronounce
the
same
is
presumptive
evidence
of
a
right
as
between
the
parties
the
courts
of
the
country
in
which
the
judgment
is
relied
on.
Ultimately,
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
12
ATTY.
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L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
matters
of
remedy
and
procedure
such
as
those
relating
to
the
service
of
the
judgment
of
the
foreign
court
simply
because
our
rules
provide
otherwise.
summons
or
court
process
upon
the
defendant,
the
authority
of
counsel
to
appear
and
represent
a
defendant
and
the
formal
requirements
in
a
decision
All
in
all,
PNCC
had
the
ultimate
duty
to
demonstrate
the
alleged
invalidity
of
are
governed
by
the
lex
fori
or
the
internal
law
of
the
forum,
i.e.,
the
law
of
such
foreign
judgment,
being
the
party
challenging
the
judgment
rendered
by
Malaysia
in
this
case.
the
High
Court
of
Malaya.
But
instead
of
doing
so,
PNCC
merely
argued
that
the
burden
lay
upon
petitioner
to
prove
the
validity
of
the
money
judgment.
GROUNDS
RELIED
UPON:
a)
Improper
service
of
summons—In
this
case,
it
is
the
procedural
law
of
N.B.:
Rule
39,
Sec.
48.
Effect
of
foreign
judgments
or
final
orders.
—
The
effect
Malaysia
where
the
judgment
was
rendered
that
determines
the
validity
of
the
of
a
judgment
or
final
order
of
a
tribunal
of
a
foreign
country,
having
service
of
court
process
on
PNCC
as
well
as
other
matters
raised
by
it.
As
to
jurisdiction
to
render
the
judgment
or
final
order
is
as
follows:
what
the
Malaysian
procedural
law
is,
remains
a
question
of
fact,
not
of
law.
It
may
not
be
taken
judicial
notice
of
and
must
be
pleaded
and
proved
like
any
(a)
In
case
of
a
judgment
or
final
order
upon
a
specific
thing,
the
judgment
or
other
fact.
§24
and
25
of
Rule
132
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court
provide
that
it
final
order,
is
conclusive
upon
the
title
to
the
thing,
and
may
be
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
or
by
a
duly
attested
or
(b)
In
case
of
a
judgment
or
final
order
against
a
person,
the
judgment
or
final
authenticated
copy
thereof.
It
was
then
incumbent
upon
PNCC
to
present
order
is
presumptive
evidence
of
a
right
as
between
the
parties
and
their
evidence
as
to
what
that
Malaysian
procedural
law
is
and
to
show
that
under
successors
in
interest
by
a
subsequent
title.
it,
the
assailed
service
of
summons
upon
a
financial
officer
of
a
corporation,
as
alleged
by
it,
is
invalid.
It
did
not.
In
either
case,
the
judgment
or
final
order
may
be
repelled
by
evidence
of
a
want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
b)
Judgment
is
tainted
with
evident
collusion,
fraud
and
clear
mistake
of
fact
mistake
of
law
or
fact.
(50a)
or
law—Fraud
to
hinder
the
enforcement
within
the
jurisdiction
of
a
foreign
judgment
must
be
extrinsic,
i.e.,
fraud
based
on
facts
not
controverted
or
Rule
131,
Sec.
3.
Disputable
presumptions.
—
The
following
presumptions
are
resolved
in
the
case
where
judgment
is
rendered,
or
that
which
would
go
to
the
satisfactory
if
uncontradicted,
but
may
be
contradicted
and
overcome
by
other
jurisdiction
of
the
court
or
would
deprive
the
party
against
whom
judgment
is
evidence:
rendered
a
chance
to
defend
the
action
to
which
he
has
a
meritorious
defense.
Intrinsic
fraud
is
one
which
goes
to
the
very
existence
of
the
cause
of
action
is
(n)
That
a
court,
or
judge
acting
as
such,
whether
in
the
Philippines
or
deemed
already
adjudged,
and
it,
therefore,
cannot
militate
against
the
elsewhere,
was
acting
in
the
lawful
exercise
of
jurisdiction;
recognition
or
enforcement
of
the
foreign
judgment.
Evidence
is
wanting
on
the
alleged
extrinsic
fraud.
Hence,
such
unsubstantiated
allegation
cannot
give
Rule
132,
Sec.
24.
Proof
of
official
record.
—
The
record
of
public
documents
rise
to
liability
therein.
referred
to
in
paragraph
(a)
of
Section
19,
when
admissible
for
any
purpose,
may
be
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
c)
Contrary
to
Constitutional
prescription
that
every
decision
must
state
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
facts
and
law
on
which
it
is
based—Lastly,
there
is
no
merit
to
the
argument
accompanied,
if
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
that
the
foreign
judgment
is
not
enforceable
in
view
of
the
absence
of
any
such
officer
has
the
custody.
If
the
office
in
which
the
record
is
kept
is
in
foreign
statement
of
facts
and
law
upon
which
the
award
in
favor
of
the
petitioner
was
country,
the
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
the
embassy
or
legation,
based.
The
lex
fori
or
the
internal
law
of
the
forum
governs
matters
of
remedy
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
officer
in
the
and
procedure.
Considering
that
under
the
procedural
rules
of
the
High
Court
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
of
Malaya,
a
valid
judgment
may
be
rendered
even
without
stating
in
the
record
is
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
(25a)
judgment
every
fact
and
law
upon
which
the
judgment
is
based,
then
the
same
must
be
accorded
respect
and
the
courts
in
this
jurisdiction
cannot
invalidate
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10.
GARCIA
V.
RECIO
that
the
divorce
issued
in
Australia
was
valid
and
recognized
in
the
Philippines.
G.R.
No.
138322
|
October
2,
2001
*En
banc
decision
The
Australian
divorce
had
ended
the
marriage;
thus,
there
was
no
more
martial
union
to
nullify
or
annul.
DOCTRINE:
EXC:
When
the
law
requires
proof
that
it
is
validly
obtained
in
conformity
with
the
foreign
law.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether
the
divorce
between
respondent
and
Editha
Samson
was
proven.
Av:
Such
as
in
cases
of
divorce,
where
Art.
26,
FC,
requires
that
the
divorce
be
2.
Whether
Rederick
was
proven
to
be
legally
capacitated
to
marry
Grace.
proven
to
be
validly
obtained
by
the
alien
spouse.
Thus,
the
divorce
cannot
be
presumed
to
be
valid.
HELD:
1.
Yes.
At
the
outset,
we
lay
the
following
basic
legal
principles:
Philippine
law
A
divorce
obtained
abroad
by
an
alien
may
be
recognized
in
our
jurisdiction,
does
not
provide
for
absolute
divorce;
hence,
our
courts
cannot
grant
it. A
provided
such
decree
is
valid
according
to
the
national
law
of
the
foreigner.
marriage
between
two
Filipinos
cannot
be
dissolved
even
by
a
divorce
However,
the
divorce
decree
and
the
governing
personal
law
of
the
alien
spouse
obtained
abroad,
because
of
Articles
15
and
17
of
the
NCC. In
mixed
who
obtained
the
divorce
must
be
proven.
Our
courts
do
not
take
judicial
notice
marriages
involving
a
Filipino
and
a
foreigner,
Art.
26 of
the
FC
allows
the
of
foreign
laws
and
judgment;
hence,
like
any
other
facts,
both
the
divorce
former
to
contract
a
subsequent
marriage
in
case
the
divorce
is
"validly
decree
and
the
national
law
of
the
alien
must
be
alleged
and
proven
according
obtained
abroad
by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating
him
or
her
to
remarry." A
to
our
law
on
evidence.
divorce
obtained
abroad
by
a
couple,
who
are
both
aliens,
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
it
is
consistent
with
their
respective
national
FACTS:
laws.
Rederick
Recio,
a
Filipino,
was
married
to
Editha
Samson,
an
Australian
citizen,
in
Malabon,
Rizal
in
1987.
They
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife
in
Australia.
Grace
argues
that
the
divorce
decree,
like
any
other
foreign
judgment,
may
be
In
1989,
a
decree
of
divorce,
purportedly
dissolving
the
marriage,
was
issued
by
given
recognition
in
this
jurisdiction
only
upon
proof
of
the
existence
of
(1)
the
an
Australian
family
court.
In
1992,
Rederick
became
an
Australian
Citizen.
foreign
law
allowing
absolute
divorce
and
(2)
the
alleged
divorce
decree
itself.
She
adds
that
Rederick
miserably
failed
to
establish
these
elements.
Rederick,
In
1994,
Grace
Garcia,
a
Filipina,
and
Rederick
were
married
in
Cabanatuan
City.
on
the
other
hand,
argues
that
the
Australian
divorce
decree
is
a
public
In
their
application
for
a
marriage
license,
Rederick
was
declared
as
"single"
document–a
written
official
act
of
an
Australian
family
court.
Therefore,
it
and
"Filipino."
requires
no
further
proof
of
its
authenticity
and
due
execution.
In
March
1998,
Grace
filed
a
Complaint
for
Declaration
of
Nullity
of
Marriage
on
Rederick
is
getting
ahead
of
himself.
Before
a
foreign
judgment
is
given
the
ground
of
bigamy,
claiming
that
she
learned
of
Rederick’s
marriage
to
presumptive
evidentiary
value,
the
document
must
first
be
presented
and
Editha
only
in
1997.
In
his
Answer,
Rederick
averred
that,
as
far
back
as
1993,
admitted
in
evidence.
A
divorce
obtained
abroad
is
proven
by
the
divorce
he
had
revealed
to
Grace
his
prior
marriage
and
its
subsequent
dissolution
in
decree
itself.
Indeed
the
best
evidence
of
a
judgment
is
the
judgment
1989.
Thus,
he
was
legally
capacitated
to
marry
Grace
in
1994.
itself.
The
decree
purports
to
be
a
written
act
or
record
of
an
act
of
an
official
body
or
tribunal
of
a
foreign
country.
In
1998,
while
the
suit
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
was
pending,
Rederick
was
able
to
secure
a
divorce
decree
from
a
family
court
in
Sydney
because
his
Under
Sections
24
and
25
of
Rule
132,
a
writing
or
document
may
be
proven
as
marriage
with
Grace
had
"irretrievably
broken
down."
Thus,
Rederick
prayed
in
a
public
or
official
record
of
a
foreign
country
by
either
(1)
an
official
his
Answer
that
the
Complaint
be
dismissed
on
the
ground
that
it
stated
no
publication
or
(2)
a
copy
thereof
attested
by
the
officer
having
legal
custody
of
cause
of
action.
The
trial
court
declared
the
marriage
dissolved
on
the
ground
the
document.
If
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
such
copy
must
be
(a)
accompanied
by
a
certificate
issued
by
the
proper
diplomatic
or
consular
officer
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in
the
Philippine
foreign
service
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
The
court
a
quo
erred
in
finding
that
the
divorce
decree
ipso
facto
clothed
record
is
kept
and
(b)
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
These
Rederick
with
the
legal
capacity
to
remarry
without
requiring
him
to
adduce
aforemetioned
rules
on
evidence
were
not
complied
with
since
Rederick
only
sufficient
evidence
to
show
the
Australian
personal
law
governing
his
status;
or
presented
the
divorce
decree.
at
the
very
least,
to
prove
his
legal
capacity
to
contract
the
second
marriage.
Neither
can
we
declare
the
marriage
null
and
void
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
It
Fortunately
for
Rederick’s
cause,
when
the
divorce
decree
of
1989
was
may
turn
out
that
under
Australian
law,
Rederick
was
really
capacitated
to
submitted
in
evidence,
Grace’s
counsel
objected,
not
to
its
admissibility,
but
marry
Grace
as
a
direct
result
of
the
divorce
decree.
Hence,
the
most
judicious
only
to
the
fact
that
it
had
not
been
registered
in
the
Local
Civil
Registry
of
course
is
to
remand
this
case
to
the
trial
court
to
receive
evidence,
if
any,
which
Cabanatuan
City.
The
trial
court
ruled
that
it
was
admissible,
subject
to
Grace’s
show
Rederick’s
legal
capacity
to
marry
Grace.
qualification. Hence,
it
was
admitted
in
evidence
and
accorded
weight
by
the
judge.
Indeed,
the
failure
to
object
properly
rendered
the
divorce
decree
N.B.:
Article
15.
Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
admissible
as
a
written
act
of
the
Family
Court
of
Sydney,
Australia.
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
(9a)
Compliance
with
Arts.
11,
13,
and
52
of
the
FC
(1)
file
a
sworn
application
for
a
marriage
license
with
the
proper
local
civil
registrar
which
shall
specify
that
if
Article
17.
…
Prohibitive
laws
concerning
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
previously
married,
how,
when
and
where
the
previous
marriage
was
dissolved
those
which
have
for
their
object
public
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
or
annulled;
2)
furnish
a
death
certificate
of
the
deceased
spouse
or
the
judicial
shall
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
by
decree
of
annulment
or
declaration
of
nullity
of
his
or
her
previous
marriage;
3)
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
a
foreign
country.
(11a)
recording
of
judgment
of
annulment
or
of
absolute
nullity
of
the
marriage,
the
partition
and
distribution
of
the
properties
of
the
spouses,
and
the
delivery
of
Art.
21.
When
either
or
both
of
the
contracting
parties
are
citizens
of
a
foreign
the
children's
presumptive
legitimes
in
the
appropriate
civil
registry
and
country,
it
shall
be
necessary
for
them
before
a
marriage
license
can
be
registries
of
property)
is
not
necessary.
Rederick
was
no
longer
bound
by
obtained,
to
submit
a
certificate
of
legal
capacity
to
contract
marriage,
issued
Philippine
personal
laws
after
he
acquired
Australian
citizenship
in
1992.
by
their
respective
diplomatic
or
consular
officials.
Naturalization
is
the
legal
act
of
adopting
an
alien
and
clothing
him
with
the
political
and
civil
rights
belonging
to
a
citizen.
Naturalized
citizens,
freed
from
Stateless
persons
or
refugees
from
other
countries
shall,
in
lieu
of
the
the
protective
cloak
of
their
former
states,
don
the
attires
of
their
adoptive
certificate
of
legal
capacity
herein
required,
submit
an
affidavit
stating
the
countries.
By
becoming
an
Australian,
respondent
severed
his
allegiance
to
circumstances
showing
such
capacity
to
contract
marriage.
(66a)
the
Philippines
and
the
vinculum
juris
that
had
tied
him
to
Philippine
personal
laws.
Art.
26.
All
marriages
solemnized
outside
the
Philippines,
in
accordance
with
the
laws
in
force
in
the
country
where
they
were
solemnized,
and
valid
there
as
2.
No.
Rederick
merely
presented
a
decree
nisi
or
an
interlocutory
decree–a
such,
shall
also
be
valid
in
this
country,
except
those
prohibited
under
Articles
conditional
or
provisional
judgment
of
divorce.
The
legal
capacity
to
contract
35
(1),
(4),
(5)
and
(6),
36,
37
and
38.
(17a)
marriage
is
determined
by
the
national
law
of
the
party
concerned.
The
certificate
mentioned
in
Art.
21
of
the
FC
would
have
been
sufficient
to
Where
a
marriage
between
a
Filipino
citizen
and
a
foreigner
is
validly
establish
the
legal
capacity
of
Rederick,
had
he
duly
presented
it
in
court.
A
celebrated
and
a
divorce
is
thereafter
validly
obtained
abroad
by
the
alien
duly
authenticated
and
admitted
certificate
is
prima
facie
evidence
of
legal
spouse
capacitating
him
or
her
to
remarry,
the
Filipino
spouse
shall
have
capacity
to
marry
on
the
part
of
the
alien
applicant
for
a
marriage
license.
capacity
to
remarry
under
Philippine
law.
(As
amended
by
Executive
Order
227)
However,
based
on
the
records
submitted,
there
is
absolutely
no
evidence
that
proves
Rederick’s
legal
capacity
to
marry
Grace.
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Rule
132,
Section
19.
Classes
of
Documents.
—
For
the
purpose
of
their
the
fact
that
he
is
a
subject
of
a
foreign
judgment,
in
order
to
file
a
petition
for
presentation
in
evidence,
documents
are
either
public
or
private.
recognition
of
foreign
judgment.
This
he
may
do
first,
by
proof
of
a
valid
divorce
(existence,
authenticity,
and
validly
obtained
in
conformity
with
the
national
Public
documents
are:
law).
After
which,
the
divorce
decree
serves
as
a
presumptive
evidence
of
his
right.
By
virtue
of
being
a
subject
of
the
foreign
divorce
decree/judgment
a)
The
written
official
acts,
or
records
of
the
official
acts
of
the
sovereign
proven,
he
may
file
a
suit
for
recognition
of
foreign
judgment.
authority,
official
bodies
and
tribunals,
and
public
officers,
whether
of
the
Philippines,
or
of
a
foreign
country;
FACTS:
Gerbert
Corpuz
was
a
former
Filipino
citizen
who
acquired
Canadian
citizenship
Section
24.
Proof
of
official
record.
—
The
record
of
public
documents
referred
through
naturalization
in
2000.
In
2005,
Gerbert
married
Daisylyn
Sto.
Tomas,
a
to
in
paragraph
(a)
of
Section
19,
when
admissible
for
any
purpose,
may
be
Filipina,
in
Pasig
City.
Due
to
work
and
other
professional
commitments,
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
Gerbert
left
for
Canada
soon
after
the
wedding.
He
returned
to
the
Philippines
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied,
if
sometime
in
April
2005
but
was
shocked
to
discover
that
his
wife
was
having
an
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
such
officer
has
affair
with
another
man.
Gerbert
returned
to
Canada
and
filed
a
petition
for
the
custody.
If
the
office
in
which
the
record
is
kept
is
in
foreign
country,
the
divorce,
which
was
granted
in
December
2005
and
took
effect
a
month
later.
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
the
embassy
or
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
officer
in
the
foreign
Two
years
after
the
divorce,
with
the
intention
of
marrying
another
Filipina,
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
record
is
Gerbert
went
to
the
Pasig
City
Civil
Registry
Office
and
registered
the
Canadian
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
(25a)
divorce
decree
on
his
and
Daisylyn’s
marriage
certificate.
Despite
the
registration,
an
official
of
the
NSO
informed
him
that
for
the
foreign
divorce
11.
CORPUZ
V.
STO.
TOMAS
decree
to
be
enforceable,
it
must
first
be
judicially
recognized
by
a
competent
G.R.
No.
186751
|
August
11,
2010
Philippine
court,
pursuant
to
NSO
Circular
No.
4.
nd
DOCTRINES:
The
alien
spouse
can
claim
no
right
under
the
2
par.
of
Art.
26,
FC
Accordingly,
Gerbert
filed
a
petition
for
judicial
recognition
of
foreign
divorce
as
the
substantive
right
it
establishes
is
in
favor
of
the
Filipino
spouse.
No
court
and/or
declaration
of
marriage
as
dissolved
with
the
RTC.
Daisylyn
offered
no
in
this
jurisdiction
can
make
a
similar
declaration
for
the
alien
spouse
(other
opposition
and,
in
fact,
alleged
her
desire
to
file
a
similar
case
herself
but
was
than
that
already
established
by
the
decree),
whose
status
and
legal
capacity
prevented
by
financial
and
personal
circumstances.
However,
the
RTC
denied
are
generally
governed
by
his
national
law.
the
petition,
concluding
that
Gerbert
was
not
the
proper
party
to
institute
the
action
for
judicial
recognition
of
the
foreign
divorce
decree
as
he
is
a
HOWEVER,
the
foreign
divorce
decree
itself,
after
its
authenticity
and
naturalized
Canadian
citizen.
Only
the
Filipino
spouse
can
avail
of
the
remedy,
nd
conformity
with
the
alien’s
national
law
have
been
duly
proven
according
to
our
under
the
2
par.
of
Art.
26
of
the
FC.
rules
of
evidence,
serves
as
a
presumptive
evidence
of
right
in
favor
of
the
alien
spouse,
pursuant
to
Sec.
48,
Rule
39
of
the
ROC,
which
provides
for
the
effect
of
ISSUE:
foreign
judgments.
Direct
involvement
or
being
the
subject
of
the
foreign
Whether
the
2nd
par.
of
Art.
26
of
the
FC
extends
to
aliens
the
right
to
petition
judgment
is
sufficient
to
clothe
a
party
with
the
requisite
interest
to
institute
an
a
court
of
Philippine
jurisdiction
for
the
recognition
of
a
foreign
divorce
decree.
action
before
our
courts
for
the
recognition
of
the
foreign
judgment.
HELD:
Av:
This
is
just
a
mere
technicality.
Alien
spouse
cannot
invoke
Art.
26,
FC
to
file
No
but
this
fact
does
not
necessarily
strip
Gerbert
of
legal
interest
to
petition
a
petition
for
judicial
recognition
of
foreign
divorce.
However,
he
may
invoke
the
RTC
for
the
recognition
of
his
foreign
divorce
decree.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
16
ATTY.
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L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
evidence
of
right
in
favor
of
Gerbert,
pursuant
to
Sec.
48,
Rule
39
of
the
ROC,
nd
The
alien
spouse
can
claim
no
right
under
the
2
par.
of
Art.
26,
FC
as
the
which
provides
for
the
effect
of
foreign
judgments.
substantive
right
it
establishes
is
in
favor
of
the
Filipino
spouse.
The
FC
recognizes
only
two
types
of
defective
marriages–void
and
voidable
marriages.
Direct
involvement
or
being
the
subject
of
the
foreign
judgment
is
sufficient
In
both
cases,
the
basis
for
the
judicial
declaration
of
absolute
nullity
or
to
clothe
a
party
with
the
requisite
interest
to
institute
an
action
before
our
annulment
of
the
marriage
exists
before
or
at
the
time
of
the
marriage.
courts
for
the
recognition
of
the
foreign
judgment.
In
a
divorce
situation,
we
Divorce,
on
the
other
hand,
contemplates
the
dissolution
of
the
lawful
union
have
declared,
no
less,
that
the
divorce
obtained
by
an
alien
abroad
may
be
for
cause
arising
after
the
marriage.
Our
family
laws
do
not
recognize
absolute
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
the
divorce
is
valid
according
to
his
or
divorce
between
Filipino
citizens.
her
national
law.
The
recognition
may
be
made
in
an
action
instituted
specifically
for
the
purpose
or
in
another
action
where
a
party
invokes
the
Recognizing
the
reality
that
divorce
is
a
possibility
in
marriages
between
a
foreign
decree
as
an
integral
aspect
of
his
claim
or
defense.
nd
Filipino
and
an
alien,
the
2
par.
of
Art.
26
was
enacted
"to
avoid
the
absurd
situation
where
the
Filipino
spouse
remains
married
to
the
alien
spouse
who,
The
records
show
that
Gerbert
attached
to
his
petition
a
copy
of
the
divorce
after
obtaining
a
divorce,
is
no
longer
married
to
the
Filipino
spouse."
The
decree,
as
well
as
the
required
certificates
proving
its
authenticity,
but
failed
to
legislative
intent
is
for
the
benefit
of
the
Filipino
spouse,
by
clarifying
his
or
include
a
copy
of
the
Canadian
law
on
divorce.
Under
this
situation,
the
court
her
marital
status,
settling
the
doubts
created
by
the
divorce
decree.
may,
at
this
point,
simply
dismiss
the
petition
for
insufficiency
of
supporting
Essentially,
the
par.
provided
the
Filipino
spouse
a
substantive
right
to
have
his
evidence
as
provided
in
Sec.
24,
Rule
132
of
the
ROC,
unless
it
deems
it
more
or
her
marriage
to
the
alien
spouse
considered
as
dissolved,
capacitating
him
or
appropriate
to
remand
the
case
to
the
RTC
to
determine
whether
the
divorce
her
to
remarry.
Art.
17,
NCC
provides
that
the
policy
against
absolute
divorces
decree
is
consistent
with
the
Canadian
divorce
law.
cannot
be
subverted
by
judgments
promulgated
in
a
foreign
country.
The
nd
inclusion
of
the
2
par.
in
Art.
26,
FC
provides
the
direct
exception
to
this
rule
The
Court
deemed
it
more
appropriate
to
take
the
latter
course
of
action,
and
serves
as
basis
for
recognizing
the
dissolution
of
the
marriage
between
given
that
interests
under
Art.
26
will
be
served
and
the
Daisylyn’s
obvious
the
Filipino
spouse
and
his
or
her
alien
spouse.
conformity
with
the
petition.
Additionally,
an
action
based
on
the
second
paragraph
of
Article
26
of
the
N.B.:
The
Court
also
ruled
that
the
law
and
the
submission
of
the
decree
by
Family
Code
is
not
limited
to
the
recognition
of
the
foreign
divorce
decree.
If
themselves
do
not
ipso
facto
authorize
a
divorce
decree’s
registration.
The
law
the
court
finds
that
the
decree
capacitated
the
alien
spouse
to
remarry,
the
should
be
read
in
relation
with
the
requirement
of
a
judicial
recognition
of
the
courts
can
declare
that
the
Filipino
spouse
is
likewise
capacitated
to
contract
foreign
judgment
before
it
can
be
given
res
judicata
effect.
another
marriage.
No
court
in
this
jurisdiction,
however,
can
make
a
similar
declaration
for
the
alien
spouse
(other
than
that
already
established
by
the
Rule
132,
Sec.
24.
Proof
of
official
record.
—
The
record
of
public
documents
decree),
whose
status
and
legal
capacity
are
generally
governed
by
his
referred
to
in
paragraph
(a)
of
Section
19,
when
admissible
for
any
purpose,
national
law.
may
be
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
However,
this
conclusion
is
not
sufficient
basis
to
dismiss
Gerbert’s
petition
accompanied,
if
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
nd
before
the
RTC.
In
other
words,
the
unavailability
of
the
2
par.
of
Art.
26
to
such
officer
has
the
custody.
If
the
office
in
which
the
record
is
kept
is
in
foreign
aliens
does
not
necessarily
strip
Gerbert
of
legal
interest
to
petition
the
RTC
country,
the
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
the
embassy
or
legation,
for
the
recognition
of
his
foreign
divorce
decree.
The
foreign
divorce
decree
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
officer
in
the
itself,
after
its
authenticity
and
conformity
with
the
alien’s
national
law
have
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
been
duly
proven
according
to
our
rules
of
evidence,
serves
as
a
presumptive
record
is
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
(25a)
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
17
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
RUST,
essentially
reiterating
the
allegations
in
the
labor
case.
The
complaint
12.
RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL
V.
ROUZIE
also
averred
that
BMSI
and
RUST
as
well
as
Raytheon
had
combined
and
G.R.
No.
162894
|
February
26,
2008
functioned
as
one
company.
DOCTRINES:
Jurisdiction
and
choice
of
law
are
two
distinct
concepts.
Jurisdiction
In
its
Answer,
Raytheon
referred
to
the
NLRC
decision
which
disclosed
that
per
considers
whether
it
is
fair
to
cause
a
defendant
to
travel
to
this
state;
choice
of
the
written
agreement
between
Rouzie
and
BMSI
and
RUST,
denominated
as
law
asks
the
further
question
whether
the
application
of
a
substantive
law
"Special
Sales
Representative
Agreement,"
the
rights
and
obligations
of
the
which
will
determine
the
merits
of
the
case
is
fair
to
both
parties.
parties
shall
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Connecticut.
Raytheon
filed
an
Omnibus
Motion
for
the
dismissal
of
the
complaint
on
grounds
of
While
it
is
within
the
discretion
of
the
trial
court
to
abstain
from
assuming
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action
and
forum
non
conveniens
and
prayed
for
jurisdiction
on
the
ground
of
forum
non
conveniens,
it
should
do
so
only
after
damages.
The
RTC
denied
Raytheon’s
omnibus
motion
stating
that
the
factual
vital
facts
are
established,
to
determine
whether
special
circumstances
require
allegations
in
the
complaint,
assuming
the
same
to
be
admitted,
were
sufficient
the
court’s
desistance.
for
the
trial
court
to
render
a
valid
judgment
thereon.
It
also
ruled
that
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
was
inapplicable
because
the
trial
court
There
are
3
consecutive
phases
involved
in
judicial
resolution
of
conflict-‐of-‐laws
could
enforce
judgment
on
Raytheon,
it
being
a
foreign
corporation
licensed
to
problems,
namely:
jurisdiction,
choice
of
law,
and
recognition
and
enforcement
do
business
in
the
Philippines.
On
appeal,
the
CA
deferred
to
the
discretion
of
of
judgments.
Thus,
in
the
instances
where
the
Court
held
that
the
local
judicial
the
trial
court
when
the
latter
decided
not
to
desist
from
assuming
jurisdiction
machinery
was
adequate
to
resolve
controversies
with
a
foreign
element,
the
on
the
ground
of
the
inapplicability
of
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens.
following
requisites
had
to
be
proved:
(1)
that
the
Philippine
Court
is
one
to
which
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort;
(2)
that
the
Philippine
Court
is
in
a
ISSUE:
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
the
facts;
and
(3)
that
Whether
the
CA
erred
in
refusing
to
dismiss
the
complaint
on
the
ground
of
the
Philippine
Court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
the
power
to
enforce
its
decision.
forum
non
conveniens
FACTS:
HELD:
In
1990,
Brand
Marine
Services,
Inc.
(BMSI),
a
corporation
duly
organized
and
No.
Raytheon
mainly
asserts
that
the
written
contract
between
Rouzie
and
existing
under
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Connecticut,
USA,
and
Stockton
Rouzie,
BMSI
included
a
valid
choice
of
law
clause—the
contract
shall
be
governed
by
Jr.,
an
American
citizen,
entered
into
a
contract
whereby
BMSI
hired
Rouzie
as
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Connecticut.
It
also
mentions
the
presence
of
foreign
its
representative
to
negotiate
the
sale
of
services
in
several
government
elements
in
the
dispute–the
parties
and
witnesses
involved
are
American
projects
in
the
Philippines
for
an
agreed
remuneration
of
10%
of
the
gross
corporations
and
citizens
and
the
evidence
to
be
presented
is
located
outside
receipts.
Rouzie
secured
a
service
contract
with
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
the
Philippines–that
renders
our
local
courts
inconvenient
forums.
on
behalf
of
BMSI
for
the
dredging
of
rivers
affected
by
the
Mt.
Pinatubo
eruption
and
mudflows.
Recently
in
Hasegawa
v.
Kitamura,
the
Court
outlined
3
consecutive
phases
involved
in
judicial
resolution
of
conflict-‐of-‐laws
problems,
namely:
In
1994,
Rouzie
filed
before
the
NLRC
a
suit
against
BMSI
and
Rust
jurisdiction,
choice
of
law,
and
recognition
and
enforcement
of
judgments.
International,
Inc.
(RUST),
Gilbert
and
Browning
for
alleged
nonpayment
of
Thus,
in
the
instances
where
the
Court
held
that
the
local
judicial
machinery
commissions,
illegal
termination
and
breach
of
employment
contract.
The
was
adequate
to
resolve
controversies
with
a
foreign
element,
the
following
complaint
was
dismissed
on
the
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction.
In
1999,
Rouzie,
requisites
had
to
be
proved:
(1)
that
the
Philippine
Court
is
one
to
which
the
then
a
resident
of
La
Union,
instituted
an
action
for
damages
before
the
RTC
of
parties
may
conveniently
resort;
(2)
that
the
Philippine
Court
is
in
a
position
Bauang,
La
Union
against
Raytheon
International,
Inc.
as
well
as
BMSI
and
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
the
facts;
and
(3)
that
the
Philippine
Court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
the
power
to
enforce
its
decision.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
18
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
foreign
elements.
In
the
same
manner,
the
Court
defers
to
the
sound
discretion
On
the
matter
of
jurisdiction
over
a
conflicts-‐of-‐laws
problem
where
the
case
of
the
lower
courts
because
their
findings
are
binding
on
this
Court.
is
filed
in
a
Philippine
court
and
where
the
court
has
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter,
the
parties
and
the
res,
it
may
or
can
proceed
to
try
the
case
even
if
the
rules
of
conflict-‐of-‐laws
or
the
convenience
of
the
parties
point
to
MINIMUM
CONTACT
a
foreign
forum.
This
is
an
exercise
of
sovereign
prerogative
of
the
country
where
the
case
is
filed.
13.
HSBC
V.
SHERMAN
Jurisdiction
over
the
nature
and
subject
matter
of
an
action
is
conferred
by
G.R.
No.
72494
|
August
11,
1989
the
Constitution
and
the
law
and
by
the
material
allegations
in
the
complaint,
irrespective
of
whether
or
not
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
recover
all
or
some
of
DOCTRINES:
A
State
does
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
absence
of
some
the
claims
or
reliefs
sought
therein.
This
case
is
an
action
for
damages
arising
reasonable
basis
for
exercising
it,
whether
the
proceedings
are
in
rem,
quasi
in
from
an
alleged
breach
of
contract.
Undoubtedly,
the
nature
of
the
action
and
rem,
or
in
personam.
To
be
reasonable,
the
jurisdiction
must
be
based
on
some
the
amount
of
damages
prayed
are
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
RTC.
minimum
contacts
that
will
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice.
As
regards
jurisdiction
over
the
parties,
the
trial
court
acquired
jurisdiction
over
herein
Rouzie
upon
the
filing
of
the
complaint.
On
the
other
hand,
The
defense
of
private
respondents
that
the
complaint
should
have
been
filed
in
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
Raytheon
was
acquired
by
its
voluntary
Singapore
is
based
merely
on
technicality.
They
did
not
even
claim,
much
less
appearance
in
court.
prove,
that
the
filing
of
the
action
here
will
cause
them
any
unnecessary
trouble,
damage,
or
expense.
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
no
showing
that
HSBC
That
the
subject
contract
included
a
stipulation
that
the
same
shall
be
filed
the
action
here
just
to
harass
private
respondents.
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Connecticut
does
not
suggest
that
the
Philippine
courts,
or
any
other
foreign
tribunal
for
that
matter,
are
precluded
Av:
Since
jurisdiction
asks
whether
it
is
fair
to
cause
defendant
to
travel
to
this
from
hearing
the
civil
action.
Jurisdiction
and
choice
of
law
are
two
distinct
state,
defendants
must
allege
and
prove
that
the
filing
of
the
action
in
the
concepts.
Jurisdiction
considers
whether
it
is
fair
to
cause
a
defendant
to
forum
will
cause
unnecessary
trouble,
damage,
or
expense
on
his
part
and
that
travel
to
this
state;
choice
of
law
asks
the
further
question
whether
the
it
was
filed
to
harass
him.
application
of
a
substantive
law
which
will
determine
the
merits
of
the
case
is
fair
to
both
parties.
The
choice
of
law
stipulation
will
become
relevant
only
FACTS:
when
the
substantive
issues
of
the
instant
case
develop,
that
is,
after
hearing
A
complaint
for
collection
of
a
sum
of
money
was
filed
by
Hongkong
and
on
the
merits
proceeds
before
the
trial
court.
Shanghai
Banking
Corporation
(HSBC)
against
private
respondents
Jack
Robert
Sherman
and
Deodato
Reloj,
before
the
RTC
QC.
Moreover,
the
propriety
of
dismissing
a
case
based
on
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
requires
a
factual
determination;
hence,
it
is
more
properly
In
1981,
Eastern
Book
Supply
Service
PTE,
Ltd.
(company),
a
company
considered
as
a
matter
of
defense.
While
it
is
within
the
discretion
of
the
trial
incorporated
in
Singapore
applied
with,
and
was
granted
by,
the
Singapore
court
to
abstain
from
assuming
jurisdiction
on
this
ground,
it
should
do
so
branch
of
HSBC
an
overdraft
facility.
As
a
security
for
the
repayment
of
sums
only
after
vital
facts
are
established,
to
determine
whether
special
advanced
through
the
aforesaid
overdraft
facility,
private
respondents
and
a
circumstances
require
the
court’s
desistance.
certain
Robin
de
Clive
Lowe,
all
of
whom
were
directors
of
the
company,
executed
a
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
in
favor
of
HSBC
whereby
the
former
Finding
no
grave
abuse
of
discretion
on
the
trial
court,
the
CA
respected
its
agreed
to
pay,
jointly
and
severally,
on
demand
all
sums
owed
by
the
conclusion
that
it
can
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
dispute
notwithstanding
its
CONFLICT
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2015-‐2016
COMPANY
to
petitioner
BANK
under
the
aforestated
overdraft
facility.
The
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
provides
that:
“This
guarantee
and
all
rights,
The
instant
case
presents
a
very
odd
situation.
In
the
ordinary
habits
of
life,
obligations
and
liabilities
arising
hereunder
shall
be
construed
and
determined
anyone
would
be
disinclined
to
litigate
before
a
foreign
tribunal,
with
more
under
and
may
be
enforced
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
Republic
of
reason
as
a
defendant.
However,
in
this
case,
private
respondents
are
Singapore.
We
hereby
agree
that
the
Courts
of
Singapore
shall
have
jurisdiction
Philippine
residents
(a
fact
which
was
not
disputed
by
them)
who
would
rather
over
all
disputes
arising
under
this
guarantee.”
The
company
failed
to
pay
its
face
a
complaint
against
them
before
a
foreign
court
and
in
the
process
incur
obligation.
Thus,
HSBC
demanded
payment
but
for
failure
to
pay,
HSBC
filed
considerable
expenses,
not
to
mention
inconvenience,
than
to
have
a
the
above-‐mentioned
complaint.
Philippine
court
try
and
resolve
the
case.
The
defense
of
private
respondents
that
the
complaint
should
have
been
filed
in
Singapore
is
based
merely
on
Private
respondents
filed
a
MTD
on
the
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
technicality.
They
did
not
even
claim,
much
less
prove,
that
the
filing
of
the
subject
matter
and
over
their
persons.
The
trial
court
denied
the
MTD,
ruling
action
here
will
cause
them
any
unnecessary
trouble,
damage,
or
expense.
On
that
there
is
nothing
in
the
Guarantee
which
says
that
the
courts
of
Singapore
the
other
hand,
there
is
no
showing
that
HSBC
filed
the
action
here
just
to
shall
have
jurisdiction
to
the
exclusion
of
the
courts
of
other
countries
or
harass
private
respondents.
nations
and
that
jurisdiction
over
the
persons
of
defendants
is
acquired
by
service
of
summons
and
copy
of
the
complaint
on
them.
There
has
been
a
valid
Further,
the
parties
did
not
thereby
stipulate
that
only
the
courts
of
service
of
summons
on
both
defendants
and
in
fact
the
same
is
admitted
when
Singapore,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
the
rest,
has
jurisdiction.
Neither
did
the
said
defendants
filed
a
'Motion
for
Extension
of
Time
to
File
Responsive
clause
in
question
operate
to
divest
Philippine
courts
of
jurisdiction.
In
Pleading.’
Private
respondents
then
filed
before
CA
a
petition
for
prohibition
International
Law,
jurisdiction
is
often
defined
as
the
right
of
a
State
to
with
preliminary
injunction
and/or
prayer
for
a
restraining
order.
CA
rendered
a
exercise
authority
over
persons
and
things
within
its
boundaries
subject
to
decision
granting
the
injunction
stating
that:
“The
loan
was
obtained
by
a
certain
exceptions.
Thus,
a
State
does
not
assume
jurisdiction
over
travelling
company
incorporated
in
Singapore.
The
loan
was
granted
by
the
sovereigns,
ambassadors
and
diplomatic
representatives
of
other
States,
and
Singapore
Branch
of
HSBC.
The
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
was
also
concluded
foreign
military
units
stationed
in
or
marching
through
State
territory
with
the
in
Singapore.
The
loan
was
in
Singaporean
dollars
and
the
repayment
thereof
permission
of
the
latter's
authorities.
This
authority,
which
finds
its
source
in
also
in
the
same
currency.
The
transaction,
to
say
the
least,
took
place
in
the
concept
of
sovereignty,
is
exclusive
within
and
throughout
the
domain
of
Singporean
setting
in
which
the
law
of
that
country
is
the
measure
by
which
the
State.
A
State
is
competent
to
take
hold
of
any
judicial
matter
it
sees
fit
by
that
relationship
of
the
parties
will
be
governed.”
making
its
courts
and
agencies
assume
jurisdiction
over
all
kinds
of
cases
brought
before
them.
ISSUE:
Whether
Philippine
courts
have
jurisdiction
over
the
suit.
While
in
the
main,
the
motion
to
dismiss
fails
to
categorically
use
with
exactitude
the
words
'improper
venue'
it
can
be
perceived
from
the
general
HELD:
thrust
and
context
of
the
motion
that
what
is
meant
is
improper
venue,
The
Yes.
While
it
is
true
that
"the
transaction
took
place
in
Singaporean
setting"
and
use
of
the
word
'jurisdiction'
was
merely
an
attempt
to
copy-‐cat
the
same
word
that
the
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
contains
a
choice-‐of-‐forum
clause,
the
employed
in
the
guarantee
agreement
but
conveys
the
concept
of
venue.
At
very
essence
of
due
process
dictates
that
the
stipulation
be
liberally
any
rate,
this
issue
is
now
of
no
moment
because
the
Court
holds
that
venue
construed.
One
basic
principle
underlies
all
rules
of
jurisdiction
in
International
here
was
properly
laid
for
the
same
reasons
discussed
above.
Law:
A
State
does
not
have
jurisdiction
in
the
absence
of
some
reasonable
basis
for
exercising
it,
whether
the
proceedings
are
in
rem
quasi
in
rem
or
in
The
respondent
Court
likewise
ruled
that:
“In
a
conflict
problem,
a
court
will
personam.
To
be
reasonable,
the
jurisdiction
must
be
based
on
some
simply
refuse
to
entertain
the
case
if
it
is
not
authorized
by
law
to
exercise
minimum
contacts
that
will
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
jurisdiction.
And
even
if
it
is
so
authorized,
it
may
still
refuse
to
entertain
the
substantial
justice.
case
by
applying
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens.”
However,
whether
a
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suit
should
be
entertained
or
dismissed
on
the
basis
of
the
principle
of
forum
relationships
of
the
ship
and
of
its
master
or
owner
as
such.
It
also
covers
non
conveniens
depends
largely
upon
the
facts
of
the
particular
case
and
is
contractual
relationships
particularly
contracts
of
affreightment.
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.
Thus,
the
CA
should
not
have
relied
on
such
principle.
What
is
important
here
is
the
place
where
the
over-‐all
harm
or
the
totality
of
the
alleged
injury
to
the
person,
reputation,
social
standing
and
human
rights
Although
the
Joint
and
Several
Guarantee
prepared
by
HSBC
is
a
contract
of
of
complainant,
had
lodged,
according
to
Morada.
All
told,
it
is
not
without
adhesion
and
that
consequently,
it
cannot
be
permitted
to
take
a
stand
basis
to
identify
the
Philippines
as
the
situs
of
the
alleged
tort.
contrary
to
the
stipulations
of
the
contract,
substantial
bases
exist
for
HSBC’s
choice
of
forum,
as
discussed
earlier.
ALG:
Center
of
gravity
approach—the
law
of
the
state
which
has
the
most
important
connection
or
is
most
intimately
connected
with
the
outcome
of
the
14.
SAUDI
ARABIAN
AIRLINES
V.
CA
particular
litigation
must
be
applied.
(PIA
v.
CA))
G.R.
No.
122191
|
October
8,
1998
In
applying
the
“State
of
the
most
significant
relationship”
rule,
the
following
DOCTRINES:
A
factual
situation
that
cuts
across
territorial
lines
and
is
affected
contacts
are
to
be
taken
into
account
and
evaluated
according
to
their
relative
by
the
diverse
laws
of
two
or
more
states
is
said
to
contain
a
“foreign
element.”
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue:
(a)
the
place
where
the
injury
occurred;
(b)
the
place
where
the
conduct
causing
the
injury
occurred;
(c)
the
These
“test
factors”
or
“points
of
contact”
or
“connecting
factors”
could
be
any
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
place
of
business
of
of
the
following:
(SAFE
IN
SF)
the
parties;
and
(d)
the
place
where
the
relationship,
if
any,
between
the
(1)
the
nationality
of
a
person,
his
domicile,
his
residence,
his
place
of
sojourn,
parties
is
centered.
or
his
origin;
(2)
the
seat
of
a
legal
or
juridical
person,
such
as
a
corporation;
CHOICE
OF
FORUM
(3)
the
situs
of
a
thing,
that
is,
the
place
where
a
thing
is,
or
is
deemed
to
be
GR:
The
plaintiff’s
choice
of
forum
should
rarely
be
disturbed.
situated.
In
particular,
the
lex
situs
is
decisive
when
real
rights
are
involved;
EXC
#3:
Unless
the
balance
is
strongly
in
favor
of
the
defendant.
Plaintiff
may
(4)
the
place
where
an
act
has
been
done,
the
locus
actus,
such
as
the
place
not,
by
choice
of
an
inconvenient
forum,
‘vex,’
‘harass,’
or
‘oppress’
the
where
a
contract
has
been
made,
a
marriage
celebrated,
a
will
signed
or
a
tort
defendant,
e.g.
by
inflicting
upon
him
needless
expense
or
disturbance.
committed.
The
lex
loci
actus
is
particularly
important
in
contracts
and
torts;
(5)
the
place
where
an
act
is
intended
to
come
into
effect,
e.g.,
the
place
of
FACTS:
performance
of
contractual
duties,
or
the
place
where
a
power
of
attorney
is
to
In
1988,
SAUDIA
hired
Milagros
Morada
as
a
Flight
Attendant
for
its
airlines
be
exercised;
based
in
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia.
In
1990,
while
on
a
lay-‐over
in
Jakarta,
(6)
the
intention
of
the
contracting
parties
as
to
the
law
that
should
govern
Indonesia,
Morada
went
to
a
disco
dance
with
fellow
crew
members
Thamer
their
agreement,
the
lex
loci
intentionis;
Al-‐Gazzawi
and
Allah
Al-‐Gazzawi,
both
Saudi
nationals.
Because
it
was
almost
(7)
the
place
where
judicial
or
administrative
proceedings
are
instituted
or
morning
when
they
returned
to
their
hotels,
they
agreed
to
have
breakfast
done.
The
lex
fori—the
law
of
the
forum—is
particularly
important
because,
as
together
at
the
room
of
Thamer.
When
they
were
in
the
room,
Allah
left
and
we
have
seen
earlier,
matters
of
‘procedure’
not
going
to
the
substance
of
the
shortly
after,
Thamer
attempted
to
rape
her.
Fortunately,
a
roomboy
and
claim
involved
are
governed
by
it;
and
because
the
lex
fori
applies
whenever
several
security
personnel
heard
her
cries
for
help
and
rescued
her.
Later,
the
the
content
of
the
otherwise
applicable
foreign
law
is
excluded
from
Indonesian
police
came
and
arrested
Thamer
and
Allah
Al-‐Gazzawi,
the
latter
as
application
in
a
given
case
for
the
reason
that
it
falls
under
one
of
the
an
accomplice.
exceptions
to
the
applications
of
foreign
law;
and
(8)
the
flag
of
a
ship,
which
in
many
cases
is
decisive
of
practically
all
legal
When
plaintiff
returned
to
Jeddah
a
few
days
later,
SAUDIA
officials
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interrogated
her
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
They
then
requested
her
to
go
She
was
denied
any
assistance
by
SAUDIA
thus,
she
then
asked
the
Philippine
back
to
Jakarta
to
help
arrange
the
release
of
Thamer
and
Allah.
Morada
did
Embassy
in
Jeddah
to
help
her
while
her
case
is
on
appeal.
Meanwhile,
to
pay
not
cooperate
in
the
negotiation
with
the
Indonesian
police
because
she
was
for
her
upkeep,
she
worked
on
the
domestic
flight
of
SAUDIA,
while
Thamer
afraid
that
she
might
be
tricked
into
something
she
did
not
want
because
of
her
and
Allah
continued
to
serve
in
the
international
flights.
Because
she
was
inability
to
understand
the
local
dialect.
She
also
declined
to
sign
a
blank
paper
wrongfully
convicted,
the
Prince
of
Makkah
dismissed
the
case
against
her
and
and
a
document
written
in
the
local
dialect.
However,
she
learned
that,
allowed
her
to
leave
Saudi
Arabia.
Shortly
before
her
return
to
Manila,
she
was
through
the
intercession
of
the
Saudi
Arabian
government,
the
Indonesian
terminated
from
the
service
by
SAUDIA,
without
her
being
informed
of
the
authorities
agreed
to
deport
Thamer
and
Allah
after
2
weeks
of
detention.
cause.
Eventually,
they
were
again
put
in
service
by
defendant
SAUDIA.
In
September
1990,
SAUDIA
transferred
Morada
to
Manila.
In
November
1993,
Morada
filed
a
Complaint
for
damages
against
SAUDIA,
and
Khaled
Al-‐Balawi,
its
country
manager
in
the
trial
court.
SAUDIA
filed
an
In
1992,
Morada’s
superiors
requested
her
to
see
Mr.
Ali
Meniewy,
Chief
Legal
Omnibus
MTD
which
raised
the
following
grounds,
to
wit:
(1)
that
the
Officer
of
SAUDIA,
in
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia.
When
she
saw
him,
he
brought
her
Complaint
states
no
cause
of
action
against
SAUDIA;
(2)
that
defendant
Al-‐
to
the
police
station
where
the
police
took
her
passport
and
questioned
her
Balawi
is
not
a
real
party
in
interest;
(3)
that
the
claim
or
demand
set
forth
in
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
Not
until
she
agreed
to
do
so
did
the
police
return
the
Complaint
has
been
waived,
abandoned
or
otherwise
extinguished;
and
(4)
her
passport
and
allowed
her
to
catch
the
afternoon
flight
out
of
Jeddah.
that
the
trial
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
try
the
case
on
the
basis
of
Art.
21
of
the
NCC,
since
the
proper
law
applicable
is
the
law
of
the
Kingdom
of
Saudi
One
year
and
a
half
later,
in
Riyadh,
Saudi
Arabia,
a
few
minutes
before
the
Arabia.
The
trial
court
denied
the
MTD.
departure
of
her
flight
to
Manila,
Morada
was
not
allowed
to
board
the
plane
and
instead
ordered
to
take
a
later
flight
to
Jeddah
to
see
Mr.
Miniewy
again.
Consequently,
SAUDIA
filed
its
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Prohibition
with
When
she
did,
she
was
brought
her
to
a
Saudi
court
where
she
was
asked
to
Prayer
for
Issuance
of
Writ
of
Preliminary
Injunction
and/or
TRO
with
the
CA,
sign
a
document
written
in
Arabic.
They
told
her
that
this
was
necessary
to
which
ruled
that
the
Philippines
is
an
appropriate
forum
considering
that
the
close
the
case
against
Thamer
and
Allah.
As
it
turned
out,
plaintiff
signed
a
Amended
Complaint’s
basis
for
recovery
of
damages
is
Art.
21,
and
thus,
clearly
notice
to
her
to
appear
before
the
court
on
June
27,
1993.
She
then
returned
to
within
the
jurisdiction
of
respondent
Court.
Manila.
ISSUE:
Shortly
afterwards,
SAUDIA
summoned
plaintiff
to
report
to
Jeddah
once
again
1.
Whether
the
case
is
a
conflict
of
laws.
where
a
Saudi
judge
interrogated
her
through
an
interpreter
about
the
Jakarta
2.
Whether
the
RTC
of
Quezon
City
has
jurisdiction.
incident.
After
one
hour
of
interrogation,
when
she
was
about
to
return
to
3.
Whether
the
Philippine
Law
should
govern.
Manila,
a
SAUDIA
officer
told
her
that
the
airline
had
forbidden
her
to
take
flight
and
took
away
her
passport
and
told
her
to
remain
in
Jeddah,
at
the
crew
HELD:
quarters,
until
further
orders.
After
a
few
days,
a
SAUDIA
legal
officer
again
1.
Yes.
A
factual
situation
that
cuts
across
territorial
lines
and
is
affected
by
escorted
plaintiff
to
the
same
court
where
the
judge,
to
her
astonishment
and
the
diverse
laws
of
two
or
more
states
is
said
to
contain
a
“foreign
element.”
shock,
rendered
a
decision
sentencing
her
to
5
months
imprisonment
and
to
286
lashes.
Only
then
did
she
realize
that
the
Saudi
court
had
tried
her,
The
forms
in
which
this
foreign
element
may
appear
are
many.
The
foreign
together
with
Thamer
and
Allah,
for
what
happened
in
Jakarta.
The
court
found
element
may
simply
consist
in
the
fact
that
one
of
the
parties
to
a
contract
is
an
Morada
guilty
of
(1)
adultery;
(2)
going
to
a
disco,
dancing
and
listening
to
the
alien
or
has
a
foreign
domicile,
or
that
a
contract
between
nationals
of
one
music
in
violation
of
Islamic
laws;
and
(3)
socializing
with
the
male
crew,
in
State
involves
properties
situated
in
another
State.
In
other
cases,
the
foreign
contravention
of
Islamic
tradition.”
element
may
assume
a
complex
form.
In
the
instant
case,
the
foreign
element
consisted
in
the
fact
that
Morada
is
a
resident
Philippine
national,
and
that
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SAUDIA
is
a
resident
foreign
corporation.
Also,
by
virtue
of
the
employment
of
“(1)
the
nationality
of
a
person,
his
domicile,
his
residence,
his
place
of
Morada
with
the
SAUDIA
as
a
flight
stewardess,
events
did
transpire
during
her
sojourn,
or
his
origin;
many
occasions
of
travel
across
national
borders,
particularly
from
Manila,
(2)
the
seat
of
a
legal
or
juridical
person,
such
as
a
corporation;
Philippines
to
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia,
and
vice
versa,
that
caused
a
“conflicts”
(3)
the
situs
of
a
thing,
that
is,
the
place
where
a
thing
is,
or
is
deemed
to
be
situation
to
arise.
Thus,
Morada’s
assertion
that
the
case
is
purely
domestic
is
situated.
In
particular,
the
lex
situs
is
decisive
when
real
rights
are
involved;
imprecise.
A
conflicts
problem
presents
itself
here,
and
the
question
of
(4)
the
place
where
an
act
has
been
done,
the
locus
actus,
such
as
the
place
jurisdiction
confronts
the
court
a
quo.
where
a
contract
has
been
made,
a
marriage
celebrated,
a
will
signed
or
a
tort
committed.
The
lex
loci
actus
is
particularly
important
in
contracts
and
2)
Yes.
Based
on
the
allegations
in
the
Amended
Complaint,
read
in
the
light
of
torts;
the
Rules
of
Court
on
jurisdiction,
the
Court
finds
that
the
RTC
of
Quezon
City
(5)
the
place
where
an
act
is
intended
to
come
into
effect,
e.g.,
the
place
of
possesses
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
suit.
Its
authority
to
try
performance
of
contractual
duties,
or
the
place
where
a
power
of
attorney
and
hear
the
case
is
provided
for
under
Sec.
1
of
R.A.
No.
7691:
“RTCs
shall
is
to
be
exercised;
exercise
exclusive
jurisdiction:
(8)
In
all
other
cases
in
which
demand,
exclusive
(6)
the
intention
of
the
contracting
parties
as
to
the
law
that
should
govern
of
interest,
damages
of
whatever
kind,
attorney's
fees,
litigation
expenses,
and
their
agreement,
the
lex
loci
intentionis;
costs
or
the
value
of
the
property
in
controversy
exceeds
One
hundred
thousand
(7)
the
place
where
judicial
or
administrative
proceedings
are
instituted
or
pesos
(P100,000.00)
or,
in
such
other
cases
in
Metro
Manila,
where
the
done.
The
lex
fori—the
law
of
the
forum—is
particularly
important
because,
demand,
exclusive
of
the
above-‐mentioned
items
exceeds
Two
hundred
as
we
have
seen
earlier,
matters
of
‘procedure’
not
going
to
the
substance
Thousand
pesos
(P200,000.00).”
of
the
claim
involved
are
governed
by
it;
and
because
the
lex
fori
applies
whenever
the
content
of
the
otherwise
applicable
foreign
law
is
excluded
Pragmatic
considerations,
including
the
convenience
of
the
parties,
also
weigh
from
application
in
a
given
case
for
the
reason
that
it
falls
under
one
of
the
heavily
in
favor
of
the
RTC
of
QC
assuming
jurisdiction.
Paramount
is
the
exceptions
to
the
applications
of
foreign
law;
and
private
interest
of
the
litigant.
Enforceability
of
a
judgment
if
one
is
obtained
is
(8)
the
flag
of
a
ship,
which
in
many
cases
is
decisive
of
practically
all
legal
quite
obvious.
Relative
advantages
and
obstacles
to
a
fair
trial
are
equally
relationships
of
the
ship
and
of
its
master
or
owner
as
such.
It
also
covers
important.
Plaintiff
may
not,
by
choice
of
an
inconvenient
forum,
‘vex,’
contractual
relationships
particularly
contracts
of
affreightment.”
‘harass,’
or
‘oppress’
the
defendant,
e.g.
by
inflicting
upon
him
needless
expense
or
disturbance.
But
unless
the
balance
is
strongly
in
favor
of
the
Considering
that
the
complaint
in
the
court
a
quo
is
one
involving
torts,
the
defendant,
the
plaintiff’s
choice
of
forum
should
rarely
be
disturbed.
“connecting
factor”
or
“point
of
contact”
could
be
the
place
or
places
where
the
tortious
conduct
or
lex
loci
actus
occurred.
And
applying
the
torts
Weighing
the
relative
claims
of
the
parties,
the
court
a
quo
found
it
best
to
principle
in
a
conflicts
case,
we
find
that
the
Philippines
could
be
said
as
a
hear
the
case
in
the
Philippines.
Had
it
refused
to
take
cognizance
of
the
case,
it
situs
of
the
tort
(the
place
where
the
alleged
tortious
conduct
took
place).
would
be
forcing
Morada
to
seek
remedial
action
elsewhere,
i.e.
in
the
This
is
because
it
is
in
the
Philippines
where
SAUDIA
allegedly
deceived
Kingdom
of
Saudi
Arabia
where
she
no
longer
maintains
substantial
Morada,
a
Filipina
residing
and
working
here.
According
to
her,
she
had
connections.
That
would
have
caused
a
fundamental
unfairness
to
her.
honestly
believed
that
SAUDIA
would,
in
the
exercise
of
its
rights
and
in
the
Moreover,
by
hearing
the
case
in
the
Philippines
no
unnecessary
difficulties
and
performance
of
its
duties,
“act
with
justice,
give
her
due
and
observe
honesty
inconvenience
have
been
shown
by
either
of
the
parties.
and
good
faith.”
Instead,
SAUDIA
failed
to
protect
her.
That
certain
acts
or
parts
of
the
injury
allegedly
occurred
in
another
country
is
of
no
moment.
What
3)
Yes.
Note
that
one
or
more
circumstances
may
be
present
to
serve
as
the
is
important
here
is
the
place
where
the
over-‐all
harm
or
the
totality
of
the
possible
test
for
the
determination
of
the
applicable
law.
These
“test
factors”
alleged
injury
to
the
person,
reputation,
social
standing
and
human
rights
of
or
“points
of
contact”
or
“connecting
factors”
could
be
any
of
the
following:
complainant,
had
lodged,
according
to
Morada.
All
told,
it
is
not
without
basis
to
identify
the
Philippines
as
the
situs
of
the
alleged
tort.
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Moreover,
with
the
widespread
criticism
of
the
traditional
rule
of
lex
loci
delicti
Lex
celebrationis,
lex
contractus,
and
state
of
the
most
significant
relationship
commissi,
modern
theories
and
rules
on
tort
liability
have
been
advanced
to
make
reference
to
the
law
applicable
to
a
dispute.
They
are
rules
proper
for
the
offer
fresh
judicial
approaches
to
arrive
at
just
results.
In
keeping
abreast
with
second
phase
in
judicial
resolution
of
conflicts
problem—the
choice
of
law.
the
modern
theories
on
tort
liability,
we
find
here
an
occasion
to
apply
the
“State
of
the
most
significant
relationship”
rule,
which
in
our
view
should
be
FACTS:
appropriate
to
apply
now,
given
the
factual
context
of
this
case.
In
determining
Petitioner
Nippon
Engineering
Consultants
Co.,
Ltd.,
a
Japanese
consultancy
the
State
which
has
the
most
significant
relationship,
the
following
contacts
firm
providing
technical
and
management
support
in
the
infrastructure
projects
are
to
be
taken
into
account
and
evaluated
according
to
their
relative
of
foreign
governments,
entered
into
an
Independent
Contractor
Agreement
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue:
(a)
the
place
where
the
injury
(ICA)
with
Minoru
Kitamura,
a
Japanese
national
permanently
residing
in
the
occurred;
(b)
the
place
where
the
conduct
causing
the
injury
occurred;
(c)
the
Philippines.
The
agreement
provides
that
Kitamura
was
to
extend
professional
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
place
of
business
services
to
Nippon
for
a
year.
Nippon
then
assigned
Kitamura
to
work
as
the
of
the
parties;
and
(d)
the
place
where
the
relationship,
if
any,
between
the
project
manager
of
the
Southern
Tagalog
Access
Road
(STAR)
Project
in
the
parties
is
centered.
Philippines,
following
the
company's
consultancy
contract
with
the
Philippine
Government.
When
the
STAR
Project
was
near
completion,
the
DPWH
engaged
As
already
discussed,
there
is
basis
for
the
claim
that
overall
injury
occurred
the
consultancy
services
of
Nippon,
this
time
for
the
detailed
engineering
and
and
lodged
in
the
Philippines.
Thus,
the
“relationship”
between
the
parties
was
construction
supervision
of
the
Bongabon-‐Baler
Road
Improvement
(BBRI)
centered
here,
although
it
should
be
stressed
that
this
suit
is
not
based
on
Project.
mere
labor
law
violations.
From
the
record,
the
claim
that
the
Philippines
has
the
most
significant
contact
with
the
matter
in
this
dispute,
raised
by
private
Petitioner
Kazuhiro
Hasegawa,
Nippon's
general
manager
for
its
International
respondent
as
plaintiff
below
against
SAUDIA,
in
our
view,
has
been
properly
Division,
then
informed
Kiramura
that
the
company
had
no
more
intention
of
established.
Indubitably,
the
Philippines
is
the
state
intimately
concerned
with
automatically
renewing
his
ICA.
His
services
would
be
engaged
by
the
company
the
ultimate
outcome
of
the
case
below,
not
just
for
the
benefit
of
all
the
only
up
to
the
substantial
completion
of
the
STAR
Project.
litigants,
but
also
for
the
vindication
of
the
country’s
system
of
law
and
justice
in
a
transnational
setting.
Threatened
with
impending
unemployment,
Kitamura,
through
his
lawyer,
requested
a
negotiation
conference
and
demanded
that
he
be
assigned
to
the
15.
HASEGAWA
V.
KITAMURA
BBRI
project.
Nippon
insisted
that
Kitamura’s
contract
was
for
a
fixed
term
that
G.R.
No.
149177
|
November
23,
2007
had
already
expired,
and
refused
to
negotiate
for
the
renewal
of
the
ICA.
Kitamura
then
filed
for
specific
performance
and
damages
with
the
RTC
of
Lipa
DOCTRINE:
In
the
judicial
resolution
of
conflicts
problems,
three
consecutive
City.
Nippon
filed
a
MTD,
contending
that
the
ICA
had
been
perfected
in
Japan
phases
are
involved:
jurisdiction,
choice
of
law,
and
recognition
and
and
executed
by
and
between
Japanese
nationals.
Thus,
petitioners
posit
that
enforcement
of
judgments.
Corresponding
to
these
phases
are
the
following
local
courts
have
no
substantial
relationship
to
the
parties
following
the
state
questions:
(1)
Where
can
or
should
litigation
be
initiated?
(2)
Which
law
will
the
of
the
most
significant
relationship
rule
in
PRIL.
The
claim
for
improper
pre-‐
court
apply?
and
(3)
Where
can
the
resulting
judgment
be
enforced?
termination
of
Kitamaru’s
ICA
could
only
be
heard
and
ventilated
in
the
proper
courts
of
Japan
following
the
principles
of
lex
loci
celebrationis
and
lex
To
succeed
in
its
motion
for
the
dismissal
of
an
action
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
contractus.
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
claim,
the
movant
must
show
that
the
court
or
tribunal
cannot
act
on
the
matter
submitted
to
it
because
no
law
grants
it
the
RTC
denied
the
motion
to
dismiss.
The
CA
ruled
hat
the
principle
of
lex
loci
power
to
adjudicate
the
claims.
celebrationis
was
not
applicable
to
the
case,
because
nowhere
in
the
pleadings
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was
the
validity
of
the
written
agreement
put
in
issue.
It
held
that
the
RTC
was
properly
vested
by
law
with
jurisdiction
to
hear
the
subject
controversy
for
a
correct
in
applying
the
principle
of
lex
loci
solutionis
(law
of
the
place
where
civil
case
for
specific
performance
and
damages
is
one
not
capable
of
pecuniary
performance
of
the
contract
was
due).
estimation
and
is
properly
cognizable
by
the
RTC
of
Lipa
City.
What
they
rather
raise
as
grounds
to
question
subject
matter
jurisdiction
are
the
principles
of
lex
ISSUE:
loci
celebrationis
and
lex
contractus,
and
the
“state
of
the
most
significant
Whether
the
subject
matter
jurisdiction
of
Philippine
courts
in
civil
cases
for
relationship
rule.
The
Court
finds
the
invocation
of
these
grounds
unsound.
specific
performance
and
damages
involving
contracts
executed
outside
the
country
by
foreign
nationals
may
be
assailed
on
the
principles
of
lex
loci
Lex
loci
celebrationis
relates
to
the
“law
of
the
place
of
the
ceremony”
or
the
celebrationis,
lex
contractus,
the
“state
of
the
most
significant
relationship
law
of
the
place
where
a
contract
is
made.
The
doctrine
of
lex
contractus
or
lex
rule,”
or
forum
non
conveniens.
loci
contractus
means
the
“law
of
the
place
where
a
contract
is
executed
or
to
be
performed.”
It
controls
the
nature,
construction,
and
validity
of
the
contract
HELD:
and
it
may
pertain
to
the
law
voluntarily
agreed
upon
by
the
parties
or
the
law
No.
In
the
judicial
resolution
of
conflicts
problems,
three
consecutive
phases
intended
by
them
either
expressly
or
implicitly.
Under
the
“state
of
the
most
are
involved:
jurisdiction,
choice
of
law,
and
recognition
and
enforcement
of
significant
relationship
rule,”
to
ascertain
what
state
law
to
apply
to
a
judgments.
dispute,
the
court
should
determine
which
state
has
the
most
substantial
connection
to
the
occurrence
and
the
parties.
In
a
case
involving
a
contract,
Analytically,
jurisdiction
and
choice
of
law
are
two
distinct
concepts.
The
the
court
should
consider
where
the
contract
was
made,
was
negotiated,
was
power
to
exercise
jurisdiction
does
not
automatically
give
a
state
to
be
performed,
and
the
domicile,
place
of
business,
or
place
of
constitutional
authority
to
apply
forum
law.
While
jurisdiction
and
the
choice
incorporation
of
the
parties.
This
rule
takes
into
account
several
contacts
and
of
the
lex
fori
will
often
coincide,
the
“minimum
contacts”
for
one
do
not
evaluates
them
according
to
their
relative
importance
with
respect
to
the
always
provide
the
necessary
“significant
contacts”
for
the
other.
The
particular
issue
to
be
resolved.
question
of
whether
the
law
of
a
state
can
be
applied
to
a
transaction
is
different
from
the
question
of
whether
the
courts
of
that
state
have
Since
these
3
principles
in
conflict
of
laws
make
reference
to
the
law
jurisdiction
to
enter
a
judgment.
applicable
to
a
dispute,
they
are
rules
proper
for
the
2nd
phase,
the
choice
of
law.
They
determine
which
state's
law
is
to
be
applied
in
resolving
the
In
this
case,
only
the
first
phase
is
at
issue—jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction,
however,
substantive
issues
of
a
conflicts
problem.
Necessarily,
as
the
only
issue
in
this
has
various
aspects.
In
assailing
the
trial
court's
jurisdiction
herein,
petitioners
case
is
that
of
jurisdiction,
choice-‐of-‐law
rules
are
not
only
inapplicable
but
are
actually
referring
to
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
also
not
yet
called
for.
Jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
in
a
judicial
proceeding
is
conferred
by
the
Further,
Nippon’s
premature
invocation
of
choice-‐of-‐law
rules
is
exposed
by
sovereign
authority,
which
establishes
and
organizes
the
court.
It
is
given
only
the
fact
that
they
have
not
yet
pointed
out
any
conflict
between
the
laws
of
by
law
and
in
the
manner
prescribed
by
law.
It
is
further
determined
by
the
Japan
and
ours.
Before
determining
which
law
should
apply,
1st
there
should
allegations
of
the
complaint
irrespective
of
whether
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
exist
a
conflict
of
laws
situation
requiring
the
application
of
the
conflict
of
laws
all
or
some
of
the
claims
asserted
therein.
To
succeed
in
its
motion
for
the
rules.
Also,
when
the
law
of
a
foreign
country
is
invoked
to
provide
the
proper
dismissal
of
an
action
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
rules
for
the
solution
of
a
case,
the
existence
of
such
law
must
be
pleaded
and
claim,
the
movant
must
show
that
the
court
or
tribunal
cannot
act
on
the
proved.
matter
submitted
to
it
because
no
law
grants
it
the
power
to
adjudicate
the
claims.
Neither
can
the
other
ground
raised,
forum
non
conveniens,
be
used
to
deprive
the
RTC
of
its
jurisdiction.
First,
it
is
not
a
proper
basis
for
a
motion
to
dismiss
In
the
instant
case,
petitioners,
in
their
MTD,
do
not
claim
that
the
RTC
is
not
because
Sec.
1,
Rule
16
of
the
Rules
of
Court
does
not
include
it
as
a
ground.
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Second,
whether
a
suit
should
be
entertained
or
dismissed
on
the
basis
of
the
required
to
be
made
by
employers
to
a
state
unemployment
compensation
said
doctrine
depends
largely
upon
the
facts
of
the
particular
case
and
is
fund.
addressed
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
RTC.
In
this
case,
the
RTC
decided
to
assume
jurisdiction.
Third,
the
propriety
of
dismissing
a
case
based
on
this
Appellant
is
a
Delaware
corporation,
having
its
principal
place
of
business
in
St.
principle
requires
a
factual
determination;
hence,
this
conflicts
principle
is
Louis,
Missouri,
and
is
engaged
in
the
manufacture
and
sale
of
shoes
and
other
more
properly
considered
a
matter
of
defense.
footwear.
Its
merchandise
is
distributed
interstate
through
several
sales
units
or
branches
located
outside
the
State
of
Washington.
Appellant
has
no
office
in
Washington,
and
makes
no
contracts
either
for
sale
or
purchase
of
merchandise
there.
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
PERSON
During
the
years
1937
to
1940,
appellant
employed
11-‐13
salesmen
under
16.
INTERNATIONAL
SHOE
CO
V.
WASHINGTON
direct
supervision
and
control
of
sales
managers
located
in
St.
Louis.
These
326
U.S.
310
(1945)
salesmen
resided
in
Washington;
their
principal
activities
were
confined
to
that
state,
and
they
were
compensated
by
commissions
based
upon
the
amount
of
DOCTRINE:
GR:
Defendant
must
be
present
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
to
their
sales.
render
a
judgment
in
personam
against
him.
For
the
said
years,
the
State
of
Washington
issued
notice
of
assessment
which
EXC:
Due
process
requires
that
if
the
defendant
is
not
present
within
the
was
personally
served
upon
the
sales
solicitor
employed
by
it
in
the
State
of
territory
of
the
forum,
he
has
certain
minimum
contacts
with
it
such
that
the
Washington,
and
a
copy
of
the
notice
was
mailed
by
registered
mail
to
maintenance
of
the
suit
does
not
offend
‘traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
appellant
at
its
address
in
St.
Louis,
Missouri.
substantial
justice.’
Appellant
appeared
specially
before
the
office
of
unemployment,
and
moved
to
The
test
is
the
extent
that
a
corporation
exercises
the
privilege
of
conducting
set
aside
the
order
and
notice
of
assessment
on
the
ground
that
the
service
activities
within
a
state,
it
enjoys
the
benefits
and
protection
of
the
laws
of
that
upon
appellant's
salesman
was
not
proper
service
upon
appellant;
that
state
and
subjects
it
to
its
jurisdiction.
appellant
was
not
a
corporation
of
the
State
of
Washington,
and
was
not
doing
business
within
the
state;
that
it
had
no
agent
within
the
state
upon
whom
The
activities
must
be
neither
irregular
nor
casual,
rather,
systematic
and
service
could
be
made.
continuous
throughout
the
years
in
question.
They
resulted
in
a
large
volume
of
interstate
business,
in
the
course
of
which
appellant
received
the
benefits
and
The
appeal
tribunal,
ruled
that
appellee
Commissioner
was
entitled
to
recover
protection
of
the
laws
of
the
state,
including
the
right
to
resort
to
the
courts
for
the
unpaid
contributions.
That
action
was
affirmed
by
the
Commissioner;
both
the
enforcement
of
its
rights.
The
obligation
which
is
here
sued
upon
arose
out
the
Superior
Court
and
the
Supreme
Court
affirmed.
of
those
very
activities.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Is
service
of
process
upon
Defendant’s
agent
sufficient
notice
when
the
International
Shoe
Co.
(Appellant)
assails
the
constitutionality
of
the
corporation’s
activities
result
in
a
large
volume
of
interstate
business
so
that
Washington
unemployment
compensation
statute
as
it
is
applied
to
them
for
the
corporation
receives
the
protection
of
the
laws
of
the
state
and
the
suit
is
infringing
the
due
process
clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
and
the
related
to
the
activities,
which
make
the
corporation
present?
commerce
clause.
The
statutes
in
question
set
up
a
comprehensive
scheme
of
unemployment
compensation,
the
costs
of
which
are
defrayed
by
contributions
HELD:
Yes.
SC
held
that
in
view
of
26
U.S.C.
§1606(a),
providing
that
no
person
shall
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be
relieved
from
compliance
with
a
state
law
requiring
payments
to
an
that
the
corporation
be
amenable
to
suits
unrelated
to
that
activity,
there
unemployment
fund
on
the
ground
that
he
is
engaged
in
interstate
commerce.
have
been
instances
in
which
the
continuous
corporate
operations
within
a
The
fact
that
the
corporation
is
engaged
in
interstate
commerce
does
not
state
were
thought
so
substantial
and
of
such
a
nature
as
to
justify
suit
relieve
it
from
liability
for
payments
to
the
state
unemployment
against
it
on
causes
of
action
arising
from
dealings
entirely
distinct
from
those
compensation
fund.
The
activities
in
behalf
of
the
corporation
render
it
activities.
amenable
to
suit
in
courts
of
the
State
to
recover
payments
due
to
the
state
unemployment
compensation
fund.
To
the
extent
that
a
corporation
exercises
the
privilege
of
conducting
activities
within
a
state,
it
enjoys
the
benefits
and
protection
of
the
laws
of
Historically,
the
jurisdiction
of
courts
to
render
judgment
in
personam
is
that
state
and
subjects
it
to
its
jurisdiction.
The
exercise
of
that
privilege
may
grounded
on
their
de
facto
power
over
the
defendant's
person.
Hence,
his
give
rise
to
obligations,
and,
so
far
as
those
obligations
arise
out
of
or
are
presence
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
a
court
was
prerequisite
to
its
connected
with
the
activities
within
the
state,
a
procedure
which
requires
the
rendition
of
a
judgment
personally
binding
him.
Now
that
the
capias
ad
corporation
to
respond
to
a
suit
brought
to
enforce
them
can,
in
most
respondendum
has
given
way
to
personal
service
of
summons
or
other
form
instances,
hardly
be
said
to
be
undue.
of
notice,
due
process
requires
only
that,
in
order
to
subject
a
defendant
to
a
judgment
in
personam,
if
he
be
not
present
within
the
territory
of
the
forum,
Applying
these
standards,
the
activities
carried
on
in
behalf
of
appellant
in
the
he
have
certain
minimum
contacts
with
it
such
that
the
maintenance
of
the
State
of
Washington
were
neither
irregular
nor
casual.
They
were
systematic
suit
does
not
offend
"traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice.”
and
continuous
throughout
the
years
in
question.
They
resulted
in
a
large
volume
of
interstate
business,
in
the
course
of
which
appellant
received
the
Since
the
corporate
personality
is
a
fiction,
it
is
clear
that,
unlike
an
individual,
benefits
and
protection
of
the
laws
of
the
state,
including
the
right
to
resort
its
"presence"
without,
as
well
as
within,
the
state
of
its
origin
can
be
to
the
courts
for
the
enforcement
of
its
rights.
The
obligation
which
is
here
manifested
only
by
activities
carried
in
its
behalf
by
those
who
are
authorized
sued
upon
arose
out
of
those
very
activities.
It
is
evident
that
these
operations
to
act
for
it.
Demands
of
due
process
may
be
met
by
such
contacts
of
the
establish
sufficient
contacts
or
ties
with
the
state
of
the
forum
to
make
it
corporation
with
the
state
of
the
forum
as
make
it
reasonable,
to
require
the
reasonable
and
just,
according
to
our
traditional
conception
of
fair
play
and
corporation
to
defend
the
particular
suit
which
is
brought
there.
substantial
justice,
to
permit
the
state
to
enforce
the
obligations
which
appellant
has
incurred
there.
Hence
we
cannot
say
that
the
maintenance
of
the
"Presence"
in
the
state
in
this
sense
has
never
been
doubted
when
the
present
suit
in
the
State
of
Washington
involves
an
unreasonable
or
undue
activities
of
the
corporation
there
have
not
only
been
continuous
and
procedure.
systematic,
but
also
give
rise
to
the
liabilities
sued
on,
even
though
no
consent
to
be
sued
or
authorization
to
an
agent
to
accept
service
of
process
has
been
17.
PERKINS
V.
BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED
MINING
given.
Conversely
it
has
been
generally
recognized
that
the
casual
presence
of
342
U.S.
437,
72
S.
Ct.
413
96
(1952)
the
corporate
agent
or
even
his
conduct
of
single
or
isolated
items
of
activities
in
a
state
in
the
corporation's
behalf
are
not
enough
to
subject
it
to
suit
on
DOCTRINE:
Thus
he
carried
on
in
Ohio
a
continuous
and
systematic
supervision
causes
of
action
unconnected
with
the
activities
there.
To
require
the
of
the
necessarily
limited
wartime
activities
of
the
company.
He
there
corporation
in
such
circumstances
to
defend
the
suit
away
from
its
home
or
discharged
his
duties
as
president
and
general
manager,
both
during
the
other
jurisdiction
where
it
carries
on
more
substantial
activities
has
been
occupation
of
the
company's
properties
by
the
Japanese
and
immediately
thought
to
lay
too
great
and
unreasonable
a
burden
on
the
corporation
to
thereafter.
While
no
mining
properties
in
Ohio
were
owned
or
operated
by
the
comport
with
due
process.
company,
many
of
its
wartime
activities
were
directed
from
Ohio
and
were
being
given
the
personal
attention
of
its
president
in
that
State
at
the
time
he
While
it
has
been
held,
in
cases
on
which
appellant
relies,
that
continuous
was
served
with
summons.
activity
of
some
sorts
within
a
state
is
not
enough
to
support
the
demand
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appropriate
to
accepting
service
or
receiving
notice
on
its
behalf,
we
Av:
Although
the
actual
business
(i.e.
mining)
is
in
the
Philippines,
the
president
recognize
that
there
is
no
unfairness
in
subjecting
that
corporation
to
the
exercised
continuous
and
systematic
supervision
over
the
whole
business
during
jurisdiction
of
the
courts
of
that
state
through
such
service
of
process
upon
the
wartime
in
Ohio.
The
corporation
may
be
sued
in
matters
related
to
such
that
representative.
This
has
been
squarely
held
to
be
so
in
a
proceeding
in
supervision.
personam
against
such
a
corporation,
at
least
in
relation
to
a
cause
of
action
arising
out
of
the
corporation's
activities
within
the
state
of
the
forum.
FACTS:
Idonah
Slade
Perkins,
a
nonresident
of
Ohio,
filed
2
actions
in
personam
in
the
The
amount
and
kind
of
activities
which
must
be
carried
on
by
the
foreign
Court
of
Common
Pleas
of
Clermont
County,
Ohio,
against
the
several
corporation
in
the
state
of
the
forum
so
as
to
make
it
reasonable
and
just
to
respondents
one
of
which
is
the
Benguet
Consolidated
Mining
Company.
It
is
subject
the
corporation
to
the
jurisdiction
of
that
state
are
to
be
determined
styled
as
a
"sociedad
anonima"
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
where
in
each
case.
The
corporate
activities
of
a
foreign
corporation
which,
under
it
owns
and
has
operated
profitable
gold
and
silver
mines.
In
one
action
Perkins
state
statute,
make
it
necessary
for
it
to
secure
a
license
and
to
designate
a
seeks
approximately
$68,400
in
dividends
claimed
to
be
due
her
as
a
statutory
agent
upon
whom
process
may
be
served
provide
a
helpful
but
not
a
stockholder.
In
the
other
she
claims
$2,500,000
damages
largely
because
of
the
conclusive
test.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
same
corporation
carries
on,
in
that
company's
failure
to
issue
to
her
certificates
for
120,000
shares
of
its
stock.
state,
other
continuous
and
systematic
corporate
activities
as
it
did
here—
consisting
of
directors'
meetings,
business
correspondence,
banking,
stock
In
each
case
the
trial
court
sustained
a
motion
to
quash
the
service
of
summons
transfers,
payment
of
salaries,
purchasing
of
machinery,
etc.—those
activities
on
the
mining
company.
The
CA
of
Ohio
affirmed
that
decision
as
did
the
SC
of
are
enough
to
make
it
fair
and
reasonable
to
subject
that
corporation
to
Ohio.
The
SC
of
Ohio
held
that
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
proceedings
in
personam
in
that
state,
at
least
insofar
as
the
proceedings
in
Amendment
prohibits
the
Ohio
courts
from
exercising
jurisdiction
over
the
personam
seek
to
enforce
causes
of
action
relating
to
those
very
activities
or
to
respondent
corporation.
The
present
case
is
a
consolidation
of
the
cases
filed
other
activities
of
the
corporation
within
the
state.
against
the
respondents.
The
court
finds
no
requirement
of
federal
due
process
that
either
prohibits
ISSUE:
Ohio
from
opening
its
courts
to
the
cause
of
action
here
presented
or
compels
Whether
as
a
matter
of
federal
due
process,
the
business
done
in
Ohio
by
the
Ohio
to
do
so.
The
company's
mining
properties
were
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
respondent
mining
company
was
sufficiently
substantial
and
of
such
a
nature
Its
operations
there
were
completely
halted
during
the
occupation
of
the
as
to
permit
Ohio
to
entertain
a
cause
of
action
against
a
foreign
corporation,
Islands
by
the
Japanese.
During
that
interim
the
president,
who
was
also
the
where
the
cause
of
action
arose
from
activities
entirely
distinct
from
its
general
manager
and
principal
stockholder
of
the
company,
returned
to
his
activities
in
Ohio.
home
in
Clermont
County,
Ohio.
There
he
maintained
an
office
in
which
he
conducted
his
personal
affairs
and
did
many
things
on
behalf
of
the
company.
HELD:
He
kept
there
office
files
of
the
company.
He
carried
on
there
correspondence
Yes.
The
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
to
the
Constitution
relating
to
the
business
of
the
company
and
to
its
employees.
He
drew
and
of
the
U.S.
leaves
Ohio
free
to
take
or
decline
jurisdiction
over
the
corporation.
distributed
there
salary
checks
on
behalf
of
the
company,
both
in
his
own
favor
Provisions
for
making
foreign
corporations
subject
to
service
in
the
state
is
a
as
president
and
in
favor
of
two
company
secretaries
who
worked
there
with
matter
of
legislative
discretion,
and
a
failure
to
provide
for
such
service
is
not
a
him.
He
used
and
maintained
in
Clermont
County,
Ohio,
two
active
bank
denial
of
due
process.
accounts
carrying
substantial
balances
of
company
funds.
From
that
office
he
supervised
policies
dealing
with
the
rehabilitation
of
the
corporation's
Today
if
an
authorized
representative
of
a
foreign
corporation
be
physically
properties
in
the
Philippines
and
he
dispatched
funds
to
cover
purchases
of
present
in
the
state
of
the
forum
and
be
there
engaged
in
activities
machinery
for
such
rehabilitation.
Thus
he
carried
on
in
Ohio
a
continuous
and
systematic
supervision
of
the
necessarily
limited
wartime
activities
of
the
CONFLICT
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company.
He
there
discharged
his
duties
as
president
and
general
manager,
both
during
the
occupation
of
the
company's
properties
by
the
Japanese
and
The
spouses
Robinsons
filed
a
products
liability
action
in
the
District
Court
of
immediately
thereafter.
While
no
mining
properties
in
Ohio
were
owned
or
Creek
County,
OK,
claiming
that
their
injuries
resulted
from
the
defective
operated
by
the
company,
many
of
its
wartime
activities
were
directed
from
design
and
placement
of
Audi’s
gas
tank
and
fuel
system.
They
joined
as
Ohio
and
were
being
given
the
personal
attention
of
its
president
in
that
defendants
the
automobile’s
manufacturer,
Audi
NSU
Auto
Union
AG;
its
State
at
the
time
he
was
served
with
summons.
Consideration
of
the
importer,
Volkswagen
of
America,
Inc.;
its
regional
distributor,
petitioner
circumstances
which,
under
the
law
of
Ohio,
ultimately
will
determine
World-‐Wide
Volkswagen
Corp;
and
its
retail
dealer,
Seaway.
Seaway
and
whether
the
courts
of
that
State
will
choose
to
take
jurisdiction
over
the
World-‐Wide
entered
special
appearances,
claiming
the
Oklahoma’s
exercise
of
corporation
is
reserved
for
the
courts
of
that
State.
jurisdiction
over
them
offended
the
limitations
on
the
State’s
jurisdiction
th
imposed
by
the
Due
Process
Clause
(14 Amendment).
The
court
concludes
that,
under
the
circumstances
above
recited,
it
would
not
violate
federal
due
process
for
Ohio
either
to
take
or
decline
jurisdiction
of
the
World-‐Wide
is
incorporated
and
has
its
business
office
in
NY.
It
distributes
to
corporation
in
this
proceeding.
The
judgment
of
the
SC
of
Ohio
is
vacated
and
retailers
in
New
York,
New
Jersey
and
Connecticut.
Seaway
is
incorporated
and
the
cause
is
remanded
to
that
court
for
further
proceedings.
has
its
business
office
in
NY.
Seaway
and
World-‐Wide
are
fully
independent
with
each
other
and
with
regard
to
VW
and
Audi,
contractual
only.
The
spouses
18.
WORLD-‐WIDE
VOLKSWAGEN
CORP
V.
WOODSON
Robinsons
adduced
no
evidence
to
show
that
either
World-‐Wide
nor
Seaway
444
U.S.
286
|
1980
does
business
in
OK,
or
sells
or
ships
to
that
state,
or
has
an
agent
to
receive
process,
or
purchases
advertisements
in
any
media
to
reach
OK.
Robinson’s
DOCTRINE:
The
Due
Process
Clause
does
not
contemplate
that
a
state
may
counsel
conceded
that
World-‐Wide
and
Seaway
never
entered
OK,
with
the
make
binding
a
judgment
in
personam
against
an
individual
or
corporate
exception
of
the
vehicle
owned
by
Robinsons.
defendant
with
which
the
state
has
no
contacts,
ties,
or
relations.
One,
isolated
occurrence
cannot
be
the
basis
of
jurisdiction.
The
District
Court
rejected
the
constitutional
claim.
World-‐Wide’s
MR
was
also
denied.
World-‐Wide
sought
a
Writ
of
Prohibition
from
the
SC
of
Oklahoma
to
The
foreseeability
that
is
critical
to
due
process
is
not
in
the
mere
likelihood
that
restrain
the
District
Court
Judge,
which
was
also
denied
holding
that
personal
a
product
will
find
its
way
into
the
forum
State,
but
it
is
that
the
defendant’s
jurisdiction
over
World-‐Wide
was
authorized
by
Oklahoma’s
“long-‐arm”
conduct
and
connection
with
the
forum
State
are
such
that
he
should
statute.
The
SC
of
Oklahoma
ruled
that
considering
that
the
product
sold
is,
by
reasonably
anticipate
being
haled
into
court
there.
(such
as
when
the
products
its
very
design,
so
mobile
that
World-‐Wide
can
foresee
its
possible
use
in
OK.
are
being
purchased
by
consumers
in
the
forum
State.)
This
is
especially
true
to
the
distributor
who
has
the
exclusive
right
to
distribute
in
NY,
NJ
and
Connecticut.
The
SC
of
OK
found
it
reasonable
to
infer
that
World-‐
Av:
Foreseeability
does
not
refer
to
whether
it
is
foreseeable
that
the
product
Wide
derive
substantial
income
from
automobiles
which
from
time
to
time
are
will
find
its
way
into
the
forum
State
but
whether
it
is
foreseeable
to
be
haled
used
in
OK.
into
court
in
the
forum
State.
ISSUE:
th
FACTS:
Whether,
consistently
with
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
14
Amendment,
an
Harry
and
Kay
Robinson
purchased
a
new
Audi
automobile
from
Seaway
Oklahoma
court
may
exercise
in
personam
jurisdiction
over
a
nonresident
Volkswagen
in
Massena,
NY
in
1976.
In
1977,
the
Robinson
family
moved
from
automobile
retailer
and
its
wholesale
distributor
in
a
products
liability
action,
NY
to
Arizona.
Passing
through
Oklahama
en
route
to
Arizona,
their
car
was
hit
when
the
defendants'
only
connection
with
Oklahoma
is
the
fact
that
an
in
the
rear
by
a
truck,
which
caused
a
fire
and
severely
burned
Kay
and
their
2
automobile
sold
in
New
York
to
New
York
residents
became
involved
in
an
children.
accident
in
Oklahoma?
CONFLICT
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power
to
render
a
valid
judgment.
HELD:
No.
The
District
Court
may
not
exercise
in
personam
jurisdiction
over
World-‐ The
US
Supreme
Court
finds
that
there
is
a
total
absence
of
those
affiliating
Wide
because
of
the
lack
of
contacts,
ties
or
relations
with
the
State
of
circumstances
that
are
a
necessary
predicate
to
any
exercise
of
state
court
Oklahoma.
Judgment
of
the
SC
of
OK
is
reversed.
jurisdiction.
World-‐Wide
carry
no
activity
whatsoever
in
Oklahoma.
They
close
no
sales
and
perform
no
services
there.
They
avail
themselves
of
none
of
the
A
State
Court
may
exercise
personal
jurisdiction
over
a
nonresident
privileges
and
benefits
of
Oklahoma
law.
They
solicit
no
business
there
either
defendant
only
as
long
as
there
exists
“minimum
contacts”
between
the
through
salespersons
or
through
advertising
reasonably
calculated
to
reach
the
defendant
and
the
forum
State.
The
concept
of
“minimum
contacts”
(1)
State.
Nor
does
the
record
show
that
they
regularly
sell
cars
at
wholesale
or
protects
the
defendant
against
the
burdens
of
litigating
in
a
distant
or
retail
to
Oklahoma
customers
or
residents,
or
that
they
indirectly,
through
inconvenient
forum,
and
(2)
it
acts
to
ensure
that
States,
through
their
courts,
others,
serve
or
seek
to
serve
the
Oklahoma
market.
In
short,
the
Robinsons
do
not
reach
out
beyond
the
limits
imposed
on
them
by
their
status
as
seek
to
base
jurisdiction
on
one,
isolated
occurrence—the
fortuitous
coequal
sovereigns
in
a
federal
system.
The
protection
against
inconvenient
circumstance
that
a
single
Audi
automobile,
sold
in
New
York
to
New
York
litigation
is
typically
described
in
terms
of
“reasonableness”
or
“fairness.”
The
residents,
happened
to
suffer
an
accident
while
passing
through
Oklahoma.
defendant’s
contacts
with
the
forum
State
must
be
such
that
maintenance
of
the
suit
“does
not
offend
traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
Even
if
it
is
foreseeable
that
the
automobile
is
mobile
by
its
very
design,
it
is
justice.”
never
been
a
sufficient
benchmark
for
personal
jurisdiction
under
the
Due
Process
Clause.
Nonetheless,
foreseeability
is
not
wholly
irrelevant.
The
This
limitation
on
state
jurisdiction
by
the
Due
Process
Clause
has
been
relaxed,
foreseeability
that
is
critical
to
due
process
is
not
in
the
mere
likelihood
that
a
due
to
the
fundamental
transformation
in
the
American
economy.
There
is
an
product
will
find
its
way
into
the
forum
State,
but
it
is
that
the
defendant’s
increase
in
commercial
transactions
touching
2
or
more
states.
Also,
the
conduct
and
connection
with
the
forum
State
are
such
that
he
should
modern
transportation
and
communication
have
made
it
much
less
reasonably
anticipate
being
haled
into
court
there.
The
Due
Process
Clause,
by
burdensome
for
a
party
sued
to
defend
himself
in
a
State
where
he
engages
in
ensuring
the
orderly
administration
of
the
laws,
gives
a
degree
of
predictability
economic
activity.
Nonetheless,
the
proposition
that
state
lines
are
irrelevant
to
the
legal
system
that
allows
potential
defendants
to
structure
their
primary
for
jurisidictional
purposes
is
not
accepted
by
the
US
SC.
Despite
the
conduct
with
some
minimum
assurance
as
to
where
that
conduct
will
and
will
Commerce
Clause
providing
for
the
Nation
as
a
common
market,
a
“free
trade
not
render
them
liable
to
suit.
unit,”
the
Framers
also
intended
the
States
retain
many
essential
attributes
of
sovereignty,
including
the
sovereign
power
to
try
causes
in
their
courts.
The
The
forum
State
does
not
exceed
its
powers
under
the
Due
Process
Clause
if
it
sovereignty
of
each
Sate,
in
turn,
implied
a
limitation
on
the
sovereignty
of
all
asserts
personal
jurisdiction
over
a
corporation
that
delivers
its
products
into
its
sister
States–a
limitation
express
or
implicit
in
both
the
original
scheme
of
the
stream
of
commerce
with
the
expectation
that
they
will
be
purchased
by
th
the
Constitution
and
the
14 Amendment.
consumers
in
the
forum
State.
But
there
is
no
such
or
similar
basis
for
Oklahoma
jurisdiction
over
World-‐Wide
or
Seaway
in
this
case.
Seaway's
sales
The
Due
Process
Clause
does
not
contemplate
that
a
state
may
make
binding
are
made
in
Massena,
N.
Y.
World-‐Wide's
market,
although
substantially
larger,
a
judgment
in
personam
against
an
individual
or
corporate
defendant
with
is
limited
to
dealers
in
New
York,
New
Jersey,
and
Connecticut.
There
is
no
which
the
state
has
no
contacts,
ties,
or
relations.
Even
if
the
defendant
would
evidence
of
record
that
any
automobiles
distributed
by
World-‐Wide
are
sold
to
suffer
minimal
or
no
inconvenience
from
being
forced
to
litigate
before
retail
customers
outside
this
tristate
area.
It
is
foreseeable
that
the
purchasers
tribunals
of
another
State;
even
if
the
forum
State
has
a
strong
interest
in
of
automobiles
sold
by
World-‐Wide
and
Seaway
may
take
them
to
Oklahoma.
applying
its
law
to
the
controversy;
even
if
the
forum
State
is
the
most
But
the
mere
"unilateral
activity
of
those
who
claim
some
relationship
with
a
convenient
location
for
litigation,
the
Due
Process
Clause,
acting
as
an
nonresident
defendant
cannot
satisfy
the
requirement
of
contact
with
the
instrument
of
interstate
federalism,
may
sometimes
act
to
divest
the
State
of
its
forum
State."
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Whether
Jones,
a
California
resident,
can
bring
suit
against
a
Florida
19.
CALDER
V.
JONES
corporation’s
employees
(Florida
residents)
in
a
California
court
for
a
claim
of
465
US
783
|
1984
libel
by
asserting
that
California
has
personal
jurisdiction
over
Florida
residents
DOCTRINE:
Under
the
circumstances,
petitioners
must
“reasonably
anticipate
HELD:
being
haled
into
court
there”
to
answer
for
the
truth
of
the
statements
made
in
Yes.
California
is
the
focal
point
of
both
the
story
and
the
harm
suffered.
their
article.
Petitioners
knew
that
the
brunt
of
that
injury
would
be
felt
by
Therefore,
jurisdiction
over
Calder,
South,
and
the
company
is
proper
in
respondent
in
the
state
in
which
she
lives/works
and
in
which
the
National
California
based
on
the
“effects”
of
their
Florida
conduct
in
California.
Enquirer
has
its
largest
circulation.
An
individual
injured
in
California
need
not
go
to
Florida
to
seek
redress
from
persons
who,
though
remaining
in
Florida,
California’s
“long-‐arm”
statute
permits
an
assertion
of
jurisdiction
over
a
knowingly
cause
the
injury
in
California;
or
through
their
intentional
conduct
in
nonresident
person
whenever
permitted
by
the
state
and
federal
Florida
calculated
to
cause
injury
to
Jones
in
California.
Constitutions.
Therefore,
turning
to
the
Constitution,
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
th
the
14
Amendment
permits
personal
jurisdiction
over
a
person
in
any
state
FACTS:
with
which
the
person
has
“certain
minimum
contacts...
such
that
the
Shirley
Jones,
a
resident
of
California,
brought
this
suit
against
the
National
maintenance
of
the
suit
does
not
offend
‘traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
Enquirer,
Inc.,
its
local
distributing
company,
president/editor
Calder,
and
substantial
justice."
reporter
South
for
libel
and
invasion
of
privacy.
The
article
at
issue
questioned
the
professionalism
of
Jones
stating
that
the
she
drank
so
heavily
preventing
This
follows
that
South
and
Calder
wrote/edited
an
article
that
they
knew
her
from
fulfilling
her
professional
obligations.
would
have
a
potentially
devastating
impact
upon
Jones.
Furthermore,
they
knew
that
the
brunt
of
that
injury
would
be
felt
by
Jones
in
the
state
in
which
South,
a
reporter
employed
by
the
Enquirer,
a
resident
of
Florida,
wrote
the
she
lives/works
and
in
which
the
National
Enquirer
has
its
largest
circulation.
first
draft
of
the
challenged
article,
his
byline
appeared
on
it.
Most
of
his
Under
the
circumstances,
Calder,
South
and
the
company
must
“reasonably
research
for
the
article
was
done
in
Florida
with
the
aid
of
sources
located
in
anticipate
being
haled
into
court
there”
to
answer
for
the
truth
of
the
California.
Aside
from
his
frequent
trips
and
phone
calls,
South
has
no
other
statements
made
in
their
article.
Finally,
an
individual
injured
in
California
relevant
contacts
with
California.
need
not
go
to
Florida
to
seek
redress
from
persons
who,
though
remaining
in
Florida,
knowingly
cause
the
injury
in
California.
Calder,
also
a
Florida
resident
and
president/editor
of
the
Enquirer,
has
only
been
to
California
twice;
once
on
a
pleasure
trip
and
the
other
to
testify
in
an
Thus,
jurisdiction
over
National
Enquirer
et
al.
in
California
is
proper
because
of
unrelated
trial
and
has
no
other
relevant
contacts
with
California.
He
their
intentional
conduct
in
Florida
calculated
to
cause
injury
to
Jones
in
reviewed/approved
the
initial
evaluation
of
the
subject
of
the
article
&
edited
it
California.
in
its
final
form.
20.
PHILSEC
INVESTMENT
V.
CA
Originally,
the
suit
was
filed
in
California
SC,
but
was
dismissed
on
the
grounds
G.R.
No.
103493
|
June
19,
1997
that
First
Amendment
concerns
weighed
against
an
assertion
of
jurisdiction
otherwise
proper
under
the
Due
Process
Clause.
The
California
CA
reversed,
FACTS:
stating
that
a
valid
basis
for
jurisdiction
did
exist
on
the
theory
that
petitioners
Ventura
Ducat
obtained
separate
loans
from
Ayala
International
Finance
intended
to,
and
did,
cause
tortuous
injury
to
Jones
in
California.
Limited
and
Philsec
Investment
Corp.
in
the
sum
of
$
2.5
M
secured
by
shares
of
stock
owned
by
Ducat.
In
order
to
facilitate
the
payment
of
the
loans,
1488,
ISSUE:
Inc.,
through
its
president
Daic,
assumed
Ducat’s
obligation
by
executing
a
Warranty
Deed
with
Vendor’s
lien
by
which
it
sold
to
Athona
Holdings
a
parcel
CONFLICT
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of
land
in
Harris
County,
Texas
while
Philsec
and
Ayala
extended
a
loan
to
actions
in
rem,
a
foreign
judgment
merely
constitutes
prima
facie
evidence
of
Athona
to
finance
payment
of
the
purchase
price.
Thus,
Ducat
was
released
the
justness
of
the
claim
of
a
party
and,
as
such,
is
subject
to
proof
to
the
from
the
obligation.
As
Athona
failed
to
pay
the
balance
of
the
purchase
price,
contrary.
the
entire
debt
became
due
and
demandable.
1488
sued
Philsec,
Ayala
and
Athona
in
the
US
for
payment
of
the
balance
plus
damages.
While
the
civil
case
In
the
case
at
bar,
it
cannot
be
said
that
petitioners
were
given
the
opportunity
was
pending,
Philsec
filed
a
complaint
and
Writ
of
Preliminary
Attachment
to
challenge
the
judgment
of
the
U.S.
court
as
basis
for
declaring
it
res
judicata
against
Ducat,
et
al.
in
the
RTC
of
Makati
alleging
that
Ducat
committed
fraud
or
conclusive
of
the
rights
of
private
respondents.
The
proceedings
in
the
trial
by
selling
the
property
at
a
price
400%
more
than
its
true
value.
RTC
issued
a
court
were
summary.
Neither
the
trial
court
nor
the
appellate
court
was
even
writ
of
preliminary
attachment
against
the
real
and
personal
property
of
Ducat.
furnished
copies
of
the
pleadings
in
the
US
Court
or
apprised
of
the
evidence
Ducat
filed
a
MTD
on
the
ground
of
litis
pendentia
and
forum
non
conveniens
presented
thereat,
to
assure
a
proper
determination
of
whether
the
issues
and
lack
of
cause
of
action
for
Philsec
as
Philsec
is
not
a
party
to
the
sale.
1488,
then
being
litigated
in
the
US
court
were
exactly
the
issues
raised
in
this
case
Inc.
also
filed
a
MTD
contending
that
the
action
being
in
personam,
such
that
the
judgment
that
might
be
rendered
would
constitute
res
judicata.
extraterritorial
service
of
summons
by
publication
was
ineffectual
and
did
not
The
trial
court
arbitrarily
dismissed
the
case
even
after
finding
that
Ducat
was
vest
the
court
with
jurisdiction
over
it,
which
is
a
non-‐resident
foreign
not
a
party
in
the
U.S.
case.
corporation.
2.
No.
Forum
non
conveniens
is
not
applicable
base
on
three
grounds:
first,
it
is
The
trial
court
granted
Ducat’s
motion
even
as
it
noted
that
Ducat
was
not
a
not
a
ground
for
a
motion
to
dismiss
under
Rule
16.
Second,
while
it
is
within
party
in
the
US
case.
The
Motion
to
Dismiss
of
1488,
Inc.
was
also
granted
on
the
discretion
of
the
trial
court
to
abstain
from
assuming
jurisdiction
on
this
the
ground
of
litis
pendentia
considering
that
the
“main
factual
element”
of
the
ground,
it
should
do
so
only
after
"vital
facts
are
established,
to
determine
cause
of
action
is
the
validity
of
the
sale
of
real
property
in
the
US.
The
trial
whether
special
circumstances"
require
the
court's
desistance,
and;
third,
the
court
also
held
that
it
was
w/o
jurisdiction
over
the
case
as
1488,
Inc.
is
a
non-‐ extraterritorial
service
of
summons
is
valid.
In
this
case,
the
trial
court
resident
and
the
action
involved
is
not
in
rem
or
quasi
in
rem.
The
abstained
from
taking
jurisdiction
solely
on
the
basis
of
the
pleadings
filed
by
extraterritorial
service
of
summons
was
therefore
ineffective.
private
respondents
in
connection
with
the
motion
to
dismiss.
It
failed
to
consider
that
PHILSEC
is
a
domestic
corporation
and
Ducat
is
a
Filipino,
and
ISSUE:
that
it
was
the
extinguishment
of
the
latter's
debt
which
was
the
object
of
1.
Whether
the
dismissal
of
the
case,
on
the
ground
that
the
judgment
in
the
the
transaction
under
litigation.
Rule
14,
§17
[now
§15]
on
extraterritorial
US
court
bars
the
civil
case,
was
proper
service
provides
that
service
of
summons
on
a
non-‐resident
defendant
may
2.
Whether
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
is
applicable
be
effected
out
of
the
Philippines
by
leave
of
Court
where,
among
others,
"the
property
of
the
defendant
has
been
attached
within
the
Philippines."
It
HELD:
is
not
disputed
that
the
properties,
real
and
personal,
of
the
Ducat
and
Daic
1.
No.
The
case
was
arbitrarily
dismissed.
While
this
court
has
given
the
effect
had
been
attached
prior
to
service
of
summons
under
the
Order
of
the
trial
of
res
judicata
to
foreign
judgments
in
several
cases,
it
was
after
the
parties
court.
opposed
to
the
judgment
had
been
given
ample
opportunity
to
repel
them
on
grounds
allowed
under
Rule
39,
§50
[now
§48]
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
to
wit:
N.B.:
Section
15.
Extraterritorial
service.
—
When
the
defendant
does
not
"want
of
jurisdiction,
want
of
notice
to
the
party,
collusion,
fraud,
or
clear
reside
and
is
not
found
in
the
Philippines,
and
the
action
affects
the
personal
mistake
of
law
or
fact."
It
is
not
necessary
for
this
purpose
to
initiate
a
status
of
the
plaintiff
or
relates
to,
or
the
subject
of
which
is,
property
within
separate
action
or
proceeding
for
enforcement
of
the
foreign
judgment.
What
the
Philippines,
in
which
the
defendant
has
or
claims
a
lien
or
interest,
actual
or
is
essential
is
that
there
is
opportunity
to
challenge
the
foreign
judgment,
in
contingent,
or
in
which
the
relief
demanded
consists,
wholly
or
in
part,
in
order
for
the
court
to
properly
determine
its
efficacy.
This
is
because
in
this
excluding
the
defendant
from
any
interest
therein,
or
the
property
of
the
jurisdiction,
with
respect
to
actions
in
personam,
as
distinguished
from
CONFLICT
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defendant
has
been
attached
within
the
Philippines,
service
may,
by
leave
of
court,
be
effected
out
of
the
Philippines
by
personal
service
as
under
section
6;
About
46
days
later,
Asuncion
filed
a
petition
for
relief
from
said
order
or
by
publication
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
such
places
and
for
declaring
him
in
default
and
from
said
judgment,
upon
the
ground
of
mistake
such
time
as
the
court
may
order,
in
which
case
a
copy
of
the
summons
and
and
excusable
negligence.
Annexed
to
said
petition
were
Asuncion’s
affidavit
order
of
the
court
shall
be
sent
by
registered
mail
to
the
last
known
address
of
and
his
verified
answer.
In
the
affidavit,
he
stated
that,
on
Sept.
26,
1955,
at
34
the
defendant,
or
in
any
other
manner
the
court
may
deem
sufficient.
Any
Pitimine
Street,
San
Francisco
del
Monte
Quezon
City,
which
is
his
residence,
he
order
granting
such
leave
shall
specify
a
reasonable
time,
which
shall
not
be
received
notice
of
a
registered
letter
at
the
Post
Office
in
San
Jose,
Nueva
Ecija,
less
than
sixty
(60)
days
after
notice,
within
which
the
defendant
must
answer.
his
old
family
residence;
that
he
proceeded
immediately
to
the
latter
(17a)
municipality
to
claim
said
letter,
which
he
received
on
Sept.
28;
that
the
letter
contained
copy
of
the
assailed
order
and
judgment,
much
to
his
surprise,
for
he
21.
PANTALEON
V.
ASUNCION
had
not
been
summoned
or
notified
of
the
hearing
of
this
case.
Had
copy
of
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐13141
|
May
22,
1959
summons
and
of
the
order
for
its
publication
been
sent
to
him
by
mail,
as
provided
in
Rule
7,
§21,
of
the
ROC
said
summons
and
order
would
have
DOCTRINE:
It
is
a
well-‐settled
principle
of
Constitutional
Law
that,
in
an
action
reached
him.
His
failure
to
appear
before
the
court
is
excusable
it
being
due
to
strictly
in
personam,
like
the
one
at
bar,
personal
service
of
summons,
within
the
mistake
of
the
authorities
concerned
in
not
complying
with
the
provisions
the
forum,
is
essential
to
the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
of
said
section.
defendant,
who
does
not
voluntarily
submit
himself
to
the
authority
of
the
court.
In
other
words,
summons
by
publication
cannot
–
consistently
with
the
ISSUE:
due
process
clause
in
the
Bill
of
Rights
–
confer
upon
the
court
jurisdiction
over
Whether
the
summons
by
publication
had
been
made
in
conformity
with
the
said
defendant.
(Superseded
by
#22
Santos
v.
PNOC)
ROC
FACTS:
HELD:
Vicenta
Pantaleon,
instituted
in
the
CFI
of
Nueva
Ecija,
an
action
to
recover
No.
Asuncion
maintains
that
copy
of
the
summons
and
of
the
order
for
the
from
Asuncion,
the
sum
of
P2,000,
with
interest
thereon,
in
addition
to
publication
thereof
were
not
deposited
“in
the
post
office,
postage
prepaid,
attorney’s
fees.
The
summons
originally
issued
was
returned
by
the
sheriff
of
directed
to
the
defendant
by
ordinary
mail
to
his
last
known
address”,
in
Nueva
Ecija
unserved,
with
the
statement
that,
according
to
reliable
violation
of
Rule
7,
§21,
of
the
ROC,
which
reads:
If
the
service
has
been
made
information,
Asuncion
was
residing
in
B-‐24
Tala
Estate,
Caloocan,
Rizal.
An
alias
by
publication,
service
may
be
proved
by
the
affidavit
of
the
printer,
his
summons
was
issued,
therefore,
for
service
in
the
place
last
mentioned.
foreman
or
principal
clerk,
or
of
the
editor,
business
or
advertising
manager,
However,
the
provincial
sheriff
of
Rizal
returned
it
unserved,
with
information
to
which
affidavit
a
copy
of
the
publication
shall
be
attached,
and
by
an
that
Asuncion
had
left
the
Tala
Estate
and
that
diligent
efforts
to
locate
him
affidavit
showing
the
deposit
of
a
copy
of
the
summons
and
order
for
proved
to
no
avail.
publication
in
the
post
office,
postage
prepaid,
directed
to
the
defendant
by
ordinary
mail
to
his
last
known
address.
Pantaleon
alleges,
however,
that
the
On
Pantaleon’s
motion,
the
court
ordered
that
Asuncion
be
summoned
by
provision
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar
is
not
this
§21,
but
§16,
of
Rule
7,
which
publication,
and
the
summons
was
published
in
the
“Examiner”,
said
to
be
a
provides:
Whenever
the
defendant
is
designated
as
an
unknown
owner,
or
the
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
Nueva
Ecija.
Having
failed
to
appear
or
like,
or
whenever
the
address
of
a
defendant
is
unknown
and
cannot
be
answer
the
complaint
within
the
period
stated
in
the
summons,
Asuncion
was
ascertained
by
diligent
inquiry,
service
may,
by
leave
of
court,
be
effect
upon
declared
in
default.
Subsequently,
after
a
hearing
held
in
the
absence
of
the
him
by
publication
in
such
places
and
for
such
times
as
the
court
may
order.
Asuncion
and
without
notice
to
him,
the
court
rendered
judgment
for
the
Further,
she
also
alleges
that
the
requirement,
in
said
§21,
of
an
affidavit
refers
Pantaleon
for
the
sum
of
P2,300,
with
interest
thereon
at
the
legal
rate.
to
the
extraterritorial
service
of
summons.
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Said
§21,
however,
is
unqualified.
It
prescribes
the
“proof
of
service
by
22.
SANTOS
V.
PNOC
publication”,
regardless
of
whether
the
defendant
is
a
resident
of
the
G.R.
No.
170943
|
September
23,
2008
Philippines
or
not.
§16
must
be
read
in
relation
to
§21,
which
complements
it.
Then,
too,
we
conceive
of
no
reason,
and
Pantaleon
has
suggested
none,
why
DOCTRINE:
The
in
rem/in
personam
distinction
with
regard
to
substituted
copy
of
the
summons
and
of
the
order
for
its
publication
should
be
mailed
to
service
was
significant
under
the
old
rule.
This
has
been
changed.
The
present
non-‐resident
defendants,
but
not
to
resident
defendants.
We
cannot
even
say
rule
expressly
states
that
it
applies
"[i]n
any
action
where
the
defendant
is
that
Asuncion,
who,
according
to
the
return
of
the
Sheriff
of
Nueva
Ecija,
was
designated
as
an
unknown
owner,
or
the
like,
or
whenever
his
whereabouts
are
reportedly
residing
in
Rizal–where
he,
in
fact
(San
Francisco
del
Monte
and
unknown
and
cannot
be
ascertained
by
diligent
inquiry..."
Thus,
it
now
applies
Quezon
City
used
to
be
part
of
Rizal),
was
residing–could
reasonably
be
to
any
action,
whether
in
personam,
in
rem
or
quasi
in
rem.
expected
to
read
the
summons
published
in
a
newspaper
said
to
be
a
general
circulation
in
Nueva
Ecija.
The
rules,
however,
do
not
require
that
the
affidavit
of
complementary
service
be
executed
by
the
clerk
of
court.
While
the
trial
court
ordinarily
does
the
Considering
that
strict
compliance
with
the
terms
of
the
statute
is
necessary
mailing
of
copies
of
its
orders
and
processes,
the
duty
to
make
the
to
confer
jurisdiction
through
service
by
publication,
the
conclusion
is
complementary
service
by
registered
mail
is
imposed
on
the
party
who
resorts
inescapable
that
the
lower
court
had
no
authority
whatsoever
to
issue
the
to
service
by
publication.
order
declaring
the
defendant
in
default
and
to
render
the
decision
thus,
both
are
null
and
void
ad
initio.
Av:
Service
by
publication
grants
jurisdiction
over
the
person
to
the
court
even
in
in
personam
proceedings.
Apart
from
the
foregoing,
it
is
a
well-‐settled
principle
of
Constitutional
Law
that,
in
an
action
strictly
in
personam,
like
the
one
at
bar,
personal
service
of
FACTS:
summons,
within
the
forum,
is
essential
to
the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
over
PNOC
Exploration
Corp.
filed
a
complaint
for
a
sum
of
money
for
the
unpaid
the
person
of
the
defendant,
who
does
not
voluntarily
submit
himself
to
the
balance
of
a
car
loan
against
Pedro
Santos
Jr.
in
the
RTC
of
Pasig
City.
Personal
authority
of
the
court.
In
other
words,
summons
by
publication
cannot
–
service
of
summons
to
Santos
failed
because
he
could
not
be
located
in
his
last
consistently
with
the
due
process
clause
in
the
Bill
of
Rights
–
confer
upon
the
known
address
despite
earnest
efforts
to
do
so.
Subsequently,
on
PNOC’s
court
jurisdiction
over
said
defendant.
Due
process
of
law
requires
personal
motion,
the
trial
court
allowed
service
of
summons
by
publication.
PNOC
service
to
support
a
personal
judgment,
and,
when
the
proceeding
is
strictly
caused
the
publication
of
the
summons
in
Remate,
a
newspaper
of
general
in
personam
brought
to
determine
the
personal
rights
and
obligations
of
the
circulation
in
the
Philippines.
Thereafter,
PNOC
submitted
the
affidavit
of
parties,
personal
service
within
the
state
or
a
voluntary
appearance
in
the
publication
of
the
advertising
manager
of
Remate
and
an
affidavit
of
service
of
case
is
essential
to
the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
so
as
to
constitute
PNOC’s
employee
to
the
effect
that
he
sent
a
copy
of
the
summons
by
compliance
with
the
constitutional
requirement
of
due
process.
registered
mail
to
Santos’
last
known
address.
When
Santos
failed
to
file
his
answer
within
the
prescribed
period,
PNOC
moved
that
the
case
be
set
for
the
Lastly,
from
the
viewpoint
of
substantial
justice
and
equity,
we
are
of
the
reception
of
its
evidence
ex
parte.
The
trial
court
granted
the
motion
in
an
opinion
that
Asuncion’s
petition
for
relief
should
have
been
granted.
It
was
order.
Thereafter,
ex
parte
presentation
proceeded
and
the
case
was
filed
well
within
the
periods
provided
in
the
ROC.
The
order
and
judgment
are
submitted
for
decision.
set
aside
and
annulled.
The
case
is
remanded
to
the
lower
court
for
further
proceedings.
However,
Santos
filed
an
"Omnibus
Motion
for
Reconsideration
and
to
Admit
Attached
Answer"
seeking
reconsideration
of
the
order
granting
reception
of
evidence
ex
parte
and
alleging
that
the
affidavit
of
service
submitted
by
PNOC
failed
to
comply
with
§19,
Rule
14
of
the
Rules
of
Court
as
it
was
not
executed
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by
the
clerk
of
court.
He
also
claimed
that
he
was
denied
due
process
as
he
was
are
unknown
and
cannot
be
ascertained
by
diligent
inquiry."
Thus,
it
now
not
notified
of
the
assailed
order.
Trial
court
denied
the
MR
holding
that
the
applies
to
any
action,
whether
in
personam,
in
rem
or
quasi
in
rem.
rules
did
not
require
the
affidavit
of
complementary
service
by
registered
mail
to
be
executed
by
the
clerk
of
court
and
that
the
assailed
order
was
actually
Regarding
the
matter
of
the
affidavit
of
service,
the
relevant
portion
of
mailed
to
Santos
at
his
last
known
address.
§19,
Rule
14
simply
speaks
of
the
following:
“…an
affidavit
showing
the
deposit
of
a
copy
of
the
summons
and
order
for
publication
in
the
post
office,
postage
ISSUE:
prepaid,
directed
to
the
defendant
by
registered
mail
to
his
last
known
Whether
there
was
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
his
person
due
to
improper
service
address.”
The
rules,
however,
do
not
require
that
the
affidavit
of
of
summons,
failure
of
the
trial
court
to
furnish
him
with
copies
of
its
orders
complementary
service
be
executed
by
the
clerk
of
court.
While
the
trial
and
processes
and
preference
for
technicality
rather
than
justice
and
equity
(In
court
ordinarily
does
the
mailing
of
copies
of
its
orders
and
processes,
the
particular,
he
claims
that
the
rule
on
service
by
publication
under
§14,
Rule
14
duty
to
make
the
complementary
service
by
registered
mail
is
imposed
on
the
of
the
ROC
applies
only
to
actions
in
rem,
not
actions
in
personam
and
that
the
party
who
resorts
to
service
by
publication.
affidavit
of
service
of
a
copy
of
the
summons
should
have
been
prepared
by
the
clerk
of
court,
not
PNOC’s
messenger.)
Moreover,
even
assuming
that
the
service
of
summons
was
defective,
the
trial
court
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
Santos
by
his
own
voluntary
HELD:
appearance
in
the
action
against
him.
§
20,
Rule
14
states:
“The
defendant’s
No.
voluntary
appearance
in
the
action
shall
be
equivalent
to
service
of
summons.”
PROPRIETY
OF
SERVICE
BY
PUBLICATION
§14,
Rule
14
provides:
“Service
upon
defendant
whose
identity
or
whereabouts
ENTITLEMENT
TO
NOTICE
OF
PROCEEDINGS
are
unknown.
–
In
any
action
where
the
defendant
is
designated
as
an
§3
and
4,
Rule
9
states:
“If
the
defending
party
fails
to
answer
within
the
time
unknown
owner,
or
the
like,
or
whenever
his
whereabouts
are
unknown
and
allowed
therefor,
the
court
shall,
upon
motion
of
the
claiming
party
with
cannot
be
ascertained
by
diligent
inquiry,
service
may,
by
leave
of
court,
be
notice
to
the
defending
party,
and
proof
of
such
failure,
declare
the
defending
effected
upon
him
by
publication
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
and
in
party
in
default.
x
x
x
Sec.
4.
Effect
of
order
of
default.
–
A
party
in
default
shall
such
places
and
for
such
times
as
the
court
may
order.”
be
entitled
to
notice
of
subsequent
proceedings
but
not
to
take
part
in
the
trial.”
Since
Santos
could
not
be
personally
served
with
summons
despite
diligent
efforts
to
locate
his
whereabouts,
PNOC
sought
and
was
granted
leave
of
court
If
the
defendant
fails
to
file
his
answer
on
time,
he
may
be
declared
in
default
to
effect
service
of
summons
upon
him
by
publication
in
a
newspaper
of
upon
motion
of
the
plaintiff
with
notice
to
the
said
defendant.
In
case
he
is
general
circulation.
Thus,
Santos
was
properly
served
with
summons
by
declared
in
default,
the
court
shall
proceed
to
render
judgment
granting
the
publication.
plaintiff
such
relief
as
his
pleading
may
warrant,
unless
the
court
in
its
discretion
requires
the
plaintiff
to
submit
evidence.
The
defaulting
defendant
Santos
claims
that
substituted
service
may
be
availed
of
only
in
an
action
in
may
not
take
part
in
the
trial
but
shall
be
entitled
to
notice
of
subsequent
rem.
He
is
wrong.
The
in
rem/in
personam
distinction
was
significant
under
proceedings.
In
this
case,
Pantaleon
moved
only
for
the
ex
parte
presentation
the
old
rule
because
it
was
silent
as
to
the
kind
of
action
to
which
the
rule
of
evidence,
not
for
the
declaration
of
Santos
in
default.
However,
the
order
was
applicable.
Because
of
this
silence,
the
Court
limited
the
application
of
did
not
limit
itself
to
permitting
respondent
to
present
its
evidence
ex
parte
but
the
old
rule
to
in
rem
actions
only.
This
has
been
changed.
The
present
rule
in
effect
issued
an
order
of
default.
But
the
trial
court
could
not
validly
do
that
expressly
states
that
it
applies
"[i]n
any
action
where
the
defendant
is
as
an
order
of
default
can
be
made
only
upon
motion
of
the
claiming
party.
If
a
designated
as
an
unknown
owner,
or
the
like,
or
whenever
his
whereabouts
party
declared
in
default
is
entitled
to
notice
of
subsequent
proceedings,
all
the
more
should
a
party
who
has
not
been
declared
in
default
be
entitled
to
CONFLICT
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such
notice.
But
what
happens
if
the
residence
or
whereabouts
of
the
present
case
an
order
was
made
directing
the
clerk
to
mail
the
required
copy
to
defending
party
is
not
known
or
he
cannot
be
located?
In
such
a
case,
there
is
the
defendant
at
Amoy
China.
No
evidence
appeared
of
record
showing
that
obviously
no
way
notice
can
be
sent
to
him
and
the
notice
requirement
such
notice
had
in
fact
been
mailed
by
the
clerk;
but
publication
was
regularly
cannot
apply
to
him.
The
law
does
not
require
that
the
impossible
be
made
in
a
periodical
as
the
law
requires.
The
court
held
that
the
making
of
the
done.
Nemo
tenetur
ad
impossibile.
The
law
obliges
no
one
to
perform
an
order
by
the
court
constituted
a
compliance
with
the
law,
in
so
far
as
necessary
impossibility. Laws
and
rules
must
be
interpreted
in
a
way
that
they
are
in
to
constitute
due
process
of
law,
and
that
if
the
clerk
failed
to
send
the
notice,
accordance
with
logic,
common
sense,
reason
and
practicality.
Be
that
as
it
his
dereliction
in
the
performance
of
his
duty
was
in
irregularity
which
did
not
may,
a
copy
of
the
order
was
nonetheless
still
mailed
to
Santos
at
his
last
constitute
an
infringement
of
the
provision
of
the
Philippine
Bill
declaring
that
known
address.
no
person
shall
have
deprived
of
property
without
due
process
of
law.
A
defendant
who
seeks
to
vacate
a
judgment
in
a
foreclosure
proceeding
on
the
ground
of
irregularity
in
the
sending
of
notice
by
post,
or
failure
to
send
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
RES
such
notice
pursuant
to
an
order
of
the
court,
must
show
that
as
result
of
which
irregularity
he
suffered
some
prejudice
of
which
the
law
can
take
23.
EL
BANCO
ESPANOL-‐FILIPINO
V.
PALANCA
account.
G.R.
No.
L-‐11390
|
March
26,
1918
N.B.:
Service
by
publication
is
still
necessary
in
quasi
in
rem
proceedings
DOCTRINES:
Where
the
defendant
in
a
mortgage
foreclosure
lives
out
of
the
because
of
due
process.
Islands
and
refuses
to
appear
otherwise
submit
himself
to
the
authority
of
the
court,
the
jurisdiction
of
the
latter
is
limited
to
the
mortgaged
property,
with
FACTS:
respect
to
which
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
is
based
upon
the
fact
that
the
Engracio
Palanca
Tanquinyeng
mortgaged
his
lands
in
Manila
as
security
for
property
is
located
within
the
district
and
that
the
court,
under
the
provisions
debt
he
owed
to
El
Banco
Español-‐Filipino.
After
the
execution
of
the
of
law
applicable
in
such
cases,
is
vested
with
the
power
to
subject
the
mortgage,
Tanquinyeng
returned
to
China
(where
he’s
a
native)
and
eventually
property
to
the
obligation
created
by
the
mortgage.
In
such
case
personal
died
there.
Because
the
Tanquinyeng
was
a
nonresident
at
the
time
of
the
jurisdiction
over
the
nonresident
defendant
is
nonessential
and
in
fact
cannot
institution
of
the
present
action,
it
was
necessary
for
the
bank
to
give
notice
to
be
acquired.
Tanquinyeng
by
publication
in
a
newspaper
of
the
city
of
Manila.
The
Court
also
ordered
that
a
copy
of
the
summons
and
complaint
be
sent
to
Tanquinyeng
at
The
failure
of
the
clerk
to
send
notice
by
mail
to
the
nonresident
defendant
in
a
his
last
place
of
residence
at
the
city
of
Amoy,
in
China.
This
order
was
made
foreclosure
proceeding,
as
required
by
an
order
of
the
court,
does
not
defeat
pursuant
to
the
following
provision
contained
in
§399
of
the
Code
of
Civil
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
over
the
mortgaged
property.
Procedure:
“In
case
of
publication,
where
the
residence
of
a
nonresident
or
absent
defendant
is
known,
the
judge
must
direct
a
copy
of
the
summons
and
In
an
action
to
foreclose
a
mortgage
against
a
nonresident
defendant
who
fails
complaint
to
be
forthwith
deposited
by
the
clerk
in
the
post-‐office,
postage
to
submit
himself
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
no
adjudication
can
be
made
prepaid,
directed
to
the
person
to
be
served,
at
his
place
of
residence.”
which
involves
a
determination
of
a
personal
liability
of
either
party
arising
out
of
the
contract
of
mortgage.
It
does
not
appear
that
the
clerk
fulfilled
the
order
of
sending
the
letter
to
China.
There
was
only
an
affidavit
signed
by
Bernardo
Chan,
employee
of
the
In
a
foreclosure
proceeding
against
a
nonresident
defendant,
the
court
is
lawyers
of
the
bank,
showing
that
he
deposited
in
the
Manila
post-‐office
a
required
to
make
an
order
for
the
clerk
to
mail
a
copy
of
the
summons
and
registered
letter,
addressed
to
Tanquinyeng,
at
Manila,
containing
copies
of
the
complaint
to
the
defendant
at
his
last
place
of
residence
if
known.
In
the
complaint,
the
bank's
affidavit,
the
summons,
and
the
order
of
the
court
CONFLICT
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directing
publication.
court,
as
in
all
cases
of
foreclosure,
to
ascertain
the
amount
due
and
to
make
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
pay
the
money
into
court.
This
step
is
a
CFI
ruled
in
favor
of
the
bank.
In
case
of
the
failure
of
Tanquinyeng
to
satisfy
necessary
precursor
of
the
order
of
sale.
In
the
present
case
the
judgment
the
judgment
within
such
period,
the
mortgage
property
located
in
the
city
of
which
was
entered
contains
the
following
words:
“Because
it
is
declared
that
Manila
should
be
exposed
to
public
sale.
The
payment
contemplated
in
said
the
said
defendant
Engracio
Palanca
Tanquinyeng
y
Limquingco,
is
indebted
in
order
was
never
made;
so
the
court
ordered
the
sale
of
the
property.
The
the
amount
of
P249,355.32,
plus
the
interest,
to
the
'Banco
Espanol-‐Filipino'…
property
was
bought
by
the
bank
for
P110,200.
7
years
after
the
confirmation
therefore
said
appellant
is
ordered
to
deliver
the
above
amount
etc.,
etc.”
of
the
sale,
Vicente
Palanca,
as
administrator
of
the
estate
of
Tanquinyeng,
requested
the
court
to
set
aside
the
order
of
default
alleging
that
the
judgment
This
is
not
the
language
of
a
personal
judgment.
Instead
it
is
clearly
intended
rendered
was
void
because
the
court
never
acquired
jurisdiction
over
merely
as
a
compliance
with
the
requirement
that
the
amount
due
shall
be
Tanquinyeng
or
the
subject
matter
of
the
action.
ascertained
and
that
the
evidence
of
this
it
may
be
observed
that
according
to
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
a
personal
judgment
against
the
debtor
for
the
ISSUES:
deficiency
is
not
to
be
rendered
until
after
the
property
has
been
sold
and
the
1.
Whether
the
court
acquired
necessary
jurisdiction
proceeds
applied
to
the
mortgage
debt.
2.
Whether
there
was
denial
of
due
process
of
law
Whatever
may
be
the
effect
in
other
respects
of
the
failure
of
the
clerk
of
the
HELD:
CFI
to
mail
the
proper
papers
to
the
defendant
in
Amoy,
China,
such
irregularity
1.
Yes.
Jurisdiction
over
the
property
which
is
the
subject
of
the
litigation
may
could
not
impair
or
defeat
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
result
either
from
(1)
a
seizure
of
the
property
under
legal
process,
whereby
it
is
brought
into
the
actual
custody
of
the
law,
or
it
may
result
from
(2)
the
In
the
latter
case
the
property,
though
at
all
times
within
the
potential
power
institution
of
legal
proceedings
wherein,
under
special
provisions
of
law,
the
of
the
court,
may
never
be
taken
into
actual
custody
at
all.
An
illustration
of
the
power
of
the
court
over
the
property
is
recognized
and
made
effective.
jurisdiction
acquired
by
actual
seizure
is
found
in
attachment
proceedings,
where
the
property
is
seized
at
the
beginning
of
the
action,
or
some
The
jurisdiction
of
the
court
over
the
property,
considered
as
the
exclusive
subsequent
stage
of
its
progress,
and
held
to
abide
the
final
event
of
the
object
of
such
action,
is
evidently
based
upon
the
following
conditions
and
litigation.
An
illustration
of
what
we
term
potential
jurisdiction
over
the
res,
is
considerations,
namely:
(1)
that
the
property
is
located
within
the
district;
(2)
found
in
the
proceeding
to
register
the
title
of
land
under
our
system
for
the
that
the
purpose
of
the
litigation
is
to
subject
the
property
by
sale
to
an
registration
of
land.
Here
the
court,
without
taking
actual
physical
control
over
obligation
fixed
upon
it
by
the
mortgage;
and
(3)
that
the
court
at
a
proper
the
property
assumes,
at
the
instance
of
some
person
claiming
to
be
owner,
to
stage
of
the
proceedings
takes
the
property
into
custody,
if
necessary,
and
exercise
a
jurisdiction
in
rem
over
the
property
and
to
adjudicate
the
title
in
expose
it
to
sale
for
the
purpose
of
satisfying
the
mortgage
debt.
favor
of
the
petitioner
against
all
the
world.
The
Court
formulated
the
following
proposition
regarding
foreclosure
In
the
terminology
of
American
law
the
action
to
foreclose
a
mortgage
is
said
to
proceeding
against
the
property
of
a
nonresident
mortgagor
who
fails
to
be
a
proceeding
quasi
in
rem,
by
which
is
expressed
the
idea
that
while
it
is
not
come
in
and
submit
himself
personally
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court:
(I)
That
strictly
speaking
an
action
in
rem
yet
it
partakes
of
that
nature
and
is
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
is
derived
from
the
power
which
it
possesses
over
substantially
such.
The
expression
"action
in
rem"
is,
in
its
narrow
application,
the
property;
(II)
that
jurisdiction
over
the
person
is
not
acquired
and
is
non-‐ used
only
with
reference
to
certain
proceedings
in
courts
of
admiralty
wherein
essential;
(III)
that
the
relief
granted
by
the
court
must
be
limited
to
such
as
the
property
alone
is
treated
as
responsible
for
the
claim
or
obligation
upon
can
be
enforced
against
the
property
itself.
which
the
proceedings
are
based.
The
action
quasi
rem
differs
from
the
true
action
in
rem
in
the
circumstance
that
in
the
former
an
individual
is
named
as
In
a
foreclosure
proceeding
against
a
nonresident
owner
it
is
necessary
for
the
defendant,
and
the
purpose
of
the
proceeding
is
to
subject
his
interest
therein
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to
the
obligation
or
lien
burdening
the
property.
All
proceedings
having
for
process
of
law.
their
sole
object
the
sale
or
other
disposition
of
the
property
of
the
defendant,
whether
by
attachment,
foreclosure,
or
other
form
of
remedy,
are
in
a
general
24.
PERKINS
V.
DIZON
way
thus
designated.
The
judgment
entered
in
these
proceedings
is
conclusive
G.R.
No.
46631
|
November
16,
1939
only
between
the
parties.
xxx
DOCTRINES:
A
quasi
in
rem
fixes
and
settles
the
title
to
the
property
in
controversy
and
to
that
extent
partakes
of
the
nature
of
the
judgment
in
rem.
It
is
true
that
in
proceedings
of
this
character,
if
the
defendant
for
whom
publication
is
made
appears,
the
action
becomes
as
to
him
a
personal
action
The
situs
of
the
shares
is
in
the
jurisdiction
where
the
corporation
is
created,
and
is
conducted
as
such.
This,
however,
does
not
affect
the
proposition
that
whether
the
certificate
evidencing
the
ownership
of
those
shares
are
within
or
where
the
defendant
fails
to
appear
the
action
is
quasi
in
rem;
and
it
should
without
that
jurisdiction.
therefore
be
considered
with
reference
to
the
principles
governing
actions
in
rem.
Service
of
the
summons
by
publication
ordered
by
virtue
of
an
action
quasi
in
rem
against
the
non-‐resident
defendant
is
valid.
2)
No.
The
failure
of
the
clerk
to
mail
the
notice
is
not
such
an
irregularity,
as
amounts
to
a
denial
of
due
process
of
law;
and
hence
that
irregularity,
if
The
action
being
quasi
in
rem
and
notice
having
been
made
by
publication,
the
proved,
would
not
avoid
the
judgment
in
this
case.
Notice
was
given
by
relief
that
may
be
granted
by
the
Philippine
court
must
be
confined
to
the
res,
it
publication
in
a
newspaper
and
this
is
the
only
form
of
notice
which
the
law
having
no
jurisdiction
to
render
a
personal
judgment
against
the
non-‐resident.
unconditionally
requires.
The
provision
of
our
law
relative
to
the
mailing
of
notice
does
not
absolutely
require
the
mailing
of
notice
unconditionally
and
FACTS:
in
every
event,
but
only
in
the
case
where
the
defendant's
residence
is
Eugene
Arthur
Perkins,
instituted
an
action
in
the
CFI
of
Manila
against
Benguet
known.
In
the
light
of
all
these
facts,
it
is
evident
that
actual
notice
to
the
Consolidated
Mining
Company
for
payment
of
dividends
on
52,874
shares
of
defendant
in
cases
of
this
kind
is
not,
under
the
law,
to
be
considered
stock
registered
in
his
name
being
withheld
by
the
company
and,
for
the
absolutely
necessary.
recognition
of
his
right
to
the
control
and
disposal
of
said
shares
against
the
claims
of
2
other
persons:
George
Engelhard
and
Idonah
Perkins
(both
are
non
The
publication
was
regularly
made
in
a
periodical
as
the
law
requires
and
the
residents,
but
the
case
did
not
indicate
the
country/ies
they
are
residing
at).
court
ordered
the
clerk
to
mail
the
notice.
Such
a
compliance
with
the
law,
in
The
Benguet
Co.
motioned
the
court
that
such
parties
be
required
to
interplead
so
far
as
necessary
to
constitute
due
process
of
law,
and
that
if
the
clerk
failed
and
settle
the
rights
among
themselves.
to
send
the
notice,
his
dereliction
in
the
performance
of
his
duty
was
in
irregularity
which
did
not
constitute
an
infringement
of
the
provision
of
the
CFI
Manila
ordered
Eugene
Perkins
to
include
in
his
complaint
as
party
Philippine
Bill
declaring
that
no
person
shall
have
deprived
of
property
without
defendants
George
and
Idonah.
Pursuant
to
the
order
of
the
CFI,
summons
by
due
process
of
law.
publication
were
served
upon
George
and
Idonah.
George
filed
an
answer.
Idonah,
through
counsel,
filed
her
pleading
entitled
"objection
to
venue,
J.Malcolm
(Dissent):
No
man
shall
be
condemned
in
his
person
or
property
motion
to
quash,
and
demurrer
to
jurisdiction"
wherein
she
challenged
the
without
notice
and
an
opportunity
of
being
heard
in
his
defense.
Protection
of
jurisdiction
of
the
lower
court
over
her
person.
the
parties
demands
a
strict
and
an
exact
compliance
with
this
constitutional
provision
in
our
organic
law
and
of
the
statutory
provisions
in
amplification.
Idonah
contends
that
the
proceeding
instituted
against
her
is
one
of
Literally
hundreds
of
precedents
could
be
cited
in
support
of
these
axiomatic
interpleading
and
is
thus,
an
action
in
personam
on
the
basis
of
§120
of
Code
of
principles.
Where
as
in
the
instant
case
the
defendant
received
no
notice
and
Civil
Procedure
which
provides
that
whenever
conflicting
claims
are
or
may
be
had
no
opportunity
to
be
heard,
certainly
we
cannot
say
that
there
is
due
CONFLICT
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made
upon
a
person
for
or
relating
to
personal
property,
or
the
performance
of
an
obligation
or
any
portion
thereof,
so
that
he
may
be
made
subject
to
several
Had
not
the
complaint
been
amended,
and
the
CFI
issued
an
order
under
actions
by
different
persons,
such
person
may
bring
an
action
against
the
calling
the
conflicting
claimants
to
interplead
with
one
another,
such
order
conflicting
claimants,
disclaiming
personal
interest
in
the
controversy,
and
the
could
not
perhaps
have
validly
been
served
by
publication
or
otherwise,
upon
court
may
order
them
to
interplead
with
one
another
and
litigate
their
several
the
non-‐resident
Idonah,
for
then
the
proceeding
would
be
a
personal
action.
claims
among
themselves,
there
upon
proceed
to
determine
their
several
claims.
Second,
no
money
judgment
or
other
relief
in
personam
is
prayed
for
against
Idonah.
The
only
relief
sought
therein
is
that
she
be
declared
to
be
without
any
ISSUE:
interest
in
the
shares.
Whether,
through
the
summons
by
publication,
the
CFI
has
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
Idonah
as
a
non-‐resident
defendant,
or,
Third,
on
the
claim
of
Idonah
Perkins
that
an
interpleader
is
in
personam,
the
notwithstanding
the
want
of
such
jurisdiction,
whether
said
court
may
validly
court
has
not
issued
an
order
compelling
the
conflicting
claimants
to
interplead
try
the
case
with
one
another
and
litigate
their
several
claims
among
themselves,
but
instead
ordered
the
plaintiff
to
amend
his
complaint
including
the
other
two
HELD:
claimants
as
defendants.
Thus,
the
publication
of
the
summons
was
ordered
Yes,
the
CFI
has
acquired
jurisdiction.
§398
of
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
[now
not
in
virtue
of
an
interpleading,
but
upon
the
filing
of
the
amended
complaint
Rule
14,
§15]
provides
that
when
a
non-‐resident
defendant
is
sued
in
the
wherein
an
action
quasi
in
rem
is
alleged.
Philippine
courts
and
it
appears,
by
the
complaint
or
by
affidavits,
that
the
action
relates
to
real
or
personal
property
within
the
Philippines
in
which
said
25.
TRAVELERS
HEALTH
ASSN
V.
VIRGINIA
defendant
has
or
claims
a
lien
or
interest,
actual
or
contingent,
or
in
which
the
339
U.S.
643
|
1950
relief
demanded
consists,
wholly
or
in
part,
in
excluding
such
person
from
any
interest
therein,
service
of
summons
maybe
made
by
publication.
DOCTRINES:
GR:
A
Minnesota
association
obtained
members
in
Montana
by
the
same
mail
solicitation
process
used
by
Travelers
to
get
Virginia
members.
The
First,
the
action
brought
by
Eugene
Perkins
is
quasi
in
rem,
for
while
the
Court
held
that
since
the
contracts
were
"executed
and
to
be
performed"
in
judgment
that
may
be
rendered
therein
is
not
strictly
a
judgment
in
rem,
"it
Minnesota,
the
Association
was
not
"doing
business"
in
Montana
and
therefore
fixes
and
settles
the
title
to
the
property
in
controversy
and
to
that
extent
could
not
be
sued
in
Montana
courts
unless
"consent"
to
Montana
suits
could
partakes
of
the
nature
of
the
judgment
in
rem."
The
amended
complaint
be
implied.
against
Idonah
seeks
to
exclude
her
from
any
interest
in
a
property
located
in
the
Philippines.
That
property
consists
in
certain
shares
of
stocks
of
Benguet
EXC:
But
where
business
activities
reach
out
beyond
one
state
and
create
Consolidated,
a
sociedad
anonima,
organized
in
the
Philippines
under
the
continuing
relationships
and
obligations
with
citizens
of
another
state,
courts
provisions
of
the
Spanish
Code
of
Commerce,
with
its
principal
office
in
the
City
need
not
resort
to
a
fictional
'consent'
in
order
to
sustain
the
jurisdiction
of
of
Manila
and
which
conducts
its
mining
activities
therein.
The
situs
of
the
regulatory
agencies
in
the
latter
state.
shares
is
in
the
jurisdiction
where
the
corporation
is
created,
whether
the
certificate
evidencing
the
ownership
of
those
shares
are
within
or
without
Due
process
requires
only
that
in
order
to
subject
a
defendant
to
a
judgment
in
that
jurisdiction.
Thus,
there
is
no
question
as
to
the
adequacy
of
publication
personam,
if
he
be
not
present
within
the
territory
of
the
forum,
he
have
certain
made
nor
as
to
the
mailing
of
the
order
of
publication
to
the
petitioner's
last
minimum
contacts
with
it
such
that
the
maintenance
of
the
suit
does
not
offend
known
place
of
residence
in
the
US.
But,
of
course,
the
action
being
quasi
in
'traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice.’
rem
and
notice
having
been
made
by
publication,
the
relief
that
may
be
granted
by
the
Philippine
court
must
be
confined
to
the
res,
it
having
no
There
is,
of
course,
one
method
by
which
claimants
could
recover
from
jurisdiction
to
render
a
personal
judgment
against
the
non-‐resident.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
39
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
appellants
in
Virginia
courts
without
the
aid
of
substituted
service
of
process:
The
Commission
rejected
Travelers'
objection
to
jurisdiction
and
their
motion
certificate
holders
in
Virginia
could
all
be
garnished
to
the
extent
of
their
to
quash
service.
Travelers
and
Pratt
were
ordered
to
cease
and
desist
from
obligations
to
the
Association.
further
solicitations
or
sales
of
certificates
to
Virginia
residents
unless
and
until
it
obtained
authority
in
accordance
with
the
“Blue
Sky
Law.”
The
Virginia
CA
FACTS:
affirmed
this
order.
The
Virginia
“Blue
Sky
Law”
was
enacted
to
protect
its
citizens
from
unfairness,
imposition
and
fraud
in
the
sales
of
certificates
of
insurance
and
other
forms
of
ISSUE:
securities.
The
law
requires
those
selling
or
offering
such
securities
to
obtain
a
Whether
the
Commonwealth
of
Virginia
has
jurisdiction
over
Travelers
permit
from
the
State
Corporation
Commission.
Applicants
for
permits
must
provide
detailed
information
concerning
their
solvency,
and
must
agree
that
HELD:
suits
can
be
filed
against
them
in
Virginia
by
service
of
process
on
the
Secretary
Yes.
Travelers’
contention
is
that
this
is
in
violation
of
the
due
process
clause
of
the
Commonwealth.
§6
provides
that
after
notice
and
a
hearing
on
the
and
that
all
their
activities
take
place
in
Nebraska,
consequently
Virginia
has
no
merits,
the
State
Corporation
Commission
is
authorized
to
issue
a
cease
and
power
to
reach
them
in
cease
and
desist
proceedings
to
enforce
any
part
of
its
desist
order,
restraining
violations
of
the
Act.
It
also
provides
for
service
by
regulatory
law.
The
court
held
that
the
state
has
power
to
issue
a
cease
and
registered
mail
where
other
types
of
service
are
unavailable
because
the
desist
order
enforcing
at
least
that
regulatory
provision
requiring
Travelers
to
offering
is
by
advertisement
and/or
solicitation
through
periodicals,
mail,
accept
service
of
process
by
Virginia
claimants
on
the
Sec.
of
the
telephone,
telegraph,
radio,
or
other
means
of
communication
from
beyond
Commonwealth.
the
limits
of
the
State.
In
Minnesota
Commercial
Men's
Ass'n
v.
Benn,
a
Minnesota
association
Travelers
Health
Association
was
incorporated
in
Nebraska
as
a
nonprofit
obtained
members
in
Montana
by
the
same
mail
solicitation
process
used
by
membership
association.
It
conducts
a
mail-‐order
health
insurance
business
Travelers
to
get
Virginia
members.
The
Court
held
that
since
the
contracts
were
from
its
office
in
Omaha,
Nebraska.
New
members
pay
an
initiation
fee
and
"executed
and
to
be
performed"
in
Minnesota,
the
Association
was
not
"doing
obligate
themselves
to
pay
periodic
assessments
at
the
said
office.
The
funds
business"
in
Montana
and
therefore
could
not
be
sued
in
Montana
courts
collected
are
used
for
operating
expenses
and
sick
benefits
to
members.
New
unless
"consent"
to
Montana
suits
could
be
implied.
But
where
business
members
are
obtained
through
the
unpaid
activities
of
those
already
members,
activities
reach
out
beyond
one
state
and
create
continuing
relationships
and
who
are
encouraged
to
recommend
the
Association
to
friends
and
submit
their
obligations
with
citizens
of
another
state,
courts
need
not
resort
to
a
fictional
names
to
the
home
office.
Pratt
then
mails
solicitations
to
these
prospects.
He
'consent'
in
order
to
sustain
the
jurisdiction
of
regulatory
agencies
in
the
encloses
blank
applications
which,
if
signed
and
returned
to
the
home
office
latter
state.
with
the
required
fee,
usually
result
in
election
of
applicants
as
members.
Certificates
are
then
mailed.
Travelers
has
solicited
Virginia
members
in
this
A
state
has
a
legitimate
interest
in
all
insurance
policies
protecting
its
residents
manner
and
had
approximately
800
Virginia
members.
against
risks,
an
interest
which
the
state
can
protect
even
though
the
state
action
may
have
repercussions
beyond
state
lines.
The
court
rejected
the
Cease
and
desist
proceedings
§6
were
instituted
by
the
State
Corporation
contention
that
a
state's
power
to
regulate
must
be
determined
by
a
Commission
against
Travelers
and
R.
E.
Pratt,
as
treasurer
of
the
Association
conceptualistic
discussion
of
theories
of
the
place
of
contracting
or
of
and
in
his
personal
capacity.
Having
received
notice
by
registered
mail
only,
performance.
Instead,
great
weight
was
given
to
the
consequences
of
the
they
appeared
'specially'
for
the
purpose
of
objecting
to
the
alleged
jurisdiction
contractual
obligations
in
the
state
where
the
insured
resided
and
the
'degree
of
the
Commonwealth
of
Virginia
and
of
its
State
Corporation
Commission,
and
of
interest'
that
state
had
in
seeing
that
those
obligations
were
faithfully
of
moving
to
set
aside
and
quash
service
of
summons.
carried
out.
Due
process
requires
only
that
in
order
to
subject
a
defendant
to
a
judgment
in
personam,
if
he
be
not
present
within
the
territory
of
the
forum,
he
have
certain
minimum
contacts
with
it
such
that
the
maintenance
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
40
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
of
the
suit
does
not
offend
'traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
Due
Process
Clause.
justice.’
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
contacts
and
ties
of
Travelers
with
Virginia
residents,
ACT
OF
STATE
DOCTRINE
together
with
that
state's
interest
in
faithful
observance
of
the
certificate
obligations,
justify
subjecting
Travelers
and
Pratt
to
cease
and
desist
proceedings
under
§6.
Travelers
did
not
engage
in
mere
isolated
or
short-‐lived
26.
FRENCH
V.
BANCO
NATIONAL
DE
CUBA
transactions.
Its
insurance
certificates,
systematically
and
widely
delivered
in
23
N.Y.2d
46
|
1968
Virginia
following
solicitation,
create
continuing
obligations
between
Travelers
and
each
of
the
many
certificate
holders
in
the
state.
Travelers
and
DOCTRINE:
Courts
will
not
inquire
into
the
validity
of
the
acts
of
a
foreign
Pratt
have
caused
claims
for
losses
to
be
investigated
and
the
Virginia
courts
government
done
within
its
own
territory.
Every
sovereign
state
is
bound
to
were
available
to
them
in
seeking
to
enforce
obligations
created
by
the
group
respect
the
independence
of
every
other
sovereign
state,
and
the
courts
of
one
of
certificates.
country
will
not
sit
in
judgment
of
the
acts
of
the
government
of
another
done
within
its
own
territory.
For
these
reasons,
Virginia
has
power
to
subject
Travelers
to
the
jurisdiction
of
its
Corporation
Commission,
and
its
cease
and
desist
provisions
designed
to
The
plaintiff
adduced
evidence
to
the
effect
that
the
Decision
did
not
conform
to
accomplish
this
purpose
can
not
be
attacked
merely
because
they
affect
Cuba's
fundamental
law
and
that
it
had
not
been
published
in
the
"Official
business
activities
which
are
carried
on
outside
the
state.
Gazette."
But
that
was
insufficient,
as
matter
of
law,
to
establish
that
the
action
dishonoring
and
repudiating
the
certificates
was
not
an
act
of
state.
It
was
Moreover,
if
Virginia
is
without
power
to
require
this
Association
to
accept
incumbent
on
the
plaintiff
to
prove
that
the
Cuban
authorities
themselves
service
of
process
on
the
Secretary
of
the
Commonwealth,
the
only
forum
for
would
deem
Decision
No.
346
invalid
and
would
disregard
it.
injured
certificate
holders
might
be
Nebraska.
Health
benefit
claims
are
seldom
so
large
that
Virginia
policyholders
could
afford
the
expense
and
trouble
of
a
FACTS:
Nebraska
law
suit.
In
addition,
suits
on
alleged
losses
can
be
more
conveniently
Case
is
grounded
in
a
proclamation
by
Fidel
Castro's
government
that
foreign
tried
in
Virginia
where
witnesses
would
most
likely
live
and
where
claims
for
investors
can
only
receive
their
return
on
investments
in
the
Cuban
Peso.
The
losses
would
presumably
be
investigated.
Such
factors
have
been
given
great
investor
here
involved
was
the
plaintiff's
assignor,
Alexander
Ritter,
an
weight
in
applying
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens.
American
citizen,
now
living
in
Florida,
who
resided
in
Cuba
at
the
time
of
the
events
from
which
this
lawsuit
arises.
Ritter
invested
$350,000
in
a
cuban
farm.
There
is,
of
course,
one
method
by
which
claimants
could
recover
from
At
the
time
the
Cuban
government
allowed
foreign
investors
to
convert
their
appellants
in
Virginia
courts
without
the
aid
of
substituted
service
of
process:
proceeds
from
their
enterprises
into
foreign
currency
and
exempted
such
certificate
holders
in
Virginia
could
all
be
garnished
to
the
extent
of
their
proceeds
from
tax
on
the
importation
of
money.
Certificates
of
tax
exemption
obligations
to
the
Association.
While
such
an
indirect
procedure
would
amounting
to
$150,000
were
acquired
by
the
investor.
undeniably
be
more
troublesome
to
claimants
than
the
plan
adopted
by
the
The
certificates
stated
that:
state
in
its
"Blue
Sky
Law,"
it
would
clearly
be
even
more
harassing
to
the
Association
and
its
Virginia
members.
Metaphysical
concepts
of
"implied
ALEXANDER
S.
RITTER
or
a
member
Bank
of
the
System,
as
endorsee
consent"
and
"presence"
in
a
state
should
not
be
solidified
into
a
constitutional
hereof,
will
receive
from
Banco
Nacional
de
Cuba
[defendant
herein]
barrier
against
Virginia's
simple,
direct
and
fair
plan
for
service
of
process
on
against
delivery
to
said
Bank
of
$
____
Cuban
Pesos
and
surrender
of
this
the
Secretary
of
the
Commonwealth.
Virginia's
subjection
of
this
Association
to
Certificate,
a
check
on
New
York
for
an
equal
amount
of
United
States
the
jurisdiction
of
that
State's
Corporation
Commission
in
a
proceeding
is
Dollars,
exempt
from
the
Tax
on
Exportation
of
Money.
consistent
with
"fair
play
and
substantial
justice,"
and
is
not
offensive
to
the
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
41
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
establish,
as
matter
of
law,
that
the
breach
of
contract,
of
which
the
plaintiff
This
certificate
was
signed
by
defendant
bank
and
the
government
agency
complains,
resulted
from,
and,
indeed,
itself
constitutes,
an
act
of
state.
responsible
for
issuing
the
certificates
(Cuban
Government's
Currency
Stabilization
Fund).
Later
that
government
agency
issued
Decision
No.
346,
On
this
analysis,
there
is
no
issue
of
burden
of
proof.
Rather,
the
question
is,
which
suspended
the
processing
of
tax
exemption
certificates
"for
the
time
what
need
be
proved.
The
defendant
introduced
evidence
showing
that
being
until
reorganization
of
the
system
of
exemptions."
When
Ritter
tendered
Decision
No.
346
had
been
issued
by
the
Currency
Stabilization
Fund,
that
it
his
certificates
for
redemption,
together
with
the
appropriate
number
of
pesos,
was
adopted
as
a
measure
to
control
currency
and
foreign
exchange
and
that
payment
in
American
dollars
was
refused
under
the
mandate
of
the
Decision.
defendant
bank
had
regarded
the
Decision
as
binding
upon
it
and
as
prohibiting
Hence,
Ritter
filed
a
case
in
the
SC,
New
York
County.
The
act
of
state
doctrine
performance
of
the
agreement
in
the
tax
exemption
certificates.
The
plaintiff
was
raised
as
a
defense
because
the
decision
of
the
Cuban
Government's
adduced
evidence
to
the
effect
that
the
Decision
did
not
conform
to
Cuba's
Currency
Stabilization
Fund
was
not
published
in
the
official
gazette.
fundamental
law
and
that
it
had
not
been
published
in
the
"Official
Gazette."
But
that
was
insufficient,
as
matter
of
law,
to
establish
that
the
action
ISSUE:
dishonoring
and
repudiating
the
certificates
was
not
an
act
of
state.
It
was
Whether
the
act
of
state
doctrine
may
be
raised
by
Banco
incumbent
on
the
plaintiff
to
prove
that
the
Cuban
authorities
themselves
would
deem
Decision
No.
346
invalid
and
would
disregard
it.
This
she
was
HELD:
obviously
unable
to
do.
Yes.
The
economic
measure
was
one
taken
by
the
Cuban
Government
and
with
which
the
Bank
complied
with
is
an
act
of
state.
Courts
will
not
inquire
into
the
The
act
of
state
doctrine
is
a
sign
of
respect
between
countries
and
between
validity
of
the
acts
of
a
foreign
government
done
within
its
own
territory.
the
judiciary
and
the
political
branch
that
the
handles
foreign
affairs.
Every
sovereign
state
is
bound
to
respect
the
independence
of
every
other
sovereign
state,
and
the
courts
of
one
country
will
not
sit
in
judgment
of
the
27.
IN
RE:
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
V.
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
acts
of
the
government
of
another
done
within
its
own
territory.
Courts
will
FOR
THE
DISTRICT
OF
HAWAII
not
examine
a
foreign
law
to
determine
whether
it
was
adopted
in
conformity
No.
04-‐71843
|
February
4,
2005
with
the
internal
procedures
and
requirements
of
the
enacting
state.
So
long
as
the
act
is
the
act
of
the
foreign
sovereign,
it
matters
not
how
grossly
the
DOCTRINE:
Every
sovereign
state
is
bound
to
respect
the
independence
of
every
sovereign
has
transgressed
its
own
laws.
If
no
institution
of
legal
authority
other
sovereign
state,
and
the
courts
of
one
country
will
not
sit
in
judgment
on
would
refuse
to
effectuate
the
decree,
its
formal
status
(because
it
was
not
the
acts
of
the
government
of
another,
done
within
its
own
territory.
Redress
of
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
in
Cuba)
is
irrelevant.
It
has
not
been
seriously
grievances
by
reason
of
such
acts
must
be
obtained
through
the
means
open
to
contended
that
the
judicial
institutions
of
Cuba
would
declare
the
decree
be
availed
of
by
sovereign
powers
as
between
themselves.
invalid.
Nor
does
the
plaintiff
make
any
such
claim.
FACTS:
Consequently,
there
is
no
basis
whatever
for
the
plaintiff's
contention
that
the
There
are
2
parties
in
this
case
which
sought
the
estate
of
Marcos.
One
is
the
action
dishonoring
and
repudiating
the
certificates
held
by
Ritter
was
not
an
Class
Plaintiffs
and
the
other
is
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
(RP).
"act
of
state."
Regardless
of
whether
or
not
Decision
No.
346
was
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
or
otherwise
complied
with
internal
Cuban
standards
of
The
U.S.
District
Court
(USDC)
in
Hawaii
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
the
class
regularity,
it
was
issued
by
the
Currency
Stabilization
Fund,
an
official
of
plaintiffs
against
the
Marcos
estate
for
HR
violations
by
the
Marcos
Regime.
instrumentality
of
the
Cuban
Government.
Moreover,
in
compliance
with
that
The
judgment
included
an
injunction
restraining
the
estate
from
transferring
Decision—or
even
if
only
in
purported
compliance—Banco
Nacional,
also
an
any
estate’s
assets.
On
the
other
hand,
the
RP
sought
to
forfeit
the
Marcos
agency
of
the
Cuban
Government,
refused
and
continues
to
refuse
to
exchange
estate’s
assets
on
the
ground
that
they
were
stolen
by
Marcos
from
the
Phil.
pesos
for
dollars
as
the
certificates
had
required.
These
undisputed
facts
CONFLICT
OF
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ATTY.
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AY
2015-‐2016
Gov’t
and
its
people.
means
open
to
be
availed
of
by
sovereign
powers
as
between
themselves.
There
was
an
earlier
case
(Credit
Suisse
Case)
wherein
the
Swiss
Asset
of
The
DC’s
orders
in
issue
violated
this
principle.
In
order
to
obtain
assets
from
Marcos
estate
had
been
frozen
by
the
Swiss
Gov’t
at
the
request
of
the
RP.
The
the
PNB,
or
to
hold
the
Bank
in
contempt
for
the
transfer
of
those
assets
to
the
Class
plaintiffs
obtained
injunction
from
USDC
of
Hawaii
to
hold
the
assets
for
RP,
the
District
court
necessarily
(and
expressly)
held
invalid
the
forfeiture
the
benefit
of
the
class
Plaintiffs.
The
US
CA
issued
a
writ
of
mandamus
and
judgment
of
the
Philippine
SC.
held
that
the
injunction
violated
the
act
of
state
doctrine,
which
preclude
American
courts
from
declaring
“invalid”
a
foreign
sovereign’s
official
act,
that
N.B.:
Other
issues
raised
by
the
Class
Plaintiffs:
Whether
the
act
of
state
is,
the
freeze
order
of
the
Swiss
gov’t.
doctrine
does
not
apply
to
judicial
decisions.
Although
the
act
of
state
doctrine
is
normally
inapplicable
to
court
judgments
arising
from
private
litigation,
there
Thereafter,
the
Swiss
government
released
the
funds
frozen
in
Switzerland
for
is
no
inflexible
rule
preventing
a
judgment
sought
by
a
foreign
government
transfer
to
the
PNB
in
escrow
pending
a
determination
of
proper
disposal
by
a
from
qualifying
as
an
act
of
state.
competent
court
in
the
Philippines.
The
PNB
deposited
the
funds
in
Singapore.
The
Philippine
SC
subsequently
held
that
the
assets
were
forfeited
to
the
RP.
Whether
the
act
of
state
doctrine
was
inapplicable
because
the
judgment
of
the
Philippine
SC
did
not
concern
matters
within
its
own
territory.
The
US
CA
The
USDC
of
Hawaii
then
made
a
ruling
that
the
Philippine
SC
had
violated
“due
held
that,
“generally,
the
act
of
state
doctrine
applies
to
official
acts
of
foreign
process
by
any
standard”
and
the
latters
judgment
was
entitled
to
no
sovereigns
“performed
within
their
own
territory.”
(Credit
Suisse
Case).
The
act
deference.
It
ordered
reinstatement
of
an
earlier
settlement
agreement
in
the
of
the
Philippine
SC
was
not
wholly
external,
however.
Its
judgment,
which
the
District
Court
wherein
the
RP
refused
to
approve
and
consent
to
it.
district
court
declared
invalid,
was
issued
in
the
Philippines
and
much
of
its
force
upon
the
PNB
arose
from
the
fact
that
the
Bank
is
a
Philippine
corp.
The
DC
then
issued
an
“Order
to
Show
Cause”
against
the
PNB,
which
was
not
a
Because
the
RP’s
“interest
in
the
enforcement
of
its
laws
does
not
end
at
its
party
to
the
litigation
in
the
DC,
requiring
the
Bank
to
show
why
it
should
not
borders,”
the
fact
that
the
escrow
funds
were
deposited
in
Singapore
does
not
be
held
in
contempt
for
violating
the
court’s
injunction
against
transfer
of
preclude
the
application
of
the
act
of
state
doctrine.
assets
by
the
estate.
The
PNB
then
filed
the
present
petition
for
mandamus
in
the
U.S.
9th
Circuit
CA,
seeking
to
restrain
the
DC
from
enforcing
its
“Order
to
28.
REPUBLIC
V.
MARCOS
Show
Cause”
and
from
pursuing
discovery
against
the
Bank
officer.
862
F.2d
1355
|
December
1,
1988
The
Bank
asserted
that
it
had
transferred
nearly
all
of
the
funds
in
issue
to
the
DOCTRINE:
As
a
practical
tool
for
keeping
the
judicial
branch
out
of
the
conduct
RP
pursuant
to
the
judgment
of
the
Philippine
SC.
It
contended
that
the
entire
of
foreign
affairs,
the
classification
of
"act
of
state"
is
not
a
promise
to
the
ruler
proceeding
against
it
for
its
transfer
of
funds
to
the
RP
violated
the
“act
of
of
any
foreign
country
that
his
conduct,
if
challenged
by
his
own
country
after
state”
doctrine.
his
fall,
may
not
become
the
subject
of
scrutiny
in
our
courts.
No
estoppel
exists
insulating
a
deposed
dictator
from
accounting.
No
guarantee
has
been
granted
ISSUE:
that
immunity
may
be
acquired
by
an
ex-‐chief
magistrate
invoking
the
magic
Whether
USDC
of
Hawaii
violated
the
act
of
State
doctrine?
words
"act
of
state"
to
cover
his
or
her
past
performance.
HELD:
The
act
of
state
doctrine
is
supple,
flexible,
ad
hoc.
The
doctrine
is
meant
to
Yes.
Every
sovereign
state
is
bound
to
respect
the
independence
of
every
facilitate
the
foreign
relations
of
the
United
States,
not
to
furnish
the
equivalent
other
sovereign
state,
and
the
courts
of
one
country
will
not
sit
in
judgment
of
sovereign
immunity
to
a
deposed
leader.
of
the
acts
of
the
government
of
another,
done
within
its
own
territory.
Redress
of
grievances
by
reason
of
such
acts
must
be
obtained
through
the
CONFLICT
OF
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AY
2015-‐2016
*N.B.:
What
is
the
difference
between
AOS
and
sovereign
immunity?
AOS
=/=
from
making
pronouncements
on
matters
over
which
it
has
no
power;
sovereign
immunity
maximally
interpreted,
the
classification
prevents
the
embarrassment
of
a
AOS
=
facilitates
foreign
relations
and
is
a
sign
of
respect
to
other
sovereigns.
court
offending
a
foreign
government
that
is
"extant
at
the
time
of
suit."
Sovereign
immunity
merely
pertains
to
insulating
a
deposed
dictator
from
accountability.
As
a
practical
tool
for
keeping
the
judicial
branch
out
of
the
conduct
of
foreign
affairs,
the
classification
of
"act
of
state"
is
not
a
promise
to
the
ruler
FACTS:
of
any
foreign
country
that
his
conduct,
if
challenged
by
his
own
country
after
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
brought
a
civil
suit
against
its
former
president,
his
fall,
may
not
become
the
subject
of
scrutiny
in
our
courts.
No
estoppel
Ferdinand
Marcos,
and
his
wife
Imelda,
asserting
claims
under
the
Racketeer
exists
insulating
a
deposed
dictator
from
accounting.
No
guarantee
has
been
Influenced
and
Corrupt
Organizations
Act
(RICO),
and
other
applicable
law.
granted
that
immunity
may
be
acquired
by
an
ex-‐
chief
magistrate
invoking
the
magic
words
"act
of
state"
to
cover
his
or
her
past
performance.
The
Republic
alleges
the
following:
that
the
Marcoses
engaged
in
mail
fraud,
wire
fraud,
and
the
transportation
of
stolen
property
in
the
foreign
or
The
classification
might
be
used
to
prevent
judicial
challenge
in
our
courts
to
interstate
commerce
of
the
United
States.
The
acts
were
repeated,
forming
a
many
deeds
of
a
dictator
in
power,
at
least
when
it
is
apparent
that
sustaining
pattern
of
predicate
acts.
The
Marcoses
and
the
other
defendants
arranged
for
such
challenge
would
bring
our
country
into
a
hostile
confrontation
with
the
the
investment
in
real
estate
in
Beverly
Hills,
California
of
$4
million
dictator.
Once
deposed,
the
dictator
will
find
it
difficult
to
deploy
the
defense
fraudulently
obtained
by
the
Marcoses.
They
arranged
for
the
creation
of
two
successfully.
The
"balance
of
considerations"
is
shifted.
A
fortiori,
when
a
bank
accounts
in
the
name
of
Imelda
Marcos
at
Lloyds
Bank
of
California
ruler's
former
domain
has
turned
against
him
and
seeks
the
recovery
of
what
totaling
over
$800,000
also
fraudulently
obtained
by
the
Marcoses;
and
that
it
claims
he
has
stolen,
the
classification
has
little
or
no
applicability.
The
act
the
Marcoses
transported
into
Hawaii
money,
jewels,
and
other
property
worth
of
state
doctrine
is
supple,
flexible,
ad
hoc.
The
doctrine
is
meant
to
facilitate
over
$7
million
also
fraudulently
obtained
by
them.
the
foreign
relations
of
the
US,
not
to
furnish
the
equivalent
of
sovereign
immunity
to
a
deposed
leader.
Before
determining
whether
issuance
of
an
injunction
was
appropriate
we
consider
two
defenses
which,
if
accepted,
would
block
trial
of
the
case:
the
In
the
instant
case
the
Marcoses
offered
no
evidence
whatsoever
to
support
Marcoses
maintain,
first,
that
their
acts
are
insulated
because
they
were
acts
of
the
classification
of
their
acts
as
acts
of
state.
The
burden
of
proving
acts
of
state
not
reviewable
by
our
courts;
and
second,
that
any
adjudication
of
these
state
rested
upon
them.
They
did
not
even
undertake
the
proof.
The
act
of
acts
would
involve
the
investigation
of
political
questions
beyond
our
courts'
state
doctrine,
the
Executive
declares,
has
"no
bearing"
on
this
case
as
it
competence.
stands.
As
the
doctrine
is
a
pragmatic
one,
we
cannot
exclude
the
possibility
that,
at
some
later
point
in
the
development
of
this
litigation,
the
Marcoses
ISSUE:
might
produce
evidence
that
would
warrant
its
application.
On
the
present
Whether
the
acts
of
state
doctrine
applies
as
a
defense
in
this
case
record,
the
defense
does
not
apply.
HELD:
No.
The
classification
of
certain
acts
as
"acts
of
state"
with
the
consequence
that
their
validity
will
be
treated
as
beyond
judicial
review
is
a
pragmatic
device,
not
required
by
the
nature
of
sovereign
authority
and
inconsistently
applied
in
international
law.
The
purpose
of
the
device
is
to
keep
the
judiciary
from
embroiling
the
courts
and
the
country
in
the
affairs
of
the
foreign
nation
whose
acts
are
challenged.
Minimally
viewed,
the
classification
keeps
a
court
CONFLICT
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AY
2015-‐2016
ASSUMPTION
OF
JURISDICTION
V.
FORUM
NON-‐CONVENIENS
Gilbert
brought
this
action
based
on
tort
in
New
York,
but
he
resides
at
Lynchburg,
Virginia.
Gulf
Oil
is
a
corporation
organized
under
the
laws
of
29.
GULF
OIL
CORPORATION
V.
GILBERT
Pennsylvania,
qualified
to
do
business
in
both
Virginia
and
New
York,
and
it
has
330
U.S.
501
|
1947
designated
officials
in
each
state
as
agents
to
receive
service
of
process.
DOCTRINE:
A
federal
district
court
has
the
power
to
dismiss
an
action
at
law
Gulf
Oil,
invoking
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens,
claimed
that
the
pursuant
to
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens—at
least
where
its
appropriate
place
for
trial
is
Virginia,
not
New
York
where
Gilbert
lives
and
the
jurisdiction
is
based
on
diversity
of
citizenship
and
the
state
courts
have
such
former
does
business,
where
all
events
in
litigation
took
place,
where
most
of
power.
the
witnesses
reside,
and
where
both
state
and
federal
courts
are
available
to
Gilbert
and
are
able
to
obtain
jurisdiction
of
the
Gulf
Oil.
The
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
means
simply
that
a
court
may
resist
imposition
upon
its
jurisdiction
even
when
jurisdiction
is
authorized
by
the
letter
The
US
District
Court
dismissed
the
case
stating
that
the
case
is
best
left
to
of
a
general
venue
statute.
Virginia
courts.
On
appeal,
the
Circuit
CA
disagreed.
Hence,
this
case
is
here
on
certiorari.
GR:
The
plaintiff
has
a
choice
of
courts
to
pursue
his
remedy.
ISSUE:
EXC:
The
plaintiff
may
not,
by
choosing
an
inconvenient
forum,
harass
a
1.
Whether
the
US
District
Court
has
the
inherent
power
to
dismiss
a
suit
defendant
by
inflicting
upon
him
trouble
not
necessary
to
his
own
right
to
pursuant
to
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens
pursue
his
remedy.
2.
Whether
the
power
was
abused
in
this
case
Important
considerations
in
the
application
of
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
HELD:
conveniens,
from
the
standpoint
of
litigants,
are:
relative
ease
of
access
to
1.
Yes.
A
federal
district
court
has
the
power
to
dismiss
an
action
at
law
sources
of
proof,
availability
of
compulsory
process
for
attendance
of
unwilling
pursuant
to
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens—at
least
where
its
witnesses,
cost
of
obtaining
attendance
of
willing
witnesses,
possibility
of
view
jurisdiction
is
based
on
diversity
of
citizenship
and
the
state
courts
have
such
of
the
premises
if
that
be
appropriate,
and
all
other
practical
problems
that
power.
The
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
means
simply
that
a
court
may
make
trial
of
a
case
easy,
expeditious,
and
inexpensive.
resist
imposition
upon
its
jurisdiction
even
when
jurisdiction
is
authorized
by
the
letter
of
a
general
venue
statute.
These
are
statutes
drawn
with
generality,
Considerations
of
public
interest
in
applying
the
doctrine
include
the
giving
a
plaintiff
a
choice
of
courts
to
pursue
his
remedy.
However,
the
plaintiff
undesirability
of
piling
up
litigation
in
congested
centers,
the
burden
of
jury
duty
may
not,
by
choosing
an
inconvenient
forum,
harass
a
defendant
by
inflicting
on
people
of
a
community
having
no
relation
to
the
litigation,
the
local
interest
upon
him
trouble
not
necessary
to
his
own
right
to
pursue
his
remedy.
But,
if
in
having
localized
controversies
decided
at
home,
and
the
unnecessary
the
choice
of
forum
is
strongly
in
favor
of
the
defendant,
the
choice
should
injection
of
problems
in
conflict
of
laws.
rarely
be
disturbed.
FACTS:
Here,
the
venue
statues
of
US
permit
Gilbert
to
commence
his
action
in
New
Gilbert
operates
a
public
warehouse.
He
alleges
that
Gulf
Oil
Corp.
carelessly
York.
But
that
does
not
settle
the
question
whether
he
must
do
so.
The
handled
a
delivery
of
gasoline
to
his
warehouse
tanks
and
pumps,
causing
fire
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens
can
never
apply
if
there
is
absence
of
and
an
explosion,
which
consumed
the
warehouse
building,
merchandise
and
jurisdiction
or
mistake
of
venue.
Courts
of
equity
and
of
law
occasionally
fixtures
within.
decline,
in
the
interest
of
justice,
to
exercise
jurisdiction
where
the
suit
is
between
aliens
or
nonresidents,
or
where,
the
litigation
can
more
appropriately
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
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45
ATTY.
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AY
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be
conducted
in
a
foreign
tribunal.
reversed.
Petition
granted.
An
interest
to
be
considered,
and
the
one
likely
to
be
most
pressed,
is
the
30.
K.K.
SHELL
SEKIYU
OSAKA
HATSUBAISHO
AND
FU
HING
OIL
CO,
LTD
V.
private
interest
of
the
litigant.
Important
considerations
are
the
relative
ease
COURT
OF
APPEALS
of
access
to
sources
of
proof;
availability
of
compulsory
process
for
G.R.
Nos.
90306-‐07
|
July
30,
1990
attendance
of
unwilling,
and
the
cost
of
obtaining
attendance
of
willing,
witnesses;
possibility
of
view
of
premises,
if
view
would
be
appropriate
to
the
FACTS:
action,
and
all
other
practical
problems
that
make
trial
of
a
case
easy,
Kumagai
Kaiun
Kaisha,
Ltd.,
a
corporation
formed
and
existing
under
the
law
of
expeditious,
and
inexpensive.
There
may
also
be
questions
as
to
the
Japan,
filed
a
complaint
for
the
collection
of
a
sum
of
money
with
preliminary
enforceability
of
a
judgment
if
one
is
obtained.
The
court
will
weigh
relative
attachment
before
RTC
Manila
against
Atlantic
Venus
Co.,
a
corporation
advantages
and
obstacles
to
fair
trial.
The
court
is
not
required
to
always
registered
in
Panama,
the
vessel
MV
Estella
and
Crestamonte
Shipping
respect
the
forum
chosen
by
the
plaintiff.
What
is
clear
in
a
long
list
of
cases,
is
Corporation,
a
Philippine
corporation.
Atlantic
is
the
owner
of
MV
Estella.
that
when
the
defendant
consents
to
be
sued,
it
extends
only
to
give
the
court
jurisdiction
over
the
person.
The
complaint
alleged
that
Crestamonte,
as
bareboat
charter
and
operator
of
the
MV
Estella,
appointed
N.S.
Shipping
Corporation
(NSS),
a
Japanese
2.
No.
Turning
to
the
question
whether
this
is
one
of
those
rather
rare
cases
corporation,
as
its
general
agent
in
Japan.
The
appointment
was
formalized
in
where
the
doctrine
should
be
applied,
we
look
to
the
interests
of
the
litigants.
an
Agency
Agreement,
which
stated:
“12.0
—
That
this
Agreement
shall
be
Gilbert
is
not
a
resident
of
New
York,
nor
did
any
event
connected
with
the
governed
by
the
Laws
of
Japan.
Any
matters,
disputes,
and/or
differences
case
take
place
there,
nor
does
any
witness
with
the
possible
exception
of
arising
between
the
parties
hereto
concerned
regarding
this
agreement
shall
be
experts
live
there.
No
one
connected
with
that
side
of
the
case
save
counsel
for
subject
exclusively
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
District
Courts
of
Japan.”
the
plaintiff
resides
there.
His
affidavits
and
arguments
are
devoted
to
controverting
claims
as
to
Gulf
Oil’s
inconvenience,
rather
than
to
showing
NSS
in
turn
appointed
Kumagai
as
its
local
agent
in
Osaka,
Japan.
Kumagai
that
the
present
forum
serves
any
convenience
for
himself,
with
one
supplied
the
MV
Estella
with
supplies
and
services
but
despite
repeated
exception—that
this
case
involves
a
claim
for
an
amount
close
to
$400,000
demands
Crestamonte
failed
to
pay
the
amounts
due.
NSS
and
Keihin
Narasaki
which
may
stagger
the
imagination
of
a
local
jury
unaccustomed
to
dealing
with
Corporation
(Keihin)
filed
complaints
in
intervention.
such
amounts.
This
is
a
strange
and
unproven
premise,
an
assumption
we
do
not
easily
make.
Fu
Hing
Oil
Co.,
Ltd.
(Fu
Hing),
a
corporation
organized
in
HK
and
not
doing
business
in
the
Phil.,
filed
a
motion
for
leave
to
intervene
with
an
attached
Gulf
Oil
points
out
that
not
only
Gilbert
but
every
person
who
ever
participated
complaint-‐in-‐intervention,
alleging
that
Fu
Hing
supplied
marine
diesel
oil
to
in
the
acts
charged
to
be
negligent
resides
in
or
near
Virginia.
The
Complaint
the
MV
Estella
and
incurred
barge
expenses
for
the
total
sum
of
152,412.56
itself
alleges
that
the
Gulf
Oil
violated
Virginia
(Lynchburg)
ordinances.
The
USD
but
such
has
remained
unpaid
despite
demand
and
that
the
claim
source
of
all
proofs
in
either
side
is
in
Virginia,
which
is
some
400
miles
from
constitutes
a
maritime
lien.
The
issuance
of
a
writ
of
attachment
was
also
New
York.
It
does
not
do
well
to
fix
the
place
of
trial
at
an
inconvenient
forum.
prayed
for.
The
course
of
adjudication
in
New
York
federal
court
might
be
beset
with
conflict
of
laws
problems
all
avoided
if
the
case
is
litigated
in
Virginia,
where
it
K.K.
Shell
Sekiyu
Osaka
Hatsubaisho,
a
corporation
organized
in
Japan
and
not
arose.
doing
business
in
the
Phil.,
likewise
filed
a
motion
to
intervene
with
an
attached
complaint
in
intervention
alleging
that
upon
request
of
NSS,
KK
Shell
Hence,
the
District
Court
did
not
exceed
its
powers
or
the
bounds
of
its
provided
and
supplied
maritime
diesel
oil
to
the
MV
Estella
at
the
ports
of
discretion
in
dismissing
Gilbert’s
complaint
and
remitting
him
to
the
courts
of
Tokyo
and
Mutsure
in
Japan
and
that
despite
previous
demands,
Crestamonte
his
own
community.
The
judgment
of
the
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
is
thus
has
failed
to
pay
the
amounts
of
16,996.96
USD
and
¥1M
and
that
KK
Shell's
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claim
constitutes
a
maritime
lien
on
the
MV
Estella.
The
complaint
in
intervention
sought
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
preliminary
attachment.
The
trial
In
the
same
vein,
as
the
choice-‐of-‐forum
clause
in
the
agreement
(paragraph
court
allowed
the
intervention
of
Fu
Hing
and
KK
Shell.
12.0)
has
not
been
conclusively
shown
to
be
binding
upon
K.K.
Shell,
additional
evidence
would
also
still
have
to
be
presented
to
establish
this
defense,
K.K.
Writs
of
preliminary
attachment
were
issued
and
upon
the
posting
of
the
Shell
cannot
therefore,
as
of
yet,
be
barred
from
instituting
an
action
in
the
counter-‐bonds,
writs
of
attachment
were
discharged.
Atlantic
and
MV
Estella
Philippines.
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaints
in
intervention
and
Atlantic
filed
a
petition
in
the
CA
against
the
lower
court
judge,
Kumagai
NSS
and
Keihin
seeking
the
2.
No.
Atlantic
and
MV
Estella
are
invoking
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
annulment
of
the
orders
of
the
trial
court.
The
CA
annulled
such
orders
and
conveniens
to
be
a
valid
ground
for
the
dismissal
of
KK
Shell's
complaint
in
directed
the
RTC
to
cease
and
desist
from
proceeding
with
the
case.
intervention.
KK
Shell,
in
turn,
argued
by
invoking
his
right
as
maritime
lienholder
under
PD
No.
1521,
the
Ship
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978.
CA:
Fu
Hing
and
KK
Shell
were
not
suppliers
but
sub-‐agents
of
NSS
therefore
they
were
bound
by
the
Agency
Agreement
between
Crestamonte
and
NSS.
Section
21.
Maritime
Lien
for
Necessaries;
persons
entitled
to
such
lien
The
LC
should
have
disallowed
the
motions
for
intervention.
Any
person
furnishing
repairs,
supplies,
towage,
use
of
dry
dock
or
marine
railway,
or
other
necessaries
to
any
vessel,
whether
foreign
or
ISSUES:
domestic,
upon
the
order
of
the
owner
of
such
vessel,
or
of
a
person
1.
Whether
Fu
Hing
and
KK
Shell
should
be
allowed
to
intervene
(since
if
Fu
authorized
by
the
owner,
shall
have
a
maritime
lien
on
the
vessel,
which
Hing
and
KK
Shell
are
sub-‐agents
of
NSS,
they
should
not
be
allowed
to
may
be
enforced
by
suit
in
rem,
and
it
shall
be
necessary
to
allege
or
intervene)
prove
that
credit
was
given
to
the
vessel.
2.
Whether
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens
may
be
invoked
However,
in
order
to
invoke
this,
it
must
be
established
that
the
credit
was
HELD:
extended
to
the
vessel
itself.
In
other
words,
considering
the
dearth
of
1.
No.
No
express
reference
to
the
contracting
of
sub-‐agents
or
the
applicability
evidence
due
to
the
fact
that
the
private
respondents
have
yet
to
file
their
of
the
term
of
the
agreement,
particularly
the
choice-‐of-‐forum
clause,
to
sub-‐ answer
in
the
proceeding
below
and
trial
on
the
merits
is
still
to
be
conducted,
agents
is
made
in
the
text
of
the
agreement.
What
the
contract
clearly
states
whether
or
not
petitioner
are
indeed
maritime
lienholder
and
as
such
may
are
NSS'
principal
duties,
i.e.,
that
it
shall
provide
for
the
necessary
services
enforce
the
lien
against
the
MV
Estella
are
matters
that
still
have
to
be
required
for
the
husbanding
of
Crestamonte's
vessels
in
Japanese
ports
and
established.
Neither
is
the
court
ready
to
rule
on
the
private
respondents'
shall
be
responsible
for
fixing
southbound
cargoes
with
revenues
sufficient
to
invocation
of
the
doctrine
of
forum
non
conveniens,
as
the
exact
nature
of
the
cover
ordinary
expenses.
Also,
the
complaint
in
intervention
filed
by
KK
Shell
relationship
of
the
parties
is
still
to
be
established.
We
leave
this
matter
to
the
merely
alleges
it
provided
and
supplied
MV
Estella
with
marine
diesel
oil
upon
LC
who
is
the
best
position
to
decide
such.
It
was
clearly
reversible
error
on
the
request
of
NSS
who
was
acting
for
and
as
duly
appointed
agent
of
part
of
the
CA
to
annul
the
LC's
orders.
There
are
still
numerous
material
facts
Crestamonte.
There
is
no
basis
for
the
CA
to
state
that
KK
Shell
admitted
in
its
to
be
established
in
order
to
arrive
at
a
conclusion
as
to
the
true
nature
of
the
intervention
that
it
was
appointed
as
local
agent/sub-‐agent
or
representatives
relationship
between
Crestamonte
and
KK
Shell
and
between
NSS
and
KK
Shell.
by
NSS
by
virtue
of
said
Agency
Agreement.
The
CA
was
erroneously
referring
The
best
recourse
would
have
been
to
allow
the
trial
court
to
proceed
with
the
to
another
case
involving
another
ship
in
another
court.
Thus,
additional
case
and
consider
whatever
defenses
may
be
raised
by
private
respondents
evidence
must
be
given
to
establish
such
allegation.
after
they
have
filed
their
answer
and
evidence
to
support
their
conflicting
claims
has
been
presented.
In
view
of
the
inconclusiveness
of
the
Agency
Agreement
and
the
pleadings
filed
in
the
trial
court,
additional
evidence,
if
there
be
any,
would
still
have
to
be
presented
to
establish
the
allegation
that
K.K.
Shell
is
a
sub-‐agent
of
NSS.
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31.
COMMUNICATIONS
MATERIAL
AND
DESIGN
V.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
G.R.
No.
102223
|
August
22,
1996
Petitioners
CMDI
and
ASPAC
Multi-‐trade
Inc.
are
both
domestic
corporations,
while
petitioner
Francisco
S.
Aguirre
is
their
President
and
majority
DOCTRINE:
GR:
A
foreign
corporation
transacting
business
in
the
Philippines
stockholder.
Private
Respondent
ITEC
is
a
corporation
duly
organized
and
without
a
license
shall
not
be
permitted
to
maintain
or
intervene
in
any
action,
existing
under
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Alabama,
USA,
and
is
a
foreign
suit,
or
proceeding
in
any
court
or
administrative
agency
of
the
Philippines,
but
corporation
not
licensed
to
do
business
in
the
Philippines.
it
may
be
sued
on
any
valid
cause
of
action
recognized
under
Philippine
laws.
ITEC
entered
into
a
contract
with
ASPAC
referred
to
as
“Representative
EXC:
A
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Philippines
may
sue
in
Agreement”.
Pursuant
to
the
contract,
ITEC
engaged
ASPAC
as
its
“exclusive
Philippine
Courts
although
not
authorized
to
do
business
here
against
a
representative”
in
the
Philippines
for
the
sale
of
ITEC’s
products,
in
Philippine
citizen
or
entity
who
had
contracted
with
and
benefited
by
said
consideration
of
which,
ASPAC
was
paid
a
stipulated
commission.
The
said
corporation.
One
who
has
dealt
with
a
corporation
of
foreign
origin
as
a
agreement
was
initially
for
a
term
of
24
months.
After
the
lapse
of
the
agreed
corporate
entity
is
estopped
to
deny
its
corporate
existence
and
capacity
having
period,
the
agreement
was
renewed
for
another
24
months.
ignored
or
taken
advantage
of
the
latter’s
incapacity.
ASPAC
and
ITEC
also
entered
into
a
“License
Agreement”
wherein
ASPAC
was
N.B.:
Corporation
Code,
Se.
133:
Code
of
1987:
able
to
incorporate
and
use
the
name
“ITEC”
in
its
own
name
becoming
legally
“[S]oliciting
orders,
purchases,
service
contracts,
opening
offices,
whether
called
and
publicly
known
as
ASPAC-‐ITEC
(Philippines).
By
virtue
of
said
contracts,
“liaison”
offices
or
branches;
appointing
representatives
or
distributors
who
are
ASPAC
sold
electronic
products,
exported
by
ITEC,
to
their
sole
customer
PLDT.
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
or
who
in
any
calendar
year
stay
in
the
Philippines
One
year
into
the
second
term
of
the
parties’
Representative
Agreement,
ITEC
for
a
period
or
periods
totaling
one
hundred
eighty
(180)
days
or
more;
decided
to
terminate
the
same,
because
ASPAC
allegedly
violated
its
participating
in
the
management,
supervision
or
control
of
any
domestic
contractual
commitment
as
stipulated
in
their
agreements.
business
firm,
entity
or
corporation
in
the
Philippines,
and
any
other
act
or
acts
that
imply
a
continuity
or
commercial
dealings
or
arrangements
and
ITEC
filed
a
civil
case
against
the
petitioners
with
the
RTC
of
Makati
and
2
contemplate
to
that
extent
the
performance
of
acts
or
works,
or
the
exercise
of
charged
them
and
another
Philippine
corporation,
DIGITAL,
of
using
some
of
the
functions
normally
incident
to,
and
in
progressive
prosecution
of,
knowledge
and
information
of
ITEC’s
products
specifications
to
develop
their
commercial
gain
or
of
the
purpose
and
object
of
the
business
organization.”
1.
own
line
of
equipment
and
product
support,
which
are
similar,
if
not
identical
Soliciting,
2.
Opening
offices,
3.
Appointing
representatives
who
stay
in
the
Phil.
to
ITEC’s
own,
and
offering
them
to
ITEC’s
former
customer.
A
MTD
the
For
180
days,
4.
Participating
in
the
management
of
domestic
business
complaint
was
filed
by
CMDI,
et
al.
on
the
following
grounds:
(1)
that
plaintiff
has
no
legal
capacity
to
sue
as
it
is
a
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Omnibus
Investments
Code,
Sec.
1:
Philippines
without
the
required
BOI
authority
and
SEC
license,
and
(2)
that
“(1)
A
foreign
firm
is
deemed
not
engaged
in
business
in
the
Philippines
if
it
plaintiff
is
simply
engaged
in
forum
shopping
which
justifies
the
application
transacts
business
through
middlemen,
acting
in
their
own
names,
such
as
against
it
of
the
principle
of
“forum
non
conveniens.”
CMDI,
et
al.
argue
that
indebtors,
commercial
bookers
or
commercial
merchants.
since
plaintiff
has
no
capacity
to
bring
suit
here,
the
Philippines
is
not
the
“most
(2)
A
foreign
corporation
is
deemed
not
“doing
business”
if
its
representative
convenient
forum”
because
the
trial
court
is
devoid
of
any
power
to
enforce
its
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
has
an
independent
status
in
that
it
transacts
orders
issued
or
decisions
rendered
in
a
case
that
could
not
have
been
business
in
its
name
and
for
its
account.”
commenced
to
begin
with.
RTC
of
Makati
issued
an
Order:
(1)
denying
the
MTD,
and
(2)
directing
the
2
Petitioner
Aguirre
is
also
the
President
of
DIGITAL.
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issuance
of
a
writ
of
preliminary
injunction.
CA
affirmed
the
ruling
of
the
lower
whether
the
foreign
corporation
is
continuing
the
body
or
substance
of
the
court.
business
or
enterprise
for
which
it
was
organized.
ISSUES:
When
a
foreign
corporation
enters
into
a
single
or
isolated
transaction
or
1.
Whether
ITEC
is
an
unlicensed
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Philippines?
occasional,
incidental,
or
casual
transactions,
which
do
not
come
within
the
2.
If
it
is,
whether
this
fact
bars
it
from
invoking
the
injunctive
authority
of
our
meaning
of
the
law,
the
foreign
corporation
is
deemed
not
engaged
in
business
courts?
in
the
Philippines.
Where
a
single
act
or
transaction,
however,
is
not
merely
incidental
or
casual
but
indicates
the
foreign
corporation’s
intention
to
do
HELD:
other
business
in
the
Philippines,
said
single
act
or
transaction
constitutes
1.
Yes.
Generally,
a
“foreign
corporation”
has
no
legal
existence
within
the
state
“doing”
or
“engaging
in”
or
“transacting”
business
in
the
Philippines.
in
which
it
is
foreign.
This
proceeds
from
the
principle
that
juridical
existence
of
a
foreign
corporation
is
confined
within
the
territory
of
the
state
under
whose
The
SC
is
persuaded
to
conclude
that
ITEC
had
been
“engaged
in”
or
“doing
laws
it
was
incorporated
and
organized,
and
it
has
no
legal
status
beyond
such
business”
in
the
Philippines.
This
is
the
inevitable
result
after
a
scrutiny
of
the
territory.
Before
a
foreign
corporation
can
transact
business
in
the
Philippines,
different
contracts
and
agreements
entered
into
by
ITEC
with
its
various
it
must
first
obtain
a
license
to
transact
business
in
the
Philippines,
and
a
business
contacts
in
the
country.
Its
arrangements,
with
these
entities
indicate
certificate
from
the
appropriate
government
agency.
If
it
transacts
business
in
convincingly
ITEC’s
purpose
to
bring
about
the
situation
among
its
customers
the
Philippines
without
such
a
license,
it
shall
not
be
permitted
to
maintain
or
and
the
general
public
that
they
are
dealing
directly
with
ITEC,
and
that
ITEC
is
intervene
in
any
action,
suit,
or
proceeding
in
any
court
or
administrative
actively
engaging
in
business
in
the
country.
agency
of
the
Philippines,
but
it
may
be
sued
on
any
valid
cause
of
action
3
recognized
under
Philippine
laws.
A
perusal
of
the
agreements
between
ASPAC
and
the
ITEC
shows
that
there
are
provisions
(ex.
“No
Competing
Product”
provision)
which
are
highly
However,
the
SC
has
not
altogether
prohibited
a
foreign
corporation
not
licensed
to
do
business
in
the
Philippines
from
suing
or
maintaining
an
action
in
Philippine
Courts.
What
it
seeks
to
prevent
is
a
foreign
corporation
doing
“[S]oliciting
orders,
purchases,
service
contracts,
opening
offices,
whether
called
business
in
the
Philippines
without
a
license
from
gaining
access
to
Philippine
“liaison”
offices
or
branches;
appointing
representatives
or
distributors
who
are
Courts.
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
or
who
in
any
calendar
year
stay
in
the
Philippines
for
a
period
or
periods
totaling
one
hundred
eighty
(180)
days
or
more;
participating
in
the
management,
supervision
or
control
of
any
domestic
The
purpose
of
the
law
in
requiring
that
foreign
corporations
doing
business
in
business
firm,
entity
or
corporation
in
the
Philippines,
and
any
other
act
or
acts
the
Philippines
be
licensed
to
do
so
and
that
they
appoint
an
agent
for
service
that
imply
a
continuity
or
commercial
dealings
or
arrangements
and
contemplate
of
process
is
to
subject
the
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
to
that
extent
the
performance
of
acts
or
works,
or
the
exercise
of
some
of
the
Philippines
to
the
jurisdiction
of
its
courts.
The
object
is
not
to
prevent
the
functions
normally
incident
to,
and
in
progressive
prosecution
of,
commercial
foreign
corporation
from
performing
single
acts,
but
to
prevent
it
from
gain
or
of
the
purpose
and
object
of
the
business
organization.”
acquiring
a
domicile
for
the
purpose
of
business
without
taking
steps
Acts
that
do
not
constitute
“doing
business
in
the
Philippines”;
Section
1
(f)
(1)
and
1
(f)
necessary
to
render
it
amenable
to
suit
in
the
local
courts.
(2)
of
the
Rules
and
Regulations
Implementing
the
Omnibus
Investments
Code
of
1987,
the
following:
4 “(1)
A
foreign
firm
is
deemed
not
engaged
in
business
in
the
Philippines
if
it
transacts
The
true
test
of
what
constitutes
“doing
business
in
the
Philippines”
is
business
through
middlemen,
acting
in
their
own
names,
such
as
indebtors,
commercial
bookers
or
commercial
merchants.
3
Section
133
of
the
Corporation
Code.
(2)
A
foreign
corporation
is
deemed
not
“doing
business”
if
its
representative
4
Acts
that
constitute
“doing
business
in
the
Philippines”;
Article
44
of
the
Omnibus
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
has
an
independent
status
in
that
it
transacts
Investments
Code
of
1987:
business
in
its
name
and
for
its
account.”
CONFLICT
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restrictive
in
nature,
such
as
to
reduce
ASPAC
to
a
mere
extension
or
Thus,
having
acquired
jurisdiction,
it
is
now
for
the
Philippine
Court,
based
on
instrument
of
ITEC.
the
facts
of
the
case,
whether
to
give
due
course
to
the
suit
or
dismiss
it,
on
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens.
Hence,
the
Philippine
Court
may
According
to
petitioner,
the
Philippine
Court
has
no
venue
to
apply
its
refuse
to
assume
jurisdiction
in
spite
of
its
having
acquired
jurisdiction.
discretion
whether
to
give
cognizance
or
not
to
the
present
action,
because
it
Conversely,
the
court
may
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
if
it
chooses
to
has
not
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
plaintiff
in
the
case,
the
do
so;
provided,
that
the
following
requisites
are
met:
1)
That
the
Philippine
latter
allegedly
having
no
personality
to
sue
before
Philippine
Courts.
Court
is
one
to
which
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to;
2)
That
the
Philippine
Court
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
2.
No,
Petitioner
ASPAC
is
however,
barred
by
estoppel.
Petitioner’s
insistence
and
the
facts;
and,
3)
That
the
Philippine
Court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
power
on
the
dismissal
of
this
action
due
to
the
application,
or
non-‐application,
of
the
to
enforce
its
decision.
private
international
law
rule
of
forum
non
conveniens
defies
well-‐settled
rules
of
fair
play.
The
aforesaid
requirements
having
been
met,
and
in
view
of
the
court’s
disposition
to
give
due
course
to
the
questioned
action,
the
matter
of
the
Firstly,
the
court
has
already
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
plaintiff
in
the
suit,
present
forum
not
being
the
“most
convenient”
as
a
ground
for
the
suit’s
by
virtue
of
his
filing
the
original
complaint.
Secondly,
notwithstanding
such
dismissal,
deserves
scant
consideration.
finding
that
ITEC
is
doing
business
in
the
country,
petitioners
are
nonetheless
estopped
from
raising
this
fact
to
bar
ITEC
from
instituting
this
injunction
case
32.
FIRST
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
V.
CA
against
it.
A
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Philippines
may
sue
in
G.R.
No.
115849
|
January
24,
1996
Philippine
Courts
although
not
authorized
to
do
business
here
against
a
Philippine
citizen
or
entity,
who
had
contracted
with
and
benefited
by
said
N.B.:
2
REQUISITES
WHEN
THE
COURT
WILL
REFUSE
TO
ASSUME
JURISDICTION:
corporation.
One
who
has
dealt
with
a
corporation
of
foreign
origin
as
a
1.
When
it
is
in
inconvenient
forum
corporate
entity
is
estopped
to
deny
its
corporate
existence
and
capacity.
2.
There
is
another
available
convenient
forum
The
rule
is
deeply
rooted
in
the
time-‐honored
axiom
of
Commodum
ex
injuria
FACTS:
sua
non
habere
debet
-‐
no
person
ought
to
derive
any
advantage
of
his
own
Producers
Bank
(now
called
First
Philippine
International
Bank),
which
has
been
wrong.
This
is
as
it
should
be
for
as
mandated
by
law,
“every
person
must
in
the
under
conservatorship
since
1984,
is
the
owner
of
6
parcels
of
land.
The
Bank
exercise
of
his
rights
and
in
the
performance
of
his
duties,
act
with
justice,
give
had
an
agreement
with
Demetrio
Demetria
and
Jose
Janolo
for
the
two
to
everyone
his
due,
and
observe
honesty
and
good
faith.”
purchase
the
parcels
of
land
for
P5.5
million.
The
said
agreement
was
made
by
Demetria
and
Janolo
with
the
Bank’s
manager,
Mercurio
Rivera.
Later
however,
The
doctrine
of
lack
of
capacity
to
sue
based
on
the
failure
to
acquire
a
local
the
Bank,
through
its
conservator,
Leonida
Encarnacion,
sought
the
repudiation
license
is
based
on
considerations
of
sound
public
policy.
The
license
of
the
agreement
as
it
alleged
that
Rivera
was
not
authorized
to
enter
into
such
requirement
was
imposed
to
subject
the
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
an
agreement,
hence
there
was
no
valid
contract
of
sale.
Subsequently,
the
Philippines
to
the
jurisdiction
of
its
courts.
Demetria
and
Janolo
sued
Producers
Bank.
The
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
Demetria
et
al.
The
Bank
filed
an
appeal
with
the
CA.
By
entering
into
the
“Representative
Agreement”
with
ITEC,
Petitioner
is
charged
with
knowledge
that
ITEC
was
not
licensed
to
engage
in
business
Meanwhile,
Henry
Co,
who
holds
80%
shares
of
stocks
with
the
said
Bank,
filed
activities
in
the
country,
and
is
thus
estopped
from
raising
in
defense
such
a
motion
for
intervention
with
the
trial
court.
The
trial
court
denied
the
motion
incapacity
of
ITEC,
having
chosen
to
ignore
or
even
presumptively
take
since
the
trial
has
been
concluded
already
and
the
case
is
now
pending
appeal.
advantage
of
the
same.
Subsequently,
Co,
assisted
by
ACCRA
law
office,
filed
a
separate
civil
case
CONFLICT
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against
Demetria
and
Janolo
seeking
to
have
the
purported
contract
of
sale
be
“In
either
of
these
situations
(choice
of
venue
or
choice
of
remedy),
the
litigant
declared
unenforceable
against
the
Bank.
Demetria
et
al
argued
that
the
actually
shops
for
a
forum
of
his
action.
This
was
the
original
concept
of
the
second
case
constitutes
forum
shopping.
term
forum
shopping.
ISSUES:
“Eventually,
however,
instead
of
actually
making
a
choice
of
the
forum
of
their
Whether
there
is
forum
shopping
actions,
litigants,
through
the
encouragement
of
their
lawyers,
file
their
actions
in
all
available
courts,
or
invoke
all
relevant
remedies
simultaneously.
This
HELD:
practice
had
not
only
resulted
to
(sic)
conflicting
adjudications
among
different
Yes.
To
begin
with,
forum-‐shopping
originated
as
a
concept
in
private
courts
and
consequent
confusion
enimical
(sic)
to
an
orderly
administration
of
international
law,
where
non-‐resident
litigants
are
given
the
option
to
choose
justice.
It
had
created
extreme
inconvenience
to
some
of
the
parties
to
the
the
forum
or
place
wherein
to
bring
their
suit
for
various
reasons
or
excuses,
action.
including
to
secure
procedural
advantages,
to
annoy
and
harass
the
defendant,
to
avoid
overcrowded
dockets,
or
to
select
a
more
friendly
venue.
To
combat
“Thus,
‘forum-‐shopping’
had
acquired
a
different
concept
-‐
which
is
unethical
these
less
than
honorable
excuses,
the
principle
of
forum
non
conveniens
was
professional
legal
practice.
And
this
necessitated
or
had
given
rise
to
the
developed
whereby
a
court,
in
conflicts
of
law
cases,
may
refuse
impositions
formulation
of
rules
and
canons
discouraging
or
altogether
prohibiting
the
on
its
jurisdiction
where
it
is
not
the
most
“convenient”
or
available
forum
practice.”
and
the
parties
are
not
precluded
from
seeking
remedies
elsewhere.
What
therefore
originally
started
both
in
conflicts
of
laws
and
in
our
domestic
In
this
light,
Black’s
Law
Dictionary
says
that
forum-‐shopping
“occurs
when
a
law
as
a
legitimate
device
for
solving
problems
has
been
abused
and
misused
party
attempts
to
have
his
action
tried
in
a
particular
court
or
jurisdiction
to
assure
scheming
litigants
of
dubious
reliefs.
where
he
feels
he
will
receive
the
most
favorable
judgment
or
verdict.”
Hence,
according
to
Words
and
Phrases,
“a
litigant
is
open
to
the
charge
of
‘forum
33.
MANILA
HOTEL
CORP
V.
NLRC
shopping’
whenever
he
chooses
a
forum
with
slight
connection
to
factual
G.R.
No.
120077
|
October
13,
2000
circumstances
surrounding
his
suit,
and
litigants
should
be
encouraged
to
attempt
to
settle
their
differences
without
imposing
undue
expense
and
DOCTRINE:
Under
the
rule
of
forum
non
conveniens,
a
Philippine
court
or
vexatious
situations
on
the
courts.”
agency
may
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
if
it
chooses
to
do
so
provided:
(1)
that
the
Philippine
court
is
one
to
which
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to
In
the
Philippines,
forum-‐shopping
has
acquired
a
connotation
encompassing
(Are
the
parties
residents
or
nationals
of
the
state
of
the
court?);
(2)
that
the
not
only
a
choice
of
venues,
as
it
was
originally
understood
in
conflicts
of
laws,
Philippine
court
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
but
also
to
a
choice
of
remedies.
As
to
the
first
(choice
of
venues),
the
Rules
of
the
facts
(Is
the
state
of
the
court
where
the
contract
is
executed
and
Court,
for
example,
allow
a
plaintiff
to
commence
personal
actions
“where
the
performed?);
and
(3)
that
the
Philippine
court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
power
to
defendant
or
any
of
the
defendants
resides
or
may
be
found,
or
where
the
enforce
its
decision
(Does
the
court
have
jurisdiction
over
both
parties?).
The
plaintiff
or
any
of
the
plaintiffs
resides,
at
the
election
of
the
plaintiff”
(Rule
4,
conditions
are
unavailing
in
the
case
at
bar.
Sec.
2
[b]).
As
to
remedies,
aggrieved
parties,
for
example,
are
given
a
choice
of
pursuing
civil
liabilities
independently
of
the
criminal,
arising
from
the
same
set
FACTS:
of
facts.
A
passenger
of
a
public
utility
vehicle
involved
in
a
vehicular
accident
Marcelo
Santos
was
an
overseas
worker,
a
printer
at
the
Mazoon
Printing
may
sue
on
culpa
contractual,
culpa
aquiliana
or
culpa
criminal
-‐
each
remedy
Press,
Sultanate
of
Oman
when
he
was
directly
hired
by
the
Palace
Hotel,
being
available
independently
of
the
others
-‐
although
he
cannot
recover
more
Beijing
by
its
GM
Gerhard
Shmidt
as
he
was
recommended
by
Nestor
Buenio,
than
once.
his
friend.
By
virtue
of
a
"management
agreement,"
Manila
Hotel
Intl.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
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ATTY.
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AY
2015-‐2016
Company,
Ltd
(MHICL)
trained
the
personnel
and
staff
of
the
Palace
Hotel
at
then
employed.
He
was
hired
without
the
intervention
of
the
POEA
or
any
Beijing,
China.
Santos
resigned
from
Mazoon
and
thereafter
signed
an
authorized
recruitment
agency
of
the
government.
employment
contract
mailed
to
him
by
Mr.
Henk.
He
went
home
to
the
Philippines
then,
proceeded
to
Beijing.
The
contract
stated
it
would
be
for
a
Under
the
rule
of
forum
non
conveniens,
a
Philippine
court
or
agency
may
period
of
2
years.
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
if
it
chooses
to
do
so
provided:
(1)
that
the
Philippine
court
is
one
to
which
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to;
(2)
After
a
short
vacation
in
the
Phil
&
barely
a
year
into
the
contract,
Santos
was
that
the
Philippine
court
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
terminated
from
his
job
due
to
retrenchment,
and
repatriated
to
the
Phil.
the
law
and
the
facts;
and
(3)
that
the
Philippine
court
has
or
is
likely
to
have
Santos,
through
his
lawyer,
demanded
full
compensation
pursuant
to
the
power
to
enforce
its
decision.
The
conditions
are
unavailing
in
the
case
at
bar.
employment
agreement,
which
Shmidt
denied.
Santos
then
filed
a
complaint
with
the
NLRC
against
MHC,
MHICL,
the
Palace
Hotel
&
Shmidt
for
illegal
Not
Convenient—From
the
time
of
recruitment,
to
employment
to
dismissal
dismissal.
occurred
outside
the
Philippines.
The
inconvenience
is
compounded
by
the
fact
that
the
proper
defendants,
the
Palace
Hotel
and
MHICL
are
not
nationals
of
The
Labor
Arbiter
granted
payment
of
damages
to
Santos.
petitioners
appealed
the
Philippines.
Neither
are
they
"doing
business
in
the
Philippines."
Likewise,
to
the
NLRC,
arguing
that
the
POEA,
not
the
NLRC
had
jurisdiction
over
the
the
main
witnesses,
Mr.
Shmidt
and
Mr.
Henk
are
non-‐residents
of
the
case.
NLRC
thus,
declared
the
arbiter’s
decision
as
null
and
void
for
want
of
Philippines.
jurisdiction.
Santos
filed
a
MR
arguing
that
the
case
was
not
cognizable
by
the
POEA
as
he
was
not
an
"overseas
contract
worker."
NLRC
granted
the
motion
No
power
to
determine
applicable
law—Neither
can
an
intelligent
decision
be
and
reversed
itself,
finding
Santos
illegally
dismissed
&
recommended
that
he
made
as
to
the
law
governing
the
employment
contract
as
such
was
perfected
be
paid
actual
damages
equivalent
to
his
salaries
for
the
unexpired
portion
of
in
foreign
soil.
This
calls
to
fore
the
application
of
the
principle
of
lex
loci
his
contract.
contractus
(the
law
of
the
place
where
the
contract
was
made).
The
employment
contract
was
not
perfected
in
the
Philippines.
Santos
signified
his
Hence,
this
petition
for
certiorari to
annul
the
orders
of
the
NLRC
for
having
acceptance
by
writing
a
letter
while
he
was
in
Oman.
This
letter
was
sent
to
the
been
issued
without
or
with
excess
jurisdiction
and
with
grave
abuse
of
Palace
Hotel
in
the
People's
Republic
of
China.
discretion.
No
power
to
determine
the
facts—Neither
can
the
NLRC
determine
the
facts
ISSUE:
surrounding
the
alleged
illegal
dismissal
as
all
acts
complained
of
took
place
in
1.
Whether
the
NLRC
is
a
convenient
forum
Beijing,
People's
Republic
of
China.
The
NLRC
was
not
in
a
position
to
2.
Whether
Manila
Hotel
Corp.
is
liable
to
Santos
determine
whether
the
Tiannamen
Square
incident
truly
adversely
affected
operations
of
the
Palace
Hotel
as
to
justify
respondent
Santos'
retrenchment.
HELD:
1.
No,
the
NLRC
was
a
seriously
inconvenient
forum.
The
main
aspects
of
the
Principle
of
effectiveness,
no
power
to
execute
decision.
—
Even
assuming
that
case
transpired
in
two
foreign
jurisdictions
and
the
case
involves
purely
foreign
a
proper
decision
could
be
reached
by
the
NLRC,
such
would
not
have
any
elements.
The
only
link
that
the
Philippines
has
with
the
case
is
that
binding
effect
against
the
employer,
the
Palace
Hotel.
The
Palace
Hotel
is
a
respondent
Santos
is
a
Filipino
citizen.
The
Palace
Hotel
and
MHICL
are
foreign
corporation
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
China
and
was
not
even
served
corporations.
Not
all
cases
involving
our
citizens
can
be
tried
here.
with
summons.
Jurisdiction
over
its
person
was
not
acquired.
The
employment
contract—Santos
was
hired
directly
by
the
Palace
Hotel,
a
This
is
not
to
say
that
Philippine
courts
and
agencies
have
no
power
to
solve
foreign
employer,
through
correspondence
sent
to
Oman,
where
Santos
was
controversies
involving
foreign
employers.
Neither
are
we
saying
that
we
do
not
have
power
over
an
employment
contract
executed
in
a
foreign
country.
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If
Santos
were
an
"overseas
contract
worker,"
a
Philippine
forum,
specifically
34.
PACIFIC
CONSULTANTS
V.
SCHONFELD
the
POEA,
not
the
NLRC,
would
protect
him. He
is
not
an
"overseas
contract
G.R.
No.
166920
|
February
19,
2007
worker"
a
fact
which
he
admits
with
conviction.
N.B.:
Requisite
#
1
–
Plaintiff
is
a
resident
of
the
Philippines.
PPI
(employer)
is
a
Even
assuming
that
the
NLRC
was
the
proper
forum,
even
on
the
merits,
the
Philippine
Corporation
NLRC's
decision
cannot
be
sustained.
Requisite
#
2
–
The
employer
was
a
Philippine
Corporation.
Plaintiff
was
issued
2.
Granted.
Piercing
the
veil
of
corporate
fiction–fact
that
MHC
is
an
an
Alien
Employment
Permit
by
DOLE
(as
required
by
the
Omnibus
Rules
incorporator
&
owns
50%
of
the
capital
stock
of
MHICL
is
not
enough
to
pierce
Implementing
the
Labor
Code).
Thus,
the
applicable
law
is
the
Labor
Code.
As
the
veil.
Even
if
we
assume:
NLRC
had
jurisdiction
over
the
case
&
MHICL
was
claimed
by
respondent,
he
had
an
employment
contract
with
petitioner
PPI;
liable
for
Santos’
retrenchment,
still
MHC,
as
a
separate
&
distinct
juridical
otherwise,
petitioner
PPI
would
not
have
filed
an
application
for
a
Permit
with
entity,
cannot
be
held
liable.
Piercing
the
veil
is
an
equitable
remedy.
When
the
the
DOLE.
Petitioners
are
thus
estopped
from
alleging
that
the
PCIJ,
not
notion
of
legal
entity
is
used
to
defeat
public
convenience,
justify
wrong,
petitioner
PPI,
had
been
the
employer
of
respondent
all
along.
protect
fraud,
or
defend
crime,
the
law
will
regard
the
corp.
as
an
association
of
persons.
It
is
done
only
when
the
corp
is
a
mere
alter
ego
or
business
Requisite
#
3
–
The
NLRC/Court
had
jurisdiction
over
the
parties.
conduit
of
a
person
or
another
corp.
FACTS:
Clear
&
convincing
evidence
is
needed
to
pierce
the
veil
of
corporate
fiction.
Schonfeld
is
a
Canadian
citizen.
Pacicon
Philippines,
Inc.
(PPI)
is
a
corporation
There
is
no
such
evidence
to
show
that
MHICL
&
MHC
are
1
&
the
same
entity.
duly
established
and
incorporated
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
Philippines
and
is
a
subsidiary
of
Pacific
Consultants
International
of
Japan
Test
to
enable
piercing
of
the
veil,
except
in
express
agency,
estoppel
or
direct
(PCIJ).
tort:
a)
Control,
not
mere
majority
or
complete
domination;
b)
Such
control
must
have
been
used
by
the
defendant
to
commit
fraud
or
wrong,
etc.;
c)
The
In
1997,
PCIJ
decided
to
engage
in
consultancy
services
for
water
and
aforesaid
control
&
breach
of
duty
must
approximately
cause
the
injury
or
sanitation
in
the
Philippines.
Schonfeld
was
employed
by
PCIJ
as
PPI
Sector
unjust
loss
complained
of.
Manager
in
its
Water
and
Sanitation
Department.
His
salary
was
to
be
paid
partly
by
PPI
and
PCIJ.
Fact
that
the
Palace
Hotel
is
a
member
of
the
Manila
Hotel
Group
is
not
enough
to
pierce
the
corporate
veil
–
there
is
no
evidence
to
show
that
they
are
1
&
the
In
January
1998,
Henrichsen
sent
a
letter
of
employment
to
Schonfeld
in
same
entity.
Canada.
Schonfeld
made
some
revisions,
signed
the
contract,
and
sent
a
copy
to
Henrichsen.
The
arbitration
clause
of
the
contract
provides
that
“any
Contrary
to
what
Santos
claims
that
MHICL
signed
his
employment
contract,
question
of
interpretation,
understanding
or
fulfillment
of
the
conditions
of
MHICL
Vice-‐President
signed
as
a
mere
witness
under
the
word
‘noted’.
employment,
as
well
as
any
question
arising
between
the
Employee
and
the
Furthermore,
there
is
no
EER
between
Santos
&
MHICL.
Company
which
is
in
consequence
of
or
connected
with
his
employment
with
the
Company
and
cannot
be
settled
amicably,
is
to
be
finally
settled,
binding
to
both
parties
through
written
submissions,
by
the
Court
of
Arbitration
in
London.”
Schonfeld
received
his
compensation
from
PPI
and
was
also
reimbursed
for
the
expenses
he
incurred
in
connection
with
his
work
as
sector
manager.
He
CONFLICT
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reported
for
work
in
Manila
except
for
occasional
assignments
abroad,
and
them.
received
instructions
from
Henrichsen.
On
May
5,
1999,
Schonfeld
received
a
letter
from
Henrichsen
informing
him
that
his
employment
had
been
In
the
instant
case,
no
restrictive
words
like
"only,"
"solely,"
"exclusively
in
terminated
effective
Aug.
4,
1999.
However,
on
July
24,
1999,
Henrichsen,
this
court,"
"in
no
other
court
save
—,"
"particularly,"
"nowhere
else
requested
him
to
stay
put
in
his
job
after
Aug.
5,
1999.
Schonfeld
continued
his
but/except
—,"
or
words
of
equal
import
were
stated
in
the
contract.
It
work
with
PPI
until
Oct.
1,
1999.
cannot
be
said
that
the
court
of
arbitration
in
London
is
an
exclusive
venue
to
bring
forth
any
complaint
arising
out
of
the
employment
contract.
Thus,
Schonfeld
filed
with
PPI
several
money
claims,
including
unpaid
salary,
leave
pay,
air
fare
from
Manila
to
Canada,
and
cost
of
shipment
of
goods
to
Petitioners
contend
that
respondent
Schonfeld
should
have
filed
his
complaint
Canada.
PPI
partially
settled
some
of
his
claims
(US$5,635.99),
but
refused
to
in
his
place
of
permanent
residence,
or
where
the
PCIJ
holds
its
principal
office,
pay
the
rest.
In
2000,
he
filed
a
Complaint
for
Illegal
Dismissal
against
PPI
and
at
the
place
where
the
contract
of
employment
was
signed,
in
London
as
stated
Henrichsen
with
the
Labor
Arbiter.
in
their
contract.
By
enumerating
possible
venues
where
Schonfeld
could
have
filed
his
complaint,
petitioners
themselves
admitted
that
the
provision
on
Labor
Arbiter:
The
employment
contract
between
Schonfeld
and
PCIJ
was
venue
in
the
employment
contract
is
merely
permissive.
controlling.
Since
the
parties
had
agreed
that
any
differences
regarding
employer-‐employee
relationship
should
be
submitted
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
As
for
petitioners’
insistence
on
the
application
of
the
principle
of
forum
non
court
of
arbitration
in
London,
only
the
court
of
arbitration
in
London
has
conveniens,
the
same
must
be
rejected.
The
bare
fact
that
Schonfeld
is
a
jurisdiction.
NLRC
affirmed.
However,
on
appeal,
the
CA
held
that
the
parties
Canadian
citizen
and
was
a
repatriate
does
not
warrant
the
application
of
the
were
not
precluded
from
bringing
a
case
related
thereto
in
other
venues.
The
principle
for
the
following
reasons:
venue
is
not
exclusive,
since
there
is
no
stipulation
that
the
complaint
cannot
be
filed
in
any
other
forum
other
than
in
the
Philippines.
(1)
The
Labor
Code
of
the
Philippines
does
NOT
include
forum
non
conveniens
as
a
ground
for
the
dismissal
of
the
complaint.
(2)
The
propriety
of
dismissing
ISSUE:
a
case
based
on
this
principle
requires
a
factual
determination;
hence,
it
is
Whether
the
labor
arbiter
has
jurisdiction
over
Schonfeld’s
claim
despite
the
properly
considered
as
defense.
(3)
In
Bank
of
America,
NT&SA,
Bank
of
undisputed
fact
that
Schonfeld,
a
foreign
national,
was
hired
abroad
by
a
America
International,
Ltd.
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
the
Court
held
that
foreign
corporation,
executed
his
employment
contract
abroad,
and
had
the
Philippine
Court
may
assume
jurisdiction
over
the
case
if
it
chooses
to
do
agreed
that
any
dispute
between
them
“shall
finally
be
settled
by
the
court
of
so
if
the
following
requisites
are
met:
(1)
the
Philippine
Court
is
one
to
which
arbitration
in
London”
the
parties
may
conveniently
resort
to;
(2)
the
Philippine
Court
is
in
a
position
to
make
an
intelligent
decision
as
to
the
law
and
the
facts;
and,
HELD:
Yes.
The
settled
rule
on
stipulations
regarding
venue,
as
held
in
the
vintage
case
of
Philippine
Banking
Corporation
v.
Tensuan,
is
that
while
they
are
WHICH/WHAT
LAW
THE
ASSUMING
COURT
WILL
APPLY
considered
valid
and
enforceable,
venue
stipulations
in
a
contract
do
NOT,
as
a
rule,
supersede
the
general
rule
set
forth
in
Rule
4
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court
in
the
absence
of
qualifying
or
restrictive
words.
They
should
be
35.
AZNAR
V.
CHRISTENSEN-‐GARCIA
considered
merely
as
an
agreement
on
additional
forum,
not
as
limiting
G.R.
No.
L-‐16749
|
January
31,
1963
venue
to
the
specified
place.
They
are
not
exclusive
but
rather
permissive.
If
the
intention
of
the
parties
were
to
restrict
venue,
there
must
be
FACTS:
accompanying
language
clearly
and
categorically
expressing
their
purpose
Edward
Christensen,
born
in
New
York,
migrated
to
California
where
he
resided
and
design
that
actions
between
them
be
litigated
only
at
the
place
named
by
and
consequently
was
considered
citizen
thereof.
He
came
to
the
Philippines
CONFLICT
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where
he
became
a
domiciliary
until
the
time
of
his
death.
However,
during
the
entire
period
of
his
residence
in
this
country,
he
had
always
considered
himself
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
a
citizen
of
California.
the
order
of
succession
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
In
his
will,
Edward
instituted
his
daughter
Maria
Lucy
Christensen
as
his
only
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
heir,
but
left
a
legacy
of
P3600
in
favor
of
Helen
Christensen
Garcia
who,
in
his
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
will
was
described
as
"not
in
any
way
related
to"
him
but
in
a
decision
rendered
country
where
said
property
may
be
found.
by
the
SC
in
another
case
had
been
declared
as
an
acknowledged
natural
daughter
of
his.
The
laws
of
California
have
prescribed
two
sets
of
laws
for
its
citizens,
one
for
residents
therein
and
another
for
those
domiciled
in
other
jurisdictions.
Art.
Helen
alleged
that
the
will
deprives
her
of
her
legitime
as
an
acknowledged
946
of
the
California
Civil
Code
is
its
conflict
of
laws
rule,
while
the
rule
natural
child.
She
claims
that
under
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
California
law
applied
in
Kaufman,
is
its
internal
law.
If
the
law
on
succession
and
the
conflict
should
be
applied,
and
in
accordance
therewith
and
following
the
doctrine
of
of
laws
rules
of
California
are
to
be
enforced
jointly,
each
in
its
own
intended
the
renvoi,
the
question
of
the
validity
of
the
testamentary
provision
in
and
appropriate
sphere,
the
principle
cited
in
Kaufman
should
apply
to
question
should
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
decedent's
domicile,
which
citizens
living
in
the
State,
but
Art.
946
should
apply
to
such
of
its
citizens
as
is
the
Philippines.
The
question
of
the
validity
of
the
testamentary
provision
are
not
domiciled
in
California
but
in
other
jurisdictions.
should
thus
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
decedent’s
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines.
She
invokes
the
provisions
of
Art.
946
of
the
Civil
Code
of
The
national
law
mentioned
in
Art.
16
is
the
law
on
conflict
of
laws
in
the
California,
which
is
as
follows:
“If
there
is
no
law
to
the
contrary,
in
the
place
California
Civil
Code,
i.e.,
Art.
946,
which
authorizes
the
reference
or
return
of
where
personal
property
is
situated,
it
is
deemed
to
follow
the
person
of
its
the
question
to
the
law
of
the
testator's
domicile.
The
conflict
of
laws
rule
in
owner,
and
is
governed
by
the
law
of
his
domicile.”
Accordingly,
her
share
must
California,
Art.
946,
Civil
Code,
precisely
refers
back
the
case,
when
a
decedent
be
increased
in
view
of
successional
rights
of
illegitimate
children
under
is
not
domiciled
in
California,
to
the
law
of
his
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines
Philippine
laws.
in
the
case
at
bar.
On
the
other
hand,
the
executor
and
Lucy
argue
that
the
national
law
of
the
The
Philippine
court
therefore
must
apply
its
own
law
as
directed
in
the
deceased
must
apply,
and
thus
the
courts
must
apply
internal
law
of
California
conflict
of
laws
rule
of
the
state
of
the
decedent.
Wherefore,
the
decision
on
the
matter.
Under
California
law,
there
are
no
compulsory
heirs
and
appealed
from
is
hereby
reversed
and
the
case
returned
to
the
lower
court
with
consequently
a
testator
may
dispose
of
his
property
by
will
in
the
form
and
instructions
that
the
partition
be
made
as
the
Philippine
law
on
succession
manner
he
desires
(Kaufman
Case).
provides.
ISSUE:
36.
BELLIS
V.
BELLIS
Whether
Philippine
law
should
ultimately
be
applied
G.R.
No.
L-‐23678
|
June
6,
1967
HELD:
FACTS:
Yes.
Edward
was
a
US
Citizen
and
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
his
Amos
Bellis
was
a
citizen
and
resident
of
Texas
at
the
time
of
his
death.
He
death.
The
law
that
governs
the
validity
of
his
testamentary
dispositions
is
had
5
legitimate
children
with
his
first
wife,
Mary
Mallen,
whom
he
divorced.
defined
in
Art.
16,
CC,
which
is
as
follows:
He
had
3
legitimate
daughters
with
his
second
wife,
Violet,
who
survived
him,
and
another
3
illegitimate
children
with
another
woman.
Before
he
died,
he
ART.
16.
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
executed
2
wills—the
first
one
disposing
of
his
Texas
properties,
the
other
of
the
country
where
it
is
situated.
disposing
his
Philippine
properties.
In
his
will,
which
he
executed
in
the
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Philippines,
he
directed
that
after
all
taxes,
obligations,
and
expenses
of
country
wherein
said
property
may
be
found.
administration
are
paid
for,
his
distributable
estate
should
be
divided,
in
trust,
in
the
following
order
and
manner:
a)
$240,000.00
to
his
first
wife
Mary
Mallen
As
a
counter-‐argument,
appellants
invoked
Art.
17,
Par.
3,
of
the
Civil
Code,
b)
$120,000.00
to
his
three
illegitimate
children
Amos
Bellis,
Jr.,
Maria
Cristina
stating—
Bellis,
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
or
$40,000.00
each,
and
c)
After
foregoing
the
two
items
have
been
satisfied,
the
remainder
shall
go
to
his
seven
surviving
children
Prohibitive
laws
concerning
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
those
by
his
first
and
second
wives.
which
have
for
their
object
public
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
shall
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
Maria
Cristina
Bellis
and
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
filed
their
respective
oppositions
by
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
a
foreign
country.
to
the
project
of
partition
on
the
ground
that
they
were
deprived
of
their
legitimes
as
illegitimate
children
and,
therefore,
compulsory
heirs
of
the
However,
it
is
evident
that
whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
deceased.
involved
in
our
System
of
legitimes
(that
is
the
public
policy
that
a
compulsory
heir
cannot
be
deprived
of
his
legitime),
Congress
has
not
intended
to
extend
The
lower
court
issued
an
order
overruling
the
oppositions
and
approving
the
the
same
to
the
succession
of
foreign
nationals.
For
it
has
specifically
chosen
executor’s
final
account,
report
and
administration,
and
project
of
partition.
to
leave,
inter
alia,
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
to
the
decedent's
Relying
upon
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
it
applied
the
national
law
of
the
national
law.
Specific
provisions
must
prevail
over
general
ones.
A
provision
in
decedent,
which
in
this
case
did
not
provide
for
legitimes.
a
foreigner's
will
to
the
effect
that
his
properties
shall
be
distributed
in
accordance
with
Philippine
law
and
not
with
his
national
law,
is
illegal
and
void,
ISSUE:
for
his
national
law
cannot
be
ignored
in
regard
to
those
matters
that
Article
Whether
such
illegitimate
children
of
Bellis
be
entitled
to
successional
rights
10—now
Article
16—of
the
Civil
Code
states
said
national
law
should
govern.
HELD:
In
this
regard,
the
parties
do
not
submit
the
case
on,
nor
even
discuss,
the
No.
The
said
illegitimate
children
are
not
entitled
to
their
legitimes.
Under
doctrine
of
renvoi,
applied
by
this
Court
in
Aznar
v.
Christensen.
Said
doctrine
is
Texas
law,
there
are
no
legitimes.
Even
if
the
other
will
was
executed
in
the
usually
pertinent
where
the
decedent
is
a
national
of
one
country,
and
a
Philippines,
his
national
law,
still,
will
govern
the
properties
for
succession
even
domicile
of
another.
In
the
present
case,
it
is
not
disputed
that
the
decedent
if
it
is
stated
in
his
testate
that
it
shall
be
governed
by
the
Philippine
law.
was
both
a
national
of
Texas
and
a
domicile
thereof
at
the
time
of
his
death. So
that
even
assuming
Texas
has
a
conflict
of
law
rule
providing
that
the
Art.16,
Par.
2
renders
applicable
the
national
law
of
the
decedent,
in
intestate
domiciliary
system
(law
of
the
domicile)
should
govern,
the
same
would
not
and
testamentary
successions,
with
regard
to
four
items:
(a)
the
order
of
result
in
a
reference
back
(renvoi)
to
Philippine
law,
but
would
still
refer
to
succession,
(b)
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
(c)
the
intrinsic
validity
of
Texas
law.
Nonetheless,
if
Texas
has
a
conflicts
rule
adopting
the
situs
theory
provisions
of
will,
and
(d)
the
capacity
to
succeed.
(lex
rei
sitae)
calling
for
the
application
of
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
properties
are
situated,
renvoi
would
arise,
since
the
properties
here
involved
ART.16
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
of
are
found
in
the
Philippines.
In
the
absence,
however,
of
proof
as
to
the
conflict
the
country
to
where
it
is
situated.
of
law
rule
of
Texas,
it
should
not
be
presumed
different
from
ours.
Appellants'
position
is
therefore
not
rested
on
the
doctrine
of
renvoi.
As
stated,
they
never
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
invoked
nor
even
mentioned
it
in
their
arguments.
Rather,
they
argue
that
their
the
order
of
successions
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
case
falls
under
the
circumstances
mentioned
in
the
third
paragraph
of
Article
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
17
in
relation
to
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code.
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
CONFLICT
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56
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37.
CADALIN
V.
POEA
ADMINISTRATOR
projects
in
several
countries
in
the
Middle
East
as
well
as
in
Southeast
Asia,
in
G.R.
No.
L-‐104776
|
December
5,
1994
Indonesia
and
Malaysia.
The
case
arose
when
their
overseas
employment
contracts
were
terminated
even
before
their
expiration.
Under
Bahrain
law,
DOCTRINE:
GR:
A
foreign
procedural
law
will
not
be
applied
in
the
forum.
where
some
of
the
complainants
were
deployed,
the
prescriptive
period
for
claims
arising
out
of
a
contract
of
employment
is
one
year.
EXC:
Law
on
prescription
of
actions
is
sui
generis
and
may
be
viewed
procedural
or
substantive
depending
on
its
characterization.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether
it
is
the
Bahrain
law
on
prescription
of
action
based
on
the
Amiri
EXC
TO
THE
EXC:
The
characterization
is
irrelevant
when
the
country
of
the
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
(1
year)
or
a
Philippine
law
on
prescription
that
shall
be
forum
has
a
"borrowing
statute,"
the
country
of
the
forum
will
apply
the
foreign
the
governing
law.
statute
of
limitations.
2.
Whether
the
prescriptive
period
governing
the
filing
of
the
claims
is
3
years,
as
provided
by
the
Labor
Code
or
10
years,
as
provided
by
the
NCC.
EXC
TO
THE
EXC
TO
THE
EXC:
The
court
of
the
forum
will
not
enforce
any
foreign
3.
Whether
it
is
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts,
which
became
the
law
of
claim
obnoxious
to
the
forum's
public
policy.
the
parties,
or
the
Amiri
Decree,
which
is
more
favorable
and
beneficial
to
the
workers,
that
shall
be
enforced.
FACTS:
On
June
6,
1984,
Bienvenido
M.
Cadalin,
Rolando
M.
Amul
and
Donato
B.
HELD:
Evangelista,
in
their
own
behalf
and
on
behalf
of
728
other
overseas
contract
1.
Philippine
law.
Art.
156
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
provides:
A
claim
workers
(OCWs)
instituted
a
class
suit
by
filing
an
"Amended
Complaint"
with
arising
out
of
a
contract
of
employment
shall
not
be
actionable
after
the
lapse
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration
(POEA)
for
money
claims
of
one
year
from
the
date
of
the
expiry
of
the
contract.
arising
from
their
recruitment
by
AIBC
and
employment
by
BRII.
As
a
general
rule,
a
foreign
procedural
law
will
not
be
applied
in
the
forum.
BRII
is
a
foreign
corporation
with
headquarters
in
Houston,
Texas,
and
is
Procedural
matters,
such
as
service
of
process,
joinder
of
actions,
period
and
engaged
in
construction;
while
AIBC
is
a
domestic
corporation
licensed
as
a
requisites
for
appeal,
and
so
forth,
are
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
forum.
service
contractor
to
recruit,
mobilize
and
deploy
Filipino
workers
for
overseas
This
is
true
even
if
the
action
is
based
upon
a
foreign
substantive
law.
employment
on
behalf
of
its
foreign
principals.
However,
a
law
on
prescription
of
actions
is
sui
generis
in
Conflict
of
Laws
in
The
amended
complaint
principally
sought
the
payment
of
the
unexpired
the
sense
that
it
may
be
viewed
either
as
procedural
or
substantive,
portion
of
the
employment
contracts,
which
was
terminated
prematurely,
and
depending
on
the
characterization
given
such
a
law.
secondarily,
the
payment
of
the
interest
of
the
earnings
of
the
Travel
and
Reserved
Fund,
interest
on
all
the
unpaid
benefits;
area
wage
and
salary
Thus
in
Bournias
v.
Atlantic
Maritime
Company,
the
American
court
applied
the
differential
pay;
fringe
benefits;
refund
of
SSS
and
premium
not
remitted
to
the
statute
of
limitations
of
New
York,
instead
of
the
Panamanian
law,
after
finding
SSS;
refund
of
withholding
tax
not
remitted
to
the
BIR;
penalties
for
committing
that
there
was
no
showing
that
the
Panamanian
law
on
prescription
was
prohibited
practices;
as
well
as
the
suspension
of
the
license
of
AIBC
and
the
intended
to
be
substantive.
Being
considered
merely
a
procedural
law
even
in
accreditation
of
BRII.
Panama,
it
has
to
give
way
to
the
law
of
the
forum
on
prescription
of
actions.
EASIER
FACTS:
Cadalin
et
al.
are
overseas
contract
workers
recruited
by
However,
the
characterization
of
a
statute
into
a
procedural
or
substantive
respondent-‐appellant
AIBC
for
its
accredited
foreign
principal,
Brown
&
Root,
law
becomes
irrelevant
when
the
country
of
the
forum
has
a
"borrowing
on
various
dates
from
1975
to
1983.
As
such,
they
were
all
deployed
at
various
statute."
Said
statute
has
the
practical
effect
of
treating
the
foreign
statute
of
limitation
as
one
of
substance.
A
"borrowing
statute"
directs
the
state
of
the
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57
ATTY.
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2015-‐2016
forum
to
apply
the
foreign
statute
of
limitations
to
the
pending
claims
based
The
claims
in
the
cases
at
bench
all
arose
from
the
employer-‐employee
on
a
foreign
law.
While
there
are
several
kinds
of
"borrowing
statutes,"
one
relations,
which
is
broader
in
scope
than
claims
arising
from
a
specific
law
or
form
provides
that
an
action
barred
by
the
laws
of
the
place
where
it
accrued,
from
the
collective
bargaining
agreement.
The
contention
of
the
POEA
will
not
be
enforced
in
the
forum
even
though
the
local
statute
has
not
run
Admin,
that
the
3-‐year
prescriptive
period
under
Art.
291
of
the
LC
applies
against
it.
Sec.
48
of
our
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
is
of
this
kind,
which
provides:
only
to
money
claims
specifically
recoverable
under
said
Code,
does
not
find
If
by
the
laws
of
the
state
or
country
where
the
cause
of
action
arose,
the
action
support
in
the
plain
language
of
the
provision.
is
barred,
it
is
also
barred
in
the
Philippines
Islands.
3.
The
overseas-‐employment
contracts
should
be
read
as
adopting
the
Sec.
48
has
not
been
repealed
or
amended
by
the
NCC.
Art.
2270
of
said
Code
provisions
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
as
part
and
parcel
thereof.
NLRC
repealed
only
those
provisions
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedures
as
to
which
were
applied
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976,
which
provides
for
greater
benefits
inconsistent
with
it.
There
is
no
provision
in
the
NCC,
which
is
inconsistent
with
than
those
stipulated
in
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts
of
the
claimants.
It
or
contradictory
to
Section
48
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
(Paras,
Philippine
was
of
the
belief
that
"where
the
laws
of
the
host
country
are
more
favorable
Conflict
of
Laws
104
[7th
ed.]).
and
beneficial
to
the
workers,
then
the
laws
of
the
host
country
shall
form
part
of
the
overseas
employment
contract."
It
quoted
with
approval
the
observation
However,
in
the
light
of
the
1987
Constitution,
Section
48
cannot
be
enforced
of
the
POEA
Administrator
that
"...in
labor
proceedings,
all
doubts
in
the
ex
proprio
vigore
(by
its
own
force)
insofar
as
it
ordains
the
application
in
this
implementation
of
the
provisions
of
the
Labor
Code
and
its
implementing
jurisdiction
of
Sec.
156
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976.
The
courts
of
the
regulations
shall
be
resolved
in
favor
of
labor."
forum
will
not
enforce
any
foreign
claim
obnoxious
to
the
forum's
public
policy.
To
enforce
the
one-‐year
prescriptive
period
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
AIBC
and
BRII
claimed
that
NLRC
acted
capriciously
and
whimsically
when
it
of
1976
as
regards
the
claims
in
question
would
contravene
the
public
policy
on
refused
to
enforce
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts,
which
became
the
law
the
protection
to
labor.
The
1987
Constitution
emphasized
that:
The
state
shall
of
the
parties.
They
contend
that
the
principle
that
a
law
is
deemed
to
be
a
part
promote
social
justice
in
all
phases
of
national
development
(Sec.
10).
The
state
of
a
contract
applies
only
to
provisions
of
Philippine
law
in
relation
to
contracts
affirms
labor
as
a
primary
social
economic
force.
It
shall
protect
the
rights
of
executed
in
the
Philippines.
workers
and
promote
their
welfare
(Sec.
18).
The
State
shall
afford
full
protection
to
labor,
local
and
overseas,
organized
and
unorganized,
and
The
overseas-‐employment
contracts,
which
were
prepared
by
AIBC
and
BRII
promote
full
employment
and
equality
of
employment
opportunities
for
all
(Art.
themselves,
provided
that
the
laws
of
the
host
country
became
applicable
to
XIII,
Sec.
3).
said
contracts
if
they
offer
terms
and
conditions
more
favorable
that
those
stipulated
therein.
It
was
stipulated
in
said
contracts
that:
2.
3
years.
The
claimants
are
of
the
view
that
the
applicable
provision
is
Art.
1144,
NCC,
which
provides:
The
following
actions
must
be
brought
within
ten
“...the
benefits
provided
to
Employee
hereunder
are
substituted
for
years
from
the
time
the
right
of
action
accrues:
(1)
Upon
a
written
contract;
(2)
and
in
lieu
of
all
other
benefits
provided
by
any
applicable
Upon
an
obligation
created
by
law;
(3)
Upon
a
judgment.
law,
provided
of
course,
that
total
remuneration
and
benefits
do
not
fall
below
that
of
the
host
country
regulation
or
custom,
it
being
NLRC,
on
the
other
hand,
believes
that
the
applicable
provision
is
Art.
291
of
understood
that
should
applicable
laws
establish
that
fringe
benefits,
or
the
LC,
which
in
pertinent
part
provides:
Money
claims-‐all
money
claims
arising
other
such
benefits
additional
to
the
compensation
herein
agreed
from
employer-‐employee
relations
accruing
during
the
effectivity
of
this
Code
cannot
be
waived,
Employee
agrees
that
such
compensation
will
be
shall
be
filed
within
three
years
from
the
time
the
cause
of
action
accrued,
adjusted
downward
so
that
the
total
compensation
hereunder,
plus
otherwise
they
shall
be
forever
barred.
the
non-‐waivable
benefits
shall
be
equivalent
to
the
compensation
herein
agreed.”
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Any
ambiguity
in
the
overseas-‐employment
contracts
should
be
interpreted
against
AIBC
and
BRII,
the
parties
that
drafted
it.
The
interpretation
of
obscure
FACTS:
words
or
stipulations
in
a
contract
shall
not
favor
the
party
who
caused
the
Petitioner
Esther
Kiobel,
representing
a
group
of
individuals
from
the
Ogoni
obscurity
(Art.
1377,
NCC).
region
in
Nigeria,
filed
a
class
action
lawsuit
under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute
(“ATS”)
against
Respondents,
the
Royal
Dutch
Petroleum
Co.,
Shell
Transport
The
parties
to
a
contract
may
select
the
law
by
which
it
is
to
be
governed.
In
and
Trading
Company
PLC,
and
Shell
Petroleum
Development
Company
of
such
a
case,
the
foreign
law
is
adopted
as
a
"system"
to
regulate
the
relations
Nigeria,
LTD
(“Royal
Dutch”),
which
allegedly
aided
and
abetted
the
Nigerian
of
the
parties,
including
questions
of
their
capacity
to
enter
into
the
contract,
Government
in
committing
violations
of
the
law
of
nations
in
Nigeria.
Royal
the
formalities
to
be
observed
by
them,
matters
of
performance,
and
so
forth.
Dutch
allegedly
aided
the
Nigerian
government
in
committing
various
acts
of
violence
against
protestors
of
the
oil
exploration
projects
in
the
Ogoni
region.
Instead
of
adopting
the
entire
mass
of
the
foreign
law,
the
parties
may
just
agree
that
specific
provisions
of
a
foreign
statute
shall
be
deemed
Petitioners
claim
that
they
have
standing
to
sue
under
the
ATS.
The
ATS
incorporated
into
their
contract
"as
a
set
of
terms."
By
such
reference
to
the
provides
that
"[t]he
district
courts
shall
have
original
jurisdiction
of
any
civil
provisions
of
the
foreign
law,
the
contract
does
not
become
a
foreign
contract
action
by
an
alien
for
a
tort
only,
committed
in
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
or
to
be
governed
by
the
foreign
law.
The
said
law
does
not
operate
as
a
statute
a
treaty
of
the
United
States."
In
other
words,
it
grants
jurisdiction
to
some
but
as
a
set
of
contractual
terms
deemed
written
in
the
contract
federal
courts
for
certain
violations
of
international
law.
Further,
because
the
history,
text,
and
purpose
of
the
statute
support
the
application
of
the
ATS
to
A
basic
policy
of
contract
is
to
protect
the
expectation
of
the
parties.
Such
party
actions
in
foreign
countries.
Petitioner
also
contends
that
previous
court
expectation
is
protected
by
giving
effect
to
the
parties'
own
choice
of
the
decisions
interpreted
the
ATS
to
extend
beyond
U.S.
territory.
In
response,
applicable
law.
The
choice
of
law
must,
however,
bear
some
relationship
to
the
Royal
Dutch
argues
that
the
ATS
is
not
an
exception
to
the
presumption
that
parties
or
their
transaction.
There
is
no
question
that
the
contracts
sought
to
U.S.
law
does
not
apply
extraterritorially,
and
should
not
be
applicable
to
be
enforced
by
claimants
have
a
direct
connection
with
the
Bahrain
law
actions
outside
of
the
U.S.
The
District
Court
dismissed
several
of
petitioners'
because
the
services
were
rendered
in
that
country.
claims,
but
on
interlocutory
appeal,
the
Second
Circuit
dismissed
the
entire
complaint,
reasoning
that
the
law
of
nations
does
not
recognize
corporate
38.
KIOBEL
V.
ROYAL
DUTCH
liability.
This
Court
granted
certiorari,
and
ordered
supplemental
briefing
on
No.
10-‐1491
|
April
17,
2013
whether
and
under
what
circumstances
courts
may
recognize
a
cause
of
action
under
the
ATS,
for
violations
of
the
law
of
nations
occurring
within
the
territory
DOCTRINE:
GR:
When
a
statute
gives
no
clear
indication
of
an
extraterritorial
of
a
sovereign
other
than
the
United
States.
application,
it
has
none.
There
is
a
presumption
against
extraterritoriality,
that
is
a
local
law
does
not
apply
extraterritorially.
The
presumption
"serves
to
ISSUE:
protect
against
unintended
clashes
between
our
laws
and
those
of
other
Whether
an
American
federal
court
can
hear
a
claim
under
the
Alien
Tort
nations
which
could
result
in
international
discord."
statute,
when
that
claim
arose
out
of
conduct
in
a
foreign
country
EXC:
When
a
statute
gives
a
clear
indication
of
an
extraterritorial
application.
HELD:
No.
The
presumption
against
extraterritoriality
applies
to
claims
under
the
ATS,
Nothing
in
the
ATS's
text
evinces
a
clear
indication
of
extraterritorial
reach.
and
nothing
in
the
statute
rebuts
that
presumption.
Violations
of
the
law
of
nations
affecting
aliens
can
occur
either
within
or
outside
the
United
States.
And
generic
terms,
like
"any"
in
the
phrase
"any
civil
Passed
as
part
of
the
Judiciary
Act
of
1789,
the
ATS
is
a
jurisdictional
statute
action,"
do
not
rebut
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality.
that
creates
no
causes
of
action.
It
permits
federal
courts
to
"recognize
private
claims
[for
a
modest
number
of
international
law
violations]
under
federal
CONFLICT
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common
law.”
In
contending
that
a
claim
under
the
ATS
does
not
reach
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States
or
any
other
country,
applying
U.
S.
law
to
conduct
occurring
in
a
foreign
sovereign's
territory,
respondents
rely
on
the
pirates
does
not
typically
impose
the
sovereign
will
of
the
US
onto
conduct
presumption
against
extraterritorial
application,
which
provides
that
“[w]hen
a
occurring
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
another
sovereign,
and
therefore
statute
gives
no
clear
indication
of
an
extraterritorial
application,
it
has
none,"
carries
less
direct
foreign
policy
consequences.
A
1795
opinion
of
Attorney
The
presumption
"serves
to
protect
against
unintended
clashes
between
our
General
William
Bradford
regarding
the
conduct
of
U.
S.
citizens
on
both
the
laws
and
those
of
other
nations
which
could
result
in
international
discord."
It
high
seas
and
a
foreign
shore
is
at
best
ambiguous
about
the
ATS's
is
typically
applied
to
discern
whether
an
Act
of
Congress
regulating
conduct
extraterritorial
application;
it
does
not
suffice
to
counter
the
weighty
concerns
applies
abroad,
see,
e.g.,
but
its
underlying
principles
similarly
constrain
courts
underlying
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality.
Finally,
there
is
no
when
considering
causes
of
action
that
may
be
brought
under
the
ATS.
Indeed,
indication
that
the
ATS
was
passed
to
make
the
United
States
a
uniquely
the
danger
of
unwarranted
judicial
interference
in
the
conduct
of
foreign
policy
hospitable
forum
for
the
enforcement
of
international
norms.
is
magnified
in
this
context,
where
the
question
is
not
what
Congress
has
done
but
what
courts
may
do.
These
foreign
policy
concerns
are
not
diminished
by
the
fact
that
Sosa
limited
federal
courts
to
recognizing
causes
of
action
only
for
V.
FOREIGN
LAW
alleged
violations
of
international
law
norms
that
are
"`specific,
universal,
and
obligatory."
ASCERTAINMENT
AND
PROOF
OF
FOREIGN
LAW;
The
presumption
is
not
rebutted
by
the
text,
history,
or
purposes
of
the
ATS.
DOCTRINE
OF
PROCESSUAL
PRESUMPTION
Nothing
in
the
ATS's
text
evinces
a
clear
indication
of
extraterritorial
reach.
Violations
of
the
law
of
nations
affecting
aliens
can
occur
either
within
or
39.
SY
JOC
LIENG
V.
PETRONILA
ENCARNACION,
GREGORIO
SY
QUIA
outside
the
United
States.
And
generic
terms,
like
"any"
in
the
phrase
"any
G.R.
No.
4718
|
March
19,
1910
civil
action,"
do
not
rebut
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality.
Petitioners
also
rely
on
the
common-‐law
"transitory
torts"
doctrine,
but
that
N.B.:
The
Chinese
Law
was
not
1.
alleged
and
2.
proven.
doctrine
is
inapposite
here;
as
the
Court
has
explained,
"the
only
justification
for
allowing
a
party
to
recover
when
the
cause
of
action
arose
in
another
The
evidence
were
not
sufficient
because:
civilized
jurisdiction
is
a
well-‐founded
belief
that
it
was
a
cause
of
action
in
that
(1)
The
evidence
of
the
Chinese
law
were
books
or
pamphlets
written
in
Chinese
place."
The
question
under
Sosa
is
not
whether
a
federal
court
has
jurisdiction
characters,
which
they
claim
contain
a
compilation
of
the
laws
of
China,
being
to
entertain
a
cause
of
action
provided
by
foreign
or
even
international
law.
useless
and
of
no
value.
The
question
is
instead
whether
the
court
has
authority
to
recognize
a
cause
of
(2)
It
may
be
that
contain,
as
plaintiff
claim,
the
laws
of
China,
but
we
have
no
action
under
U.
S.
law
to
enforce
a
norm
of
international
law.
That
question
is
Spanish
translation
of
them,
they
being
in
the
Chinese
language,
and
written
not
answered
by
the
mere
fact
that
the
ATS
mentions
torts.
with
characters
which
are
absolutely
unknown
to
this
court
and
to
the
defendants.
The
historical
background
against
which
the
ATS
was
enacted
also
does
not
(3)
There
is
no
evidence
that
these
four
books
or
pamphlets
were
printed
by
overcome
the
presumption.
When
the
ATS
was
passed,
"three
principal
authority
of
the
Chinese
Government
or
offenses
against
the
law
of
nations"
had
been
identified
by
Blackstone:
(4)
that
they
have
been
duly
authenticated
by
the
certificate
of
competent
violation
of
safe
conducts,
infringement
of
the
rights
of
ambassadors,
and
authorities
or
piracy.
Prominent
contemporary
examples
of
the
first
two
offenses
—
(5)
that
they
are
properly
sealed
with
the
seal
of
the
nation
to
which
they
immediately
before
and
after
passage
of
the
ATS
—
provide
no
support
for
the
belong.
For
this
reason
the
said
books
or
pamphlets
can
not,
under
any
proposition
that
Congress
expected
causes
of
action
to
be
brought
under
the
circumstances,
be
considered
as
documentary
proof
of
the
laws
of
China.
statute
for
violations
of
the
law
of
nations
occurring
abroad.
And
although
the
offense
of
piracy
normally
occurs
on
the
high
seas,
beyond
the
territorial
CONFLICT
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The
oral
testimonies
were
also
not
sufficient
to
establish
the
foreign
law
ISSUES:
because:
Should
the
estate
of
Vicente
Romero
Sy
Quia,
deceased,
be
distributed
in
(1)
they
were
unable
to
say
positively
at
least
that
the
book
contains
an
exact
accordance
with
Chinese
laws?
copy
of
the
original.
N.B.:
Summary
of
rulings
are
provided
at
the
end
in
case
Gulapa
asks
for
them
st
(2)
The
1
witness
he
had
never
made
a
regular
study
of
the
laws
of
his
country,
during
recitation
simply
consulting
the
same
in
connection
with
his
official
reports,
admitted
that
he
had
never
read
or
seen
the
original
copy
of
this
alleged
compilation,
the
HELD:
books
not
being
duly
certified,
adding
that
he
could
not
say
whether
the
book
No.
The
plaintiffs
in
this
case
have
invoked
certain
provisions
of
the
Chinese
was
an
exact
copy
of
the
original.
laws
as
one
of
the
grounds
of
the
action
by
them
instituted
and
now
contend
nd
(3)
The
2
witness,
the
interpreter,
as
to
the
written
and
unwritten
laws
of
that
the
estate
of
Vicente
Romero
Sy
Quia,
deceased,
should
be
distributed
in
China,
does
not
show,
as
required
by
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
that
he
knew
accordance
with
the
laws
of
that
country.
Even
disregarding
the
fact
that
the
such
laws
or
that
he
was
acquainted
with
the
nature
of
the
laws
alleged
to
be
plaintiffs
should
have,
but
have
not,
alleged
in
their
complaint,
as
one
of
the
contained
in
the
said
books.
He
merely
confined
himself
to
expressing
his
own
facts
constituting
their
cause
of
action,
the
existence
of
a
law
passed
and
opinion
with
reference
to
the
two
classes
of
laws.
promulgated
in
China,
the
existence
of
which
law,
being
foreign,
should
have
been
alleged
in
the
complaint,
the
fact
remains
that
there
is
absolutely
no
SUMMARY
OF
FACTS:
evidence
in
the
record
as
to
the
existence
of
the
Chinese
laws
referred
to
by
1847
–
married
in
china
plaintiffs
in
their
subsequent
pleadings,
the
evidence
of
this
character
1853
–
married
in
the
Philippines
to
a
Filipina
introduced
by
them
consisting
of
books
or
pamphlets
written
in
Chinese
1894
–
died
characters
and
marked
"Exhibits
AH,
AI,
AJ,
and
AK,’
which
they
claim
contain
a
compilation
of
the
laws
of
China,
being
useless
and
of
no
value.
Plaintiffs
(all
chinese
citizens)
claim
that
they
are
the
heirs
of
Vicente
Romero
Sy
Quia,
being
married
to
Yap
Puan
Niu
in
or
about
the
year
1847
in
Amoy,
China;
thereby,
they
are
entitled
to
the
inheritance
left
by
Vicente.
On
the
It
may
be
that
contain,
as
plaintiff
claim,
the
laws
of
China,
but
we
have
no
other
hand,
defendants
(Filipinos)
are
as
found
by
the
lower
courts,
the
Spanish
translation
of
them,
they
being
in
the
Chinese
language,
and
written
legitimate
heirs
of
Vicente
as
he
was
married
to
Petronila
Encarnacion
(a
native
with
characters
which
are
absolutely
unknown
to
this
court
and
to
the
of
Vigan,
Ilocos
Sur)
on
June
9,
1853
as
shown
in
their
certificate
of
marriage.
defendants.
Further,
the
plaintiffs
have
not
prescribed
by
section
292
of
the
Plaintiffs
allege
that
they
are
the
rightful
heirs
and
that
the
subsequent
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
and,
finally,
there
is
no
evidence
that
these
four
books
marriage
of
Vicente
was
void.
Defendants
maintained
that
the
claim
of
the
or
pamphlets
were
printed
by
authority
of
the
Chinese
Government
or
that
plaintiffs
regarding
the
alleged
first
marriage
of
Vicente
were
fraudulent.
The
they
have
been
duly
authenticated
by
the
certificate
of
competent
authorities
plaintiffs
presented
witnesses
and
got
their
respective
depositions
in
China
to
or
that
they
are
properly
sealed
with
the
seal
of
the
nation
to
which
they
prove
that
the
first
marriage
took
place.
The
lower
courts
found
that
there
is
no
belong.
For
this
reason
the
said
books
or
pamphlets
can
not,
under
any
marriage
to
Yap
contrary
to
the
allegations
of
the
plaintiffs.
The
decision
is
circumstances,
be
considered
as
documentary
proof
of
the
laws
of
China.
(The
based
on
the
improbability
of
the
allegations
of
the
plaintiffs
that
Vicente
lived
Court
cited
sections
3004,
3015
and
3026
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure)
in
China
for
around
four
years
after
such
marriage.
There
being
no
valid
marriage
certificate
presented
and
the
testimonies
of
the
witnesses
presented
The
jurisprudence
of
American
and
Spanish
tribunals
is
uniform
on
this
subject:
contradict
each
other.
In
the
plaintiffs'
subsequent
pleadings,
they
prayed
that
"Whenever
a
foreign
law
is
invoked
in
our
tribunals,
its
existence
must
be
the
decision
be
reversed
and
that
the
properties
of
Vicente
be
distributed
to
satisfactory
established
as
any
other
fact.”
them
according
to
the
laws
of
China.
If
the
pamphlets
or
books,
written
in
Chinese
characters,
do
not
satisfactory
establish
the
existence
of
certain
Chinese
laws
invoked
by
the
plaintiffs,
not
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
61
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
only
because
such
pamphlets
or
books
lack
the
aforesaid
formalities
and
Article
816.
The
will
of
an
alien
who
is
abroad
produces
effect
in
the
Philippines
requisites,
but
further
because
there
is
no
evidence
as
to
the
nature
of
the
laws
if
made
with
the
formalities
prescribed
by
the
law
of
the
place
in
which
he
contained
in
those
books
or
pamphlets
and
the
subjects
with
which
they
deal;
resides,
or
according
to
the
formalities
observed
in
his
country,
or
in
conformity
on
the
other
hand,
the
two
witnesses
whose
testimony
was
introduced
for
the
with
those
which
this
Code
prescribes.
purpose
of
establishing
the
authenticity
of
the
laws
which,
according
to
the
plaintiffs,
are
contained
in
the
said
books,
were
unable
to
say
positively
at
least
Summary
of
Facts:
that
the
book
marked
Exhibit
AH
contains
an
exact
copy
of
the
original.
And
the
Emil
Johnson
died
in
the
City
of
Manila;
however
he
was
a
naturalized
Chinese
consul
of
this
city,
Sy
Int
Chu,
after
stating
that
he
had
never
made
a
American
citizen.
He
left
a
will
through
which
he
disposed
an
estate
valued
at
regular
study
of
the
laws
of
his
country,
simply
consulting
the
same
in
231,800php.
However,
the
will
was
signed
by
two
witnesses
instead
of
the
connection
with
his
official
reports,
admitted
that
he
had
never
read
or
seen
three
required
by
Sec.
618
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
However,
a
petition
the
original
copy
of
this
alleged
compilation,
the
books
not
being
duly
certified,
was
made
stating
that
the
will
was
made
in
conformity
with
US
Law,
thus
valid
adding
that
he
could
not
say
whether
the
book
marked.
"Exhibit
AH"
was
an
in
the
Philippines
as
provided
for
in
Section
636
in
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
exact
copy
of
the
original.
The
will
was
later
probated
and
declared
legal,
however
the
testator's
daughter,
Ebba
Ingeborg
entered
an
appearance,
claiming
that
as
a
legitimate
The
testimony
of
the
witness
Ly
Ung
Bing,
the
interpreter,
as
to
the
written
and
child
she
cannot
be
deprived
of
the
legitime
which
she
is
entitled
to
as
unwritten
laws
of
China,
does
not
show,
as
required
by
the
Code
of
Civil
provided
by
Philippine
law.
She
moved
to
annul
the
decree
of
probate
and
put
Procedure,
that
he
knew
such
laws
or
that
he
was
acquainted
with
the
nature
the
estate
into
intestate
administration
in
order
for
her
to
claim
the
estate
as
of
the
laws
alleged
to
be
contained
in
the
said
books.
He
merely
confined
the
sole
legitimate
heir
of
her
father.
himself
to
expressing
his
own
opinion
with
reference
to
the
two
classes
of
laws.
He,
not
being
an
expert
on
the
subject
throughly
conversant
with
the
laws
of
FACTS:
China,
his
testimony,
considering
the
manner
in
which
laws
of
China,
his
Emil
H.
Johnson,
a
native
of
Sweden
and
a
naturalized
citizen
of
the
United
testimony,
considering
the
manner
in
which
he
testified,
can
not
even
be
States,
died
in
the
city
of
Manila,
leaving
a
will
by
which
he
disposed
of
an
accepted
as
a
partial
evidence
that
the
said
four
books
really
contain
the
estate,
the
value
of
which
was
P231,800.
This
document
is
an
holographic
written
and
unwritten
laws
of
China.
instrument,
being
written
in
the
testator's
own
handwriting,
and
is
signed
by
himself
and
two
witnesses
only,
instead
of
three
witnesses
required
by
section
40.
IN
THE
MATTER
OF
THE
ESTATE
OF
EMIL
H.
JOHNSON.
EBBA
INGEBORG
618
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
This
will,
therefore,
was
not
executed
in
JOHNSON
conformity
with
the
provisions
of
law
generally
applicable
to
wills
executed
by
G.R.
No.
L-‐12767
|
November
16,
1918
inhabitants
of
these
Islands,
and
hence
could
not
have
been
proved
under
section
618.
ALG:
At
the
time
of
the
decision
of
this
case,
Phil.
courts
can
take
judicial
notice
of
US
Federal
Laws
because
it
was
then
a
colony.
Now,
the
Philippine
courts
However,
a
petition
was
presented
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
the
city
of
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
any
US
Law
except
under
certain
exceptions.
Manila
for
the
probate
of
this
will,
on
the
ground
that
Johnson
was
at
the
time
of
his
death
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Illinois,
United
States
of
America;
that
the
N.B.:
The
following
articles
govern
foreign
wills
now:
will
was
duly
executed
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
that
State;
and
hence
could
properly
be
probated
here
pursuant
to
section
636
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Article
17.
The
forms
and
solemnities
of
contracts,
wills,
and
other
public
Procedure.
This
section
reads
as
follows:
instruments
shall
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
they
are
executed.
Will
made
here
by
alien.
-‐
A
will
made
within
the
Philippine
Islands
by
a
citizen
or
subject
of
another
state
or
country,
which
is
executed
in
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
62
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
accordance
with
the
law
of
the
state
or
country
of
which
he
is
a
citizen
About
three
months
after
the
will
had
been
probated,
the
attorneys
for
Ebba
or
subject,
and
which
might
be
proved
and
allowed
by
the
law
of
his
Ingeborg
Johnson
entered
an
appearance
in
her
behalf
and
noted
an
exception
own
state
or
country,
may
be
proved,
allowed,
and
recorded
in
the
to
the
other
admitting
the
will
to
probate.
The
purpose
of
the
proceeding
on
Philippine
Islands,
and
shall
have
the
same
effect
as
if
executed
behalf
of
the
petitioner
is
to
annul
the
decree
of
probate
and
put
the
estate
according
to
the
laws
of
these
Islands.
into
intestate
administration,
thus
preparing
the
way
for
the
establishment
of
the
claim
of
the
petitioner
as
the
sole
legitimate
heir
of
her
father.
The
hearing
on
said
application
was
set
and
three
weeks
publication
of
notice
was
ordered
in
the
"Manila
Daily
Bulletin."
Witnesses
were
examined
relative
ISSUES:
to
the
execution
of
the
will.
Thereafter
the
document
was
declared
to
be
legal
Whether
the
will
was
executed
in
conformity
with
the
statutes
of
the
State
of
and
was
admitted
to
probate.
Victor
Johnson
was
appointed
sole
Illinois
administrator.
HELD:
By
virtue
of
the
will,
the
testator
bequeath
his
property
to
his
brother
Victor,
to
No?
It
does
not
affirmatively
appear
from
the
transaction
of
the
testimony
his
father
and
mother
in
Sweden,
to
his
daughter
Ebba
Ingeborg,
to
his
wife,
adduced
in
the
trial
court
that
any
witness
was
examined
with
reference
to
the
Alejandra
Ibañez,
if
she
remains
single
and
to
Simeona
Ibañez,
spinster,
if
she
law
of
Illinois
on
the
subject
of
the
execution
of
will.
The
trial
judge
no
doubt
remains
single.
The
rest
of
the
property
is
left
to
the
testator's
five
children
-‐
was
satisfied
that
the
will
was
properly
executed
by
examining
section
1874
of
Mercedes,
Encarnacion,
Victor,
Eleonor
and
Alberto.
the
Revised
Statutes
of
Illinois
and
he
may
have
assumed
that
he
could
take
judicial
notice
of
the
laws
of
Illinois
under
section
275
of
the
Code
of
Civil
The
biographical
facts
relative
to
the
deceased
necessary
to
an
understanding
Procedure.
If
so,
he
was
in
our
opinion
mistaken.
that
section
authorizes
the
of
the
case
are
these:
Emil
H.
Johnson
was
born
in
Sweden,
May
25,
1877,
from
courts
here
to
take
judicial
notice,
among
other
things,
of
the
acts
of
the
which
country
he
emigrated
to
the
United
States
and
lived
in
Chicago,
Illinois,
legislative
department
of
the
United
States.
These
words
clearly
have
reference
from
1893
to
1898.
On
May
9,
1898,
at
Chicago,
he
was
married
to
Rosalie
to
Acts
of
the
Congress
of
the
United
States;
and
we
would
hesitate
to
hold
Ackeson,
and
immediately
thereafter
embarked
for
the
Philippine
Islands
as
a
that
our
courts
can,
under
this
provision,
take
judicial
notice
of
the
multifarious
soldier
in
the
Army
of
the
United
States.
As
a
result
of
relations
between
laws
of
the
various
American
States.
Nor
do
we
think
that
any
such
authority
Johnson
and
Rosalie
Ackeson
a
daughter,
named
Ebba
Ingeborg,
was
born.
can
be
derived
from
the
broader
language,
used
in
the
same
action,
where
it
is
said
that
our
courts
may
take
judicial
notice
of
matters
of
public
knowledge
After
Johnson
was
discharged
as
a
soldier
from
the
service
of
the
United
States
"similar"
to
those
therein
enumerated.
The
proper
rule
we
think
is
to
require
he
continued
to
live
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
on
November
20,
1902,
the
proof
of
the
statutes
of
the
States
of
the
American
Union
whenever
their
wife,
Rosalie
Johnson,
was
granted
a
decree
of
divorce
from
him
in
the
Circuit
provisions
are
determinative
of
the
issues
in
any
action
litigated
in
the
Court
of
Cook
County,
Illinois,
on
the
ground
of
desertion.
A
little
later
Johnson
Philippine
courts.
appeared
in
the
United
States
on
a
visit
and
on
January
10,
1903,
procured
a
certificate
of
naturalization
at
Chicago.
After
a
short
trip
to
Sweden,
the
Nevertheless,
even
supposing
that
the
trial
court
may
have
erred
in
taking
deceased
returned
to
Manila,
where
he
prospered
in
business
and
continued
to
judicial
notice
of
the
law
of
Illinois
on
the
point
in
question,
such
error
is
not
live
until
his
death.
now
available
to
the
petitioner,
first,
because
the
petition
does
not
state
any
fact
from
which
it
would
appear
that
the
law
of
Illinois
is
different
from
what
In
this
city
he
appears
to
have
entered
into
marital
relations
with
Alejandra
the
court
found,
and,
secondly,
because
the
assignment
of
error
and
Ibañez,
by
whom
he
had
three
children:
Mercedes,
Encarnacion
and
Victor.
The
argument
for
the
appellant
in
this
court
raises
no
question
based
on
such
other
two
children
(Eleonor
and
Alberto)
mentioned
in
the
will
were
borne
to
supposed
error.
the
deceased
by
Simeona
Ibañez.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
63
ATTY.
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GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
The
petitioner,
it
is
true,
states
in
general
terms
that
the
will
in
question
is
41.
IN
THE
MATTER
ESTATE
OF
EDWARD
RANDOLPH
HIX,
DECEASED.
invalid
and
inadequate
to
pass
real
and
personal
property
in
the
State
of
A.W.
FLUEMER
V.
ANNIE
COUSHING
HIX
Illinois,
but
this
is
merely
a
conclusion
of
law.
The
affidavits
by
which
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐3263
|
March
17,
1930
petition
is
accompanied
contain
no
reference
to
the
subject,
and
we
are
cited
to
no
authority
in
the
appellant's
brief
which
might
tent
to
raise
a
doubt
as
to
DOCTRINES:
The
submission
of
the
aforementioned
copy
of
the
law
was
far
the
correctness
of
the
conclusion
of
the
trial
court.
It
is
very
clear,
therefore,
from
a
compliance
with
the
law.
The
laws
of
a
foreign
jurisdiction
do
not
prove
that
this
point
cannot
be
urged
as
of
serious
moment.
themselves
in
our
courts.
The
courts
of
the
Philippine
Islands
are
not
authorized
to
take
judicial
notice
of
the
laws
of
the
various
States
of
the
American
Union.
But
it
is
insisted
in
the
brief
for
the
appellant
that
the
will
in
question
was
not
Such
laws
must
be
proved
as
facts.
properly
admissible
to
probate
because
it
contains
provisions
which
cannot
be
given
effect
consistently
with
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands;
and
it
is
There
was
no
showing
that
the
book
from
which
an
extract
was
taken
was
suggested
that
as
the
petitioner
is
a
legitimate
heir
of
the
testator
she
cannot
printed
or
published
under
the
authority
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
as
be
deprived
of
the
legitime
to
which
she
is
entitled
under
the
law
governing
provided
in
section
300
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
Nor
was
the
extract
from
testamentary
successions
in
these
Islands.
Upon
this
point
it
is
sufficient
to
say
the
law
attested
by
the
certificate
of
the
officer
having
charge
of
the
original,
that
the
probate
of
the
will
does
not
affect
the
intrinsic
validity
of
its
provisions,
under
the
seal
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
as
provided
in
section
301
of
the
the
decree
of
probate
being
conclusive
only
as
regards
the
due
execution
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
No
evidence
was
introduced
to
show
that
the
extract
will.
from
the
laws
of
West
Virginia
was
in
force
at
the
time
the
alleged
will
was
executed.
If,
therefore,
upon
the
distribution
of
this
estate,
it
should
appear
that
any
legacy
given
by
the
will
or
other
disposition
made
therein
is
contrary
to
the
law
FACTS:
applicable
in
such
case,
the
will
must
necessarily
yield
upon
that
point
and
the
The
special
administrator
of
the
estate
of
Edward
Randolph
Hix
appeals
from
a
law
must
prevail.
Nevertheless,
it
should
not
be
forgotten
that
the
intrinsic
decision
of
Judge
of
First
Instance
Tuason
denying
the
probate
of
the
alleged
validity
of
the
provisions
of
this
will
must
be
determined
by
the
law
of
Illinois
last
will
and
testament
of
the
deceased.
and
not,
as
the
appellant
apparently
assumes.
It
is
settled
that
in
legal
and
testamentary
successions,
with
regard
to
the
order
of
succession,
as
well
as
to
It
is
the
theory
of
the
petitioner
that
the
alleged
will
was
executed
in
Elkins,
the
amount
of
the
successional
rights
and
to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
their
West
Virginia,
on
November
3,
1925,
by
Hix
who
had
his
residence
in
that
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
laws
of
the
nation
of
the
person
whose
jurisdiction,
and
that
the
laws
of
West
Virginia
govern.
To
this
end,
there
was
succession
is
in
question,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
the
submitted
a
copy
of
section
3868
of
Acts
1882,
c.
84
as
found
in
West
Virginia
country
where
it
may
be
situate.
Code,
Annotated,
by
Hogg,
Charles
E.,
vol.
2,
1914,
p.
1690,
and
as
certified
to
by
the
Director
of
the
National
Library.
Given
the
matters
discussed
hereinabove,
the
trial
court
committed
no
error
in
denying
the
relief
sought.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
will
should
be
allowed
probate
in
the
Philippines
despite
the
absence
of
proof
showing
compliance
with
the
laws
of
West
Virginia
for
the
execution
of
wills?
HELD:
No.
The
submission
of
the
aforementioned
copy
of
the
law
was
far
from
a
compliance
with
the
law.
The
laws
of
a
foreign
jurisdiction
do
not
prove
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themselves
in
our
courts.
The
courts
of
the
Philippine
Islands
are
not
the
presentation
of
other
competent
evidence
to
prove
the
existence
of
foreign
authorized
to
take
judicial
notice
of
the
laws
of
the
various
States
of
the
law
(i.e.
as
long
as
the
court
is
“satisfied”
with
the
evidence
presented).
Hence,
American
Union.
Such
laws
must
be
proved
as
facts.
(In
re
Estate
of
Johnson
the
law
may
be
proved
by
expert
testimony
(i.e.
practicing
lawyer)
[1918],
39
Phil.,
156.)
Here
the
requirements
of
the
law
were
not
met.
There
accompanied
by
a
copy
of
the
particular
law
being
cited.
On
the
other
hand,
was
no
showing
that
the
book
from
which
an
extract
was
taken
was
printed
the
court
was
not
satisfied
with
the
evidence
presented
in
the
Hix
case
(i.e.
or
published
under
the
authority
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
as
provided
in
testimony
of
the
special
administrator
and
West
Virginia
Code,
Annotated,
and
section
300
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
Nor
was
the
extract
from
the
law
as
certified
to
by
the
Director
of
the
National
Library)
attested
by
the
certificate
of
the
officer
having
charge
of
the
original,
under
the
seal
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
as
provided
in
section
301
of
the
Code
FACTS:
of
Civil
Procedure.
No
evidence
was
introduced
to
show
that
the
extract
from
This
case
involves
the
liability
of
A.H.
Muzzal,
a
former
resident
of
the
State
of
the
laws
of
West
Virginia
was
in
force
at
the
time
the
alleged
will
was
California,
now
residing
in
the
Philippines,
for
obligations
contracted
by
Meyer-‐
executed.
Muzzal
Company,
a
California
corporation,
on
5
Nov
1928
and
22
Dec
1928
with
Willamette
Iron
&
Steel
Works.
Stanley
Hermann,
a
CPA/auditor
hired
by
It
was
also
necessary
for
the
petitioner
to
prove
that
the
testator
had
his
Meyer-‐
Muzzal
Company
on
said
dates,
testified
that
A.H.
Muzzal
subscribed
domicile
in
West
Virginia
and
not
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
The
only
evidence
and
owned
1,433
out
of
the
5,000
Meyer-‐Muzzal
Company
shares
(par
value
of
introduced
to
establish
this
fact
consisted
of
the
recitals
in
the
alleged
will
and
$10
each)
at
the
time
the
obligations
were
contracted.
Willamette
seeks
to
the
testimony
of
the
petitioner.
Also
in
beginning
administration
proceedings
recover
under
Sec.
322
of
the
Civil
Code
of
California,
which
provides:
originally
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
the
petitioner
violated
his
own
theory
by
attempting
to
have
the
principal
administration
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
SEC.
322.
Each
stockholder
of
a
corporation
is
individually
and
personally
liable
for
such
proportion
of
all
its
debts
and
liabilities
42.
WILLIAMETTE
v.
MUZZAL
contracted
or
incurred
during
the
time
he
was
a
stockholder
as
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐42538
|
May
21,
1935
amount
of
stock
or
shares
owned
by
him
bears
to
the
whole
of
the
subscribed
capital
stock
or
shares
of
the
corporation.
Any
creditor
of
DOCTRINE:
GR:
Foreign
law
must
be
proven
in
accordance
with
the
procedure
the
corporation
may
institute
joint
or
several
actions
against
any
of
its
under
the
Rules
of
Court.
stockholders,
for
the
proportion
of
his
claim
payable
by
each,
and
in
such
action
the
court
must
(1)
ascertain
the
proportion
of
the
claim
or
EXC
#1:
A
reading
of
sections
300
and
301
of
our
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
will
debt
for
which
each
defendant
is
liable,
and
(2)
a
several
judgment
convince
one
that
these
sections
do
not
exclude
the
presentation
of
other
must
be
rendered
against
each,
in
conformity
therewith.
If
any
competent
evidence
to
prove
the
existence
of
a
foreign
law.
stockholder
pays
his
proportion
of
any
debt
due
from
the
corporation,
incurred
while
he
was
such
stockholder,
he
is
relieved
from
any
The
foreign
law
is
a
matter
of
fact
...
You
ask
the
witness
what
the
law
is;
he
further
personal
liability
for
such
debt,
and
if
an
action
has
been
may
from
his
recollection,
or
on
producing
and
referring
to
books,
say
what
it
is.
brought
against
him
upon
such
debt,
it
must
be
dismissed,
as
to
him,
upon
his
paying
the
costs,
or
such
proportion
thereof
as
may
be
N.B.:
Other
than
the
lawyer’s
testimony,
an
annotated
Civil
Code
of
California
properly
chargeable
against
him.
The
liability
of
each
stockholder
is
was
also
presented
as
evidence.
The
law
was
deemed
proved.
determined
by
the
amount
of
stock
or
shares
owned
by
him
at
the
time
the
debt
or
liability
was
incurred;
and
such
liability
is
not
released
Kyna’s
notes:
Comparison
between
Hix
and
Muzzal
case
–
Although
it
is
by
any
subsequent
transfer
of
stock.
desirable
that
that
foreign
law
be
proved
in
accordance
with
Rule
132
Section
24,
the
Supreme
Court
held
in
Muzzal
that
the
foregoing
rule
does
not
exclude
The
CFI
of
Zamboanga
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
Willamette;
hence
this
CONFLICT
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appeal
by
A.H.
Muzzal.
Company
inc.
And
as
part
of
his
testimony,
a
full
quotation
of
the
cited
section
was
offered
in
evidence.
This
was
held
to
be
sufficient
proof.
ISSUES:
Whether
the
lower
court
erred
in
finding
that
plaintiff
has
proven
the
existence
FACTS:
of
the
foreign
law
involved
in
this
action
Walter
G.
Stevenson,
born
in
the
Philippines
of
British
parents
and
married
in
Manila
to
Beatrice
Mauricia
Stevenson,
another
British
subject,
died
in
1951
in
HELD:
San
Francisco,
California,
USA,
where
he
and
his
wife
established
their
No.
Mr.
Arthur
W.
Bolton,
an
attorney-‐at-‐law
of
San
Francisco,
California,
since
permanent
residence
since
1945.
In
his
probated
will
(executed
in
SF,
probated
the
year
1918,
under
oath,
quoted
verbatim
section
322
of
the
California
Civil
in
Superior
Court
of
California),
Stevenson
instituted
his
wife
Beatrice
as
his
Code
and
stated
that
said
section
was
in
force
at
the
time
the
obligations
of
the
sole
heiress
to
several
real
and
personal
properties
(2
parcels
of
land
in
Baguio,
defendant
to
the
plaintiff
were
incurred,
i.e.,
on
November
5,
1928
and
shares
of
stock,
credit,
and
cash)
acquired
by
the
spouses
while
residing
in
the
December
22,
1928.
This
evidence
sufficiently
established
the
fact
that
the
Philippines.
section
in
question
was
the
law
of
the
State
of
California
on
the
above
dates.
A
reading
of
sections
300
and
301
of
our
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
will
convince
In
1951,
ancillary
administration
proceedings
were
instituted
in
CFI
Manila
for
one
that
these
sections
do
not
exclude
the
presentation
of
other
competent
the
settlement
of
the
estate
in
the
Philippines.
The
will
was
admitted
to
evidence
to
prove
the
existence
of
a
foreign
law.
probate
and
Ian
Murray
Statt
was
appointed
ancillary
administrator.
Statt
filed
a
preliminary
estate
and
inheritance
tax
return
with
the
reservation
of
having
"The
foreign
law
is
a
matter
of
fact
...
You
ask
the
witness
what
the
law
is;
he
the
properties
declared
finally
appraised
at
their
values
6
months
after
the
may
from
his
recollection,
or
on
producing
and
referring
to
books,
say
what
it
death
of
Stevenson.
The
preliminary
return
was
made
in
order
to
secure
the
is."
(Lord
Campbell
concurring
in
an
opinion
of
Lord
Chief
Justice
Denman
in
a
waiver
of
the
CIR
on
the
inheritance
tax
due
on
210k
shares
of
stock
in
the
well
known
English
case
where
a
witness
was
called
upon
to
prove
the
Roman
Mindanao
Mother
Lode
Mines
Inc.
(MMLMI)
which
the
estate
desired
to
laws
of
marriage
and
was
permitted
to
testify,
though
he
referred
to
a
book
dispose
in
the
US.
The
CIR
accepted
the
valuation
of
the
personal
properties
containing
the
decrees
of
the
Council
of
Trent
as
controlling,
Jones
on
declared
in
the
return,
but
increased
the
appraisal
of
the
2
parcels
of
land
in
Evidence,
Second
Edition,
Volume
4,
pages
3148-‐3152.)
Aside
from
the
Baguio
City.
Ultimately,
the
estate
was
assessed
an
estate
tax
of
5.15k
and
testimony
of
Attorney
Bolton
Ragland's
Annotated
Civil
Code
of
California
inheritance
tax
of
10.9k,
both
of
which
paid
by
the
estate
in
1952.
was
presented
as
evidence.
This
book
contains
that
State's
Civil
Code
as
adopted
March
21,
1872,
with
the
subsequent
official
statute
amendments
to
The
ancillary
administrator
filed
an
amended
estate
and
inheritance
tax
return
and
including
the
year
1929.
in
pursuance
of
the
reservation
he
made
and
Sec.
91
of
the
NIRC.
The
amended
return
reduced
the
value
of
the
shares
of
stock
in
MMLMI
from
0.38
per
share
43.
CIR
v
FISHER
to
0.20,
based
on
the
market
notation
of
the
stock
obtaining
at
the
SF
G.R.
No.
L-‐11622
|
January
28,
1961
California
Stock
Exchange
6
months
after
the
death
of
Stevenson.
Statt
likewise
made
claim
for
several
deductions
in
the
form
of
funeral
and
judicial
expenses,
In
the
case
at
bar,
to
prove
the
pertinent
California
law,
Attorney
Allison
Gibbs,
real
estate
tax,
and
claims
against
the
estate.
counsel
for
Fisher,
testified
that
as
an
active
member
of
the
California
Bar
since
1931,
he
is
familiar
with
the
revenue
and
taxation
laws
of
the
State
of
Beatrice
assigned
all
her
rights
and
interests
in
the
estate
to
spouses
Douglas
California.
When
asked
by
the
lower
court
to
state
the
pertinent
California
law
and
Bettina
Fisher.
as
regards
exemption
of
intangible
personal
properties,
the
witness
cited
nd
article
4,
section
13851
(a)
and
(b)
of
the
California
Internal
and
Revenue
Code
In
1953,
the
ancillary
administrator
filed
a
2
amended
return
containing
new
as
published
in
Derring's
California
Code,
a
publication
of
the
Bancroft-‐Whitney
claims
for
additional
exemption
and
deduction
to
wit:
(1)
deduction
in
the
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amount
of
P4,000.00
from
the
gross
estate
of
the
decedent
as
provided
for
in
the
Tax
Court,
the
pertinent
English
law
that
allegedly
vests
in
the
decedent
Section
861
(4)
of
the
U.S.
Federal
Internal
Revenue
Code
which
the
ancillary
husband
full
ownership
of
the
properties
acquired
during
the
marriage
has
administrator
averred
was
allowable
by
way
of
the
reciprocity
granted
by
not
been
proven
by
the
CIR.
Except
for
a
mere
allegation
in
his
answer,
which
Section
122
of
the
NIRC,
as
then
held
by
the
Board
of
Tax
Appeals
in
a
previous;
is
not
sufficient,
the
record
is
bereft
of
any
evidence
as
to
what
English
law
and
(2)
exemption
from
the
imposition
of
estate
and
inheritance
taxes
on
the
says
on
the
matter.
In
the
absence
of
proof,
the
Court
is
justified,
therefore,
shares
of
stock
in
the
MMLMI
also
pursuant
to
the
said
reciprocity
proviso.
In
in
indulging
in
what
Wharton
calls
"processual
presumption,"
in
presuming
this
last
return,
the
estate
claimed
that
it
was
liable
only
for
the
amount
of
that
the
law
of
England
on
this
matter
is
the
same
as
our
law.
P525.34
for
estate
tax
and
P238.06
for
inheritance
tax.
A
refund
of
15,259
was
requested
by
the
estate
but
was
denied
by
the
CIR.
CIR
can
neither
make
use
of
Art.
16
of
the
NCC
(art.
10
of
the
old
code)
to
bolster
his
stand.
A
reading
of
Art.
10,
which
is
applicable
in
this
case,
shows
The
Fishers,
as
assignees
of
Beatrice,
commenced
action
in
CFI
Manila
for
the
that
it
does
not
encompass
or
contemplate
to
govern
the
question
of
property
recovery
of
the
said
amount.
The
case
was
forwarded
to
the
CTA,
which
set
the
relation
between
spouses.
Said
article
distinctly
speaks
of
amount
of
allowable
exemptions
and
deductions
in
dispute.
Both
parties
appealed.
successional
rights
and
this
term,
in
speaks
in
our
opinion,
properly
refers
to
the
extent
or
amount
of
property
that
each
heir
is
legally
entitled
to
inherit
ISSUE:
from
the
estate
available
for
distribution.
It
needs
to
be
pointed
out
that
Whether
in
determining
the
taxable
net
estate
of
the
decedent,
½
of
the
net
the
property
relation
of
spouses,
as
distinguished
from
their
successional
rights,
estate
should
be
deducted
therefrom
as
the
share
of
the
surviving
spouse
in
is
governed
differently
by
the
specific
and
express
provisions
of
Title
VI,
accordance
with
our
law
on
conjugal
partnership
and
in
relation
to
Section
89
Chapter
I
of
our
new
Civil
Code
(Title
III,
Chapter
I
of
the
old
Civil
Code.)
Thus,
(c)
of
the
NIRC
the
lower
court
correctly
deducted
the
half
of
the
conjugal
property
in
determining
the
hereditary
estate
left
by
the
deceased
Stevenson.
HELD:
Yes.
Since
the
marriage
of
the
Stevensons
in
the
Philippines
took
place
in
1909,
However,
as
held
in
the
case
of
Willamette
Iron
and
Steel
Works
v.
Muzzal,
a
the
applicable
law
is
Art.
1325
of
the
old
Civil
Code,
not
Art.
124
of
the
NCC,
as
reading
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
will
convince
one
that
these
sections
do
posited
by
the
CIR.
It
is
true
that
both
articles
adhere
to
the
so-‐called
not
exclude
the
presentation
of
other
competent
evidence
to
prove
the
nationality
theory
of
determining
the
property
relation
of
spouses
where
one
existence
of
a
foreign
law.
In
that
case,
we
considered
the
testimony
of
an
of
them
is
a
foreigner
and
they
have
made
no
prior
agreement
as
to
the
attorney-‐at-‐law
of
San
Francisco,
California
who
quoted
verbatim
a
section
of
administration
disposition,
and
ownership
of
their
conjugal
properties.
In
such
California
Civil
Code
and
who
stated
that
the
same
was
in
force
at
the
time
the
a
case,
the
national
law
of
the
husband
becomes
the
dominant
law
in
obligations
were
contracted,
as
sufficient
evidence
to
establish
the
existence
of
determining
the
property
relation
of
the
spouses.
There
is,
however,
a
said
law.
In
the
case
at
bar,
to
prove
the
pertinent
California
law,
Attorney
difference
between
the
two
articles
in
that
Article
124 of
the
new
Civil
Code
Allison
Gibbs,
counsel
for
Fisher,
testified
that
as
an
active
member
of
the
expressly
provides
that
it
shall
be
applicable
regardless
of
whether
the
California
Bar
since
1931,
he
is
familiar
with
the
revenue
and
taxation
laws
of
marriage
was
celebrated
in
the
Philippines
or
abroad
while
Article
1325
of
the
the
State
of
California.
When
asked
by
the
lower
court
to
state
the
pertinent
old
Civil
Code
is
limited
to
marriages
contracted
in
a
foreign
land.
California
law
as
regards
exemption
of
intangible
personal
properties,
the
witness
cited
article
4,
section
13851
(a)
and
(b)
of
the
California
Internal
and
It
must
be
noted,
however,
that
what
has
just
been
said
refers
to
mixed
Revenue
Code
as
published
in
Derring's
California
Code,
a
publication
of
the
marriages
between
a
Filipino
citizen
and
a
foreigner.
In
the
instant
case,
both
Bancroft-‐Whitney
Company
inc.
And
as
part
of
his
testimony,
a
full
quotation
of
spouses
are
foreigners
who
married
in
the
Philippines.
If
we
adopt
the
view
of
the
cited
section
was
offered
in
evidence.
This
was
held
to
be
sufficient
proof.
Manresa,
the
law
determinative
of
the
property
relation
of
the
Stevensons,
married
in
1909,
would
be
the
English
law
even
if
the
marriage
was
celebrated
in
the
Philippines,
both
of
them
being
foreigners.
But,
as
correctly
observed
by
CONFLICT
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44.
PARDO
v
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
Guttierez,
a
respectable
citizen
who
has
known
the
applicant
for
27
years,
GR
No.
L-‐2248
|
January
23,
1950
granted
the
application,
considering
the
fact
that
applicant
arrived
in
the
(In
the
matter
of
the
petition
of
Vicente
Rosal
Pardo
to
be
admitted
a
citizen
Philippines
when
he
was
only
10
years
old
and
has
lived
here
for
44
years
of
the
Philippines)
continuously
except
for
a
few
months
of
visit
in
Spain.
His
mingling
and
dealing
by
reason
of
his
work
with
people
who
use
Tagalog
in
their
daily
intercourse,
DOCTRINE:
EXC
#2:
Evidence
of
the
law
of
a
foreign
country
on
reciprocity
lends
credence
in
his
testimony
that
he
has
acquired
a
good
working
regarding
the
acquisition
of
citizenship,
although
not
meeting
the
prescribed
knowledge
of
the
language.
He
also
owned
2
stores
on
the
Escolta
and
has
rule
of
practice,
may
be
allowed
and
used
as
basis
for
favorable
action,
if,
in
the
been
a
foreman
and
warehouseman
at
Soriano
&
Co.
light
of
all
the
circumstances,
the
Court
is
"satisfied
of
the
authenticity
of
the
written
proof
offered."
2.
Yes.
The
applicant
introduced
a
certificate
signed
by
the
Consul
General
of
Spain
in
the
Philippines,
stating
that
in
accordance
with
articles
17
and
225
of
"Applicability
of
the
Rules,"
provides
that
"These
rules
shall
not
apply
to
land
the
Spanish
Civil
Code,
among
other
Spanish
legislation,
Filipinos
are
eligible
to
registration,
cadastral
and
election
cases,
naturalization
and
insolvency
Spanish
citizenship
in
Spain.
Article
17
provides
that
foreigners
who
have
proceedings,
and
other
cases
not
herein
provided
for,
except
by
analogy
or
in
a
obtained
a
certificate
of
naturalization
and
those
who
have
not
obtained
such
suppletory
character
and
whenever
practicable
and
convenience.”
[NICOLE]
certificate
but
have
acquired
domicile
in
any
town
of
the
Monarchy
are
Spaniards.
No
discrimination
being
made
in
these
provisions,
they
apply
to
By
reason
of
this
provision,
literal
adherence
to
the
Rules
of
Court,
which
persons
of
any
nationality.
include
rules
of
evidence,
is
not
obligatory
in
a
proceeding
like
that
under
the
Philippine
law
is
judicial
in
character,
and
strict
compliance
with
the
process
As
the
Spanish
Civil
Code
has
been
and
still
is
"the
basic
code
in
force
of
the
prescribed
by
statute,
if
there
were
one,
would
be
essential,
yet
when,
as
here,
Philippines,"
articles
17
et
seq.
thereof
may
be
regarded
as
matters
known
to
no
specific
procedure
is
indicated
in
the
premises,
it
is
only
necessary
that
the
judges
of
the
Philippines
by
reason
of
their
judicial
functions
and
may
be
merits
of
the
petition
be
passed
on
and
a
decision
reached
on
a
far
judicially
recognized
by
them
without
the
introduction
of
proof.
Moreover,
in
a
consideration
of
the
evidence
on
satisfactory
proof.
number
of
decisions
mere
authentication
of
the
Chinese
Naturalization
Law
by
the
Chinese
Consulate
General
of
Manila
has
been
held
to
be
competent
proof
N.B.:
A
copy
of
a
foreign
law
certified
only
by
the
local
consul
of
the
applicant's
of
that
law.
country
was
considered
as
sufficient
proof.
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION:
In
a
number
of
decisions,
mere
ISSUE:
authentication
of
the
Chinese
naturalization
law
by
the
Chinese
Consulate
1.
Whether
Vicente
is
eligible
for
Philippine
citizenship
general
in
Manila
has
been
taken
as
competent
proof
of
that
law.
The
Solicitor
2.
Whether
the
laws
of
Spain
grant
Filipinos
the
right
to
become
naturalized
General
takes
exception
to
this
passage
–
in
several
jurisprudence,
the
Court
citizens
of
that
country
“did
not
rule
that
the
mere
authentication
of
the
Chinese
Naturalization
Law
by
the
Chinese
Consulate
General
of
manila
constitute
competent
proof
of
that
FACTS
and
HELD:
law,
but
that
the
question
as
to
whether
or
not
the
copy
of
the
Chinese
1.
Yes.
Vicente
Rosal
Pardo,
a
Spanish
citizen
born
in
Spain
in
1895
and
residing
Nationality
Law
presented
in
said
cases
were
properly
authenticated
and
in
the
Philippines
since
1905,
where
he
married
a
Filipino
woman
and
where
he
admissible
in
evidence
to
prove
reciprocity,
as
required
in
section
4
(h)
of
the
is
at
present
employed
in
Manila,
has
been
adjudged
by
the
CFI
of
Manila
Revised
Naturalization
Law,
has
become
academic
because
of
the
admission
entitled
to
become
a
Filipino
citizen.
The
government
appealed
said
decision,
made
by
counsel
for
the
oppositor
(Republic
of
the
Philippines)
to
the
effect
contending
that
Vicente
is
unable
to
speak
and
write
any
of
the
principal
that
in
another
case,
there
has
been
presented
a
copy
of
the
Naturalization
Filipino
languages.
The
trial
judge,
strengthened
by
the
testimony
of
Lino
Laws
of
China
duly
authenticated
in
accordance
with
the
Rules
of
the
Court.”
CONFLICT
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The
SC
corrected
said
argument,
stating
that
in
Yap
vs.
Solicitor
General,
the
regarding
the
acquisition
of
citizenship,
although
not
meeting
the
prescribed
document
admitted
purported
to
be
"a
copy
of
the
Chinese
law
of
citizenship,
rule
of
practice
by
section
41
of
Rule
123,
may
be
allowed
and
used
as
basis
where
it
appears
that
Filipinos
can
acquire
Chinese
Citizenship
by
for
a
favorable
action
if,
in
the
light
of
all
circumstances,
the
court
is
satisfied
naturalization."
There
was
nothing
in
that
decision
which
would
show
that
the
of
the
authenticity
of
the
written
proof
offered.
certificate
or
authentication
was
made
by
a
Philippine
diplomatic
or
consular
representative
in
China.
In
Jose
Leelin
vs.
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
we
said
45.
PCIB
v
ESCOLIN
that
"in
previous
cases,
a
translation
of
the
Chinese
Naturalization
Law,
made
GR
Nos.
L-‐27860
and
L-‐27896
|
March
29,
1974
and
certified
to
be
correct
by
the
Chinese
Consulate
General
in
Manila,
was
admitted
and
considered
efficient
evidence
to
establish
that
the
laws
of
China
DOCTRINE:
Processual
Presumption—The
foreign
law,
whenever
applicable,
permit
Filipinos
to
become
citizens
of
that
country."
In
Yee
Boo
Mann
vs.
should
be
proved
by
the
proponent
thereof,
otherwise,
such
law
shall
be
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
the
petitioner
introduced
in
evidence
a
translation
presumed
to
be
exactly
the
same
as
the
law
of
the
forum.
of
the
Chinese
Naturalization
Law,
certified
to
be
correct
by
the
Chinese
Consul
General
in
Manila.
The
court
held
in
that
case
that
the
objection
to
the
Aznar
v.
Garcia
case
can't
be
used
to
show
what
Texas
law
may
contain,
as
evidence
"is
of
no
moment,
since
this
court
has
already
accepted
it
as
fact
in
there's
a
time
difference
between
this
case
and
that
case,
thus
the
Texas
law
previous
naturalization
cases
that
the
laws
of
China
permit
Filipinos
to
might
have
changed
in
between
the
rulings.
naturalize
in
that
country."
FACTS:
If
it
be
true,
as
the
Solicitor
General
notes,
that
in
the
Yap
case
the
ratio
The
Hodges
spouses,
both
Texas
citizens
and
domiciled
in
the
Philippines,
made
decidendi
was
that
"there
has
been
presented
a
copy
of
the
Naturalization
Laws
in
their
individual
wills,
provisions
which
provide
that
upon
their
deaths,
their
of
China
duly
authenticated
in
accordance
with
the
Rules
of
the
Court,"
then
whole
estate
would
be
inherited
by
the
surviving
spouse
and
that
spouse
could
the
decision
recognized
as
a
fact
the
existence
of
a
law
of
China
under
which
manage
and
alienate
the
said
lands,
with
the
exception
of
the
Texas
property,
Filipinos
may
be
naturalized.
Of
this
fact
the
court
properly
assumed
judicial
and
the
remainder
upon
the
death
of
the
surviving
spouse
would
redound
to
knowledge
in
the
cases
that
came
up
before
it
soon
after.
the
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
deceased
surviving
spouse.
We
realize
that
a
copy
of
a
foreign
law
certified
only
by
the
local
consul
of
the
Linnie
Jane
Hodges
died
first
in
Iloilo
leaving
a
will
executed
in
Texas
but
applicant's
country
does
not
conform
to
the
requirement
concerning
the
probated
in
the
CFI
of
Iloilo
City
with
the
widower
Charles
Newton
Hodges
certification
and
authentication
of
such
law
(sec.
41,
Rule
123).
But
the
case
at
appointed
as
Executor,
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
will.
Charles
was
bar
and
the
cases
cited
therein
as
precedents
are
not
governed
by
the
Rules
of
previously
appointed
Special
Administrator,
in
which
capacity
he
filed
an
the
Court.
Rule
1342,
entitled
"Applicability
of
the
Rules,"
provides
that
“urgent
ex-‐parte
motion
to
allow
or
authorize
himself
to
continue
the
business
"These
rules
shall
not
apply
to
land
registration,
cadastral
and
election
cases,
in
which
he
was
engaged
and
to
perform
acts
which
he
had
been
doing
while
naturalization
and
insolvency
proceedings,
and
other
cases
not
herein
deceased
was
living”
which
was
granted
by
the
court.
As
Executor
he
filed
provided
for,
except
by
analogy
or
in
a
suppletory
character
and
whenever
another
motion
to
approve
all
sales,
conveyances,
leases,
mortgages
that
he
practicable
and
convenience.
By
reason
of
this
provision,
literal
adherence
to
had
made
further
and
subsequent
transaction
which
he
may
do
in
accordance
the
Rules
of
Court,
which
include
rules
of
evidence,
is
not
obligatory
in
a
with
the
last
wishes
of
his
wife”
which
was
also
approved
by
the
court.
In
proceeding
like
that
under
the
Philippine
law
is
judicial
in
character,
and
strict
financial
statements
submitted
before
the
court,
he
made
statements
that
the
compliance
with
the
process
prescribed
by
statute,
if
there
were
one,
would
estate
of
Linnie
is
1/2
of
the
conjugal
estate.
He
also
allegedly
renounced
his
be
essential,
yet
when,
as
here,
no
specific
procedure
is
indicated
in
the
inheritance
in
a
tax
declaration
in
the
U.S.
premises,
it
is
only
necessary
that
the
merits
of
the
petition
be
passed
on
and
a
decision
reached
on
a
far
consideration
of
the
evidence
on
satisfactory
proof.
Accordingly,
evidence
of
the
law
of
a
foreign
country
or
reciprocity
CONFLICT
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Subsequently,
Charles
also
died.
Magno
was
appointed
as
the
admistratrix
for
the
court,
such
as
when
they
are
well
and
generally
known
or
they
have
been
the
estate
of
both
spouses
but
later
replaced
by
PCIB
as
to
Charles’
estate.
actually
ruled
upon
in
other
cases
before
it
and
none
of
the
parties
concerned
Charles
before
his
death,
failed
to
make
accounting,
and
also
failed
to
acquire
to
not
claim
otherwise.
final
adjudication
of
Linnie’s
estate.
Since
there
was
no
liquidation
of
Linnie’s
estate,
the
brothers
and
sisters
of
Linnie
wanted
to
determine
the
extent
of
her
When,
with
respect
to
certain
aspects
of
the
foreign
laws
concerned,
the
estate
that
they
could
inherit.
parties
in
a
given
case
do
not
have
any
controversy
or
are
more
or
less
in
agreement,
the
Court
may
take
it
for
granted
for
the
purposes
of
the
ISSUE:
particular
case
before
it
that
the
said
laws
are
as
such
virtual
agreement
Whether
Philippine
Law
or
Texas
Law
shall
govern
(regarding
Conflict
of
Laws)
indicates,
without
the
need
of
requiring
the
presentation
of
what
otherwise
Remanded
(Texas
law
may
be
applied
but
must
be
proved)
would
be
competent
evidence
on
the
point.
PCIB’s
representations
in
regard
to
the
laws
of
Texas
virtually
constitute
admissions
of
fact
which
the
other
HELD:
parties
and
the
court
are
being
made
to
rely
and
act
upon.
PCIB
is
“not
It
is
necessary
that
the
Texas
law
be
ascertained.
Here
it
must
be
proven
permitted
to
contradict
them
or
subsequently
take
a
position
contradictory
to
whether
a
renvoi
will
happen
or
whether
Texas
law
makes
the
testamentary
or
inconsistent
with
them.”
provisions
valid.
In
line
with
Texas
law,
which
should
be
proven
is
the
law
enforced
during
the
death
of
Linnie
and
not
in
any
other
time.
PCIB
can't
claim
that
the
estate
of
Linnie
is
not
entitled
to
at
least
1/4
of
conjugal
property,
they
having
argued
that
it
is
so.
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
the
law
of
the
nationality
of
the
decedent
applies.
But
if
we
apply
Texas
law,
personal
property
is
governed
by
the
law
of
The
SC
held
that
the
estate
of
Linnie
inherited
by
her
brothers
and
sisters
could
domicile
of
the
decedent
and
real
property
is
governed
by
its
situs
(both
of
be
more
than
just
stated,
but
this
would
depend
on
(1)
whether
upon
the
which
is
the
Philippines).
Furthermore
Texas
law
provides
no
legitime.
Thus,
the
proper
application
of
the
principle
of
renvoi
in
relation
to
Article
16
of
the
Civil
renvoi
doctrine.
Philippine
law
provides
that
the
Surviving
Spouse,
being
the
Code
and
the
pertinent
laws
of
Texas,
it
will
appear
that
Hodges
had
no
sole
heir,
gets
1/2
of
the
conjugal
property,
then
1/2
goes
to
the
estate
of
the
legitime
as
contended
by
Magno,
and
(2)
whether
or
not
it
can
be
held
that
spouse.
If
1/2
of
the
estate
of
the
decedent
goes
to
the
surviving
spouse
which
Hodges
had
legally
and
effectively
renounced
his
inheritance
from
his
wife.
is
the
sole
heir,
then
Charles
gets
1/4
of
the
whole
conjugal
property.
The
Court
Under
the
circumstances
presently
obtaining
and
in
the
state
of
the
record
of
said
that
Texas
law
may
apply,
but
was
not
proven.
The
laws
of
a
foreign
these
cases,
as
of
now,
the
Court
is
not
in
a
position
to
make
a
final
ruling,
jurisdiction
do
not
prove
themselves
in
our
courts,
The
courts
of
the
Philippines
whether
of
fact
or
of
law,
on
any
of
these
two
issues,
and
We,
therefore,
Islands
are
not
authorized
to
take
judicial
notice
of
the
laws
of
the
various
reserve
said
issues
for
further
proceedings
and
resolution
in
the
first
instance
States
of
the
American
Union.
Such
laws
must
be
proved
as
facts.
The
by
the
court
o
quo,
as
hereinabove
indicated.
We
reiterate,
however,
that
proponent
should
show
the
foreign
law;
as
certified
by
person
holding/having
pending
such
further
proceedings,
as
matters
stand
at
this
stage,
Our
custody
of
such
law,
with
a
certificate
that
such
officer
does
have
custody
over
considered
opinion
is
that
it
is
beyond
cavil
that
since,
under
the
terms
of
the
said
law.
Aznar
v.
Garcia
case
can't
be
used
to
show
what
Texas
law
may
will
of
Mrs.
Hodges,
her
husband
could
not
have
anyway
legally
adjudicated
or
contain,
as
there's
a
time
difference
between
this
case
and
that
case,
thus
the
caused
to
be
adjudicated
to
himself
her
whole
share
of
their
conjugal
Texas
law
might
have
changed
in
between
the
rulings.
partnership,
albeit
he
could
have
disposed
any
part
thereof
during
his
lifetime,
the
resulting
estate
of
Mrs.
Hodges,
of
which
Magno
is
the
uncontested
The
question
of
what
are
the
laws
of
Texas
governing
the
matters
in
issue
is,
administratrix,
cannot
be
less
than
one-‐fourth
of
the
conjugal
partnership
in
the
first
instance,
one
of
fact,
not
of
law.
Elementary
is
the
rule
that
foreign
properties,
as
of
the
time
of
her
death,
minus
what,
as
explained
earlier,
have
laws
may
not
be
taken
judicial
notice
of
and
have
to
be
proven
like
any
other
been
gratuitously
disposed
of
therefrom,
by
Hodges
in
favor
of
third
persons
fact
in
dispute
between
the
parties
in
any
proceeding,
with
the
rare
exception
since
then,
for
even
if
it
were
assumed
that,
as
contended
by
PCIB,
under
in
instances
when
the
said
laws
are
already
within
the
actual
knowledge
of
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code
and
applying
renvoi
the
laws
of
the
Philippines
are
CONFLICT
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2015-‐2016
the
ones
ultimately
applicable,
such
one-‐fourth
share
would
be
her
free
record
that
overbooking
of
flights
is
a
common
and
accepted
practice
of
disposable
portion,
taking
into
account
already
the
legitime
of
her
husband
airlines
in
the
US
and
is
specifically
allowed
under
the
Code
of
Federal
under
the
Civil
Code.
Regulations
by
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Board,
no
fraud
nor
bad
faith
could
be
imputed
on
respondent
TWA.
TWA
was
remiss
in
not
informing
petitioners
that
46.
ZALAMEA
VS.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
AND
TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES
the
flight
was
overbooked.
But
there
was
no
bad
faith
in
placing
the
petitioners
G.R.
No.
104235
|
November
18,
1993
in
the
waitlist
along
with
48
passengers.
DOCTRINE:
In
other
jurisprudence
mentioned,
the
CFR
was
pleaded
and
proved.
ISSUE:
This
was
TWA’s
failure.
It
presented
only
a
deposition—the
one
who
presented
Whether
there
was
bad
faith
on
the
part
of
TWA,
considering
that
TWA
the
statement
is
not
an
expert
of
the
CFR.
He
was
only
an
employee.
contends
that
overbooking
of
flights
is
a
common
and
accepted
practice
in
the
US
GR:
Foreign
written
law
must
be
proven
by
official
publication
etc.
EXC:
Foreign
written
law
may
be
proven
by
testimony.
(Muzzal)
HELD:
EXC
TO
THE
EXC:
When
the
one
who
testified
is
not
an
expert
of
the
foreign
law.
Yes,
there
was
fraud
or
bad
faith.
The
US
law
or
regulation
allegedly
(Zalamea)
authorizing
overbooking
has
never
been
proved.
Foreign
laws
do
not
prove
themselves
nor
can
the
courts
take
judicial
notice
of
them.
Like
any
other
FACTS:
fact,
they
must
be
alleged
and
proved.
Written
law
may
be
evidenced
by
an
Petitioner-‐spouses
Zalamea
and
their
daughter
purchased
3
airline
tickets
from
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
the
Manila
agent
of
TransWorld
Airlines
for
a
flight
to
NY-‐LA.
The
tickets
were
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied
with
a
certificate
that
at
a
discount
of
75%
and
the
daughter
was
a
full
fare.
such
officer
has
custody.
The
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
an
embassy
or
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice-‐consul,
or
consular
agent
or
While
in
NY,
they
received
a
notice
of
the
reconfirmation.
On
the
appointed
by
any
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
date,
they
checked
in
at
10am
for
their
11am
flight
but
were
placed
on
the
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
waitlist.
The
daughter
appeared
as
No.
13
on
the
waitlist
while
the
two
Zalameas
were
listed
as
No.
34,
showing
a
party
of
two.
Out
of
the
42
names,
TWA
relied
solely
on
the
statement
of
its
customer
service
agent,
Ms.
Lather,
in
the
first
22
names
were
eventually
allowed
to
board,
including
the
father.
The
her
deposition.
Aside
from
such,
there
is
no
official
publication
of
said
code
others
weren’t
able
to
fly.
As
it
were,
those
holding
full-‐fare
tickets
were
given
presented
as
evidence.
Respondent
court’s
finding
that
overbooking
is
allowed
first
priority.
The
father
later
discovered
that
he
was
holding
his
daughter’s
full-‐ has
no
basis.
fare
ticket.
Those
with
discounted
tickets
were
denied
boarding.
Even
in
the
next
flight
to
LA,
the
mother
and
daughter
couldn’t
be
accommodated
because
Even
if
the
claimed
U.S.
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
exist,
the
same
isn’t
it
was
fully
book.
They
were
constrained
to
book
in
another
flight
and
applicable
in
accordance
with
the
principle
of
lex
loci
contractus
which
require
purchased
2
tickets
from
American
Airlines
at
$918.
that
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
airline
ticket
was
issued
should
be
applied
by
the
court
where
the
passengers
are
residents
and
nationals
of
the
forum
In
the
Philippines,
petitioners
filed
an
action
for
damages
based
on
breach
of
and
the
ticket
is
issued
in
such
State
by
the
defendant
airline.
Since
the
tickets
contract
of
air
carriage
before
the
RTC
Makati.
The
RTC
ordered
the
airline
were
sold
and
issued
in
the
Philippines,
the
applicable
law
would
be
Philippine
company
to
pay
the
ticket
costs,
as
well
as
moral
damages
and
attorney’s
fees.
law.
However,
the
CA
held
that
moral
damages
are
recoverable
only
where
there
is
fraud
or
bad
faith
(in
a
breach
of
contract
of
carriage).
Since
it
is
a
matter
of
CONFLICT
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47.
MANUFACTURERS
HANOVER
TRUST
CO
V.
GUERRERO
defined
in
Sec.
19,
Rule
132:
“Public
documents
are:
(a)
the
written
official
acts,
G.R.
No.
135804
|
February
19,
2003
or
records
of
the
official
acts
of
the
sovereign
authority,
official
bodies
and
tribunals,
an
public
officers,
whether
of
the
Philippines,
or
of
a
foreign
DOCTRINE:
An
affidavit
cannot
prove
a
foreign
law.
country.”
Thus,
the
procedure
outlined
in
Sec.
24,
Rule
132
should
be
followed.
Walden
affidavit
was
taken
abroad
ex
parte
and
the
affiant
never
testified
in
CA
likewise
rejected
the
Bank’s
argument
that
Sec.
2,
Rule
34
of
the
old
ROC
open
court.
The
Walden
affidavit
cannot
be
considered
as
proof
of
New
York
allows
the
Bank
to
move
with
the
supporting
Walden
affidavit
for
partial
law
on
damages
not
only
because
it
is
self-‐serving
but
also
because
it
does
not
summary
judgment
in
its
favor.
CA
clarified
that
the
Walden
affidavit
is
not
the
state
the
specific
New
York
law
on
damages.
The
Walden
affidavit
states
supporting
affidavit
referred
to
in
the
provision
that
would
prove
the
lack
of
conclusions
from
the
affiant’s
personal
interpretation
and
opinion
of
the
facts
genuine
issue
between
the
parties.
CA
concluded
that
even
if
the
Walden
of
the
case
vis-‐a-‐vis
the
alleged
laws
and
jurisprudence
without
citing
any
law
in
affidavit
is
used
for
purposes
of
summary
judgment,
the
Bank
must
still
comply
particular.
the
Bank
attached
copies
of
some
of
the
U.S.
court
decisions
cited
in
with
the
procedure
prescribed
by
the
Rules
to
prove
the
foreign
law.
the
Walden
affidavit,
these
copies
do
not
comply
with
Section
24
of
Rule
132
on
proof
of
official
records
or
decisions
of
foreign
courts.
ISSUES:
Whether
the
Bank’s
affidavit
may
serve
as
proof
for
the
NY
law
N.B.:
(1)
He
didn’t
testify
in
court.
(2)
The
affidavit
did
not
mention
any
specific
law.
HELD:
ALG
disagrees.
Tort
is
common
law.
There
really
is
no
written
law
on
tort.
No.
Under
Section
24
of
Rule
132,
the
record
of
public
documents
of
a
sovereign
authority
or
tribunal
may
be
proved
by
(1)
an
official
publication
FACTS:
thereof
or
(2)
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
thereof.
In
1994,
respondent
Rafael
Ma.
Guerrero
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
against
Such
official
publication
or
copy
must
be
accompanied,
if
the
record
is
not
kept
petitioner
Manufacturers
Hanover
Trust
Co.
and/or
Chemical
Bank
with
the
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
the
attesting
officer
has
the
legal
RTC
of
Manila
for
payment
of
damages
allegedly
for
illegally
withheld
taxes
custody
thereof.
The
certificate
may
be
issued
by
any
of
the
authorized
charged
against
interests
on
his
checking
account
with
the
Bank,
a
returned
Philippine
embassy
or
consular
officials
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
check
worth
$18k
due
to
signature
verification
problems,
and
unauthorized
which
the
record
is
kept,
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
The
conversion
of
his
account.
The
Bank
in
it
Answer,
alleged
that
by
stipulation,
attestation
must
state,
in
substance,
that
the
copy
is
a
correct
copy
of
the
Guerrero’s
account
is
governed
by
New
York
law
and
such
law
does
not
permit
original,
or
a
specific
part
thereof,
as
the
case
may
be,
and
must
be
under
the
any
of
Guerrero’s
claims
except
actual
damages.
The
Bank
then
filed
a
Motion
official
seal
of
the
attesting
officer.
for
Partial
Summary
Judgment
seeking
for
the
dismissal
of
Guerrero’s
claims
except
for
actual
damages.
The
affidavit
of
Alyssa
Walden,
a
NY
attorney,
Certain
exceptions
to
this
rule
were
recognized
in
Asiavest
Limited
v.
Court
of
supported
the
Bank’s
motion,
stating
that
Guerrero’s
NY
bank
account
Appeals.
In
that
case,
the
SC
considered
the
testimony
under
oath
of
an
stipulated
that
the
governing
law
is
NY
law,
which
reiterates
what
the
Bank
attorney-‐at-‐law
of
San
Francisco,
California,
who
quoted
verbatim
a
section
alleged.
The
Philippine
Consular
Office
in
NY
authenticated
the
Walden
of
California
Civil
Code
and
who
stated
that
the
same
was
in
force
at
the
time
affidavit.
the
obligations
were
contracted,
as
sufficient
evidence
to
establish
the
existence
of
said
law.
Likewise,
in
several
naturalization
cases,
it
was
held
by
RTC
denied
Bank’s
Motion
and
MR.
Bank
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
with
the
the
Court
that
evidence
of
the
law
of
a
foreign
country
on
reciprocity
CA
assailing
the
RTC
Orders.
The
CA
dismissed
petition.
It
held
that
the
Walden
regarding
the
acquisition
of
citizenship,
although
not
meeting
the
prescribed
affidavit
does
not
serve
as
proof
of
the
NY
law
and
jurisprudence
relied
on
by
rule
of
practice,
may
be
allowed
and
used
as
basis
for
favorable
action,
if,
in
the
Bank.
The
CA
considered
NY
law
and
jurisprudence
as
public
documents
the
light
of
all
the
circumstances,
the
Court
is
"satisfied
of
the
authenticity
of
the
written
proof
offered."
CONFLICT
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was
time-‐chartered
by
SCI
to
Halla
Merchant
Co.,
a
South
Korean
company.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
Bank
cannot
rely
on
such
rulings
to
support
its
cause.
Halla
sub-‐chartered
the
vessel
through
a
time
charter
to
Transmar
Shipping,
These
cases
involved
attorneys
testifying
in
open
court
during
the
trial
in
the
Inc.
who
further
subchartered
to
vessel
to
Portserv
Limited.
Both
Transmar
and
Philippines
and
quoting
the
particular
foreign
laws
sought
to
be
established.
On
Portserv
are
Canadian
corporations.
In
1995,
Portserv
requested
petitioner
the
other
hand,
the
Walden
affidavit
was
taken
abroad
ex
parte
and
the
Crescent
Petroleum,
a
Canadian
corporation
engaged
in
selling
petroleum
and
affiant
never
testified
in
open
court.
The
Walden
affidavit
cannot
be
oil
products
for
the
use
and
operation
of
oceangoing
vessels,
to
deliver
marine
considered
as
proof
of
New
York
law
on
damages
not
only
because
it
is
self-‐ fuel
oils
(bunker
fuels)
to
the
vessel,
which
Crescent
granted
through
an
advice
serving
but
also
because
it
does
not
state
the
specific
New
York
law
on
via
facsimile.
As
security
for
the
payment
and
related
services,
Crescent
damages.
The
Walden
affidavit
states
conclusions
from
the
affiant’s
personal
received
2
checks
of
$100k
and
$200k.
Thus,
Crescent
contracted
with
its
interpretation
and
opinion
of
the
facts
of
the
case
vis-‐a-‐vis
the
alleged
laws
supplier,
Marine
Petrobulk,
another
Canadian
corporation,
for
the
physical
and
jurisprudence
without
citing
any
law
in
particular.
The
citations
in
the
delivery
of
the
bunker
fuels
to
the
Vessel.
Walden
affidavit
of
various
U.S.
court
decisions
do
not
constitute
proof
of
the
official
records
or
decisions
of
the
U.S.
courts.
While
the
Bank
attached
copies
Marine
Petrobulk
delivered
the
bunker
fuels
inclusive
of
barging
and
of
some
of
the
U.S.
court
decisions
cited
in
the
Walden
affidavit,
these
copies
demurrage
charges
at
the
port
of
Pioneer
Grain,
Vancouver,
Canada.
The
Chief
do
not
comply
with
Section
24
of
Rule
132
on
proof
of
official
records
or
Engineer
Officer
of
the
Vessel
duly
acknowledged
and
received
the
delivery
decisions
of
foreign
courts.
receipt.
Marine
Petrobulk
issued
an
invoice
to
Crescent,
which
issued
a
check
for
the
same
invoice
amount
in
favor
of
Marine
Petrobulk.
The
check
was
then
Next,
the
Bank
makes
much
of
Guerrero’s
failure
to
submit
an
opposing
encashed.
Crescent
issued
a
revised
invoice
to
Portserv
and/or
charterers
of
affidavit
to
the
Walden
affidavit.
The
Bank
still
had
the
burden
of
proving
New
the
vessel
with
instruction
to
remit
the
amount
on
or
before
December
1,
York
law
and
jurisprudence
even
if
Guerrero
did
not
present
an
opposing
1995.
The
period
lapsed
and
several
demands
were
made
but
no
payment
was
affidavit.
As
the
party
moving
for
summary
judgment,
the
Bank
has
the
burden
received.
The
checks
issued
to
Crescent
as
security
were
dishonored
as
well.
of
clearly
demonstrating
the
absence
of
any
genuine
issue
of
fact
and
that
any
doubt
as
to
the
existence
of
such
issue
is
resolved
against
the
movant.
Petition
While
the
Vessel
was
docked
at
the
port
of
Cebu
City,
Crescent
instituted
denied.
before
the
RTC
of
Cebu
an
action
for
sum
of
money
with
TRO
and
writ
of
preliminary
attachment
against
respondents
Vessel,
SCI,
Portserv,
and
48.
CRESCENT
PETROLEUM
v
M/V
“LOK
MAHESHWARI”,
THE
SHIPPING
Transmar.
The
attachment
was
granted.
Summonses
were
then
served
to
CORPORATION
OF
INDIA
respondents
through
the
Master
of
the
Vessel.
A
letter
of
undertaking
issued
G.R.
No.
155014
|
November
11,
2005
by
Pioneer
Insurance
and
Surety
Corporation
was
approved
by
the
trial
court
as
counter-‐bond,
thus,
the
attachment
was
lifted.
Respondents
were
declared
in
DOCTRINES:
ALG:
What
was
odd
about
this
case?
Crescent
claims
that
default.
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
Crescent,
holding
defendants
solidarily
liable.
Canadian
Law
applies
but
since
it
failed
to
plead
and
prove
Canadian
law,
it
then
said
that
Philippine
law
applies.
Respondents,
on
appeal,
alleged
that
as
per
Part
II
of
the
Bunker
Fuel
Agreement
between
Crescent
and
Portserv,
NY
law
governs
the
construction,
SC
denied
the
attachment
because
there
was
failure
to
state
cause
of
action—it
validity,
and
performance
of
the
contract.
They
also
submitted
certified
copies
had
to
state
the
law
that
applies.
of
the
Commercial
Instruments
and
Maritime
Lien
Act
of
the
US,
some
US
cases,
and
some
Canadian
cases
to
support
their
defense.
CA
reversed,
FACTS:
dismissing
the
action
primarily
on
the
ground
of
forum
non
conveniens.
M/V
“Lok
Maheshwari”
is
an
oceangoing
vessel
of
Indian
registry,
owned
by
Shipping
Corporation
of
India,
principally
owned
by
the
Government
of
India.
It
ISSUE:
Whether
the
enforcement
of
a
maritime
lien
is
expressly
granted
by
law
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
73
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
One.
"In
a
suit
to
establish
and
enforce
a
maritime
lien
for
supplies
furnished
to
HELD:
a
vessel
in
a
foreign
port,
whether
such
lien
exists,
or
whether
the
court
has
or
No.
Crescent
bases
its
claim
of
a
maritime
lien
on
Sections
21,
22
and
23
of
PD
will
exercise
jurisdiction,
depends
on
the
law
of
the
country
where
the
supplies
No.
1521,
also
known
as
the
Ship
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978,
viz:
were
furnished,
which
must
be
pleaded
and
proved."
Sec.
21.
Maritime
Lien
for
Necessaries;
persons
entitled
to
such
lien.
-‐
Any
Two.
The
Lauritzen-‐Romero-‐Rhoditis
trilogy
of
cases,
which
replaced
such
person
furnishing
repairs,
supplies,
towage,
use
of
dry
dock
or
maritime
railway,
single-‐factor
methodologies
as
the
law
of
the
place
of
supply.
In
Lauritzen
v.
or
other
necessaries,
to
any
vessel,
whether
foreign
or
domestic,
upon
the
order
Larsen,
a
Danish
seaman,
while
in
Havana
and
in
the
course
of
his
employment,
of
the
owner
of
such
vessel,
or
of
a
person
authorized
by
the
owner,
shall
have
a
was
negligently
injured.
He
sued
the
shipowner
in
a
federal
district
court
in
maritime
lien
on
the
vessel,
which
may
be
enforced
by
suit
in
rem,
and
it
shall
New
York
for
damages
under
the
Jones
Act.
In
holding
that
Danish
law
and
not
be
necessary
to
allege
or
prove
that
credit
was
given
to
the
vessel.
the
Jones
Act
was
applicable,
the
Supreme
Court
adopted
a
multiple-‐contact
test
to
determine,
in
the
absence
of
a
specific
Congressional
directive
as
to
the
Sec.
22.
Persons
Authorized
to
Procure
Repairs,
Supplies
and
Necessaries.
-‐
The
statute’s
reach,
which
jurisdiction’s
law
should
be
applied.
The
following
following
persons
shall
be
presumed
to
have
authority
from
the
owner
to
factors
were
considered:
(1)
place
of
the
wrongful
act;
(2)
law
of
the
flag;
(3)
procure
repairs,
supplies,
towage,
use
of
dry
dock
or
marine
railway,
and
other
allegiance
or
domicile
of
the
injured;
(4)
allegiance
of
the
defendant
shipowner;
necessaries
for
the
vessel:
The
managing
owner,
ship’s
husband,
master
or
any
(5)
place
of
contract;
(6)
inaccessibility
of
foreign
forum;
and
(7)
law
of
the
person
to
whom
the
management
of
the
vessel
at
the
port
of
supply
is
forum.
entrusted.
No
person
tortuously
or
unlawfully
in
possession
or
charge
of
a
vessel
shall
have
authority
to
bind
the
vessel.
In
Romero
v.
International
Terminal
Operating
Co,
SC
again
considered
a
foreign
seaman’s
personal
injury
claim
under
both
the
Jones
Act
and
the
Sec.
23.
Notice
to
Person
Furnishing
Repairs,
Supplies
and
Necessaries.
-‐
The
general
maritime
law.
The
Court
held
that
the
factors
first
announced
in
the
officers
and
agents
of
a
vessel
specified
in
Section
22
of
this
Decree
shall
be
case
of
Lauritzen
were
applicable
not
only
to
personal
injury
claims
arising
taken
to
include
such
officers
and
agents
when
appointed
by
a
charterer,
by
an
under
the
Jones
Act
but
to
all
matters
arising
under
maritime
law
in
general.
owner
pro
hac
vice,
or
by
an
agreed
purchaser
in
possession
of
the
vessel;
but
nothing
in
this
Decree
shall
be
construed
to
confer
a
lien
when
the
furnisher
Hellenic
Lines,
Ltd.
v.
Rhoditis
was
also
a
suit
under
the
Jones
Act
by
a
Greek
knew,
or
by
exercise
of
reasonable
diligence
could
have
ascertained,
that
seaman
injured
aboard
a
ship
of
Greek
registry
while
in
American
waters.
The
because
of
the
terms
of
a
charter
party,
agreement
for
sale
of
the
vessel,
or
for
U.S.
Supreme
Court
observed
that
of
the
seven
factors
listed
in
the
Lauritzen
any
other
reason,
the
person
ordering
the
repairs,
supplies,
or
other
necessaries
test,
four
were
in
favor
of
the
shipowner
and
against
jurisdiction.
In
arriving
at
was
without
authority
to
bind
the
vessel
therefor.
the
conclusion
that
the
Jones
Act
applies,
it
ruled
that
the
application
of
the
Lauritzen
test
is
not
a
mechanical
one.
It
stated
thus:
"[t]he
significance
of
one
Petitioner
Crescent
submits
that
these
provisions
apply
to
both
domestic
and
or
more
factors
must
be
considered
in
light
of
the
national
interest
served
by
foreign
vessels,
as
well
as
domestic
and
foreign
suppliers
of
necessaries.
The
SC
the
assertion
of
Jones
Act
jurisdiction.
Moreover,
the
list
of
seven
factors
in
does
not
agree.
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978
was
enacted
"to
accelerate
the
Lauritzen
was
not
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
The
shipowner’s
base
of
growth
and
development
of
the
shipping
industry"
and
"to
extend
the
benefits
operations
is
another
factor
of
importance
in
determining
whether
the
Jones
accorded
to
overseas
shipping
under
PD
No.
214
to
domestic
shipping.”
It
is
Act
is
applicable;
and
there
well
may
be
others."
patterned
closely
from
the
U.S.
Ship
Mortgage
Act
of
1920
and
the
Liberian
Maritime
Law
relating
to
preferred
mortgage.
The
various
tests
used
in
the
U.S.
The
principles
enunciated
in
these
maritime
tort
cases
have
been
extended
to
to
determine
whether
a
maritime
lien
exists
are
the
following:
cases
involving
unpaid
supplies
and
necessaries.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
74
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
Three.
The
factors
provided
in
Restatement
(Second)
of
Conflicts
of
Law
have
also
been
applied,
especially
in
resolving
cases
brought
under
the
Federal
But
under
which
law
should
petitioner
Crescent
prove
the
existence
of
its
Maritime
Lien
Act.
Their
application
suggests
that
in
the
absence
of
an
effective
maritime
lien?
It
is
clear
that
Canada
has
the
most
significant
interest
in
this
choice
of
law
by
the
parties,
the
forum
contacts
to
be
considered
include:
(a)
dispute.
The
injured
party
is
a
Canadian
corporation,
the
sub-‐charterer
which
the
place
of
contracting;
(b)
the
place
of
negotiation
of
the
contract;
(c)
the
placed
the
orders
for
the
supplies
is
also
Canadian,
the
entity
which
physically
place
of
performance;
(d)
the
location
of
the
subject
matter
of
the
contract;
delivered
the
bunker
fuels
is
in
Canada,
the
place
of
contracting
and
and
(e)
the
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
place
of
negotiation
is
in
Canada,
and
the
supplies
were
delivered
in
Canada.
business
of
the
parties.
The
arbitration
clause
contained
in
the
Bunker
Fuel
Agreement
which
states
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
Court
cannot
sustain
petitioner
Crescent’s
insistence
on
that
New
York
law
governs
the
"construction,
validity
and
performance"
of
the
the
application
of
P.D.
No.
1521
or
the
Ship
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978
and
contract
is
only
a
factor
that
may
be
considered
in
the
choice-‐of-‐law
analysis
hold
that
a
maritime
lien
exists.
but
is
not
conclusive.
As
in
the
cases
of
Gulf
Trading
and
Swedish
Telecom,
the
lien
that
is
the
subject
matter
of
this
case
arose
by
operation
of
law
and
not
by
First.
Out
of
the
seven
basic
factors
listed
in
the
case
of
Lauritzen,
Philippine
contract
because
the
shipowner
was
not
a
party
to
the
contract
under
which
law
only
falls
under
one
–
the
law
of
the
forum.
All
other
elements
are
foreign
–
the
goods
were
supplied.
Canada
is
the
place
of
the
wrongful
act,
of
the
allegiance
or
domicile
of
the
injured
and
the
place
of
contract;
India
is
the
law
of
the
flag
and
the
allegiance
It
is
worthy
to
note
that
petitioner
Crescent
never
alleged
and
proved
of
the
defendant
shipowner.
Balancing
these
basic
interests,
it
is
inconceivable
Canadian
law
as
basis
for
the
existence
of
a
maritime
lien.
To
the
end,
it
that
the
Philippine
court
has
any
interest
in
the
case
that
outweighs
the
insisted
on
its
theory
that
Philippine
law
applies.
Petitioner
contends
that
interests
of
Canada
or
India
for
that
matter.
even
if
foreign
law
applies,
since
the
same
was
not
properly
pleaded
and
proved,
such
foreign
law
must
be
presumed
to
be
the
same
as
Philippine
law
Second.
P.D.
No.
1521
or
the
Ship
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978
is
inapplicable
pursuant
to
the
doctrine
of
processual
presumption.
Thus,
we
are
left
with
following
the
factors
under
Restatement
(Second)
of
Conflict
of
Laws.
Like
the
two
choices:
(1)
dismiss
the
case
for
petitioner’s
failure
to
establish
a
cause
of
Federal
Maritime
Lien
Act
of
the
U.S.,
P.D.
No.
1521
or
the
Ship
Mortgage
action
or
(2)
presume
that
Canadian
law
is
the
same
as
Philippine
law.
In
either
Decree
of
1978
was
enacted
primarily
to
protect
Filipino
suppliers
and
was
not
case,
the
case
has
to
be
dismissed.
intended
to
create
a
lien
from
a
contract
for
supplies
between
foreign
entities
delivered
in
a
foreign
port.
It
is
well-‐settled
that
a
party
whose
cause
of
action
or
defense
depends
upon
a
foreign
law
has
the
burden
of
proving
the
foreign
law.
Such
foreign
law
is
Third.
Applying
P.D.
No.
1521
or
the
Ship
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978
and
rule
treated
as
a
question
of
fact
to
be
properly
pleaded
and
proved.
Petitioner
that
a
maritime
lien
exists
would
not
promote
the
public
policy
behind
the
Crescent’s
insistence
on
enforcing
a
maritime
lien
before
our
courts
enactment
of
the
law
to
develop
the
domestic
shipping
industry.
Opening
up
depended
on
the
existence
of
a
maritime
lien
under
the
proper
law.
By
our
courts
to
foreign
suppliers
by
granting
them
a
maritime
lien
under
our
laws
erroneously
claiming
a
maritime
lien
under
Philippine
law
instead
of
proving
even
if
they
are
not
entitled
to
a
maritime
lien
under
their
laws
will
encourage
that
a
maritime
lien
exists
under
Canadian
law,
petitioner
Crescent
failed
to
forum
shopping.
establish
a
cause
of
action.
Finally.
The
submission
of
petitioner
is
not
in
keeping
with
the
reasonable
Even
if
we
apply
the
doctrine
of
processual
presumption,
the
result
will
still
expectation
of
the
parties
to
the
contract.
Indeed,
when
the
parties
entered
be
the
same.
Under
P.D.
No.
1521
or
the
Ship
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978,
the
into
a
contract
for
supplies
in
Canada,
they
could
not
have
intended
the
laws
of
following
are
the
requisites
for
maritime
liens
on
necessaries
to
exist:
(1)
the
a
remote
country
like
the
Philippines
to
determine
the
creation
of
a
lien
by
the
"necessaries"
must
have
been
furnished
to
and
for
the
benefit
of
the
vessel;
mere
accident
of
the
Vessel’s
being
in
Philippine
territory.
(2)
the
"necessaries"
must
have
been
necessary
for
the
continuation
of
the
CONFLICT
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voyage
of
the
vessel;
(3)
the
credit
must
have
been
extended
to
the
vessel;
(4)
there
must
be
necessity
for
the
extension
of
the
credit;
and
(5)
the
Finally.
The
necessaries
were
not
ordered
by
persons
authorized
to
contract
in
necessaries
must
be
ordered
by
persons
authorized
to
contract
on
behalf
of
behalf
of
the
vessel
as
provided
under
Section
22
of
P.D.
No.
1521
or
the
Ship
the
vessel.
These
do
not
avail
in
the
instant
case.
Mortgage
Decree
of
1978
-‐
the
managing
owner,
the
ship’s
husband,
master
or
any
person
with
whom
the
management
of
the
vessel
at
the
port
of
supply
is
First.
It
was
not
established
that
benefit
was
extended
to
the
vessel.
While
this
entrusted.
Clearly,
Portserv,
a
sub-‐charterer
under
a
time
charter,
is
not
is
presumed
when
the
master
of
the
ship
is
the
one
who
placed
the
order,
it
is
someone
to
whom
the
management
of
the
vessel
has
been
entrusted.
A
time
not
disputed
that
in
this
case
it
was
the
sub-‐charterer
Portserv
which
placed
charter
is
a
contract
for
the
use
of
a
vessel
for
a
specified
period
of
time
or
for
the
orders
to
petitioner
Crescent.
Hence,
the
presumption
does
not
arise
and
it
the
duration
of
one
or
more
specified
voyages
wherein
the
owner
of
the
time-‐
is
incumbent
upon
petitioner
Crescent
to
prove
that
benefit
was
extended
to
chartered
vessel
retains
possession
and
control
through
the
master
and
crew
the
vessel.
Petitioner
did
not.
who
remain
his
employees.
Not
enjoying
the
presumption
of
authority,
petitioner
Crescent
should
have
proved
that
Portserv
was
authorized
by
the
Second.
Petitioner
Crescent
did
not
show
any
proof
that
the
marine
products
shipowner
to
contract
for
supplies.
Petitioner
failed.
were
necessary
for
the
continuation
of
the
vessel.
49.
EDI-‐STAFF
BUILDERS
INTERNATIONAL
INC.
V.
NLRC
Third.
It
was
not
established
that
credit
was
extended
to
the
vessel.
It
is
G.R.
No.
145587
|
October
26,
2007
presumed
that
"in
the
absence
of
fraud
or
collusion,
where
advances
are
made
to
a
captain
in
a
foreign
port,
upon
his
request,
to
pay
for
necessary
DOCTRINE:
In
international
law,
the
party
who
wants
to
have
a
foreign
law
repairs
or
supplies
to
enable
his
vessel
to
prosecute
her
voyage,
or
to
pay
applied
to
a
dispute
or
case
has
the
burden
of
proving
the
foreign
law.
The
harbor
dues,
or
for
pilotage,
towage
and
like
services
rendered
to
the
vessel,
foreign
law
is
treated
as
a
question
of
fact
to
be
properly
pleaded
and
proved
as
that
they
are
made
upon
the
credit
of
the
vessel
as
well
as
upon
that
of
her
the
judge
or
labor
arbiter
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
a
foreign
law.
He
is
owners."
In
this
case,
it
was
the
sub-‐charterer
Portserv
which
requested
for
the
presumed
to
know
only
domestic
or
forum
law.
delivery
of
the
bunker
fuels.
The
issuance
of
two
checks
amounting
to
US$300,000
in
favor
of
petitioner
Crescent
prior
to
the
delivery
of
the
bunkers
GR:
Stipulation
that
Saudi
law
would
apply
to
an
agreement
is
valid.
as
security
for
the
payment
of
the
obligation
weakens
petitioner
Crescent’s
BUT
SEE:
Stipulations
cannot
render
illusory
Phil.
Laws
and
regulations
on
labor
contention
that
credit
was
extended
to
the
Vessel.
because
it
is
imbued
with
public
interest
(see
Pakistan
v
Ople)
We
also
note
that
when
copies
of
the
charter
parties
were
submitted
by
FACTS:
respondents
in
the
Court
of
Appeals,
the
time
charters
between
respondent
SCI
Petitioner
EDI-‐Staff
builders
International,
Inc.
is
a
corporation
engaged
in
and
Halla
and
between
Halla
and
Transmar
were
shown
to
contain
a
clause
recruitment
and
placement
of
OFWs.
Expertise
Search
International
(ESI)
is
which
states
that
"the
Charterers
shall
provide
and
pay
for
all
the
fuel
except
as
another
recruitment
agency,
which
collaborated
with
EDI
to
process
the
otherwise
agreed."
This
militates
against
petitioner
Crescent’s
position
that
documentation
and
deployment
of
private
respondent
Eleazar
Gran
to
Saudi
Portserv
is
authorized
by
the
shipowner
to
contract
for
supplies
upon
the
credit
Arabia.
Gran
was
recruited
by
EDI,
and
deployed
by
ESI
to
work
for
Omar
of
the
vessel.
Ahmed
Ali
Bin
Bechr
Est.
(OAB),
in
Riyadh,
KSA.
Fourth.
There
was
no
proof
of
necessity
of
credit.
A
necessity
of
credit
will
be
It
appears
that
OAB
asked
EDI
for
curricula
vitae
of
qualified
applicants
for
the
presumed
where
it
appears
that
the
repairs
and
supplies
were
necessary
for
position
of
"Computer
Specialist."
In
a
facsimile
transmission,
OAB
informed
the
ship
and
that
they
were
ordered
by
the
master.
This
presumption
does
not
EDI
that
it
selected
Gran
for
the
position
of
"Computer
Specialist”
and
that
if
arise
in
this
case
since
the
fuels
were
not
ordered
by
the
master
and
there
was
the
latter
agrees
to
the
terms
and
conditions
of
employment,
which
included:
no
proof
of
necessity
for
the
supplies.
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(1)
a
monthly
salary
of
SR
(Saudi
Riyal)
2,250.00
(USD
600.00),
EDI
may
arrange
the
OFW,
the
local
recruiter/agent,
and
the
foreign
employer/principal
are
for
Gran's
immediate
dispatch;
and
that
(2)
Saudi
Labor
Laws
will
govern
governed
by
the
employment
contract.
A
contract
freely
entered
into
is
matters
not
provided
for
in
the
contract
(e.g.
specific
causes
for
termination,
considered
law
between
the
parties;
and
hence,
should
be
respected.
In
termination
procedures,
etc.);
among
others.
formulating
the
contract,
the
parties
may
establish
such
stipulations,
clauses,
terms
and
conditions
as
they
may
deem
convenient,
provided
they
are
not
After
accepting
OAB's
offer
of
employment,
Gran
signed
an
employment
contrary
to
law,
morals,
good
customs,
public
order,
or
public
policy.
contract
that
granted
him
a
monthly
salary
of
USD
850.00
for
a
period
of
2
years.
Upon
arrival
in
Riyadh,
however,
Gran
questioned
the
discrepancy
in
his
In
the
present
case,
Saudi
Labor
Laws,
being
the
law
intended
by
the
parties
monthly
salary—his
employment
contract
stated
USD
850.00,
while
his
(lex
loci
intentiones)
to
apply
to
the
contract,
these
should
govern
all
matters
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Agency
(POEA)
Information
Sheet
indicated
relating
to
the
termination
of
the
employment
of
Gran.
USD
600.00
only.
However,
through
the
assistance
of
the
EDI
office
in
Riyadh,
OAB
agreed
to
pay
Gran
USD
850.00.
In
international
law,
the
party
who
wants
to
have
a
foreign
law
applied
to
a
dispute
or
case
has
the
burden
of
proving
the
foreign
law.
The
foreign
law
is
After
Gran
had
been
working
for
about
five
months
for
OAB,
his
employment
treated
as
a
question
of
fact
to
be
properly
pleaded
and
proved
as
the
judge
was
terminated
on
the
following
grounds:
1.
Non-‐compliance
to
contract
or
labor
arbiter
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
a
foreign
law.
He
is
presumed
to
requirements
by
the
recruitment
agency
primarily
on
salary
and
contract
know
only
domestic
or
forum
law.
duration.
2.
Non-‐compliance
to
pre-‐qualification
requirements
by
the
recruitment
agency.
3.
Insubordination
or
disobedience
to
Top
Management
Unfortunately
for
EDI,
it
did
not
prove
the
pertinent
Saudi
laws
on
the
Order
and/or
instructions.
matter;
thus,
the
International
Law
doctrine
of
presumed-‐identity
approach
or
processual
presumption
comes
into
play.
Where
a
foreign
law
is
not
Gran
received
from
OAB
the
total
amount
of
SR
2,948.00
representing
his
final
pleaded
or,
even
if
pleaded,
is
not
proved,
the
presumption
is
that
foreign
pay,
and
on
the
same
day,
he
executed
a
Declaration
releasing
OAB
from
any
law
is
the
same
as
ours.
Thus,
we
apply
Philippine
labor
laws
in
determining
financial
obligation
or
otherwise,
towards
him.
However,
after
his
arrival
in
the
the
issues
presented
before
us.
Philippines,
Gran
instituted
a
complaint
against
ESI/EDI,
OAB,
Country
Bankers
Insurance
Corporation,
and
Western
Guaranty
Corporation
with
the
NLRC
In
illegal
dismissal
cases,
it
has
been
established
by
Philippine
law
and
Quezon
City
for
underpayment
of
wages/salaries
and
illegal
dismissal.
jurisprudence
that
the
employer
should
prove
that
the
dismissal
of
employees
or
personnel
is
legal
and
just.
Section
33
of
Art.
277
(b)
of
the
Labor
Code
states
The
Labor
Arbiter
ruled
that
there
was
neither
underpayment
nor
illegal
that:
dismissal.
The
NLRC,
however,
reversed
the
Labor
Arbiter's
Decision.
Upon
a
petition
for
certiorari,
the
CA
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
NLRC.
(b)
Subject
to
the
constitutional
right
of
workers
to
security
of
tenure
and
their
right
to
be
protected
against
dismissal
except
for
a
just
and
ISSUES:
authorized
cause
and
without
prejudice
to
the
requirement
of
notice
1.
Whether
EDI
has
established
by
way
of
substantial
evidence
that
Gran's
under
Art.
283
of
this
Code,
the
employer
shall
furnish
the
worker
whose
termination
was
justifiable
by
reason
of
incompetence,
insubordination,
and
employment
is
sought
to
be
terminated
a
written
notice
containing
a
disobedience.
Corollary
hereto,
whether
the
Prieto
vs.
NLRC
ruling,
as
applied
statement
of
the
causes
for
termination
and
shall
afford
the
latter
ample
by
the
CA,
is
applicable
in
the
instant
case
opportunity
to
be
heard
and
to
defend
himself
with
the
assistance
of
his
2.
Whether
Gran
was
afforded
due
process
prior
to
termination
representative
if
he
so
desires
in
accordance
with
company
rules
and
regulations
promulgated
pursuant
to
guidelines
set
by
the
Department
HELD:
of
Labor
and
Employment.
Any
decision
taken
by
the
employer
shall
be
1.
No.
In
cases
involving
OFWs,
the
rights
and
obligations
among
and
between
without
prejudice
to
the
right
of
the
workers
to
contest
the
validity
or
CONFLICT
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legality
of
his
dismissal
by
filing
a
complaint
with
the
regional
branch
of
have
provided
a
copy
of
the
company
policy,
Gran's
job
description,
or
any
the
NLRC.
The
burden
of
proving
that
the
termination
was
for
a
valid
or
other
document
that
would
show
that
the
"Daily
Activity
Reports"
were
authorized
cause
shall
rest
on
the
employer.
x
x
x
required
for
submission
by
the
employees,
more
particularly
by
a
Computer
Specialist.
In
many
cases,
it
has
been
held
that
in
termination
disputes
or
illegal
dismissal
cases,
the
employer
has
the
burden
of
proving
that
the
dismissal
is
for
just
and
Even
though
EDI
and/or
ESI
were
merely
the
local
employment
or
valid
causes;
and
failure
to
do
so
would
necessarily
mean
that
the
dismissal
recruitment
agencies
and
not
the
foreign
employer,
they
should
have
was
not
justified
and
therefore
illegal.
Taking
into
account
the
character
of
the
adduced
additional
evidence
to
convincingly
show
that
Gran's
employment
charges
and
the
penalty
meted
to
an
employee,
the
employer
is
bound
to
was
validly
and
legally
terminated.
The
burden
devolves
not
only
upon
the
adduce
clear,
accurate,
consistent,
and
convincing
evidence
to
prove
that
the
foreign-‐based
employer
but
also
on
the
employment
or
recruitment
agency
dismissal
is
valid
and
legal.
for
the
latter
is
not
only
an
agent
of
the
former,
but
is
also
solidarily
liable
with
the
foreign
principal
for
any
claims
or
liabilities
arising
from
the
In
the
instant
case,
EDI
submitted
two
letters
as
evidence.
The
first
is
the
dismissal
of
the
worker.
Thus,
EDI
failed
to
prove
that
Gran
was
justifiably
termination
letter,
addressed
to
Gran,
from
Andrea
E.
Nicolaou,
Managing
dismissed
due
to
incompetence,
insubordination,
or
willful
disobedience.
Director
of
OAB.
The
second
is
an
unsigned
letter
from
OAB
addressed
to
EDI
and
ESI,
which
outlined
the
reasons
why
OAB
had
terminated
Gran's
PRIETO
RULING
employment.
EDI
claims
that
Gran
was
incompetent
for
the
Computer
Specialist
In
Prieto,
this
Court
ruled
that
"[i]t
is
presumed
that
before
their
deployment,
position
because
he
had
"insufficient
knowledge
in
programming
and
zero
the
petitioners
were
subjected
to
trade
tests
required
by
law
to
be
conducted
knowledge
of
[the]
ACAD
system."
Gran
was
justifiably
dismissed
due
to
by
the
recruiting
agency
to
insure
employment
of
only
technically
qualified
insubordination
or
disobedience
because
he
continually
failed
to
submit
the
workers
for
the
foreign
principal."
The
CA,
using
the
ruling
in
the
said
case,
required
"Daily
Activity
Reports."
However,
other
than
the
abovementioned
ruled
that
Gran
must
have
passed
the
test;
otherwise,
he
would
not
have
been
letters,
no
other
evidence
was
presented
to
show
how
and
why
Gran
was
hired.
Therefore,
EDI
was
at
fault
when
it
deployed
Gran
who
was
allegedly
considered
incompetent,
insubordinate,
or
disobedient.
EDI
had
clearly
failed
"incompetent"
for
the
job.
to
overcome
the
burden
of
proving
that
Gran
was
validly
dismissed.
The
CA
is
correct
in
applying
Prieto
although
Gran
misrepresented
himself
in
his
An
allegation
of
incompetence
should
have
a
factual
foundation.
Incompetence
CV
as
a
Computer
Specialist.
The
purpose
of
the
required
trade
test
is
to
weed
may
be
shown
by
weighing
it
against
a
standard,
benchmark,
or
criterion.
out
incompetent
applicants
from
the
pool
of
available
workers.
It
is
supposed
However,
EDI
failed
to
establish
any
such
bases.
to
reveal
applicants
with
false
educational
backgrounds,
and
expose
bogus
qualifications.
Since
EDI
deployed
Gran
to
Riyadh,
it
can
be
presumed
that
Gran
With
regard
to
insubordination
and
disobedience,
the
elements
that
must
had
passed
the
required
trade
test
and
that
Gran
is
qualified
for
the
job.
Even
if
concur
for
the
charge
of
insubordination
or
willful
disobedience
to
prosper
there
was
no
objective
trade
test
done
by
EDI,
it
was
still
EDI's
responsibility
to
were
not
present.
It
was
held
in
Micro
Sales
Operation
Network
v.
NLRC:
For
subject
Gran
to
a
trade
test;
and
its
failure
to
do
so
only
weakened
its
position
willful
disobedience
to
be
a
valid
cause
for
dismissal,
the
following
twin
but
should
not
in
any
way
prejudice
Gran.
In
any
case,
the
issue
is
rendered
elements
must
concur:
(1)
the
employee's
assailed
conduct
must
have
been
moot
and
academic
because
Gran's
incompetency
is
unproved.
willful,
that
is,
characterized
by
a
wrongful
and
perverse
attitude;
and
(2)
the
order
violated
must
have
been
reasonable,
lawful,
made
known
to
the
2.
No.
As
discussed
earlier,
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
Saudi
laws,
Philippine
employee
and
must
pertain
to
the
duties
which
he
had
been
engaged
to
Labor
laws
and
regulations
shall
govern
the
relationship
between
Gran
and
EDI.
discharge.
In
the
case
at
bar,
EDI
failed
to
show
that
the
order
of
the
company
Thus,
our
laws
and
rules
on
the
requisites
of
due
process
relating
to
which
was
violated—the
submission
of
"Daily
Activity
Reports"—was
part
of
termination
of
employment
shall
apply.
Under
the
twin
notice
requirement,
the
Gran's
duties
as
a
Computer
Specialist.
Before
the
Labor
Arbiter,
EDI
should
employees
must
be
given
two
(2)
notices
before
their
employment
could
be
CONFLICT
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terminated:
(1)
a
first
notice
to
apprise
the
employees
of
their
fault,
and
(2)
a
either
for
their
reciprocal
benefit
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
person."
second
notice
to
communicate
to
the
employees
that
their
employment
is
being
terminated.
In
between
the
first
and
second
notice,
the
employees
The
Court
agreed
with
Tirso’s
view,
supported
by
eminent
commentators,
that
should
be
given
a
hearing
or
opportunity
to
defend
themselves
personally
or
by
the
prohibition
of
Art.
669
is
directed
against
the
execution
of
a
joint
will,
or
counsel
of
their
choice.
the
expression
by
two
or
more
testators
of
their
wills
in
a
single
document
and
by
one
act,
rather
than
against
mutual
or
reciprocal
wills,
which
may
be
OAB's
manner
of
dismissing
Gran
fell
short
of
the
two
notice
requirement.
separately
executed.
Upon
this
premise,
however,
Tirso
argues
that
Art.
669
While
it
furnished
Gran
the
written
notice
informing
him
of
his
dismissal,
it
has
been
repealed
by
Act.
No.
190
(Code
of
CivPro),
which
he
claims
provides
failed
to
furnish
Gran
the
written
notice
apprising
him
of
the
charges
against
for
and
regulates
the
extrinsic
formalities
of
wills,
contending
that
whether
two
him,
as
prescribed
by
the
Labor
Code.
Consequently,
he
was
denied
the
wills
should
be
executed
conjointly
or
separately
is
but
a
matter
of
extrinsic
opportunity
to
respond
to
said
notice.
In
addition,
OAB
did
not
schedule
a
formality.
hearing
or
conference
with
Gran
to
defend
himself
and
adduce
evidence
in
support
of
his
defenses.
ISSUE:
Whether
Art.
669
of
the
Civil
Code
was
repealed
by
Act
No.
190
(Code
of
CivPro)
EXCEPTIONS
TO
THE
APPLICATION
OF
FOREIGN
LAW
HELD:
No.
The
SC
applied
its
ruling
in
In
re:
Will
of
Bilbao,
wherein
it
stated
that
50.
DACANAY
V.
FLORENDO
several
articles
of
the
Civil
Code
regarding
wills
have
not
only
been
referred
to
G.R.
No.
L-‐2071
|
September
19,
1950
but
have
also
been
applied
side
by
side
with
the
provisions
of
the
Code
of
CivPro.
The
provision
of
Art.
669
is
not
unwise
and
is
not
against
public
policy.
Contrary
to
public
policy
The
reason
for
this
is
that
when
a
will
is
made
jointly
or
in
the
same
instrument,
the
spouse
who
is
more
aggressive,
stronger
in
will
or
character
and
dominant
N.B.:
What
provision
is
relevant
today?
is
liable
to
dictate
the
terms
of
the
will
for
his
or
her
own
benefit
or
for
that
of
Article
819.
Wills,
prohibited
by
the
preceding
article,
executed
by
Filipinos
in
a
third
persons
whom
he
or
she
desires
to
favor.
And,
where
the
will
is
not
only
foreign
country
shall
not
be
valid
in
the
Philippines,
even
though
authorized
by
joint
but
reciprocal,
either
one
of
the
spouses
who
may
happen
to
be
the
laws
of
the
country
where
they
may
have
been
executed.
(733a)
unscrupulous,
wicked,
faithless
or
desperate,
knowing
as
he
or
she
does
the
terms
of
the
will
whereby
the
whole
property
of
the
spouses
both
conjugal
and
FACTS:
paraphernal
goes
to
the
survivor,
may
be
tempted
to
kill
or
dispose
of
the
A
joint
and
reciprocal
will
was
executed
by
the
spouses
Isabel
Florendo
and
other.
Tirso
Dacanay
in
1940.
After
the
death
of
Isabel,
Tirso
now
seek
to
probate
said
will
in
CFI
La
Union,
with
the
will
providing
in
substance
that
whoever
of
the
Considering
the
wisdom
of
the
provisions
of
this
Art.
669
and
the
fact
that
it
spouses,
joint
testators,
shall
survive
the
other,
shall
inherit
all
the
properties
has
not
been
repealed,
at
least
not
expressly,
as
well
as
the
consideration
that
of
the
latter,
with
an
agreement
as
to
how
the
surviving
spouse
shall
dispose
of
its
provisions
are
not
incompatible
with
those
of
the
Code
of
CivPro
on
the
the
properties
in
case
of
his
or
her
demise.
subject
of
wills,
said
Art.
669
of
the
Civil
Code
is
still
in
force.
Further,
this
article
has
been
reproduced
word
for
word
in
Art.
818
of
the
New
Civil
Code.
The
relatives
of
the
deceased
Isabel
opposed
the
probate
of
said
will
on
the
The
implication
is
that
the
Philippine
Legislature
that
passed
this
Act
and
ground
that
it
is
null
and
void
for
being
in
violation
of
Art.
669
of
the
Civil
Code:
approved
the
NCC,
including
the
members
of
the
Code
Commission
who
"Two
or
more
persons
cannot
make
a
will
conjointly
or
in
the
same
instrument,
prepared
it,
are
of
the
opinion
that
the
provisions
of
Art.
669
are
not
incompatible
with
those
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
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2.
Whether
private
respondents
are
natural
children
of
Sy
Kiat
with
Asuncion
51.
YAO
KEE,
ET
AL.
V.
SY-‐GONZALES
Gillego
G.R.
No.
L-‐55960
|
November
24,
1988
HELD:
DOCTRINE:
To
establish
a
valid
foreign
marriage
two
things
must
be
proven,
1.
No.
To
buttress
petitioners’
argument
that
the
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
namely:
(1)
the
existence
of
the
foreign
law
as
a
question
of
fact;
and
(2)
the
in
accordance
with
Chinese
law
and
custom
was
conclusively
proven,
they
alleged
foreign
marriage
by
convincing
evidence.
relied
on
the
following
testimonial
and
documentary
evidence.
FACTS:
(1)
the
testimony
of
Yao
Kee:
She
testified
that
she
was
married
to
Sy
Sy
Kiat,
a
Chinese
national,
died
on
January
17,
1977
in
Caloocan
City
where
he
Kiat
in
1931
in
Fookien,
China.
She
does
not
have
a
marriage
certificate
was
then
residing,
leaving
behind
real
and
personal
properties
here
in
the
because
the
practice
during
that
time
was
for
elders
to
agree
upon
the
Philippines
worth
P300,000.00
more
or
less.
betrothal
of
their
children,
and
in
her
case,
her
elder
brother
was
the
one
who
contracted
or
entered
into
[an]
agreement
with
the
parents
of
Thereafter,
private
respondents
(all
surnamed
Sy)
filed
a
petition
for
the
grant
her
husband.
During
the
wedding
the
document
would
be
signed
by
the
of
letters
of
administration
of
the
then
CFI
of
Rizal,
Caloocan
City.
In
said
parents
of
the
groom
as
well
as
by
the
parents
of
the
bride
and
there
is
petition
they
alleged
among
others
that
(a)
they
are
the
children
of
the
no
solemnizing
officer
as
is
known
in
the
Philippines.
The
parties
deceased
with
Asuncion
Gillego;
and
(b)
to
their
knowledge
Sy
Kiat
died
themselves
do
not
sign
the
document.
As
to
the
whereabouts
of
this
intestate;
among
others.
document,
she
and
Sy
Kiat
were
married
for
46
years
already
and
the
document
was
left
in
China
and
she
doubt
if
that
document
can
still
be
The
petition
was
opposed
by
Petitioners
Yao
Kee,
Sze
Sook
Wah,
Sze
Lai
Cho
found
now.
It
was
left
in
the
possession
of
Sy
Kiat's
family.
Right
now,
she
and
Sy
Yun
Chen
who
alleged
that:
(a)
Yao
Kee
is
the
lawful
wife
of
Sy
Kiat,
does
not
know
the
whereabouts
of
that
document
because
of
the
lapse
whom
he
married
in
China;
(b)
the
other
oppositors
are
the
legitimate
children
of
many
years
and
because
they
left
it
in
a
certain
place
and
it
was
of
the
deceased
with
Yao
Kee;
and,
(c)
Sze
Sook
Wah
is
the
eldest
among
them
already
eaten
by
the
termites.
and
is
competent,
willing
and
desirous
to
become
the
administratrix
of
the
(2)
The
testimony
of
Gan
Ching,
a
younger
brother
of
Yao
Kee
who
stated
estate
of
Sy
Kiat.
that
he
was
among
the
many
people
who
attended
the
wedding
of
his
sister
with
Sy
Kiat
and
that
no
marriage
certificate
is
issued
by
the
After
hearing,
the
probate
court
ruled
in
favor
of
the
petitioners
and
found
that
Chinese
government,
a
document
signed
by
the
parents
or
elders
of
the
(1)
Sy
Kiat
was
legally
married
to
Yao
Kee;
(2)
Petitioners
are
the
legitimate
parties
being
sufficient.
children
of
Yao
Kee
with
Sy
Kiat;
and
(3)
private
respondents
are
the
(3)
The
statements
made
by
Asuncion
Gillego
to
the
effect
that
Sy
Kiat
acknowledged
illegitimate
offsprings
of
Sy
Kiat
with
Asuncion
Gillego.
On
was
married
to
Yao
Kee
according
to
Chinese
custom;
and
Sy
Kiat's
appeal
the
CA
ruled
that
Sy
Kiat
is
an
unmarried
man
who
was
living
with
admission
to
her
that
he
has
a
Chinese
wife
whom
he
married
according
Asuncion
Gillego
without
the
benefit
of
marriage
for
many
years
and
that
the
to
Chinese
custom.
legality
of
the
alleged
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
in
China
had
not
been
(4)
Sy
Kiat's
Master
Card
of
Registered
Alien
issued
in
Caloocan
City
on
proven
to
be
valid
to
the
laws
of
the
Chinese
People's
Republic
of
China.
October
3,
1972
where
the
following
entries
are
found:
"Marital
status—
Married";
"If
married
give
name
of
spouses—Yao
Kee";
"Address-‐China;
ISSUES:
"Date
of
marriage—1931";
and
"Place
of
marriage—China"
1.
Whether
the
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
was
proven
valid
in
accordance
(5)
Sy
Kiat's
Alien
Certificate
of
Registration
issued
in
Manila
stating:
with
laws
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
"Civil
status—Married";
and,
'If
married,
state
name
and
address
of
spouse—Yao
Kee
Chingkang,
China".
CONFLICT
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(6)
The
certification
issued
in
Manila
by
the
Embassy
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
to
the
effect
that
"according
to
the
information
Proof
of
a
written
foreign
law,
on
the
other
hand,
is
provided
for
under
Rule
available
at
the
Embassy
Mr.
Sy
Kiat
a
Chinese
national
and
Mrs.
Yao
Kee
132
section
25,
thus:
alias
Yui
Yip
also
Chinese
were
married
on
January
19,
1931
in
Fukien,
the
People's
Republic
of
China.
SEC.
25.
Proof
of
public
or
official
record.—An
official
record
or
an
entry
therein,
when
admissible
for
any
purpose,
may
be
evidenced
by
an
These
evidence
may
very
well
prove
the
fact
of
marriage
between
Yao
Kee
and
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
Sy
Kiat.
However,
the
same
do
not
suffice
to
establish
the
validity
of
said
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied,
if
the
marriage
in
accordance
with
Chinese
law
or
custom.
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
such
officer
has
the
custody.
If
the
office
in
which
the
record
is
kept
is
in
a
foreign
Custom
is
defined
as
"a
rule
of
conduct
formed
by
repetition
of
acts,
country,
the
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
embassy
or
uniformly
observed
(practiced)
as
a
social
rule,
legally
binding
and
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
obligatory".
The
law
requires
that
"a
custom
must
be
proved
as
a
fact,
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
according
to
the
rules
of
evidence"
[Art.
12,
NCC.]
On
this
score
the
Court
had
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
occasion
to
state
that
"a
local
custom
as
a
source
of
right
can
not
be
office.
considered
by
a
court
of
justice
unless
such
custom
is
properly
established
by
competent
evidence
like
any
other
fact.”
The
same
evidence,
if
not
one
of
a
The
Court
has
interpreted
§25
to
include
competent
evidence
like
the
higher
degree,
should
be
required
of
a
foreign
custom.
testimony
of
a
witness
to
prove
the
existence
of
a
written
foreign
law.
The
law
on
foreign
marriages
is
provided
by
Art.
71
of
the
Civil
Code
which
In
the
case
at
bar
petitioners
did
not
present
any
competent
evidence
relative
states
that:
Art.
71.
All
marriages
performed
outside
the
Philippines
in
to
the
law
and
custom
of
China
on
marriage.
The
testimonies
of
Yao
and
Gan
accordance
with
the
laws
in
force
in
the
country
where
they
were
performed
Ching
cannot
be
considered
as
proof
of
China's
law
or
custom
on
marriage
not
and
valid
there
as
such,
shall
also
be
valid
in
this
country,
except
bigamous,
only
because
they
are
self-‐serving
evidence,
but
more
importantly,
there
is
no
polygamous,
or
incestuous
marriages,
as
determined
by
Philippine
law.
[Now,
showing
that
they
are
competent
to
testify
on
the
subject
matter.
For
failure
Art.
26,
FC]
to
prove
the
foreign
law
or
custom,
and
consequently,
the
validity
of
the
marriage
in
accordance
with
said
law
or
custom,
the
marriage
between
Yao
Kee
Construing
this
provision
of
law
the
Court
has
held
that
to
establish
a
valid
and
Sy
Kiat
cannot
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction.
foreign
marriage
two
things
must
be
proven,
namely:
(1)
the
existence
of
the
foreign
law
as
a
question
of
fact;
and
(2)
the
alleged
foreign
marriage
by
Petitioners
cited
the
case
of
Sy
Joc
Lieng
v.
Sy
Quia,
where
the
party
alleging
convincing
evidence.
the
foreign
marraige
were
not
duty
bound
to
prove
the
Chinese
law
on
marriage
as
judicial
notice
thereof
had
been
taken
by
the
Court.
This
EXISTENCE
OF
THE
FOREIGN
LAW
contention
is
erroneous.
Well-‐established
in
this
jurisdiction
is
the
principle
In
proving
a
foreign
law
the
procedure
is
provided
in
the
Rules
of
Court.
With
that
Philippine
courts
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
foreign
laws.
They
must
respect
to
an
unwritten
foreign
law,
Rule
130,
§45
states
that:
be
alleged
and
proved
as
any
other
fact.
Moreover
a
reading
of
said
case
would
show
that
the
party
alleging
the
foreign
marriage
presented
a
witness,
SEC.
45.
Unwritten
law.—The
oral
testimony
of
witnesses,
skilled
therein,
one
Li
Ung
Bieng,
to
prove
that
matrimonial
letters
mutually
exchanged
by
the
is
admissible
as
evidence
of
the
unwritten
law
of
a
foreign
country,
as
contracting
parties
constitute
the
essential
requisite
for
a
marriage
to
be
are
also
printed
and
published
books
of
reports
of
decisions
of
the
courts
considered
duly
solemnized
in
China.
His
testimony
was
uniformly
of
the
foreign
country,
if
proved
to
be
commonly
admitted
in
such
corroborated
by
authors
on
the
subject
of
Chinese
marriage.
courts.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
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Further,
assuming
arguendo
that
the
Court
has
indeed
taken
judicial
notice
of
52.
BANK
OF
AMERICA
V.
AMERICAN
REALTY
CORPORATION
the
law
of
China
on
marriage
in
the
aforecited
case,
petitioners
however
have
G.R.
No.
133876
|
December
29,
1999
not
shown
any
proof
that
the
Chinese
law
or
custom
obtaining
at
the
time
the
Sy
Joc
Lieng
marriage
was
celebrated
in
1847
was
still
the
law
when
the
FACTS:
alleged
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
took
place
in
1931
or
eighty-‐four
(84)
Bank
of
America
NT
&
SA
(BANTSA)
is
an
international
banking
institution
duly
years
later.
licensed
to
do
business
in
the
Philippines,
organized
under
the
laws
of
the
State
of
California.
American
Realty
(ARC)
is
a
domestic
corporation.
Bank
of
America
EXISTENCE
OF
THE
FOREIGN
MARRIAGE
International
Limited
(BAIL)
is
a
limited
liability
company
organized
and
existing
Petitioners
moreover
cite
the
case
of
U.S.
v.
Memoracion,
where
the
testimony
under
the
laws
of
England.
of
one
of
the
contracting
parties
is
competent
evidence
to
show
the
fact
of
marriage.
This
case
however
is
not
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar
as
said
case
did
BANTSA
and
BAIL
granted
three
multimillion
USD
loans
to
1.
Liberian
Transport
not
concern
a
foreign
marriage
and
the
issue
posed
was
whether
or
not
the
2.
El
Challenger
and
3.
Eshley
Compania
(herein
referred
to
as
borrowers).
All
oral
testimony
of
a
spouse
is
competent
evidence
to
prove
the
fact
of
are
existing
under
the
laws
of
Panama,
and
are
foreign
affiliates
of
ARC.
marriage
in
a
complaint
for
adultery.
BANTSA
and
the
borrowers
signed
restructuring
agreements
due
to
their
rd
Accordingly,
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
the
Chinese
law
on
marriage,
it
should
default.
As
additional
security,
ARC,
as
3 party
mortgagor,
executed
2
real
be
presumed
that
it
is
the
same
as
ours.
Since
Yao
Kee
admitted
in
her
estate
mortgages
over
land
parcels
in
San
Jose
Del
Monte,
Bulacan.
Eventually,
testimony
that
there
was
no
solemnizing
officer
as
is
known
here
in
the
the
borrowers
defaulted
in
the
restructured
loans,
prompting
BANTSA
to
file
4
Philippines
[See
Art.
56,
Civil
Code]
when
her
alleged
marriage
to
Sy
Kiat
was
civil
actions
before
foreign
courts
for
the
collection:
2
in
England’s
High
Court
celebrated,
it
therefore
follows
that
her
marriage
to
Sy
Kiat,
even
if
true,
and
2
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Hongkong
High
Court.
cannot
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction.
rd
In
the
cases
before
foreign
courts,
ARC
as
the
3
party
mortgagor
wasn’t
2.
Yes.
Private
respondents
on
the
other
hand
are
also
the
deceased's
impleaded
as
party-‐defendant.
In
1992,
BANTSA
filed
an
application
for
acknowledged
natural
children
with
Asuncion
Gillego.
They
have
in
their
favor
extrajudicial
foreclosure
of
REM
before
the
Office
of
the
Provincial
Sheriff
of
their
father's
acknowledgment,
evidenced
by
a
compromise
agreement
Bulacan.
After
publication
and
due
notice,
the
mortgaged
real
properties
were
entered
into
by
and
between
their
parents
and
approved
by
the
CFI,
wherein
Sy
sold,
with
Integrated
Credit
&
Corporation
Services
(ICCS)
as
the
highest
bidder
Kiat
not
only
acknowleged
them
as
his
children
by
Asuncion
Gillego
but
likewise
for
24m.
made
provisions
for
their
support
and
future
inheritance.
ARC
then
filed
before
the
Pasig
RTC
an
action
for
damages
for
BANTSA’s
act
of
As
regards
petitioners,
they
failed
to
establish
the
marriage
of
Yao
Kee
with
Sy
extrajudicially
foreclosing
the
mortgages
despite
the
pendency
of
civil
suits
Kiat
according
to
the
laws
of
China.
Thus,
they
cannot
be
accorded
the
status
of
before
foreign
courts
for
the
collection
of
the
principal
loan.
BANTSA
alleged
legitimate
children
but
only
that
of
acknowledged
natural
children.
Petitioners
that
the
rule
prohibiting
the
mortgagee
from
foreclosing
the
mortgage
after
an
are
natural
children,
it
appearing
that
at
the
time
of
their
conception
Yao
Kee
ordinary
suit
for
collection
has
been
filed
is
not
applicable
here,
because:
1)
rd
and
Sy
Kiat
were
not
disqualified
by
any
impediment
to
marry
one
another
[See
ARC
is
a
3 party
mortgagor
and
not
a
party
in
the
principal
restructuring
Art.
269,
Civil
Code.]
agreements,
and
not
made
as
a
defendant
in
HKG
and
England
2)
There
is
no
civil
suit
for
sum
of
money
filed
in
the
Philippines
since
they
were
filed
in
HKG
and
England,
so
such
decisions
which
may
be
rendered
are
not
enforceable
unless
there
is
a
separate
action
and
3)
Under
English
Law,
which
is
the
governing
law
under
the
principal
agreements,
the
mortgagee
does
not
lose
its
security
interest
by
filing
civil
actions
for
sums
of
money.
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OF
LAWS
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Thus,
when
the
foreign
law,
judgment
or
contract
is
contrary
to
a
sound
and
ARC
filed
a
motion
for
suspension
of
the
redemption
period
because
it
cannot
established
public
policy
of
the
forum,
the
said
foreign
law,
judgment
or
exercise
the
right
without
waiving
its
contentions
in
the
case
that
the
order
shall
not
be
applied.
foreclosure
of
the
mortgage
on
its
properties
is
legally
improper
and
therefore
invalid.
Additionally,
prohibitive
laws
concerning
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
those
which
have
for
their
object
public
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
RTC
granted
the
motion
for
suspension.
RD
of
Meycauyan
received
the
order.
shall
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
by
After
a
month,
ICCS
consolidated
its
ownership
over
the
real
properties,
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
a
foreign
country.
(Art.
17,
NCC)
resulting
in
the
issuance
of
TCT
in
its
name.
ICCS
then
sold
them
to
Stateland
Investment
Corporation
for
39m,
and
TCTs
were
issued
to
its
name.
The
public
policy
sought
to
be
protected
in
the
instant
case
is
the
principle
imbedded
in
our
jurisdiction
proscribing
the
splitting
up
of
a
single
cause
of
The
Pasig
RTC
rendered
a
decision
in
favor
of
ARC.
CA
affirmed.
action.
ISSUE:
§4,
Rule
2
of
the
1997
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
is
pertinent—If
two
or
more
suits
Whether
BANTSA’s
act
of
filing
a
collection
suit
against
the
principal
debtors
for
are
instituted
on
the
basis
of
the
same
cause
of
action,
the
filing
of
one
or
a
the
recovery
of
the
loan
before
the
foreign
courts
constituted
a
waiver
of
the
judgment
upon
the
merits
in
any
one
is
available
as
a
ground
for
the
dismissal
remedy
of
foreclosure
of
the
others.
HELD:
Moreover,
foreign
law
should
not
be
applied
when
its
application
would
work
Yes.
undeniable
injustice
to
the
citizens
or
residents
of
the
forum.
To
give
justice
is
the
most
important
function
of
law;
hence,
a
law,
or
judgment
or
contract
ENGLISH
LAW
NOT
APPLICABLE
that
is
obviously
unjust
negates
the
fundamental
principles
of
Conflict
of
BANTSA
further
alleges
that
under
English
Law,
which
according
to
it
is
the
Laws.
governing
law
with
regard
to
the
principal
agreements,
the
mortgagee
does
not
lose
its
security
interest
by
simply
filing
civil
actions
for
sums
of
money.
The
Court
disagreed,
ruling
that
English
Law
is
not
applicable.
VI.
NATURE
OF
CONFLICTS
RULES,
THE
PROBLEM
OF
In
the
case
at
bench,
Philippine
law
shall
apply
notwithstanding
the
evidence
CHARACTERIZATION,
AND
RENVOI
presented
by
BANTSA
to
prove
the
English
law
on
the
matter.
There
is
no
judicial
notice
of
any
foreign
law.
A
foreign
law
must
be
properly
pleaded
and
53.
IN
THE
MATTER
OF
THE
TESTATE
ESTATE
OF
EDWARD
E.
CHRISTENSEN
proved
as
a
fact.
Thus,
if
the
foreign
law
involved
is
not
properly
pleaded
and
G.R.
No.
L-‐16749
|
January
31,
1963
proved,
our
courts
will
presume
that
the
foreign
law
is
the
same
as
our
local
or
domestic
or
internal
law.
This
is
what
we
refer
to
as
the
doctrine
of
DOCTRINE:
There
are
two
types
of
renvoi.
(1)
The
type
of
renvoi
where
a
jural
processual
presumption.
matter
is
presented
which
the
COL
rule
of
the
forum
refers
to
a
foreign
law,
the
conflict-‐of-‐laws
rule
of
which,
in
turn,
refers
the
matter
back
again
to
the
law
of
Assuming
arguendo
that
the
English
Law
on
the
matter
were
properly
pleaded
the
forum.
(2)
The
doctrine
of
renvoi
which
postulates
that
the
court
of
the
and
proved
in
accordance
with
§24,
Rule
132
of
the
Rules
of
Court
and
the
forum,
in
determining
the
question
before
it,
must
take
into
account
the
whole
jurisprudence
laid
down
in
Yao
Kee,
et
al.
v.
Sy-‐Gonzales,
said
foreign
law
would
law
of
the
other
jurisdiction,
but
also
its
rules
as
to
COL,
and
then
apply
the
law
still
not
find
applicability.
to
the
actual
question
which
the
rules
of
the
other
jurisdiction
prescribe.
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OF
LAWS
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According
to
this
theory
'the
law
of
a
country'
means
the
whole
of
its
law.
that
at
the
time
of
his
death
he
was
domiciled
in
the
Philippines.
Hence,
the
law
that
governs
the
validity
of
his
testamentary
dispositions
is
defined
in
Art.
FACTS:
16
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
which
is
as
follows:
Edward
E.
Christensen
executed
a
will
in
Manila
on
March
5,
1951.
He
stated
therein
that
he
has
one
child,
Mary
Lucy
Christensen
(now
Mrs.
Bernard
ART.
16.
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
Daney),
a
Filipino
citizen
but
a
resident
of
Los
Angeles
and
that
he
had
no
other
of
the
country
where
it
is
situated.
living
ascendants
and
descendants.
To
her,
he
devised
and
bequeathed
all
the
income
from
the
remainder
of
his
property
and
estate,
real,
personal
and/or
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
mixed,
of
whatsoever
kind
or
character,
and
wheresoever
situated.
He
also
the
order
of
succession
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
stipulated
the
he
was
devising
and
bequeathing
to
Maria
Helen
Christensen
the
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
sum
of
P3,600
and
paid
to
her
in
monthly
increments
of
P100.
Thus,
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
executor
finalized
the
account
and
project
of
partition
as
such.
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
country
where
said
property
may
be
found.
Maria
Helen
opposed
the
approval
of
the
project
of
partition
as
it
deprives
her
of
her
legitime
as
an
acknowledged
natural
child,
she
having
been
declared
the
The
application
of
the
aforementioned
in
the
case
at
bar
requires
the
court
in
as
such
in
a
previous
case.
The
legal
grounds
of
opposition
are
(a)
that
determination
of
the
meaning
of
the
term
"national
law"
as
used
therein.
There
the
distribution
should
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
Philippines,
and
(b)
that
is
no
single
American
law
governing
the
validity
of
testamentary
provisions
in
said
order
of
distribution
is
contrary
to
law
as
it
denies
her
one-‐half
of
the
the
US
since
each
state
has
its
own
private
law
applicable
to
its
citizens
only
estate.
Furthermore,
she
alleged
that
the
law
that
should
govern
Edward's
and
in
force
only
within
the
state.
The
"national
law"
indicated
in
Art.
16
estate
should
not
be
the
internal
law
of
California
alone,
but
the
entire
law
cannot,
therefore,
possibly
mean
or
apply
to
any
general
American
law.
It
thereof
because
several
foreign
elements
are
involved.
She
alleged
further
that
refers
then
to
the
private
law
of
the
State
of
California.
The
next
question
is,
the
forum
is
the
Philippines
and
even
if
the
case
were
decided
in
California,
what
is
the
law
in
California
governing
the
disposition
of
personal
property?
§946
of
the
California
Civil
Code,
requires
that
the
domicile
of
the
decedent
should
apply.
It
is
argued
on
executor's
behalf
that
as
the
deceased
Christensen
was
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
California,
the
internal
law
thereof,
should
govern
the
The
court
below
ruled
that
as
Edward
was
a
citizen
of
the
US
and
of
the
State
of
determination
of
the
validity
of
the
testamentary
provisions
of
Christensen's
California
at
the
time
of
his
death,
it
follows
then
that
the
successional
rights
will,
such
law
being
in
force
in
the
State
of
California
of
which
Christensen
was
and
intrinsic
validity
of
the
provisions
in
his
will
are
to
be
governed
by
a
citizen.
Maria
Helen,
on
the
other
hand,
insists
that
Art.
946
should
be
California
law.
Therefore,
it
held
that
he
had
the
right
to
dispose
of
his
property
applicable,
which
reads:
“If
there
is
no
law
to
the
contrary,
in
the
place
where
in
the
way
he
desires
because
the
right
of
absolute
dominion
over
his
property
personal
property
is
situated,
it
is
deemed
to
follow
the
person
of
its
owner,
and
is
sacred
and
inviolable.
is
governed
by
the
law
of
his
domicile.”
And
in
accordance
therewith
and
following
the
doctrine
of
the
renvoi,
the
question
of
the
validity
of
the
ISSUE:
testamentary
provision
in
question
should
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
Whether
under
Renvoi
Doctrine
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
testamentary
decedent's
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines.
disposition
of
the
distribution
should
be
governed
by
the
Philippine
Laws?
The
theory
of
doctrine
of
renvoi
states
the
problem
in
this
way:
"When
the
HELD:
Conflict
of
Laws
rule
of
the
forum
refers
a
jural
matter
to
a
foreign
law
for
Yes.
There
is
no
question
that
Edward
was
a
citizen
of
the
United
States
and
of
decision,
is
the
reference
to
the
purely
internal
rules
of
law
of
the
foreign
the
State
of
California
at
the
time
of
his
death
and
there
is
also
no
question
system;
i.e.,
to
the
totality
of
the
foreign
law
minus
its
Conflict
of
Laws
rules?"
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Von
Bar
presented
his
views
at
the
meeting
of
the
Institute
of
International
In
explaining
the
logic
behind
renvoi,
the
Court
cited
this:
“The
Michigan
court
Law,
at
Neuchatel,
in
1900,
in
the
form
of
the
following
theses:
1)
Every
court
chose
to
accept
the
renvoi,
that
is,
applied
the
Conflict
of
Laws
rule
of
Illinois
shall
observe
the
law
of
its
country
as
regards
the
application
of
foreign
laws.
which
referred
the
matter
back
to
Michigan
law.
But
once
having
determined
(2)
Provided
that
no
express
provision
to
the
contrary
exists,
the
court
shall
the
COL
principle
is
the
rule
looked
to,
it
is
difficult
to
see
why
the
reference
respect:
(a)
The
provisions
of
a
foreign
law
which
disclaims
the
right
to
bind
its
back
should
not
have
been
to
Michigan
Conflict
of
Laws.
This
would
have
nationals
abroad
as
regards
their
personal
statute,
and
desires
that
said
resulted
in
the
"endless
chain
of
references"
which
has
so
often
been
criticized
personal
statute
shall
be
determined
by
the
law
of
the
domicile,
or
even
by
the
by
legal
writers.
The
opponents
of
the
renvoi
would
have
looked
merely
to
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
act
in
question
occurred.
(b)
The
decision
of
two
or
internal
law
of
Illinois,
thus
rejecting
the
renvoi
or
the
reference
back.
Yet
there
more
foreign
systems
of
law,
provided
it
be
certain
that
one
of
them
is
seems
no
compelling
logical
reason
why
the
original
reference
should
be
the
necessarily
competent,
which
agree
in
attributing
the
determination
of
a
internal
law
rather
than
to
the
Conflict
of
Laws
rule.
It
is
true
that
such
a
question
to
the
same
system
of
law.
solution
avoids
going
on
a
merry-‐go-‐round,
but
those
who
have
accepted
the
renvoi
theory
avoid
this
inextricabilis
circulas
by
getting
off
at
the
second
Art.
946
of
the
California
Civil
Code
is
its
COL
rule,
while
the
rule
invoked
by
reference
and
at
that
point
applying
internal
law.”
Maria
Helen
is
an
internal
law.
If
the
law
on
succession
and
the
conflict
of
laws
rules
of
California
are
to
be
enforced
jointly,
each
in
its
own
intended
and
The
court
also
discussed
two
types
of
renvoi.
One
type
of
renvoi
is
where
a
appropriate
sphere,
the
internal
law
should
apply
to
citizens
living
in
the
State,
jural
matter
is
presented
which
the
COL
rule
of
the
forum
refers
to
a
foreign
but
Article
946
should
apply
to
such
of
its
citizens
as
are
not
domiciled
in
law,
the
conflict-‐of-‐laws
rule
of
which,
in
turn,
refers
the
matter
back
again
to
California
but
in
other
jurisdictions.
The
rule
laid
down
of
resorting
to
the
law
the
law
of
the
forum.
This
is
renvoi
in
the
narrower
sense.
The
German
term
of
the
domicile
in
the
determination
of
matters
with
foreign
element
involved
for
this
judicial
process
is
'Ruckverweisung.'
Thus,
after
a
decision
has
been
is
in
accord
with
the
general
principle
of
American
law
that
the
domiciliary
law
arrived
that
a
foreign
law
is
to
be
resorted
to
as
governing
a
particular
case,
the
should
govern
in
most
matters
or
rights
which
follow
the
person
of
the
owner.
further
question
may
arise:
Are
the
rules
as
to
the
COL
contained
in
such
foreign
law
also
to
be
resorted
to?
This
is
a
question
which,
while
it
has
been
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
estate
of
Edward
through
its
executor
argues
that
what
considered
by
the
courts
in
but
a
few
instances,
has
been
the
subject
of
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines
pointed
out
as
the
national
law
is
the
frequent
discussion
by
textwriters
and
essayists.
The
doctrine
involved
has
internal
law
of
California.
However,
the
laws
of
California
have
prescribed
two
been
descriptively
designated
as
the
"Renvoyer"
to
send
back,
or
the
sets
of
laws
for
its
citizens,
one
for
residents
therein
and
another
for
those
"Ruchversweisung",
or
the
"Weiterverweisung."
domiciled
in
other
jurisdictions.
Reason
then
demands
that
the
California
internal
law
should
be
enforced
as
it
is
prescribed
for
its
citizens
residing
The
second
theory
is
known
as
the
"doctrine
of
renvoi."
The
doctrine
therein,
and
enforce
the
conflict
of
laws
rules
for
the
citizens
domiciled
postulates
that
the
court
of
the
forum,
in
determining
the
question
before
it,
abroad.
If
the
court
then
must
enforce
the
law
of
California
as
in
comity
we
must
take
into
account
the
whole
law
of
the
other
jurisdiction,
also
its
rules
as
are
bound
to
go,
as
so
declared
in
Art.
16,
then
we
must
enforce
the
law
of
to
COL,
and
then
apply
the
law
to
the
actual
question,
which
the
rules
of
the
California
in
accordance
with
the
express
mandate
thereof
and
as
above
other
jurisdiction
prescribe.
This
may
be
the
law
of
the
forum.
The
doctrine
of
explained,
i.e.,
apply
the
internal
law
for
residents
therein,
and
its
conflict-‐of-‐
the
renvoi
has
generally
been
repudiated
by
the
American
authorities.
The
laws
rule
for
those
domiciled
abroad.
recognition
of
this
renvoi
theory
implies
that
the
rules
of
the
conflict
of
laws
are
to
be
understood
as
incorporating
not
only
the
ordinary
or
internal
law
of
It
is
further
argued
by
the
executor
that
that
the
clause
"if
there
is
no
law
to
the
foreign
state
or
country,
but
its
rules
of
the
conflict
of
laws
as
well.
the
contrary
in
the
place
where
the
property
is
situated"
in
Sec.
946
of
the
According
to
this
theory
'the
law
of
a
country'
means
the
whole
of
its
law.
California
Civil
Code
refers
to
Art.
16
and
that
the
law
to
the
contrary
in
the
Philippines
is
the
provision
in
said
Art.
16
that
the
national
law
of
the
deceased
should
govern.
The
court
held
that
this
contention
cannot
be
sustained.
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Helen
alleged
that
the
will
deprives
her
of
her
legitime
as
an
acknowledged
The
national
law
mentioned
in
Art.
16
is
the
law
on
COL
in
the
California
Civil
natural
child.
She
claims
that
under
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
Code,
i.e.
Art.
946,
which
authorizes
the
reference
or
return
of
the
question
the
California
law
should
be
applied,
and
in
accordance
therewith
and
following
to
the
law
of
the
testator's
domicile.
The
conflict
of
laws
rule
in
California,
the
doctrine
of
the
renvoi,
the
question
of
the
validity
of
the
testamentary
Art.
946
precisely
refers
back
the
case,
when
a
decedent
is
not
domiciled
in
provision
in
question
should
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
decedent's
California,
to
the
law
of
his
domicile—the
Philippines
in
the
case
at
bar.
The
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines.
The
question
of
the
validity
of
the
court
of
the
domicile
cannot
and
should
not
refer
the
case
back
to
California;
testamentary
provision
should
thus
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
such
action
would
leave
the
issue
incapable
of
determination
because
the
decedent’s
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines.
She
invokes
the
provisions
of
Art.
case
will
then
be
like
a
football,
tossed
back
and
forth
between
the
two
946
of
the
Civil
Code
of
California,
which
is
as
follows:
“If
there
is
no
law
to
the
states,
between
the
country
of
which
the
decedent
was
a
citizen
and
the
contrary,
in
the
place
where
personal
property
is
situated,
it
is
deemed
to
country
of
his
domicile.
The
Philippine
court
must
apply
its
own
law
as
follow
the
person
of
its
owner,
and
is
governed
by
the
law
of
his
domicile.”
directed
in
the
conflict
of
laws
rule
of
the
state
of
the
decedent,
if
the
Accordingly,
her
share
must
be
increased
in
view
of
successional
rights
of
question
has
to
be
decided,
especially
as
the
application
of
the
internal
law
of
illegitimate
children
under
Philippine
laws.
California
provides
no
legitime
for
children
while
the
Philippine
law,
Arts.
887(4)
and
894,
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
makes
natural
children
legally
On
the
other
hand,
the
executor
and
Lucy
argued
that
the
national
law
of
the
acknowledged
forced
heirs
of
the
parent
recognizing
them.
deceased
must
apply,
and
thus
the
courts
must
apply
internal
law
of
California
on
the
matter.
Under
California
law,
there
are
no
compulsory
heirs
and
Therefore,
the
court
found
that
the
domicile
of
Edward
although,
a
citizen
of
consequently
a
testator
may
dispose
of
his
property
by
will
in
the
form
and
California,
is
the
Philippines.
Hence,
the
validity
of
the
provisions
of
his
will
manner
he
desires
(Kaufman
Case).
depriving
his
acknowledged
natural
child
Maria
Helen
should
be
governed
by
Philippine
Law
pursuant
to
Art.
946,
not
by
the
internal
law
of
California.
The
ISSUE:
appealed
decision
is
reversed
and
the
case
is
returned
to
the
lower
court
so
Whether
Philippine
law
should
ultimately
be
applied
that
the
partition
can
be
made
pursuant
to
Philippine
law
on
succession.
HELD:
54.
AZNAR
V.
CHRISTENSEN-‐GARCIA,
supra
Yes.
Edward
was
a
US
Citizen
and
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
his
death.
The
law
that
governs
the
validity
of
his
testamentary
dispositions
is
FACTS:
defined
in
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines.
Edward
Christensen,
born
in
New
York,
migrated
to
California
where
he
resided
and
consequently
was
considered
citizen
thereof.
He
came
to
the
Philippines
The
laws
of
California
have
prescribed
two
sets
of
laws
for
its
citizens,
one
for
where
he
became
a
domiciliary
until
the
time
of
his
death.
However,
during
the
residents
therein
and
another
for
those
domiciled
in
other
jurisdictions.
Article
entire
period
of
his
residence
in
this
country,
he
had
always
considered
himself
946
of
the
California
Civil
Code
is
its
conflict
of
laws
rule,
while
the
rule
a
citizen
of
California.
applied
in
Kaufman,
is
its
internal
law.
If
the
law
on
succession
and
the
conflict
of
laws
rules
of
California
are
to
be
enforced
jointly,
each
in
its
own
intended
In
his
will,
Edward
instituted
his
daughter
Maria
Lucy
Christensen
as
his
only
and
appropriate
sphere,
the
principle
cited
in
Kaufman
should
apply
to
heir,
but
left
a
legacy
of
P3600
in
favor
of
Helen
Christensen
Garcia
who,
in
his
citizens
living
in
the
State,
but
Article
946
should
apply
to
such
of
its
citizens
will
was
described
as
"not
in
any
way
related
to"
him
but
in
a
decision
rendered
as
are
not
domiciled
in
California
but
in
other
jurisdictions.
by
the
SC
in
another
case
had
been
declared
as
an
acknowledged
natural
daughter
of
his.
The
national
law
mentioned
in
Art.
16
is
the
law
on
conflict
of
laws
in
the
California
Civil
Code,
i.e.,
Art.
946,
which
authorizes
the
reference
or
return
of
the
question
to
the
law
of
the
testator's
domicile.
The
conflict
of
laws
rule
in
CONFLICT
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California,
Art.
946,
Civil
Code,
precisely
refers
back
the
case,
when
a
decedent
properties
are
situated,
renvoi
would
arise,
since
the
properties
here
involved
is
not
domiciled
in
California,
to
the
law
of
his
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines
are
found
in
the
Philippines.
in
the
case
at
bar.
Whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
involved
in
our
System
of
The
Philippine
court
therefore
must
apply
its
own
law
as
directed
in
the
legitimes,
Congress
has
not
intended
to
extend
the
same
to
the
succession
of
conflict
of
laws
rule
of
the
state
of
the
decedent.
Wherefore,
the
decision
foreign
nationals.
appealed
from
is
hereby
reversed
and
the
case
returned
to
the
lower
court
with
instructions
that
the
partition
be
made
as
the
Philippine
law
on
succession
FACTS:
provides.
Amos
Bellis
was
a
citizen
and
resident
of
Texas
at
the
time
of
his
death.
He
had
5
legitimate
children
with
his
first
wife,
Mary
Mallen,
whom
he
divorced.
He
RENVOI
DOCTRINE
had
3
legitimate
daughters
with
his
second
wife,
Violet,
who
survived
him,
and
A
jural
matter
is
presented
which
the
conflict-‐of-‐laws
rule
of
the
forum
refers
another
3
illegitimate
children
with
another
woman.
Before
he
died,
he
to
a
foreign
law,
the
conflict-‐of-‐laws
rule
of
which,
in
turn,
refers
the
matter
executed
2
wills,
disposing
of
his
Texas
properties,
the
other
disposing
his
back
again
to
the
law
of
the
forum.
This
is
renvoi
in
the
narrower
sense.
The
Philippine
properties.
In
his
will,
which
he
executed
in
the
Philippines,
he
German
term
for
this
judicial
process
is
'Ruckverweisung.'
directed
that
after
all
taxes,
obligations,
and
expenses
of
administration
are
paid
for,
his
distributable
estate
should
be
divided,
in
trust,
in
the
following
Another
theory,
known
as
the
"doctrine
of
renvoi",
has
been
advanced.
The
order
and
manner:
a)
$240,000.00
to
his
first
wife
Mary
Mallen
b)
$120,000.00
theory
of
the
doctrine
of
renvoi
is
that
the
court
of
the
forum,
in
determining
to
his
three
illegitimate
children
Amos
Bellis,
Jr.,
Maria
Cristina
Bellis,
Miriam
the
question
before
it,
must
take
into
account
the
whole
law
of
the
other
Palma
Bellis,
or
$40,000.00
each,
and
c)
After
foregoing
the
two
items
have
jurisdiction,
but
also
its
rules
as
to
conflict
of
laws,
and
then
apply
the
law
to
been
satisfied,
the
remainder
shall
go
to
his
seven
surviving
children
by
his
first
the
actual
question
which
the
rules
of
the
other
jurisdiction
prescribe.
This
may
and
second
wives.
be
the
law
of
the
forum.
Maria
Cristina
Bellis
and
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
filed
their
respective
oppositions
Residence
Domicile
to
the
project
of
partition
on
the
ground
that
they
were
deprived
of
their
Requires
bodily
presence
of
an
Requires
bodily
presence
in
that
place
legitimes
as
illegitimate
children
and,
therefore,
compulsory
heirs
of
the
inhabitant
in
a
given
place
and
also
an
intention
to
make
it
one’s
deceased.
domicile
The
lower
court
issued
an
order
overruling
the
oppositions
and
approving
the
54.
BELLIS
V.
BELLIS,
supra
executor’s
final
account,
report
and
administration,
and
project
of
partition.
Relying
upon
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
it
applied
the
national
law
of
the
DOCTRINE:
The
doctrine
of
renvoi
is
usually
pertinent
where
the
decedent
is
a
decedent,
which
in
this
case
did
not
provide
for
legitimes.
national
of
one
country,
and
a
domicile
of
another.
In
the
present
case,
the
decedent
was
both
a
national
of
Texas
and
a
domicile
thereof
at
the
time
of
his
ISSUE:
death. So
that
even
assuming
Texas
has
a
conflict
of
law
rule
providing
that
the
Whether
such
illegitimate
children
of
Bellis
be
entitled
to
successional
rights
domiciliary
system
(law
of
the
domicile)
should
govern,
the
same
would
not
result
in
a
reference
back
(renvoi)
to
Philippine
law,
but
would
still
refer
to
HELD:
Texas
law.
Nonetheless,
if
Texas
has
a
conflicts
rule
adopting
the
situs
theory
No.
The
said
illegitimate
children
are
not
entitled
to
their
legitimes.
Under
(lex
rei
sitae)
calling
for
the
application
of
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
Texas
law,
there
are
no
legitimes.
Even
if
the
other
will
was
executed
in
the
Philippines,
his
national
law,
still,
will
govern
the
properties
for
succession
even
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if
it
is
stated
in
his
testate
that
it
shall
be
governed
by
the
Philippine
law.
domiciliary
system
(law
of
the
domicile)
should
govern,
the
same
would
not
result
in
a
reference
back
(renvoi)
to
Philippine
law,
but
would
still
refer
to
Art.
16,
Par.
2
renders
applicable
the
national
law
of
the
decedent,
in
intestate
Texas
law.
Nonetheless,
if
Texas
has
a
conflicts
rule
adopting
the
situs
theory
and
testamentary
successions,
with
regard
to
four
items:
(a)
the
order
of
(lex
rei
sitae)
calling
for
the
application
of
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
succession,
(b)
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
(c)
the
intrinsic
validity
of
properties
are
situated,
renvoi
would
arise,
since
the
properties
here
involved
provisions
of
will,
and
(d)
the
capacity
to
succeed.
are
found
in
the
Philippines.
In
the
absence,
however,
of
proof
as
to
the
conflict
of
law
rule
of
Texas,
it
should
not
be
presumed
different
from
ours.
The
Appellants
however
counter
that
Art.
17,
par.
3—Prohibitive
laws
concerning
appellants’
position
is
therefore
not
rested
on
the
doctrine
of
renvoi.
As
stated,
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
those
which
have
for
their
object
public
they
never
invoked
nor
even
mentioned
it
in
their
arguments.
Rather,
they
rd
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
shall
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
argue
that
their
case
falls
under
the
circumstances
mentioned
in
the
3
par.
of
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
by
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
Art.
17
in
relation
to
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code.
a
foreign
country.—prevails
as
the
exception
to
Art.
16,
par.
2.
This
is
not
correct.
55.
SAUDI
ARABIAN
AIRLINES
V.
CA,
supra
Congress
deleted
the
phrase,
"notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
this
and
the
DOCTRINES:
A
factual
situation
that
cuts
across
territorial
lines
and
is
affected
next
preceding
article"
when
they
incorporated
Art.
11
of
the
old
Civil
Code
as
by
the
diverse
laws
of
two
or
more
states
is
said
to
contain
a
“foreign
element.”
Art.
17
of
the
new
Civil
Code,
while
reproducing
without
substantial
change
the
second
paragraph
of
Art.
10
of
the
old
Civil
Code
as
Art.
16
in
the
new.
It
must
Characterization
or
the
doctrine
of
qualification
is
the
process
of
deciding
have
been
their
purpose
to
make
the
second
paragraph
of
Art.
16
a
specific
whether
or
not
the
facts
relate
to
the
kind
of
question
specified
in
a
conflicts
provision
in
itself
which
must
be
applied
in
testate
and
intestate
succession.
As
rule.
The
purpose
of
“characterization”
is
to
enable
the
forum
to
select
the
further
indication
of
this
legislative
intent,
Congress
added
a
new
provision,
proper
law.
under
Art.
1039,
which
decrees
that
capacity
to
succeed
is
to
be
governed
by
the
national
law
of
the
decedent.
Choice-‐of-‐law
rules
invariably
consist
of
a
factual
relationship
(such
as
property
right,
contract
claim)
and
a
connecting
factor
or
point
of
contact,
such
as
the
It
is
therefore
evident
that
whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
situs
of
the
res,
the
place
of
celebration,
the
place
of
performance,
or
the
place
involved
in
our
system
of
legitimes,
Congress
has
not
intended
to
extend
the
of
wrongdoing.
Note
that
one
or
more
circumstances
may
be
present
to
serve
same
to
the
succession
of
foreign
nationals.
For
it
has
specifically
chosen
to
as
the
possible
test
for
the
determination
of
the
applicable
law.
leave,
inter
alia,
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
to
the
decedent's
national
law.
Specific
provisions
must
prevail
over
general
ones.
A
provision
in
a
These
“test
factors”
or
“points
of
contact”
or
“connecting
factors”
could
be
any
foreigner's
will
to
the
effect
that
his
properties
shall
be
distributed
in
of
the
following:
(SAFE
IN
SF)
accordance
with
Philippine
law
and
not
with
his
national
law,
is
illegal
and
void,
(1)
the
nationality
of
a
person,
his
domicile,
his
residence,
his
place
of
sojourn,
for
his
national
law
cannot
be
ignored
in
regard
to
those
matters
that
Art.
10— or
his
origin;
now
Art.
16—of
the
Civil
Code
states
said
national
law
should
govern.
(2)
the
seat
of
a
legal
or
juridical
person,
such
as
a
corporation;
(3)
the
situs
of
a
thing,
that
is,
the
place
where
a
thing
is,
or
is
deemed
to
be
In
this
regard,
the
parties
do
not
submit
the
case
on,
nor
even
discuss,
the
situated.
In
particular,
the
lex
situs
is
decisive
when
real
rights
are
involved;
doctrine
of
renvoi,
applied
by
this
Court
in
Aznar
v.
Christensen.
Said
doctrine
(4)
the
place
where
an
act
has
been
done,
the
locus
actus,
such
as
the
place
is
usually
pertinent
where
the
decedent
is
a
national
of
one
country,
and
a
where
a
contract
has
been
made,
a
marriage
celebrated,
a
will
signed
or
a
tort
domicile
of
another.
In
the
present
case,
it
is
not
disputed
that
the
decedent
committed.
The
lex
loci
actus
is
particularly
important
in
contracts
and
torts;
was
both
a
national
of
Texas
and
a
domicile
thereof
at
the
time
of
his
death. (5)
the
place
where
an
act
is
intended
to
come
into
effect,
e.g.,
the
place
of
So
that
even
assuming
Texas
has
a
conflict
of
law
rule
providing
that
the
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performance
of
contractual
duties,
or
the
place
where
a
power
of
attorney
is
to
afraid
that
she
might
be
tricked
into
something
she
did
not
want
because
of
her
be
exercised;
inability
to
understand
the
local
dialect.
She
also
declined
to
sign
a
blank
paper
(6)
the
intention
of
the
contracting
parties
as
to
the
law
that
should
govern
and
a
document
written
in
the
local
dialect.
However,
she
learned
that,
their
agreement,
the
lex
loci
intentionis;
through
the
intercession
of
the
Saudi
Arabian
government,
the
Indonesian
(7)
the
place
where
judicial
or
administrative
proceedings
are
instituted
or
authorities
agreed
to
deport
Thamer
and
Allah
after
2
weeks
of
detention.
done.
The
lex
fori—the
law
of
the
forum—is
particularly
important
because,
as
Eventually,
they
were
again
put
in
service
by
defendant
SAUDIA.
In
September
we
have
seen
earlier,
matters
of
‘procedure’
not
going
to
the
substance
of
the
1990,
SAUDIA
transferred
Morada
to
Manila.
claim
involved
are
governed
by
it;
and
because
the
lex
fori
applies
whenever
the
content
of
the
otherwise
applicable
foreign
law
is
excluded
from
In
1992,
Morada’s
superiors
requested
her
to
see
Mr.
Ali
Meniewy,
Chief
Legal
application
in
a
given
case
for
the
reason
that
it
falls
under
one
of
the
Officer
of
SAUDIA,
in
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia.
When
she
saw
him,
he
brought
her
exceptions
to
the
applications
of
foreign
law;
and
to
the
police
station
where
the
police
took
her
passport
and
questioned
her
(8)
the
flag
of
a
ship,
which
in
many
cases
is
decisive
of
practically
all
legal
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
Not
until
she
agreed
to
do
so
did
the
police
return
relationships
of
the
ship
and
of
its
master
or
owner
as
such.
It
also
covers
her
passport
and
allowed
her
to
catch
the
afternoon
flight
out
of
Jeddah.
contractual
relationships
particularly
contracts
of
affreightment.
One
year
and
a
half
later,
in
Riyadh,
a
few
minutes
before
the
departure
of
her
In
applying
the
“State
of
the
most
significant
relationship”
rule,
the
following
flight
to
Manila,
Morada
was
not
allowed
to
board
the
plane
and
instead
contacts
are
to
be
taken
into
account
and
evaluated
according
to
their
relative
ordered
to
take
a
later
flight
to
Jeddah
to
see
Mr.
Miniewy
again.
When
she
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue:
(a)
the
place
where
the
injury
did,
she
was
brought
her
to
a
Saudi
court
where
she
was
asked
to
sign
a
occurred;
(b)
the
place
where
the
conduct
causing
the
injury
occurred;
(c)
the
document
written
in
Arabic.
They
told
her
that
this
was
necessary
to
close
the
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
place
of
business
of
case
against
Thamer
and
Allah.
As
it
turned
out,
plaintiff
signed
a
notice
to
her
the
parties;
and
(d)
the
place
where
the
relationship,
if
any,
between
the
to
appear
before
the
court
on
June
27,
1993.
She
then
returned
to
Manila.
parties
is
centered.
Shortly
afterwards,
SAUDIA
summoned
plaintiff
to
report
to
Jeddah
once
again
FACTS:
where
a
Saudi
judge
interrogated
her
through
an
interpreter
about
the
Jakarta
In
1988,
SAUDIA
hired
Milagros
Morada
as
a
Flight
Attendant
for
its
airlines
incident.
After
one
hour
of
interrogation,
when
she
was
about
to
return
to
based
in
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia.
In
1990,
while
on
a
lay-‐over
in
Jakarta,
Manila,
a
SAUDIA
officer
told
her
that
the
airline
had
forbidden
her
to
take
Indonesia,
Morada
went
to
a
disco
dance
with
fellow
crew
members
Thamer
flight
and
took
away
her
passport
and
told
her
to
remain
in
Jeddah,
at
the
crew
Al-‐Gazzawi
and
Allah
Al-‐Gazzawi,
both
Saudi
nationals.
Because
it
was
almost
quarters,
until
further
orders.
After
a
few
days,
a
SAUDIA
legal
officer
again
morning
when
they
returned
to
their
hotels,
they
agreed
to
have
breakfast
escorted
plaintiff
to
the
same
court
where
the
judge,
to
her
astonishment
and
together
at
the
room
of
Thamer.
When
they
were
in
the
room,
Allah
left
and
shock,
rendered
a
decision
sentencing
her
to
5
months
imprisonment
and
to
shortly
after,
Thamer
attempted
to
rape
her.
Fortunately,
a
roomboy
and
286
lashes.
Only
then
did
she
realize
that
the
Saudi
court
had
tried
her,
several
security
personnel
heard
her
cries
for
help
and
rescued
her.
Later,
the
together
with
Thamer
and
Allah,
for
what
happened
in
Jakarta.
The
court
found
Indonesian
police
came
and
arrested
Thamer
and
Allah
Al-‐Gazzawi,
the
latter
as
Morada
guilty
of
(1)
adultery;
(2)
going
to
a
disco,
dancing
and
listening
to
the
an
accomplice.
music
in
violation
of
Islamic
laws;
and
(3)
socializing
with
the
male
crew,
in
contravention
of
Islamic
tradition.”
When
plaintiff
returned
to
Jeddah
a
few
days
later,
SAUDIA
officials
interrogated
her
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
They
then
requested
her
to
go
She
was
denied
any
assistance
by
SAUDIA
thus,
she
then
asked
the
Philippine
back
to
Jakarta
to
help
arrange
the
release
of
Thamer
and
Allah.
Morada
did
Embassy
in
Jeddah
to
help
her
while
her
case
is
on
appeal.
Meanwhile,
to
pay
not
cooperate
in
the
negotiation
with
the
Indonesian
police
because
she
was
for
her
upkeep,
she
worked
on
the
domestic
flight
of
SAUDIA,
while
Thamer
and
Allah
continued
to
serve
in
the
international
flights.
Because
she
was
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wrongfully
convicted,
the
Prince
of
Makkah
dismissed
the
case
against
her
and
situation
to
arise.
Thus,
Morada’s
assertion
that
the
case
is
purely
domestic
is
allowed
her
to
leave
Saudi
Arabia.
Shortly
before
her
return
to
Manila,
she
was
imprecise.
A
conflicts
problem
presents
itself
here,
and
the
question
of
terminated
from
the
service
by
SAUDIA,
without
her
being
informed
of
the
jurisdiction
confronts
the
court
a
quo.
cause.
2)
Yes.
Based
on
the
allegations
in
the
Amended
Complaint,
read
in
the
light
of
In
November
1993,
Morada
filed
a
Complaint
for
damages
against
SAUDIA,
and
the
Rules
of
Court
on
jurisdiction,
the
Court
finds
that
the
RTC
of
Quezon
City
Khaled
Al-‐Balawi,
its
country
manager
in
the
trial
court.
SAUDIA
filed
an
possesses
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
suit.
Its
authority
to
try
Omnibus
MTD
which
raised
the
following
grounds,
to
wit:
(1)
that
the
and
hear
the
case
is
provided
for
under
Sec.
1
of
R.A.
No.
7691:
“RTCs
shall
Complaint
states
no
cause
of
action
against
SAUDIA;
(2)
that
defendant
Al-‐ exercise
exclusive
jurisdiction:
(8)
In
all
other
cases
in
which
demand,
exclusive
Balawi
is
not
a
real
party
in
interest;
(3)
that
the
claim
or
demand
set
forth
in
of
interest,
damages
of
whatever
kind,
attorney's
fees,
litigation
expenses,
and
the
Complaint
has
been
waived,
abandoned
or
otherwise
extinguished;
and
(4)
costs
or
the
value
of
the
property
in
controversy
exceeds
One
hundred
thousand
that
the
trial
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
try
the
case
on
the
basis
of
Art.
21
of
pesos
(P100,000.00)
or,
in
such
other
cases
in
Metro
Manila,
where
the
the
NCC,
since
the
proper
law
applicable
is
the
law
of
the
KSA.
The
trial
court
demand,
exclusive
of
the
above-‐mentioned
items
exceeds
Two
hundred
denied
the
MTD.
Thousand
pesos
(P200,000.00).”
Consequently,
SAUDIA
filed
its
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Prohibition
with
Pragmatic
considerations,
including
the
convenience
of
the
parties,
also
weigh
Prayer
for
Issuance
of
Writ
of
Preliminary
Injunction
and/or
TRO
with
the
CA,
heavily
in
favor
of
the
RTC
of
QC
assuming
jurisdiction.
Paramount
is
the
which
ruled
that
the
Philippines
is
an
appropriate
forum
considering
that
the
private
interest
of
the
litigant.
Enforceability
of
a
judgment
if
one
is
obtained
is
Amended
Complaint’s
basis
for
recovery
of
damages
is
Art.
21,
and
thus,
clearly
quite
obvious.
Relative
advantages
and
obstacles
to
a
fair
trial
are
equally
within
the
jurisdiction
of
respondent
Court.
important.
Plaintiff
may
not,
by
choice
of
an
inconvenient
forum,
‘vex,’
‘harass,’
or
‘oppress’
the
defendant,
e.g.
by
inflicting
upon
him
needless
expense
or
ISSUE:
disturbance.
But
unless
the
balance
is
strongly
in
favor
of
the
defendant,
the
1.
Whether
the
case
is
a
conflict
of
laws.
plaintiff’s
choice
of
forum
should
rarely
be
disturbed.
2.
Whether
the
RTC
of
Quezon
City
has
jurisdiction.
3.
Whether
the
Philippine
Law
should
govern.
Weighing
the
relative
claims
of
the
parties,
the
court
a
quo
found
it
best
to
hear
the
case
in
the
Philippines.
Had
it
refused
to
take
cognizance
of
the
case,
it
HELD:
would
be
forcing
Morada
to
seek
remedial
action
elsewhere,
i.e.
in
the
KSA
1.
Yes.
A
factual
situation
that
cuts
across
territorial
lines
and
is
affected
by
where
she
no
longer
maintains
substantial
connections.
That
would
have
the
diverse
laws
of
two
or
more
states
is
said
to
contain
a
“foreign
element.”
caused
a
fundamental
unfairness
to
her.
Moreover,
by
hearing
the
case
in
the
Philippines
no
unnecessary
difficulties
and
inconvenience
have
been
shown
by
The
forms
in
which
this
foreign
element
may
appear
are
many.
The
foreign
either
of
the
parties.
element
may
simply
consist
in
the
fact
that
one
of
the
parties
to
a
contract
is
an
alien
or
has
a
foreign
domicile,
or
that
a
contract
between
nationals
of
one
3)
Yes.
As
to
the
choice
of
applicable
law,
we
note
that
choice-‐of-‐law
problems
State
involves
properties
situated
in
another
State.
In
other
cases,
the
foreign
seek
to
answer
two
important
questions:
(1)
What
legal
system
should
control
element
may
assume
a
complex
form.
In
the
instant
case,
the
foreign
element
a
given
situation
where
some
of
the
significant
facts
occurred
in
two
or
more
consisted
in
the
fact
that
Morada
is
a
resident
Philippine
national,
and
that
states;
and
(2)
to
what
extent
should
the
chosen
legal
system
regulate
the
SAUDIA
is
a
resident
foreign
corporation.
Also,
by
virtue
of
the
employment
of
situation.
Morada
with
the
SAUDIA
as
a
flight
stewardess,
events
did
transpire
during
her
many
occasions
of
travel
across
national
borders,
particularly
from
Manila,
Before
a
choice
can
be
made,
it
is
necessary
for
us
to
determine
under
what
Philippines
to
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia,
and
vice
versa,
that
caused
a
“conflicts”
category
a
certain
set
of
facts
or
rules
fall.
This
process
is
known
as
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“characterization,”
or
the
“doctrine
of
qualification.”
It
is
the
“process
of
legal
relationships
of
the
ship
and
of
its
master
or
owner
as
such.
It
also
deciding
whether
or
not
the
facts
relate
to
the
kind
of
question
specified
in
a
covers
contractual
relationships
particularly
contracts
of
affreightment.
conflicts
rule.”
The
purpose
of
“characterization”
is
to
enable
the
forum
to
select
the
proper
law.
Considering
that
the
complaint
in
the
court
a
quo
is
one
involving
torts,
the
“connecting
factor”
or
“point
of
contact”
could
be
the
place
or
places
where
Our
starting
point
of
analysis
here
is
not
a
legal
relation,
but
a
factual
the
tortious
conduct
or
lex
loci
actus
occurred.
And
applying
the
torts
situation,
event,
or
operative
fact.
An
essential
element
of
conflict
rules
is
the
principle
in
a
conflicts
case,
we
find
that
the
Philippines
could
be
said
as
a
indication
of
a
“test”
or
“connecting
factor”
or
“point
of
contact.”
Choice-‐of-‐ situs
of
the
tort
(the
place
where
the
alleged
tortious
conduct
took
place).
law
rules
invariably
consist
of
a
factual
relationship
(such
as
property
right,
This
is
because
it
is
in
the
Philippines
where
SAUDIA
allegedly
deceived
contract
claim)
and
a
connecting
factor
or
point
of
contact,
such
as
the
situs
of
Morada,
a
Filipina
residing
and
working
here.
According
to
her,
she
had
the
res,
the
place
of
celebration,
the
place
of
performance,
or
the
place
of
honestly
believed
that
SAUDIA
would,
in
the
exercise
of
its
rights
and
in
the
wrongdoing.
performance
of
its
duties,
“act
with
justice,
give
her
due
and
observe
honesty
and
good
faith.”
Instead,
SAUDIA
failed
to
protect
her.
That
certain
acts
or
Note
that
one
or
more
circumstances
may
be
present
to
serve
as
the
possible
parts
of
the
injury
allegedly
occurred
in
another
country
is
of
no
moment.
What
test
for
the
determination
of
the
applicable
law.
These
“test
factors”
or
“points
is
important
here
is
the
place
where
the
over-‐all
harm
or
the
totality
of
the
of
contact”
or
“connecting
factors”
could
be
any
of
the
following:
alleged
injury
to
the
person,
reputation,
social
standing
and
human
rights
of
complainant,
had
lodged,
according
to
Morada.
All
told,
it
is
not
without
basis
(1)
the
nationality
of
a
person,
his
domicile,
his
residence,
his
place
of
to
identify
the
Philippines
as
the
situs
of
the
alleged
tort.
sojourn,
or
his
origin;
(2)
the
seat
of
a
legal
or
juridical
person,
such
as
a
corporation;
Moreover,
with
the
widespread
criticism
of
the
traditional
rule
of
lex
loci
delicti
(3)
the
situs
of
a
thing,
that
is,
the
place
where
a
thing
is,
or
is
deemed
to
commissi,
modern
theories
and
rules
on
tort
liability
have
been
advanced
to
be
situated.
In
particular,
the
lex
situs
is
decisive
when
real
rights
are
offer
fresh
judicial
approaches
to
arrive
at
just
results.
In
keeping
abreast
with
involved;
the
modern
theories
on
tort
liability,
we
find
here
an
occasion
to
apply
the
(4)
the
place
where
an
act
has
been
done,
the
locus
actus,
such
as
the
“State
of
the
most
significant
relationship”
rule,
which
in
our
view
should
be
place
where
a
contract
has
been
made,
a
marriage
celebrated,
a
will
appropriate
to
apply
now,
given
the
factual
context
of
this
case.
In
determining
signed
or
a
tort
committed.
The
lex
loci
actus
is
particularly
important
in
the
State
which
has
the
most
significant
relationship,
the
following
contacts
contracts
and
torts;
are
to
be
taken
into
account
and
evaluated
according
to
their
relative
(5)
the
place
where
an
act
is
intended
to
come
into
effect,
e.g.,
the
place
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue:
(a)
the
place
where
the
injury
of
performance
of
contractual
duties,
or
the
place
where
a
power
of
occurred;
(b)
the
place
where
the
conduct
causing
the
injury
occurred;
(c)
the
attorney
is
to
be
exercised;
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
place
of
business
(6)
the
intention
of
the
contracting
parties
as
to
the
law
that
should
of
the
parties;
and
(d)
the
place
where
the
relationship,
if
any,
between
the
govern
their
agreement,
the
lex
loci
intentionis;
parties
is
centered.
(7)
the
place
where
judicial
or
administrative
proceedings
are
instituted
or
done.
The
lex
fori—the
law
of
the
forum—is
particularly
important
With
these
guidelines
in
mind,
the
trial
court
must
proceed
to
try
and
adjudge
because,
as
we
have
seen
earlier,
matters
of
‘procedure’
not
going
to
the
the
case
in
the
light
of
relevant
Philippine
law,
with
due
consideration
of
the
substance
of
the
claim
involved
are
governed
by
it;
and
because
the
lex
foreign
element
or
elements
involved.
Nothing
said
herein,
of
course,
should
be
fori
applies
whenever
the
content
of
the
otherwise
applicable
foreign
construed
as
prejudging
the
results
of
the
case
in
any
manner
whatsoever.
law
is
excluded
from
application
in
a
given
case
for
the
reason
that
it
falls
under
one
of
the
exceptions
to
the
applications
of
foreign
law;
and
(8)
the
flag
of
a
ship,
which
in
many
cases
is
decisive
of
practically
all
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56.
LLORENTE
V.
CA
Sur,
a
petition
for
the
probate
and
allowance
of
his
last
will
and
testament
G.R.
No.
124371
|
November
23,
2000
wherein
Lorenzo
moved
that
Alicia
be
appointed
Special
Administratrix
of
his
estate.
RTC
admitted
the
will
to
probate.
Before
the
proceedings
could
be
FACTS:
terminated,
Lorenzo
died.
Lorenzo
Llorente
was
an
enlisted
serviceman
of
the
US
Navy.
During
his
term
of
duty,
Lorenzo
and
Paula
Llorente
were
married
before
a
parish
priest,
Roman
Paula
filed
with
the
same
court
a
petition
for
letters
of
administration
over
Catholic
Church,
in
Camarines
Sur.
Before
the
outbreak
of
the
Pacific
War,
Lorenzo’s
estate
in
her
favor.
Paula
contended
(1)
that
she
was
Lorenzo’s
Lorenzo
departed
for
the
US
and
Paula
stayed
in
the
conjugal
home
in
surviving
spouse,
(2)
that
the
various
property
were
acquired
during
their
Camarines
Sur.
Afterwards,
Lorenzo
was
naturalized
as
an
American
Citizen.
marriage,
(3)
that
Lorenzo’s
will
disposed
of
all
his
property
in
favor
of
Alicia
Upon
the
end
of
the
WWII,
Lorenzo
was
granted
an
accrued
leave
by
the
US
and
her
children,
encroaching
on
her
legitime
and
1/2
share
in
the
conjugal
Navy,
to
visit
his
wife
and
he
visited
the
Philippines.
He
discovered
that
his
wife
property.
Alicia
filed
in
the
testate
proceeding
a
petition
for
the
issuance
of
Paula
was
pregnant
and
was
“living
in”
and
having
an
adulterous
relationship
letters
testamentary.
RTC
gave
due
course
to
Paula's
petition.
RTC
held
that
the
with
his
brother,
Ceferino
Llorente.
Paula
gave
birth
to
a
boy
registered
as
divorce
decree
was
void
and
inapplicable
in
the
Philippines
and
therefore
the
“Crisologo
Llorente,”
with
the
birth
certificate
stating
that
the
child
was
not
second
marriage
with
Alicia
was
also
void.
CA
affirmed
RTC's
decision.
legitimate
and
the
line
for
the
father’s
name
was
left
blank.
ISSUE:
Lorenzo
refused
to
forgive
Paula
and
live
with
her.
In
fact,
the
couple
drew
a
Who
are
entitled
to
inherit
from
the
late
Lorenzo
N.
Llorente?
written
agreement
to
the
effect
that
(1)
all
the
family
allowances
allotted
by
the
US
Navy
as
part
of
Lorenzo’s
salary
and
all
other
obligations
for
Paula’s
HELD:
daily
maintenance
and
support
would
be
suspended;
(2)
they
would
dissolve
Alicia
and
her
three
children.
their
marital
union
in
accordance
with
judicial
proceedings;
(3)
they
would
make
a
separate
agreement
regarding
their
conjugal
property
acquired
during
THE
APPLICABLE
LAW
their
marital
life;
and
(4)
Lorenzo
would
not
prosecute
Paula
for
her
adulterous
The
fact
that
Lorenzo
became
an
American
citizen
long
before
and
at
the
time
act
since
she
voluntarily
admitted
her
fault
and
agreed
to
separate
from
of:
(1)
his
divorce
from
Paula;
(2)
marriage
to
Alicia;
(3)
execution
of
his
will;
Lorenzo
peacefully.
The
agreement
was
signed
by
both
Lorenzo
and
Paula
and
and
(4)
death,
is
duly
established,
admitted
and
undisputed.
Thus,
as
a
rule,
was
witnessed
by
Paula’s
father
and
stepmother.
The
agreement
was
issues
arising
from
these
incidents
are
necessarily
governed
by
foreign
law.
notarized.
Foreign
laws
do
not
prove
themselves
in
our
jurisdiction
and
our
courts
are
not
authorized
to
take
judicial
notice
of
them.
Like
any
other
fact,
they
must
be
Lorenzo
returned
to
the
US
and
filed
for
divorce
with
the
Superior
Court
of
the
alleged
and
proved.
State
of
California
and
was
issued
an
interlocutory
judgment
of
divorce.
The
divorce
decree
became
final
afterwards.
While
the
substance
of
the
foreign
law
was
pleaded,
the
CA
did
not
admit
the
foreign
law.
The
CA
and
the
RTC
called
to
the
fore
the
renvoi
doctrine,
where
Lorenzo
returned
to
the
Philippines
and
married
Alicia
Llorente
in
Manila.
the
case
was
“referred
back”
to
the
law
of
the
decedent’s
domicile,
in
this
case,
Apparently,
Alicia
had
no
knowledge
of
the
first
marriage
even
if
they
resided
Philippine
law.
While
the
trial
court
stated
that
the
law
of
New
York
was
not
in
the
same
town
as
Paula,
who
did
not
oppose
the
marriage
or
cohabitation.
sufficiently
proven,
in
the
same
breath
it
made
the
categorical,
albeit
equally
Lorenzo
and
Alicia
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife.
Their
25
year
union
unproven
statement
that
“American
law
follows
the
‘domiciliary
theory’
hence,
produced
three
children,
Raul,
Luz
and
Beverly,
all
surnamed
Llorente.
Philippine
law
applies
when
determining
the
validity
of
Lorenzo’s
will.
Lorenzo
executed
a
Last
Will
and
Testament.
In
the
will,
Lorenzo
bequeathed
all
First,
there
is
no
such
thing
as
one
American
law.
The
"national
law"
indicated
his
property
to
Alicia
and
their
3
children.
Lorenzo
filed
with
the
RTC
Camarines
in
Art.16
of
the
Civil
Code
cannot
possibly
apply
to
general
American
law.
There
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is
no
such
law
governing
the
validity
of
testamentary
provisions
in
the
US.
Each
condition
and
legal
capacity.”
State
of
the
union
has
its
own
law
applicable
to
its
citizens
and
in
force
only
within
the
State.
It
can
therefore
refer
to
no
other
than
the
law
of
the
State
of
Whether
the
will
is
intrinsically
valid
and
who
shall
inherit
from
Lorenzo
are
which
the
decedent
was
a
resident.
Second,
there
is
no
showing
that
the
issues
best
proved
by
foreign
law,
which
must
be
pleaded
and
proved.
Whether
application
of
the
renvoi
doctrine
is
called
for
or
required
by
NY
State
law.
the
will
was
executed
in
accordance
with
the
formalities
required
is
answered
by
referring
to
Philippine
law.
In
fact,
the
will
was
duly
probated.
The
hasty
application
of
Philippine
law
and
the
complete
disregard
of
the
will,
already
probated
as
duly
executed
in
accordance
with
the
formalities
of
Philippine
law,
is
fatal,
especially
in
light
of
the
factual
and
legal
circumstances
PROPERTY
here
obtaining.
VALIDITY
OF
THE
FOREIGN
DIVORCE
IMMOVABLES
Owing
to
the
nationality
principle
embodied
in
Art.15
of
the
Civil
Code—Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal
SCOPE
OF
LEX
SITUS:
[CFE
IME]
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
even
though
1. Capacity
to
take
and
transfer
immovables
living
abroad.—only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
by
the
policy
against
2. Formalities
of
conveyance
absolute
divorces,
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
our
concept
of
public
3. Essential
validity
and
effect
of
the
transfer
policy
and
morality.
However,
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
abroad,
provided
they
4. Interpretation
and
effect
of
conveyance
are
valid
according
to
their
national
law.
Once
proven
that
the
person
who
GR:
Lex
Situs
initiated
the
divorce
was
no
longer
a
Filipino
citizen
when
he
obtained
the
EXC:
If
transferred
through
agreement:
1.
Lex
Loci
Intentionis,
2.
If
divorce
from
his
spouse,
the
spouse
will
lose
her
right
to
inherit
from
him.
not,
Lex
loci
celebrationis,
or
3.
If
not,
Lex
situs
5. Marital
interest
in
land
Divorce
and
its
legal
effects
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines
insofar
as
6. Equitable
interests
in
land
respondent
is
concerned
in
view
of
the
nationality
principle
in
our
civil
law
on
the
status
of
persons.
The
divorce
obtained
by
Lorenzo
from
his
first
wife
Paula
EXCEPTIONS:
[ROCSS]
was
valid
and
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction
as
a
matter
of
comity.
Now,
the
1. Rights
and
liabilities
of
the
parties
to
a
contract
where
the
subject
matter
of
effects
of
this
divorce
(as
to
the
succession
to
the
estate
of
the
decedent)
are
the
contract
is
an
immovable
–
governed
by
the
law
that
regulates
the
matters
best
left
to
the
determination
of
the
trial
court.
contract
itself
2. Validity
and
effect
of
the
obligation
which
that
mortgage
secures
–
VALIDIY
OF
THE
WILL
governed
by
principles
applicable
to
contracts
generally
The
Civil
Code
provides:
“Art.
17.
The
forms
and
solemnities
of
contracts,
wills,
3. Validity
of
a
contract
to
transfer
as
opposed
to
validity
of
a
transfer
–
and
other
public
instruments
shall
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
proper
law
of
the
contract
which
they
are
executed.
When
the
acts
referred
to
are
executed
before
the
4. Problems
of
succession
–
Art.
16
and
17
diplomatic
or
consular
officials
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
in
a
foreign
5. Property
belongs
to
a
diplomat
or
to
another
sovereign
–
(Holy
See
v.
country,
the
solemnities
established
by
Philippine
laws
shall
be
observed
in
Rosario)
their
execution.”
MOVABLES
The
clear
intent
of
Lorenzo
to
bequeath
his
property
to
his
second
wife
and
CHOSES
IN
POSSESSION
children
by
her
is
glaringly
shown
in
the
will
he
executed.
Since
he
was
a
foreigner,
he
is
not
covered
by
our
laws
on
“family
rights
and
duties,
status,
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
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DE
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93
ATTY.
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AY
2015-‐2016
GR:
Lex
situs
or
the
law
of
the
State
in
which
the
property
is
located
at
the
time
of
the
57.
LAUREL
V.
GARCIA
transaction
in
question
Kyna’s
notes:
EXC:
[SHAD]
Article
16
(par
1)
is
not
the
answer
to
all
conflict
of
laws
questions
in
relation
to
1.
SEIZURE
AND
ARREST
movables
and
immovable
i.e.
the
Roponggi
property
in
this
case.
Atty.
Gulapa
Law
of
the
resting
place/law
of
the
place
where
the
property
is
seized
thinks
that
there
exists
a
conflict
of
laws
issue
given
that
the
situs
of
the
2.
DISPOSITION
property
is
in
Japan.
However,
the
lex
situs
rule
wasn’t
applied
in
this
case
Owner:
1.
Law
of
the
resting
place,
or
2.
If
not,
Law
of
any
place
having
a
because
the
issue
in
this
case
involves
the
authority
of
the
respondent
officials
substantial
connection
with
the
transaction
which
would
uphold
its
validity
to
validly
dispose
of
property
belonging
to
the
State.
And
the
validity
of
the
Non-‐owner
(when
the
one
entering
into
the
transaction
is
not
an
owner
but
procedures
adopted
to
effect
its
sale.
This
is
governed
by
Philippine
Law.
has
authority
to
do
so):
Law
of
the
place
where
the
goods
were
actually
situated
at
the
time
of
the
transaction
in
question
Conflict
of
law
situation
arises
only
when:
3.
HIGH
SEAS/FOREIGN
PORT
1.
There
is
a
dispute
as
to
title
to
or
ownership
of
an
immovable,
such
that
the
1.
Law
of
the
flag
of
the
ship,
or
2.
In
states
consisting
of
several
countries
capacity
to
take,
and
transfer
immovables,
formalities
of
conveyance,
essential
like
the
UK,
law
of
the
place
of
registry
validity
and
effect
of
transfer,
or
the
interpretation
and
effect
of
conveyance
are
determined.
CHOSES
IN
ACTION
2.
A
foreign
law
on
land
ownership
and
its
conveyance
is
asserted
to
conflict
with
a
domestic
law
on
the
same
manner.
Hence
the
need
to
determine
which
DEBTS
law
should
apply.
Voluntary/Assignment
-‐
1.
Law
of
the
contract,
2.
If
not,
Lex
loci
intentionis,
But
according
to
Sir,
there
is
actually
a
conflict
of
laws
situation
in
this
case
or
3.
If
not,
Law
which
has
the
most
significant
relationship
to
the
since
the
property
is
basically
Ph
gov’t
property
situated
in
Japan.
transaction
Involuntary/Garnishment
–
Law
of
the
State
where
jurisdiction
is
effectively
Art.
420.
The
following
things
are
property
of
public
dominion:
exercisable
against
the
garnishee
(where
it
may
be
garnished)
(1)
Those
intended
for
public
use,
such
as
roads,
canals,
rivers,
torrents,
ports
and
bridges
constructed
by
the
State,
banks,
shores,
roadsteads,
and
others
of
NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
similar
character;
Law
of
the
place
where
the
instrument
is
at
the
time
of
the
transfer
(2)
Those
which
belong
to
the
State,
without
being
for
public
use,
and
are
intended
for
some
public
service
or
for
the
development
of
the
national
CORPORATE
STOCKS
OR
SHARES
wealth.
(339a)
Between
assignor
and
assignee
–
Law
most
closely
connected
to
the
transaction
FACTS:
Has
the
consequence
of
changing
the
relations
of
the
parties
with
the
This
case
is
a
consolidation
of
two
petitions
for
prohibition
seeking
to
enjoin
corporation
–
Law
of
the
place
of
incorporation
respondents
in
their
capacities
as
Head
of
the
Asset
Privatization
Trust,
Secretary
of
Foreign
Affairs,
Executive
Secretary,
and
members
of
the
Principal
and
Bidding
Committees
on
the
Utilization/Disposition
of
Philippine
Government
Properties
in
Japan
from
proceeding
with
the
bidding
for
the
sale
of
the
“Roppongi
property”.
The
subject
property
in
this
case
is
one
of
the
four
(4)
properties
in
Japan
CONFLICT
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acquired
by
the
Philippine
government
under
the
Reparations
Agreement
entered
into
with
Japan,
the
other
lots
being:
(1)
The
Nampeidai
Property,
ISSUE:
which
is
the
present
site
of
the
Philippine
Embassy
Chancery;
(2)
The
Kobe
Whether
or
not
Japanese
law
should
govern
the
sale
of
the
Roppongi
property
Commercial
Property,
categorized
as
a
commercial
lot
now
being
used
as
a
warehouse
and
parking
lot
for
the
consulate
staff;
and
(3)
The
Kobe
Residential
HELD:
Property,
which
is
now
vacant.
No.
The
nature
of
the
Roppongi
lot
as
property
for
public
service
is
expressly
spelled
out.
It
is
dictated
by
the
terms
of
the
Reparations
Agreement
and
the
The
properties
and
the
capital
goods
and
services
procured
from
the
Japanese
corresponding
contract
of
procurement
which
bind
both
the
Philippine
government
for
national
development
projects
are
part
of
the
indemnification
government
and
the
Japanese
government.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
it
is
of
to
the
Filipino
people
for
their
losses
in
life
and
property
and
their
suffering
public
dominion
and
is
outside
the
commerce
of
man.
And
the
property
during
World
War
II.
continues
to
be
part
of
the
public
domain,
not
available
for
private
appropriation
or
ownership
until
there
is
a
formal
declaration
on
the
part
of
The
Roppongi
property
consists
of
the
land
and
building
"for
the
Chancery
of
the
government
to
withdraw
it
from
being
such.
the
Philippine
Embassy".
As
intended,
it
became
the
site
of
the
Philippine
Embassy
until
the
latter
was
transferred
to
Nampeidai
when
the
Roppongi
The
Roppongi
property
is
correctly
classified
under
paragraph
2
of
Art.
420
of
building
needed
major
repairs.
Due
to
the
failure
of
our
government
to
provide
the
Civil
Code
as
property
belonging
to
the
State
and
intended
for
some
public
necessary
funds,
the
Roppongi
property
has
remained
undeveloped
since
that
service.
As
property
of
public
dominion,
the
Roppongi
lot
is
outside
the
time.
commerce
of
man.
It
cannot
be
alienated.
Its
ownership
is
a
special
collective
ownership
for
general
use
and
enjoyment,
an
application
to
the
satisfaction
of
During
the
incumbency
of
President
Aquino,
a
proposal
was
made
by
the
collective
needs,
and
resides
in
the
social
group.
The
purpose
is
not
to
serve
the
former
Philippine
Ambassador
to
Japan,
Carlos
J.
Valdez,
to
lease
the
subject
State
as
a
juridical
person,
but
the
citizens;
it
is
intended
for
the
common
public
property
to
Kajima
Corporation,
a
Japanese
firm,
in
exchange
for
the
welfare
and
cannot
be
the
object
of
appropriation.
construction
of
2
buildings
in
Roppongi,
1
building
in
Nampeidai,
and
the
renovation
of
the
Philippine
Chancery
in
Nampeidai.
The
Government
did
not
It
is
not
for
the
President
to
convey
valuable
real
property
of
the
government
act
favorably
on
said
proposal,
but
instead,
on
11
August
1986,
President
on
his
or
her
own
sole
will.
Any
such
conveyances
must
be
authorized
and
Aquino
created
a
committee
to
study
the
disposition
or
utilization
of
Philippine
approved
by
a
law
enacted
by
the
Congress.
It
requires
executive
and
government
properties
in
Tokyo
and
Kobe
though
AO-‐3,
and
AO
3-‐A
to
3-‐D.
On
legislative
concurrence.
Moreover,
an
abandonment
of
the
intention
to
use
the
25
July
1987,
the
President
issued
EO
296
entitling
non-‐Filipino
citizens
or
Roppongi
property
for
public
service
and
to
make
it
patrimonial
property
under
entities
to
avail
of
reparations'
capital
goods
and
services
in
the
event
of
sale,
Article
422
of
the
Civil
Code
must
be
definite.
Abandonment
cannot
be
inferred
lease
or
disposition.
The
four
properties
in
Japan
including
the
Roppongi
from
the
non-‐use
alone
specially
if
the
non-‐use
was
attributable
not
to
the
property
were
specifically
mentioned
in
the
first
"Whereas"
clause.
Amidst
government’s
own
deliberate
and
indubitable
will
but
to
a
lack
of
financial
opposition
by
various
sectors,
the
Executive
branch
of
the
government
has
support
to
repair
and
improve
the
property
been
pushing,
with
great
vigor,
its
decision
to
sell
the
reparations
properties
starting
with
the
Roppongi
lot.
The
respondents
have
failed
to
convincingly
show
that
the
property
has
become
patrimonial.
The
fact
that
the
Roppongi
site
has
not
been
used
for
a
These
petitions
claim
that
the
Roppongi
property
forms
part
of
the
public
long
time
for
actual
Embassy
service
does
not
automatically
convert
it
to
domain
as
characterized
under
Art.
420
of
the
Civil
Code,
and
thus
cannot
be
patrimonial
property.
Any
such
conversion
happens
only
if
the
property
is
alienated,
being
outside
the
commerce
of
man.
On
the
other
hand,
withdrawn
from
public
use.
A
property
continues
to
be
part
of
the
public
respondents
invoke
lex
loci
rei
sitae,
or
lex
situs
and
insist
Japanese
Law
and
domain,
not
available
for
private
appropriation
or
ownership
until
there
is
a
not
our
Civil
Code
should
apply.
formal
declaration
on
the
part
of
the
government
to
withdraw
it
from
being
CONFLICT
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such.
In
the
present
case,
the
recent
Administrative
Orders
authorizing
a
study
law
which
should
determine
who
can
acquire
the
properties
so
that
the
of
the
status
and
conditions
of
government
properties
in
Japan
were
merely
constitutional
limitation
on
acquisition
of
lands
of
the
public
domain
to
Filipino
directives
for
investigation
but
did
not
in
any
way
signify
a
clear
intention
to
citizens
and
entities
wholly
owned
by
Filipinos
is
inapplicable.
We
see
no
point
dispose
of
the
properties.
Further
EO
296
does
not
declare
that
the
properties
in
belaboring
whether
or
not
this
opinion
is
correct.
Why
should
we
discuss
lost
their
public
character,
but
merely
intends
to
make
the
properties
available
who
can
acquire
the
Roppongi
lot
when
there
is
no
showing
that
it
can
be
to
foreigners
and
not
to
Filipinos
alone
in
case
of
a
sale,
lease
or
other
sold?
disposition.
Ultimately,
there
is
no
law
authorizing
the
conveyance
of
the
Roppongi
property.
58.
HOLY
SEE
V.
ROSARIO
G.R.
No.
101949
|
December
1,
1994
The
respondents
try
to
get
around
the
public
dominion
character
of
the
Roppongi
property
by
insisting
that
Japanese
law
and
not
our
Civil
Code
should
DOCTRINE:
The
right
of
a
foreign
sovereign
to
acquire
property,
real
or
apply.
personal,
in
a
receiving
state,
necessary
for
the
creation
and
maintenance
of
its
diplomatic
mission,
is
recognized
in
the
1961
Vienna
Convention
on
Diplomatic
It
is
exceedingly
strange
why
our
top
government
officials,
of
all
people,
should
Relations
(Arts.
20-‐22).
be
the
ones
to
insist
that
in
the
sale
of
extremely
valuable
government
property,
Japanese
law
and
not
Philippine
law
should
prevail.
The
Japanese
The
immunity
of
the
sovereign
is
recognized
only
with
regard
to
public
acts
or
law—its
coverage
and
effects,
when
enacted,
and
exceptions
to
its
provisions— acts
jure
imperii
of
a
state,
but
not
with
regard
to
private
acts
or
acts
jure
is
not
presented
to
the
Court.
It
is
simply
asserted
that
the
lex
loci
rei
sitae
or
gestionis.
Japanese
law
should
apply
without
stating
what
that
law
provides.
It
is
assumed
on
faith
that
Japanese
law
would
allow
the
sale.
This
Court
has
considered
the
following
transactions
by
a
foreign
state
with
private
parties
as
acts
jure
imperii:
(1)
the
lease
by
a
foreign
government
of
We
see
no
reason
why
a
conflict
of
law
rule
should
apply
when
no
conflict
of
apartment
buildings
for
use
of
its
military
officers;
(2)
the
conduct
of
public
law
situation
exists.
A
conflict
of
law
situation
arises
only
when:
(1)
There
is
a
bidding
for
the
repair
of
a
wharf
at
a
United
States
Naval
Station;
and
(3)
the
dispute
over
the
title
or
ownership
of
an
immovable,
such
that
the
capacity
to
change
of
employment
status
of
base
employees.
take
and
transfer
immovables,
the
formalities
of
conveyance,
the
essential
validity
and
effect
of
the
transfer,
or
the
interpretation
and
effect
of
a
FSIA
defines
a
commercial
activity
as
"either
a
regular
course
of
commercial
conveyance,
are
to
be
determined
and
(2)
A
foreign
law
on
land
ownership
and
conduct
or
a
particular
commercial
transaction
or
act."
Furthermore,
the
law
its
conveyance
is
asserted
to
conflict
with
a
domestic
law
on
the
same
matters.
declared
that
the
"commercial
character
of
the
activity
shall
be
determined
by
Hence,
the
need
to
determine
which
law
should
apply.
reference
to
the
nature
of
the
course
of
conduct
or
particular
transaction
or
In
the
instant
case,
none
of
the
above
elements
exists.
act,
rather
than
by
reference
to
its
purpose."
The
issues
are
not
concerned
with
validity
of
ownership
or
title.
There
is
no
question
that
the
property
belongs
to
the
Philippines.
The
issue
is
the
This
case
is
one
of
the
exceptions
to
the
lex
situs
rule.
In
this
case,
the
property
authority
of
the
respondent
officials
to
validly
dispose
of
property
belonging
is
beyond
the
jurisdiction
of
the
state
where
such
property
is
located.
Thus,
the
to
the
State.
And
the
validity
of
the
procedures
adopted
to
effect
its
sale.
This
lex
situs
rule
does
not
apply.
is
governed
by
Philippine
Law.
The
rule
of
lex
situs
does
not
apply.
The
assertion
that
the
opinion
of
the
Secretary
of
Justice
sheds
light
on
the
ALG:
The
very
nature
of
the
sale
as
imperii
was
refuted
by
the
squatters.
relevance
of
the
lex
situs
rule
is
misplaced.
The
opinion
does
not
tackle
the
alienability
of
the
real
properties
procured
through
reparations
nor
the
existence
in
what
body
of
the
authority
to
sell
them.
In
discussing
who
are
capable
of
acquiring
the
lots,
the
Secretary
merely
explains
that
it
is
the
foreign
CONFLICT
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FACTS:
accepted
principles
of
International
Law
are
adopted
by
our
Courts
and
thus
Petitioner
is
the
Holy
See
who
exercises
sovereignty
over
the
Vatican
City
in
shall
form
part
of
the
laws
of
the
land
as
a
condition
and
consequence
of
our
Rome,
Italy,
and
is
represented
in
the
Philippines
by
the
Papal
Nuncio;
Private
admission
in
the
society
of
nations.
respondent,
Starbright
Sales
Enterprises,
Inc.,
is
a
domestic
corporation
engaged
in
the
real
estate
business.
It
was
noted
in
Article
31(A)
of
the
1961
Vienna
Convention
on
Diplomatic
This
petition
arose
from
a
controversy
over
a
parcel
of
land
consisting
of
6,000
Relations
that
diplomatic
envoy
shall
be
granted
immunity
from
civil
and
square
meters
located
in
the
Municipality
of
Paranaque
registered
in
the
name
administrative
jurisdiction
of
the
receiving
state
over
any
real
action
relating
of
petitioner.
Said
lot
was
contiguous
with
two
other
lots
registered
in
the
to
private
immovable
property.
The
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs
(DFA)
name
of
the
Philippine
Realty
Corporation
(PRC).
certified
that
the
Embassy
of
the
Holy
See
is
a
duly
accredited
diplomatic
missionary
to
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
and
is
thus
exempted
from
local
The
three
lots
were
sold
to
Ramon
Licup,
through
Msgr.
Domingo
A.
Cirilos,
Jr.,
jurisdiction
and
is
entitled
to
the
immunity
rights
of
a
diplomatic
mission
or
acting
as
agent
to
the
sellers.
Later,
Licup
assigned
his
rights
to
the
sale
to
embassy
in
this
Court.
private
respondent.
In
view
of
the
refusal
of
the
squatters
to
vacate
the
lots
sold
to
private
Furthermore,
it
shall
be
understood
that
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
petitioner
has
respondent,
a
dispute
arose
as
to
who
of
the
parties
has
the
responsibility
of
bought
and
sold
lands
in
the
ordinary
course
of
real
estate
business,
surely,
the
evicting
and
clearing
the
land
of
squatters.
Complicating
the
relations
of
the
said
transaction
can
be
categorized
as
an
act
jure
gestionis.
However,
petitioner
parties
was
the
sale
by
petitioner
of
Lot
5-‐A
to
Tropicana
Properties
and
has
denied
that
the
acquisition
and
subsequent
disposal
of
the
lot
were
made
Development
Corporation
(Tropicana).
for
profit
but
claimed
that
it
acquired
said
property
for
the
site
of
its
mission
or
Private
respondent
filed
a
complaint
with
the
RTC,
Branch
61,
Makati,
Metro
the
Apostolic
Nunciature
in
the
Philippines.
Private
respondent
failed
to
Manila
for
annulment
of
the
sale
of
the
three
parcels
of
land,
and
specific
dispute
said
claim.
performance
and
damages
against
petitioner,
represented
by
the
Papal
Nuncio,
and
three
other
defendants:
namely,
Msgr.
Domingo
A.
Cirilos,
Jr.,
the
PRC
and
Lot
5-‐A
was
acquired
by
petitioner
as
a
donation
from
the
Archdiocese
of
Tropicana
Manila.
The
donation
was
made
not
for
commercial
purpose,
but
for
the
use
petitioner
and
Msgr.
Cirilos
separately
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaint
—
of
petitioner
to
construct
thereon
the
official
place
of
residence
of
the
Papal
petitioner
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
based
on
sovereign
immunity
from
suit,
and
Nuncio.
The
right
of
a
foreign
sovereign
to
acquire
property,
real
or
personal,
Msgr.
Cirilos
for
being
an
improper
party.
An
opposition
to
the
motion
was
filed
in
a
receiving
state,
necessary
for
the
creation
and
maintenance
of
its
by
private
respondent.
diplomatic
mission,
is
recognized
in
the
1961
Vienna
Convention
on
the
trial
court
issued
an
order
denying,
among
others,
petitioner’s
MTD
after
Diplomatic
Relations
(Arts.
20-‐22).
This
treaty
was
concurred
in
by
the
finding
that
petitioner
“shed
off
[its]
sovereign
immunity
by
entering
into
the
Philippine
Senate
and
entered
into
force
in
the
Philippines
on
November
15,
business
contract
in
question”
Petitioner
forthwith
elevated
the
matter
to
us.
1965.
In
its
petition,
petitioner
invokes
the
privilege
of
sovereign
immunity
only
on
its
own
behalf
and
on
behalf
of
its
official
representative,
the
Papal
Nuncio.
The
decision
to
transfer
the
property
and
the
subsequent
disposal
thereof
are
likewise
clothed
with
a
governmental
character.
Petitioner
did
not
sell
Lot
5-‐A
ISSUE:
for
profit
or
gain.
It
merely
wanted
to
dispose
off
the
same
because
the
Whether
the
Holy
See
is
immune
from
suit
insofar
as
its
business
relations
squatters
living
thereon
made
it
almost
impossible
for
petitioner
to
use
it
for
regarding
selling
a
lot
to
a
private
entity
the
purpose
of
the
donation.
HELD:
The
Court
held
that
Holy
See
may
properly
invoke
sovereign
immunity
for
its
non-‐suability.
As
expressed
in
Sec.
2,
Art
II
of
the
1987
Constitution,
generally
CONFLICT
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59.
SALVACION
V.
CENTRAL
BANK
No.
The
provisions
of
Section
113
of
Central
Bank
Circular
No.
960
and
PD
No.
1246,
insofar
as
it
amends
Section
8
of
R.A.
No.
6426,
are
hereby
held
to
be
E.g.
of
involuntary
assignment
INAPPLICABLE
to
this
case
because
of
its
peculiar
circumstances.
Respondents
are
hereby
required
to
comply
with
the
writ
of
execution
issued
in
the
civil
case
FACTS:
and
to
release
to
petitioners
the
dollar
deposit
of
Bartelli
in
such
amount
as
On
February
4,
1989,
Greg
Bartelli
y
Northcott,
an
American
tourist,
coaxed
and
would
satisfy
the
judgment.
lured
petitioner
Karen
Salvacion,
then
12
years
old
to
go
with
him
to
his
apartment.
Therein,
Greg
Bartelli
detained
Karen
Salvacion
for
four
days,
or
up
The
questioned
law
makes
futile
the
favorable
judgment
and
award
of
damages
to
February
7,
1989
and
was
able
to
rape
the
child
once
on
February
4,
and
that
Salvacion
and
her
parents
fully
deserve.
It
then
proceeded
to
show
that
three
times
each
day
on
February
5,
6,
and
7,
1989.
On
February
7,
1989,
after
the
economic
basis
for
the
enactment
of
RA
No.
6426
is
not
anymore
present;
policemen
and
people
living
nearby,
rescued
Karen,
Greg
Bartelli
was
arrested
and
even
if
it
still
exists,
the
questioned
law
still
denies
those
entitled
to
due
and
detained
at
the
Makati
Municipal
Jail.
The
policemen
recovered
from
process
of
law
for
being
unreasonable
and
oppressive.
The
intention
of
the
law
Bartelli
the
following
items:
1.)
Dollar
Check
No.
368,
Control
No.
021000678-‐ may
be
good
when
enacted.
The
law
failed
to
anticipate
the
iniquitous
effects
1166111303,
US
3,903.20;
2.)
COCOBANK
Bank
Book
No.
104-‐108758-‐8
(Peso
producing
outright
injustice
and
inequality
such
as
the
case
before
us.
Acct.);
3.)
Dollar
Account
—
China
Banking
Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-‐2;
4.)
ID-‐
122-‐30-‐8877;
5.)
Philippine
Money
(P234.00)
cash;
6.)
Door
Keys
6
pieces;
7.)
The
SC
adopted
the
comment
of
the
Solicitor
General
who
argued
that
the
Stuffed
Doll
(Teddy
Bear)
used
in
seducing
the
complainant.
Offshore
Banking
System
and
the
Foreign
Currency
Deposit
System
were
designed
to
draw
deposits
from
foreign
lenders
and
investors
and,
Basically,
Greg
Bartelli,
an
American
tourist,
was
arrested
for
committing
four
subsequently,
to
give
the
latter
protection.
However,
the
foreign
currency
counts
of
rape
and
serious
illegal
detention
against
Karen
Salvacion.
Police
deposit
made
by
a
transient
or
a
tourist
is
not
the
kind
of
deposit
encouraged
recovered
from
him
several
dollar
checks
and
a
dollar
account
in
the
China
by
PD
Nos.
1034
and
1035
and
given
incentives
and
protection
by
said
laws
Banking
Corp.
He
was,
however,
able
to
escape
from
prison.
In
a
civil
case
filed
because
such
depositor
stays
only
for
a
few
days
in
the
country
and,
against
him,
the
trial
court
awarded
Salvacion
moral,
exemplary
and
attorney’s
therefore,
will
maintain
his
deposit
in
the
bank
only
for
a
short
time.
fees
amounting
to
almost
P1,000,000.00.
Considering
that
Bartelli
is
just
a
tourist
or
a
transient,
he
is
not
entitled
to
the
protection
of
Section
113
of
Central
Bank
Circular
No.
960
and
PD
No.
Salvacion
tried
to
execute
the
judgment
on
the
dollar
deposit
of
Bartelli
with
1246
against
attachment,
garnishment
or
other
court
processes.
the
China
Banking
Corp.
but
the
latter
refused
arguing
that
Section
11
of
Central
Bank
Circular
No.
960
exempts
foreign
currency
deposits
from
In
fine,
the
application
of
the
law
depends
on
the
extent
of
its
justice.
attachment,
garnishment,
or
any
other
order
or
process
of
any
court,
legislative
Eventually,
if
we
rule
that
the
questioned
Section
113
of
Central
Bank
Circular
body,
government
agency
or
any
administrative
body
whatsoever.
Salvacion
No.
960
which
exempts
from
attachment,
garnishment,
or
any
other
order
or
therefore
filed
this
action
for
declaratory
relief
in
the
Supreme
Court.
process
of
any
court,
legislative
body,
government
agency
or
any
administrative
body
whatsoever,
is
applicable
to
a
foreign
transient,
injustice
would
result
ISSUE:
especially
to
a
citizen
aggrieved
by
a
foreign
guest
like
accused
Greg
Bartelli.
Should
Section
113
of
Central
Bank
Circular
No.
960
and
Section
8
of
R.A.
No.
This
would
negate
Article
10
of
the
New
Civil
Code
which
provides
that
“in
case
6426,
as
amended
by
PD
1246,
otherwise
known
as
the
Foreign
Currency
of
doubt
in
the
interpretation
or
application
of
laws,
it
is
presumed
that
the
Deposit
Act
be
made
applicable
to
a
foreign
transient?
lawmaking
body
intended
right
and
justice
to
prevail.
HELD:
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tax
on
inheritance.
Thus,
if
the
issue
of
the
case
is
not
purely
personal,
do
not
apply
Article
16
(par
2).
VIII.
PERSONAL
LAW,
NATIONALITY
AND
DOMICILE
FACTS:
DOMICILE
This
is
an
appeal
from
a
final
order
of
the
CFI
Manila,
requiring
the
register
of
deeds
of
the
City
of
Manila
to
cancel
certificates
of
title
Nos.
20880,
28336
and
1.
Domicile
by
origin
28331,
covering
lands
located
in
the
City
of
Manila,
Philippine
Islands,
and
issue
EXC:
Surely
a
mere
intention
to
return
to
their
former
homes,
a
in
lieu
thereof
new
certificates
of
transfer
of
title
in
favor
of
Allison
D.
Gibbs
consummation
every
humane
person
desires
for
them,
not
realized
and
without
requiring
him
to
present
any
document
showing
that
the
succession
which
may
never
be
realized
should
not
prevent
them,
under
the
tax
due
under
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
Administrative
Code
has
been
circumstances,
from
acquiring
a
residence
for
voting
purposes.
The
paid.
court
didn’t
consider
their
domicile
of
origin
because
the
intent
to
return
(future
intent
to
return)
will
not
necessarily
happen.
(Alcantara
The
order
of
the
court
of
March
10,
1931,
recites
that
the
parcels
of
land
v.
Secretary
of
Interior)
covered
by
said
certificates
of
title
formerly
belonged
to
the
conjugal
partnership
of
Allison
D.
Gibbs
and
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs;
that
Eva
died
intestate
2.
Domicile
by
choice
in
Palo
Alto,
California,
on
November
28,
1929;
that
at
the
time
of
her
death
1)
residence
or
bodily
presence
in
the
new
locality
she
and
her
husband
were
citizens
of
the
State
of
California
and
domiciled
2)
an
intention
to
remain
there
(animus
manendi)
for
an
indefinite
therein.
period
of
time,
and
3)
an
intention
to
abandon
the
old
domicile.
(Gallego
v.
Vera)
It
appears
further
from
said
order
that
Allison
was
appointed
administrator
of
the
state
of
his
said
deceased
wife
in
a
case
in
the
same
court,
entitled
"In
the
Abandonment
of
domicile
Matter
of
the
Intestate
Estate
of
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs,
Deceased";
that
in
1. A
deliberate
and
provable
choice
of
a
new
domicile,
intestate
proceedings,
Allison
on
September
22,1930,
filed
an
ex
parte
petition
2. Coupled
with
actual
residence
in
the
place
chosen,
with
a
in
which
he
alleged
"that
the
parcels
of
land
hereunder
described
belong
to
the
declared
or
provable
intent
that
it
should
be
one's
fixed
conjugal
partnership
of
Allison
and
his
wife,
Eva",
describing
in
detail
the
3
facts
and
permanent
place
of
abode,
one's
home.
(Vellila
v.
here
involved;
and
further
alleging
that
his
said
wife,
a
citizen
and
resident
of
Posadas)
California,
died
on
November
28,1929;
that
in
accordance
with
the
law
of
California,
the
community
property
of
spouses
who
are
citizens
of
California,
3.
Constructive
domicile
upon
the
death
of
the
wife
previous
to
that
of
the
husband,
belongs
absolutely
to
the
surviving
husband
without
administration;
that
the
conjugal
partnership
60.
GIBBS
V.
GOVERNMENT
of
Allison
and
Eva
Gibbs,
deceased,
has
no
obligations
or
debts
and
no
one
will
be
prejudiced
by
adjucating
said
parcels
of
land
(and
17
others
not
here
DOCTRINE:
The
second
paragraph
of
article
10
[now
article
16]
can
be
invoked
involved)
to
be
the
absolute
property
of
Allison
as
sole
owner.
The
court
only
when
the
deceased
was
vested
with
a
descendible
interest
in
property
granted
said
petition
and
on
September
22,
1930,
entered
a
decree
adjucating
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Philippine
Islands.
to
Allison
as
the
sole
and
absolute
owner
of
said
lands,
applying
section
1401
of
the
Civil
Code
of
California.
Gibbs
presented
this
decree
to
the
register
of
deeds
ALG:
Why
would
art.
16
not
apply?
Art.
16
is
limited
to
purely
personal
of
Manila
and
demanded
that
the
latter
issue
to
him
a
TCT.
relations.
The
issue
involved
is
tax
on
inheritance.
This
case
involved
merely
some
aspect
of
personal
law—there
is
a
succession
aspect
but
the
main
issue
is
Section
1547
of
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
Administrative
Code
provides
in
CONFLICT
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part
that:
Registers
of
deeds
shall
not
register
in
the
registry
of
property
any
document
3.
A
parcel
of
land
in
the
City
of
Manila,
represented
by
TCT
No.
28331,
dated
transferring
real
property
or
real
rights
therein
or
any
chattel
mortgage,
by
way
April
6,
1927,
which
it
states
"that
Allison
D.
Gibbs
married
to
Eva
Johnson
of
gifts
mortis
causa,
legacy
or
inheritance,
unless
the
payment
of
the
tax
fixed
Gibbs"
is
the
owner
of
the
land
described
therein;
that
said
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs
in
this
article
and
actually
due
thereon
shall
be
shown.
And
they
shall
died
intestate
on
November
28,
1929,
living
surviving
her
husband,
the
immediately
notify
the
Collector
of
Internal
Revenue
or
the
corresponding
appellee,
and
2
sons,
Allison
J.
Gibbs,
now
age
25
and
Finley
J.
Gibbs,
now
aged
provincial
treasurer
of
the
non-‐payment
of
the
tax
discovered
by
them.
22,
as
her
sole
heirs
of
law.
Acting
upon
the
authority
of
said
section,
the
register
of
deeds
of
the
City
of
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
Administrative
Code
entitled
"Tax
on
Manila,
declined
to
accept
as
binding
said
decree
of
court
of
September
inheritances,
legacies
and
other
acquisitions
mortis
causa"
provides
in
section
22,1930,
and
refused
to
register
the
transfer
of
title
of
the
said
conjugal
1536
that
"Every
transmission
by
virtue
of
inheritance
...
of
real
property
...
property
to
Allison
on
the
ground
that
the
corresponding
inheritance
tax
had
shall
be
subject
to
the
following
tax."
not
been
paid.
Thereupon,
under
date
of
December
26,
1930,
Allison
filed
in
the
said
court
a
petition
for
an
order
requiring
the
said
register
of
deeds
"to
ISSUE:
issue
the
corresponding
titles"
to
Gibbs
without
requiring
previous
payment
of
WON
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs
at
the
time
of
her
death
the
owner
of
a
descendible
any
inheritance
tax.
After
due
hearing
of
the
parties,
the
court
reaffirmed
said
interest
in
the
Philippine
lands
above-‐mentioned?
(YES)
order
of
September
22,
1930,
and
entered
the
order
of
March
10,
1931,
which
WON
Register
of
Deeds
erred
in
declining
to
register
the
transfer
title
of
the
is
under
review
on
this
appeal.
conjugal
property
on
the
ground
of
unpaid
inheritance
tax?
(NO)
On
January
3,
1933,
this
court
remanded
the
case
to
the
court
of
origin
for
new
HELD:
trial
upon
additional
evidence
in
regard
to
the
pertinent
law
of
California
in
The
second
paragraph
Article
10
[now
Art.
16]
of
the
Civil
Code
provides:
force
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
Mrs.
Gibbs,
also
authorizing
the
introduction
Nevertheless,
legal
and
testamentary
successions,
in
respect
to
the
order
of
of
evidence
with
reference
to
the
dates
of
the
acquisition
of
the
property
succession
as
well
as
to
the
amount
of
the
successional
rights
and
the
intrinsic
involved
in
this
suit
and
with
reference
to
the
California
law
in
force
at
the
time
validity
of
their
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
of
such
acquisition.
The
case
is
now
before
us
with
the
supplementary
whose
succession
is
in
question,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
or
evidence.
the
country
in
which
it
may
be
situated.
For
the
purposes
of
this
case,
the
Court
considered
the
following
facts
as
The
second
paragraph
of
article
10
applies
only
when
a
legal
or
testamentary
established
by
the
evidence
or
the
admissions
of
the
parties:
Allison
has
been
succession
has
taken
place
in
the
Philippines
and
in
accordance
with
the
law
of
continuously,
since
the
year
1902,
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
California
and
the
Philippine
Islands;
and
the
foreign
law
is
consulted
only
in
regard
to
the
domiciled
therein;
that
he
and
Eva
were
married
at
Columbus,
Ohio,
in
July
order
of
succession
or
the
extent
of
the
successional
rights;
in
other
words,
the
1906;
that
there
was
no
ante-‐nuptial
marriage
contract
between
the
parties;
second
paragraph
of
article
10
can
be
invoked
only
when
the
deceased
was
that
during
the
existence
of
said
marriage
the
spouses
acquired
the
following
vested
with
a
descendible
interest
in
property
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
lands,
among
others,
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
as
conjugal
property:
Philippine
Islands.
1.
A
parcel
of
land
in
the
City
of
Manila
represented
by
TCT
No.
20880,
dated
March
16,
1920,
and
registered
in
the
name
of
"Allison
D.
Gibbs
casado
con
Eva
In
the
case
of
Clarke
vs.
Clarke,
the
court
said:
Johnson
Gibbs".
2.
A
parcel
of
land
in
the
City
of
Manila,
represented
by
TCT
It
is
principle
firmly
established
that
to
the
law
of
the
state
in
which
the
land
is
No.
28336,
dated
May
14,
1927,
in
which
it
is
certified
"that
spouses
Allison
D.
situated
we
must
look
for
the
rules
which
govern
its
descent,
alienation,
and
Gibbs
and
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs
are
the
owners
in
fee
simple"
of
the
land
therein
transfer,
and
for
the
effect
and
construction
of
wills
and
other
conveyances.
described.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
100
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
This
fundamental
principle
is
stated
in
the
first
paragraph
of
article
10
of
our
FACTS:
Civil
Code
as
follows:
"Personal
property
is
subject
to
the
laws
of
the
nation
of
The
petitioners
allege
that
they
are
qualified
voters
residing
at
Culion
Leper
the
owner
thereof;
real
property
to
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
it
is
Colony,
Culion,
Palawan,
having
voted
in
previous
elections
in
the
Philippine
situated.”
Islands;
that
in
a
public
mass
meeting
held
on
April
5,
1935,
they
adopted
a
resolution
demanding
the
right
to
vote
in
the
plebiscite
and
requesting
that
Under
this
broad
principle,
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
title
which
vested
in
electoral
precincts
be
established
within
the
radius
of
the
Culion
Leper
Colony
Mrs.
Gibbs
at
the
time
of
the
acquisition
of
the
community
lands
here
in
in
order
that
the
qualified
voters
therein
could
register,
which
resolution
was
question
must
be
determined
in
accordance
with
the
lex
rei
sitae.
It
is
admitted
sent
to
his
Excellency,
the
Governor-‐General,
who
referred
it
to
the
Honorable,
that
the
Philippine
lands
here
in
question
were
acquired
as
community
the
Secretary
of
the
Interior;
that
the
Department
of
the
Interior,
through
its
property
of
the
conjugal
partnership
of
the
appellee
and
his
wife.
Under
the
legal
division,
ruled
that
no
new
electoral
precincts
could
be
created
at
Culion
law
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
she
was
vested
of
a
title
equal
to
that
of
her
Leper
Colony
inasmuch
as
the
plebiscite
is
treated
as
and
considered
as
a
husband.
It
results
that
the
wife
of
the
appellee
was,
by
the
law
of
the
special
election;
that
in
view
of
this
ruling
the
petitioners
requested,
by
Philippine
Islands,
vested
of
a
descendible
interest,
equal
to
that
of
her
telegram,
the
Interior
Department
to
authorize
the
Balala
Electoral
Board
of
husband,
in
the
Philippine
lands
covered
by
certificates
of
title
Nos.
20880,
Inspectors,
Culion,
Palawan,
to
register
the
qualified
voters
of
Culion
Leper
28336
and
28331,
from
the
date
of
their
acquisition
to
the
date
of
her
death.
Colony;
that
this
request
was
refused
upon
the
ground
that
the
petitioners
were
not
bona
fide
residents
of
Culion,
Palawan;
that
on
April
23,
1935,
the
The
descendible
interest
of
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs
in
the
lands
aforesaid
was
petitioners
Juan
L.
Alcantara,
Miguel
Valdes,
Adolfo
Almeda
and
Dionisio
transmitted
to
her
heirs
by
virtue
of
inheritance
and
this
transmission
plainly
Pañgilinan,
accompanied
by
Attorney
Martin
Miras,
appeared
before
the
falls
within
the
language
of
section
1536
of
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
chairman
of
the
Balala
Electoral
Board
of
Inspectors
and
requested
him
to
Administrative
Code
which
levies
a
tax
on
inheritances.
It
is
unnecessary
in
this
register
and
inscribe
them
in
the
officials
list
of
qualified
voters
in
order
that
proceeding
to
determine
the
"order
of
succession"
or
the
"extent
of
the
they
might
vote
on
May
14,
1935,
and
that
their
request
was
denied
on
the
successional
rights"
(article
10,
Civil
Code,
supra)
which
would
be
regulated
by
ground
that
no
specific
instructions
to
register
them
had
been
received
from
section
1386
of
the
Civil
Code
of
California
which
was
in
effect
at
the
time
of
the
Department
of
the
Interior.
the
death
of
Mrs.
Gibbs.
The
principal
allegation
of
the
respondents,
by
way
of
special
defense,
is
"that
61.
ALCANTARA
V.
SECRETARY
OF
INTERIOR
the
herein
petitioners
are
not
qualified
voters,
because
they
shall
not
have
been
residents
of
Culion
for
six
months
next
preceding
the
day
of
voting,
for
DOCTRINE:
They
are
not
permitted
to
return
to
their
former
homes
to
vote.
They
they
have
not
acquired
residence
in
Culion
as
they
are
confined
therein
as
are
not
allowed
to
visit
their
former
homes
even
though
they
have
been
lepers
against
their
will,
and
they
have
no
intention
to
permanently
reside
separated
from
near
and
dear
relatives
who
are
not
afflicted
as
they
are.
Surely
there
(sections
430-‐431
of
the
Administrative
Code
as
finally
amended
by
Acts
a
mere
intention
to
return
to
their
former
homes,
a
consummation
every
Nos.
3387,
sec.
1,
and
4112,
secs.
1
to
3);
and
in
view
thereof,
the
respondent
humane
person
desires
for
them,
not
realized
and
which
may
never
be
realized
Secretary
of
the
Interior
has
ruled
that
the
petitioners
are
not
qualified
voters
should
not
prevent
them,
under
the
circumstances,
from
acquiring
a
residence
and
therefore
cannot
be
registered
under
the
law."
for
voting
purposes.
At
present
the
nearest
approach
to
a
constitution
that
we
have
in
the
The
court
didn’t
consider
their
domicile
of
origin
because
the
intent
to
return
Philippines
in
our
Organic
Act,
the
Jones
Law,
enacted
August
29,
1916,
by
the
(future
intent
to
return)
will
not
necessarily
happen.
Congress
of
the
United
States.
"The
organic
law
(or
Act)
of
a
territory
takes
the
place
of
a
constitution
as
the
fundamental
law
of
the
local
government."
The
only
provisions
contained
in
that
law
as
to
the
qualification
of
voters
reads
as
follows:
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
101
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
SEC.
15.
That
at
the
first
election
held
pursuant
to
this
Act,
the
qualified
SEC.
432.
Disqualifications.
—
The
following
persons
shall
be
disqualified
from
electors
shall
be
those
having
the
qualifications
of
voters
under
the
present
voting:
law;
thereafter
and
until
otherwise
provided
by
the
Philippine
Legislature
(a)
Any
person
who,
since
the
thirteenth
day
of
August,
eighteen
hundred
and
herein
provided
for
the
qualifications
of
voters
for
Senators
and
ninety-‐eight,
has
been
sentenced
by
final
judgment
to
suffer
not
less
than
Representatives
in
the
Philippines
and
all
officers
elected
by
the
people
shall
be
eighteen
months
of
imprisonment,
such
disability
not
having
been
removed
by
as
follows:
plenary
pardon.
(b)
Any
persons
who
has
violated
an
oath
of
allegiance
taken
by
him
to
the
United
States.
(c)
Insane
or
feeble-‐minded
persons.
(d)
Deaf-‐
Every
male
person
who
is
not
a
citizen
or
subject
of
a
foreign
power
twenty-‐
mutes
who
cannot
read
and
write.
one
years
of
age
or
over
(except
insane
and
feeble-‐minded
persons
and
those
(e)
Electors
registered
under
subsection
(c)
of
the
next
preceding
section
who,
convicted
in
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
of
an
infamous
offense
since
the
after
failing
to
make
sworn
statement
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
board
of
thirteenth
day
of
August,
eighteen
hundred
and
ninety-‐eight),
who
shall
have
inspectors
at
any
of
its
two
meetings
for
registration
and
revision,
that
they
are
been
a
resident
of
the
Philippines
for
one
year
and
of
the
municipality
in
which
incapacitated
for
preparing
their
ballots
due
to
permanent
physical
disability,
he
shall
offer
to
voter
for
six
months
next
preceding
the
day
of
voting,
and
who
present
themselves
at
the
hour
of
voting
as
incapacitated,
irrespective
of
is
comprised
within
one
of
the
following
classes:
whether
such
incapacity
be
real
or
feigned.
(a)
Those
who
under
existing
law
are
legal
voters
and
have
exercised
the
right
of
suffrage.
ISSUE:
(b)
Those
who
own
real
property
to
the
value
of
500
pesos,
or
who
annually
Whether
or
not
the
petitioners
have
acquitted
a
residence
for
voting
purposes
pay
30
pesos
or
more
of
the
established
taxes.
(c)
Those
who
are
able
to
red
in
the
municipality
in
which
they
desire
to
vote.
and
write
either
Spanish,
English,
or
a
native
language.
Under
the
authority
conferred
upon
it
by
the
above
quoted
section
the
HELD:
Philippine
Legislature
has
prescribed
the
qualifications
and
disqualifications
of
In
some
of
the
states
there
is
a
constitutional
provision
to
the
effect
that
for
voters
in
sections
431
and
432
of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
which
read
the
purpose
of
voting
no
person
shall
be
deemed
to
have
gained
or
lost
a
as
follows:
residence
while
a
student
at
any
seminary
of
learning.
Under
such
a
provision
it
has
been
held
"that
a
student
does
not
acquire
a
residence
for
voting
purposes
SEC.
431.
Qualifications
prescribed
for
voters.
—
Every
male
or
female
person
merely
by
attending
such
an
institution."
In
addition
to
such
provisions
as
to
who
is
not
a
citizen
or
subject
of
a
foreign
power,
twenty-‐one
years
of
age
or
students,
constitutions
of
some
states
provide
that
"For
the
purpose
of
voting,
over,
who
shall
have
been
a
resident
of
the
Philippines
for
one
year
and
of
the
no
person
shall
be
deemed
to
have
gained
or
lost
a
residence
by
reason
shall
municipality
in
which
he
shall
offer
to
vote
for
six
months
next
preceding
the
be
deemed
to
have
gained
or
lost
a
residence
by
reason
of
his
presence
or
day
of
voting
is
entitled
to
vote
in
all
elections
if
comprised
within
either
of
the
absence
while
...
kept
at
any
almshouse
or
other
asylum
at
public
expense;
...
following
three
classes:
."Under
such
a
provision
the
rule
in
some
jurisdictions
is
"that
inmates
of
soldiers'
homes,
by
going
to
and
residing
in
such
home,
neither
lose
their
old,
(a)
Those
who,
under
the
laws
in
force
in
the
Philippine
Islands
upon
the
nor
gain
a
new,
residence,
though
they
intend
to
reside
in
the
home
twenty-‐eight
day
of
August,
nineteen
hundred
and
sixteen,
were
legal
voters
permanently.
Hence
they
are
not
entitled
to
vote
except
at
their
place
of
and
had
exercised
the
right
of
suffrage.
(b)
Male
persons
who
own
real
residence
before
becoming
such
inmates.
property
to
the
value
of
five
hundred
pesos,
declared
in
their
name
for
taxation
purposes
for
a
period
of
not
less
than
one
year
prior
to
the
date
of
the
election,
In
other
jurisdictions,
however,
a
contrary
conclusion
has
been
reached,
upon
or
who
annually
pay
thirty
pesos
or
more
of
the
established
taxes.
the
theory
that
under
such
a
constitutional
provision
an
inmate
such
an
(c)
Those
who
are
able
to
read
and
write
either
Spanish,
or
English,
or
a
native
institution
may
acquire
a
residence
at
the
home.
language.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
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TORRES
102
ATTY.
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AY
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In
the
absence
of
such
a
constitutional
prohibition
the
rule
is
that
a
permanent
not
be
considered
as
having
resided
for
six
months
next
preceding
the
day
of
member
of
a
soldiers'
home
has
a
residence
at
such
home
for
the
purpose
of
voting
because
"they
have
not
acquired
residence
in
Culion
as
they
are
voting.
confined
therein
as
lepers
against
their
will,
and
they
have
no
intention
to
permanently
reside
there."
There
being
no
such
provisions
or
prohibitions
in
the
Jones
Law
nor
in
the
In
ruling
out
this
objection,
and
in
holding
that
these
lepers
were
entitled
to
sections
of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
quoted
above,
we
see
no
reason
vote,
this
court
said:
for
applying
in
this
jurisdiction
the
legal
doctrine
of
the
courts
of
the
states
There
are
a
large
number
of
people
confined
in
the
Culion
Leper
Colony.
They
which
have
adopted
such,
or
similar,
constitutional
provisions.
are
not
permitted
to
return
to
their
former
homes
to
vote.
They
are
not
allowed
to
visit
their
former
homes
even
though
they
have
been
separated
There
are
a
large
number
of
people
confined
in
the
Culion
Leper
Colony.
They
from
near
and
dear
relatives
who
are
not
afflicted
as
they
are.
Why
split
hairs
are
not
permitted
to
return
to
their
former
homes
to
vote.
They
are
not
over
the
meaning
of
residence
for
voting
purposes
under
such
circumstances?
allowed
to
visit
their
former
homes
even
though
they
have
been
separated
Assuming
that
the
petitioners
intend
to
return
to
their
former
homes
if
at
some
from
near
and
dear
relatives
who
are
not
afflicted
as
they
are.
Why
split
hairs
future
time
they
are
cured,
this
intention
does
not
necessarily
defeat
their
over
the
meaning
of
residence
for
voting
purposes
under
such
circumstances?
residence
before
they
actually
do
return
if
they
have
been
residents
of
the
Assuming
that
the
petitioners
intend
to
return
to
their
former
homes
if
at
some
Philippine
Islands
for
one
year
and
of
the
municipality
in
which
they
offer
to
future
time
they
are
cured,
this
intention
does
not
necessarily
defeat
their
vote
for
six
months
next
preceding
the
day
of
voting.
Surely
a
mere
intention
residence
before
they
actually
do
return
if
they
have
been
residents
"of
the
to
return
to
their
former
homes,
a
consummation
every
humane
person
Philippine
Islands
for
one
year
and
of
the
municipality
in
which
they
offer
to
desires
for
them,
not
realized
and
which
may
never
be
realized
should
not
vote
for
six
months
next
preceding
the
day
of
voting."
Surely
a
mere
intention
prevent
them,
under
the
circumstances,
from
acquiring
a
residence
for
voting
to
return
to
their
former
homes,
a
consummation
every
humane
person
desires
purposes.
for
them,
not
realized
and
which
may
never
be
realized
should
not
prevent
them,
under
the
circumstances,
from
acquiring
a
residence
for
voting
purposes.
The
ruling
in
the
alcantara
case
is
decisive
as
to
the
right
of
the
lepers
to
vote.
It
was
there
said
that
they
can
vote
in
the
places
where
they
are
confined
This
court
is
of
the
opinion
that,
under
our
liberal
law,
such
of
the
petitioners
as
provided
that
they
evince
their
desire
to
do
so
and
had
resided
there
for
at
have
been
residents
of
the
Philippine
Islands
for
one
year
and
residents
for
six
least
a
period
of
six
months.
It
is
true
that
the
ruling
was
given
in
connection
months
in
the
municipality
in
which
they
desire
to
vote
and
have
the
other
with
a
plebiscite,
but
this
matter
is
of
no
moment
because
the
paramount
issue
qualifications
prescribed
for
voters
in
section
431
of
the
Revised
Administrative
therein
involved
has
reference
to
their
qualification
from
the
point
of
view
of
Code
and
who
have
none
of
the
disqualifications
prescribed
in
section
432
of
residence.
the
same
Code
were
entitled
to
register
and
vote
in
the
plebiscite
of
May
14,
1935.
Having
reached
this
conclusion
and
being
unable
to
determine
from
the
62.
VELLILA
V.
POSADAS
record
whether
the
petitioners
have
the
prescribed
qualifications
for
voters
and
none
of
the
prescribed
disqualifications
this
court
on
May
11,
1935,
sent
DOCTRINE:
The
record
before
us
leaves
no
doubt
in
our
minds
that
the
"usual
the
above
mentioned
telegram
to
the
parties
in
this
case.
residence"
of
this
unfortunate
man,
whom
appellant
describes
as
a
"fugitive"
and
"outcast",
was
in
Manila
where
he
had
lived
and
toiled
for
more
than
a
HELD:
quarter
of
a
century,
rather
than
in
any
foreign
country
he
visited
during
his
Petitioners,
who
were
lepers
residing
at
the
Culion
Leper
Colony,
demanded
wanderings
up
to
the
date
of
his
death
in
Calcutta.
To
effect
the
abandonment
that
they
be
granted
the
right
to
vote
in
the
plebiscite
(on
the
vital
question
of
of
one's
domicile,
there
must
be
a
deliberate
and
provable
choice
of
a
new
the
acceptance
or
rejection
of
the
Constitution
for
the
Commonwealth
of
the
domicile,
coupled
with
actual
residence
in
the
place
chosen,
with
a
declared
or
Philippine
Islands)
to
be
held
on
May
14,
1935
but
was
refused
by
the
Secretary
provable
intent
that
it
should
be
one's
fixed
and
permanent
place
of
abode,
of
Interior
on
the
ground
that
they
were
not
qualified
voters
in
that
they
could
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
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TORRES
103
ATTY.
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AY
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one's
home.
the
Philippine
Islands
in
1902
or
1903
and
engaged
actively
in
business
in
these
Islands
up
to
the
time
of
his
death
in
Calcutta,
India,
on
February
18,
1931.
ALG:
It
was
not
proved
that
he
acquired
another
domicile.
He
had
no
business
elsewhere
and
at
the
time
of
his
death
left
an
estate
FACTS:
consisting
principally
of
bonds
and
shares
of
stock
of
corporations
organized
Arthur
Graydon
Moody
died
in
Calcutta,
India,
on
February
18,
1931
and
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
bank
deposits
and
other
intangibles
executed
in
the
Philippine
Islands
a
will,
by
virtue
of
which,
he
bequeathed
all
and
personal
property
valued
by
the
commissioners
of
appraisal
and
claims
at
his
property
to
his
only
sister,
Ida
M.
Palmer,
who
then
was
and
still
is
a
citizen
P609,767.58
and
by
the
CIR
for
the
purposes
of
inheritance
tax
at
P653,657.47.
and
resident
of
the
State
of
New
York,
USA.
A
petition
for
appointment
of
special
administrator
of
the
estate
of
the
All
of
said
property
at
the
time
of
his
death
was
located
and
had
its
situs
deceased
Arthur
Graydon
Moody
was
filed
by
W.
Maxwell
Thebaut
with
the
CFI
within
the
Philippine
Islands.
So
far
as
this
record
shows,
he
left
no
property
of
of
Manila.
any
kind
located
anywhere
else.
Subsequently
a
petition
was
filed
by
Ida
M.
Palmer,
asking
for
the
probate
of
In
his
will
executed
without
date
in
Manila
in
accordance
with
the
formalities
of
said
will
of
the
deceased
Moody,
and
the
same
was,
after
hearing,
duly
the
Philippine
law,
in
which
he
bequeathed
all
his
property
to
his
sister,
Ida
M.
probated
by
the
court.
Palmer,
he
stated:
"I,
Arthur
G.
Moody,
a
citizen
'of
the
United
States
of
Ida
M.
Palmer
was
declared
to
be
the
sole
and
only
heiress
of
the
deceased
America,
residing
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
hereby
publish
and
declare
the
Arthur
Graydon
Moody;
and
that
during
the
hearing
for
the
declaration
of
following
as
my
last
Will
and
Testament
*
*
*"
heirs,
Ida
M.
Palmer
presented
as
evidence
a
letter
dated
February
28,
1925,
Plaintiff
contends:
"That
there
is
no
valid
law
or
regulation
of
the
Government
and
addressed
to
her
by
Moody.
of
the
Philippine
Islands
under
or
by
virtue
of
which
any
inheritance
tax
may
be
levied,
assessed
or
collected
upon
transfer,
by
death
and
succession,
of
The
property
left
by
Moody
consisted
principally
of
bonds
and
shares
of
stock
intangible
personal
properties
of
a
person
not
domiciled
in
the
Philippine
of
corporations
organized
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
bank
Islands,
and
the
levy
and
collection
by
defendant
of
inheritance
tax
xxx...
deposits
and
other
personal
properties,
as
are
more
fully
shown
in
the
constituted
and
constitutes
the
taking
and
deprivation
of
property
without
due
inventory
filed
by
the
special
administrator
(Thebaut).
process
of
law.
It
is
alleged
in
the
complaint
that
at
the
time
of
his
death,
Arthur
G.
Moody
was
a
"non-‐resident
of
the
Philippine
Islands".
The
BIR
prepared
for
the
estate
an
inheritance
tax
return
and
an
income
tax
return
for
the
fractional
period
from
January
1,
1931
to
June
30,
1931
ISSUES:
Whether
Moody
was
legally
domiciled
in
the
Philippine
Islands
on
the
day
of
his
The
estate
of
the
late
Moody
paid
under
protest
the
sum
of
P50,000
on
July
22,
death?
YES
1931,
and
the
other
sum
of
P40,019.75
on
January
19,
1932,
making
a
total
of
Whether
Moody’s
estate
is
subject
to
inheritance
tax?
YES
P90,019.75,
of
which
P77,018.39
covers
the
assessment
for
inheritance
tax
and
the
sum
of
P13,001.41
covers
the
assessment
for
income
tax
against
said
HELD:
estate.
The
Supreme
Court
affirmed
the
judgment
of
the
trial
court,
first,
because
the
property
in
the
estate
of
Arthur
G.
Moody
at
the
time
of
his
death
was
located
The
CIR
overruled
the
protest
made
by
Ida
M.
Palmer
through
her
attorney.
and
had
its
situs
within
the
Philippine
Islands
and,
second,
because
his
legal
domicile
up
to
the
time
of
his
death
was
within
the
Philippine
Islands.
In
addition
to
the
facts,
it
appears
that
Moody,
an
American
citizen,
came
to
CONFLICT
OF
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AV
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104
ATTY.
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AY
2015-‐2016
Moody
was
never
married
and
there
is
no
doubt
that
he
had
his
legal
domicile
establishment
of
a
legal
domicile
there.
The
negative
evidence
that
he
told
in
the
Philippine
Islands
from
1902
or
1903
forward
during
which
time
he
Cooley
that
he
did
not
intend
to
return
to
Manila
does
not
prove
that
he
had
accumulated
a
fortune
from
his
business
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
He
lived
in
established
a
domicile
in
Paris.
His
short
stay
of
three
months
in
Paris
is
entirely
the
Elks’
Club
in
Manila
for
many
years
and
was
living
there
up
to
the
date
he
consistent
with
the
view
that
he
was
a
transient
in
Paris
for
the
purpose
of
left
Manila
the
latter
part
of
February,
1928,
under
the
following
receiving
treatments
at
the
Pasteur
Institute.
The
evidence
in
the
record
circumstances:
He
was
afflicted
with
leprosy
in
an
advanced
stage
and
had
indicates
clearly
that
Moody’s
continued
absence
from
his
legal
domicile
in
been
informed
by
Dr.
Wade
that
he
would
be
reported
to
the
Philippine
the
Philippines
was
due
to
and
reasonably
accounted
for
by
the
same
motive
authorities
for
confinement
in
the
Culion
Leper
Colony
as
required
by
the
law.
that
caused
his
surreptitious
departure,
namely,
to
evade
confinement
in
the
Distressed
at
the
thought
of
being
thus
segregated
and
in
violation
of
his
Culion
Leper
Colony;
for
he
doubtless
knew
that
on
his
return
he
would
be
promise
to
Dr.
Wade
that
he
would
voluntarily
go
to
Culion,
he
surreptitiously
immediately
confined,
because
his
affliction
became
graver
while
he
was
left
the
Islands
the
latter
part
of
February,
1928,
under
cover
of
night,
on
a
absent
than
it
was
on
the
day
of
his
precipitous
departure
and
he
could
not
freighter,
without
ticket,
passport
or
tax
clearance
certificate.
The
record
does
conceal
himself
in
the
Philippines
where
he
was
well
known,
as
he
might
do
not
show
where
Moody
was
during
the
remainder
of
the
year
1928.
He
lived
in
foreign
parts.
with
a
friend
in
Paris,
France,
during
the
months
of
March
and
April
of
the
year
1929
where
he
was
receiving
treatment
for
leprosy
at
the
Pasteur
Institute.
The
Our
Civil
Code
(art.
40)
defines
the
domicile
of
natural
persons
as
"the
place
of
record
does
not
show
where
Moody
was
in
the
interval
between
April,
1929,
their
usual
residence."
The
record
before
us
leaves
no
doubt
in
our
minds
that
and
November
26,
1930,
on
which
latter
date
he
wrote
a
letter
to
Harry
Wendt
the
"usual
residence"
of
this
unfortunate
man,
whom
appellant
describes
as
a
of
Manila,
offering
to
sell
him
his
interest
in
the
Camera
Supply
Company,
a
"fugitive"
and
"outcast",
was
in
Manila
where
he
had
lived
and
toiled
for
Philippine
corporation,
in
which
Moody
owned
599
out
of
603
shares.
In
this
more
than
a
quarter
of
a
century,
rather
than
in
any
foreign
country
he
letter,
among
other
things,
he
states:
"Certainly
I’ll
never
return
there
to
live
or
visited
during
his
wanderings
up
to
the
date
of
his
death
in
Calcutta.
To
effect
enter
business
again."
the
abandonment
of
one’s
domicile,
there
must
be
a
deliberate
and
provable
choice
of
a
new
domicile,
coupled
with
actual
residence
in
the
place
chosen,
As
Moody
died
of
leprosy
less
than
two
months
after
these
letters
were
with
a
declared
or
provable
intent
that
it
should
be
one’s
fixed
and
written,
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
he
would
have
been
immediately
permanent
place
of
abode,
one’s
home.
There
is
a
complete
dearth
of
segregated
in
the
Culion
Leper
Colony
had
he
returned
to
the
Philippine
evidence
in
the
record
that
Moody
ever
established
a
new
domicile
in
a
foreign
Islands.
He
was,
therefore,
a
fugitive,
not
from
justice,
but
from
confinement
in
country.
the
Culion
Leper
Colony
in
accordance
with
the
law
of
the
Philippine
Islands.
63.
GALLEGO
V.
VERA
There
is
no
statement
of
Moody,
oral
or
written,
in
the
record
that
he
had
adopted
a
new
domicile
while
he
was
absent
from
Manila.
Though
he
was
DOCTRINE:
In
order
to
acquire
a
domicile
by
choice,
there
must
concur
(1)
physically
present
for
some
months
in
Calcutta
prior
to
the
date
of
his
death
residence
or
bodily
presence
in
the
new
locality,
(2)
an
intention
to
remain
there,
the
appellant
does
not
claim
that
Moody
had
a
domicile
there
although
there,
and
(3)
an
intention
to
abandon
the
old
domicile.
it
was
precisely
from
Calcutta
that
he
wrote
and
cabled
that
he
wished
to
sell
his
business
in
Manila
and
that
he
had
no
intention
to
live
there
again.
Much
In
other
words,
there
must
be
an
animus
non
revertendi
and
an
animus
less
plausible,
it
seems
to
us,
is
the
claim
that
he
established
a
legal
domicile
in
manendi.
The
purpose
to
remain
in
or
at
the
domicile
of
choice
must
be
for
an
Paris
in
February,
1929.
The
record
contains
no
writing
whatever
of
Moody
INDEFINITE
period
of
time.
The
acts
of
the
person
must
conform
with
his
from
Paris.
There
is
no
evidence
as
to
where
in
Paris
he
had
any
fixed
abode
purpose.
The
change
of
residence
must
be
voluntary;
the
residence
at
the
place
that
he
intended
to
be
his
permanent
home.
There
is
no
evidence
that
he
chosen
for
the
domicile
must
be
actual;
and
to
the
fact
of
residence
there
must
acquired
any
property
in
Paris
or
engaged
in
any
settled
business
on
his
own
be
added
the
animus
manendi.
account
there.
There
is
no
evidence
of
any
affirmative
factors
that
prove
the
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2015-‐2016
there,
and
(3)
an
intention
to
abandon
the
old
domicile.
In
other
words,
there
FACTS:
must
be
an
animus
non
revertendi
and
an
animus
manendi.
The
purpose
to
This
is
a
petition
for
certiorari
to
review
the
decision
of
the
CA
affirming
the
remain
in
or
at
the
domicile
of
choice
must
be
for
an
INDEFINITE
period
of
decision
of
the
CFI
of
Leyte,
which
declared
illegal
the
petitioner’s
election
to
time.
The
acts
of
the
person
must
conform
with
his
purpose.
The
change
of
the
office
of
the
municipal
mayor
of
Abuyog,
Leyte
in
the
election
of
Dec.
1940,
residence
must
be
voluntary;
the
residence
at
the
place
chosen
for
the
on
the
ground
that
he
did
not
meet
the
residence
qualification.
domicile
must
be
actual;
and
to
the
fact
of
residence
there
must
be
added
the
animus
manendi.
Gallego
is
a
native
of
Abuyog,
Leyte.
After
his
studies,
he
was
employed
as
a
school
teacher
in
Catarman,
Samar,
as
well
as
in
some
municipalities
in
Leyte.
The
purpose
to
remain
in
the
domicile
should
be
for
an
INDEFINITE
period
of
In
1937,
he
ran
as
municipal
mayor
in
Abuyog,
Leyte,
but
lost.
In
June
1938,
he
time.
The
court
believed
that
Gallego
had
no
intention
to
stay
in
Malaybalay
worked
in
Malaybalay
Bukidnon
in
a
plantation
of
the
Bureau
of
Forestry
to
indefinitely
because:
make
up
for
the
financial
drawback
caused
by
his
loss
in
the
previous
election,
and
stayed
there
until
he
resigned
in
Sept.
1940.
1. When
he
was
employed
as
a
teacher
in
Samar,
he
always
returned
in
Abuyog
and
even
resigned
when
he
ran
for
office
in
1937
Gallego
registered
himself
as
an
elector
in
Bukidnon
and
voted
there
in
the
2. His
departure
was
only
for
the
purpose
of
making
up
for
the
financial
election
for
assemblymen
held
in
Dec.
1938,
and
in
Jan.
1940,
He
obtained
and
drawback
caused
by
his
loss
in
the
election
paid
for
his
residence
cert.
from
the
municipal
treasurer
of
Malaybalay,
in
3. He
did
not
take
his
wife
and
children
to
Malaybalay
with
him
which
certificate
it
was
stated
that
he
had
resided
in
the
said
municipality
for
4. He
bought
a
piece
of
land
in
Abuyog
and
did
not
avail
of
the
land
in
1.5
yrs.
the
plantation
offered
to
him
by
the
government
ten
hectares
of
land
within
the
chichona
reservation
in
Malaybalay,
where
he
worked
as
a
The
CA
declared
that
Gallego
lost
his
domicile
in
Abuyog
Leyte
at
the
time
he
nurseryman.
was
elected
mayor
there
on
the
grounds
that:
5. During
the
short
period
of
about
two
years
he
stayed
in
Malaybalay
as
• He
registered
as
a
voter
in
Malaybalay,
Bukidnon
a
government
employee,
he
visited
his
home
town
and
his
family
no
• He
voted
in
Malaybalay
in
the
1938
election
for
assemblymen
less
than
three
times
notwithstanding
the
great
distance
between
the
• He
obtained
a
residence
cert
from
the
municipality
of
Malaybalay
two
places.
ISSUE:
The
court
said
that
the
manifest
intent
of
the
law
in
fixing
a
residence
Whether
or
not
Gallego
lost
his
domicile
of
origin
in
Abuyog,
Leyte
and
qualification
is
to:
acquired
a
new
domicile
in
Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.
“exclude
a
stranger
or
a
newcomer,
unacquainted
with
the
conditions
and
needs
of
a
community
and
not
identified
with
the
latter,
from
an
elective
office
HELD:
to
serve
that
community.”
Gallego
did
not
lose
his
domicile
in
Abuyog
by
working
in
Malaybalay
as
an
employee,
registering
as
voter
there
and
securing
his
residence
certificate
And
the
petitioner
was
a
native
there,
had
run
for
the
same
office
before,
and
rd
there
for
1940.
was
now
elected
with
a
majority
of
800
votes
in
a
3
class
municipality.
The
term
"residence"
as
used
in
the
election
law
is
synonymous
with
"domicile"
which
imports
not
only
intention
to
reside
in
a
fixed
place
but
also
personal
presence
in
that
place,
coupled
with
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention.
In
order
to
acquire
a
domicile
by
choice,
there
must
concur
(1)
residence
or
bodily
presence
in
the
new
locality,
(2)
an
intention
to
remain
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64.
VILLHERMOSA
V.
COMMISSIONER
OF
IMMIGRATION
denied
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
requested
by
Florentina
Villahermosa
on
G.R.
No.
L-‐1663
|
21
March
1948
behalf
of
her
son
Delfin
Co.
She
appealed.
DOCTRINES:
He
is,
at
the
time
he
entered
this
country
from
China,
was
a
ISSUE:
Chinese
subject
to
deportation,
and
any
subsequent
change
in
his
status
can
not
Whether
on
the
strength
of
such
reacquisition
of
Philippine
citizenship
by
erase
the
taint
of
his
unlawful,
surreptitious
entry.
Florentina,
Delfin
is
a
national
not
subject
to
deportation?
The
status
of
an
immigrant
and
his
right
to
stay
here
is
to
be
determined
as
of
HELD:
the
time
of
his
entry
and
that
he
could
not
do
afterwards
anything
to
render
No.
There
are
two
reasons
why
Delfin
Co
must
be
returned
to
China.
First,
he
is
valid
what
was
originally
an
illegal
entry.
not
now
a
Filipino
citizen;
and
second,
granting
that
he
is,
at
the
time
he
entered
this
country
from
China
he
was
a
Chinese
subject
to
deportation,
and
ALG:
If
she
became
a
widow
ON
or
AFTER
October
21,
1963
–
she
has
to
any
subsequent
change
in
his
status
can
not
erase
the
taint
of
his
unlawful,
repatriate
herself,
otherwise,
she
remains
a
foreigner.
She
does
not
surreptitious
entry.
immediately
reacquire
Philippine
citizenship.
(CA
No.
63)
Section
1
of
Article
IV
of
the
Constitution
enumerates
those
who
are
citizens
of
FACTS:
the
Philippines,
as
follows:
(1)
Those
who
are
citizens
of
the
Philippine
Islands
In
1946,
Delfin,
18
y/o,
born
in
Paniqui,
Tarlac,
of
a
Chinese
father
named
Co
at
the
time
of
the
adoption
of
the
Constitution.
(2)
Those
born
in
the
Philippine
Suy,
alias
Yu
Kui,
and
Florentina
Villahermosa,
left
the
Philippines
for
China
as
a
Islands
of
foreign
parents
who,
before
adoption
of
this
Constitution,
had
been
Chinese
repatriate.
Due
to
financial
difficulties
in
China,
he
took
steps
to
return
elected
to
public
office
in
the
Philippine
Islands.
(3)
Those
whose
fathers
are
to
the
Phil.
while
there
he
met
a
Chinese
(Co
Soon
Tiong),
who
informed
him
citizens
of
the
Philippines.
(4)
Those
whose
mothers
are
citizens
of
the
of
a
plan
to
smuggle
their
compatriots
into
the
Phil.
Delfin
agreed
to
lead
the
Philippines
and
upon
reaching
the
age
of
majority,
elect
Philippine
party
to
Ilocos
Sur
where
his
mother
had
relatives,
who
could
render
valuable
citizenship.
(5)
Those
who
are
naturalized
in
accordance
with
law.
assistance.
Delfin's
claim
to
citizenship
can
only
be
predicated,
if
at
all,
on
paragraph
4
of
In
the
night
of
March
24,
1947,
their
party
of
69
Chinese,
led
by
Delfin,
landed
the
above
section.
But,
being
a
minor
he
has
not
had
the
opportunity
to
elect
clandestinely
on
the
shores
of
Sto.
Domingo,
Ilocos
Sur,
in
an
attempt
to
evade
Philippine
citizenship,
and
therefore
he
is
as
yet
an
alien,
his
father
being
a
Phil.
immigration
laws.
Unfortunately,
the
immigrants
were
discovered
and
Chinese.
apprehended
immediately
after
arrival.
Delfin
was
examined
by
the
Commissioner
of
Immigration.
After
formal
investigation,
the
Commissioner
of
We
have
heretofore
held
that,
after
the
Constitution,
mere
birth
in
the
Immigration
rendered
a
decision
ordering
the
deportation
of
Delfin.
After
Philippines
of
a
Chinese
father
and
Filipino
mother
does
not
ipso
facto
confer
knowing
the
apprehension
of
her
son
Delfin,
Florentina,
filed
in
the
civil
Philippine
citizenship
and
that
jus
sanguinis
instead
off
jus
soli
is
the
registry
of
Tarlac
under
C.A.
No.
63
an
oath
of
allegiance
for
the
purpose
of
predominating
factor
on
questions
of
citizenship.
resuming
her
Philippine
citizenship,
which
she
had
lost
upon
her
marriage
to
Co
Suy.
Nevertheless,
it
is
contended
that
Florentina
Villahermosa
being
a
Filipina,
Delfin,
should
likewise
be
a
Filipino.
C.A.
No.
63
does
not
provide
that
upon
On
the
strength
of
such
reacquisition
of
Philippine
citizenship
by
Florentina,
it
repatriation
of
a
Filipina
her
children
acquire
Philippine
citizenship.
It
would
was
contended
that
Delfin,
being
a
minor,
followed
the
citizenship
of
his
be
illogical
to
consider
Delfin
as
repatriated
like
his
mother,
because
he
never
mother,
and
was
a
national
not
subject
to
deportation.
These
contentions
were
was
a
Filipino
citizen
and
could
not
have
reacquired
such
citizenship.
overruled
by
the
immigration
authorities.
Judge
Sotero
Rodas,
(CFI
of
Manila)
While
his
Chinese
father
lived,
Delfin
was
not
a
Filipino.
His
mother
was
not
a
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Filipina;
she
was
Chinese.
After
the
death
of
such
father,
Villahermosa
Petitioner
Saludo
is
a
Filipino,
a
member
of
the
House
of
Reps
and
resident
of
continued
to
be
a
Chinese,
until
she
reacquired
her
Filipino
citizenship
in
April,
S.Leyte.
Respondent
AMEX
is
a
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Phil,
engaged
1947.
After
that
reacquisition
Delfin
could
claim
that
his
mother
was
a
Filipina
in
providing
credit
and
credit
facilities
&
allied
services
with
an
office
in
Makati.
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
4,
section
1
of
Article
IV
of
the
Constitution;
but,
according
to
that
same
Organic
Act,
he
had
to
elect
Philippine
citizenship
Saludo’s
cause
of
action
stemmed
from
the
wrongful
dishonor
of
his
AMEX
upon
attaining
his
majority.
Until
he
becomes
of
age
and
makes
the
election,
credit
card
&
supplementary
card
issued
to
his
daughter.
The
first
dishonor
he
is
the
Chinese
citizen
that
he
was
at
the
time
of
his
father's
demise.
happened
when
Saludo’s
daughter
used
her
card
to
pay
for
her
purchases
in
the
US
in
April
2000.
The
second
happened
when
Saludo
used
his
card
to
pay
Moreover,
in
Juan
Co
vs.
Rafferty,
Court
said
that
the
status
of
an
immigrant
his
account
in
Hotel
Okawa
(Tokyo)
while
there
with
other
delegates
from
the
and
his
right
to
stay
here
is
to
be
determined
as
of
the
time
of
his
entry
and
Phil
to
attend
the
Congressional
Recognition
in
honor
of
Mr.
Tanaka.
Allegedly,
that
he
could
not
do
afterwards
anything
to
render
valid
what
was
originally
these
dishonors
resulted
from
AMEX’s
unilateral
act
of
suspending
petitioner
an
illegal
entry.
A
Chinese
person,
not
a
merchant
at
the
time
he
applies
to
Saludo’s
account
for
his
failure
to
pay
the
balance
covering
the
period
of
March
enter
the
Islands,
will
not
be
permitted
to
remain
here
upon
the
theory
that
2000.
Saludo
denied
receiving
the
statement
of
account.
Further,
he
alleged
a
he
became
a
merchant
during
the
time
he
was
waiting
for
the
decision
of
the
wrongful
charge
for
late
payment
in
June
2000,
and
subsequent
cancellation
of
proper
authorities.
SC
declared
that
Delfin
Co
is
not
now
a
Filipino
and
he,
the
cards
in
the
following
month.
having
entered
this
country
surreptitiously,
is
subject
to
deportation.
AMEX
raised
the
defenses
of
lack
of
cause
of
action
and
improper
venue.
On
71.
SALUDO
V.
AMERICAN
EXPRESS
the
latter,
they
said
that
the
residents
are
not
residents
of
S.Leyte,
and
even
G.R.
No.
159507
|
19
April
2006
Saludo
was
allegedly
not
a
resident
thereof
as
evinced
by
his
community
tax
certificate
(CTC)
which
was
issued
in
Pasay.
Saludo
responded
that
at
the
time
DOCTRINE:
“Resides”
means
the
place
of
abode,
whether
permanent
or
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint,
he
was
already
a
resident
of
S.
Leyte;
that
his
temporary
of
the
plaintiff
of
the
defendant,
as
distinguished
from
“domicile”
CTCs
were
issued
in
Pasay
was
only
because
he
had
an
office
there.
which
denotes
a
fixed
permanent
residence
to
which,
when
absent
one
has
the
intention
of
returning.
ISSUE:
Residence
is
not
domicile,
but
domicile
is
residence
coupled
with
the
intention
Did
the
appellate
court
err
in
declaring
an
improper
venue,
because
none
of
to
remain
for
an
unlimited
time.
A
man
can
have
but
one
domicile
for
one
and
the
parties
was
a
resident
of
S.
Leyte
at
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint?
the
same
purpose
at
any
time,
but
he
may
have
numerous
places
of
residence.
Residence
simply
requires
bodily
presence
as
an
inhabitant
in
a
given
place,
HELD:
while
domicile
requires
bodily
presence
in
that
place
and
also
an
intention
to
Yes.
This
complaint
is
a
personal
action,
governed
by
Sec
2,
Rule
4
of
ROC
make
it
one's
domicile.
No
particular
length
of
time
of
residence
is
required
(Venue
of
Actions).
The
choice
of
venue
for
personal
actions
cognizable
by
the
though;
however,
the
residence
must
be
more
than
temporary.
We
note
that
RTC
is
given
to
the
plaintiff.
Jurisprudence
has
held
that
the
term
“resides”
Sec
2,
Rule
4
uses
the
term
“residence,”
not
domicile.
means
the
place
of
abode,
whether
permanent
or
temporary
of
the
plaintiff
of
the
defendant,
as
distinguished
from
“domicile”
which
denotes
a
fixed
FACTS:
permanent
residence
to
which,
when
absent
one
has
the
intention
of
Saludo
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
against
American
Express
Inc.
(AMEX)
returning.
Similarly,
in
Conflict
of
Laws,
residence
applies
to
a
temporary
stay
and/or
its
officers
Fish
(Vice
President
&
Country
Manager)
&
Mascrinas
of
a
person
in
a
given
place,
while
domicile
refers
to
the
relatively
more
(Operations
Head)
with
Branch
25,
RTC
Maasin,
Southern
Leyte
(S.Leyte).
permanent
abode
of
a
person.
This
distinction
is
very
well
emphasized
in
cases
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where
the
Domiciliary
Theory
must
necessarily
supplant
the
Nationality
Theory
particular
place;
and
(2)
personal
or
physical
presence
in
that
place,
coupled
in
cases
involving
stateless
persons.
with
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention.
As
the
Court
elucidated,
"the
place
where
a
party
actually
or
constructively
has
a
permanent
home,
where
he,
no
Residence
is
not
domicile,
but
domicile
is
residence
coupled
with
the
intention
matter
where
he
may
be
found
at
any
given
time,
eventually
intends
to
return
to
remain
for
an
unlimited
time.
A
man
can
have
but
one
domicile
for
one
and
and
remain,
i.e.,
his
domicile,
is
that
to
which
the
Constitution
refers
when
it
the
same
purpose
at
any
time,
but
he
may
have
numerous
places
of
residence.
speaks
of
residence
for
the
purposes
of
election
law."
His
place
of
residence
generally
is
his
place
of
domicile,
but
is
not
by
any
means,
necessarily
so
since
no
length
of
residence
without
intention
of
On
the
other
hand,
for
purposes
of
venue,
the
less
technical
definition
of
remaining
will
constitute
domicile.
Residence
simply
requires
bodily
presence
"residence"
is
adopted.
Thus,
it
is
understood
to
mean
as
"the
personal,
actual
as
an
inhabitant
in
a
given
place,
while
domicile
requires
bodily
presence
in
or
physical
habitation
of
a
person,
actual
residence
or
place
of
abode.
It
that
place
and
also
an
intention
to
make
it
one's
domicile.
No
particular
length
signifies
physical
presence
in
a
place
and
actual
stay
thereat.
In
this
popular
of
time
of
residence
is
required
though;
however,
the
residence
must
be
more
sense,
the
term
means
merely
residence,
that
is,
personal
residence,
not
legal
than
temporary.
We
note
that
Sec
2,
Rule
4
uses
the
term
“residence,”
not
residence
or
domicile.
Residence
simply
requires
bodily
presence
as
an
domicile.
inhabitant
in
a
given
place,
while
domicile
requires
bodily
presence
in
that
place
and
also
an
intention
to
make
it
one's
domicile."
There
is
no
dispute
that
petitioner
Saludo
was
the
congressman
or
the
representative
of
the
lone
district
of
Southern
Leyte
at
the
time
of
filing
of
his
Since
petitioner
Saludo,
as
congressman
or
the
lone
representative
of
the
complaint
with
the
court
a
quo.
Even
the
appellate
court
admits
this
fact
as
it
district
of
Southern
Leyte,
had
his
residence
(or
domicile)
therein
as
the
term
is
states
that
"it
may
be
conceded
that
private
respondent
ever
so
often
travels
construed
in
relation
to
election
laws,
necessarily,
he
is
also
deemed
to
have
to
Maasin
City,
Southern
Leyte,
because
he
is
its
representative
in
the
lower
had
his
residence
therein
for
purposes
of
venue
for
filing
personal
actions.
Put
house.”
in
another
manner,
Southern
Leyte,
as
the
domicile
of
petitioner
Saludo,
was
also
his
residence,
as
the
term
is
understood
in
its
popular
sense.
This
is
As
a
member
of
the
House
of
Representatives,
petitioner
Saludo
was
correctly
because
"residence
is
not
domicile,
but
domicile
is
residence
coupled
with
the
deemed
by
the
court
a
quo
as
possessing
the
requirements
for
the
said
intention
to
remain
for
an
unlimited
time."
position,
including
that
he
was
then
a
resident
of
the
district
which
he
was
representing,
i.e.,
Southern
Leyte.
Significantly,
for
purposes
of
election
law,
S.
Leyte,
as
the
domicile
of
petitioner
Saludo,
was
also
his
residence,
as
the
the
term
"residence"
is
synonymous
with
"domicile,"
thus:
term
is
understood
in
its
popular
sense.
This
is
because
"residence
is
not
x
x
x
[T]he
Court
held
that
"domicile"
and
"residence"
are
synonymous.
The
domicile,
but
domicile
is
residence
coupled
with
the
intention
to
remain
for
an
term
"residence,"
as
used
in
the
election
law,
imports
not
only
an
intention
to
unlimited
time."
Further,
petitioner
Saludo's
residence
in
S.
Leyte
could
reside
in
a
fixed
place
but
also
personal
presence
in
that
place,
coupled
with
likewise
be
properly
taken
judicial
notice
of
by
the
court
a
quo.
It
is
bound
to
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention.
"Domicile"
denotes
a
fixed
permanent
know
that,
under
the
Constitution,
one
of
the
qualifications
of
a
congressman
residence
to
which
when
absent
for
business
or
pleasure,
or
for
like
reasons,
or
representative
to
the
House
of
Representatives
is
having
a
residence
in
the
one
intends
to
return.
x
x
x
district
in
which
he
shall
be
elected.
Petition
GRANTED.
It
can
be
readily
gleaned
that
the
definition
of
"residence"
for
purposes
of
election
law
is
more
stringent
in
that
it
is
equated
with
the
term
"domicile."
Hence,
for
the
said
purpose,
the
term
"residence"
imports
"not
only
an
intention
to
reside
in
a
fixed
place
but
also
personal
presence
in
that
place,
coupled
with
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention."
When
parsed,
therefore,
the
term
"residence"
requires
two
elements:
(1)
intention
to
reside
in
the
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NATIONALITY
5.
And
is
not
in
any
way
disqualified
under
the
provisions
of
the
Act.
6.
The
petition
shall
also
set
forth
the
names
and
post
office
addresses
of
such
witnesses
as
the
petitioner
may
desire
to
introduce
at
the
hearing
of
the
case
MINORS
Are
Filipinos
if:
A
petition
not
so
verified
by
at
least
two
persons
who
are
citizens
is
not
merely
1. a.
Minor
children
of
persons
naturalized
under
the
law;
and
voidable
but
void.
The
Court
went
further
and
said
that
such
petition
could
not
b.
Born
in
the
Philippines
"shall
be
considered
citizens
thereof".
be
amended.
2. a.
Foreign-‐born
minor
child,
b.
If
dwelling
in
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
the
naturalization
of
the
parents,
"shall
automatically
The
strong
legal
presumption
that
the
applicant
was
born
in
wedlock—that
his
become
a
Filipino
citizen".
parent
were
lawful
husband
and
wife—cannot
be
destroyed
by
evidence
so
slim
and
shaky.
No
conditions
are
exacted;
citizenship
of
said
minor
children
is
conferred
by
the
law
itself,
without
further
proceedings
and
as
a
Gulapa:
The
SC
seemed
to
imply
in
Villahermoso
that
for
a
child
to
elect
matter
of
course.
An
alien
wife
of
a
Filipino
does
not
fit
into
either
Philippine
citizenship,
the
mother
should
be
a
Filipino
citizen
at
the
time
of
of
the
categories
just
mentioned.
Legal
action
has
to
be
taken
to
such
election.
If
we
were
to
follow
this
interpretation,
very
few
children
could
make
her
a
citizen.
avail
themselves
of
the
option,
for
in
many
instance
(under
the
provisions
of
the
1935
Constitution)
the
mother
would
follow
the
husband’s
nationality
and
ALIEN
WIFE
thus
lose
Philippine
Citizenship.
The
same
result
is
reached
if
we
require
An
alien
woman
married
to
a
Filipino
who
desires
to
be
a
citizen
of
this
Filipino
citizenship
on
the
part
of
the
mother
at
the
time
of
the
birth
of
the
country
must
apply
therefor
by
filing
a
petition
for
citizenship
reciting
child.
The
more
realistic
approach
would
be
to
consider
it
sufficient
that
the
that
she
possesses
all
the
qualifications
set
forth
in
Section
2,
and
none
mother
was
a
Filipino
citizen
at
the
time
of
her
marriage
to
a
foreigner.
of
the
disqualifications
under
Section
4,
both
of
the
Revised
Organically,
the
mother
did
not
do
anything
to
become
an
alien
except
to
get
Naturalization
Law.
married.
This
is
in
effect,
is
the
impression
drawn
from
the
1951
decision
of
the
SC
in
the
case
of
In
re
Robert
Cu.
64.
IN
RE:
ROBERT
CU
G.R.
No.
L-‐3018
|
18
July
1951
FACTS:
Robert
Cu
filed
a
petition
for
naturalization
setting
forth
facts
required
and
DOCTRINE:
If
the
applicant's
parents
were
legally
married,
which
is
however
to
appropriate
for
that
purpose,
but
at
the
hearing
he
said
that
he
was
a
citizen
of
be
presumed,
then
he
was
born
a
Chinese
citizen
and
continued
to
be
so,
unless
the
Philippines;
and
upon
the
conclusion
of
the
trial,
the
CFI
of
Rizal
found
him
upon
the
age
of
majority
he
elected
Philippine
citizenship
which
he
confessedly
"to
be
a
Filipino
citizen,
both
by
right
of
birth
and
by
right
of
selection,"
and
did
not
do.
dismissed
the
petition
for
naturalization,
holding
impliedly
that
being
already
a
Philippine
citizen
he
did
not
have
to
be
naturalized.
The
CFI's
pronouncement
is
According
to
this
provision,
the
witnesses
must
be:
[CDR2
QN]
based
solely
on
the
applicant’s
testimony
that
he
was
born
in
Angat,
Bulacan
in
1.
citizens
of
the
Philippines
and
1913.
That
he
was
a
subject
of
the
Phil.
and
that
when
he
was
a
kid
of
about
5
2.
"personally
know
the
petitioner
to
be
a
resident
of
the
Philippines
for
the
months
old,
his
mother,
who
was
a
Filipina,
died.
Then
his
father
allegedly
period
of
time
required
by
this
Act,"
which
in
cases
of
petitioners
born
in
the
brought
him
to
China
right
after
that
but
at
the
age
of
5,
they
left
China
and
Philippines
is
5
years
(Sec.
3)
and
in
other
cases
10
years
(Sec.
2,
par.
2)
Robert
was
given
to
the
care
of
Doña
Margarita
Mangahas.
3.
Petitioner
must
be
a
person
of
good
repute
and
morally
irreproachable,
4.
He
has
all
the
qualifications
necessary
to
become
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
Upon
motion
of
the
attorney
for
the
Government,
who
protested
that
the
last
CONFLICT
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answer
(that
Robert
is
a
Filipino
citizen)
was
a
mere
conclusion
of
the
witness
He
admitted
that
he
did
not
filed
any
citizenship
application
by
election
in
(Robert
himself),
the
testimony
was
ordered
stricken
out.
But
Cu
proceeded
writing.
Although
he
was
a
member
of
the
reserve
force
of
the
Philippine
Army;
that
he
considered
himself
a
Filipino
citizen
on
account
of
the
fact
that
his
an
ROTC
trainee;
trained
in
the
Philippine
Army;
was
called
during
the
war;
mother
was
a
Filipina
and
he
was
born
in
the
Philippines.
His
only
fault
was
that
currently
a
government
employee;
a
member
of
the
faculty
of
UP;
and
a
he
failed
to
file
his
application
to
elect
Philippine
citizenship
and
so
he
filed
his
resident
physician
of
the
Philippine
General
Hospital.
But
these
circumstances
application
now.
He
was
asked
whether
his
mother
was
legally
married
to
his
alone
made
this
witness
neither
a
citizen
of
this
country
nor
eligible
as
a
father,
to
which
he
answered
“The
way
I
know
it,
they
are
not
legally
married.”
vouching
witness
in
a
proceeding
of
this
character.
As
to
the
other
witnesses,
Dr.
Pastor
Gomez,
testified
that
he
had
known
Mr.
Cu
since
liberation,
about
ISSUE:
August,
1945.
But
after
this
answer
was
given,
the
counsel
for
the
Govt.
Whether
the
Cu
is
entitled
to
be
admitted
to
Philippine
citizenship
under
the
objected
to
the
witness'
testifying
any
further,
and
the
objection
having
been
present
application?
sustained,
Dr.
Gomez
was
withdrawn.
HELD:
US
Jurisprudence
provides
that
a
petition
not
so
verified
by
at
least
two
No.
As
observed,
Cu’s
statements
make
plain
that
the
he
was
at
best
uncertain
persons
who
are
citizens
is
not
merely
voidable
but
void.
The
Court
went
that
his
parents
were
unmarried
to
each
other
and
are
therefore
utterly
further
and
said
that
such
petition
could
not
be
amended.
Also,
the
Courts
inadequate
to
serve
as
basis
for
declaring
him
a
Philippine
citizen.
If
the
cannot
be
expected
to
possess
acquaintance
with
the
candidates
with
the
applicant's
parents
were
legally
married,
which
is
however
to
be
presumed,
presenting
themselves
for
naturalization
—
in
fact,
no
duty
rests
upon
them
in
then
he
was
born
a
Chinese
citizen
and
continued
to
be
so,
unless
upon
the
this
particular;
so
that
witnesses
appearing
before
them
are
in
a
way
insures
of
age
of
majority
he
elected
Philippine
citizenship
which
he
confessedly
did
not
the
character
of
the
candidate
concerned,
and
on
their
testimony
the
courts
do.
are
of
necessity
compelled
to
rely.
A
witness
who
is
incompetent
renders
an
application
void.
The
question
of
a
witness'
qualifications
in
naturalization
Sec.
7
of
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law
provides
that
the
petition
for
proceedings
is
therefore
a
matter
of
more
than
usual
importance.
citizenship,
besides
stating
the
petitioner's
qualifications
as
enumerated
in
the
Act,
"must
be
signed
by
the
applicant
in
his
own
handwriting
and
be
The
above
US
rulings
are
not
binding
upon
this
Court,
but
it
is
a
rational
rule
of
supported
by
the
affidavit
of
at
least
two
credible
persons,
stating
that
they
statutory
construction
that
a
statute
adopted
from
another
state
or
country
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines
and
personally
know
the
petitioner
to
be
a
will
be
presumed
to
be
adopted
with
the
construction
placed
upon
it
by
the
resident
of
the
Philippines
for
the
period
of
time
required
by
this
Act
and
a
courts
of
that
state
or
country
before
its
adoption.
Such
construction
is
person
of
good
repute
and
morally
irreproachable,
and
that
said
petitioner
has
regarded
as
of
great
weight,
or
at
least
persuasive,
and
will
generally
be
in
their
opinion
all
the
qualifications
necessary
to
become
a
citizen
of
the
followed
if
found
reasonable,
and
in
harmony
with
justice
and
public
policy,
Philippines
and
is
not
in
any
way
disqualified
under
the
provisions
of
the
Act.
and
with
other
laws
of
the
adopting
jurisdiction
on
the
subject.
We
find
the
The
petition
shall
also
set
forth
the
names
and
post
office
addresses
of
such
United
States
courts'
reasoning
to
be
sound
and
reasonable
and
we
make
it
our
witnesses
as
the
petitioner
may
desire
to
introduce
at
the
hearing
of
the
case."
own.
According
to
this
provision,
the
witnesses
must
be
citizens
of
the
Philippines
and
"personally
know
the
petitioner
to
be
a
resident
of
the
Philippines
for
the
It
is
unnecessary
to
consider
whether
the
application
could
be
granted
if
period
of
time
required
by
this
Act,"
which
in
cases
of
petitioners
born
in
the
witnesses,
other
than
the
vouching
witnesses,
who
were
Philippine
citizens
and
Philippines
is
5
years
(Sec.
3)
and
in
other
cases
10
years
(Sec.
2,
par.
2).
knew
the
applicant
for
the
time
required
by
the
statute,
had
testified
and
established
the
petitioner's
qualifications
for
admission
to
citizenship;
as
By
their
testimony,
the
two
witnesses
who
made
affidavits
and
gave
evidence
already
indicated,
no
such
witnesses
were
introduced
in
support
of
the
in
support
of
the
application
were
not
qualified
for
this
role.
Dr.
Jose
Ku
Yeg
petition.
The
appealed
decision
is
affirmed
in
so
far
as
it
dismissed
the
petition
Keng
admitted
that
his
father
was
a
Chinese
national
and
his
mother
a
Filipina.
for
naturalization
and
reversed
in
so
far
as
it
declared
the
applicant
a
citizen
of
CONFLICT
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the
Philippines.
This
dismissal,
however,
will
be
without
prejudice
to
the
right
Yes.
Edward
was
a
US
Citizen
and
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
his
of
the
Robert
Cu
to
file
a
new
application
for
naturalization
death.
The
law
that
governs
the
validity
of
his
testamentary
dispositions
is
defined
in
Art.
16,
CC,
which
is
as
follows:
65.
AZNAR
V.
CHRISTENSEN-‐GARCIA,
SUPRA
ART.
16.
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
FACTS:
of
the
country
where
it
is
situated.
Edward
Christensen,
born
in
New
York,
migrated
to
California
where
he
resided
and
consequently
was
considered
citizen
thereof.
He
came
to
the
Philippines
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
where
he
became
a
domiciliary
until
the
time
of
his
death.
However,
during
the
the
order
of
succession
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
entire
period
of
his
residence
in
this
country,
he
had
always
considered
himself
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
a
citizen
of
California.
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
In
his
will,
Edward
instituted
his
daughter
Maria
Lucy
Christensen
as
his
only
country
where
said
property
may
be
found.
heir,
but
left
a
legacy
of
P3600
in
favor
of
Helen
Christensen
Garcia
who,
in
his
will
was
described
as
"not
in
any
way
related
to"
him
but
in
a
decision
rendered
The
laws
of
California
have
prescribed
two
sets
of
laws
for
its
citizens,
one
for
by
the
SC
in
another
case
had
been
declared
as
an
acknowledged
natural
residents
therein
and
another
for
those
domiciled
in
other
jurisdictions.
Art.
daughter
of
his.
946
of
the
California
Civil
Code
is
its
conflict
of
laws
rule,
while
the
rule
applied
in
Kaufman,
is
its
internal
law.
If
the
law
on
succession
and
the
conflict
Helen
alleged
that
the
will
deprives
her
of
her
legitime
as
an
acknowledged
of
laws
rules
of
California
are
to
be
enforced
jointly,
each
in
its
own
intended
natural
child.
She
claims
that
under
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
California
law
and
appropriate
sphere,
the
principle
cited
in
Kaufman
should
apply
to
should
be
applied,
and
in
accordance
therewith
and
following
the
doctrine
of
citizens
living
in
the
State,
but
Art.
946
should
apply
to
such
of
its
citizens
as
renvoi,
the
question
of
the
validity
of
the
testamentary
provision
in
question
are
not
domiciled
in
California
but
in
other
jurisdictions.
should
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
decedent's
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines.
She
invokes
the
provisions
of
Art.
946
of
the
Civil
Code
of
The
national
law
mentioned
in
Art.
16
is
the
law
on
conflict
of
laws
in
the
California,
which
is
as
follows:
“If
there
is
no
law
to
the
contrary,
in
the
place
California
Civil
Code,
i.e.,
Art.
946,
which
authorizes
the
reference
or
return
of
where
personal
property
is
situated,
it
is
deemed
to
follow
the
person
of
its
the
question
to
the
law
of
the
testator's
domicile.
The
conflict
of
laws
rule
in
owner,
and
is
governed
by
the
law
of
his
domicile.”
Accordingly,
her
share
California
precisely
refers
back
the
case,
when
a
decedent
is
not
domiciled
in
must
be
increased
in
view
of
successional
rights
of
illegitimate
children
under
California,
to
the
law
of
his
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines
in
the
case
at
Philippine
laws.
bar.
On
the
other
hand,
the
executor
and
Lucy
argue
that
the
national
law
of
the
The
Philippine
court
therefore
must
apply
its
own
law
as
directed
in
the
deceased
must
apply,
and
thus
the
courts
must
apply
internal
law
of
California
conflict
of
laws
rule
of
the
state
of
the
decedent.
Wherefore,
the
decision
on
the
matter.
Under
California
law,
there
are
no
compulsory
heirs
and
appealed
from
is
hereby
reversed
and
the
case
returned
to
the
lower
court
with
consequently
a
testator
may
dispose
of
his
property
by
will
in
the
form
and
instructions
that
the
partition
be
made
as
the
Philippine
law
on
succession
manner
he
desires
(Kaufman
Case).
provides.
ISSUE:
Whether
Philippine
law
should
ultimately
be
applied
HELD:
CONFLICT
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68.
LAO
CHAY
V.
GALANG
G.R.
No.
L-‐19977
|
30
October
1964
ISSUE:
Whether
the
wife
of
a
Chinese
who
obtained
papers
of
Philippine
citizenship,
DOCTRINE:
It
is
now
settled
that
under
this
provision,
an
alien
woman,
who
is
automatically
follows
the
citizenship
of
her
husband
if
not
otherwise
married
to
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
acquires
the
citizenship
of
her
husband
disqualified
under
the
Naturalization
Law
only
if
she
has
all
the
qualifications
prescribed
in
Section
2
and
none
of
the
disqualifications
provided
in
Section
4
of
the
law.
Since
Ng
Siu
Luan
admittedly
HELD:
does
not
possess
the
qualifications
for
naturalization,
her
marriage
to
Lao
Chay
No.
Sec.
15
of
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law
provides:
Effect
of
the
be
deemed
as
automatically
vesting
in
her
Filipino
citizenship.
Duty
of
consorts
naturalization
on
wife
and
children
-‐
Any
woman
who
is
now
or
may
here-‐after
to
live
together
is
irrelevant
to
the
issue
which
concerns
only
the
right
of
a
be
married
to
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines,
and
who
might
herself
be
lawfully
sovereign
state
to
determine
what
aliens
can
remain
within
its
territory
and
naturalized,
shall
be
deemed
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines.
under
what
conditions
they
can
stay
therein.
It
is
now
settled
that
under
this
provision,
an
alien
woman,
who
is
married
to
FACTS:
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
acquires
the
citizenship
of
her
husband
only
if
she
Ng
Siu
Luan
and
her
three
children,
who
are
all
of
minor
age,
came
to
the
has
all
the
qualifications
prescribed
in
Section
2
and
none
of
the
Philippines
on
January
19,
1960
as
temporary
visitors,
having
been
allowed
to
disqualifications
provided
in
Section
4
of
the
law.
Since
Ng
Siu
Luan
stay
in
this
country
until
January
26,
1961.
Instead
of
departing
on
that
date,
admittedly
does
not
possess
the
qualifications
for
naturalization,
her
however,
appellees
asked
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
for
the
cancellation
of
marriage
to
Lao
Chay
be
deemed
as
automatically
vesting
in
her
Filipino
their
alien
certificates
of
registration
as
well
as
those
of
their
children
on
the
citizenship.
basis
of
Lao
Chay's
admission
to
Philippine
citizenship
on
December
12,
1960.
Anent
appellees'
claim
that
a
difference
in
the
citizenship
of
husband
and
wife
On
January
20,
1961,
appellant
Commissioner
of
Immigration
granted
the
is
subversive
of
family
solidarity,
this
Court
has
already
said
that
the
duty
of
petition
as
far
as
Lao
Chay
and
the
three
children
were
concerned,
but
denied
consorts
to
live
together
is
irrelevant
to
the
issue
which
concerns
only
the
the
same
with
respect
to
Ng
Siu
Luan
on
the
ground
that
"she
is
not
qualified
to
right
of
a
sovereign
state
to
determine
what
aliens
can
remain
within
its
acquire
Philippine
citizenship
of
her
husband
under
the
provision
of
paragraph
territory
and
under
what
conditions
they
can
stay
therein.
1,
Section
15
of
CA
No.
473,
as
she
lacks
the
requirements
provided
for
under
paragraph
2
of
the
same
Act."
He
therefore
asked
her
to
leave
the
country
on
69.
ZITA
NGO
BURCA
V.
REPUBLIC
January
26,
1961.
The
Immigration
Commissioner
denied
a
subsequent
motion
G.R.
No.
L-‐24252
|
30
January
1967
for
reconsideration,
although
he
gave
Ng
Siu
Luan
a
five-‐day
extension
within
which
to
arrange
for
her
departure.
DOCTRINE:
Minor
children
of
persons
naturalized
under
the
law
who
were
born
in
the
Philippines
"shall
be
considered
citizens
thereof".
Similarly,
a
foreign-‐born
To
stop
the
threatened
deportation
of
Ng
Siu
Luan
appellees
filed
a
petition
for
minor
child,
if
dwelling
in
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
the
naturalization
of
the
mandamus
and
prohibition
in
the
CFI
and
secured
from
it
a
writ
of
preliminary
parents,
"shall
automatically
become
a
Filipino
citizen".
No
conditions
are
injunction.
exacted;
citizenship
of
said
minor
children
is
conferred
by
the
law
itself,
without
further
proceedings
and
as
a
matter
of
course.
An
alien
wife
of
a
Filipino
does
After
trial,
the
court
granted
the
petition,
and
held
that
the
law
does
not
not
fit
into
either
of
the
categories
just
mentioned.
Legal
action
has
to
be
taken
require
that
an
alien
wife
should
have
the
same
qualifications
as
those
required
to
make
her
a
citizen.
of
applicants
for
naturalization,
it
being
enough
that
she
is
not
otherwise
disqualified.
CONFLICT
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2015-‐2016
(1)
An
alien
woman
married
to
a
Filipino
who
desires
to
be
a
citizen
of
this
Immigration.
Conceivably,
absence
of
clear
legal
direction
on
the
matter
could
country
must
apply
therefor
by
filing
a
petition
for
citizenship
reciting
that
she
have
given
rise
to
divergence
of
views.
We
should
aim
at
drying
up
sources
of
possesses
all
the
qualifications
set
forth
in
Section
2,
and
none
of
the
doubt.
Parties
interested
should
not
be
enmeshed
in
jurisdictional
disqualifications
under
Section
4,
both
of
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law;
(2)
entanglements.
Public
policy
and
sound
practice,
therefore,
suggest
that
a
Said
petition
must
be
filed
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
where
petitioner
has
clear-‐cut
ruling
be
made
on
this
subject.
resided
at
least
one
year
immediately
preceding
the
filing
of
the
petition;
and
If
an
alien
woman
married
to
a
Filipino
does
not
become
ipso
facto
a
citizen,
(3)
Any
action
by
any
other
office,
agency,
board
or
official,
administrative
or
then
she
must
have
to
file
a
"petition
for
citizenship"
in
order
that
she
may
otherwise
—
other
than
the
judgment
of
a
competent
court
of
justice
—
acquire
the
status
of
a
Filipino
citizen.
Authority
for
this
view
is
Section
7
of
the
certifying
or
declaring
that
an
alien
wife
of
the
Filipino
citizen
is
also
a
Filipino
Revised
Naturalization
Law
in
which
the
plain
language
is:
"Any
person
citizen,
is
hereby
declared
null
and
void.
desiring
to
acquire
Philippine
citizenship,
shall
file
with
the
competent
court"
a
petition
for
the
purpose.
And
this,
because
such
alien
woman
is
not
a
citizen,
Gulapa:
How
did
Burca
modify
Lao
Chay?
A
wife
must
file
a
petition
with
the
and
she
desires
to
acquire
it.
The
proper
forum,
Section
8
of
the
same
law
competent
courts
for
purposes
of
naturalization.
points
out,
is
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
the
province
where
the
petitioner
has
resided
"at
least
one
year
immediately
preceding
the
filing
of
the
petition".
We
part
from
the
premise
that
such
an
alien
woman
does
not,
by
the
fact
of
It
is
quite
plain
that
the
determination
of
whether
said
alien
wife
should
be
marriage,
acquire
Philippine
citizenship.
The
statute
heretofore
quoted
(Sec.
given
the
status
of
a
citizen
should
fall
within
the
area
allocated
to
competent
15,
Revised
Naturalization
Law),
we
repeat,
recites
that
she
"shall
be
deemed
a
courts.
That
this
is
so,
is
exemplified
by
the
fact
that
this
Court
has
taken
citizen
of
the
Philippines"
if
she
"might
herself
be
lawfully
naturalized".
jurisdiction
in
one
such
case
originating
from
the
court
of
first
instance,
where
an
alien
woman
had
directly
sought
naturalization
in
her
favor.
How
then
shall
she
be
"deemed"
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines?
An
examination
of
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law
is
quite
revealing.
For
instance,
minor
children
And,
as
nothing
in
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law
empowers
any
other
office,
of
persons
naturalized
under
the
law
who
were
born
in
the
Philippines
"shall
be
agency,
board
or
official,
to
determine
such
question,
we
are
persuaded
to
say
considered
citizens
thereof".
Similarly,
a
foreign-‐born
minor
child,
if
dwelling
in
that
resolution
thereof
rests
exclusively
with
the
competent
courts.
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
the
naturalization
of
the
parents,
"shall
automatically
become
a
Filipino
citizen".
No
conditions
are
exacted;
citizenship
We
accordingly
rule
that:
(1)
An
alien
woman
married
to
a
Filipino
who
of
said
minor
children
is
conferred
by
the
law
itself,
without
further
desires
to
be
a
citizen
of
this
country
must
apply
therefor
by
filing
a
petition
proceedings
and
as
a
matter
of
course.
An
alien
wife
of
a
Filipino
does
not
fit
for
citizenship
reciting
that
she
possesses
all
the
qualifications
set
forth
in
into
either
of
the
categories
just
mentioned.
Legal
action
has
to
be
taken
to
Section
2,
and
none
of
the
disqualifications
under
Section
4,
both
of
the
make
her
a
citizen.
Revised
Naturalization
Law;
(2)
Said
petition
must
be
filed
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
where
petitioner
has
resided
at
least
one
year
immediately
There
is
no
law
or
rule
which
authorizes
a
declaration
of
Filipino
citizenship.
preceding
the
filing
of
the
petition;
and
(3)
Any
action
by
any
other
office,
Citizenship
is
not
an
appropriate
subject
for
declaratory
judgment
agency,
board
or
official,
administrative
or
otherwise
—
other
than
the
proceedings.
And
in
one
case,
we
held
that
citizenship
of
an
alien
woman
judgment
of
a
competent
court
of
justice
—
certifying
or
declaring
that
an
married
to
a
Filipino
must
be
determined
in
an
"appropriate
proceeding".
alien
wife
of
the
Filipino
citizen
is
also
a
Filipino
citizen,
is
hereby
declared
null
and
void.
Speculations
arise
as
to
the
import
of
the
term
"appropriate
proceeding".
The
record
of
this
case
disclose
that,
in
some
quarters,
opinion
is
advanced
that
the
determination
of
whether
an
alien
woman
married
to
a
Filipino
shall
be
deemed
a
Filipino
citizen,
may
be
made
by
the
Commissioner
of
CONFLICT
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70.
MO
YA
YIM
YAO
V.
CIR
Ping
for
1
month.
She
was
permitted
to
come
and
stay
in
the
Phils.
until
April
G.R.
No.
L-‐21289
|
1971
13,
1961.
Upon
her
arrival,
one
Asher
Cheng
filed
a
P1Million
bond
to
ensure
that
she
would
actually
depart
from
the
country
on
or
before
the
expiration
of
DOCTRINE:
Under
Section
15
of
Commonwealth
Act
473,
(“…any
woman
her
authorized
period
of
stay
or
within
the
period
the
COI
or
his
authorized
married
to
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines,
and
who
might
herself
be
lawfully
representative
might
allow.
Repeatedly,
LY
Yeung
was
allowed
to
stay
in
the
naturalized,
is
deemed
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines.”)
an
alien
woman
marrying
a
Philippines
up
to
February
13,
1962.
Filipino,
native
born
or
naturalized,
becomes
ipso
facto
a
Filipina
provided
she
is
not
disqualified
to
be
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
under
Section
4
of
the
same
But
days
before,
on
January
25,
1962,
she
married
Moy
Ya
Lim
Yao
alias
law.
Likewise,
an
alien
woman
married
to
an
alien
who
is
subsequently
Edilberto
Aguinaldo
Lim,
a
Filipino.
The
COI
ordered
her
arrest,
deportation
and
naturalized
here
follows
the
Philippine
citizenship
of
her
husband
the
moment
confiscation
of
her
bond.
It
was
noted
that
she
could
not
write
either
English
or
he
takes
his
oath
as
Filipino
citizen,
provided
that
she
does
not
suffer
from
any
Tagalog,
and
could
speak
only
a
few
words
in
those
language.
She
could
not
of
the
disqualifications
under
said
Section
4.
If
the
Court
will
interpret
it
such
name
any
Filipino
neighbor,
with
a
Filipino
name
except
one,
Rosa.
She
did
not
that
the
alien
wife
must
prove
the
qualifications
prescribed
by
the
law
(Sec
2
of
know
the
names
of
her
brothers-‐
in-‐law,
or
sisters-‐in-‐law.
LY
Yeung
and
her
CA
473),
the
privilege
granted
to
alien
wives
would
become
illusory.
husband
Lim
contended
that
she
has
become
a
Filipino
through
her
marriage,
thus
prayed
for
the
court
to
enjoin
the
COI’s
order.
Gulapa:
How
did
this
modify
Burca
and
Lao
Chay?
What
was
the
latin
term?
Ipso
facto.
No
need
to
file
a
petition
BUT
for
practical
purposes,
she
should
file
The
COI
and
Office
of
Solicitor
General
(OSG)
won
in
the
lower
court
on
the
with
the
Bureau
of
Immigration.
following
basis:
An
alien
woman
married
to
a
Filipino
citizen
does
not
have
to
prove
in
a
judicial
1.
It
is
evident
that
said
marriage
was
effected
merely
for
convenience
to
proceeding
that
she
does
not
suffer
from
any
of
the
disqualifications
under
defeat
or
avoid
her
then
impending
compulsory
departure
[or
deportation].
Section
4
of
the
Naturalization
Law,
who
will
determine
whether
she
has
automatically
become
a
Filipino
citizen
by
the
mere
fact
of
marriage
to
a
2.
She
must
not
only
be
not
among
those
disqualified
but
also
she
must
prove
Filipino
National?
Evidently,
her
on
determination
will
not
bind
the
government
she
is
qualified.
Based
on
Sec.15
of
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law
which
agencies.
She
still
has
to
prove
before
some
agency
of
the
Government
that
she
provides:
“Effect
of
the
naturalization
on
wife
and
children.
—
Any
woman
who
is
not
disqualified
to
become
a
Filipino
citizen
by
naturalization.
Since
the
is
now
or
may
hereafter
be
married
to
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines,
and
who
current
position
of
the
SC
is
that
there
can
be
no
independent
action
for
the
might
herself
be
lawfully
naturalized
shall
be
deemed
a
citizen
of
the
judicial
declaration
of
the
citizenship
of
an
individual
-‐
whether
in
an
action
for
Philippines,”
COI
asserted
that
the
clause
"who
might
herself
be
lawfully
declaratory
relief
or
in
a
summary
action
for
a
change
or
correction
in
the
Civil
naturalized"
incontestably
implies
that
an
alien
woman
may
be
deemed
a
Registry
–
the
determination
must
be
made
by
some
administrative
agency,
citizen
of
the
Philippines
by
virtue
of
her
marriage
to
a
Filipino
citizen
only
if
she
such
as
the
Immigration
Office
or
the
Department
of
Foreign
affairs.
possesses
all
the
qualifications
and
none
of
the
disqualifications
specified
in
the
law,
because
these
are
the
explicit
requisites
provided
by
law
for
an
alien
to
be
Case:
Chinese
woman
married
a
Filipino
citizen.
Court
held
she
became
a
naturalized.
Thus,
LY
Yeung
while
claiming
not
to
be
disqualified,
cannot
allege
Filipino
citizen
through
marriage.
that
she
possesses
all
the
qualifications
to
be
naturalized,
because
(1)
she
has
Facts:
On
February
8,
1961,
Lau
Yuen
Yeung
(LY
Yeung)
applied
for
a
passport
been
admitted
as
a
temporary
visitor
only,
and
(2)
it
is
obvious
at
once
that
she
visa
to
enter
the
Philippines
as
a
non-‐immigrant.
In
the
interview
for
her
lacks
at
least,
the
req’d
length
of
residence
in
the
Philippines.
If
the
intention
of
application
for
a
temporary
visitor's
visa
to
enter
the
Philippines,
she
stated
the
law
that
that
the
alien
need
only
be
not
disqualified,
it
would
have
been
that
she
was
a
Chinese
residing
at
Kowloon,
Hongkong,
and
that
she
desired
to
worded
"and
who
herself
is
not
disqualified
to
become
a
citizen
of
the
take
a
pleasure
trip
to
the
Philippines
to
visit
her
great
(grand)
uncle
Lau
Ching
Philippines."
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3.
There
was
deliberate
and
voluntary
representation
by
LY
Yeung
that
she
will
have
been
recognized
by
the
respondent
as
a
Filipino
citizen
in
the
instant
case,
enter
and
stay
only
for
a
period
of
1
month
and
was
able
to
secure
a
visa,
thus,
without
requiring
her
to
submit
to
the
usual
proceedings
for
naturalization.
she
cannot
go
back
on
her
representation
to
stay
permanently
without
first
Hence,
LY
Yeung
is
not
among
those
disqualified
under
Section
4
of
CA
473,
and
departing
from
the
Philippines
as
she
had
promised.
Based
on
Sec.
9
(g)
of
the
“may
be
lawfully
naturalized.”
Philippine
Immigration
Act
of
1940,
“An
alien
who
is
admitted
as
a
non-‐
immigrant
cannot
remain
in
the
Philippines
permanently.
To
obtain
permanent
As
under
any
other
law
rich
in
benefits
for
those
coming
under
it,
doubtless
admission,
a
non-‐immigrant
alien
must
depart
voluntarily
to
some
foreign
there
will
be
instances
where
unscrupulous
persons
will
attempt
to
take
country
and
procure
from
the
appropriate
Philippine
Consul
the
proper
visa
and
advantage
of
this
provision
of
law
by
entering
into
fake
and
fictitious
marriages
thereafter
undergo
examination
by
the
Officers
of
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
at
or
mala
fide
matrimonies.
We
cannot
as
a
matter
of
law
hold
that
just
because
a
Philippine
port
of
entry
for
determination
of
his
admissibility
in
accordance
of
these
possibilities,
the
construction
of
the
provision
should
be
otherwise
with
the
requirements
of
this
Act.”
than
as
dictated
inexorably
by
more
ponderous
relevant
considerations,
legal,
juridical
and
practical.
There
can
always
be
means
of
discovering
such
4.
COI,
under
Sec.3
of
the
Commonwealth
Act
613,
is
charged
with
the
undesirable
practice
and
every
case
can
be
dealt
with
accordingly
as
it
arises.
administration
of
all
laws
relating
to
immigration
is
given
the
authority
to
perform
the
quasi-‐judicial
function
in
determining
cases
presented
to
him
in
IX.
MARRIAGE,
ADOPTION,
AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS
relation
to
alien
immigrants
ISSUE:
MARRIAGE
Whether
marriage
of
a
foreigner
woman
to
a
Filipino
citizen
confers
ipso
facto
to
her
Philippine
citizenship?
Art.
17
&
Art.
26
–
Lex
loci
celebrationis
is
an
imperative
rule.
HELD:
EXC:
Yes.
Accordingly,
We
now
hold,
all
previous
decisions
of
this
Court
indicating
35
(1)
-‐
Those
contracted
by
any
party
below
eighteen
years
of
age
otherwise
notwithstanding,
that
under
Section
15
of
Commonwealth
Act
473,
even
with
the
consent
of
parents
or
guardians;
an
alien
woman
marrying
a
Filipino,
native
born
or
naturalized,
becomes
ipso
facto
a
Filipina
provided
she
is
not
disqualified
to
be
a
citizen
of
the
35
(4)
-‐
Those
bigamous
or
polygamous
marriages
not
failing
under
Philippines
under
Section
4
of
the
same
law.
Likewise,
an
alien
woman
Article
41;
married
to
an
alien
who
is
subsequently
naturalized
here
follows
the
Philippine
citizenship
of
her
husband
the
moment
he
takes
his
oath
as
Filipino
citizen,
35
(5)
-‐
Those
contracted
through
mistake
of
one
contracting
party
as
provided
that
she
does
not
suffer
from
any
of
the
disqualifications
under
said
to
the
identity
of
the
other;
and
Section
4.
35
(6)
-‐
Those
subsequent
marriages
that
are
void
under
Article
53;
If
the
Court
will
interpret
it
such
that
the
alien
wife
must
prove
the
qualifications
prescribed
by
the
law
(Sec
2
of
CA
473),
the
privilege
granted
to
alien
wives
would
become
illusory.
The
wife
is
required
to
prove
only
that
she
36
-‐
A
marriage
contracted
by
any
party
who,
at
the
time
of
the
may
herself
be
lawfully
naturalized
(or
not
disqualified)
in
order
to
establish
her
celebration,
was
psychologically
incapacitated
to
comply
with
the
citizenship
status
as
a
fact.
For
the
phrase
"herself
may
be
lawfully
naturalized,"
essential
marital
obligations
of
marriage,
shall
likewise
be
void
even
if
the
wife
need
no
longer
prove
qualifications.
The
OSG
has
implicitly
conceded
such
incapacity
becomes
manifest
only
after
its
solemnization.
that
had
it
been
established
in
the
proceedings
that
LY
Yeung
possesses
all
the
qualifications
required
by
the
law
of
applicants
for
naturalization,
she
would
37
-‐
Marriages
between
the
following
are
incestuous
and
void
from
the
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beginning,
whether
relationship
between
the
parties
be
legitimate
or
prove
(2)
that
the
foreign
marriage
took
place
in
accordance
with
the
foreign
illegitimate:
law.
(1)
Between
ascendants
and
descendants
of
any
degree;
and
(2)
Between
brothers
and
sisters,
whether
of
the
full
or
half
blood.
"Priest"
and
"minister
of
the
Gospel"
means
all
clergymen
of
every
denomination
and
faith.
A
Mohammedan
Iman
is
a
"priest
or
minister
of
the
38
-‐
The
following
marriages
shall
be
void
from
the
beginning
for
Gospel,"
and
Mohammedanism
is
a
"denomination,"
within
the
meaning
of
the
reasons
of
public
policy:
[Co
SLASS
CAK]
Marriage
Law.
(1)
Between
collateral
blood
relatives
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate,
up
to
the
fourth
civil
degree;
(2)
Between
step-‐parents
and
Here
the
consequences
entailed
in
holding
that
the
marriage
of
Adong
and
the
step-‐children;
(3)
Between
parents-‐in-‐law
and
children-‐in-‐law;
(4)
deceased,
in
conformity
with
the
Mohammedan
religion
and
Moro
customs,
Between
the
adopting
parent
and
the
adopted
child;
(5)
Between
the
was
void,
would
be
far
reaching
in
disastrous
result
because
there
are
at
least
surviving
spouse
of
the
adopting
parent
and
the
adopted
child;
(6)
150K
Moros
who
have
been
married
according
to
local
custom.
Between
the
surviving
spouse
of
the
adopted
child
and
the
adopter;
(7)
Between
an
adopted
child
and
a
legitimate
child
of
the
adopter;
(8)
Kyna’s
notes:
Between
adopted
children
of
the
same
adopter;
and
(9)
Between
Now,
the
validity
of
Muslims
Marriages
is
based
on
the
Muslim
Code.
parties
where
one,
with
the
intention
to
marry
the
other,
killed
that
other
person's
spouse,
or
his
or
her
own
spouse.
(82)
N.B.:
Art.
26.
All
marriages
solemnized
outside
the
Philippines,
in
accordance
with
the
laws
in
force
in
the
country
where
they
were
solemnized,
and
valid
Art.
2,
FC:
ESSENTIAL
REQUISITIES:
[LC]
there
as
such,
shall
also
be
valid
in
this
country,
except
those
prohibited
under
1. Legal
capacity
of
the
contracting
parties
who
must
be
a
male
and
a
Articles
35
(1),
(4),
(5)
and
(6),
36,
37
and
38.
female
2. Consent
freely
given
in
the
presence
of
the
solemnizing
officer
Where
a
marriage
between
a
Filipino
citizen
and
a
foreigner
is
validly
celebrated
and
a
divorce
is
thereafter
validly
obtained
abroad
by
the
alien
Art.
3,
FC:
FORMAL
REQUISITIES
[ALC]
spouse
capacitating
him
or
her
to
remarry,
the
Filipino
spouse
shall
have
1. Authority
of
the
solemnizing
officer
capacity
to
remarry
under
Philippine
law.
(As
amended
by
Executive
Order
227)
2. A
valid
marriage
license
except
in
cases
provided
in
Chapter
2
of
this
Title
FACTS:
3. A
marriage
ceremony
which
takes
place
with
the
appearance
of
the
Cheong
Boo,
a
native
of
China,
died
intestate
in
Zamboanga.
He
left
property
contracting
parties
before
the
solemnizing
officer
and
their
personal
worth
nearly
100K.
The
estate
of
the
deceased
was
claimed
by
2
parties:
(1)
declaration
that
they
take
each
other
as
husband
and
wife
in
the
Cheong
Seng
Gee,
who
alleged
that
he
was
a
legitimate
child
by
the
marriage
of
presence
of
not
less
than
2
witnesses
of
legal
age
Cheong
Boo
with
Tan
Dit
in
China
in
1895,
and
(2)
Mora
Adong,
who
alleged
that
she
had
been
lawfully
married
to
Cheong
Boo
in
1896
in
Basilan,
according
73.
ADONG
V.
CHEONG
SENG
GEE
to
the
ceremonies
prescribed
by
the
book
on
marriage
of
the
Koran,
with
her
G.R.
No.
18081
|
March
3,
1922
daughters
Payang
and
Rosalia.
DOCTRINES:
To
establish
a
valid
foreign
marriage
pursuant
to
this
comity
The
conflicting
claims
to
the
estate
of
Cheong
Boo
were
ventilated
in
the
CFI
of
provision,
it
is
first
necessary
to
prove
before
the
courts
of
the
Islands
(1)
the
Zamboanga.
The
trial
judge
Abeto
reached
the
conclusion
that
the
proof
did
existence
of
the
foreign
law
as
a
question
of
fact,
and
it
is
then
necessary
to
not
sufficiently
establish
the
Chinese
marriage
but
that
because
Cheong
Seng
Gee
had
been
admitted
to
the
Philippine
Islands
as
the
son
of
the
deceased,
he
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should
share
in
the
estate
as
a
natural
child.
As
to
the
allegations
of
Adong,
the
executed,
including
decrees
of
registration,
Cheong
Boo
stated
that
he
was
conclusion
was
that
the
marriage
between
Adong
and
the
deceased
had
been
married
to
Adong
and
he
gave
written
consent
to
the
marriage
of
his
minor
adequately
proved
but
that
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands
it
could
not
daughter,
Payang.
be
held
to
be
a
lawful
marriage;
so,
the
daughters
Payang
and
Rosalia
would
3
sections
of
the
Marriage
Law
(General
Order
No.
68)
must
be
taken
into
inherit
as
natural
children.
The
order
of
the
judge
was
for
there
to
be
a
consideration.
Sec.
IX
provides
"No
marriage
heretofore
solemnized
before
any
partition
of
the
property
of
the
deceased
Cheong
Boo
between
the
natural
person
professing
to
have
authority
therefor
shall
be
invalid
for
want
of
such
children,
Cheong
Seng
Gee,
Payang,
and
Rosalia.
Both
parties
appealed.
authority
or
on
account
of
any
informality,
irregularity,
or
omission,
if
it
was
celebrated
with
the
belief
of
the
parties,
or
either
of
them,
that
he
had
authority
ISSUES:
and
that
they
have
been
lawfully
married."
Marriage
in
this
jurisdiction
is
both
1.
Whether
the
marriage
contracted
in
China,
and
proven
mainly
by
an
alleged
a
civil
contract
and
a
new
relation,
an
institution
in
the
maintenance
of
which
matrimonial
letter,
is
valid
in
the
Philippines
the
public
is
deeply
interested.
Consequently,
every
intendment
of
the
law
2.
Whether
the
marriage
performed
in
the
Philippines
according
to
the
rites
of
leans
toward
legalizing
matrimony.
Persons
dwelling
together
in
apparent
the
Mohammedan
religion
is
valid
matrimony
are
presumed,
in
the
absence
of
contrary
evidence,
to
be
in
fact
married.
Sec.
IX
is
in
the
nature
of
a
curative
provision
intended
to
safeguard
HELD:
society
by
legalizing
prior
marriages.
The
courts
can
properly
incline
the
scales
Validity
of
the
Chinese
Marriage
of
their
decisions
in
favor
of
the
solution
which
will
more
effectively
promote
The
immigration
documents
only
go
to
show
the
relation
of
parent
and
child
the
public
policy.
Here
the
consequences
entailed
in
holding
that
the
marriage
existing
between
the
Cheong
Boo
and
son
Cheong
Seng
Gee
but
do
not
of
the
Adong
and
the
deceased,
in
conformity
with
the
Mohammedan
religion
establish
the
marriage
between
the
deceased
and
Seng
Gee’s
mother.
Sec.
IV
and
Moro
customs,
was
void,
would
be
far
reaching
in
disastrous
result
of
Marriage
Law
(General
Order
No.
68)
provides
that
"All
marriages
contracted
because
there
are
at
least
150K
Moros
who
have
been
married
according
to
without
these
Islands,
which
would
be
valid
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
local
custom.
The
court
has
the
power
either
to
nullify
or
to
validate
all
of
these
the
same
were
contracted,
are
valid
in
these
Islands."
To
establish
a
valid
marriages;
either
to
make
all
of
the
children
born
of
these
unions
bastards
or
to
foreign
marriage
pursuant
to
this
comity
provision,
it
is
first
necessary
to
make
them
legitimate.
The
court
held
that
the
evidence
produced
a
moral
prove
before
the
courts
of
the
Islands
the
existence
of
the
foreign
law
as
a
conviction
of
the
existence
of
the
Mohammedan
marriage
and
regarded
the
question
of
fact,
and
it
is
then
necessary
to
prove
the
alleged
foreign
provisions
of
Sec.
IX
as
validating
marriages
performed
according
to
the
rites
of
marriage
by
convincing
evidence.
In
the
case
at
bar
there
is
no
competent
the
Mohammedan
religion.
Thus,
the
Mohammedan
marriage
is
valid,
giving
to
testimony
as
to
what
the
laws
of
Amoy,
China
concerning
marriage
were
in
the
widow
and
the
2
legitimate
children
the
rights
accruing
to
them
under
the
1895.
There
is
lacking
proof
so
clear,
strong,
and
unequivocal
as
to
produce
a
law.
moral
conviction
of
the
existence
of
the
alleged
prior
Chinese
marriage.
Also,
Sec.
V
provides
that
"Marriage
may
be
solemnized
by
either
a
judge
of
any
court
inferior
to
the
SC,
justice
of
the
peace,
or
priest
or
minister
of
the
Validity
of
the
Mohammedan
Marriage
Gospel
of
any
denomination..."
"Priest"
and
"minister
of
the
Gospel"
means
Adong
claimed
that
a
marriage
ceremony
took
place
in
Basilan
according
to
the
all
clergymen
of
every
denomination
and
faith.
A
Mohammedan
Iman
is
a
rites
of
Mohammedan
religion.
This
is
established
by
the
Iman
who
solemnized
"priest
or
minister
of
the
Gospel,"
and
Mohammedanism
is
a
the
marriage,
and
by
other
eyewitnesses,
such
as
Adong’s
father
and
the
chief
"denomination,"
within
the
meaning
of
the
Marriage
Law.
of
the
rancheria.
The
groom
complied
with
Quranic
law
by
giving
to
the
bride
a
Lastly,
Sec.
VI
provides
that
"No
particular
form
for
the
ceremony
of
marriage
is
dowry
of
P250
in
money
and
P250
in
goods.
From
then
day
until
the
death
of
required,
but
the
parties
must
declare,
in
the
presence
of
the
person
Cheong
Boo,
they
cohabited
as
husband
and
wife.
They
had
5
children,
2
are
solemnizing
the
marriage,
that
they
take
each
other
as
husband
and
wife."
The
living
at
the
time
of
this
case.
In
his
relations
w/
3rd
persons,
Cheong
Boo
2
essentials
of
a
valid
marriage
are
capacity
and
consent.
The
latter
element
treated
Adong
as
his
lawful
wife.
He
admitted
this
relationship
in
several
may
be
inferred
from
the
ceremony
performed,
the
acts
of
the
parties,
and
private
and
public
documents.
Thus,
when
different
legal
documents
were
habit
or
repute.
In
this
instance,
there
is
no
question
of
capacity
nor
consent.
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While
it
is
true
that
during
the
Mohammedan
ceremony,
the
remarks
of
the
(2)
The
Presiding
Justice
and
the
Justices
of
the
Court
of
Appeals;
priest
were
addressed
more
to
the
elders
than
to
the
participants,
it
is
likewise
(3)
Judges
of
the
Courts
of
First
Instance;
true
that
Cheong
Boo
and
Adong
did
in
fact
take
each
other
to
be
husband
and
(4)
Mayors
of
cities
and
municipalities;
wife
and
did
thereafter
live
together
as
husband
and
wife.
(5)
Municipal
judges
and
justices
of
the
peace;
(6)
Priests,
rabbis,
ministers
of
the
gospel
of
any
denomination,
church,
religion
78.
WONG
WOO
YUI
V.
VIVO
or
sect,
duly
registered,
as
provided
in
Article
92;
and
G.R.
No.
L-‐21076
|
March
31,
1965
(7)
Ship
captains,
airplane
chiefs,
military
commanders,
and
consuls
and
vice-‐
consuls
in
special
cases
provided
in
Articles
74
and
75.
(4a)
DOCTRINE:
Since
our
law
only
recognizes
a
marriage
celebrated
before
any
of
the
officers
mentioned
therein,
and
a
village
leader
is
not
one
of
them,
it
is
clear
FACTS:
that
petitioner’s
marriage,
even
if
true,
cannot
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction.
In
proceedings
held
before
the
Board
of
Special
Inquiry
in
June,
1961,
Wong
Woo
Yiu
declared
that
she
came
to
the
Philippines
in
1961
for
the
first
time
to
The
fact
of
marriage
was
proved
but
not
the
Chinese
Law
on
marriage.
Even
if
join
her
husband,
Perfecto
Bias,
a
Filipino
citizen
to
whom
she
was
married
in
the
petitioners
proved
that
a
marriage
was
celebrated,
the
marriage
is
still
void
Chingkang,
China
on
January
15,
1929,
that
they
had
several
children
all
of
because
the
marriage
was
not
celebrated
before
any
of
the
officers
mentioned
whom
are
not
located
in
the
Philippines,
and
that
their
marriage
was
in
the
law
(Philippine
law).
celebrated
by
one
Chua
Tio,
a
village
leader.
ALG:
However,
the
present
Family
Code
changed
this,
particularly
Article
26.
On
June
28,
1961,
the
Board
of
Special
Inquiry
No.
3
rendered
a
decision
finding
Absence
or
lack
of
authority
by
the
solemnizing
officers
is
NOT
one
of
the
petitioner
to
be
legally
married
to
Perfecto
Bias,
thus
declaring
legal
her
exceptions
of
void
marriages.
Thus,
the
foreign
marriage
is
still
valid,
admission
into
the
country
as
a
non-‐quota
immigrant.
This
decision
was
notwithstanding
such
lack
of
authority.
affirmed
by
the
Board
of
Commissioners
on
July
12,
1961
of
which
petitioner
was
duly
informed
in
a
letter
sent
on
the
same
date
by
the
Secretary
of
the
Kyna’s
notes:
Board.
But
how
come
gay
marriages
are
void
even
if
not
expressly
prohibited
by
Article
26
of
the
FC?
However,
on
June
28,
1962,
the
same
Board
of
Commissioners,
but
composed
entirely
of
a
new
set
of
members,
rendered
a
new
decision
contrary
to
that
of
See
à
Article
1.
Marriage
is
a
special
contract
of
permanent
union
between
a
the
Board
of
Special
Inquiry
No.
3
and
ordering
petitioner
to
be
excluded
from
man
and
a
woman
entered
into
in
accordance
with
law
for
the
establishment
the
country,
after
discrepancies
were
found
in
the
statements
made
by
of
conjugal
and
family
life.
petitioner
and
her
alleged
husband
during
several
investigation
conducted
by
the
immigration
authorities
concerning
the
alleged
marriage
before
a
village
What’s
wrong
with
this
pronouncement?
There
is
a
presumption
that
the
leader
in
China
in
1929,
thus
concluding
that
the
petitioner's
claim
that
she
is
marriage
was
celebrated
abroad
but
because
the
parties
failed
to
prove
the
the
lawful
wife
of
Perfecto
Bias
was
without
basis
in
evidence
as
it
was
"a
mass
foreign
law
on
marriage,
the
courts
applied
the
Doctrine
of
Processual
of
oral
and
documentary
evidence
bereft
of
substantial
proof
of
husband-‐wife
Presumption
à
argument
becomes
CIRCULAR
relationship,”
the
Board
of
Commissioners
motu
proprio
reviewed
the
record
concerning
the
admission
of
petitioner
into
the
country
resulting
in
its
finding
How
does
the
SC
step
back?
–
See
next
case
that
she
was
improperly
admitted.
*SEE
Art.
56.
Marriage
may
be
solemnized
by:
ISSUE:
(1)
The
Chief
Justice
and
Associate
Justices
of
the
Supreme
Court;
Whether
Wong
Woo
Yiu's
marriage
to
Perfecto
Blas
is
valid
and
making
her
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admission
into
the
country
legal
Custom
is
defined
as
"a
rule
of
conduct
formed
by
repetition
of
acts,
uniformly
observed
(practiced)
as
a
social
rule,
legally
binding
and
obligatory".
The
law
HELD:
requires
that
"a
custom
must
be
proved
as
a
fact,
according
to
the
rules
of
No.
SC
affirmed
the
latter
Board's
decision.
Indeed,
not
only
is
there
no
evidence"
[Art.
12,
NCC.]
documentary
evidence
to
support
the
alleged
marriage
of
petitioner
to
Perfecto
Bias
but
the
record
is
punctured
with
so
many
inconsistencies
which
In
proving
a
foreign
law
the
procedure
is
provided
in
the
Rules
of
Court.
With
cannot
but
lead
one
to
doubt
their
veracity
concerning
the
pretended
marriage
respect
to
an
unwritten
foreign
law,
Rule
130,
§45
states
that:
in
China
in
1929.
This
claim
cannot
also
be
entertained
under
our
law
on
family
relations.
Thus,
Article
15
of
our
new
Civil
Code
provides
that
laws
relating
to
SEC.
45.
Unwritten
law.—The
oral
testimony
of
witnesses,
skilled
therein,
is
family
rights
or
to
the
status
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
admissible
as
evidence
of
the
unwritten
law
of
a
foreign
country,
as
are
also
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad,
and
it
is
well-‐known
that
in
1929
in
printed
and
published
books
of
reports
of
decisions
of
the
courts
of
the
foreign
order
that
a
marriage
celebrated
in
the
Philippines
may
be
valid
it
must
be
country,
if
proved
to
be
commonly
admitted
in
such
courts.
solemnized
either
by
a
judge
of
any
court
inferior
to
the
Supreme
Court,
a
justice
of
the
peace,
or
a
priest
or
minister
of
the
gospel
of
any
denomination
Proof
of
a
written
foreign
law,
on
the
other
hand,
is
provided
for
under
Rule
duly
registered
in
the
Philippine
Library
and
Museum
(Public
Act
3412,
132
section
25,
thus:
Section
2).
But
it
may
be
contended
that
under
Section
4
of
General
orders
No.
68,
as
reproduced
in
Section
19
of
Act
No.
3613,
which
is
now
Article
71
of
our
SEC.
25.
Proof
of
public
or
official
record.—An
official
record
or
an
entry
therein,
new
Civil
Code,
a
marriage
contracted
outside
of
the
Philippines
which
is
valid
when
admissible
for
any
purpose,
may
be
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
under
the
law
of
the
country
in
which
it
was
celebrated
is
also
valid
in
the
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
Philippines.
But
no
validity
can
be
given
to
this
contention
because
no
proof
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied,
if
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
was
presented
relative
to
the
law
of
marriage
in
China.
Such
being
the
case,
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
such
officer
has
the
custody.
If
the
office
in
we
should
apply
the
general
rule
that
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
the
law
of
a
which
the
record
is
kept
is
in
a
foreign
country,
the
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
foreign
country
it
should
be
presumed
that
it
is
the
same
as
our
own.
secretary
of
embassy
or
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
The
statutes
of
other
countries
or
states
must
be
pleaded
and
proved
the
same
foreign
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
as
any
other
fact.
Courts
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
what
such
laws
are.
In
office.
the
absence
of
pleading
and
proof
the
laws
of
a
foreign
country
or
state
will
be
presumed
to
be
the
same
as
our
own.
Since
our
law
only
recognizes
a
The
Court
has
interpreted
§25
to
include
competent
evidence
like
the
testimony
marriage
celebrated
before
any
of
the
officers
mentioned
therein,
and
a
of
a
witness
to
prove
the
existence
of
a
written
foreign
law.
village
leader
is
not
one
of
them,
it
is
clear
that
petitioner’s
marriage,
even
if
*1.
Official
publication,
or
true,
cannot
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction.
2.
Copy
a.
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
83.
YAO
KEE,
ET
AL.
V.
SY-‐GONZALES,
SUPRA
deputy,
b.
and
accompanied,
if
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
DOCTRINE:
To
establish
a
valid
foreign
marriage
two
things
must
be
proven,
certificate
that
such
officer
has
the
custody.
/
If
the
office
in
which
the
record
is
namely:
(1)
the
existence
of
the
foreign
law
as
a
question
of
fact;
and
(2)
the
kept
is
in
a
foreign
country,
the
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
alleged
foreign
marriage
by
convincing
evidence.
embassy
or
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept
and
c.
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
office.
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deceased
with
Asuncion
Gillego;
and
(b)
to
their
knowledge
Sy
Kiat
died
In
the
case
at
bar
petitioners
did
not
present
any
competent
evidence
relative
to
intestate;
among
others.
the
law
and
custom
of
China
on
marriage.
The
testimonies
of
Yao
and
Gan
Ching
cannot
be
considered
as
proof
of
China's
law
or
custom
on
marriage
not
The
petition
was
opposed
by
Petitioners
Yao
Kee,
Sze
Sook
Wah,
Sze
Lai
Cho
only
because
they
are
self-‐serving
evidence,
but
more
importantly,
there
is
no
and
Sy
Yun
Chen
who
alleged
that:
(a)
Yao
Kee
is
the
lawful
wife
of
Sy
Kiat,
showing
that
they
are
competent
to
testify
on
the
subject
matter.
whom
he
married
in
China;
(b)
the
other
oppositors
are
the
legitimate
children
of
the
deceased
with
Yao
Kee;
and,
(c)
Sze
Sook
Wah
is
the
eldest
among
them
ALG:
Fact
of
marriage
was
proven
in
this
case,
but
the
law
was
not
proved
that
and
is
competent,
willing
and
desirous
to
become
the
administratrix
of
the
it
was
done
in
accordance
with
Chinese
laws.
estate
of
Sy
Kiat.
But
it
was
said
that
the
absence
or
lack
of
authority
by
the
solemnizing
officers
After
hearing,
the
probate
court
ruled
in
favor
of
the
petitioners
and
found
that
is
NOT
one
of
the
exceptions
of
void
marriages
under
Article
26.
Thus,
the
(1)
Sy
Kiat
was
legally
married
to
Yao
Kee;
(2)
Petitioners
are
the
legitimate
foreign
marriage
is
still
valid,
notwithstanding
such
lack
of
authority
by
the
children
of
Yao
Kee
with
Sy
Kiat;
and
(3)
private
respondents
are
the
solemnizing
officer.
acknowledged
illegitimate
offsprings
of
Sy
Kiat
with
Asuncion
Gillego.
On
appeal
the
CA
ruled
that
Sy
Kiat
is
an
unmarried
man
who
was
living
with
Here,
it
can
be
concluded
that
Yao
Kee
(and
even
Wong
Woo)
is
still
the
correct
Asuncion
Gillego
without
the
benefit
of
marriage
for
many
years
and
that
the
ruling
despite
Article
26
(which
does
not
expressly
provide
that
lack
of
authority
legality
of
the
alleged
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
in
China
had
not
been
of
solemnizing
officer
invalidates
a
marriage).
Article
26
presupposes
that
a
proven
to
be
valid
to
the
laws
of
the
Chinese
People's
Republic
of
China.
marriage
that
is
validly
celebrated
in
one
state.
The
marriages
in
these
two
cases
could
not
have
complied
with
Article
26
because
these
marriages
were
ISSUES:
not
proven.
Thus
Article
26
becomes
immaterial
in
these
two
cases.
1.
Whether
the
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
was
proven
valid
in
accordance
with
laws
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
*Av:
This
is
confusing
to
me.
Art.
26
refers
to
marriages
celebrated
outside
the
2.
Whether
private
respondents
are
natural
children
of
Sy
Kiat
with
Asuncion
Philippines,
such
as
the
case
at
bar.
In
order
for
them
to
be
valid,
it
must
be
Gillego
valid
where
it
was
executed
but
due
to
failure
to
prove
the
foreign
law,
the
law
is
presumed
to
be
the
same
as
the
Phil.
Law.
In
the
Phil,
Art.
56
then
should
HELD:
govern
with
regard
to
solemnizing
officer,
no
longer
Art.
26.
In
any
case,
one
1.
No.
To
buttress
petitioners’
argument
that
the
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
can
argue
simply
that
as
ruled
in
Wong
Woo
and
Yao
Kee,
the
court
applied
Art.
in
accordance
with
Chinese
law
and
custom
was
conclusively
proven,
they
56
not
Art.
26
anymore.
relied
on
the
following
testimonial
and
documentary
evidence.
FACTS:
(1)
the
testimony
of
Yao
Kee:
She
testified
that
she
was
married
to
Sy
Sy
Kiat,
a
Chinese
national,
died
on
January
17,
1977
in
Caloocan
City
where
he
Kiat
in
1931
in
Fookien,
China.
She
does
not
have
a
marriage
certificate
was
then
residing,
leaving
behind
real
and
personal
properties
here
in
the
because
the
practice
during
that
time
was
for
elders
to
agree
upon
the
Philippines
worth
P300,000.00
more
or
less.
betrothal
of
their
children,
and
in
her
case,
her
elder
brother
was
the
one
who
contracted
or
entered
into
[an]
agreement
with
the
parents
of
Thereafter,
private
respondents
(all
surnamed
Sy)
filed
a
petition
for
the
grant
her
husband.
During
the
wedding
the
document
would
be
signed
by
the
of
letters
of
administration
of
the
then
CFI
of
Rizal,
Caloocan
City.
In
said
parents
of
the
groom
as
well
as
by
the
parents
of
the
bride
and
there
is
petition
they
alleged
among
others
that
(a)
they
are
the
children
of
the
no
solemnizing
officer
as
is
known
in
the
Philippines.
The
parties
themselves
do
not
sign
the
document.
As
to
the
whereabouts
of
this
document,
she
and
Sy
Kiat
were
married
for
46
years
already
and
the
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document
was
left
in
China
and
she
doubt
if
that
document
can
still
be
The
law
on
foreign
marriages
is
provided
by
Art.
71
of
the
Civil
Code
which
found
now.
It
was
left
in
the
possession
of
Sy
Kiat's
family.
Right
now,
she
states
that:
Art.
71.
All
marriages
performed
outside
the
Philippines
in
does
not
know
the
whereabouts
of
that
document
because
of
the
lapse
accordance
with
the
laws
in
force
in
the
country
where
they
were
performed
of
many
years
and
because
they
left
it
in
a
certain
place
and
it
was
and
valid
there
as
such,
shall
also
be
valid
in
this
country,
except
bigamous,
already
eaten
by
the
termites.
polygamous,
or
incestuous
marriages,
as
determined
by
Philippine
law.
[Now,
(2)
The
testimony
of
Gan
Ching,
a
younger
brother
of
Yao
Kee
who
stated
Art.
26,
FC]
that
he
was
among
the
many
people
who
attended
the
wedding
of
his
sister
with
Sy
Kiat
and
that
no
marriage
certificate
is
issued
by
the
Construing
this
provision
of
law
the
Court
has
held
that
to
establish
a
valid
Chinese
government,
a
document
signed
by
the
parents
or
elders
of
the
foreign
marriage
two
things
must
be
proven,
namely:
(1)
the
existence
of
the
parties
being
sufficient.
foreign
law
as
a
question
of
fact;
and
(2)
the
alleged
foreign
marriage
by
(3)
The
statements
made
by
Asuncion
Gillego
to
the
effect
that
Sy
Kiat
convincing
evidence.
was
married
to
Yao
Kee
according
to
Chinese
custom;
and
Sy
Kiat's
admission
to
her
that
he
has
a
Chinese
wife
whom
he
married
according
EXISTENCE
OF
THE
FOREIGN
LAW
to
Chinese
custom.
In
proving
a
foreign
law
the
procedure
is
provided
in
the
Rules
of
Court.
With
(4)
Sy
Kiat's
Master
Card
of
Registered
Alien
issued
in
Caloocan
City
on
respect
to
an
unwritten
foreign
law,
Rule
130,
§45
states
that:
October
3,
1972
where
the
following
entries
are
found:
"Marital
status—
Married";
"If
married
give
name
of
spouses—Yao
Kee";
"Address-‐China;
SEC.
45.
Unwritten
law.—The
oral
testimony
of
witnesses,
skilled
therein,
"Date
of
marriage—1931";
and
"Place
of
marriage—China"
is
admissible
as
evidence
of
the
unwritten
law
of
a
foreign
country,
as
(5)
Sy
Kiat's
Alien
Certificate
of
Registration
issued
in
Manila
stating:
are
also
printed
and
published
books
of
reports
of
decisions
of
the
courts
"Civil
status—Married";
and,
'If
married,
state
name
and
address
of
of
the
foreign
country,
if
proved
to
be
commonly
admitted
in
such
spouse—Yao
Kee
Chingkang,
China".
courts.
(6)
The
certification
issued
in
Manila
by
the
Embassy
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
to
the
effect
that
"according
to
the
information
Proof
of
a
written
foreign
law,
on
the
other
hand,
is
provided
for
under
Rule
available
at
the
Embassy
Mr.
Sy
Kiat
a
Chinese
national
and
Mrs.
Yao
Kee
132
section
25,
thus:
alias
Yui
Yip
also
Chinese
were
married
on
January
19,
1931
in
Fukien,
the
People's
Republic
of
China.
SEC.
25.
Proof
of
public
or
official
record.—An
official
record
or
an
entry
therein,
when
admissible
for
any
purpose,
may
be
evidenced
by
an
These
evidence
may
very
well
prove
the
fact
of
marriage
between
Yao
Kee
and
official
publication
thereof
or
by
a
copy
attested
by
the
officer
having
the
Sy
Kiat.
However,
the
same
do
not
suffice
to
establish
the
validity
of
said
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
his
deputy,
and
accompanied,
if
the
marriage
in
accordance
with
Chinese
law
or
custom.
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
certificate
that
such
officer
has
the
custody.
If
the
office
in
which
the
record
is
kept
is
in
a
foreign
Custom
is
defined
as
"a
rule
of
conduct
formed
by
repetition
of
acts,
country,
the
certificate
may
be
made
by
a
secretary
of
embassy
or
uniformly
observed
(practiced)
as
a
social
rule,
legally
binding
and
legation,
consul
general,
consul,
vice
consul,
or
consular
agent
or
by
any
obligatory".
The
law
requires
that
"a
custom
must
be
proved
as
a
fact,
officer
in
the
foreign
service
of
the
Philippines
stationed
in
the
foreign
according
to
the
rules
of
evidence"
[Art.
12,
NCC.]
On
this
score
the
Court
had
country
in
which
the
record
is
kept
and
authenticated
by
the
seal
of
his
occasion
to
state
that
"a
local
custom
as
a
source
of
right
can
not
be
office.
considered
by
a
court
of
justice
unless
such
custom
is
properly
established
by
competent
evidence
like
any
other
fact.”
The
same
evidence,
if
not
one
of
a
The
Court
has
interpreted
§25
to
include
competent
evidence
like
the
higher
degree,
should
be
required
of
a
foreign
custom.
testimony
of
a
witness
to
prove
the
existence
of
a
written
foreign
law.
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In
the
case
at
bar
petitioners
did
not
present
any
competent
evidence
relative
celebrated,
it
therefore
follows
that
her
marriage
to
Sy
Kiat,
even
if
true,
to
the
law
and
custom
of
China
on
marriage.
The
testimonies
of
Yao
and
Gan
cannot
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction.
Ching
cannot
be
considered
as
proof
of
China's
law
or
custom
on
marriage
not
only
because
they
are
self-‐serving
evidence,
but
more
importantly,
there
is
no
2.
Yes.
Private
respondents
on
the
other
hand
are
also
the
deceased's
showing
that
they
are
competent
to
testify
on
the
subject
matter.
For
failure
acknowledged
natural
children
with
Asuncion
Gillego.
They
have
in
their
favor
to
prove
the
foreign
law
or
custom,
and
consequently,
the
validity
of
the
their
father's
acknowledgment,
evidenced
by
a
compromise
agreement
marriage
in
accordance
with
said
law
or
custom,
the
marriage
between
Yao
Kee
entered
into
by
and
between
their
parents
and
approved
by
the
CFI,
wherein
Sy
and
Sy
Kiat
cannot
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction.
Kiat
not
only
acknowleged
them
as
his
children
by
Asuncion
Gillego
but
likewise
made
provisions
for
their
support
and
future
inheritance.
Petitioners
cited
the
case
of
Sy
Joc
Lieng
v.
Sy
Quia,
where
the
party
alleging
the
foreign
marraige
were
not
duty
bound
to
prove
the
Chinese
law
on
As
regards
petitioners,
they
failed
to
establish
the
marriage
of
Yao
Kee
with
Sy
marriage
as
judicial
notice
thereof
had
been
taken
by
the
Court.
This
Kiat
according
to
the
laws
of
China.
Thus,
they
cannot
be
accorded
the
status
of
contention
is
erroneous.
Well-‐established
in
this
jurisdiction
is
the
principle
legitimate
children
but
only
that
of
acknowledged
natural
children.
Petitioners
that
Philippine
courts
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
foreign
laws.
They
must
are
natural
children,
it
appearing
that
at
the
time
of
their
conception
Yao
Kee
be
alleged
and
proved
as
any
other
fact.
Moreover
a
reading
of
said
case
and
Sy
Kiat
were
not
disqualified
by
any
impediment
to
marry
one
another
[See
would
show
that
the
party
alleging
the
foreign
marriage
presented
a
witness,
Art.
269,
Civil
Code.]
one
Li
Ung
Bieng,
to
prove
that
matrimonial
letters
mutually
exchanged
by
the
contracting
parties
constitute
the
essential
requisite
for
a
marriage
to
be
85.
BOARD
OF
COMMISSIONERS
V.
DELA
ROSA
considered
duly
solemnized
in
China.
His
testimony
was
uniformly
G.R.
Nos.
95122-‐23
|
31
May
1991
corroborated
by
authors
on
the
subject
of
Chinese
marriage.
DOCTRINE:
"In
case
of
doubt,
all
presumptions
favor
the
solidarity
of
the
family.
Further,
assuming
arguendo
that
the
Court
has
indeed
taken
judicial
notice
of
Thus,
every
intendment
of
law
or
facts
leans
toward
the
validity
of
marriage,
the
law
of
China
on
marriage
in
the
aforecited
case,
petitioners
however
have
the
indissolubility
of
the
marriage
bonds,
the
legitimacy
of
children,
the
not
shown
any
proof
that
the
Chinese
law
or
custom
obtaining
at
the
time
community
of
property
during
marriage,
the
authority
of
parents
over
their
the
Sy
Joc
Lieng
marriage
was
celebrated
in
1847
was
still
the
law
when
the
children,
and
the
validity
of
defense
for
any
member
of
the
family
in
case
of
alleged
marriage
of
Sy
Kiat
to
Yao
Kee
took
place
in
1931
or
eighty-‐four
(84)
unlawful
aggression."
years
later.
Kyna’s
notes:
EXISTENCE
OF
THE
FOREIGN
MARRIAGE
ALG:
What
was
not
proved
is
the
CHINESE
law.
The
issue
of
deportation
would
Petitioners
moreover
cite
the
case
of
U.S.
v.
Memoracion,
where
the
testimony
be
resolved
by
filiation
of
the
father
(meaning
there
is
a
need
to
establish
the
of
one
of
the
contracting
parties
is
competent
evidence
to
show
the
fact
of
legitimate
filiation
with
the
father
by
proving
the
Chinese
law
relating
to
the
marriage.
This
case
however
is
not
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar
as
said
case
did
marriage.
(Constitution
in
1935
says
“…of
Filipino
FATHERS.
If
mother,
there
not
concern
a
foreign
marriage
and
the
issue
posed
was
whether
or
not
the
should
selection
at
the
age
of
majority).
oral
testimony
of
a
spouse
is
competent
evidence
to
prove
the
fact
of
marriage
in
a
complaint
for
adultery.
In
short,
William
didn’t
need
to
prove
fact
of
marriage
and
law
at
that
point
(he
was
only
12).
SC
didn’t
overturn
Adiong,
Yao
Kee
and
Wong
Wee.
Why?
Accordingly,
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
the
Chinese
law
on
marriage,
it
should
be
presumed
that
it
is
the
same
as
ours.
Since
Yao
Kee
admitted
in
her
1.
Deportation
proceeding
–
technical
rules
of
evidence
won’t
apply
testimony
that
there
was
no
solemnizing
officer
as
is
known
here
in
the
Philippines
[See
Art.
56,
Civil
Code]
when
her
alleged
marriage
to
Sy
Kiat
was
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2.
It
was
not
William’s
fault
-‐
The
lack
of
proof
of
Chinese
law
on
the
matter
2)
and
a
warrant
of
exclusion
also
dated
July
6,
1962
was
issued.
cannot
be
blamed
on
Santiago
Gatchalian
much
more
on
respondent
William
Gatchalian
who
was
then
a
twelve-‐year
old
minor.
The
fact
is,
as
records
William
and
the
others
covered
by
the
warrant
of
exclusion
filed
a
motion
for
indicate,
Santiago
was
not
pressed
by
the
Citizenship
Investigation
Board
to
re-‐
hearing
with
the
BOSI
where
the
deportation
case
was
assigned.
The
Acting
prove
the
laws
of
China
relating
to
marriage,
having
been
content
with
the
Commissioner
reaffirmed
Decision
1
and
recalled
the
warrant
of
arrest
against
testimony
of
Santiago
that
the
Marriage
Certificate
was
lost
or
destroyed
William.
during
the
Japanese
occupation
of
China.
Neither
was
Francisco
Gatchalian's
testimony
subjected
to
the
same
scrutiny
by
the
Board
of
Special
Inquiry.
However,
in
1990,
the
NBI
Acting
Director
recommended
that
William
be
charged
with
a
violation
of
the
Immigration
Act
of
1940
to
the
Justice
3.
Nevertheless,
the
testimonies
of
Santiago
Gatchalian
and
Francisco
Secretary,
who
then
indorsed
the
recommendation
to
the
Commissioner
of
Gatchalian
before
the
Philippine
consular
and
immigration
authorities
Immigration
for
investigation
and
immediate
action.
William
was
arrested
but
regarding
their
marriages,
birth
and
relationship
to
each
other
are
not
self-‐ was
also
released
on
the
same
day
upon
posting
a
P200K
cash
bond.
serving
but
are
admissible
in
evidence
as
statements
or
declarations
regarding
family
reputation
or
tradition
in
matters
of
pedigree
(Sec.
34,
Rule
130).
William
then
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition
before
the
Manila
RTC
(Judge
dela
Rosa
presided).
BOC
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
alleging
that
the
Regarding
burden
of
proof
(“…he
who
asserts
that
the
marriage
is
not
valid
judge
had
no
jurisdiction
over
the
BOC
and/or
the
BOSI.
The
MTD
was
denied
under
our
law
bears
the
burden
of
proof
to
present
the
foreign
law.)
This
is
a
and
the
judge
restrained
the
BOC
from
continuing
with
any
of
the
proceedings
circumstance
exclusively
applied
in
this
case.
The
general
rule
still
stands
that
that
would
lead
to
the
deportation
of
William.
one
still
has
to
prove
the
law
and
fact
of
marriage.
Two
days
later,
William’s
wife
and
minor
children
filed
an
injunction
case
FACTS:
before
the
Valenzuela
RTC
alleging
that
BOC
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
In
1960,
Santiago
Gatchalian
was
recognized
by
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
as
a
jurisdiction
in
the
institution
of
the
deportation
proceedings
against
William.
A
native
born
Filipino
citizen
following
the
citizenship
of
his
natural
mother.
He
TRO
was
issued
restraining
the
BOC
from
continuing
with
the
deportation
had
5
children
with
his
wife,
Chu
Gim
Tee:
Jose,
Gloria,
Francisco,
Elena
and
proceedings
against
William.
Benjamin.
In
the
present
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition,
BOC
seeks
to
set
aside
the
On
June
27,
1961,
2
of
Santiago’s
children
(Gloria
and
Francisco),
together
with
abovementioned
TRO
and
resolutions
of
the
Manila
and
Valenzuela
RTC.
Francisco’s
sons
(William
and
Johnson),
arrived
in
Manila
from
Hong
Kong
seeking
admission
as
Filipino
citizens.
They
had
with
them
Certificates
of
ISSUES:
Registration
and
Identity
issued
by
the
Philippine
Consulate
in
HK.
After
Whether
William
(respondent)
is
a
Filipino
citizen
and
therefore
should
NOT
be
investigation,
the
Board
of
Special
Inquiry
No.
1
(BOSI)
rendered
a
decision
deported.
dated
July
6,
1961
(Decision
1)
admitting
William
and
his
companions
as
Filipino
citizens.
They
were
then
issued
an
Identification
Certificate
by
the
immigration
HELD:
authorities.
Petitioners,
on
the
other
hand,
claim
that
respondent
is
an
alien.
In
support
of
their
position,
petitioners
point
out
that
Santiago
Gatchalian's
marriage
with
The
following
year,
the
DOJ
Secretary
directed
the
Board
of
Commissioners
Chu
Gim
Tee
in
China
as
well
as
the
marriage
of
Francisco
(father
of
William)
(BOC)
to
review
all
cases
where
entry
was
allowed
on
the
ground
that
the
Gatchalian
to
Ong
Chiu
Kiok,
likewise
in
China,
were
not
supported
by
any
entrant
was
a
Philippine
citizen,
including
the
case
of
William
and
his
relatives.
evidence
other
than
their
own
self-‐serving
testimony
nor
was
there
any
On
July
6,
1962,
the
BOC
reversed
the
decision
of
the
BOSI
(Reversal
=
Decision
showing
what
the
laws
of
China
were.
It
is
the
postulate
advanced
by
petitioners
that
for
the
said
marriages
to
be
valid
in
this
country,
it
should
have
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been
shown
that
they
were
valid
by
the
laws
of
China
wherein
the
same
were
This
forecloses
any
further
question
about
the
Philippine
citizenship
of
contracted.
There
being
none,
petitioners
conclude
that
the
aforesaid
respondent
William
Gatchalian.
marriages
cannot
be
considered
valid.
Hence,
Santiago's
children,
including
The
Court
is
not
unaware
of
Woong
Woo
Yiu
vs.
Vivo
(13
SCRA
552
[1965])
Francisco,
followed
the
citizenship
of
their
mother,
having
been
born
outside
relied
upon
by
petitioners.
The
ruling
arrived
thereat,
however,
cannot
apply
in
of
a
valid
marriage.
Similarly,
the
validity
of
the
Francisco's
marriage
not
the
case
at
bar
for
the
simple
reason
that
the
parties
therein
testified
to
have
having
been
demonstrated,
William
and
Johnson
followed
the
citizenship
of
been
married
in
China
by
a
village
leader,
which
undoubtedly
is
not
among
their
mother,
a
Chinese
national.
those
authorized
to
solemnize
marriage
as
provided
in
Art.
56
of
the
Civil
Code
(now
Art.
7,
Family
Code).
Philippine
law,
following
the
lex
loci
celebrationis,
adheres
to
the
rule
that
a
marriage
formally
valid
where
celebrated
is
valid
everywhere.
Referring
to
84.
EUGENIO
V.
VELEZ
marriages
contracted
abroad,
Art.
71
of
the
Civil
Code
(now
Art.
26
of
the
1990
Family
Code)
provides
that
"(a)ll
marriages
performed
outside
of
the
Philippines
in
accordance
with
the
laws
in
force
in
the
country
where
they
were
DOCTRINE:
The
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code,
unless
expressly
providing
to
the
performed,
and
valid
there
as
such,
shall
also
be
valid
in
this
country
.
.
."
And
contrary
as
in
Article
144,
when
referring
to
a
"spouse"
contemplate
a
lawfully
any
doubt
as
to
the
validity
of
the
matrimonial
unity
and
the
extent
as
to
how
wedded
spouse.
far
the
validity
of
such
marriage
may
be
extended
to
the
consequences
of
the
coverture
is
answered
by
Art.
220
of
the
Civil
Code
in
this
manner:
"In
case
of
ALG:
GR:
Common
law
marriages
are
unrecognized
in
the
Philippines.
doubt,
all
presumptions
favor
the
solidarity
of
the
family.
Thus,
every
EXC:
Unless
the
law
expressly
provides
that
it
involves
common
law
marriages:
intendment
of
law
or
facts
leans
toward
the
validity
of
marriage,
the
1.
Article
144
of
the
Family
Code
-‐
When
a
man
and
a
woman
live
together
as
indissolubility
of
the
marriage
bonds,
the
legitimacy
of
children,
the
husband
and
wife,
but
they
are
not
married,
or
their
marriage
is
void
from
the
community
of
property
during
marriage,
the
authority
of
parents
over
their
beginning,
the
property
acquired
by
either
or
both
of
them
through
their
work
children,
and
the
validity
of
defense
for
any
member
of
the
family
in
case
of
or
industry
or
their
wages
and
salaries
shall
be
governed
by
the
rules
on
co-‐
unlawful
aggression."
(Emphasis
supplied).
Bearing
in
mind
the
"processual
ownership.
presumption"
enunciated
in
Miciano
and
other
cases,
he
who
asserts
that
the
marriage
is
not
valid
under
our
law
bears
the
burden
of
proof
to
present
the
2.
Art.
332
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code
-‐
Persons
exempt
from
criminal
liability.
—
foreign
law.
No
criminal,
but
only
civil
liability,
shall
result
from
the
commission
of
the
crime
of
theft,
swindling
or
malicious
mischief
committed
or
caused
mutually
by
the
Having
declared
the
assailed
marriages
as
valid,
respondent
William
Gatchalian
following
persons:
follows
the
citizenship
of
his
father
Francisco,
a
Filipino,
as
a
legitimate
child
of
the
latter.
Francisco,
in
turn
is
likewise
a
Filipino
being
the
legitimate
child
of
1.
Spouses,
ascendants
and
descendants,
or
relatives
by
affinity
in
the
same
Santiago
Gatchalian
who
(the
latter)
is
admittedly
a
Filipino
citizen
whose
line.
x
x
x
Philippine
citizenship
was
recognized
by
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
in
an
order
dated
July
12,
1960.
3.
Article
34
of
the
Family
Code
-‐
Art.
34.
No
license
shall
be
necessary
for
the
marriage
of
a
man
and
a
woman
who
have
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife
Finally,
respondent
William
Gatchalian
belongs
to
the
class
of
Filipino
citizens
for
at
least
five
years
and
without
any
legal
impediment
to
marry
each
other.
contemplated
under
Sec.
1,
Article
IV
of
the
Constitution,
which
provides:
The
contracting
parties
shall
state
the
foregoing
facts
in
an
affidavit
before
any
Sec.
1.
The
following
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines:
person
authorized
by
law
to
administer
oaths.
The
solemnizing
officer
shall
also
(1)
Those
who
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
the
adoption
of
this
state
under
oath
that
he
ascertained
the
qualifications
of
the
contracting
Constitution.
.
.
.
parties
are
found
no
legal
impediment
to
the
marriage.
(76a)
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support
under
Art.
294
was
used
as
the
basis
of
the
award.
Since
there
was
no
FACTS:
surviving
spouse,
ascendants
or
descendants,
the
brothers
and
sisters
were
Unaware
of
Vitaliana's
death
on
August
28,
1988,
her
full
blood
brothers
and
preferred
over
petitioner
who
was
merely
a
common
law
spouse,
the
latter
sisters
(Vargases)
filed
on
September
27,
1988,
a
petition
for
habeas
corpus
being
himself
legally
married
to
another
woman.
before
the
RTC
of
Misamis
Oriental.
They
alleged
that
Vitaliana
was
forcefully
taken
by
Eugenio
and
was
detained
in
his
palacial
residence
in
Jasaan,
Misamis
ISSUES:
Oriental.
At
the
time
the
petition
was
filed,
it
was
alleged
that
Vitaliana
was
25,
1)
Whether
the
court
has
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
and
nature
of
the
single,
and
living
with
Eugenio.
The
next
day,
the
court
issued
the
writ
of
proceedings
(YES)
habeas
corpus
but
the
writ
was
returned
unsatisfied.
Counsel
of
Eugenio
stated
2)
Whether
Eugenio
can
be
considered
as
the
spouse
of
Vitaliana.
(NO)
that
Vitaliana
already
died
on
Aug.
28
because
of
heart
failure
due
to
her
pregnancy
and
that
Eugenio
refused
to
surrender
the
corpse
on
the
ground
HELD:
that
a
corpse
cannot
be
the
subject
of
habeas
corpus
and
that
he
had
already
Full
blood
brothers
and
sisters
of
Vitaliana
(deceased)
alleged
that
Eugenio
was
obtained
a
burial
permit.
Furthermore,
since
he
is
the
common
law
spouse,
he
in
no
way
related
to
Vitaliana
and
that
he
was
wrongfully
interfering
with
the
has
the
right
to
the
custody
of
the
body
and
to
perform
the
burial
rights.
Vargases'
duty
to
bury
her.
They
invoked
the
Civil
Code
provisions
on
asserting
Eugenio
filed
an
urgent
motion
to
dismiss
based
on
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
that
they
are
to
be
considered
as
the
next
of
kin
in
the
Philippines
and
nature
of
the
action.
therefore
they
are
the
legal
custodians
of
the
corpse.
Satisfied
with
its
jurisdiction,
the
respondent
court
then
proceeded
to
the
matter
of
rightful
A
special
proceeding
for
habeas
corpus,
Eugenio
argued,
is
not
applicable
to
a
custody
over
the
dead
body,
(for
purposes
of
burial
thereof).
The
order
of
dead
person
but
extends
only
to
all
cases
of
illegal
confinement
or
detention
of
preference
to
give
support
under
Art.
294
was
used
as
the
basis
of
the
award.
a
live
person.
On
the
side
of
the
Vargases,
they
were
granted
leave
of
court
to
Since
there
was
no
surviving
spouse,
ascendants
or
descendants,
the
brothers
amend
their
petition.
They
alleged
that
Eugenio
was
in
no
way
related
to
and
sisters
were
preferred
over
petitioner
who
was
merely
a
common
law
Vitaliana
and
that
he
was
wrongfully
interfering
with
the
Vargases'
duty
to
bury
spouse,
the
latter
being
himself
legally
married
to
another
woman.
her.
They
invoked
the
Civil
Code
provisions
on
asserting
that
they
are
to
be
considered
as
the
next
of
kin
in
the
Philippines
and
therefore
they
are
the
legal
The
court
held
that
the
custody
of
the
dead
body
of
Vitaliana
was
correctly
custodians
of
the
corpse.
The
motion
to
dismiss
was
denied.
Thereafter,
the
awarded
to
the
surviving
brothers
and
sisters
pursuant
to
Section
1103
of
the
court
a
quo
proceeded
as
in
or
civil
cases
and,
in
due
course,
rendered
a
Revised
Administrative
Code
which
provides:
decision,
resolving
the
main
issue
of
whether
or
not
said
court
acquired
“Persons
charged
with
duty
of
burial-‐
if
the
deceased
was
an
jurisdiction
over
the
case
by
treating
it
as
an
action
for
custody
of
a
dead
body,
unmarried
man
or
woman
or
a
child
and
left
any
kin;
the
duty
of
the
without
the
petitioners
having
to
file
a
separate
civil
action
for
such
relief,
and
burial
shall
devolve
upon
the
nearest
kin
of
the
deceased.
without
the
Court
first
dismissing
the
original
petition
for
habeas
corpus.
Petitioner
claims
he
is
the
spouse
contemplated
under
Art.
294
of
the
Civil
The
amendments
to
the
petition
were
but
elaborations
but
the
ultimate
facts
Code,
the
term
spouse
used
therein
not
being
preceded
by
any
qualification;
remained
the
same,
hence,
this
court
strongly
finds
that
this
court
has
ample
hence,
in
the
absence
of
such
qualification,
he
is
the
rightful
custodian
of
jurisdiction
to
entertain
and
sit
on
this
case
as
an
action
for
custody
and
burial
Vitaliana's
body.
Vitaliana's
brothers
and
sisters
contend
otherwise.
Indeed,
of
the
dead
body
because
the
body
of
the
petition
controls
and
is
binding
and
Philippine
Law
does
not
recognize
common
law
marriages.
A
man
and
woman
since
this
case
was
raffled
to
this
court
to
the
exclusion
of
all
other
courts,
it
is
not
legally
married
who
cohabit
for
many
years
as
husband
and
wife,
who
the
primary
duty
of
this
court
to
decide
and
dispose
of
this
case.
represent
themselves
to
the
public
as
husband
and
wife,
and
who
are
reputed
to
be
husband
and
wife
in
the
community
where
they
live
may
be
considered
Satisfied
with
its
jurisdiction,
the
respondent
court
then
proceeded
to
the
legally
mauled
in
common
law
jurisdictions
but
not
in
the
Philippines.
matter
of
rightful
custody
over
the
dead
body.
The
order
of
preference
to
give
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ARIS
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While
it
is
true
that
our
laws
do
not
just
brush
aside
the
fact
that
such
Termination
of
marriage
relations
–
void
relationships
are
present
in
our
society,
and
that
they
produce
a
community
of
properties
and
interests
which
is
governed
by
law,
authority
exists
in
case
law
After
marriage
à
void
in
both
circumstances.
So
characterization
would
have
to
the
effect
that
such
form
of
co-‐ownership
requires
that
the
man
and
woman
not
happened
at
all.
living
together
must
not
in
any
way
be
incapacitated
to
contract
marriage.
In
any
case,
herein
petitioner
has
a
subsisting
marriage
with
another
woman,
a
FACTS:
legal
impediment
which
disqualified
him
from
even
legally
marrying
Vitaliana.
Oct.
18,
1969
–
Private
respondent
Jose
Vicente
De
Leon
and
petitioner
Sylvia
In
Santero
vs.
CFI
of
Cavite,
the
Court,
thru
Mr.
Justice
Paras,
interpreting
Art.
Lichauco
De
Leon
were
united
in
wedlock
before
the
Municipal
Mayor
of
188
of
the
Civil
Code
(Support
of
Surviving
Spouse
and
Children
During
Binangonan
Rizal
Liquidation
of
Inventoried
Property)
stated:
"Be
it
noted
however
that
with
Aug.
28,
1971
–
Susana
L.
De
Leon
were
born
from
this
union
respect
to
'spouse',
the
same
must
be
the
legitimate
'spouse'
(not
common-‐law
Oct.
1972
–
De
facto
separation
between
the
spouses
occurred
due
to
spouses)."
irreconcilable
marital
differences;
Sylvia
left
the
conjugal
home
March
1973
–
Sylvia
went
to
the
US
and
obtained
American
citizenship
There
is
a
view
that
under
Article
332
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code,
the
term
Nov.
29,
1973
–
Sylvia
filed
with
the
Superior
Court
of
California,
a
petition
for
"spouse"
embraces
common
law
relation
for
purposes
of
exemption
from
dissolution
of
marriage
against
Jose
Vicente;
also
filed
claims
for
support
and
criminal
liability
in
cases
of
theft,
swindling
and
malicious
mischief
committed
distribution
of
properties/
but
since
Jose
Vicente
was
a
Philippine
resident
and
or
caused
mutually
by
spouses.
The
Penal
Code
article,
it
is
said,
makes
no
did
not
have
any
assets
in
the
US,
Sylvia
held
the
divorce
proceedings
in
distinction
between
a
couple
whose
cohabitation
is
sanctioned
by
a
sacrament
abeyance
and
concentrated
her
efforts
to
obtain
property
settlements
with
or
legal
tie
and
another
who
are
husband
and
wife
de
facto.
But
this
view
Jose
Vicente
cannot
even
apply
to
the
facts
of
the
case
at
bar.
We
hold
that
the
provisions
March
16,
1977
–
Sylvia
entered
into
a
Letter-‐Agreement
with
private
of
the
Civil
Code,
unless
expressly
providing
to
the
contrary
as
in
Article
144,
respondent
Macaria
De
Leon
(her
mother-‐in-‐law)
when
referring
to
a
"spouse"
contemplate
a
lawfully
wedded
spouse.
March
30,
1977
-‐
Sylvia
and
Jose
Vicente
filed
before
the
CFI
of
Rizal
a
joint
Petitioner
vis-‐a-‐vis
Vitaliana
was
not
a
lawfully-‐wedded
spouse
to
her;
in
fact,
petition
for
judicial
approval
of
dissolution
of
their
conjugal
partnership
he
was
not
legally
capacitated
to
marry
her
in
her
lifetime.
Trial
court:
declared
that
the
conjugal
partnership
of
the
spouses
is
DISSOLVED
March
17,
1980
–
Sylvia
moved
for
the
execution
of
the
Order
of
the
trial
court;
81.
DE
LEON
V.
CA
Vicente
moved
for
MR
186
SCRA
347
(1990)
April
20,
1980
–
Macaria
filed
with
the
trial
court
a
motion
for
leave
to
intervene,
alleging
that
she
is
the
owner
of
the
properties
involved
in
the
case;
DOCTRINE:
But
marriage
is
NOT
a
mere
contract
but
a
sacred
social
assailed
the
validity
and
legality
of
the
Letter-‐Agreement
which
had
for
its
institution.
Thus,
Art.
52
of
the
Civil
Code
provides:
Art.
52.
Marriage
is
not
a
purpose,
the
termination
of
the
marital
relations
of
the
spouses
mere
contract
but
an
inviolable
social
institution.
Its
nature,
consequences
CA:
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
RTC
and
incidents
are
governed
by
law
and
not
subject
to
stipulations...
ISSUE:
Kyna’s
notes:
Whether
or
not
the
Letter-‐Agreement
is
valid
ALG:
What
is
the
issue
in
COL?
IT
IS
A
CHARACTERIZATION
EXAMPLE
IN
RELATION
TO
MARRIAGE.
HELD:
No.
The
only
basis
by
which
Sylvia
may
lay
claim
to
the
properties
which
are
the
Agreement
executed
before
marriage
subject
matter
of
the
Letter-‐Agreement,
is
the
Letter-‐Agreement
itself.
Sylvia
Termination
of
property
relation
–
would
have
been
valid
insists
that
the
consideration
for
her
execution
of
the
Letter-‐Agreement
was
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the
termination
of
property
relations
with
her
husband.
Indeed,
Sylvia
and
Jose
citizen
and
a
foreigner
is
validly
celebrated
and
a
divorce
is
thereafter
Vicente
subsequently
filed
a
joint
petition
for
judicial
approval
of
the
validly
obtained
abroad
by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating
him
or
her
to
dissolution
of
their
conjugal
partnership,
sanctioned
by
Article
191
of
the
Civil
remarry,
the
Filipino
spouse
shall
have
capacity
to
remarry
under
Code.
On
the
other
hand,
Macaria
and
Jose
Vicente
assert
that
the
Philippine
law.
consideration
was
the
termination
of
marital
relationship.
2.
CASE
OF
VAN
DORN
(FOREIGN
SPOUSE
IS
ESTOPPED
FROM
DENYING
RTC
said
that
the
cause
or
consideration
for
the
intervenor
Macaria
De
Leon
in
THE
DIVORCE
BECAUSE
HE/SHE
HIMSELF/HERSELF
OBTAINED
THE
having
executed
the
Letter-‐Agreement
was
the
termination
of
the
marital
DIVORCE
DECREE
IN
ANOTHER
STATE)
relationship
between
her
son
Jose
Vicente
De
Leon
and
Sylvia
Lichauco
de
3.
NECESSARY
RECOGNITION
(IF
BOTH
SPOUSES
ARE
ALIENS
–
THEY
Leon.
ARE
GOVERNED
BY
THEIR
NATIONAL
LAW
ACCDG
TO
ART.
15)
But
marriage
is
NOT
a
mere
contract
but
a
sacred
social
institution.
Thus,
Art.
WHAT
GOVERNS
ANNULMENT?
52
of
the
Civil
Code
provides:
Art.
52.
Marriage
is
not
a
mere
contract
but
an
LAW
GOVERNING
THE
FORMAL
AND
SUBSTANTIVE
VALIDITY
OF
inviolable
social
institution.
Its
nature,
consequences
and
incidents
are
MARRIAGE
governed
by
law
and
not
subject
to
stipulations...
75.
HIX
V.
FLUEMER
From
the
foregoing
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
court
believes
that
Macaria
G.R.
No.
L-‐34259
|
March
21,
1931
De
Leon’s
undertaking
that
the
termination
of
marital
relationship
is
not
only
contrary
to
law
but
also
to
Filipino
morals
and
public
policy.
As
such,
any
DOCTRINES:
It
is
not
the
citizenship
of
the
plaintiff
for
divorce,
which
confers
agreement
or
obligations
based
on
such
unlawful
consideration
and
which
is
jurisdiction
upon
a
court,
but
his
legal
residence
within
the
State
where
he
contrary
to
public
policy
should
be
deemed
null
and
void.
applies
for
a
divorce.
Even
granting
that
the
consideration
of
the
Letter-‐Agreement
was
the
Hix
himself
believed
he
had
relinquished
his
former
legal
residence
in
West
termination
of
property
relations,
the
Court
said
that:
Virginia,
of
which
he
was
a
citizen,
upon
establishing
his
marriage
domicile
in
the
City
of
Manila,
Philippine
Islands,
is
shown
by
the
fact
that
he
had
to
Art.
221.
The
following
shall
be
void
and
of
no
effect:
reestablish
his
residence
in
said
State
for
the
length
of
time
fixed
by
the
law
(1)
Any
contract
for
personal
separation
between
husband
and
wife;
in
order
to
be
able
to
file
his
complaint
for
a
divorce.
(2)
Every
extra-‐judicial
agreement,
during
marriage,
for
the
dissolution
of
the
conjugal
partnership
of
gains
or
of
the
absolute
community
of
property
(1)
That
the
residence
acquired
in
a
state
of
the
American
Union
by
a
husband,
between
husband
and
wife
who,
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
a
divorce,
abandons
the
country
wherein
are
his
matrimonial
domicile
and
his
wife,
who
is
living
apart
from
him
by
mutual
DIVORCE
consent,
and
then
returns
to
said
matrimonial
domicile
after
obtaining
a
divorce,
continues
residing,
therein
and
engaging
in
business,
is
not
bona
fide
residence,
and
does
not
confer
jurisdiction
upon
the
court
even
if
he
alleges
in
DIVORCE
IS
THE
LEGAL
DISSOLUTION
OF
THE
MARRIAGE
BOND
RENDERED
BY
A
the
complaint
for
divorce
that
he
intends
to
reside
permanently
in
said
state;
(2)
COMPETENT
COURT
FOR
CAUSES
DEFINED
BY
LAW
WHICH
AROSE
AFTER
that
the
summons
by
publication
in
a
complaint
for
divorce,
filed
in
a
state
by
MARRIAGE.
IT
PRESUPPOSES
THAT
MARRIAGE
IS
VALID.
the
husband
who
has
gone
to
said
state,
abandoning
his
matrimonial
domicile
where
his
wife
continues
to
reside,
does
not
confer
jurisdiction
upon
the
court
METHODS
BY
WHICH
PHIL.
LAW
RECOGNIZES
DIVORCE:
over
the
person
of
said
wife
when
she
has
not
entered
an
appearance
in
the
1.
FAMILY
CODE,
ARTICLE
26(2)
-‐
Where
a
marriage
between
a
Filipino
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case,
and
the
decree
issued
by
said
court
dissolving
the
marriage
is
not
binding
On
March
16,
1919,
the
appellant
left
for
Canada,
where
she
remained
with
upon
her;
and
(3)
that
a
decree
of
divorce
issued
by
a
court
of
any
state
or
their
child
until
February,
1921,
when
she
returned
to
Manila
in
a
very
territory
of
the
American
Union,
or
of
a
foreign
country,
may
be
impeached
in
precarious
condition
of
health
and
was
given
medical
treatment
in
the
St.
another
case
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
in
said
court
over
the
subject
matter,
or
Paul's
Hospital
at
the
expense
of
her
husband.
After
she
regained
her
health,
over
the
person
of
the
defendant,
or
for
fraud
in
obtaining
it
on
the
part
of
the
she
lived
apart
from
her
husband
by
mutual
consent.
person
procuring
it.
On
December
7,
1922,
the
appellant
instituted
an
action
in
the
CFI
of
Manila
Av:
Phil.
Law
does
not
prohibit
aliens
from
obtaining
divorce
decrees.
(Art.
26)
against
her
husband,
E.
Randolph
Hix,
for
the
purpose
of
compelling
him
to
As
long
as
the
divorce
is
validly
obtained
abroad,
it
shall
be
recognized
in
the
provide
adequate
support
for
herself
and
her
son,
Preston
Randolf
Hix.
The
trial
Phil.
HOWEVER,
how
is
divorce
validly
obtained
abroad
by
an
alien
spouse?
court
adjudicated
the
case
in
her
favor
and
ordered
the
defendant
E.
Randolph
Hix
to
pay
her
the
sum
of
P500
in
advance
on
or
before
the
5th
day
of
each
1.
Divorce
must
have
been
valid
under
the
national
law
of
the
foreign
spouse
month
for
the
maintenance
of
herself
and
her
son.
(Plead
and
prove
national
law)
2.
The
court
granting
the
divorce
decree
must
have
had
jurisdiction
to
render
In
the
month
of
May,
1925,
(12
years
after
they
established
their
domicile
in
such.
The
court
acquires
jurisdiction
if
the
state
of
the
court
is
the
matrimonial
Manila)
that
is,
one
year
after
his
arrival
at
Elkins,
West
Virginia,
the
deceased
domicile
of
the
spouses.
(Hix
v.
Fluemer)
filed
a
complaint
for
a
divorce
with
the
Circuit
Court
of
Randolph
County,
West
Virginia,
alleging,
among
other
things,
that
he
was
a
citizen
of
the
US,
and
FACTS:
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
and
had
been
for
more
than
one
year
prior
to
the
E.
Randolph
Hix
was
born
in
the
year
1866
in
Union,
South
Carolina,
where
he
date
of
the
institution
of
the
suit,
an
actual
bona
fide
citizen
and
resident
of
lived
with
his
parents
until
the
age
of
15.
They
then
moved
to
Rye,
Westchester
Randolph
County,
West
Virginia;
that
Annie
Cousins
Hix
was
a
resident
of
the
County,
New
York.
A
few
years
later,
he
was
sent
to
the
University
of
Lehigh,
City
of
Peking,
China;
that
on
December
1,
1921,
his
wife
had
abandoned
and
and
to
the
Massachusetts
Institute
of
Technology,
leaving
the
latter
before
deserted
him,
taking
up
a
separate
residence
and
declining
to
live
or
have
graduating,
to
accept
employment
with
the
Edison
Company
where
he
worked
anything
to
do
with
him;
that
he,
Hix,
freely,
voluntarily,
and
adequately
for
about
three
years.
After
resigning
from
his
position
he
opened
an
office
and
supported
his
wife
and
child,
paying
her
the
sum
of
$175
per
month;
that
he
engaged
in
private
work
as
consulting
engineer
and
contractor
until
the
year
intended
to
reside
permanently
in
the
US,
and
that
it
was
with
such
intention
1895,
when
he
moved
to
Wheeling,
West
Virginia,
to
engage
in
the
general
that
he
had
returned
to
West
Virginia;
that
he
and
his
wife
had
been
living
engineering
business
as
a
member
of
the
firm
of
Hogg
&
Hix,
surveyors.
apart
for
three
years,
and
that
she
had
rejected
his
offer
of
reconciliation.
As
the
appellant
was
not
a
resident
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
she
was
After
fifteen
years
of
residence
in
Wheeling,
he
took
an
examination
and
summoned
upon
the
complaint
for
divorce
by
publication,
and
not
having
received
an
appointment
as
coal
expert
for
the
Philippine
Government,
arriving
entered
an
appearance
in
the
case,
either
personally
or
by
counsel
within
the
at
Manila
some
time
during
the
year
1910.
While
E.
Randolph
Hix
was
living
in
term
fixed,
the
Circuit
Court
of
Randolph
County,
West
Virginia,
rendered
Manila
in
1912,
he
met
appellant
Annie
and
married
her
in
Shanghai,
China,
on
judgment
against
her
in
1925
declaring
her
marriage
with
the
plaintiff
or
about
June
24,
1913,
returning
to
Manila
where
they
established
their
dissolved.
Having
procured
the
divorce,
E.
Randolph
Hix
returned
to
Manila
in
domicile.
A
son
was
born
of
this
union
in
Boston,
Massachusetts,
on
July
1,
1927,
where
he
continued
to
live
and
engaged
in
business
up
to
the
time
of
his
1915,
named
Preston
Randolph
Hix,
while
she
was
in
the
US
where
she
had
death
in
the
year
1929.
gone
on
the
month
of
May
of
the
same
year
to
visit
her
family
and
the
mother
and
sister
of
her
husband.
The
appellant
returned
to
Manila
in
November,
ISSUE:
1916,
and
continued
to
live
with
the
deceased
as
husband
and
wife.
Whether
the
Circuit
Court
of
Randolph
County
in
West
Virginia
acquired
jurisdiction
to
take
cognizance
of
the
complaint
for
divorce
filed
by
E
.Randolph
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Hix
and
to
render
a
valid
and
binding
judgment
against
the
petitioner
and
applies
for
a
divorce.
That
E.
Randolph
Hix
himself
believed
he
had
appellant,
Annie
Cousins
Hix.
relinquished
his
former
legal
residence
in
West
Virginia,
of
which
he
was
a
citizen,
upon
establishing
his
marriage
domicile
in
the
City
of
Manila,
HELD:
Philippine
Islands,
is
shown
by
the
fact
that
he
had
to
reestablish
his
In
order
that
a
judgment
of
a
court
or
judge
of
any
state
of
the
American
Union
residence
in
said
State
for
the
length
of
time
fixed
by
the
law
in
order
to
be
with
respect
to
the
personal
or
legal
condition
of
a
particular
person
may
be
able
to
file
his
complaint
for
a
divorce.
conclusive
and
constitute
res
judicata,
it
is
essential
that
the
court
have
jurisdiction,
and
such
jurisdiction
is
presumed
in
the
absence
of
evidence
to
the
Since
E.
Randolph
Hix
was
not
a
bona
fide
resident
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
contrary.
the
divorce
decree
he
obtained
from
the
Circuit
Court
of
Randolph
County,
is
null
and
void,
said
court
having
failed
to
acquire
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
Section
312
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
provides:
matter.
SEC.
312.
How
Judicial
Record
May
be
Impeached.
—
Any
judicial
record
may
be
impeached
by
evidence
of
a
want
of
jurisdiction
in
the
court
or
judicial
officer,
That
the
residence
acquired
in
a
state
of
the
American
Union
by
a
husband,
of
collusion
between
the
parties,
or
of
fraud
in
the
party
offering
the
record,
in
who,
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
a
divorce,
abandons
the
country
wherein
respect
to
the
proceedings.
are
his
matrimonial
domicile
and
his
wife,
who
is
living
apart
from
him
by
mutual
consent,
and
then
returns
to
said
matrimonial
domicile
after
One
of
the
conditions
for
the
validity
of
a
decree
of
absolute
divorce
is
that
obtaining
a
divorce,
continues
residing,
therein
and
engaging
in
business,
is
the
court
granting
it
has
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter,
and
to
not
bona
fide
residence,
and
does
not
confer
jurisdiction
upon
the
court
even
this
end
the
plaintiff
must
be
domiciled
in
good
faith,
and
for
the
length
of
if
he
alleges
in
the
complaint
for
divorce
that
he
intends
to
reside
time
fixed
by
the
law,
in
the
state
in
which
it
was
granted.
E.
Randolph
Hix
permanently
in
said
state.
was
domiciled
in
the
City
of
Manila
where
he
lived
apart
from
his
wife
and
child,
by
mutual
consent,
and
here
he
had
his
business.
He
removed
to
the
77.
ARCA
V.
JAVIER
State
of
West
Virginia
leaving
his
aforesaid
wife
and
child
and
his
business
G.R.
No.
L-‐6768
|
July
31,
1954
behind,
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
an
absolute
divorce,
which
he
did
in
1925,
returning
in
the
year
1927
to
reside
in
the
City
of
Manila,
and
DOCTRINES:
One
of
the
essential
conditions
for
the
validity
of
a
decree
of
continuing
his
business.
divorce
is
that
the
court
must
have
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
and
in
order
that
this
may
be
acquired,
plaintiff
must
be
domiciled
in
good
faith
in
the
Although
the
opponent
and
appellee
attempted
to
show
that
E.
Randolph
Hix
State
in
which
it
is
granted.
So
it
has
been
held
that
"it
is
not
...
the
citizenship
went
to
West
Virginia
with
the
intention
of
residing
there
permanently,
as
of
the
plaintiff
for
divorce
which
confers
jurisdiction
upon
a
court,
but
his
legal
allege
in
the
complaint
for
divorce,
such
an
intention
was
contradicted
by
the
residence
within
the
State."
fact
that
before
leaving
the
City
of
Manila,
he
did
not
liquidate
his
business
but
placed
it
under
the
management
of
said
opponent,
and
once
having
obtained
[DVBD]
his
divorce,
he
returned
to
the
City
of
Manila
to
take
up
his
residence
and
to
1.
Neither
domiciled
+
merely
to
obtain
divorce
=
no
jurisdiction
to
determine
continue
his
aforesaid
business,
and
that
his
purpose
in
going
to
West
Virginia
martial
status
was
to
obtain
a
divorce.
2.
Voluntary
appearance
=/=
jurisdiction
3.
Bona
fide
residence
of
the
plaintiff
=
jurisdiction
This
ruling
has
not
been
weakened
in
the
present
case
by
the
fact
that
E.
4.
Matrimonial
domicile
governs
over
separate
domicile
in
good
faith
Randolph
Hix
was
a
citizen
of
the
United
States
and
of
the
State
of
West
Virginia,
since
it
is
not
the
citizenship
of
the
plaintiff
for
divorce
which
confers
The
courts
in
the
Philippines
can
grant
a
divorce
only
on
the
ground
of
jurisdiction
upon
a
court,
but
his
legal
residence
within
the
State
where
he
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"adultery
on
the
part
of
the
wife
or
concubinage
on
the
part
of
the
husband"
as
Philippines,
arriving
on
February
13,
1950.
After
his
arrival
in
the
Philippines,
provided
for
under
section
1
of
Act
No.
2710.
armed
with
two
decrees
of
divorce
issued
by
the
Circuit
Court
of
Mobile
County,
State
of
Alabama,
USA,
Alfredo
Javier
married
Maria
Odvina
before
the
Gulapa:
Divorce
was
filed
in
1940
and
was
issued
in
1941.
The
governing
law
Municipal
Court
of
Manila
on
April
19,
1950.
was
Act
2710
(Divorce
Law).
The
latter
only
allowed
divorce
on
the
grounds
of
concubinage
and
adultery.
At
the
instance
of
plaintiff
Salud,
an
information
for
bigamy
was
filed
by
the
Divorce
decree
here
relevant:
City
Fiscal
of
Manila
on
July
25,
1950
against
defendant
Alfredo
Javier
with
the
Filipinos
–
can
only
get
divorced
in
adultery
and
concubinage
CFI
of
Manila.
Foreigners
–
any
ground
as
long
as
it
is
validly
obtained
ISSUE:
In
this
case,
the
ground
alleged
by
Javier
was
abandonment
by
the
wife.
Whether
the
divorce
decree
has
a
valid
effect
in
this
jurisdiction
History
of
divorce
law
in
the
Philippines:
HELD:
Divorce
law
(1917)
à
Amended
to
include
other
grounds
(1942
during
the
No.
One
of
the
essential
conditions
for
the
validity
of
a
decree
of
divorce
is
Japanese
occupation)
à
It
was
amended
again
before
the
enactment
of
the
old
that
the
court
must
have
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
and
in
order
Civil
Code
à
U.S.
came
back
and
Philippines
went
back
to
the
Divorce
Law
à
that
this
may
be
acquired,
plaintiff
must
be
domiciled
in
good
faith
in
the
Divorce
Law
repealed
by
the
Civil
Code
(1950).
State
in
which
it
is
granted.
So
it
has
been
held
that
"it
is
not
...
the
citizenship
of
the
plaintiff
for
divorce
which
confers
jurisdiction
upon
a
court,
but
his
legal
residence
within
the
State."
FACTS:
Alfredo
Javier
was
a
native
born
citizen
of
the
Philippines
who,
in
1937,
married
It
is
true
that
Salud
filed
an
answer
in
the
divorce
case
instituted
at
the
Mobile
Salud
R.
Arca,
another
Filipino
citizen.
Before
their
marriage
they
had
already
a
County
in
view
of
the
summons
served
upon
her
in
this
jurisdiction,
but
this
child,
Alfredo
Javier,
Jr.,
who
thereby
became
legitimated.
In
1927
appellant
action
cannot
be
interpreted
as
placing
her
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
enlisted
in
the
U.S.
Navy
and
in
1938
(a
year
after
being
married)
sailed
for
the
because
it
was
a
special
appearance,
the
only
purpose
of
which
was
to
impugn
United
States
aboard
a
navy
ship
in
connection
with
his
service
leaving
behind
the
claim
of
appellant
that
his
domicile
or
legal
residence
at
that
time
was
his
wife
and
child,
and
on
August
13,
1940
(2
years
after
leaving),
he
filed
an
Mobile
County,
and
to
show
that
the
ground
of
desertion
imputed
to
her
was
action
for
divorce
in
the
Circuit
Court
of
Mobile
County,
Alabama,
U.S.A.,
baseless
and
false.
alleging
as
ground
abandonment
by
his
wife.
Having
received
a
copy
of
the
complaint,
Salud
R.
Arca
filed
an
answer
alleging,
among
other
things,
that
In
several
cases
this
court
laid
down
the
following
doctrines:
appellant
was
not
a
resident
of
Mobile
County,
but
of
Naic,
Cavite,
Philippines,
The
court
of
a
country
in
which
neither
of
the
spouses
is
domiciled
and
and
that
it
was
not
true
that
the
cause
of
their
separation
was
abandonment
to
which
one
or
both
of
them
may
resort
merely
for
the
purpose
of
on
her
part
but
that
appellant
was
in
the
US,
without
her,
because
he
was
then
obtaining
a
divorce
has
no
jurisdiction
to
determine
their
matrimonial
enlisted
in
the
U.S.
Navy.
Nevertheless,
the
Circuit
Court
of
Mobile
County
status;
and
a
divorce
granted
by
such
a
court
is
not
entitled
to
granted
a
decree
of
divorce
on
April
9,
1941.
recognition
elsewhere.
The
voluntary
appearance
of
the
defendant
before
such
a
tribunal
does
not
vest
the
court
with
jurisdiction.
In
July,
1941,
Alfredo
Javier
married
Thelma
Francis,
an
American
citizen,
and
bought
a
house
and
lot
at
248
Brooklyn,
NY
City.
In
1949,
Thelma
obtained
a
It
follows
that,
to
give
a
court
jurisdiction
on
the
ground
of
the
plaintiff's
divorce
from
him
for
reasons
not
disclosed
by
the
evidence,
and,
later
on,
residence
in
the
State
or
country
of
the
judicial
forum,
his
residence
having
retired
from
the
US
Navy,
defendant
Alfredo
Javier
returned
to
the
must
be
bona
fide.
If
a
spouse
leaves
the
family
domicile
and
goes
to
another
State
for
the
sole
purpose
of
obtaining
a
divorce,
and
with
no
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intention
of
remaining,
his
residence
there
is
not
sufficient
to
confer
decree
cannot
be
enforced
in
this
jurisdiction.
The
divorce
decree
in
question
jurisdiction
on
the
courts
of
the
State.
This
is
especially
true
where
the
was
granted
on
the
ground
of
desertion,
clearly
not
a
cause
for
divorce
under
cause
of
divorce
is
one
not
recognized
by
the
laws
of
the
State
of
his
our
laws.
own
domicile.
The
above
pronouncement
is
sound
as
it
is
in
keeping
with
the
well
known
But
even
if
his
residence
had
been
taken
up
in
good
faith,
and
the
court
principle
of
Private
International
Law
which
prohibits
the
extension
of
a
had
acquired
jurisdiction
to
take
cognizance
of
the
divorce
suit,
the
foreign
judgment,
or
the
law
affecting
the
same,
if
it
is
contrary
to
the
law
or
decree
issued
in
his
favor
is
not
binding
upon
the
appellant;
for
the
fundamental
policy
of
the
State
of
the
forum.
It
is
also
in
keeping
with
our
matrimonial
domicile
of
the
spouses
being
the
City
of
Manila,
and
no
concept
of
moral
values
which
has
always
looked
upon
marriage
as
an
new
domicile
having
been
acquired
in
West
Virginia,
the
summons
institution.
And
such
concept
has
actually
crystallized
in
a
more
tangible
made
by
publication,
she
not
having
entered
an
appearance
in
the
manner
when
in
the
new
Civil
Code
our
people,
through
Congress,
decided
to
case,
either
personally
or
by
counsel,
did
not
confer
jurisdiction
upon
eliminate
altogether
our
law
relative
to
divorce.
Because
of
such
concept
we
said
court
over
her
person.
cannot
but
react
adversely
to
any
attempt
to
extend
here
the
effect
of
a
decree
which
is
not
in
consonance
with
our
customs,
morals,
and
traditions.
At
all
times
the
matrimonial
domicile
of
this
couple
has
been
within
the
Philippine
Islands
and
the
residence
acquired
in
the
State
of
Nevada
by
The
courts
in
the
Philippines
can
grant
a
divorce
only
on
the
ground
of
the
husband
for
the
purpose
of
securing
a
divorce
was
not
a
bona
fide
"adultery
on
the
part
of
the
wife
or
concubinage
on
the
part
of
the
husband"
as
residence
and
did
not
confer
jurisdiction
upon
the
court
of
the
State
to
provided
for
under
section
1
of
Act
No.
2710.
The
divorce
decree
in
question
dissolve
the
bonds
of
matrimony
in
which
he
had
entered
in
1919.
was
granted
on
the
ground
of
desertion,
clearly
not
a
cause
for
divorce
under
our
laws.
That
our
divorce
law,
Act
No.
2710,
is
too
strict
or
too
liberal
is
not
for
In
the
light
of
the
foregoing
authorities,
it
cannot
therefore
be
said
that
the
this
court
decide.
(Barretto
Gonzales
vs.
Gonzales,
supra).
The
allotment
of
Mobile
County
Court
of
Alabama
had
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
case
for
the
powers
between
the
different
governmental
agencies
restricts
the
judiciary
simple
reason
that
at
the
time
it
was
filed
appellant's
legal
residence
was
then
within
the
confines
of
interpretation,
not
of
legislation.
The
legislative
policy
on
in
the
Philippines.
He
could
not
have
acquired
legal
residence
or
domicile
at
the
matter
of
divorce
in
this
jurisdiction
is
clearly
set
forth
in
Act
No.
2710
and
Mobile
County
when
he
moved
to
that
place
in
1938
because
at
that
time
he
has
been
upheld
by
this
court.
was
still
in
the
service
of
the
U.S.
Navy
and
merely
rented
a
room
where
he
used
to
stay
during
his
occasional
shore
leave
for
shift
duty.
That
he
never
76.
BARRETTO
V.
GONZALES
intended
to
live
there
permanently
is
shown
by
the
fact
that
after
his
marriage
G.R.
No.
37048
|
March
7,
1933
to
Thelma
Francis
in
1941,
he
moved
to
New
York
where
he
bought
a
house
and
a
lot,
and
after
his
divorce
from
Thelma
in
1949
and
his
retirement
from
DOCTRINE:
Litigants
by
mutual
agreement
cannot
compel
the
courts
to
approve
the
U.S.
Navy,
he
returned
to
the
Philippines
and
married
Maria
Odvina
of
Naic,
of
their
own
actions
or
permit
the
personal
relations
of
the
citizens
of
these
Cavite,
where
he
lived
ever
since.
It
may
therefore
be
said
that
appellant
went
Islands
to
be
affected
by
decrees
of
foreign
courts
in
a
manner
which
our
to
Mobile
County,
not
with
the
intention
of
permanently
residing
there,
or
of
Government
believes
is
contrary
to
public
order
and
good
morals.
considering
that
place
as
his
permanent
abode,
but
for
the
sole
purpose
of
obtaining
divorce
from
his
wife.
Such
residence
is
not
sufficient
to
confer
*N.B.:
Article
15.
Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
jurisdiction
on
the
court.
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
(9a)
Under
section
1
of
Act
No.
2710,
the
courts
in
the
Philippines
can
grant
divorce
only
on
the
ground
of
adultery
on
the
part
of
the
wife
or
concubinage
on
the
part
of
the
husband,
and
if
the
decree
is
predicated
on
another
ground,
that
CONFLICT
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Article
17.
Prohibitive
laws
concerning
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
those
which
have
for
their
object
public
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
shall
ISSUE:
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
by
Whether
the
decree
of
divorce
could
be
enforced
in
the
Philippines
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
a
foreign
country
HELD:
FACTS:
No.
The
SC
said
that
the
action
of
the
husband
was
clearly
to
circumvent
the
Plaintiff
and
defendants
are
citizens
of
the
Phil.,
residents
of
Manila
and
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands
regarding
divorce
and
to
secure
for
themselves
a
married
in
the
Phil.
They
voluntarily
separated
and
not
lived
as
husband
and
change
of
status
for
reasons
and
under
conditions
not
authorized
by
our
law.
wife.
They
have
4
children,
who
are
11,
10,
8
and
6
years
of
age.
They
agreed
to
At
all
times
the
matrimonial
domicile
of
this
couple
has
been
within
the
allow
the
husband
for
the
wife’s
support
and
their
children,
500
pesos
monthly
Philippine
Islands
and
the
residence
acquired
in
the
State
of
Nevada
by
the
and
to
be
increased
during
illness
and
necessity,
and
the
title
of
properties
be
husband
for
the
purpose
of
securing
a
divorce
was
not
a
bona
fide
residence
put
in
her
name.
After
the
agreement,
husband
left
the
Philippines
and
resided
and
did
not
confer
jurisdiction
upon
the
Court
of
that
State
to
dissolve
the
in
Reno,
Nevada
and
secured
an
absolute
divorce
on
the
ground
of
desertion,
bonds
of
matrimony
in
which
he
had
entered
in
1919.
While
the
decisions
of
which
was
approved
in
November
1927.
During
that
time,
he
married
a
Filipina
this
court
heretofore
in
refusing
to
recognize
the
validity
of
foreign
divorce
has
and
had
4
children
as
a
result
of
that
marriage.
Defendant
reduced
the
amount
usually
been
expressed
in
the
negative
and
have
been
based
upon
lack
of
he
agreed
for
the
support
and
has
not
made
payments
fixed
in
the
divorce
matrimonial
domicile
or
fraud
or
collusion,
we
have
not
overlooked
the
decree.
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
now
in
force
in
these
Islands.
Article
9
thereof
reads
as
follows:
The
laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
When
he
went
back
to
Philippines,
the
wife
brought
an
action
before
the
CFI
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons,
are
binding
upon
Spaniards
even
Manila
requesting
that
the
court
confirm
and
ratify
the
decree
of
divorce
though
they
reside
in
a
foreign
country.
issued
by
the
state
of
Nevada.
And
that
section
9
of
Act
No.
2710,
which
reads
as
follows:
“The
decree
of
divorce
shall
dissolve
the
community
of
property
as
And
article
11,
the
last
part
of
which
reads:...
the
prohibitive
laws
concerning
soon
as
such
decree
becomes
final,
but
shall
not
dissolve
the
bonds
of
persons,
their
acts
and
their
property,
and
those
intended
to
promote
public
matrimony
until
one
year
thereafter.
The
bonds
of
matrimony
shall
not
be
order
and
good
morals,
shall
not
be
rendered
without
effect
by
any
foreign
laws
considered
as
dissolved
with
regard
to
the
spouse
who,
having
legitimate
or
judgments
or
by
anything
done
or
any
agreements
entered
into
a
foreign
children,
has
not
delivered
to
each
of
them
or
to
the
guardian
appointed
by
the
country.
court,
within
said
period
of
one
year,
the
equivalent
of
what
would
have
been
due
to
them
as
their
legal
portion
if
said
spouse
had
died
intestate
immediately
It
is
therefore
a
serious
question
whether
any
foreign
divorce
relating
to
after
the
dissolution
of
the
community
of
property.”
be
enforced,
and
that
she
citizens
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
will
be
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction,
except
it
and
the
defendant
deliver
to
the
guardian
ad
litem
the
equivalent
of
what
be
for
a
cause,
and
under
conditions
for
which
the
courts
of
Philippine
Islands
would
have
been
due
to
their
children.
It
is
also
prayed
that
the
community
would
grant
a
divorce.
The
lower
court
in
granting
relief
as
prayed
for
frankly
existing
between
plaintiff
and
defendant
be
declared
dissolved
and
the
stated
that
the
securing
of
the
divorce,
the
contracting
of
another
marriage
and
defendant
be
ordered
to
render
an
accounting
and
to
deliver
to
the
plaintiff
the
bringing
into
the
world
of
innocent
children
brings
about
such
a
condition
her
share
of
the
community
property,
that
the
defendant
be
ordered
to
pay
the
that
the
court
must
grant
relief.
The
hardships
of
the
existing
divorce
laws
of
plaintiff
alimony
at
the
rate
of
P500
per
month.
the
Philippine
Islands
are
well
known
to
the
members
of
the
Legislature.
It
is
of
no
moment
in
this
litigation
what
the
personal
views
of
the
writer
on
the
A
guardian
ad
litem
was
appointed
for
the
minor
children,
and
they
appeared
subject
of
divorce
may
be.
It
is
the
duty
of
the
courts
to
enforce
the
laws
of
as
intervenors
and
join
their
mother
in
these
proceedings.
CFI
rendered
divorce
as
written
by
the
Legislature
if
they
are
constitutional.
Courts
have
no
judgment
against
the
defendant
husband.
right
to
say
that
such
laws
are
too
strict
or
too
liberal.
CONFLICT
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Litigants
by
mutual
agreement
cannot
compel
the
courts
to
approve
of
their
Escano
parents
wanted
them
to
have
a
church
wedding
but
Escano
changed
own
actions
or
permit
the
personal
relations
of
the
citizens
of
these
Islands
to
her
mind
when
she
received
an
anonymous
letter
stating
that
Tenchavez
had
be
affected
by
decrees
of
foreign
courts
in
a
manner
which
our
Government
another
woman.
Escano
parents
did
not
agree
as
well.
Vicenta
continued
living
believes
is
contrary
to
public
order
and
good
morals.
Holding
the
above
views
with
her
parents
while
Pastor
returned
to
his
job
in
Manila.
They
continued
to
it
becomes
unnecessary
to
discuss
the
serious
constitutional
question
exchange
letters
that
were
not
as
endearing
as
before.
Vicenta
went
to
presented
by
appellant
in
his
first
assignment
of
error.
Misamis
Occidental,
to
escape
from
the
scandal
that
her
marriage
stirred
in
Cebu
society.
There,
a
lawyer
filed
for
her
a
petition,
drafted
79.
TENCHAVEZ
V.
ESCANO
by
then
Senator
Emmanuel
Pelaez,
to
annul
her
marriage.
She
did
not
sign
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐19671
|
29
November
1965
petition
however
and
the
case
was
dismissed
without
prejudice
because
of
her
non-‐appearance
at
the
hearing.
DOCTRINE:
It
is
irrelevant
that
appellant
Pastor
Tenchavez
should
have
appeared
in
the
Nevada
divorce
court.
Primarily
because
the
policy
of
our
law
She
applied
for
a
passport,
indicating
in
her
application
that
she
was
single,
that
cannot
be
nullified
by
acts
of
private
parties
(Civil
Code,
Art.
17)
and
her
purpose
was
to
study,
and
she
was
domiciled
in
Cebu
City,
and
that
she
additionally,
because
the
mere
appearance
of
a
non-‐resident
consort
cannot
intended
to
return
after
2
yrs.
In
the
US,
Escano
filed
divorce
against
confer
jurisdiction
where
the
court
originally
had
none
(Arca
v.
Javier).
Tenchavez
in
the
Second
Judicial
District
Court
of
the
State
of
Nevada
in
and
for
the
County
of
Washoe,
on
the
ground
of
"extreme
cruelty,
entirely
mental
in
N.B.:
character."
Oct/21/1950
-‐
decree
of
divorce,
"final
and
absolute",
was
issued
The
divorce
decree
was
obtained
in
the
year
1950.
At
this
time,
the
New
Civil
in
open
court
by
the
said
tribunal.
Code
was
already
in
force.
In
this
case,
the
marriage
between
Escano
and
Tenchavez
was
declared
still
subsisting
by
the
court
because
at
the
time
the
Later,
Escano
married
an
American,
Russell
Leo
Moran,
in
Nevada.
She
now
divorce
decree
was
obtained
by
Escano
and
issued
by
the
courts
of
Nevada,
lives
with
him
in
California,
and,
by
him,
has
begotten
children.
Aug/8/1958
-‐
Escano
was
still
a
Filipino
Citizen.
She
acquired
American
citizenship.
Jul/30/1955
amended
on
May
31,
1956
-‐
Tenchavez
had
initiated
the
proceedings
at
bar
against
Vicenta
F.
Escaño,
legal
FACTS:
separation
for
bigamy,
against
Escano
Parents,
whom
he
charged
with
having
Vicenta
Escaño
is
27
y.o.
scion
of
a
well-‐to-‐do
and
socially
prominent
Filipino
dissuaded
and
discouraged
Vicenta
from
joining
her
husband,
and
alienating
family
of
Spanish
ancestry
and
a
"sheltered
colegiala".
Pastor
Tenchavez
is
a
32
her
affections,
and
against
the
Roman
Catholic
Church,
for
having,
through
its
years
of
age,
an
engineer,
ex-‐army
officer
and
of
undistinguished
stock.
Diocesan
Tribunal,
decreed
the
annulment
of
the
marriage,
and
asked
for
legal
separation
and
one
million
pesos
in
damages.
They
exchanged
marriage
vows
without
the
knowledge
of
her
parents,
before
a
Catholic
chaplain,
Lt.
Moises
Lavares.
The
marriage
was
the
culmination
of
a
Escano
–
claimed
a
valid
divorce
from
plaintiff
and
an
equally
valid
marriage
to
previous
love
affair
and
was
duly
registered
with
the
local
civil
register.
They
her
present
husband,
Russell
Leo
Moran
planned
to
get
married
and
then
elope.
Elopement
did
not,
however,
Escano
Parents
-‐
denied
that
they
had
in
any
way
influenced
their
daughter's
materialize
because
when
Vicente
went
back
to
her
classes
after
the
marriage,
acts,
and
counterclaimed
for
moral
damages.
her
mother
was
already
waiting
for
her
at
the
college.
Vicenta
was
taken
home
CFI,
Cebu
-‐
did
not
decree
a
legal
separation,
but
freed
the
plaintiff
from
where
she
admitted
that
she
had
already
married
Pastor.
Mamerto
and
Mena
supporting
his
wife
and
to
acquire
property
to
the
exclusion
of
his
wife.
It
Escaño
(Escaño
parents)
were
surprised,
because
Pastor
never
asked
for
the
allowed
the
counterclaim
of
Mamerto
Escaño
and
Mena
Escaño
for
moral
and
hand
of
Vicenta,
and
were
disgusted
because
of
the
great
scandal
that
the
exemplary
damages
and
attorney's
fees
against
the
plaintiff-‐appellant
clandestine
marriage
would
provoke.
(P45,000.00).
Thus,
plaintiff
resorted
directly
to
this
Court.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
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134
ATTY.
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ISSUE:
74.
RAMIREZ
V.
GMUR
Whether
Escano
was
still
a
Filipino
citizen
when
the
divorce
decree
was
issued
G.R.
No.
L-‐11796
|
August
5,
1918
HELD:
DOCTRINES:
It
is
established
by
the
great
weight
of
authority
that
the
court
of
a
Yes.
At
the
time
the
divorce
decree
was
issued,
Escano
like
her
husband,
was
country
in
which
neither
of
the
spouses
is
domiciled
and
to
which
one
or
both
still
a
Filipino
citizen.
She
was
then
subject
to
Philippine
law
under
Art.
15
of
of
them
may
resort
merely
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
a
divorce
has
no
the
NCC.
Philippine
law,
under
the
NCC
then
now
in
force,
does
not
admit
jurisdiction
to
determine
their
matrimonial
status;
and
a
divorce
granted
by
absolute
divorce
but
only
provides
for
legal
separation.
such
a
court
is
not
entitled
to
recognition
elsewhere.
The
voluntary
appearance
of
the
defendant
before
such
a
tribunal
does
not
vest
the
court
with
NCC
does
not
allow
absolute
divorce,
quo
ad
vinculo
matrimonii;
and
does
not
jurisdiction.
even
use
that
term,
to
further
emphasize
its
restrictive
policy
on
the
matter,
in
contrast
to
the
preceding
legislation
that
admitted
absolute
divorce
on
grounds
It
follows
that,
to
give
a
court
jurisdiction
on
the
ground
of
the
plaintiff's
of
adultery
of
the
wife
or
concubinage
of
the
husband
(Act
2710).
Instead
of
residence
in
the
State
or
country
of
the
judicial
forum,
his
residence
must
be
divorce,
the
NCC
only
provides
for
legal
separation
(Title
IV,
Book
1,
Arts.
97
to
bona
fide.
If
a
spouse
leaves
the
family
domicile
and
goes
to
another
State
for
108),
and,
even
in
that
case,
it
expressly
prescribes
that
"the
marriage
bonds
the
sole
purpose
of
obtaining
a
divorce,
and
with
no
intention
of
remaining,
his
shall
not
be
severed"
residence
there
is
not
sufficient
to
confer
jurisdiction
on
the
courts
of
that
State.
This
is
especially
true
where
the
cause
of
divorce
is
one
not
recognized
For
Phil.
courts
to
recognize
foreign
divorce
decrees
bet.
Filipino
citizens
would
by
the
laws
of
the
State
of
his
own
domicile.
be
a
patent
violation
of
the
declared
policy
of
the
State,
especially
in
view
of
the
3rd
par.
of
Art.
17,
NCC.
Moreover,
recognition
would
give
rise
to
FACTS:
scandalous
discrimination
in
favor
of
wealthy
citizens
to
the
detriment
of
those
Samuel
Bischoff
Werthmuller,
a
native
of
Switzerland
but
a
resident
of
the
members
of
our
society
whose
means
do
not
permit
them
to
sojourn
abroad
Philippines,
died
in
Iloilo
City
on
June
29,
1913,
leaving
valuable
asset
which
he
and
obtain
absolute
divorce
outside
the
Phils.
disposed
by
will.
His
will
was
offered
for
probate
in
the
CFI
of
Iloilo,
which
allowed
it.
Werthmuller’s
widow,
Doña
Ana
M.
Ramirez,
was
named
as
Therefore,
a
foreign
divorce
bet.
Filipino
citizens,
sought
and
decreed
after
the
executrix.
Everything
was
given
to
the
widow,
as
the
will
provided,
except
for
a
effectivity
of
the
NCC,
is
not
entitled
to
recognition
as
valid
in
this
jurisdiction.
piece
of
real
property
in
the
City
of
Thun,
Switzerland,
which
was
devised
to
Werthmuller’s
brothers
and
sisters.
Werthmuller
seemed
to
have
ignored
in
From
this
point
of
view,
it
is
irrelevant
that
appellant
Pastor
Tenchavez
making
his
will
that
he
had
heirs
from
his
natural
daughter,
Leona
Castro.
should
have
appeared
in
the
Nevada
divorce
court.
Primarily
because
the
policy
of
our
law
cannot
be
nullified
by
acts
of
private
parties
(Civil
Code,Art.
Leona
Castro
was
the
daughter
of
Felisa
Castro
and
an
unknown
father.
There
17)
and
additionally,
because
the
mere
appearance
of
a
non-‐resident
consort
was
an
annotation
on
the
margin
of
the
original
baptismal
entry
of
Leona
cannot
confer
jurisdiction
where
the
court
originally
had
none
(Arca
vs.
Castro
that
a
public
document
(an
“escritura”)
states
that
she
was
recognized
Javier,
95
Phil.
579).
by
Samuel
Bischoff
on
June
22,
1877.
This
annotation
was
authenticated
by
the
signature
of
Father
Ferrero,
whose
deposition
was
taken
in
this
case.
Father
Ferrero
testified
that
the
word
“escritura”
in
this
entry
means
a
public
document;
and
he
says
that
such
document
was
exhibited
to
him
when
the
marginal
note
was
added
to
the
baptismal
record
and
supplied
the
basis
of
the
annotation
in
the
entry.
CONFLICT
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Samuel
Bischoff
tacitly
recognized
Leona
Castro
as
his
daughter
and
treated
her
as
such.
Leona
Castro
was
later
married
to
Frederick
von
Kauffman,
a
British
ISSUE:
subject,
born
in
HK
and
lived
in
Iloilo
City.
Leona
Castro
and
von
Kauffman
had
1.
WON
the
divorce
decree
granted
by
the
Paris
court
can
be
recognized
in
the
3
children
(Elene,
Federico
and
Ernesto).
Leona
Castro
was
then
brought
to
Philippines
Thun,
Switzerland
to
recuperate
her
health.
Years
later,
Leona
Castro
informed
2.
WON
the
Mory
claimants
are
entitled
to
the
estate
von
Kauffman
that
she
does
not
want
to
stay
married
with
the
latter.
HELD:
Von
Kauffman
later
obtained
a
divorce
decree
in
Paris,
France.
It
showed
that
No.
The
divorce
decree
in
question
cannot
be
recognized
as
valid
in
the
Leona
Castro
lived
in
Paris,
though
there
is
no
evidence
showing
that
she
Philippines.
The
French
tribunal
has
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
an
action
for
acquired
permanent
domicile
in
Paris.
the
dissolution
of
a
marriage
contracted
in
the
Philippines
by
a
person
domiciled
here;
such
marriage
being
indissoluble
under
the
laws
then
The
estrangement
of
von
Kauffman
and
Leona
Castro
was
because
Leona
prevailing
in
this
country.
Castro
was
attracted
to
Dr.
Ernest
Emil
Mory,
the
physician
in
charge
of
the
sanitarium
in
Switzerland
where
Leona
Castro
was
brought.
Dr.
Mory
and
The
evidence
shows
that
both
Kauffman
and
Leona
are
domiciled
in
Iloilo,
Leona
Castro
was
later
married
in
London,
England.
It
appears
that
Dr.
Mory
Philippines
and
that
their
departure
to
Switzerland
was
for
medical
purpose,
was
already
married
to
a
certain
Helena
Wolpman,
but
had
divorced
her.
and
that
Kauffman
went
to
Paris
in
1904
to
obtain
a
divorce
without
an
intention
to
establish
permanent
residence
in
that
city.
Before
Dr.
Mory
and
Leona
Castro
got
married,
they
begot
a
daughter
named
nd
Leontina
Elizabeth
in
Thun,
Switzerland.
A
2 daughter,
Carmen
Maria,
was
A
court,
where
neither
of
the
spouses
is
domiciled,
and
to
which
one
or
both
of
born
in
Berne,
Switzerland,
and
a
3rd
daughter,
Esther.
On
October
6,
1910,
them
may
resort
merely
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
a
divorce,
has
no
Leona
Castro
died.
jurisdiction
to
determine
their
matrimonial
status;
and
a
divorce
granted
by
such
a
court
is
not
entitled
to
recognition
elsewhere.
Now,
the
2
sets
of
children
are
claiming
from
the
estate
of
Samuel
Werthmuller.
Otto
Gmur
is
the
guardian
of
the
3
Mory
daughters.
Frederick
2.
No.
With
regard
to
the
Mory
claimants,
their
rights
principally
depend
upon
von
Kauffman
appeared
as
guardian
for
his
own
children.
the
effect
to
be
given
by
this
court
to
divorce
degree
granted
to
Kauffman
in
Paris.
If
divorce
decree
is
valid,
the
subsequent
marriage
of
Leona
and
Mory
is
Ana
Ramirez
insists,
as
against
the
Mory
daughters,
that
the
Leona
Castro
had
also
valid.
never
been
recognized
by
Samuel
Werthmuller
at
all.
Since
the
divorce
granted
by
the
French
court
cannot
be
recognized,
it
follows
As
to
the
Mory
daughters,
Leontina
Elizabeth
is
considered
an
illegitimate
that
the
marriage
between
Mory
and
Leona
in
London
could
not
legalize
their
daughter
which
was
legitimated
by
the
subsequent
marriage
of
Dr.
Mory
and
relations.
The
claims
of
the
Mory
children
to
participate
in
the
estate
of
Leona
Castro.
Carmen
Maria
and
Esther
Renate,
on
the
other
hand,
are
to
be
Bischoff
must
be
rejected.
The
right
to
inherit
is
limited
to
legitimate,
considered
legitimate
offspring
of
Leona
Castro
since
the
latter’s
marriage
to
legitimated,
and
acknowledged
natural
children.
von
Kauffman
was
already
divorced
when
they
were
born
and
Leona
was
already
married
to
Dr.
Mory.
The
von
Kauffman
children
insists
that
the
divorce
decree
was
wholly
invalid;
that
the
Mory
daughters
are
the
offspring
of
an
adulterous
relationship;
and
that
the
von
Kauffman
daughters
alone
should
be
entitled
to
participate
in
the
division
of
the
estate.
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80.
VAN
DORN
V.
ROMILLO
139
SCRA
139
(1985)
HELD:
Yes.
There
can
be
no
question
as
to
the
validity
of
that
Nevada
divorce
in
any
of
DOCTRINE:
However,
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
abroad,
which
may
be
the
States
of
the
United
States.
The
decree
is
binding
on
private
respondent
as
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
they
are
valid
according
to
their
an
American
citizen.
For
instance,
private
respondent
cannot
sue
petitioner,
as
national
law.
Thus,
pursuant
to
his
national
law,
private
respondent
is
no
longer
her
husband,
in
any
State
of
the
Union.
What
he
is
contending
in
this
case
is
the
husband
of
petitioner.
He
would
have
no
standing
to
sue
in
the
case
below
that
the
divorce
is
not
valid
and
binding
in
this
jurisdiction,
the
same
being
as
petitioner's
husband
entitled
to
exercise
control
over
conjugal
assets.
As
he
contrary
to
local
law
and
public
policy.
is
bound
by
the
Decision
of
his
own
country's
Court,
which
validly
exercised
jurisdiction
over
him,
and
whose
decision
he
does
not
repudiate,
he
is
It
is
true
that
owing
to
the
nationality
principle
embodied
in
Article
15
of
the
estopped
by
his
own
representation
before
said
Court
from
asserting
his
right
Civil
Code,
only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
by
the
policy
against
over
the
alleged
conjugal
property.
absolute
divorces
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
our
concept
of
public
police
and
morality
(art.
17).
However,
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
Kyna’s
Notes:
abroad,
which
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
they
are
valid
ALG:
1.
Divorce
obtained
abroad
is
allowed
and
recognized
in
the
Philippines
as
according
to
their
national
law.
In
this
case,
the
divorce
in
Nevada
released
long
as
the
foreigner
participated
in
the
proceedings
–
TRUE
private
respondent
from
the
marriage
from
the
standards
of
American
law,
2.
Divorce
obtained
by
a
Filipino
where
foreigner
spouse
participated
is
valid
under
which
divorce
dissolves
the
marriage.
As
stated
by
the
Federal
Supreme
here
in
the
Philippines
–
FALSE
Court
of
the
United
States
in
Atherton
vs.
Atherton,
45
L.
Ed.
794,
799:
The
purpose
and
effect
of
a
decree
of
divorce
from
the
bond
FACTS:
of
matrimony
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
are
to
Alice
Reyes
Van
Dorn,
a
Filipino
Citizen
and
private
respondent,
Richard
Upton,
change
the
existing
status
or
domestic
relation
of
husband
a
US
citizen,
was
married
in
Hong
Kong
in
1979.
They
established
their
and
wife,
and
to
free
them
both
from
the
bond.
The
marriage
residence
in
the
Philippines
and
had
2
children.
They
were
divorced
in
Nevada,
tie
when
thus
severed
as
to
one
party,
ceases
to
bind
either.
USA
in
1982
and
petitioner
remarried,
this
time
with
Theodore
Van
Dorn.
A
suit
A
husband
without
a
wife,
or
a
wife
without
a
husband,
is
against
petitioner
was
filed
on
June
8,
1983,
stating
that
petitioner’s
business
in
unknown
to
the
law.
When
the
law
provides,
in
the
nature
of
Ermita
Manila,
the
Galleon
Shop,
is
a
conjugal
property
with
Upton
and
prayed
a
penalty
that
the
guilty
party
shall
not
marry
again,
that
therein
that
Alice
be
ordered
to
render
an
accounting
of
the
business
and
he
be
party,
as
well
as
the
other,
is
still
absolutely
freed
from
the
declared
as
the
administrator
of
the
said
property.
Petitioner
moved
to
dismiss
bond
of
the
former
marriage.
the
case
on
the
ground
that
the
cause
of
action
is
barred
by
previous
judgment
in
the
divorce
proceedings
before
the
Nevada
Court
wherein
respondent
had
Thus,
pursuant
to
his
national
law,
private
respondent
is
no
longer
the
husband
acknowledged
that
he
and
petitioner
had
"no
community
property"
as
of
June
of
petitioner.
He
would
have
no
standing
to
sue
in
the
case
below
as
11,
1982.
The
Court
below
denied
the
Motion
to
Dismiss
in
the
mentioned
case
petitioner's
husband
entitled
to
exercise
control
over
conjugal
assets.
As
he
is
on
the
ground
that
the
property
involved
is
located
in
the
Philippines
so
that
bound
by
the
Decision
of
his
own
country's
Court,
which
validly
exercised
the
Divorce
Decree
has
no
bearing
in
the
case.
jurisdiction
over
him,
and
whose
decision
he
does
not
repudiate,
he
is
estopped
by
his
own
representation
before
said
Court
from
asserting
his
right
ISSUE:
over
the
alleged
conjugal
property.
Whether
or
not
the
foreign
divorce
between
the
petitioner
and
private
respondent
in
Nevada
is
binding
in
the
Philippines
where
petitioner
is
a
Filipino
To
maintain,
as
private
respondent
does,
that,
under
our
laws,
petitioner
has
to
citizen?
be
considered
still
married
to
private
respondent
and
still
subject
to
a
wife's
obligations
under
Article
109,
et.
seq.
of
the
Civil
Code
cannot
be
just.
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Petitioner
should
not
be
obliged
to
live
together
with,
observe
respect
and
discovered
that
his
wife
Paula
was
pregnant
and
was
“living
in”
and
having
an
fidelity,
and
render
support
to
private
respondent.
The
latter
should
not
adulterous
relationship
with
his
brother,
Ceferino
Llorente.
Paula
gave
birth
to
continue
to
be
one
of
her
heirs
with
possible
rights
to
conjugal
property.
She
a
boy
registered
as
“Crisologo
Llorente,”
with
the
birth
certificate
stating
that
should
not
be
discriminated
against
in
her
own
country
if
the
ends
of
justice
are
the
child
was
not
legitimate
and
the
line
for
the
father’s
name
was
left
blank.
to
be
served.
Lorenzo
refused
to
forgive
Paula
and
live
with
her.
In
fact,
the
couple
drew
a
Husband
in
this
case
is
estopped
–
this
is
one
way
to
recognize
divorce
decrees
written
agreement
to
the
effect
that
(1)
all
the
family
allowances
allotted
by
the
United
States
Navy
as
part
of
Lorenzo’s
salary
and
all
other
obligations
for
71.
LLORENTE
V.
CA,
SUPRA
Paula’s
daily
maintenance
and
support
would
be
suspended;
(2)
they
would
dissolve
their
marital
union
in
accordance
with
judicial
proceedings;
(3)
they
DOCTRINE:
Only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
by
the
policy
against
absolute
would
make
a
separate
agreement
regarding
their
conjugal
property
acquired
divorces,
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
our
concept
of
public
policy
during
their
marital
life;
and
(4)
Lorenzo
would
not
prosecute
Paula
for
her
and
morality.
In
the
same
case,
the
Court
ruled
that
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
adulterous
act
since
she
voluntarily
admitted
her
fault
and
agreed
to
separate
abroad,
provided
they
are
valid
according
to
their
national
law.
from
Lorenzo
peacefully.
The
agreement
was
signed
by
both
Lorenzo
and
Paula
and
was
witnessed
by
Paula’s
father
and
stepmother.
The
agreement
was
ALG:
notarized.
1991
–
Celebration
of
marriage
1992
–
Filipino
went
to
the
U.S.
Lorenzo
returned
to
the
US
and
filed
for
divorce
with
the
Superior
Court
of
the
1993
–
Obtains
a
divorce
decree
in
U.S.
State
of
California
and
was
issued
an
interlocutory
judgment
of
divorce.
The
divorce
decree
became
final
afterwards.
The
divorce
decree
is
not
valid.
The
Filipino
remained
a
Filipino
citizen
and
not
a
citizen
of
the
U.S.
So
the
governing
law
over
the
person
of
the
Filipino
is
still
Lorenzo
returned
to
the
Philippines
and
married
Alicia
Llorente
in
Manila.
Philippine
law.
Apparently,
Alicia
had
no
knowledge
of
the
first
marriage
even
if
they
resided
in
the
same
town
as
Paula,
who
did
not
oppose
the
marriage
or
cohabitation.
1991
–
Celebration
of
marriage
Lorenzo
and
Alicia
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife.
Their
25
year
union
1992
–
Filipino
went
to
the
U.S.
and
became
an
American
citizen
produced
three
children,
Raul,
Luz
and
Beverly,
all
surnamed
Llorente.
1993
–
Obtains
a
divorce
decree
in
U.S.
Lorenzo
executed
a
Last
Will
and
Testament.
In
the
will,
Lorenzo
bequeathed
all
The
divorce
decree
is
valid.
It
is
the
time
of
getting
the
divorce
which
is
his
property
to
Alicia
and
their
three
children.
Lorenzo
filed
with
the
RTC
material.
Camarines
Sur,
a
petition
for
the
probate
and
allowance
of
his
last
will
and
testament
wherein
Lorenzo
moved
that
Alicia
be
appointed
Special
FACTS:
Administratrix
of
his
estate.
RTC
admitted
the
will
to
probate.
Before
the
Llorente
was
an
enlisted
serviceman
of
the
United
States
Navy.
During
his
term
proceedings
could
be
terminated,
Lorenzo
died.
of
duty,
Lorenzo
and
Paula
Llorente
were
married
before
a
parish
priest,
Roman
Catholic
Church,
in
Camarines
Sur.
Before
the
outbreak
of
the
Pacific
Paula
filed
with
the
same
court
a
petition
for
letters
of
administration
over
War,
Lorenzo
departed
for
the
United
States
and
Paula
stayed
in
the
conjugal
Lorenzo’s
estate
in
her
favor.
Paula
contended
(1)
that
she
was
Lorenzo’s
home
in
Camarines
Sur.
Afterwards,
Lorenzo
was
naturalized
as
an
American
surviving
spouse,
(2)
that
the
various
property
were
acquired
during
their
Citizen.
Upon
the
end
of
the
World
War
II,
Lorenzo
was
granted
an
accrued
marriage,
(3)
that
Lorenzo’s
will
disposed
of
all
his
property
in
favor
of
Alicia
leave
by
the
US
Navy,
to
visit
his
wife
and
he
visited
the
Philippines.
He
and
her
children,
encroaching
on
her
legitime
and
1/2
share
in
the
conjugal
property.
Alicia
filed
in
the
testate
proceeding
a
petition
for
the
issuance
of
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
138
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
letters
testamentary.
RTC
gave
due
course
to
Paula's
petition.
RTC
held
that
the
proven
that
respondent
was
no
longer
a
Filipino
citizen
when
he
obtained
the
divorce
decree
was
and
void
and
inapplicable
in
the
Philippines
and
therefore
divorce
from
petitioner,
the
ruling
in
Van
Dorn
would
become
applicable
and
the
second
marriage
with
Alicia
was
also
void.
CA
affirmed
RTC's
decision.
petitioner
could
“very
well
lose
her
right
to
inherit”
from
him.
ISSUE:
In
Pilapil
v.
Ibay-‐Somera,
we
recognized
the
divorce
obtained
by
the
Whether
Lorenzo’s
first
marriage
has
been
validly
dissolved
through
a
divorce
respondent
in
his
country,
the
Federal
Republic
of
Germany.
There,
we
stated
decree,
which
capacitated
him
to
remarry
Alicia.
that
divorce
and
its
legal
effects
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines
insofar
as
respondent
is
concerned
in
view
of
the
nationality
principle
in
our
civil
law
on
HELD:
the
status
of
persons.
The
Applicable
Law
The
fact
that
the
late
Lorenzo
N.
Llorente
became
an
American
citizen
long
For
failing
to
apply
these
doctrines,
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
must
before
and
at
the
time
of:
(1)
his
divorce
from
Paula;
(2)
marriage
to
Alicia;
(3)
be
reversed.
We
hold
that
the
divorce
obtained
by
Lorenzo
H.
Llorente
from
his
execution
of
his
will;
and
(4)
death,
is
duly
established,
admitted
and
first
wife
Paula
was
valid
and
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction
as
a
matter
of
undisputed.
Thus,
as
a
rule,
issues
arising
from
these
incidents
are
necessarily
comity.
Now,
the
effects
of
this
divorce
(as
to
the
succession
to
the
estate
of
governed
by
foreign
law.
the
decedent)
are
matters
best
left
to
the
determination
of
the
trial
court.
The
Civil
Code
clearly
provides:
ADOPTION
“Art.
15.
Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
ADOPTION
IS
AN
ACT
WHICH
RENDERS
A
CHILD
LEGITIMATE
IN
RELATION
TO
THE
ADOPTING
PARENTS
TO
WHOM
THE
CHILD
MAY
OR
MAY
NOT
BE
RELATED.
“Art.
16.
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
of
the
country
where
it
is
situated.
ISSUES
IN
COL
RELATE
TO:
1. JURISDICTION
TO
GRANT
“However,
intestate
and
testamentary
succession,
both
with
respect
to
the
2. CAPACITY
OF
ALIEN
TO
ADOPT
order
of
succession
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
the
3. EFFECTS
OF
CONSEQUENCES
OF
ADOPTION
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
whatever
may
be
CHOICE
OF
LAW
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
country
wherein
said
property
Personal
law
of
both
the
adopter
and
adoptee
may
be
found.”
Adopter:
to
determine
his
eligibility
to
adopt
Adoptee:
to
determine
his
eligibility
to
be
adopted
Validity
of
the
Foreign
Divorce
In
Van
Dorn
v.
Romillo,
Jr.
we
held
that
owing
to
the
nationality
principle
EFFECTS:
SROPALS2
embodied
in
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code,
only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
1. CREATION
OF
SUCCESSIONAL
RIGHTS
AND
OBLIGAITONS
BETWEEN
by
the
policy
against
absolute
divorces,
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
ADOPTERS
AND
ADOPTEE
our
concept
of
public
policy
and
morality.
In
the
same
case,
the
Court
ruled
2. PARTIES
ARE
VESTED
WITH
RIGHTS—CIVIL
RIGHTS
FOR
THE
ADOPTERS,
that
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
abroad,
provided
they
are
valid
according
to
SUCH
AS
PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
AND
THE
ADOPTEE’S
LEGITIMACY,
AND
their
national
law.
THE
RIGHT
TO
USE
THE
ADOPTER’S
SURNAME
FOR
THE
ADOPTEE
3. ALL
LEGAL
TIES
BETWEEN
BIOLOGICAL
PARENTS
AND
THE
ADOPTEE
SHALL
Citing
this
landmark
case,
the
Court
held
in
Quita
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
that
once
BE
SEVERED
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
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139
ATTY.
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L.
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AY
2015-‐2016
BUT—Adoptee
may
still
claim
inheritance
from
natural
3. Illegitimate
child,
by
a
qualified
adopter
to
raise
the
status
of
the
parents
former
to
that
of
legitimacy
4. A
child
whose
adoption
has
been
previously
rescinded
DOMESTIC
ADOPTION
ACT
OF
1998
5. A
child
whose
biological
or
adoptive
parents
have
died,
after
6
months
from
such
death
WHO
MAY
ADOPT:
6. Any
person
below
18
y/o
who
has
been
judicially
or
administratively
declared
available
for
adoption
ANY
FILIPINO
CITIZEN
WHO:
[CLEGS
16]
1. In
possession
of
full
civil
capacity
and
legal
rights
INTER-‐COUNTRY
ADOPTION
ACT
OF
1995
2. Of
legal
age
3. Emotionally
and
psychologically
capable
of
caring
for
children
PETITIONER
4. Of
good
moral
character
1. Adopter
or
5. In
a
position
to
support
and
care
for
his
children
in
keeping
with
the
2. Inter-‐country
adoption
body
of
the
adopter’s
state
means
of
the
family
6. At
least
16
years
older
than
the
adoptee
WHO
MAY
ADOPT:
[DA2C2E
JoMS
27]
1. Country
has
diplomatic
relations
with
the
Phil.
ANY
ALIEN
POSSESSING
THE
SAME
QUALIFICATIONS
AS
ABOVE,
PROVIDED:
[3
DiCE]
2. Whose
government
has
a
foreign
adoption
agency
1. Living
in
the
Phil.
For
at
least
3
continuous
years
prior
to
the
filing
of
3. Whose
laws
allow
adoption
the
application
for
adoption
and
maintains
such
residence
until
the
4. Capacity
to
act
and
assume
all
the
rights
and
responsibilities
incidental
adoption
decree
is
entered
to
parental
authority
under
his/her
national
law
2. His
country
has
diplomatic
relations
with
the
Phil.
5. Undergone
appropriate
counseling
from
an
accredited
counselor
in
3. Certified
by
his
diplomatic
or
consular
office
or
any
appropriate
his/her
country
government
agency
to
have
legal
capacity
to
adopt
in
his
country,
and
6. Is
eligible
to
adopt
under
his/her
national
law
that
his
government
allows
the
adoptee
to
enter
his
country
as
his
7. Files
jointly
with
his/her
spouse,
if
any,
who
shall
have
the
same
adopted
child
qualifications
and
none
of
the
disqualifications
to
adopt
as
prescribed
above
THE
GUARDIAN
WITH
RESPECT
TO
THE
WARD
AFTER
THE
TERMINATION
OF
THE
8. Has
not
been
convicted
of
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude
GUARDIANSHIP
AND
CLEARANCE
OF
HIS
FINANCIAL
ACCOUTABILITIES
9. Can
provide
the
proper
care
and
support
and
give
the
necessary
moral
values
and
example
to
the
child
and
in
the
proper
case
to
all
his/her
GR:
Spouses
shall
jointly
adopt.
other
children
EXC:
[other’s
LC,
own
IC
with
consent,
leg
sep]
10. At
least
27
y/o
and
is
at
least
16
years
older
than
the
child
to
be
1. If
one
spouse
seeks
to
adopt
the
legitimate
child
of
the
other
adopted
at
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
application,
unless
the
applicant
2. If
one
spouse
seeks
to
adopt
his
own
illegitimate
child,
provided
that
is
the
parent
by
nature
of
the
child
to
be
adopted
or
is
the
spouse
of
the
other
spouse
has
signified
his
consent
thereto
such
parent
by
nature
3. If
the
spouses
are
legally
separate
from
each
other
WHO
MAY
BE
ADOPTED:
WHO
MAY
BE
ADOPTED:
[CLIRD2
18]
1. A
child
voluntarily
or
involuntarily
committed
to
DSWD
as
dependent,
1. Person
who
has
been
consistently
considered
and
treated
by
the
abandoned
or
neglected
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
Child
and
adopters
as
their
own
child
since
minority
Youth
Welfare
Code
2. Legitimate
child
of
the
spouse
of
the
prospective
adopter
2. Below
15
y/o
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
140
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
Whether
Caraballo
is
qualified
to
adopt
65.
CARABALLO
V.
REPUBLIC
G.R.
No.
L-‐15080
|
25
April
1962
HELD:
No.
(Law
in
effect
at
that
time)
Article
335
of
the
Civil
Code
provides:
The
DOCTRINE:
Ricardo
R.
Caraballo,
the
petitioner,
an
American
citizen
who
now
following
cannot
adopt
-‐
(1)
Those
who
have
legitimate,
legitimated,
lives
in
Clark
Field,
municipality
of
Angeles,
province
of
Pampanga,
Republic
of
acknowledged
natural
children,
or
natural
children
by
legal
fiction;
(2)
The
the
Philippines,
because
of
his
assignment
as
staff
sergeant
in
the
United
States
guardian,
with
respect
to
the
ward,
before
the
final
approval
of
his
accounts;
Air
Force
–
his
stay
in
the
Philippines
then
being
temporary
–
is
a
non-‐resident
(3)
A
married
person,
without
the
consent
of
the
other
spouse;
(4)
Non-‐
alien
who,
pursuant
to
clause
4
of
the
above
quoted
article
of
the
Civil
Code,
is
resident
aliens;
(5)
Resident
aliens
with
whose
government
the
Republic
of
the
disqualified
to
adopt
a
child
in
the
Philippines.
Philippines
has
broken
diplomatic
relations;
(6)
Any
person
who
has
been
convicted
of
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude,
when
the
penalty
imposed
was
N.B.:
Under
the
Inter-‐Country
Adoption
Act,
a
non-‐resident
alien
may
now
six
months’
imprisonment
or
more.
adopt
a
child
in
the
Philippines
subject
to
certain
qualifications
[DA2C2E
JoMS
27]
A
person
is
deemed
a
resident
of
a
place
in
a
country
or
state
where
he
has
his
abode
and
lives
there
permanently.
It
is
a
place
chosen
by
him
freely
and
FACTS:
voluntarily,
although
he
may
later
on
change
his
mind
and
live
elsewhere.
A
Ricardo
R.
Caraballo,
an
American
citizen,
was
living
with
his
wife
Graciela
place
in
a
country
or
state
where
he
lives
and
stays
permanently
and
to
which
Caraballo
in
Clark
Field,
Angeles,
Pampanga.
He
enlisted
in
the
US
Air
Force
as
he
intends
to
return
after
a
temporary
absence,
no
matter
how
long,
is
his
staff
sergeant
detailed
in
Clark
through
a
verified
petition
before
the
CFI
of
domicile.
A
sojourn
such
as
a
tourist
though
actually
present
at
a
place
of
his
Pampanga.
free
choice
cannot
be
deemed
a
resident
of
that
place.
A
foreigner
who
has
a
business
or
interest
therein
or
property
located
in
a
country
or
state
and
goes
He
alleged
that
he
and
his
wife
have
no
legitimate,
legitimated,
acknowledged
and
stays
in
that
country
or
state
to
look
after
his
business
or
property
or
to
natural
children,
natural
children
by
legal
fiction
or
any
other
descendants,
and
check
up
the
manner
or
way
his
business
or
property
is
being
conducted
or
run
that
with
his
wife’s
written
consent,
he
desires
to
adopt
Norma
Lee
Caber,
a
by
his
manager
but
does
not
intend
to
remain
in
the
country
indefinitely
cannot
five-‐year
old
daughter
of
Mercedes
Caber
of
an
unknown
father.
Caber
gave
be
deemed
a
resident
of
such
country.
Actual
or
physical
presence
or
stay
of
a
her
consent
in
a
sworn
statement.
person
in
a
place,
not
of
his
free
and
voluntary
choice
and
without
intent
to
remain
there
indefinitely,
does
not
make
him
a
resident
of
the
place.
The
verified
petition
was
ordered
to
be
published,
but
no
one
appeared
to
contest
the
adoption.
Provincial
and
Assistant
Provincial
Fiscal
of
Pampanga
Looking
after
the
welfare
of
a
minor
to
be
adopted
the
law
has
surrounded
him
moved
to
dismiss
the
petition
since
the
petitioner,
being
a
non-‐resident
alien,
is
with
safeguards
to
achieve
and
insure
such
welfare.
It
cannot
be
gainsaid
that
not
qualified
to
adopt.
MD
denied.
an
adopted
minor
may
be
removed
from
the
country
by
the
adopter,
who
is
not
a
resident
of
the
Philippines,
and
placed
beyond
the
reach
and
protection
The
CFI
granted
the
adoption
of
Norma
Lee
Caber
after
finding
the
following
of
the
country
of
his
birth.
facts:
petitioner
is
32
years
old,
the
child
is
3
months
old,
he
had
the
child
in
his
household
since
the
day
following
her
birth
and
has
developed
fondness
for
Ricardo
R.
Caraballo,
the
petitioner,
an
American
citizen
who
now
lives
in
her.
He
is
a
staff
sergeant
in
the
US
Air
Force
and
is
adequately
compensated,
Clark
Field,
municipality
of
Angeles,
province
of
Pampanga,
Republic
of
the
and
he
has
never
been
convicted
of
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude.
Philippines,
because
of
his
assignment
as
staff
sergeant
in
the
United
States
Air
Force
–
his
stay
in
the
Philippines
then
being
temporary
–
is
a
non-‐resident
ISSUE:
alien
who,
pursuant
to
clause
4
of
the
above
quoted
article
of
the
Civil
Code,
is
disqualified
to
adopt
a
child
in
the
Philippines.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
141
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
LEX
FORI
SUCCESSION
INTERPRETATION
OF
WILLS
SUCCESSION
IS
A
MODE
OF
ACQUISITION
BY
VIRUTE
OF
WHICH
THE
PROPERTY,
1.
INTENT
OF
THE
PARTIES
SHALL
GOVERN,
OR
IN
DEFAULT
OF
WHICH,
RIGHTS,
AND
OBLIGATIONS
TO
THE
EXTENT
OF
THE
VALUE
OF
THE
2.
INTERPRETATION
THAT
WILL
GIVE
EFFECT
TO
EVERY
STIPULATION
INHERITANCE,
OF
A
PERSON
ARE
TRANSMITTED
THROUGH
HIS
DEATH
TO
WHERE
DISPOSITION
IS
OPERATIVE
IS
PREFERRED
ANOTHER
OR
OTHERS
EITHER
BY
HIS
WILL
OR
BY
OPEARTION
OF
LAW.
WHERE
INTESTACY
IS
PREVENTED
IS
PREFERRED
TWO
THEORIES
ADMIN
OF
ESTATE
UNIVERSAL
SUCCESSION
LEX
FORI
WHATEVER
PERSONAL
LAW
GOVERNED
THE
DECEDENT
GOVERNS
SUCCESSION
TO
HIS
ENTIRE
ESTATE
AFTER
HIS
ACTUAL
PARTITION
DEATH;
PH
ADHERES
TO
THIS
LEX
SITEI
SPLIT
OR
DIVISION
SYSTEM
SEEKS
TO
DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN
IMMOVALES
AND
86.
IN
RE
ESTATE
OF
JOHNSON
MOVABLES;
LEX
SITUS
–
IMMOVABLES;
DOMICILE
-‐
G.R.
No.
L-‐12767
|
November
16,
1918
MOVABLES
Upon
this
point
it
is
sufficient
to
say
that
the
probate
of
the
will
does
not
affect
CAPACITY
TO
SUCCEED
the
intrinsic
validity
of
its
provisions,
the
decree
of
probate
being
conclusive
ART.
1039
-‐
NATIONAL
LAW
only
as
regards
the
due
execution
of
the
will.
The
will
was
properly
admissible
to
probate.
INTRINSIC
VALIDITY
ART.
16
-‐
AT
THE
TIME
OF
DEATH
N.B.:
Due
execution
–
[FM
VIPS]
1.
Formalities
2.
T
was
of
sound
and
disposing
mind
3.
No
Vitiation
of
consent
4.
EXTRINSIC
OR
FORMAL
VALIDITY
Not
procured
by
improper
Influence
or
Pressure
5.
Signature
is
genuine
ART.
17
-‐
AT
THE
TIME
OF
EXECUTION
The
following
articles
govern
foreign
wills
now:
FIL
ABROAD
LAW
OF
THE
COUNTRY
IN
WHICH
HE
MAY
BE
Article
17.
The
forms
and
solemnities
of
contracts,
wills,
and
other
public
ALIEN
PHIL
NATIONAL
LAW
instruments
shall
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
they
are
ALIEN
ABROAD
[RNP]
LAW
OF
RESIDENCE,
NATL
LAW,
PHIL
executed.
LAW
HOLO
WILL
WRITTEN,
DATED,
SIGNED
ENTIRELY
Article
816.
The
will
of
an
alien
who
is
abroad
produces
effect
in
the
Philippines
FIL
JOINT
WILLS
VOID
if
made
with
the
formalities
prescribed
by
the
law
of
the
place
in
which
he
resides,
or
according
to
the
formalities
observed
in
his
country,
or
in
conformity
REVOCATION
with
those
which
this
Code
prescribes.
NONRES
ABROAD
[MD]
WILL
WAS
MADE,
DOMICILIARY
LAW
RES
ABROAD
[PR]
PHIL
LAW,
PLACE
OF
REVOCATION
At
the
time
of
the
decision
of
this
case,
Phil.
courts
can
take
judicial
notice
of
US
Federal
Laws
because
it
was
then
a
colony.
Now,
the
Philippine
courts
cannot
PROBATE
CONFLICT
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take
judicial
notice
of
any
US
Law
except
under
certain
exceptions.
accordance
with
the
law
of
the
state
or
country
of
which
he
is
a
citizen
or
subject,
and
which
might
be
proved
and
allowed
by
the
law
of
his
own
ALG:
At
that
time,
our
courts
can
only
take
judicial
notice
of
federal
law
but
not
state
or
country,
may
be
proved,
allowed,
and
recorded
in
the
Philippine
state
law.
The
country
was
a
US
protectorate
then.
Islands,
and
shall
have
the
same
effect
as
if
executed
according
to
the
laws
of
these
Islands.
Summary
of
Facts:
Emil
Johnson
died
in
the
City
of
Manila;
however
he
was
a
naturalized
The
hearing
on
said
application
was
set
and
three
weeks
publication
of
notice
American
citizen.
He
left
a
will
through
which
he
disposed
an
estate
valued
at
was
ordered
in
the
"Manila
Daily
Bulletin."
Witnesses
were
examined
relative
P231,800.
However,
the
will
was
signed
by
two
witnesses
instead
of
the
3
to
the
execution
of
the
will.
Thereafter
the
document
was
declared
to
be
legal
required
by
Sec.
618
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
However,
a
petition
was
and
was
admitted
to
probate.
Victor
Johnson
was
appointed
sole
made
stating
that
the
will
was
made
in
conformity
with
US
Law,
thus
valid
in
administrator.
the
Philippines
as
provided
for
in
Section
636
in
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
The
will
was
later
probated
and
declared
legal,
however
the
testator's
By
virtue
of
the
will,
the
testator
bequeath
shares
of
the
corporate
stock
in
the
daughter,
Ebba
Ingeborg
entered
an
appearance,
claiming
that
as
a
legitimate
Johnson-‐Pickett
Rope
Company
to
his
brother
Victor,
to
his
father
and
mother
child
she
cannot
be
deprived
of
the
legitime
which
she
is
entitled
to
as
in
Sweden,
to
his
daughter
Ebba
Ingeborg,
to
his
wife,
Alejandra
Ibañez,
if
she
provided
by
Philippine
law.
She
moved
to
annul
the
decree
of
probate
and
put
remains
single
and
to
Simeona
Ibañez,
spinster,
if
she
remains
single.
The
rest
the
estate
into
intestate
administration
in
order
for
her
to
claim
the
estate
as
of
the
property
is
left
to
the
testator's
five
children
-‐
Mercedes,
Encarnacion,
the
sole
legitimate
heir
of
her
father.
Victor,
Eleonor
and
Alberto.
FACTS:
The
biographical
facts
relative
to
the
deceased
necessary
to
an
understanding
Emil
H.
Johnson,
a
native
of
Sweden
and
a
naturalized
citizen
of
the
United
of
the
case
are
these:
Emil
H.
Johnson
was
born
in
Sweden,
May
25,
1877,
from
States,
died
in
the
city
of
Manila,
leaving
a
will
by
which
he
disposed
of
an
which
country
he
emigrated
to
the
United
States
and
lived
in
Chicago,
Illinois,
estate,
the
value
of
which
was
P231,800.
This
document
is
a
holographic
from
1893
to
1898.
On
May
9,
1898,
at
Chicago,
he
was
married
to
Rosalie
instrument,
being
written
in
the
testator's
own
handwriting,
and
is
signed
by
Ackeson,
and
immediately
thereafter
embarked
for
the
Philippine
Islands
as
a
himself
and
two
witnesses
only,
instead
of
three
witnesses
required
by
section
soldier
in
the
Army
of
the
United
States.
As
a
result
of
relations
between
618
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
This
will,
therefore,
was
not
executed
in
Johnson
and
Rosalie
Ackeson
a
daughter,
named
Ebba
Ingeborg,
was
born.
conformity
with
the
provisions
of
law
generally
applicable
to
wills
executed
by
inhabitants
of
these
Islands,
and
hence
could
not
have
been
proved
under
After
Johnson
was
discharged
as
a
soldier
from
the
service
of
the
United
States
section
618.
he
continued
to
live
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
on
November
20,
1902,
the
wife,
Rosalie
Johnson,
was
granted
a
decree
of
divorce
from
him
in
the
Circuit
However,
a
petition
was
presented
in
the
CFI
of
the
city
of
Manila
for
the
Court
of
Cook
County,
Illinois,
on
the
ground
of
desertion.
A
little
later
Johnson
probate
of
this
will,
on
the
ground
that
Johnson
was
at
the
time
of
his
death
a
appeared
in
the
United
States
on
a
visit
and
on
January
10,
1903,
procured
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Illinois,
USA;
that
the
will
was
duly
executed
in
certificate
of
naturalization
at
Chicago.
After
a
short
trip
to
Sweden,
the
accordance
with
the
laws
of
that
State;
and
hence
could
properly
be
probated
deceased
returned
to
Manila,
where
he
prospered
in
business
and
continued
to
here
pursuant
to
section
636
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
This
section
reads
live
until
his
death.
as
follows:
In
this
city
he
appears
to
have
entered
into
marital
relations
with
Alejandra
Will
made
here
by
alien.
-‐
A
will
made
within
the
Philippine
Islands
by
a
Ibañez,
by
whom
he
had
three
children:
Mercedes,
Encarnacion
and
Victor.
The
citizen
or
subject
of
another
state
or
country,
which
is
executed
in
other
two
children
(Eleonor
and
Alberto)
mentioned
in
the
will
were
borne
to
the
deceased
by
Simeona
Ibañez.
CONFLICT
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About
three
months
after
the
will
had
been
probated,
the
attorneys
for
Ebba
It
does
not
affirmatively
appear
from
the
transaction
of
the
testimony
adduced
Ingeborg
Johnson
entered
an
appearance
in
her
behalf
and
noted
an
exception
in
the
trial
court
that
any
witness
was
examined
with
reference
to
the
law
of
to
the
other
admitting
the
will
to
probate.
The
purpose
of
the
proceeding
on
Illinois
on
the
subject
of
the
execution
of
will.
The
trial
judge
no
doubt
was
behalf
of
the
petitioner
is
to
annul
the
decree
of
probate
and
put
the
estate
satisfied
that
the
will
was
properly
executed
by
examining
section
1874
of
the
into
intestate
administration,
thus
preparing
the
way
for
the
establishment
of
Revised
Statutes
of
Illinois
and
he
may
have
assumed
that
he
could
take
judicial
the
claim
of
the
petitioner
as
the
sole
legitimate
heir
of
her
father.
At
the
time
notice
of
the
laws
of
Illinois
under
section
275
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
If
the
court
made
the
order
of
publication,
it
was
apprised
of
the
fact
that
the
so,
he
was
in
our
opinion
mistaken
that
section
authorizes
the
courts
here
to
petitioner
lived
in
the
United
States
and
that
as
daughter
and
heir
she
was
take
judicial
notice,
among
other
things,
of
the
acts
of
the
legislative
necessarily
interested
in
the
probate
of
the
will.
It
is,
therefore,
insisted
that
department
of
the
United
States.
These
words
clearly
have
reference
to
Acts
of
the
court
should
have
appointed
a
date
for
the
probate
of
the
will
sufficiently
the
Congress
of
the
US;
and
we
would
hesitate
to
hold
that
our
courts
can,
far
in
the
future
to
permit
the
petitioner
to
be
present
either
in
person
or
by
under
this
provision,
take
judicial
notice
of
the
multifarious
laws
of
the
various
representation;
and
it
is
said
that
the
failure
of
the
court
thus
to
postpone
the
American
States.
Nor
do
we
think
that
any
such
authority
can
be
derived
from
probate
of
the
will
constitutes
an
infringement
of
that
provision
of
the
the
broader
language,
used
in
the
same
action,
where
it
is
said
that
our
courts
Philippine
Bill
which
declared
that
property
shall
not
be
taken
without
due
may
take
judicial
notice
of
matters
of
public
knowledge
"similar"
to
those
process
of
law.
therein
enumerated.
The
proper
rule
we
think
is
to
require
proof
of
the
statutes
of
the
States
of
the
American
Union
whenever
their
provisions
are
The
grounds
upon
which
the
petitioner
seeks
to
avoid
the
probate
are:
(1)
Emil
determinative
of
the
issues
in
any
action
litigated
in
the
Philippine
courts.
was
a
resident
of
the
city
of
Manila
and
not
a
resident
of
the
State
of
Illinois
at
the
time
the
will
in
question
was
executed;
(2)
The
will
is
invalid
and
Nevertheless,
even
supposing
that
the
trial
court
may
have
erred
in
taking
inadequate
to
pass
real
and
personal
property
in
the
State
of
Illinois;
(3)
The
judicial
notice
of
the
law
of
Illinois
on
the
point
in
question,
such
error
is
not
order
admitting
the
will
to
probate
was
made
without
notice
to
the
petitioner;
now
available
to
the
petitioner,
first,
because
the
petition
does
not
state
any
and
(4)
The
order
in
question
was
beyond
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
fact
from
which
it
would
appear
that
the
law
of
Illinois
is
different
from
what
the
court
found,
and,
secondly,
because
the
assignment
of
error
and
ISSUES:
argument
for
the
appellant
in
this
court
raises
no
question
based
on
such
Whether
the
testator
was
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Illinois
and
that
the
will
was
supposed
error.
executed
in
conformity
with
the
laws
of
that
State
and
was
necessarily
and
properly
admitted
to
probate
The
petitioner,
it
is
true,
states
in
general
terms
that
the
will
in
question
is
invalid
and
inadequate
to
pass
real
and
personal
property
in
the
State
of
HELD:
Illinois,
but
this
is
merely
a
conclusion
of
law.
The
affidavits
by
which
the
Yes.
The
proof
adduced
before
the
trial
court
must
therefore
be
taken
as
petition
is
accompanied
contain
no
reference
to
the
subject,
and
we
are
cited
showing
that,
at
the
time
the
will
was
executed,
the
testator
was,
as
stated
in
to
no
authority
in
the
appellant's
brief
which
might
tend
to
raise
a
doubt
as
to
the
order
of
probate,
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Illinois.
This,
in
connection
with
the
correctness
of
the
conclusion
of
the
trial
court.
It
is
very
clear,
therefore,
the
circumstance
that
the
petition
does
not
even
so
much
as
deny
such
that
this
point
cannot
be
urged
as
of
serious
moment.
citizenship
but
only
asserts
that
the
testator
was
a
resident
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
demonstrates
the
impossibility
of
setting
the
probate
aside
for
lack
of
But
it
is
insisted
in
the
brief
for
the
appellant
that
the
will
in
question
was
not
the
necessary
citizenship
on
the
part
of
the
testator.
But
residence
in
the
properly
admissible
to
probate
because
it
contains
provisions
which
cannot
Philippine
Islands
is
compatible
with
citizenship
in
Illinois.
As
already
observed,
be
given
effect
consistently
with
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands;
and
it
is
the
allegation
of
the
petition
on
this
point
is
wholly
insufficient
to
justify
any
suggested
that
as
the
petitioner
is
a
legitimate
heir
of
the
testator
she
cannot
relief
whatever.
be
deprived
of
the
legitime
to
which
she
is
entitled
under
the
law
governing
CONFLICT
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testamentary
successions
in
these
Islands.
Upon
this
point
it
is
sufficient
to
say
that
the
probate
of
the
will
does
not
affect
the
intrinsic
validity
of
its
N.B.:
provisions,
the
decree
of
probate
being
conclusive
only
as
regards
the
due
Art.
873.
Impossible
conditions
and
those
contrary
to
law
or
good
customs
shall
execution
of
the
will.
be
considered
as
not
imposed
and
shall
in
no
manner
prejudice
the
heir,
even
if
the
testator
should
otherwise
provide.
If,
therefore,
upon
the
distribution
of
this
estate,
it
should
appear
that
any
legacy
given
by
the
will
or
other
disposition
made
therein
is
contrary
to
the
law
applicable
in
such
case,
the
will
must
necessarily
yield
upon
that
point
and
the
FACTS:
law
must
prevail.
Nevertheless,
it
should
not
be
forgotten
that
the
intrinsic
The
judicial
administrator
of
the
estate
of
deceased
Joseph
Brimo
filed
a
validity
of
the
provisions
of
this
will
must
be
determined
by
the
law
of
Illinois
scheme
of
partition,
which
was
approved.
Andre
Brimo,
one
of
the
brothers
of
and
not,
as
the
appellant
apparently
assumes.
It
is
settled
that
in
legal
and
the
deceased,
opposed
it
based
on
the
fact
that
the
partition
in
question
puts
testamentary
successions,
with
regard
to
the
order
of
succession,
as
well
as
to
into
effect
the
provisions
of
Joseph’s
will
which
are
not
in
accordance
with
the
the
amount
of
the
successional
rights
and
to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
their
laws
of
his
Turkish
nationality,
for
which
reason
they
are
void
as
being
in
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
laws
of
the
nation
of
the
person
whose
violation
or
article
10
(now
article
16)
of
the
Civil
Code.
succession
is
in
question,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
the
country
where
it
may
be
situate.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
approval
of
the
scheme
partition
was
erroneous
Given
the
matters
discussed
hereinabove,
the
trial
court
committed
no
error
in
denying
the
relief
sought.
HELD:
No,
but
modified
to
include
Andre.
The
law
then
in
force
was
the
Old
Civil
Code
87.
MICIANO
V.
BRIMO
of
the
Philippines
which,
among
other
things,
provides:
Nevertheless,
legal
and
G.R.
No.
L-‐22595
|
November
1,
1927
testamentary
successions,
in
respect
to
the
order
of
succession
as
well
as
to
the
amount
of
the
successional
rights
and
the
intrinsic
validity
of
their
provisions,
DOCTRINE:
The
institution
of
legatees
in
this
will
is
conditional,
and
the
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
in
condition
is
that
the
instituted
legatees
must
respect
the
testator's
will
to
question,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
or
the
country
in
which
it
distribute
his
property,
not
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
his
nationality,
but
in
may
be
situated.
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
Philippines.
If
this
condition
were
legal
and
valid,
any
legatee
who
fails
to
comply
with
it,
as
Andre
who,
by
his
attitude
in
The
fact
is
that
Andre
did
not
prove
that
Joseph’s
testamentary
dispositions
are
these
proceedings
has
not
respected
the
will
of
the
testator,
is
prevented
from
not
in
accordance
with
Turkish
laws,
inasmuch
as
he
did
not
present
any
receiving
his
legacy.
However,
said
condition
is
void,
being
contrary
to
law,
for
evidence
showing
what
the
Turkish
laws
are
on
the
matter.
In
the
absence
of
Art
792
of
the
Old
Civil
Code
provides
that
conditions
contrary
to
law
or
good
evidence
on
such
laws,
they
are
presumed
to
be
the
same
as
those
of
the
morals
shall
be
considered
as
not
imposed
and
shall
not
prejudice
the
heir
or
Philippines.
Andre,
himself,
acknowledges
that
said
laws
have
not
been
proven
legatee
in
any
manner
whatsoever,
even
if
the
testator
otherwise
provides.
in
these
proceedings
when
he
asked
the
court
to
be
given
an
opportunity
to
present
evidence
on
this
point;
so
much
so
that
he
assigns
as
an
error
of
the
Said
condition
is
contrary
to
law
because
it
expressly
ignores
the
testator's
court
in
not
having
deferred
the
approval
of
the
scheme
of
partition
until
the
national
law
when,
according
to
Art
10,
such
national
law
of
the
testator
is
the
receipt
of
certain
testimony
requested
regarding
the
Turkish
laws
on
the
one
to
govern
his
testamentary
dispositions.
Said
condition
then
is
considered
matter.
The
refusal
to
give
Andre
another
opportunity
to
prove
such
laws
does
unwritten,
and
the
institution
of
legatees
in
said
will
is
unconditional
and
is
not
an
error.
It
is
discretionary
with
the
trial
court,
and,
taking
into
consequently
valid
and
effective
even
as
to
the
Andre.
consideration
that
Andre
was
granted
ample
opportunity
to
introduce
CONFLICT
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evidence,
there
was
no
abuse
of
discretion
on
the
part
of
the
court
in
this
it,
and
to
the
condition
imposed
upon
the
legatees,
is
null
and
void,
being
particular.
There
is,
therefore,
no
evidence
in
the
record
that
the
national
law
contrary
to
law.
All
of
the
remaining
clauses
of
the
will
with
all
their
of
the
testator
was
violated
in
the
testamentary
dispositions
in
question
dispositions
and
requests
are
perfectly
valid
and
effective
it
not
appearing
that
which,
not
being
contrary
to
our
laws
in
force,
must
be
complied
with
and
said
clauses
are
contrary
to
the
testator's
national
law.
executed.
Therefore,
the
approval
of
the
scheme
of
partition
in
this
respect
Therefore,
the
orders
appealed
from
were
modified
and
distribution
of
Joseph
was
not
erroneous.
Brimo’s
estate
was
directed
to
be
made
in
such
a
manner
as
to
include
Andre
Brimo
as
one
of
the
legatees,
and
the
scheme
of
partition
submitted
by
the
In
regard
to
the
1st
assignment
of
error,
which
deals
with
the
exclusion
of
Miciano
was
approved
in
all
other
respects.
Andre
as
a
legatee,
inasmuch
as
he
is
one
of
the
persons
designated
as
such
in
will,
it
must
be
taken
into
consideration
that
such
exclusion
is
based
on
the
last
88.
VALERA
V.
CALDERON
part
of
the
2nd
clause
of
the
will,
which
says:
G.R.
No.
L-‐36342
|
October
8,
1932
Second.
I
like
desire
to
state
that
although
by
law,
I
am
a
Turkish
citizen,
this
DOCTRINE:
The
court
which
originally
took
cognizance
of
the
case
decided
that
citizenship
having
been
conferred
upon
me
by
conquest
and
not
by
free
choice,
such
circumstance
does
not
invalidate
the
will.
We
concur
in
said
opinion
and
nor
by
nationality
and,
on
the
other
hand,
having
resided
for
a
considerable
hold
that
a
clause
drawn
up
in
such
manner
is
superfluous
and
does
not
affect
length
of
time
in
the
Philippine
Islands
where
I
succeeded
in
acquiring
all
of
the
in
any
way
the
essential
requisites
prescribed
for
holographic
wills
by
the
property
that
I
now
possess,
it
is
my
wish
that
the
distribution
of
my
property
French
law,
and,
consequently,
it
has
not
invalidated
the
will
nor
deprived
it
of
and
everything
in
connection
with
this,
my
will,
be
made
and
disposed
of
in
its
holographic
character.
In
reaching
this
conclusion,
we
base
our
opinion
not
accordance
with
the
laws
in
force
in
the
Philippine
islands,
requesting
all
of
only
on
the
clear
and
conclusive
provisions
of
article
970
of
the
French
Civil
my
relatives
to
respect
this
wish,
otherwise,
I
annul
and
cancel
beforehand
Code
and
on
the
decisions
of
the
French
CA
cited
in
the
appelee's
brief,
but
whatever
disposition
found
in
this
will
favorable
to
the
person
or
persons
who
principally
on
the
fact
established
in
the
depositions
made
by
practicing
fail
to
comply
with
this
request.
attorneys
F.
de
Roussy
de
Sales,
Gething
C.
Miller
and
Henri
Gadd
of
Paris,
France,
who
emphatically
declared
that
the
will
in
question
did
not
lose
its
The
institution
of
legatees
in
this
will
is
conditional,
and
the
condition
is
that
holographic
character
by
the
addition
of
the
aforementioned
attestation
clause
the
instituted
legatees
must
respect
the
testator's
will
to
distribute
his
and
that
it
may
be
allowed
to
probate
in
conformity
with
the
French
laws
under
property,
not
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
his
nationality,
but
in
accordance
which
it
had
been
made
and
executed.
with
the
laws
of
the
Philippines.
If
this
condition
were
legal
and
valid,
any
legatee
who
fails
to
comply
with
it,
as
Andre
who,
by
his
attitude
in
these
FACTS:
proceedings
has
not
respected
the
will
of
the
testator,
is
prevented
from
The
deceased
Francisco
Varela
Calderon,
a
physician
by
profession,
was
a
receiving
his
legacy.
However,
said
condition
is
void,
being
contrary
to
law,
Filipino
citizen
resident
of
the
City
of
Manila
where
he
owned
real
properties
for
Art
792
of
the
Old
Civil
Code
provides
that
conditions
contrary
to
law
or
assessed
at
P188,017.81.
He
traveled
abroad
for
his
health
and
temporarily
good
morals
shall
be
considered
as
not
imposed
and
shall
not
prejudice
the
resided
in
Hendaye-‐Plage,
France.
Not
feeling
very
well,
but
in
the
full
heir
or
legatee
in
any
manner
whatsoever,
even
if
the
testator
otherwise
enjoyment
of
his
mental
faculties,
he
decided
to
make
his
last
will
and
provides.
testament,
on
April
14,
1930,
in
Paris,
France,
with
the
assistance
of
attorneys
Said
condition
is
contrary
to
law
because
it
expressly
ignores
the
testator's
F.
de
Roussy
de
Sales,
Gething
C.
Miller
and
Henri
Gadd.
Sometime
later,
he
national
law
when,
according
to
Art
10,
such
national
law
of
the
testator
is
died
in
the
Grand-‐Hotel
de
Leysin
Sanatorium
in
Switzerland.
the
one
to
govern
his
testamentary
dispositions.
Said
condition
then
is
considered
unwritten,
and
the
institution
of
legatees
in
said
will
is
On
September
20,
1930,
the
herein
petitioner-‐appellee,
Francisco
Carmelo
unconditional
and
consequently
valid
and
effective
even
as
to
the
Andre.
Varela,
filed
a
petition
in
the
CFI
of
the
City
of
Manila,
praying
that
said
will
be
From
all
this,
the
second
clause
of
the
will
regarding
the
law
which
shall
govern
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admitted
to
probate.
Said
petition
was
opposed
by
the
deceased's
brother
allowed
and
admitted
to
probate
therein,
may,
also
be
proved,
allowed
and
Angel,
Jesus,
Trinidad,
Paula,
Pilar
and
Maria,
surnamed
Varela
Calderon,
on
recorded
in
the
Philippine
Islands
in
the
same
manner
and
with
the
same
effect
the
grounds:
(a)
That
the
will
sought
to
be
probate
was
not
holographic
in
as
if
executed
in
the
latter
country.
Both
provisions
of
law
literally
copied
from
character
and
did
not
comply
with
the
requisites
prescribed
by
article
970
of
the
English
text,
read
as
follows:
the
French
Civil
Code;
(b)
that
the
witnesses
to
the
will
did
not
possess
the
qualifications
required
by
article
980
of
the
French
Civil
Code;
(c)
that
for
not
Article
970,
French
Civil
Code
à
A
holographic
will
is
not
valid
unless
it
is
having
complied
with
the
requisites
prescribed
by
the
French
law,
said
will
is
entirely
written,
dated,
and
signed
by
the
testator.
No
other
formality
is
null
and
void;
(d)
that
neither
has
it
the
character
of
an
open
will,
not
having
required.
been
executed
in
accordance
with
article
1001
of
the
French
Civil
Code;
and
(e)
Article
635,
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
à
Will
made
out
of
the
Philippine
Islands.
that
the
provisions
of
article
1007
of
the
same
Code
relative
to
the
recording
of
—
A
will
made
out
of
the
Philippine
Islands
which
might
be
proved
and
allowed
wills
were
not
complied
with
in
connection
with
the
will
in
question.
by
the
laws
of
the
state
or
country
in
which
it
was
made,
may
be
proved,
allowed,
and
recorded
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
shall
have
the
same
effect
The
original
will
was
executed
in
the
French
language
and
had
been
written,
as
if
executed
according
to
the
laws
of
these
Islands.
dated
and
signed
by
the
testator
with
his
own
hand,
with
the
exception
of
the
attestation
clause
which
appears
at
the
bottom
of
the
document.
This
fact
is
It
is
an
admitted
fact
that
the
will
was
written,
dated
and
signed
by
the
proved
by
the
testimony
of
the
appellee
and
his
other
witnesses,
including
the
deceased
testator,
for
which
reason,
there
is
no
doubt
that
it
had
been
made
depositions,
and
is
admitted
by
the
appellants.
and
executed
in
accordance
with
article
970
of
the
French
Civil
Code
were
it
not
for
the
attestation
clause
which
appears
at
the
bottom
of
the
document.
The
petition
for
the
allowance
and
probate
of
said
will
is
based
on
the
provisions
of
article
970
of
the
French
Civil
Code,
to
wit:
“A
holographic
will
is
The
appellants
contend
that
the
addition
of
said
of
clause
has
entirely
vitiated
not
valid
unless
it
is
entirely
written,
dated,
and
signed
by
the
testator.
No
the
will,
because
it
ceased
to
be
a
holographic
will,
neither
does
it
possess
the
other
formality
is
required.”
and
on
section
635
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
requisites
of
a
public
or
open
will
in
accordance
with
the
French
law.
The
court
to
wit:
“Will
made
out
of
the
Philippine
Islands.
—
A
will
made
out
of
the
which
originally
took
cognizance
of
the
case
decided
that
such
circumstance
Philippine
Islands
which
might
be
proved
and
allowed
by
the
laws
of
the
state
does
not
invalidate
the
will.
We
concur
in
said
opinion
and
hold
that
a
clause
or
country
in
which
it
was
made,
may
be
proved,
allowed,
and
recorded
in
the
drawn
up
in
such
manner
is
superfluous
and
does
not
affect
in
any
way
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
shall
have
the
same
effect
as
if
executed
according
to
essential
requisites
prescribed
for
holographic
wills
by
the
French
law,
and,
the
laws
of
these
Islands.”
consequently,
it
has
not
invalidated
the
will
nor
deprived
it
of
its
holographic
character.
In
reaching
this
conclusion,
we
base
our
opinion
not
only
on
the
ISSUE:
clear
and
conclusive
provisions
of
article
970
of
the
French
Civil
Code
and
on
Whether
the
holographic
will
was
made
and
executed,
in
accordance
with
the
the
decisions
of
the
French
Court
of
Appeals
cited
in
the
appelee's
brief,
but
laws
of
the
French
Republic
and
thus,
validly
allowed
and
admitted
principally
on
the
fact
established
in
the
depositions
made
by
practicing
attorneys
F.
de
Roussy
de
Sales,
Gething
C.
Miller
and
Henri
Gadd
of
Paris,
HELD:
France,
who
emphatically
declared
that
the
will
in
question
did
not
lose
its
Yes.
The
petition
for
the
allowance
and
probate
of
said
will
is
based
on
the
holographic
character
by
the
addition
of
the
aforementioned
attestation
provisions
of
article
970
of
the
French
Civil
Code
which
considers
as
a
clause
and
that
it
may
be
allowed
to
probate
in
conformity
with
the
French
holographic
will
that
which
is
made
or
executed,
dated
and
signed
by
the
laws
under
which
it
had
been
made
and
executed.
testator
in
his
own
handwriting
without
the
necessity
of
any
other
formality,
and
on
section
635
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
in
force
in
this
jurisdiction
89.
GIBBS
V.
GOVERNMENT
which
provides
that
a
will
made
out
of
the
Philippine
Islands
in
accordance
with
G.R.
No.
L-‐35694
|
December
23,
1933
the
laws
in
force
in
the
country
in
which
it
was
made
and
which
may
be
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Kyna’s
notes:
partnership
of
Allison
D.
Gibbs
and
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs;
that
Eva
died
intestate
The
issue
involved
is
tax
on
inheritance.
Thus,
if
the
issue
of
the
case
is
not
in
Palo
Alto,
California,
on
November
28,
1929;
that
at
the
time
of
her
death
purely
personal,
do
not
apply
Article
16
(par
2).
she
and
her
husband
were
citizens
of
the
State
of
California
and
domiciled
therein.
Av:
Under
California
Law,
spouses
only
have
inchoate
rights
over
properties
acquired
jointly.
Thus,
upon
the
death
of
the
wife,
the
entire
community
It
appears
further
from
said
order
that
Allison
was
appointed
administrator
of
property
without
administration
belongs
to
the
surviving
husband;
that
he
is
the
state
of
his
said
deceased
wife
in
a
case
in
the
same
court,
entitled
"In
the
the
absolute
owner
of
all
the
community
property
from
the
moment
of
the
Matter
of
the
Intestate
Estate
of
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs,
Deceased";
that
in
death
of
his
wife,
not
by
virtue
of
succession
or
by
virtue
of
her
death,
but
by
intestate
proceedings,
Allison
on
September
22,
1930,
filed
an
ex
parte
petition
virtue
of
the
fact
that
when
the
death
of
the
wife
precedes
that
of
the
husband
in
which
he
alleged
"that
the
parcels
of
land
hereunder
described
belong
to
the
he
acquires
the
community
property,
not
as
an
heir
or
as
the
beneficiary
of
his
conjugal
partnership
of
Allison
and
his
wife,
Eva",
describing
in
detail
the
3
facts
deceased
wife,
but
because
she
never
had
more
than
an
inchoate
interest
or
here
involved;
and
further
alleging
that
his
said
wife,
a
citizen
and
resident
of
expentancy
which
is
extinguished
upon
her
death.
California,
died
on
November
28,
1929;
that
in
accordance
with
the
law
of
California,
the
community
property
of
spouses
who
are
citizens
of
California,
However,
since
the
Phil.
Adheres
to
the
lex
situs
rule
with
regard
to
properties
upon
the
death
of
the
wife
previous
to
that
of
the
husband,
belongs
and
the
properties
were
in
the
Phil.,
under
Phil.
Law,
both
spouses
are
absolute
absolutely
to
the
surviving
husband
without
administration;
that
the
conjugal
owners
of
the
property.
It
results
that
the
wife
of
Allison
was,
by
the
law
of
the
partnership
of
Allison
and
Eva
Gibbs,
deceased,
has
no
obligations
or
debts
and
Philippine
Islands,
vested
of
a
descendible
interest,
equal
to
that
of
her
no
one
will
be
prejudiced
by
adjudicating
said
parcels
of
land
(and
17
others
husband,
in
the
Philippine
lands.
not
here
involved)
to
be
the
absolute
property
of
Allison
as
sole
owner.
The
court
granted
said
petition
and
on
September
22,
1930,
entered
a
decree
DOCTRINE:
The
issue
in
this
case
is
tax
on
inheritance
not
capacity
to
succeed,
adjucating
to
Allison
as
the
sole
and
absolute
owner
of
said
lands,
applying
intrinsic
validity,
amount
of
successional
rights,
or
order
of
succession
[CIAO].
section
1401
of
the
Civil
Code
of
California.
Gibbs
presented
this
decree
to
the
Hence,
Art.
16(2)
which
prescribes
national
law
should
not
have
been
applied.
register
of
deeds
of
Manila
and
demanded
that
the
latter
issue
to
him
a
TCT.
(The
California
Law
in
this
case
states
that
there
was
no
inheritance.)
The
Acting
upon
the
authority
of
Section
1547
of
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
issue—which
is
inheritance
tax—not
being
purely
personal,
Art.
16(2)
should
Administrative
Code,
the
register
of
deeds
refused
to
register
the
transfer
of
not
be
applied.
Rather,
Lex
Situs
should
govern.
(The
Phil.
Law
provides
that
in
title
of
the
said
conjugal
property
to
Allison
on
the
ground
that
the
this
case,
there
was
inheritance.)
corresponding
inheritance
tax
had
not
been
paid.
Thereupon,
under
date
of
December
26,
1930,
Allison
filed
in
the
said
court
a
petition
for
an
order
FACTS:
requiring
the
said
register
of
deeds
"to
issue
the
corresponding
titles"
to
Gibbs
This
is
an
appeal
from
a
final
order
of
the
CFI
Manila,
requiring
the
register
of
without
requiring
previous
payment
of
any
inheritance
tax.
After
due
hearing
deeds
of
the
City
of
Manila
to
cancel
certificates
of
title
Nos.
20880,
28336
and
of
the
parties,
the
court
reaffirmed
said
order
of
September
22,
1930,
and
28331,
covering
lands
located
in
the
City
of
Manila,
Philippine
Islands,
and
issue
entered
the
order
of
March
10,
1931,
which
is
under
review
on
this
appeal.
in
lieu
thereof
new
certificates
of
transfer
of
title
in
favor
of
Allison
D.
Gibbs
without
requiring
him
to
present
any
document
showing
that
the
succession
For
the
purposes
of
this
case,
the
Court
considered
the
following
facts
as
tax
due
under
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
Administrative
Code
has
been
established
by
the
evidence
or
the
admissions
of
the
parties:
Allison
has
been
paid.
continuously,
since
the
year
1902,
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
California
and
domiciled
therein;
that
he
and
Eva
were
married
at
Columbus,
Ohio,
in
July
The
order
of
the
court
of
March
10,
1931,
recites
that
the
parcels
of
land
1906;
that
there
was
no
ante-‐nuptial
marriage
contract
between
the
parties.
covered
by
said
certificates
of
title
formerly
belonged
to
the
conjugal
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
Administrative
Code
entitled
"Tax
on
CONFLICT
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LAWS
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TORRES
148
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AY
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inheritances,
legacies
and
other
acquisitions
mortis
causa"
provides
in
section
grants
practical
autonomy
to
the
Government
of
the
Philippine
Islands.
This
1536
that
"Every
transmission
by
virtue
of
inheritance
...
of
real
property
...
Government,
therefore,
may
apply
the
principles
and
rules
of
private
shall
be
subject
to
the
following
tax."
international
law
(conflicts
of
laws)
on
the
same
footing
as
an
organized
territory
or
state
of
the
United
States.
We
should,
therefore,
resort
to
the
law
ISSUES:
of
California,
the
nationality
and
domicile
of
Mrs.
Gibbs,
to
ascertain
the
1.
Whether
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs
at
the
time
of
her
death
is
the
owner
of
a
norm
which
would
be
applied
here
as
law
were
there
any
question
as
to
her
descendible
interest
in
the
Philippine
lands
above-‐mentioned?
status.
2.
Whether
the
Register
of
Deeds
erred
in
declining
to
register
the
transfer
title
of
the
conjugal
property
on
the
ground
of
unpaid
inheritance
tax?
(NO)
But
the
appellant's
chief
argument
and
the
sole
basis
of
the
lower
court's
nd
decision
rests
upon
the
2
paragraph
of
article
10
of
the
Civil
Code
which
is
as
HELD:
follows:
Nevertheless,
legal
and
testamentary
successions,
in
respect
to
the
1.
Yes.
Allison
contends
that
the
law
of
California
should
determine
the
nature
order
of
succession
as
well
as
to
the
amount
of
the
successional
rights
and
the
and
extent
of
the
title,
if
any,
that
vested
in
Eva
under
the
3
certificates
of
title
intrinsic
validity
of
their
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
Nos.
20880,
28336
and
28331
above
referred
to,
citing
article
9
of
the
Civil
person
whose
succession
is
in
question,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
Code
(The
laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition,
property
or
the
country
in
which
it
may
be
situated.
and
legal
capacity
of
persons,
are
binding
upon
Spaniards
even
though
they
reside
in
a
foreign
country.)
But
that,
even
if
the
nature
and
extent
of
her
title
In
construing
the
above
language
the
Court
met
at
the
outset
with
some
under
said
certificates
be
governed
by
the
law
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
the
difficulty
by
the
expression
"the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
nd
laws
of
California
govern
the
succession
to
such
title,
citing
the
2
paragraph
of
in
question",
by
reason
of
the
rather
anomalous
political
status
of
the
article
10
of
the
Civil
Code.
Philippine
Islands.
The
Court
encountered
no
difficulty
in
applying
article
10
in
the
case
of
a
citizen
of
Turkey.
(Miciano
v.
Brimo)
Having
regard
to
the
practical
It
is
argued
that
the
conjugal
right
of
the
California
wife
in
community
real
autonomy
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
as
above
stated,
the
Court
concluded
that
if
estate
in
the
Philippine
Islands
is
a
personal
right
and
must,
therefore,
be
article
10
is
applicable
and
the
estate
in
question
is
that
of
a
deceased
settled
by
the
law
governing
her
personal
status,
that
is,
the
law
of
California.
American
citizen,
the
succession
shall
be
regulated
in
accordance
with
the
But
our
attention
has
not
been
called
to
any
law
of
California
that
incapacitates
norms
of
the
State
of
his
domicile
in
the
United
States.
a
married
woman
from
acquiring
or
holding
land
in
a
foreign
jurisdiction
in
accordance
with
the
lex
rei
sitae.
There
is
not
the
slightest
doubt
that
a
The
trial
court
found
that
under
the
law
of
California,
upon
the
death
of
the
California
married
woman
can
acquire
title
to
land
in
a
common
law
jurisdiction
wife,
the
entire
community
property
without
administration
belongs
to
the
like
the
State
of
Illinois
or
the
District
of
Columbia,
subject
to
the
common-‐law
surviving
husband;
that
he
is
the
absolute
owner
of
all
the
community
estate
by
the
courtesy
which
would
vest
in
her
husband.
Nor
is
there
any
doubt
property
from
the
moment
of
the
death
of
his
wife,
not
by
virtue
of
that
if
a
California
husband
acquired
land
in
such
a
jurisdiction
his
wife
would
succession
or
by
virtue
of
her
death,
but
by
virtue
of
the
fact
that
when
the
be
vested
with
the
common
law
right
of
dower,
the
prerequisite
conditions
death
of
the
wife
precedes
that
of
the
husband
he
acquires
the
community
obtaining.
Article
9
of
the
Civil
Code
treats
of
purely
personal
relations
and
property,
not
as
an
heir
or
as
the
beneficiary
of
his
deceased
wife,
but
status
and
capacity
for
juristic
acts,
the
rules
relating
to
property,
both
because
she
never
had
more
than
an
inchoate
interest
or
expentancy
which
is
personal
and
real,
being
governed
by
article
10
of
the
Civil
Code.
extinguished
upon
her
death.
Quoting
the
case
of
Estate
of
Klumpke,
the
court
Furthermore,
article
9,
by
its
very
terms,
is
applicable
only
to
"Spaniards"
said:
"The
decisions
under
this
section
(1401
Civil
Code
of
California)
are
(now,
by
construction,
to
citizens
of
the
Philippine
Islands).
uniform
to
the
effect
that
the
husband
does
not
take
the
community
property
upon
the
death
of
the
wife
by
succession,
but
that
he
holds
it
all
from
the
The
Organic
Act
of
the
Philippine
Islands
(Act
of
Congress,
August
29,
1916,
moment
of
her
death
as
though
required
by
himself.
...
It
never
belonged
to
the
known
as
the
"Jones
Law")
as
regards
the
determination
of
private
rights,
estate
of
the
deceased
wife."
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
149
ATTY.
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AY
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provides
that
"the
husband
may
dispose
by
will
of
his
half
only
of
the
property
The
argument
of
Allison
apparently
leads
to
this
dilemma:
If
he
takes
nothing
of
the
conjugal
partnership."
Article
1426
provides
that
upon
dissolution
of
the
nd
by
succession
from
his
deceased
wife,
how
can
the
2 paragraph
of
article
10
conjugal
partnership
and
after
inventory
and
liquidation,
"the
net
remainder
of
be
invoked?
Can
Allison
be
heard
to
say
that
there
is
a
legal
succession
under
the
partnership
property
shall
be
divided
share
and
share
alike
between
the
the
law
of
the
Philippine
Islands
and
no
legal
succession
under
the
law
of
husband
and
wife,
or
their
respective
heirs."
Under
the
provisions
of
the
Civil
nd
California?
It
seems
clear
that
the
2 paragraph
of
article
10
applies
only
when
Code
and
the
jurisprudence
prevailing
here,
the
wife,
upon
the
acquisition
of
a
legal
or
testamentary
succession
has
taken
place
in
the
Philippines
and
in
any
conjugal
property,
becomes
immediately
vested
with
an
interest
and
title
accordance
with
the
law
of
the
Philippine
Islands;
and
the
foreign
law
is
therein
equal
to
that
of
her
husband,
subject
to
the
power
of
management
and
consulted
only
in
regard
to
the
order
of
succession
or
the
extent
of
the
disposition
which
the
law
vests
in
the
husband.
Immediately
upon
her
death,
if
nd
successional
rights;
in
other
words,
the
2 paragraph
of
article
10
can
be
there
are
no
obligations
of
the
decedent,
as
is
true
in
the
present
case,
her
invoked
only
when
the
deceased
was
vested
with
a
descendible
interest
in
share
in
the
conjugal
property
is
transmitted
to
her
heirs
by
succession.
property
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Philippine
Islands.
(Articles
657,
659,
661,
Civil
Code)
In
the
case
of
Clarke
v.
Clarke,
the
court
said:
It
is
principle
firmly
established
It
results
that
the
wife
of
Allison
was,
by
the
law
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
that
to
the
law
of
the
state
in
which
the
land
is
situated
we
must
look
for
the
vested
of
a
descendible
interest,
equal
to
that
of
her
husband,
in
the
Philippine
rules
which
govern
its
descent,
alienation,
and
transfer,
and
for
the
effect
and
lands
covered
by
certificates
of
title
Nos.
20880,
28336
and
28331,
from
the
construction
of
wills
and
other
conveyances.
This
fundamental
principle
is
date
of
their
acquisition
to
the
date
of
her
death.
Allison
himself
believed
that
stated
in
the
first
paragraph
of
article
10
of
our
Civil
Code
as
follows:
"Personal
his
wife
was
vested
of
such
a
title
and
interest
in
manifest
from
the
end
of
said
property
is
subject
to
the
laws
of
the
nation
of
the
owner
thereof;
real
property
certificates,
No.
28336,
dated
May
14,
1927,
introduced
by
him
in
evidence,
in
to
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
it
is
situated.
which
it
is
certified
that
"the
spouses
Allison
D.
Gibbs
and
Eva
Johnson
Gibbs
are
the
owners
in
fee
simple
of
the
conjugal
lands
therein
described."
It
is
stated
in
5
Cal.
Jur.,
478:
In
accord
with
the
rule
that
real
property
is
subject
to
the
lex
rei
sitae,
the
respective
rights
of
husband
and
wife
in
such
The
descendible
interest
of
Eva
in
the
lands
aforesaid
was
transmitted
to
her
property,
in
the
absence
of
an
antenuptial
contract,
are
determined
by
the
heirs
by
virtue
of
inheritance
and
this
transmission
plainly
falls
within
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
property
is
situated,
irrespective
of
the
domicile
of
language
of
section
1536
of
Article
XI
of
Chapter
40
of
the
Administrative
the
parties
or
to
the
place
where
the
marriage
was
celebrated.
Code
which
levies
a
tax
on
inheritances.
It
is
unnecessary
in
this
proceeding
to
determine
the
"order
of
succession"
or
the
"extent
of
the
successional
rights"
Under
this
broad
principle,
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
title
which
vested
in
(article
10,
Civil
Code,
supra)
which
would
be
regulated
by
section
1386
of
the
Mrs.
Gibbs
at
the
time
of
the
acquisition
of
the
community
lands
here
in
Civil
Code
of
California
which
was
in
effect
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
Mrs.
question
must
be
determined
in
accordance
with
the
lex
rei
sitae.
It
is
admitted
Gibbs.
that
the
Philippine
lands
here
in
question
were
acquired
as
community
property
of
the
conjugal
partnership
of
Allison
and
his
wife.
Under
the
law
of
The
record
does
not
show
what
the
proper
amount
of
the
inheritance
tax
in
the
Philippine
Islands,
she
was
vested
of
a
title
equal
to
that
of
her
husband.
this
case
would
be
nor
that
Allison
in
any
way
challenged
the
power
of
the
Article
1407
of
the
Civil
Code
provides:
All
the
property
of
the
spouses
shall
be
Government
to
levy
an
inheritance
tax
or
the
validity
of
the
statute
under
deemed
partnership
property
in
the
absence
of
proof
that
it
belongs
exclusively
which
the
register
of
deeds
refused
to
issue
a
certificate
of
transfer
reciting
to
the
husband
or
to
the
wife.
that
Allison
is
the
exclusive
owner
of
the
Philippine
lands
included
in
the
3
certificates
of
title
here
involved.
Article
1395
provides:
"The
conjugal
partnership
shall
be
governed
by
the
rules
of
law
applicable
to
the
contract
of
partnership
in
all
matters
in
which
such
The
judgment
of
the
court
below
of
March
10,
1931,
is
reversed
with
directions
rules
do
not
conflict
with
the
express
provisions
of
this
chapter."
Article
1414
to
dismiss
the
petition,
without
special
pronouncement
as
to
the
costs.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
150
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
upon
the
filing
of
a
bond
in
the
sum
of
P10,000.00,
let
letters
testamentary
be
90.
PHILIPPINE
TRUST
V.
BOHANAN
issued
and
after
taking
the
prescribed
oath,
it
may
enter
upon
the
execution
G.R.
No.
L-‐12105
|
30
January
1960
and
performance
of
its
trust.
DOCTRINES:
As
in
accordance
with
Article
10
of
the
old
Civil
Code,
the
validity
of
It
does
not
appear
that
the
order
granting
probate
was
ever
questioned
on
testamentary
dispositions
are
to
be
governed
by
the
national
law
of
the
appeal.
The
executor
filed
a
project
of
partition
dated
January
24,
1956,
testator,
and
as
it
has
been
decided
and
it
is
not
disputed
that
the
national
law
making,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
will,
the
following
of
the
testator
is
that
of
the
State
of
Nevada,
which
allows
a
testator
to
dispose
adjudications:
(1)
one-‐half
of
the
residuary
estate,
to
the
Farmers
and
of
all
his
property
according
to
his
will,
as
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
order
of
the
Merchants
National
Bank
of
Los
Angeles,
California,
U.S.A.
in
trust
only
for
the
court
approving
the
project
of
partition
made
in
accordance
with
the
benefit
of
testator's
grandson
Edward
George
Bohanan,
which
consists
of
testamentary
provisions,
must
be,
as
it
is
hereby
affirmed,
with
costs
against
several
mining
companies;
(2)
the
other
half
of
the
residuary
estate
to
the
appellants.
testator's
brother,
F.L.
Bohanan,
and
his
sister,
Mrs.
M.
B.
Galbraith,
share
and
share
alike.
This
consist
in
the
same
amount
of
cash
and
of
shares
of
Since
no
right
to
share
in
the
inheritance
in
favor
of
a
divorced
wife
exists
in
the
mining
stock
similar
to
those
given
to
testator's
grandson;
(3)
legacies
of
P6,000
State
of
Nevada
and
since
the
court
below
had
already
found
that
there
was
no
each
to
his
(testator)
son,
Edward
Gilbert
Bohana,
and
his
daughter,
Mary
Lydia
conjugal
property
between
the
testator
and
Magdalena,
the
latter
can
now
Bohanan,
to
be
paid
in
three
yearly
installments;
(4)
legacies
to
Clara
Daen,
in
have
no
longer
claim
to
pay
portion
of
the
estate
left
by
the
testator.
the
amount
of
P10,000.00;
Katherine
Woodward,
P2,000;
Beulah
Fox,
P4,000;
and
Elizabeth
Hastings,
P2,000;
It
will
be
seen
from
the
above
that
out
of
the
FACTS:
total
estate
(after
deducting
administration
expenses)
of
P211,639.33
in
cash,
On
April
24,
1950,
the
CFI
of
Manila,
admitted
to
probate
a
last
will
and
the
testator
gave
his
grandson
P90,819.67
and
one-‐half
of
all
shares
of
stock
of
testament
of
C.
O.
Bohanan,
executed
by
him
on
April
23,
1944
in
Manila.
several
mining
companies
and
to
his
brother
and
sister
the
same
amount.
To
his
children
he
gave
a
legacy
of
only
P6,000
each,
or
a
total
of
P12,000.
According
to
the
evidence
of
the
opponents
the
testator
was
born
in
Nebraska
and
therefore
a
citizen
of
that
state,
or
at
least
a
citizen
of
California
where
The
wife
Magadalena
C.
Bohanan
and
her
two
children
questioned
the
some
of
his
properties
are
located.
This
contention
in
untenable.
validity
of
the
testamentary
provisions,
claiming
that
they
have
been
Notwithstanding
the
long
residence
of
the
decedent
in
the
Philippines,
his
stay
deprived
of
the
legitime
that
the
laws
of
the
form
concede
to
them.
here
was
merely
temporary,
and
he
continued
and
remained
to
be
a
citizen
of
the
US
and
of
the
state
of
his
pertinent
residence
to
spend
the
rest
of
his
days
ISSUE:
in
that
state.
His
permanent
residence
or
domicile
in
the
US
depended
upon
Whether
Magdalena
and
her
two
children
have
been
deprived
of
the
legitime
his
personal
intent
or
desire,
and
he
selected
Nevada
as
his
domicile
and
due
to
them?
therefore
at
the
time
of
his
death,
he
was
a
citizen
of
that
state.
Nobody
can
choose
his
domicile
or
permanent
residence
for
him.
That
is
his
exclusive
HELD:
personal
right.
No.
The
first
question
refers
to
the
share
that
the
wife
of
the
testator,
Magdalena
C.
Bohanan,
should
be
entitled
to
receive.
The
will
has
not
given
her
Wherefore,
the
court
finds
that
the
testator
C.
O.
Bohanan
was
at
the
time
of
any
share
in
the
estate
left
by
the
testator.
It
is
argued
that
it
was
error
for
the
his
death
a
citizen
of
the
US
and
of
the
State
of
Nevada
and
declares
that
his
trial
court
to
have
recognized
the
Reno
divorce
secured
by
the
testator
from
his
will
and
testament,
is
fully
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
state
of
Nevada
Filipino
wife
Magdalena
C.
Bohanan,
and
that
said
divorce
should
be
declared
a
and
admits
the
same
to
probate.
Accordingly,
the
Philippine
Trust
Company,
nullity
in
this
jurisdiction.
named
as
the
executor
of
the
will,
is
hereby
appointed
to
such
executor
and
The
court
below
refused
to
recognize
the
claim
of
the
widow
on
the
ground
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
151
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
that
the
laws
of
Nevada,
of
which
the
deceased
was
a
citizen,
allow
him
to
successions,
in
respect
to
the
order
of
succession
as
well
as
to
the
extent
of
the
dispose
of
all
of
his
properties
without
requiring
him
to
leave
any
portion
of
successional
rights
and
the
intrinsic
validity
of
their
provisions,
shall
be
his
estate
to
his
wife.
Section
9905
of
Nevada
Compiled
Laws
of
1925
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
in
question,
provides:
Every
person
over
the
age
of
eighteen
years,
of
sound
mind,
may,
by
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
the
country
in
which
it
is
last
will,
dispose
of
all
his
or
her
estate,
real
and
personal,
the
same
being
found.
chargeable
with
the
payment
of
the
testator's
debts.
In
the
proceedings
for
the
probate
of
the
will,
it
was
found
out
and
it
was
Besides,
the
right
of
Magdalena
to
a
share
in
the
testator's
estate
had
already
decided
that
the
testator
was
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Nevada
because
he
had
been
passed
upon
adversely
against
her
in
an
order
dated
June
19,
1955,
which
selected
this
as
his
domicile
and
his
permanent
residence.
So
the
question
at
had
become
final,
as
Magdalena
does
not
appear
to
have
appealed
therefrom
issue
is
whether
the
testementary
dispositions,
especially
those
for
the
children
to
question
its
validity.
On
December
16,
1953,
the
said
former
wife
filed
a
which
are
short
of
the
legitime
given
them
by
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
motion
to
withdraw
the
sum
of
P20,000
from
the
funds
of
the
estate,
are
valid.
It
is
not
disputed
that
the
laws
of
Nevada
allow
a
testator
to
dispose
chargeable
against
her
share
in
the
conjugal
property,
and
the
court
in
its
said
of
all
his
properties
by
will.
It
does
not
appear
that
at
time
of
the
hearing
of
the
error
found
that
there
exists
no
community
property
owned
by
the
decedent
project
of
partition,
the
above-‐quoted
provision
was
introduced
in
evidence,
as
and
his
former
wife
at
the
time
the
decree
of
divorce
was
issued.
As
already
it
was
the
executor's
duly
to
do.
and
Magdalena
C.
Bohanan
may
no
longer
question
the
fact
contained
therein,
i.e.
that
there
was
no
community
property
acquired
by
the
testator
and
The
law
of
Nevada,
being
a
foreign
law
can
only
be
proved
in
our
courts
in
the
Magdalena
C.
Bohanan
during
their
converture.
form
and
manner
provided
for
by
our
Rules,
which
are
as
follows:
SEC.
41.
Proof
of
public
or
official
record.
—
An
official
record
or
an
entry
therein,
when
Moreover,
the
court
below
had
found
that
the
testator
and
Magdalena
were
admissible
for
any
purpose,
may
be
evidenced
by
an
official
publication
thereof
married
on
January
30,
1909,
and
that
divorce
was
granted
to
him
on
May
20,
or
by
a
copy
tested
by
the
officer
having
the
legal
custody
of
the
record,
or
by
1922;
that
sometime
in
1925,
Magdalena
married
Carl
Aaron
and
this
his
deputy,
and
accompanied,
if
the
record
is
not
kept
in
the
Philippines,
with
a
marriage
was
subsisting
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
testator.
Since
no
certificate
that
such
officer
has
the
custody.
right
to
share
in
the
inheritance
in
favor
of
a
divorced
wife
exists
in
the
State
of
Nevada
and
since
the
court
below
had
already
found
that
there
was
no
We
have,
however,
consulted
the
records
of
the
case
in
the
court
below
and
conjugal
property
between
the
testator
and
Magdalena,
the
latter
can
now
we
have
found
that
during
the
hearing
on
October
4,
1954
of
the
motion
of
for
have
no
longer
claim
to
pay
portion
of
the
estate
left
by
the
testator.
withdrawal
of
P20,000
as
her
share,
the
foreign
law,
especially
Section
9905,
Compiled
Nevada
Laws
was
introduced
in
evidence
by
appellant's
counsel.
In
The
most
important
issue
is
the
claim
of
the
testator's
children,
Edward
and
addition,
the
other
appellants,
children
of
the
testator,
do
not
dispute
the
Mary
Lydia,
who
had
received
legacies
in
the
amount
of
P6,000
each
only,
and,
above-‐
quoted
provision
of
the
laws
of
the
State
of
Nevada.
Under
all
the
therefore,
have
not
been
given
their
shares
in
the
estate
which,
in
accordance
above
circumstances,
we
are
constrained
to
hold
that
the
pertinent
law
of
with
the
laws
of
the
forum,
should
be
two-‐thirds
of
the
estate
left
by
the
Nevada,
especially
Section
9905
of
the
Compiled
Nevada
Laws
of
1925,
can
be
testator.
Is
the
failure
old
the
testator
to
give
his
children
two-‐thirds
of
the
taken
judicial
notice
of
by
us,
without
proof
of
such
law
having
been
offered
at
estate
left
by
him
at
the
time
of
his
death,
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
the
hearing
of
the
project
of
partition.
forum
valid?
As
in
accordance
with
Article
10
of
the
old
Civil
Code,
the
validity
of
The
old
Civil
Code,
which
is
applicable
to
this
case
because
the
testator
died
in
testamentary
dispositions
are
to
be
governed
by
the
national
law
of
the
1944,
expressly
provides
that
successional
rights
to
personal
property
are
to
testator,
and
as
it
has
been
decided
and
it
is
not
disputed
that
the
national
be
governed
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
in
law
of
the
testator
is
that
of
the
State
of
Nevada,
which
allows
a
testator
to
question.
Says
the
law
on
this
point:
Nevertheless,
legal
and
testamentary
dispose
of
all
his
property
according
to
his
will,
as
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
order
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
152
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
of
the
court
approving
the
project
of
partition
made
in
accordance
with
the
said
three
witnesses
signed
their
names
on
the
last
page
after
the
attestation
testamentary
provisions,
must
be,
as
it
is
hereby
affirmed,
with
costs
against
clause
in
his
presence
and
in
the
presence
of
each
other.
The
oppositors
did
appellants.
not
submit
any
evidence.
The
trial
court
found
and
declared
the
will
to
be
a
holographic
will;
that
it
was
in
the
handwriting
of
the
testator
and
that
94.
ENRIQUEZ
V.
ABADIA
although
at
the
time
it
was
executed
and
at
the
time
of
the
testator's
death,
G.R.
No.
L-‐7188
|
August
9,
1954
holographic
wills
were
not
permitted
by
law
still,
because
at
the
time
of
the
hearing
and
when
the
case
was
to
be
decided
the
new
Civil
Code
was
already
in
DOCTRINES:
The
extrinsic
validity
of
a
will
is
to
be
judged
not
by
the
law
force,
which
Code
permitted
the
execution
of
holographic
wills,
under
a
liberal
enforce
at
the
time
of
the
testator's
death
or
at
the
time
the
supposed
will
is
view,
and
to
carry
out
the
intention
of
the
testator
which
according
to
the
trial
presented
in
court
for
probate
or
when
the
petition
is
decided
by
the
court
but
court
is
the
controlling
factor
and
may
override
any
defect
in
form,
said
trial
at
the
time
the
instrument
was
executed
(Art.
795
of
the
Civil
Code).
One
court
admitted
to
probate
the
Last
Will
and
Testament
of
Father
Sancho
reason
in
support
of
the
rule
is
that
although
the
will
operates
upon
and
after
Abadia.
The
oppositors
appealed
from
that
decision.
the
death
of
the
testator,
the
wishes
of
the
testator
about
the
disposition
of
his
estate
among
his
heirs
and
among
the
legatees
is
given
solemn
expression
at
ISSUE:
the
time
the
will
is
executed,
and
in
reality,
the
legacy
or
bequest
then
Whether
the
holographic
will
should
be
allowed
despite
the
fact
that
when
it
becomes
a
completed
act.
was
executed
the
civil
code
proscribes
the
execution
of
such
wills
The
general
rule
is
that
the
Legislature
cannot
validate
void
wills.
HELD:
No.
The
new
Civil
Code
(Republic
Act
No.
386)
under
article
810
thereof
N.B.:
Art.
795.
The
validity
of
a
will
as
to
its
form
depends
upon
the
observance
provides
that
a
person
may
execute
a
holographic
will
which
must
be
entirely
of
the
law
in
force
at
the
time
it
is
made.
written,
dated
and
signed
by
the
testator
himself
and
need
not
be
witnessed.
It
is
a
fact,
however,
that
at
the
time
that
Exhibit
"A"
was
executed
in
1923
and
at
FACTS:
the
time
that
Father
Abadia
died
in
1943,
holographic
wills
were
not
permitted,
On
September
6,
1923,
Father
Sancho
Abadia,
parish
priest
and
also
a
resident
and
the
law
at
the
time
imposed
certain
requirements
for
the
execution
of
of
Talisay,
Cebu,
executed
a
document
purporting
to
be
his
Last
Will
and
wills,
such
as
numbering
correlatively
each
page
(not
folio
or
sheet)
in
letters
Testament.
He
died
on
January
14,
1943,
in
the
municipality
of
Aloguinsan,
and
signing
on
the
left
hand
margin
by
the
testator
and
by
the
three
attesting
Cebu,
where
he
was
an
evacuee.
He
left
properties
estimated
at
P8,000
in
witnesses,
requirements
which
were
not
complied
with
in
Exhibit
"A"
because
value.
On
October
2,
1946,
Andres
Enriquez,
one
of
the
legatees
filed
a
petition
the
back
pages
of
the
first
two
folios
of
the
will
were
not
signed
by
any
one,
not
for
the
probate
of
the
will
in
the
CFI
of
Cebu.
Some
cousins
and
nephews
who
even
by
the
testator
and
were
not
numbered,
and
as
to
the
three
front
pages,
would
inherit
the
estate
of
the
deceased
if
he
left
no
will,
filed
opposition.
they
were
signed
only
by
the
testator.
During
the
hearing
one
of
the
attesting
witnesses,
the
other
two
being
dead,
The
validity
of
a
will
is
to
be
judged
not
by
the
law
enforce
at
the
time
of
the
testified
without
contradiction
that
in
his
presence
and
in
the
presence
of
his
testator's
death
or
at
the
time
the
supposed
will
is
presented
in
court
for
co-‐witnesses,
Father
Sancho
wrote
out
in
longhand
the
will
in
Spanish
which
probate
or
when
the
petition
is
decided
by
the
court
but
at
the
time
the
the
testator
spoke
and
understood;
that
he
signed
on
The
left
hand
margin
of
instrument
was
executed
(Art.
795
of
the
Civil
Code).
One
reason
in
support
the
front
page
of
each
of
the
three
folios
or
sheets
of
which
the
document
is
of
the
rule
is
that
although
the
will
operates
upon
and
after
the
death
of
the
composed,
and
numbered
the
same
with
Arabic
numerals,
and
finally
signed
testator,
the
wishes
of
the
testator
about
the
disposition
of
his
estate
among
his
name
at
the
end
of
his
writing
at
the
last
page,
all
this,
in
the
presence
of
his
heirs
and
among
the
legatees
is
given
solemn
expression
at
the
time
the
the
three
attesting
witnesses
after
telling
that
it
was
his
last
will
and
that
the
will
is
executed,
and
in
reality,
the
legacy
or
bequest
then
becomes
a
completed
act.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
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will
was
described
as
"not
in
any
way
related
to"
him
but
in
a
decision
rendered
Of
course,
there
is
the
view
that
the
intention
of
the
testator
should
be
the
by
the
SC
in
another
case
had
been
declared
as
an
acknowledged
natural
ruling
and
controlling
factor
and
that
all
adequate
remedies
and
interpretations
daughter
of
his.
should
be
resorted
to
in
order
to
carry
out
said
intention,
and
that
when
statutes
passed
after
the
execution
of
the
will
and
after
the
death
of
the
Helen
alleged
that
the
will
deprives
her
of
her
legitime
as
an
acknowledged
testator
lessen
the
formalities
required
by
law
for
the
execution
of
wills,
said
natural
child.
She
claims
that
under
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
California
law
subsequent
statutes
should
be
applied
so
as
to
validate
wills
defectively
should
be
applied,
and
in
accordance
therewith
and
following
the
doctrine
of
executed
according
to
the
law
in
force
at
the
time
of
execution.
However,
we
renvoi,
the
question
of
the
validity
of
the
testamentary
provision
in
question
should
not
forget
that
from
the
day
of
the
death
of
the
testator,
if
he
leaves
a
should
be
referred
back
to
the
law
of
the
decedent's
domicile,
which
is
the
will,
the
title
of
the
legatees
and
devisees
under
it
becomes
a
vested
right,
Philippines.
She
invokes
the
provisions
of
Art.
946
of
the
Civil
Code
of
protected
under
the
due
process
clause
of
the
constitution
against
a
California,
which
is
as
follows:
“If
there
is
no
law
to
the
contrary,
in
the
place
subsequent
change
in
the
statute
adding
new
legal
requirements
of
execution
where
personal
property
is
situated,
it
is
deemed
to
follow
the
person
of
its
of
wills
which
would
invalidate
such
a
will.
By
parity
of
reasoning,
when
one
owner,
and
is
governed
by
the
law
of
his
domicile.”
Accordingly,
her
share
executes
a
will
which
is
invalid
for
failure
to
observe
and
follow
the
legal
must
be
increased
in
view
of
successional
rights
of
illegitimate
children
under
requirements
at
the
time
of
its
execution
then
upon
his
death
he
should
be
Philippine
laws.
regarded
and
declared
as
having
died
intestate,
and
his
heirs
will
then
inherit
by
intestate
succession,
and
no
subsequent
law
with
more
liberal
requirements
On
the
other
hand,
the
executor
and
Lucy
argue
that
the
national
law
of
the
or
which
dispenses
with
such
requirements
as
to
execution
should
be
allowed
deceased
must
apply,
and
thus
the
courts
must
apply
internal
law
of
California
to
validate
a
defective
will
and
thereby
divest
the
heirs
of
their
vested
rights
in
on
the
matter.
Under
California
law,
there
are
no
compulsory
heirs
and
the
estate
by
intestate
succession.
The
general
rule
is
that
the
Legislature
consequently
a
testator
may
dispose
of
his
property
by
will
in
the
form
and
cannot
validate
void
wills
manner
he
desires
(Kaufman
Case).
91.
AZNAR
V.
CHRISTENSES-‐GARCIA
ISSUE:
G.R.
No.
L-‐16749
|
January
31,
1963
Whether
Philippine
law
should
ultimately
be
applied
DOCTRINE:
The
recognition
of
the
renvoi
theory
implies
that
the
rules
of
conflict
HELD:
of
laws
are
to
be
understood
as
incorporating
not
only
the
ordinary
or
internal
Yes.
Edward
was
a
US
Citizen
and
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
at
the
time
of
his
laws
of
the
foreign
state
or
country
but
its
rules
of
conflict
of
laws
as
well.
death.
The
law
that
governs
the
validity
of
his
testamentary
dispositions
is
According
to
this
theory,
the
law
of
a
country
means
the
whole
of
its
law.
defined
in
Art.
16,
CC,
which
is
as
follows:
FACTS:
ART.
16.
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
Edward
Christensen,
born
in
New
York,
migrated
to
California
where
he
resided
of
the
country
where
it
is
situated.
and
consequently
was
considered
citizen
thereof.
He
came
to
the
Philippines
where
he
became
a
domiciliary
until
the
time
of
his
death.
However,
during
the
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
entire
period
of
his
residence
in
this
country,
he
had
always
considered
himself
the
order
of
succession
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
a
citizen
of
California.
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
In
his
will,
Edward
instituted
his
daughter
Maria
Lucy
Christensen
as
his
only
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
heir,
but
left
a
legacy
of
P3600
in
favor
of
Helen
Christensen
Garcia
who,
in
his
country
where
said
property
may
be
found.
CONFLICT
OF
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The
laws
of
California
have
prescribed
two
sets
of
laws
for
its
citizens,
one
for
Maria
Cristina
Bellis
and
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
filed
their
respective
residents
therein
and
another
for
those
domiciled
in
other
jurisdictions.
Art.
oppositions
to
the
project
of
partition
on
the
ground
that
they
were
deprived
946
of
the
California
Civil
Code
is
its
conflict
of
laws
rule,
while
the
rule
of
their
legitimes
as
illegitimate
children
and,
therefore,
compulsory
heirs
of
applied
in
Kaufman,
is
its
internal
law.
If
the
law
on
succession
and
the
conflict
the
deceased.
of
laws
rules
of
California
are
to
be
enforced
jointly,
each
in
its
own
intended
and
appropriate
sphere,
the
principle
cited
in
Kaufman
should
apply
to
The
lower
court
issued
an
order
overruling
the
oppositions
and
approving
the
citizens
living
in
the
State,
but
Art.
946
should
apply
to
such
of
its
citizens
as
executor’s
final
account,
report
and
administration,
and
project
of
partition.
are
not
domiciled
in
California
but
in
other
jurisdictions.
Relying
upon
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
it
applied
the
national
law
of
the
decedent,
which
in
this
case
did
not
provide
for
legitimes.
The
national
law
mentioned
in
Art.
16
is
the
law
on
conflict
of
laws
in
the
California
Civil
Code,
i.e.,
Art.
946,
which
authorizes
the
reference
or
return
of
ISSUE:
the
question
to
the
law
of
the
testator's
domicile.
The
conflict
of
laws
rule
in
Whether
such
illegitimate
children
of
Bellis
be
entitled
to
successional
rights
California
precisely
refers
back
the
case,
when
a
decedent
is
not
domiciled
in
California,
to
the
law
of
his
domicile,
which
is
the
Philippines
in
the
case
at
HELD:
bar.
No.
The
said
illegitimate
children
are
not
entitled
to
their
legitimes.
Under
Texas
law,
there
are
no
legitimes.
Even
if
the
other
will
was
executed
in
the
The
Philippine
court
therefore
must
apply
its
own
law
as
directed
in
the
Philippines,
his
national
law,
still,
will
govern
the
properties
for
succession
conflict
of
laws
rule
of
the
state
of
the
decedent.
Wherefore,
the
decision
even
if
it
is
stated
in
his
testate
that
it
shall
be
governed
by
the
Philippine
appealed
from
is
hereby
reversed
and
the
case
returned
to
the
lower
court
with
law.
instructions
that
the
partition
be
made
as
the
Philippine
law
on
succession
provides.
Art.
16,
Par.
2
renders
applicable
the
national
law
of
the
decedent,
in
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
with
regard
to
four
items:
(a)
the
order
of
92.
BELLIS
V.
BELLIS
succession,
(b)
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
(c)
the
intrinsic
validity
of
G.R.
No.
L-‐23678
|
June
6,
1967
provisions
of
will,
and
(d)
the
capacity
to
succeed.
FACTS:
ART.16
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
of
Amos
Bellis
was
a
citizen
and
resident
of
Texas
at
the
time
of
his
death.
He
the
country
to
where
it
is
situated.
had
5
legitimate
children
with
his
first
wife,
Mary
Mallen,
whom
he
divorced.
He
had
3
legitimate
daughters
with
his
second
wife,
Violet,
who
survived
him,
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
and
another
3
illegitimate
children
with
another
woman.
Before
he
died,
he
the
order
of
successions
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
executed
2
wills—the
first
one
disposing
of
his
Texas
properties,
the
other
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
disposing
his
Philippine
properties.
In
his
will,
which
he
executed
in
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
Philippines,
he
directed
that
after
all
taxes,
obligations,
and
expenses
of
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
administration
are
paid
for,
his
distributable
estate
should
be
divided,
in
trust,
country
wherein
said
property
may
be
found.
in
the
following
order
and
manner:
a)
$240,000.00
to
his
first
wife
Mary
Mallen
b)
$120,000.00
to
his
three
illegitimate
children
Amos
Bellis,
Jr.,
Maria
Cristina
As
a
counter-‐argument,
appellants
invoked
Art.
17,
Par.
3,
of
the
Civil
Code,
Bellis,
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
or
$40,000.00
each,
and
c)
After
foregoing
the
two
stating—
items
have
been
satisfied,
the
remainder
shall
go
to
his
seven
surviving
children
by
his
first
and
second
wives.
Prohibitive
laws
concerning
persons,
their
acts
or
property,
and
those
which
have
for
their
object
public
order,
public
policy
and
good
customs
CONFLICT
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LAWS
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shall
not
be
rendered
ineffective
by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
persons
whom
he
or
she
desires
to
favor.
And,
where
the
will
is
not
only
joint
by
determinations
or
conventions
agreed
upon
in
a
foreign
country.
but
reciprocal,
either
one
of
the
spouses
who
may
happen
to
be
unscrupulous,
wicked,
faithless,
or
desperate,
knowing
as
he
or
she
does
the
terms
of
the
will
However,
it
is
evident
that
whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
whereby
the
whole
property
of
the
spouses
both
conjugal
and
paraphernal
goes
involved
in
our
System
of
legitimes
(that
is
the
public
policy
that
a
compulsory
to
the
survivor,
may
be
tempted
to
kill
or
dispose
of
the
other.
heir
cannot
be
deprived
of
his
legitime),
Congress
has
not
intended
to
extend
the
same
to
the
succession
of
foreign
nationals.
For
it
has
specifically
chosen
ALG:
What
needs
to
be
stipulated
for
a
will
to
be
joint?
“Our
property..
be
given
to
leave,
inter
alia,
the
amount
of
successional
rights,
to
the
decedent's
and
transmitted
to
anyone
or
either
of
us,
who
may
survive
the
other,
or
who
national
law.
Specific
provisions
must
prevail
over
general
ones.
A
provision
in
may
remain
the
surviving
spouse
of
the
other."
a
foreigner's
will
to
the
effect
that
his
properties
shall
be
distributed
in
accordance
with
Philippine
law
and
not
with
his
national
law,
is
illegal
and
void,
N.B.:
for
his
national
law
cannot
be
ignored
in
regard
to
those
matters
that
Article
Art.
818.
Two
or
more
persons
cannot
make
a
will
jointly,
or
in
the
same
10—now
Article
16—of
the
Civil
Code
states
said
national
law
should
govern.
instrument,
either
for
their
reciprocal
benefit
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
person.
(669)
In
this
regard,
the
parties
do
not
submit
the
case
on,
nor
even
discuss,
the
doctrine
of
renvoi,
applied
by
this
Court
in
Aznar
v.
Christensen.
Said
doctrine
is
Art.
819.
Wills,
prohibited
by
the
preceding
article,
executed
by
Filipinos
in
a
usually
pertinent
where
the
decedent
is
a
national
of
one
country,
and
a
foreign
country
shall
not
be
valid
in
the
Philippines,
even
though
authorized
by
domicile
of
another.
In
the
present
case,
it
is
not
disputed
that
the
decedent
the
laws
of
the
country
where
they
may
have
been
executed.
(733a)
was
both
a
national
of
Texas
and
a
domicile
thereof
at
the
time
of
his
death.
So
that
even
assuming
Texas
has
a
conflict
of
law
rule
providing
that
the
FACTS:
domiciliary
system
(law
of
the
domicile)
should
govern,
the
same
would
not
Victor
Bilbao
jointly
with
his
wife
Ramona
M.
Navarro,
executed
the
will
in
result
in
a
reference
back
(renvoi)
to
Philippine
law,
but
would
still
refer
to
question
on
October
6,
1931,
on
a
single
page
or
sheet.
The
two
testators
in
Texas
law.
Nonetheless,
if
Texas
has
a
conflicts
rule
adopting
the
situs
theory
their
testament
directed
that
"all
of
our
respective
private
properties
both
real
(lex
rei
sitae)
calling
for
the
application
of
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
and
personal,
and
all
of
our
conjugal
properties,
and
any
other
property
properties
are
situated,
renvoi
would
arise,
since
the
properties
here
involved
belonging
to
either
or
both
of
us,
be
given
and
transmitted
to
anyone
or
either
are
found
in
the
Philippines.
In
the
absence,
however,
of
proof
as
to
the
of
us,
who
may
survive
the
other,
or
who
may
remain
the
surviving
spouse
of
conflict
of
law
rule
of
Texas,
it
should
not
be
presumed
different
from
ours.
the
other."
Appellants'
position
is
therefore
not
rested
on
the
doctrine
of
renvoi.
As
stated,
they
never
invoked
nor
even
mentioned
it
in
their
arguments.
Rather,
they
The
petition
for
probate
was
opposed
by
one
Filemon
Abringe,
a
near
relative
argue
that
their
case
falls
under
the
circumstances
mentioned
in
the
third
of
the
deceased,
among
other
grounds,
that
the
alleged
will
was
executed
by
paragraph
of
Article
17
in
relation
to
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code.
the
husband
and
wife
for
their
reciprocal
benefit
and
therefore
not
valid,
and
that
it
was
not
executed
and
attested
to
as
required
by
law.
After
hearing,
the
93.
BILBAO
V.
BILBAO
trial
court
found
the
will
to
have
been
executed
conjointly
by
the
deceased
G.R.
No.
L-‐2200
|
August
2,
1950
husband
and
wife
for
their
reciprocal
benefit,
and
that
a
will
of
that
kind
is
neither
contemplated
by
Act
No.
190,
known
as
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
nor
DOCTRINE:
The
reason
for
this
provision,
especially
as
regards
husbands
and
permitted
by
article
669
of
the
Civil
Code
which
provides:
Two
or
more
persons
wife
is
that
when
a
will
is
made
jointly
or
in
the
same
instrument,
the
spouse
cannot
make
a
will
conjointly
or
in
the
same
instrument,
either
for
their
who
is
more
aggressive,
stronger
in
will
or
character
and
dominant
is
liable
to
reciprocal
benefit
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
person.
dictate
the
terms
of
the
will
for
his
or
her
own
benefit
or
for
that
of
third
CONFLICT
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The
thesis
of
the
appellant
is,
that
inasmuch
as
the
present
law
on
wills
as
law.
The
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
normally
comes
only
after
the
court
has
embodied
in
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
has
been
taken
from
American
law,
it
declared
that
the
will
has
been
duly
authenticated.
should
be
interpreted
in
accordance
with
the
said
law,
and
because
joint
and
reciprocal
wills
are
neither
regarded
as
invalid
nor
on
the
contrary
they
are
EXC:
Where
practical
considerations
demand
that
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
allowed,
then
article
669
of
the
Civil
Code
prohibiting
the
execution
of
joint
will
be
passed
upon,
even
before
it
is
probated,
the
court
should
meet
the
wills
whether
reciprocal
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
party
should
be
issue.
considered
as
having
been
repealed
and
superseded
by
the
new
law.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Adoracion
C.
Campos
died,
leaving
her
father,
petitioner
Hermogenes
Campos
Whether
a
joint
and
reciprocal
will
particularly
between
husband
and
wife
is
and
her
sisters,
private
respondent
Nenita
C.
Paguia,
Remedios
C.
Lopez
and
valid
under
the
present
law
Marieta
C.
Medina
as
the
surviving
heirs.
As
Hermogenes
Campos
was
the
only
compulsory
heir,
he
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Adjudication
under
Rule
74,
HELD:
Section
I
of
the
Rules
of
Court
whereby
he
adjudicated
unto
himself
thex
No.
The
provisions
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
regarding
wills
have
not
ownership
of
the
entire
estate
of
the
deceased
Adoracion
Campos.
Eleven
repealed
all
the
articles
of
the
old
Civil
Code
on
the
same
subject
matter;
article
months
after,
Nenita
C.
Paguia
filed
a
petition
for
the
reprobate
of
a
will
of
the
669
of
the
Civil
Code
is
not
incompatible
or
inconsistent
with
said
provisions
of
deceased,
Adoracion
Campos,
which
was
allegedly
executed
in
the
US
and
for
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
and
finally,
said
article
669
of
the
Civil
Code
is
still
her
appointment
as
administratrix
of
the
estate
of
the
deceased
testatrix.
in
force.
In
her
petition,
Nenita
alleged
that
the
testatrix
was
an
American
citizen
at
the
The
provision
of
article
669
of
the
Civil
Code
prohibiting
the
execution
of
a
will
time
of
her
death
and
was
a
permanent
resident
of
4633
Ditman
Street,
by
two
or
more
persons
conjointly
or
in
the
same
instrument
either
for
their
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.;
that
the
testatrix
died
in
Manila
while
reciprocal
benefit
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
person,
is
not
unwise
and
is
not
temporarily
residing
with
her
sister
Malate,
Manila;
that
during
her
lifetime,
against
public
policy.
The
reason
for
this
provision,
especially
as
regards
the
testatrix
made
her
last
will
and
testament
on
July
10,
1975,
according
to
husbands
and
wife
is
that
when
a
will
is
made
jointly
or
in
the
same
instrument,
the
laws
of
Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.,
nominating
Wilfredo
Barzaga
of
New
Jersey
the
spouse
who
is
more
aggressive,
stronger
in
will
or
character
and
dominant
as
executor;
that
after
the
testatrix
death,
her
last
will
and
testament
was
is
liable
to
dictate
the
terms
of
the
will
for
his
or
her
own
benefit
or
for
that
of
presented,
probated,
allowed,
and
registered
with
the
Registry
of
Wins
at
the
third
persons
whom
he
or
she
desires
to
favor.
And,
where
the
will
is
not
only
County
of
Philadelphia,
U.S.A.,
that
Clement
L.
McLaughlin,
the
administrator
joint
but
reciprocal,
either
one
of
the
spouses
who
may
happen
to
be
who
was
appointed
after
Dr.
Barzaga
had
declined
and
waived
his
appointment
unscrupulous,
wicked,
faithless,
or
desperate,
knowing
as
he
or
she
does
the
as
executor
in
favor
of
the
former,
is
also
a
resident
of
Philadelphia,
U.S.A.,
and
terms
of
the
will
whereby
the
whole
property
of
the
spouses
both
conjugal
and
that
therefore,
there
is
an
urgent
need
for
the
appointment
of
an
paraphernal
goes
to
the
survivor,
may
be
tempted
to
kill
or
dispose
of
the
administratrix
to
administer
and
eventually
distribute
the
properties
of
the
other.
estate
located
in
the
Philippines.
95.
CAYETANO
V.
LEONIDAS
An
opposition
to
the
reprobate
of
the
will
was
filed
by
herein
petitioner
G.R.
No.
L-‐54919
|
May
30,
1984
alleging
among
other
things,
that
he
has
every
reason
to
believe
that
the
will
in
question
is
a
forgery;
that
the
intrinsic
provisions
of
the
will
are
null
and
DOCTRINE:
GR:
The
probate
court's
authority
is
limited
only
to
the
extrinsic
void;
and
that
even
if
pertinent
American
laws
on
intrinsic
provisions
are
validity
of
the
will,
the
due
execution
thereof,
the
testatrix's
testamentary
invoked,
the
same
could
not
apply
inasmuch
as
they
would
work
injustice
and
capacity
and
the
compliance
with
the
requisites
or
solemnities
prescribed
by
injury
to
him.
Later,
however,
the
petitioner
through
his
counsel,
Atty.
Franco
CONFLICT
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Loyola,
filed
a
Motion
to
Dismiss
Opposition
(With
Waiver
of
Rights
or
denied.
Petitioner
Cayetano
persists
with
the
allegations
that
the
respondent
Interests)
stating
that
he
"has
been
able
to
verify
the
veracity
thereof
(of
the
judge
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
his
jurisdiction.
will)
and
now
confirms
the
same
to
be
truly
the
probated
will
of
his
daughter
Adoracion."
Hence,
an
ex-‐parte
presentation
of
evidence
for
the
reprobate
of
ISSUE:
the
questioned
will
was
made.
1.
Whether
the
respondent
judge
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
his
jurisdiction
2.
Whether
the
national
law
should
apply
as
regards
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
On
January
10,
1979,
the
respondent
judge
issued
an
order,
admitting
and
provisions
of
the
will
allowing
probate
in
the
Philippines
of
Adoracion
Campos’
Last
Will
And
3.
Whether
CFI
of
Manila
acquired
jurisdiction
Testament
and
appointing
Nenita
Campos
Paguia
as
Administratrix
of
the
estate
of
said
decedent.
Subsequently,
Hermogenes
Campos
filed
a
petition
for
HELD:
relief,
praying
that
the
order
allowing
the
will
be
set
aside
on
the
ground
that
1.
No.
The
first
issue
raised
by
the
petitioner
is
anchored
on
the
allegation
that
the
withdrawal
of
his
opposition
to
the
same
was
secured
through
fraudulent
the
respondent
judge
acted
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
when
he
allowed
means.
According
to
him,
the
"Motion
to
Dismiss
Opposition"
was
inserted
the
withdrawal
of
the
petitioner's
opposition
to
the
reprobate
of
the
will.
No
among
the
papers
which
he
signed
in
connection
with
two
Deeds
of
proof
was
adduced
to
support
petitioner's
contention
that
the
motion
to
Conditional
Sales
which
he
executed
with
the
Construction
and
Development
withdraw
was
secured
through
fraudulent
means
and
that
Atty.
Franco
Loyola
Corporation
of
the
Philippines
(CDCP).
He
also
alleged
that
the
lawyer
who
filed
was
not
his
counsel
of
record.
The
records
show
that
after
the
firing
of
the
the
withdrawal
of
the
opposition
was
not
his
counsel-‐of-‐record
in
the
special
contested
motion,
the
petitioner
at
a
later
date,
filed
a
manifestation
wherein
proceedings
case.
he
confirmed
that
the
Motion
to
Dismiss
Opposition
was
his
voluntary
act
and
deed.
Moreover,
at
the
time
the
motion
was
filed,
the
petitioner's
former
The
petition
for
relief
was
set
for
hearing
but
the
petitioner
failed
to
appear.
He
counsel,
Atty.
Jose
P.
Lagrosa
had
long
withdrawn
from
the
case
and
had
been
made
several
motions
for
postponement.
Petitioner
filed
another
motion
substituted
by
Atty.
Franco
Loyola
who
in
turn
filed
the
motion.
The
present
entitled
"Motion
to
Vacate
and/or
Set
Aside
the
Order
of
January
10,
1979,
petitioner
cannot,
therefore,
maintain
that
the
old
man's
attorney
of
record
and/or
dismiss
the
case
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
was
Atty.
Lagrosa
at
the
time
of
filing
the
motion.
Since
the
withdrawal
was
in
order,
the
respondent
judge
acted
correctly
in
hearing
the
probate
of
the
will
The
hearing
of
May
29,
1980
was
re-‐set
by
the
court
for
June
19,
1980.
When
ex-‐parte,
there
being
no
other
opposition
to
the
same.
the
case
was
called
for
hearing
on
this
date,
the
counsel
for
petitioner
tried
to
argue
his
motion
to
vacate
instead
of
adducing
evidence
in
support
of
the
2.
Yes.
As
a
general
rule,
the
probate
court's
authority
is
limited
only
to
the
petition
for
relief.
Thus,
the
respondent
judge
issued
an
order
dismissing
the
extrinsic
validity
of
the
will,
the
due
execution
thereof,
the
testatrix's
petition
for
relief
for
failure
to
present
evidence
in
support
thereof.
Petitioner
testamentary
capacity
and
the
compliance
with
the
requisites
or
solemnities
filed
a
MR
but
the
same
was
denied.
In
the
same
order,
respondent
judge
also
prescribed
by
law.
The
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
normally
comes
only
after
denied
the
motion
to
vacate
for
lack
of
merit.
Hence,
this
petition.
the
court
has
declared
that
the
will
has
been
duly
authenticated.
However,
where
practical
considerations
demand
that
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
Meanwhile,
on
June
6,
1982,
petitioner
Hermogenes
Campos
died
and
left
a
be
passed
upon,
even
before
it
is
probated,
the
court
should
meet
the
issue.
will,
which,
incidentally
has
been
questioned
by
the
respondent,
as
on
its
face,
patently
null
and
void,
and
a
fabrication,
appointing
Polly
Cayetano
as
the
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
petitioner
maintains
that
since
the
respondent
judge
executrix
of
his
last
will
and
testament.
Cayetano,
therefore,
filed
a
motion
to
allowed
the
reprobate
of
Adoracion's
will,
Hermogenes
C.
Campos
was
substitute
herself
as
petitioner
in
the
instant
case
which
was
granted
by
the
divested
of
his
legitime
which
was
reserved
by
the
law
for
him.
This
contention
court.
A
motion
to
dismiss
the
petition
on
the
ground
that
the
rights
of
the
is
without
merit.
petitioner
Hermogenes
Campos
merged
upon
his
death
with
the
rights
of
the
respondent
and
her
sisters,
only
remaining
children
and
forced
heirs
was
Although
on
its
face,
the
will
appeared
to
have
preterited
the
petitioner
and
CONFLICT
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thus,
the
respondent
judge
should
have
denied
its
reprobate
outright,
the
INTRINSIC
VALIDITY
private
respondents
have
sufficiently
established
that
Adoracion
was,
at
the
Lex
loci
intentionis
(it
is
usually
the
choice
of
forum)
time
of
her
death,
an
American
citizen
and
a
permanent
resident
of
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.
Therefore,
under
Article
16
par.
(2)
and
PHILIPPINES
1039
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
law
which
governs
Adoracion
Campo's
will
is
the
law
of
Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.,
which
is
the
national
law
of
the
decedent.
FORMS
Although
the
parties
admit
that
the
Pennsylvania
law
does
not
provide
for
Lex
loci
celebrationis
(Art.
17)
legitimes
and
that
all
the
estate
may
be
given
away
by
the
testatrix
to
a
CAPACITY
complete
stranger,
the
petitioner
argues
that
such
law
should
not
apply
National
law
(Art.
15)
–
Gulapa:
Disagrees
with
Salonga
that
this
pertains
because
it
would
be
contrary
to
the
sound
and
established
public
policy
and
only
to
family
relations.
The
word
“family”
does
not
qualify
the
would
run
counter
to
the
specific
provisions
of
Philippine
Law.
subsequent
enumeration,
that
is,
“…status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons…”
It
is
a
settled
rule
that
as
regards
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
provisions
of
the
INTRINSIC/ESSENTIAL
VALIDITY
will,
as
provided
for
by
Article
16(2)
and
1039
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
national
law
Lex
loci
intentionis
of
the
decedent
must
apply.
This
was
squarely
applied
in
the
case
of
Bellis
v.
a. Express
(Lex
voluntatis
–
when
there
is
a
choice
of
law
clause)
Bellis.
b. Implied
(Most
substantial
connection
with
the
transaction
and
the
parties/Points
of
contact)
3.
Yes.
Finally,
we
find
the
contention
of
the
petition
as
to
the
issue
of
96.
MOLINA
V.
DELA
RIVA
jurisdiction
utterly
devoid
of
merit.
Applying
Rule
73,
Section
1,
of
the
Rules
of
1906
Court,
the
settlement
of
the
estate
of
Adoracion
Campos
was
correctly
filed
with
the
CFI
of
Manila
where
she
had
an
estate
since
it
was
alleged
and
VENUE
proven
that
Adoracion
at
the
time
of
her
death
was
a
citizen
and
permanent
resident
of
Pennsylvania,
United
States
of
America
and
not
a
"usual
resident
of
Kyna’s
notes:
Cavite"
as
alleged
by
the
petitioner.
Moreover,
petitioner
is
now
estopped
from
ALG:
This
was
the
ruling
before.
The
prevailing
rule
now
is
that
VENUE
(not
questioning
the
jurisdiction
of
the
probate
court
in
the
petition
for
relief.
It
is
a
jurisdiction)
may
be
agreed
upon
by
the
parties
via
a
Choice
of
Forum
Clause
or
settled
rule
that
a
party
cannot
invoke
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
to
secure
Arbitration
Clause.
affirmative
relief,
against
his
opponent
and
after
failing
to
obtain
such
relief,
repudiate
or
question
that
same
jurisdiction.
How
do
you
formulate
an
Arbitration
Clause
regarding
venue?
Do
not
forget
to
indicate
“…to
the
exclusion
of
all
other
courts.”
XI.
CONTRACTS
See
HSBC
v.
Sherman
(1989)
“Applying
the
foregoing
to
the
case
at
bar,
the
parties
did
not
thereby
stipulate
CONTRACTS
IN
GENERAL
that
only
the
courts
of
Singapore,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
the
rest,
has
jurisdiction.
Neither
did
the
clause
in
question
operate
to
divest
Philippine
FORMS
courts
of
jurisdiction.
In
International
Law,
jurisdiction
is
often
defined
as
the
Lex
loci
celebrationis
(derived
from
the
broad
proposition
that
the
right
of
a
State
to
exercise
authority
over
persons
and
things
within
its
place
governs
the
act,
locus
regit
actum)
boundaries
subject
to
certain
exceptions.
Thus,
a
State
does
not
assume
CAPACITY
jurisdiction
over
travelling
sovereigns,
ambassadors
and
diplomatic
Personal
law
CONFLICT
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representatives
of
other
States,
and
foreign
military
units
stationed
in
or
the
city
of
Manila,
it
is
apparent
that
the
CFI
of
that
city
had
jurisdiction
to
try
marching
through
State
territory
with
the
permission
of
the
latter's
authorities.
and
determine
this
action.
This
authority,
which
finds
its
source
in
the
concept
of
sovereignty,
is
exclusive
within
and
throughout
the
domain
of
the
State.
A
State
is
competent
to
take
It
is
further
urged
in
support
of
the
alleged
want
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
hold
of
any
judicial
matter
it
sees
fit
by
making
its
courts
and
agencies
assume
the
court
below,
that
the
parties
had
mutually
designated
in
the
contract
in
jurisdiction
over
all
kinds
of
cases
brought
before
them
(J.
Salonga,
Private
question
the
town
of
Bato,
Islands
of
Catanduanes,
as
the
place
where
all
International
Law,
1981,
pp.
37-‐38)
judicial
and
extrajudicial
acts
necessary
under
the
terms
thereof
should
take
place.
Paragraph
9
of
the
contract
contains
in
fact
a
stipulation
to
that
effect.
FACTS:
This
the
appellant
claims
amounted
to
an
express
submission
by
the
This
is
an
action
to
recover
a
debt
due
upon
a
contract
executed
July
27,
1903,
contracting
parties
to
jurisdiction
of
the
CFI
of
the
Province
of
Albay,
in
which
whereby
plaintiff
transferred
to
the
defendant
the
abaca
and
copra
business
the
town
of
Bato
was
located.
theretofore
carried
on
by
him
at
various
places
in
the
Island
of
Catanduanes,
with
all
the
property
and
right
pertaining
to
the
said
business,
or
the
sum
of
We
are
of
the
opinion
that
the
designation
of
the
town
of
Bato
made
by
the
134,636
pesos
and
12
cents,
payable
in
Mexican
currency
or
its
equivalent
in
parties
had
no
legal
force
and
could
not
have
the
effect
of
depriving
the
CFI
of
local
currency.
Defendant
paid
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
contract,
on
Manila
of
the
jurisdiction
conferred
on
it
by
law.
This
would
be
true
even
account
of
the
purchase
price,
the
sum
of
P33,659
pesos
and
3
cents,
promising
though
it
may
be
granted
that
the
parties
actually
intended
to
waive
the
rights
to
pay
the
balance
on
three
installments
P33,659
pesos
and
3
cents
each,
with
of
domicile
and
expressly
submit
themselves
to
the
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
the
interest
at
the
rate
of
5
per
cent
per
annum
from
the
date
of
the
contract.
The
CFI
of
Albay,
contended
the
appellant,
all
of
which
it
may
be
said
seems
to
be
first
installment
became
due
July
27,
1904.
It
was
for
the
recovery
of
this
first
very
doubtful,
judging
from
the
vague
and
uncertain
manner
in
which
the
installment
that
their
action
was
brought
in
the
CFI
of
the
City
of
Manila.
designation
was
made.
The
jurisdiction
of
a
court
is
filed
by
law
and
not
by
the
will
of
the
parties.
As
a
matter
of
public
policy,
parties
can
only
stipulate
in
Defendant
demurred
to
the
complaint
on
the
ground
that
the
court
had
no
regard
to
that
which
is
expressly
authorized
by
law.
Section
377
of
the
Code
jurisdiction
of
the
subject
of
the
action.
The
court
overruled
the
demurrer
and
of
Civil
Procedure
provides
a
plain
and
definite
rule
for
the
purpose
of
defendant
refused
to
and
did
not,
as
a
matter
of
fact,
answer
plaintiff’s
determining
the
jurisdiction
of
courts
according
to
the
nature
of
the
action.
complaint.
Neither
that
section
nor
any
other
provision
of
law,
of
which
we
have
any
knowledge,
authorizes
the
parties
to
submit
themselves
by
an
express
Judgment
having
been
rendered
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff
for
the
sum
of
33,659
stipulation
to
the
jurisdiction
of
a
particular
court
to
the
exclusion
of
the
pesos
and
3
cents,
Mexican
currency,
equal
to
30,052
pesos
and
70
centavos,
court
duly
vested
with
such
jurisdiction.
Philippine
currency,
an
interest
thereon
at
the
rate
of
5
per
cent
per
annum
from
July
27,
1903
and
costs,
the
defendant
duly
excepted.
It
is
not
true
as
contended
by
the
appellant
that
the
right
which
litigants
had
under
the
Spanish
law
to
submit
themselves
to
the
jurisdiction
of
a
particular
ISSUES:
court
was
governed
by
the
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code.
Such
right
was
Whether
the
court
had
jurisdiction
of
the
subject
of
the
action
recognized
and
governed
by
the
provisions
of
the
Law
of
Procedure
and
not
by
the
substantive
law.
The
right
to
contract,
recognized
in
the
Civil
Code
and
HELD:
referred
to
by
appellant,
has
nothing
to
do
with
the
right
to
establish
and
fix
Yes.
A
personal
action
like
this
for
the
record
of
a
debt
may
be
brought,
under
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court.
This
right
can
only
be
exercised
by
the
legislative
section
377
of
the
Code
of
the
Civil
Procedure,
in
the
CFI
of
the
province
branch
of
the
Government,
the
only
one
vested
with
the
necessary
power
to
where
the
plaintiff
resides
or
in
the
province
where
the
defendant
may
make
rules
governing
the
subject.
In
this
connection
it
may
be
said
that
the
reside,
at
the
election
of
the
plaintiff.
Both
parties
to
this
case
being
residents
jurisdiction
of
a
court
can
not
be
the
subject-‐matter
of
a
contract.
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97.
INSULAR
GOVERNMENT
V.
FRANK
On
the
otherhand,
in
Insular
Government
v.
Frank,
an
obiter
dictum
favored
the
G.
R.
No.
2935
|
March
23,
1909
compulsory
approach.
CAPACITY
TO
ENTER
INTO
A
CONTRACT
“....
Matters
bearing
upon
the
execution,
the
interpretation
and
the
validity
of
the
contract
are
determined
by
the
law
where
the
contract
is
made.”
Kyna’s
notes:
Under
Art.
17,
the
Philippines
follow
the
lex
loci
contractus
rule.
Does
the
Philippine
law
follow
the
compulsory
or
optional
approach?
ALG:
The
result
would
have
been
the
same
if
they
applied
the
Nationality
Rule.
Compulsory
approach
–
When
a
person
enters
into
a
contract
on
State
A,
he
has
Although
generally,
capacity
of
the
parties
to
enter
into
a
contract
is
governed
to
obey
its
sovereign
and,
necessarily,
State
A’s
laws
with
respect
to
the
by
national
law.
This
is
one
case
not
involving
real
property
which
was
decided
formalities
of
the
transaction.
Thus,
the
law
of
the
place
of
contracting
by
our
SC,
where
instead
of
national
law,
what
should
determine
capacity
to
determines
the
validity
of
the
contract.
The
law,
lex
loci
contractus,
determines
enter
into
a
contract
is
the
lex
loci
celebrationis.
According
to
Conflict
of
Laws
whether
the
agreement
should
be
sealed
and
delivered,
or
whether
it
should
be
writer
Edgardo
Paras,
Frank’s
capacity
should
be
judged
by
his
national
law
and
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public.
not
by
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
contract
was
entered
into.
In
the
instant
case
whether
it
is
the
place
where
the
contract
was
made
or
Frank’s
nationality,
Optional
approach
–
the
form
is
merely
the
dress
of
the
transaction,
and
being
the
result
would
be
the
same.
However,
as
suggested
by
the
mentioned
author,
part
of
it,
should
be
governed
by
the
same
law
that
governs
the
entire
for
the
conflicts
rule
in
capacity
in
general,
national
law
of
the
parties
is
transaction.
Moreover,
the
place
of
the
execution
of
the
contract
may
have
only
controlling.
a
casual
or
incidental
connection
with
the
contract.
N.B.:
Article
15.
Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
Thus
the
rules
are:
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
(1)
The
formalities
required
to
make
a
valid
contract
are
determined
by
the
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
local
(internal)
law
of
the
State
chosen
by
the
parties
to
govern
their
contract
or,
in
default
thereof,
by
the
local
law
of
the
State
which
has
the
most
FACTS:
significant
relationship
to
the
transaction
and
In
1903
in
the
state
of
Illinois,
Mr.
Frank,
a
US
citizen
and
a
representative
of
(2)
Formalities
which
meet
the
requirements
of
the
place
where
the
parties
the
Insular
Government
of
the
Philippines
entered
into
a
contract
whereby
the
execute
the
contract
will
usually
be
acceptable.
former
shall
serve
as
stenographer
in
the
Philippines
for
a
period
of
2
years.
The
contract
contained
a
provision
that
in
case
of
violation
of
its
terms,
Mr.
This
optional,
alternate
approach
protects
the
rational,
justified
expectations
of
Frank
shall
be
liable
for
the
amount
incurred
by
the
Philippine
Government
for
the
contracting
parties.
his
travel
from
Chicago
to
Manila
and
one-‐half
salary
paid
during
such
period.
After
serving
for
6
months,
defendant
left
the
service
and
refused
to
make
In
Philippine
law,
the
Civil
Code
follows
the
optional
approach
with
respect
to
further
compliance
with
the
terms
of
the
contract,
therefore
the
Government
the
formal
validity
of
wills,
in
an
effort
to
uphold
the
wishes
of
the
testator.
sued
him
to
recover
the
amount
of
$269.23
plus
damages.
The
lower
court
ruled
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff,
hence
the
defendant
appealed
presenting
Article
816.
The
will
of
an
alien
who
is
abroad
produces
effect
in
the
Philippines
minority
as
his
special
defense.
By
reason
of
the
fact
that
under
the
laws
of
the
if
made
with
the
formalities
prescribed
by
the
law
of
the
place
in
which
he
Philippines,
contracts
made
by
person
who
did
not
reach
majority
age
of
23
are
resides,
or
according
to
the
formalities
observed
in
his
country,
or
in
conformity
unenforceable.
Defendant
claim
that
he
is
an
adult
when
he
left
Chicago
but
with
those
which
this
Code
prescribes.
was
a
minor
when
he
arrived
in
Manila
and
at
the
time
the
plaintiff
attempted
to
enforce
the
contract.
CONFLICT
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ATTY.
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went
before
a
notary
public
and
executed
two
instruments,
wherein
and
ISSUE:
whereby
she
emancipated
her
two
sons,
with
their
consent
and
acceptance.
No
Whether
the
contract
is
valid
guardian
of
the
person
or
property
of
these
two
sons
had
ever
been
applied
for
or
appointed
under
or
by
virtue
of
the
provisions
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
HELD:
since
the
promulgation
of
the
Code
in
1901.
After
the
execution
of
Exhibit
T
Yes.
Mr.
Frank
being
fully
qualified
to
enter
into
a
contract
at
the
place
and
and
U,
both
Joaquin
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa
and
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa
time
the
contract
was
made,
he
cannot
therefore
plead
infancy
as
a
defense
at
participated
in
the
management
of
Aldecoa
and
Co,
as
partners
by
being
the
place
where
the
contract
is
being
enforced.
Although
Mr.
Frank
was
still
a
present
and
voting
at
meetings
of
the
partners
of
the
company
upon
matters
minor
under
Philippine
laws,
he
was
nevertheless
considered
an
adult
under
connected
with
its
affairs.
the
laws
of
the
state
of
Illinois,
the
place
where
the
contract
was
made.
No
rule
is
better
settled
in
law
than
that
matters
bearing
upon
the
execution,
On
the
23rd
of
February,
1906,
the
defendant
firm
of
Aldeco
and
Co.
obtained
interpretation
and
validity
of
a
contract
are
determined
by
the
law
of
the
from
the
bank
a
credit
in
account
current
up
to
the
sum
of
P450,000
upon
the
place
where
the
contract
is
made.
Matters
connected
to
its
performance
are
terms
and
conditions
set
forth
in
the
instrument
executed
on
that
date
(Exhibit
regulated
by
the
law
prevailing
at
the
place
of
its
performance.
Matters
A).
Later
it
was
agreed
that
the
defendants,
Isabel
Palet
and
her
two
sons,
respecting
a
remedy,
such
as
bringing
of
a
suit,
admissibility
of
evidence,
and
Joaquin
and
Zoilo,
should
mortgage,
in
addition
to
certain
securities
of
Aldecoa
statutes
of
limitations,
depend
upon
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
suit
is
and
Co.,
as
set
forth
in
Exhibit
A,
certain
of
their
real
properties
as
additional
brought.
security
for
the
obligations
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
So,
on
March
23,
1906,
the
mortgage,
Exhibit
B,
was
executed
wherein
certain
corrections
in
the
98.
IBANEZ
V.
HONGKONG
&
SHANGHAI
BANK
description
of
some
of
the
real
property
mortgaged
to
the
bank
by
Exhibit
A
G.R.
No.
L-‐6889
|
March
23,
1915
were
made
and
the
amount
for
which
each
of
the
mortgaged
properties
should
be
liable
was
set
forth.
These
two
mortgages,
Exhibits
A
and
B,
were
duly
N.B.:
Not
discussed.
recorded
in
the
registry
of
property
of
the
city
of
Manila
on
March
23,
1906.
FACTS:
On
the
31st
day
of
December,
1906,
the
firm
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
went
into
The
defendants,
Joaquin
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
and
liquidation
on
account
of
the
expiration
of
the
term
for
which
it
had
been
Cecilia
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
were
born
in
the
Philippine
Islands
on
March
27,
organized,
and
the
intervener,
Urquhart,
was
duly
elected
by
the
parties
as
1884,
July
4,
1885,
and
1887,
respectively,
the
legitimate
children
of
Zoilo
liquidator,
and
be
resolution
dated
January
24,
1907,
he
was
granted
the
Ibañez
de
Alcoa
and
the
defendant,
Isabel
Palet.
Both
parents
were
native
of
authority
expressed
in
that
resolution.
Spain.
The
father's
domicile
was
in
Manila,
and
he
died
here
on
October
4,
1895.
The
widow,
still
retaining
her
Manila
domicile,
left
the
Philippine
Islands
On
June
30,
1907,
Aldeco
and
Co.
in
liquidation,
for
the
purposes
of
certain
and
went
to
Spain
in
1897
because
of
her
health,
and
did
not
return
until
the
litigation
about
to
be
commenced
in
its
behalf,
required
an
injunction
bond
in
latter
part
of
1902.
The
firm
of
Aldecoa
&
Co.,
of
which
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
the
sum
of
P50,000,
which
was
furnished
by
the
bank
upon
the
condition
that
deceased,
had
been
a
member
and
managing
director,
was
reorganized
in
any
liability
incurred
on
the
part
of
the
bank
upon
this
injunction
bond
would
December,
1896,
and
the
widow
became
one
of
the
general
or
"capitalistic"
be
covered
by
the
mortgage
of
February
23,
1906.
An
agreement
to
this
effect
partners
of
the
firm.
The
three
children,
above
mentioned,
appear
in
the
was
executed
by
Aldecoa
and
Co.
in
liquidation,
by
Isabel
Palet,
by
Joaquin
articles
of
agreement
as
industrial
partners.
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
who
had
then
attained
his
full
majority,
and
by
Zoilo
Ibañez
`
de
Aldecoa,
who
was
not
yet
twenty-‐three
years
of
age.
In
1908,
Joaquin
On
July
31,
1903,
Isabel
Palet,
the
widowed
mother
of
Joaquin
Ibañez
de
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
and
Cecilia
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa
Aldecoa
and
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
who
were
then
over
the
age
of
18
years,
commenced
an
action
against
their
mother,
Isabel
Palet,
and
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
in
which
the
bank
was
not
a
party,
and
in
September
of
that
year
procured
a
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
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judgment
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
annulling
the
articles
of
copartnership
March
13,
1907,
Exhibit
V),
and
on
the
30th
day
of
August
of
that
year
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
in
so
far
as
they
were
concerned,
and
decreeing
that
they
Urquhart,
as
liquidator,
under
the
authority
vested
in
him
as
such,
and
in
were
creditors
and
not
partners
of
that
firm.
compliance
with
the
terms
of
the
contract
of
June
13,
1907,
mortgaged
to
the
plaintiff,
by
way
of
additional
security
for
the
performance
of
the
obligations
The
real
property
of
the
defendant
Isabel
Palet,
mortgaged
to
the
plaintiff,
set
forth
in
Exhibits
A
and
B,
the
312
shares
of
the
Pasay
Estate
Company,
corporation
by
the
instrument
of
March
23,
1906,
was,
at
the
instance
of
the
Limited,
acquired
by
Aldecoa
and
Co.
defendant,
registered
under
the
provisions
of
the
Land
Registration
Act,
subject
to
the
mortgage
thereon
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff,
by
decree,
of
the
land
court
On
the
31st
day
of
March,
1907,
Aldecoa
and
Co.
mortgaged,
as
additional
dated
March
8,
1907.
security
for
the
performance
of
those
obligations,
to
the
plaintiff
the
right
of
mortgage,
pertaining
to
the
firm
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
upon
certain
real
estate
in
On
the
6th
of
November,
1906,
the
defendants,
Isabel
Palet
and
her
three
that
Province
of
Ambos
Camarines,
mortgaged
to
Aldecoa
and
Co.
by
one
children,
Joaquin
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
and
Cecilia
Ibañez
Andres
Garchitorena
to
secure
a
balance
of
indebtedness
to
that
firm
of
the
de
Aldecoa,
applied
to
the
land
court
for
the
registration
of
their
title
to
the
sum
of
P20,280.19.
The
mortgage
thus
created
in
favor
of
the
bank
was
duly
real
property
described
in
paragraph
4
of
the
instrument
of
March
23,
1906
recorded
in
the
registry
of
deeds
of
that
province.
On
the
31st
day
of
March,
(Exhibit
B),
in
which
application
they
stated
that
the
undivided
three-‐fourths
of
1907,
Aldecoa
and
Co.
mortgaged
as
further
additional
security
for
the
said
properties
belonging
to
the
defendants,
Isabel
Palet,
Joaquin
Ibañez
de
performance
of
the
obligations,
the
right
of
mortgage
pertaining
to
the
firm
of
Aldecoa,
and
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa,
were
subject
to
the
mortgage
in
favor
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
upon
other
real
property
in
the
same
province,
mortgaged
by
the
plaintiff
to
secure
the
sum
of
P203,985.97
under
the
terms
of
the
the
firm
of
Tremoya
Hermanos
and
Liborio
Tremoya,
to
secure
the
instrument
dated
March
22,
1906.
Pursuant
to
this
petition
the
Court
of
Land
indebtedness
of
that
firm
to
the
firm
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
of
P43,117.40
and
the
Registration,
by
decree
dated
September
8,
1907,
registered
the
title
to
the
personal
debt
of
the
latter
of
P75,463.54.
The
mortgage
thus
created
in
favor
undivided
three-‐fourths
interest
therein
pertaining
to
the
defendants,
Isabel
of
the
bank
was
filed
for
record
with
the
registrar
of
deeds
of
that
province.
Palet
and
her
two
sons,
Joaquin
and
Zoilo,
to
the
mortgage
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff
to
secure
the
sun
of
P203,985.97.
On
the
30th
day
of
January,
1907,
Aldecoa
and
Co.
duly
authorized
the
bank
to
collect
from
certain
persons
and
firms,
named
in
the
instrument
granting
this
On
December
22,
1906,
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
by
a
public
instrument
executed
authority,
any
and
all
debts
owing
by
them
to
Aldecoa
and
Co.
and
to
apply
all
before
a
notary
public,
as
additional
security
for
the
performance
of
the
amounts
so
collected
to
the
satisfaction,
pro
tanto,
of
any
indebtedness
of
obligations
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff
under
the
terms
of
the
contracts
Exhibits
A
Aldecoa
and
Co.
to
the
bank.
and
B,
mortgaged
to
the
bank
the
right
of
mortgage
pertaining
to
Aldecoa
and
Co.
upon
certain
real
property
in
the
Province
of
Albay,
mortgaged
to
said
By
a
public
instrument
dated
February
18,
1907,
Aldecoa
and
Co.
company
by
one
Zubeldia
to
secure
an
indebtedness
to
that
firm.
Subsequent
acknowledged
as
indebtedness
to
Joaquin
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa
in
the
sum
of
to
the
execution
of
this
instrument,
Zubeldia
caused
his
title
to
the
mortgaged
P154,589.20,
a
like
indebtedness
to
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa
in
the
sum
of
property
to
be
registered
under
the
provisions
of
the
Land
Registration
Act,
P89,177.07.
On
September
30,
1908,
Joaquin,
Zoilo,
and
Cecilia
recovered
a
subject
to
a
mortgage
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
to
secure
the
sum
of
P103,943.84
and
judgment
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Manila
for
the
payment
to
them
of
to
the
mortgage
of
the
mortgage
right
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
to
the
plaintiff.
the
sum
of
P155,127.31,
as
the
balance
due
them
upon
the
indebtedness
acknowledged
in
the
public
instrument
dated
February
18,
1907.
As
the
result
of
the
litigation
Aldecoa
and
Co.
and
A.
S.
Macleod,
wherein
the
On
November
30,
1907,
Joaquin,
Zoilo,
and
Cecilia
instituted
an
action
in
the
injunction
bond
for
P50,000
was
made
by
the
bank
in
the
manner
and
for
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
the
city
of
the
Manila
against
the
plaintiff
bank
for
the
purpose
above
set
forth,
Aldecoa
and
Co.
became
the
owner,
through
a
purpose
of
obtaining
a
judicial
declaration
to
the
effect
that
the
contract
compromise
agreement
executed
in
Manila
on
the
14th
of
August,
1907,
of
the
whereby
Aldecoa
and
Co.
mortgaged
to
the
bank
the
shares
of
the
Pasay
Estate
shares
of
the
Pasay
Estate
Company
Limited
(referred
to
in
the
contract
of
Company
recovered
from
Alejandro
S.
Macleod,
was
null
and
void,
and
for
a
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
163
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judgment
of
that
these
shares
be
sold
and
applied
to
the
satisfaction
of
their
induced,
or
attempted
to
induce,
any
customer
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
to
judgment
obtained
on
September
30,
1908.
Judgment
was
rendered
by
the
discontinue
business
relations
with
that
company.
The
court
further
found
that
lower
court
in
favor
of
the
plaintiffs
in
that
action
in
accordance
with
their
Urquhart
had
failed
to
show
that
he
had
any
legal
interest
in
the
matter
in
prayer,
but
upon
appeal
this
court
reversed
that
judgment
and
declared
that
litigadtion
between
plaintiff
and
defendants,
or
in
the
success
of
either
of
the
the
mortgage
of
the
shares
of
stock
in
the
Pasay
Estate
Co.
to
the
bank
was
parties,
or
an
interest
against
both,
as
required
by
section
121
of
the
Code
of
valid.
Civil
Procedure.
In
October,
1908,
Joaquin
and
Zoilo
Ibañez
de
Aldecoa
instituted
an
action
ISSUES:
against
the
plaintiff
bank
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
a
judgment
annulling
1.
W/N
the
court
erred
in
overruling
the
defendant's
demurrer
based
upon
the
the
mortgages
created
by
them
upon
their
interest
in
the
properties
alleged
ambiguity
and
vagueness
of
the
complaint
described
in
Exhibits
A
and
B,
upon
the
ground
that
the
emancipation
by
their
2.
W/N
the
court
erred
in
ruling
that
there
was
no
competent
evidence
that
the
mother
was
void
and
of
no
effect,
and
that,
therefore,
they
were
minors
plaintiff
had
induced
Aldecoa
and
Co.'s
provincial
debtors
to
cease
making
incapable
of
creating
a
valid
mortgage
upon
their
real
property.
The
Court
of
consignments
to
that
firm
First
Instance
dismissed
the
complaint
as
to
Joaquin
upon
the
ground
that
he
3.
W/N
the
court
erred
in
rendering
a
judgment
in
a
special
proceeding
for
the
had
ratified
those
mortgages
after
becoming
of
age,
but
entered
a
judgment
foreclosure
of
a
mortgage,
Aldecoa
and
Co.
not
having
mortgaged
any
real
annulling
said
mortgages
with
respect
to
Zoilo.
Both
parties
appealed
from
this
estate
of
any
kind
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
trial
court,
and
the
obligation
of
decision
and
the
case
was
given
registry
No.
6889
in
the
Supreme
Court.
the
persons
who
had
signed
the
contract
of
suretyship
in
favor
of
the
bank
having
been
extinguished
by
operation
of
law.
On
the
31st
day
of
December,
1906,
on
which
date
the
defendant
Aldecoa
and
Co.
went
into
liquidation,
the
amount
of
indebtedness
to
the
bank
upon
the
HELD:
overdraft
created
by
the
terms
of
the
contract,
Exhibit
A,
was
P516,517.98.
With
respect
to
the
contention
set
forth
in
the
s
assignment
of
error
to
the
Neither
the
defendant
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
nor
any
of
the
defendants
herein,
have
effect
that
the
bank
has
prejudiced
Aldecoa
and
Co.
by
having
induced
paid
or
caused
to
be
paid
to
the
bank
the
yearly
partial
payments
due
under
customers
of
the
latter
to
cease
their
commercial
relations
with
this
defendant,
the
terms
of
the
contract,
Exhibit
A.
But
from
time
to
time
the
bank
has
the
ruling
of
the
court
that
there
is
no
evidence
to
show
that
there
was
any
collected
and
received
from
provincial
debtors
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
the
various
such
inducement
is
fully
supported
by
the
record.
It
may
be
possible
that
some
sums
shown
in
Exhibit
Q,
all
of
which
sums
so
received
have
been
placed
to
the
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.'s
customers
ceased
doing
business
with
that
firm
after
it
credit
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
and
notice
duty
given.
Also,
the
bank,
from
time
to
went
into
liquidation.
This
is
the
ordinary
effect
of
a
commercial
firm
going
time,
since
the
date
upon
which
Aldecoa
and
Co.
went
into
liquidation,
has
consideration,
for
the
reason
that
it
was
a
well
known
fact
that
Aldecoa
and
Co.
received
various
other
sums
from,
or
for
the
account
of,
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
all
of
was
insolvent.
It
is
hardly
probable
that
the
bank,
with
so
large
a
claim
against
which
have
been
duly
placed
to
the
credit
of
that
firm,
including
the
sum
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
and
with
unsatisfactory
security
for
the
payment
of
its
claim,
P22,552.63,
the
amount
of
the
credit
against
one
Achaval,
assigned
to
the
bank
would
have
taken
any
action
whatever
which
might
have
had
the
effect
of
by
Aldecoa
and
Co.
The
balance
to
the
credit
of
the
bank
on
the
31st
day
of
diminishing
Aldecoa
and
Co.'s
ability
to
discharge
their
claim.
The
contention
December,
1911,
as
shown
on
the
books
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
was
for
the
sum
of
that
the
customers
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
included
in
the
list
of
debtors
ceased
to
P416.853.46.
It
appeared
that
an
error
had
been
committed
by
the
bank
in
make
consignments
to
the
firm
because
they
had
been
advised
by
the
bank
liquidating
the
interest
charged
to
Aldecoa
and
Co.,
and
this
error
was
that
Aldecoa
and
Co.
had
authorized
the
bank
to
collect
these
credits
from
the
corrected
so
that
the
actual
amount
of
the
indebtedness
of
Aldecoa
and
Co.
to
defendant's
provincial
customers
and
apply
the
amounts
so
collected
to
the
the
plaintiff
on
the
15th
of
February,
1912,
with
interest
to
December
10,
1912,
partial
discharge
of
the
indebtedness
of
the
defendant
to
the
bank.
the
date
of
the
judgment,
the
amount
was
P344,924.23.
Furthermore,
the
bank
was
expressly
empowered
to
take
any
steps
which
might
be
necessary,
judicially
or
extrajudicially,
for
the
collection
of
these
The
trial
court
found
that
there
was
no
competent
evidence
that
the
bank
credits.
The
real
reason
which
caused
the
defendant's
provincial
customers
to
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
164
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AY
2015-‐2016
cease
making
shipments
was
due
to
the
fact
that
the
defendant,
being
out
of
funds,
could
not
give
its
customers
any
further
credit.
It
is
therefore
clear
that
*N.B.:
the
bank,
having
exercised
the
authority
conferred
upon
it
by
the
company
in
a
What
if
the
plaintiff
was
a
corporation?
legal
manner,
is
not
responsible
for
any
damages
which
might
have
resulted
DOING
BUSINESS
from
the
failure
of
the
defendant's
provincial
customers
to
continue
doing
WITH
LICENSE
–MAY
SUE
AND
BE
SUED
business
with
that
firm.
WITHOUT
LICENSE
–MAY
NOT
SUE
BUT
MAY
BE
SUED
In
the
third
assignments
of
errors
two
propositions
are
insisted
upon:
(1)
that
in
ISOLATED
TRANSACTION
these
foreclosure
proceedings
the
court
was
without
jurisdiction
to
render
MAY
SUE
BUT
MAY
NOT
BE
SUED
(NO
JURISDICTION
OVER
FOREIGN
judgment
against
Aldecoa
and
Co.
for
the
reason
that
firm
had
mortgaged
no
CORPORAITONS)
EXCEPT
IF
IT
CONSENTED
THROUGH
CONTRACTUAL
real
property
within
the
city
of
Manila
to
the
plaintiff;
and
(2)
that
the
STIPULATION
mortgages
given
by
this
defendant
have
been
extinguished
by
reason
of
the
fact
that
the
bank
extended
the
time
within
which
the
defendant's
provincial
Corporation
A
is
a
foreign
corporation
doing
business
in
the
Philippines
but
debtors
might
make
their
payments.
without
a
license.
It
entered
into
a
contract
with
a
Philippine
domestic
corporation.
Before
suing
the
domestic
corporation,
it
obtained
a
license.
Can
it
We
understand
that
the
bank
is
not
seeking
to
exercise
its
mortgages
rights
sue?
Yes.
upon
the
mortgages
which
the
defendant
firm
holds
upon
certain
real
properties
in
the
Provinces
of
Albay
and
Ambros
Camarines
and
to
sell
these
Subsequent
acquisition
of
the
license
will
cure
the
lack
of
capacity
to
sue
at
the
properties
at
public
auction
in
these
proceedings.
Nor
do
we
understand
that
time
of
the
execution
of
the
contract.
It
can
then
re-‐file
the
suit
on
the
same
the
judgment
of
the
trial
courts
directs
that
this
be
done.
Before
that
property
contract
or
transaction.
can
be
sold
the
original
mortgagors
will
have
to
be
made
parties.
The
bank
is
not
trying
to
foreclose,
in
this
section,
any
mortgages
on
real
property
executed
Home
Insurance
Company
v.
ESL,
G.R.
No.
L-‐34382,
July
20,
1983
by
Aldecoa
and
Co.
It
is
true
that
the
bank
sought
and
obtained
a
money
judgment
against
that
firm,
and
at
the
same
time
and
in
the
same
action
Eriks
PTE.
Ltd
v.
CA,
G.R.
No.
118843,
February
6,
1997
obtained
a
foreclosure
judgment
against
the
other
defendants.
If
two
or
more
persons
are
in
solidum
the
debtors
mortgage
any
of
their
real
property
situate
FACTS:
in
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court,
the
creditor,
in
case
of
the
solidary
debtors
in
This
is
an
action
to
collect
P59,082.92,
together
with
lawful
interests
from
14
the
same
suit
and
secure
a
joint
and
several
judgment
against
them,
as
well
as
October
1947,
the
date
of
the
written
demand
for
payment,
and
costs.
The
judgments
of
foreclosure
upon
the
respective
mortgages.
claim
arises
out
of
a
shipment
of
1,000
tons
of
coconut
oil
emulsion
sold
by
the
plaintiff,
as
agent
of
the
defendant,
to
Jas.
Maxwell
Fassett,
who
in
turn
100.
KING
MAU
WU
V.
SYCIP
assigned
it
to
Fortrade
Corporation.
Under
an
agency
agreement
set
forth
in
a
G.R.
No.
L-‐5897
|
April
23,
1954
letter
dated
7
November
1946
in
New
York
addressed
to
the
defendant
and
accepted
by
the
latter
on
the
22nd
day
of
the
same
month,
the
plaintiff
was
DOCTRINE:
A
non-‐resident
may
sue
a
resident
in
the
courts
of
this
country
made
the
exclusive
agent
of
the
defendant
in
the
sale
of
coconut
oil
and
its
where
the
defendant
may
be
summoned
and
his
property
leviable
upon
derivatives
outside
the
Philippines
and
was
to
be
paid
2
1/2
per
cent
on
the
execution
in
the
case
of
a
favorable,
final
and
executory
judgment.
There
is
no
total
actual
sale
price
of
sales
obtained
through
his
efforts
in
addition
thereto
conflict
of
laws
involved
in
the
case,
because
it
is
only
a
question
of
enforcing
an
50
per
cent
of
the
difference
between
the
authorized
sale
price
and
the
actual
obligation
created
by
or
arising
from
contract;
and
unless
the
enforcement
of
sale
price.
the
contract
be
against
public
policy
of
the
forum,
it
must
be
enforced.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
165
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
After
the
trial
where
the
depositions
of
the
plaintiff
and
of
Jas,
Maxwell
Fassett
101.
SHEWARAM
V.
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES
and
several
letters
in
connection
therewith
were
introduced
and
the
testimony
G.R.
No.
L-‐20099
|
July
7,
1966
of
the
defendant
was
heard,
the
Court
rendered
judgment
as
prayed
for
in
the
complaint.
A
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied.
A
motion
for
a
new
trial
DOCTRINE:
The
fact
that
those
conditions
are
printed
at
the
back
of
the
ticket
was
filed,
supported
by
the
defendant's
affidavit,
based
on
newly
discovered
stub
in
letters
so
small
that
they
are
hard
to
read
would
not
warrant
the
evidence
which
consists
of
a
duplicate
original
of
a
letter
dated
16
October
presumption
that
the
appellee
was
aware
of
those
conditions
such
that
he
had
1946
covering
the
sale
of
1,000
tons
of
coconut
oil
soap
emulsion
signed
by
Jas.
"fairly
and
freely
agreed"
to
those
conditions.
Maxwell
Fassett
assigned
by
the
latter
to
the
defendant;
the
letter
of
credit
No.
20122
of
the
Chemical
Bank
&
Trust
Company
in
favor
of
Jas.
Maxwell
Fassett
*N.B.:
Art.
1750.
A
contract
fixing
the
sum
that
may
be
recovered
by
the
owner
assigned
by
the
latter
to
the
defendant;
and
a
letter
dated
16
December
1946
or
shipper
for
the
loss,
destruction,
or
deterioration
of
the
goods
is
valid,
if
it
is
by
the
Fortrade
Corporation
to
Jas.
Maxwell
Fassett
accepted
it
on
24
reasonable
and
just
under
the
circumstances,
and
has
been
fairly
and
freely
December
1946,
all
of
which
documents,
according
to
the
defendant,
could
not
agreed
upon.
[RJFF]
be
produced
at
the
trial,
despite
the
use
of
reasonable
diligence,
and
if
produced
they
would
alter
the
result
of
the
controversy.
The
motion
for
new
FACTS:
trial
was
denied.
The
defendant
is
appealing
from
said
judgment.
Parmanand
Shewaram
was
a
paying
passenger
on
PAL’s
aircraft
from
Zamboanga
to
Manila
and
checked
in
a
suitcase
and
2
other
pieces.
The
ISSUE:
suitcase
was
mistagged
by
PAL’s
personnel
in
Zamboanga
as
IGN
(for
Iligan)
Whether
a
contract
executed
in
a
foreign
country
is
cognizable
by
Philippine
instead
of
MNL
(for
Manila),
thus
Shewaram
was
unable
to
receive
his
luggage
courts
in
Manila.
He
made
a
claim
with
PAL’s
personnel
in
Manila
and
another
suitcase
similar
to
his
own
which
was
the
only
baggage
left
for
that
flight,
was
HELD:
given
to
the
plaintiff
for
him
to
take
delivery,
but
he
refused
on
the
ground
that
The
contention
that
as
the
contract
was
executed
in
New
York,
the
Court
of
it
was
not
his.
When
the
suitcase
was
located,
PAL
personnel
delivered
it
to
First
Instance
of
Manila
has
no
jurisdiction
over
this
case,
is
without
merit,
plaintiff,
but
upon
checking,
Shewaram’s
Transistor
Radio
7
and
Rollflex
because
a
non-‐resident
may
sue
a
resident
in
the
courts
of
this
country
where
Camera
were
missing.
the
defendant
may
be
summoned
and
his
property
leviable
upon
execution
in
the
case
of
a
favorable,
final
and
executory
judgment.
It
is
a
personal
action
The
PAL
ticket,
on
the
reverse
side,
stated
in
fine
print
that:
The
liability,
if
any,
for
the
collection
of
a
sum
of
money
which
the
Courts
of
First
Instance
have
for
loss
or
damage
to
checked
baggage
or
for
delay
in
the
delivery
thereof
is
jurisdiction
to
try
and
decide.
There
is
no
conflict
of
laws
involved
in
the
case,
limited
to
its
value
and,
unless
the
passenger
declares
in
advance
a
higher
because
it
is
only
a
question
of
enforcing
an
obligation
created
by
or
arising
valuation
and
pay
an
additional
charge
therefor,
the
value
shall
be
conclusively
from
contract;
and
unless
the
enforcement
of
the
contract
be
against
public
deemed
not
to
exceed
P100.00
for
each
ticket.
policy
of
the
forum,
it
must
be
enforced.
The
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
collect
P7,589.88
for
commission
and
P50,000
for
ISSUE:
one-‐half
of
the
overprice,
or
a
total
of
P57,589.88,
lawful
interests
thereon
Whether
the
limited
liability
rule
shall
apply
in
the
case
at
bar?
from
the
date
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint,
and
costs
in
both
instances.
HELD:
NO.
The
law
that
may
be
invoked,
in
this
connection
is
Article
1750
of
the
New
Civil
Code
which
provides
as
follows:
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
166
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
A
contract
fixing
the
sum
that
may
be
recovered
by
the
owner
or
shipper
for
the
loss,
destruction,
or
deterioration
of
the
goods
is
valid,
if
it
is
While
it
may
be
true
that
Ong
Yiu
had
not
signed
the
plane
ticket,
he
is
reasonable
and
just
under
the
circumstances,
and
has
been
fairly
and
nevertheless
bound
by
the
provisions
thereof.
“Such
provisions
have
been
held
freely
agreed
upon.
to
be
a
part
of
the
contract
of
carriage,
and
valid
and
binding
upon
the
passenger
regardless
of
the
latter’s
lack
of
knowledge
or
assent
to
the
In
accordance
with
the
above-‐quoted
provision
of
Article
1750
of
the
New
Civil
regulation”.
It
is
what
is
known
as
a
contract
of
“adhesion”.
Code,
the
pecuniary
liability
of
a
common
carrier
may,
by
contract,
be
limited
to
a
fixed
amount.
It
is
required,
however,
that
the
contract
must
be
Kyna’s
notes:
"reasonable
and
just
under
the
circumstances
and
has
been
fairly
and
freely
Compare
Shewaram
and
Ong
Yiu
Case.
In
Shewaram,
the
stipulation
cannot
be
agreed
upon."
said
to
have
been
freely
agreed
upon
because
they
were
in
small
hard
to
read
font.
In
the
case
before
us
We
believe
that
the
requirements
of
said
article
have
not
been
met.
It
cannot
be
said
that
the
appellee
had
actually
entered
into
a
Do
other
stipulations
fall
under
this
pronouncement?
contract
with
the
appellant,
embodying
the
conditions
as
printed
at
the
back
No.
Limitation
of
liability
of
this
kind
is
specially
covered
by
Article
1750.
It
must
of
the
ticket
stub
that
was
issued
by
the
appellant
to
the
appellee.
The
fact
be
FAIRLY
and
FREELY
agreed
upon.
that
those
conditions
are
printed
at
the
back
of
the
ticket
stub
in
letters
so
small
that
they
are
hard
to
read
would
not
warrant
the
presumption
that
the
FACTS:
appellee
was
aware
of
those
conditions
such
that
he
had
"fairly
and
freely
Ong
Yiu
was
scheduled
to
travel
from
Cebu
to
Butuan
on
board
a
PAL
flight.
He
agreed"
to
those
conditions.
The
trial
court
has
categorically
stated
in
its
checked
in
one
piece
of
baggage
(a
blue
maleta)
containing
important
decision
that
the
"Defendant
admits
that
passengers
do
not
sign
the
ticket,
documents
that
he
needed
for
the
trials
he
was
scheduled
to
attend.
Upon
much
less
did
plaintiff
herein
sign
his
ticket
when
he
made
the
flight
on
arrival
at
Butuan,
he
discovered
that
the
luggage
was
missing
and
demanded
November
23,
1959."
We
hold,
therefore,
that
the
appellee
is
not,
and
cannot
that
PAL
deliver
it
to
him
the
following
day.
PAL,
despite
their
extensive
efforts,
be,
bound
by
the
conditions
of
carriage
found
at
the
back
of
the
ticket
stub
failed
to
deliver
the
baggage
on
time,
causing
Ong
Yiu
to
postpone
the
hearing.
issued
to
him
when
he
made
the
flight
on
appellant's
plane
on
November
23,
Ong
Yiu
sued
PAL
for
damages
for
breach
of
contract
of
transportation.
1959.
The
pertinent
Condition
of
Carriage
printed
at
the
back
of
the
plane
ticket
It
having
been
clearly
found
by
the
trial
court
that
the
transistor
radio
and
the
reads:
camera
of
the
appellee
were
lost
as
a
result
of
the
negligence
of
the
appellant
as
a
common
carrier,
the
liability
of
the
appellant
is
clear
—
it
must
pay
the
8.
BAGGAGE
LIABILITY
...
The
total
liability
of
the
Carrier
for
lost
or
appellee
the
value
of
those
two
articles.
damaged
baggage
of
the
passenger
is
LIMITED
TO
P100.00
for
each
ticket
unless
a
passenger
declares
a
higher
valuation
in
excess
of
102.
ONG
YIU
V.
CA
P100.00,
but
not
in
excess,
however,
of
a
total
valuation
of
P1,000.00
1979
and
additional
charges
are
paid
pursuant
to
Carrier's
tariffs.
DOCTRINE:
The
validity
of
this
stipulation
is
not
questioned
by
the
plaintiff.
They
are
printed
in
reasonably
and
fairly
big
letters,
and
are
easily
readable.
ISSUES:
Moreover,
plaintiff
had
been
a
frequent
passenger
of
PAL
from
Cebu
to
Butuan
Whether
Ong
Yiu
is
entitled
to
damages;
does
the
doctrine
of
limited
liability
City
and
back,
and
he,
being
a
lawyer
and
businessman,
must
be
fully
aware
of
apply
these
conditions.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
167
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
HELD:
As
a
general
proposition,
the
plaintiff's
maleta
having
been
pilfered
while
in
the
EXC:
When
the
conditions
printed
at
the
back
of
the
ticket
were
so
small
and
custody
of
the
defendant,
it
is
presumed
that
the
defendant
had
been
hard
to
read
that
they
would
not
warrant
the
presumption
that
the
passenger
negligent.
The
liability,
however,
of
PAL
for
the
loss,
in
accordance
with
the
was
aware
of
the
conditions
and
that
he
had
freely
and
fairly
agreed
thereto.
stipulation
written
on
the
back
of
the
ticket,
Exhibit
12,
is
limited
to
P100.00
per
baggage,
plaintiff
not
having
declared
a
greater
value,
and
not
having
called
FACTS:
the
attention
of
the
defendant
on
its
true
value
and
paid
the
tariff
therefor.
PanAm
Airlines
refused
to
accommodate
Respondent
Tinitigan
on
Pan
Am
The
validity
of
this
stipulation
is
not
questioned
by
the
plaintiff.
They
are
Flight
No.
431
from
Sto.
Domingo,
Republica
Dominica
to
San
Juan,
Puerto
Rico
printed
in
reasonably
and
fairly
big
letters,
and
are
easily
readable.
notwithstanding
that
she
possessed
a
confirmed
plane
ticket.
While
plaintiff
Moreover,
plaintiff
had
been
a
frequent
passenger
of
PAL
from
Cebu
to
was
standing
in
line
to
board
the
aircraft,
a
Pan
Am
employee
ordered
her
in
a
Butuan
City
and
back,
and
he,
being
a
lawyer
and
businessman,
must
be
fully
loud
voice
to
step
out
of
line
because
her
ticket
was
not
confirmed
to
her
aware
of
these
conditions.
embarrassment
in
the
presence
of
several
people
who
heard
and
order.
Despite
her
pleas
she
was
not
allowed
to
board
the
aircraft.
And
her
seat
was
There
is
no
dispute
that
Ong
Yiu
did
not
declare
any
higher
value
for
his
also
given
to
a
Caucasian.
The
plane
took
off
without
her
but
with
her
luggage
luggage,
much
less
did
he
pay
any
additional
transportation
charge.
But
Ong
Yiu
on
board.
She
was
forced
to
return
to
her
hotel
without
any
luggage
much
less
argues
that
he
had
not
actually
entered
into
a
contract
with
PAL
limiting
the
an
extra
dress.
latter's
liability
for
loss
or
delay
of
the
baggage
of
its
passengers,
and
that
Art.
1750
of
the
Civil
Code
has
not
been
complied
with.
While
in
Sto.
Domingo,
Tinitigan
is
expected
to
be
in
San
Juan
that
same
day
to
meet
a
client
to
sign
a
contract
or
lose
it.
She
was
expected
to
make
a
profit
of
While
it
may
be
true
that
Ong
Yiu
had
not
signed
the
plane
ticket,
he
is
$1,000
in
said
contract
but
because
she
was
unable
to
board
the
flight,
said
nevertheless
bound
by
the
provisions
thereof.
“Such
provisions
have
been
profit
was
lost.
She
also
lost
her
luggage.
held
to
be
a
part
of
the
contract
of
carriage,
and
valid
and
binding
upon
the
passenger
regardless
of
the
latter’s
lack
of
knowledge
or
assent
to
the
The
airline
ticket
contains
the
following
conditions:
“NOTICE
OF
BAGGAGE
regulation”.
It
is
what
is
known
as
a
contract
of
“adhesion”,
in
regards
which
LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS:
Liability
for
loss,
delay,
or
damage
to
baggage
is
limited
it
has
been
said
that
contracts
of
adhesion
wherein
one
party
imposes
a
as
follows
unless
a
higher
value
is
declared
in
advance
and
additional
charges
ready
made
form
of
contract
on
the
other,
as
the
plane
ticket
in
the
case
at
are
paid:
(1)
for
most
international
travel
(including
domestic
portions
of
bar,
are
contracts
not
entirely
prohibited.
The
one
who
adheres
to
the
international
journeys)
to
approximately
$9.07
per
pound
($20.00
per
kilo)
for
contract
is
in
reality
free
to
reject
it
entirely;
if
he
adheres,
he
gives
his
checked
baggage
and
$400
per
passenger
for
unchecked
baggage…”
consent.
"a
contract
limiting
liability
upon
an
agreed
valuation
does
not
offend
against
the
policy
of
the
law
forbidding
one
from
contracting
against
his
own
negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
award
of
damages
was
proper.
103.
PAN
AMERICAN
WORLD
AIRWAYS
V.
IAC
1988
HELD:
Yes,
on
the
basis
of
the
foregoing
stipulations
printed
at
the
back
of
the
ticket,
DOCTRINE:
GR:
The
stipulations
in
a
plane
ticket
though
not
signed,
nevertheless
Panam’s
liability
for
the
lost
baggage
of
private
respondent
Pangan
is
limited
to
binds
the
passenger.
Such
provisions
have
been
held
to
be
a
part
of
the
$600.00
($20.00
x
30
kilos)
as
the
latter
did
not
declare
a
higher
value
for
his
contract
of
carriage,
and
valid
and
binding
upon
the
passenger
regardless
of
baggage
and
pay
the
corresponding
additional
charges.
the
latter's
lack
of
knowledge
or
assent
to
the
regulation.
CONFLICT
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The
ruling
in
Ong
Yiu
v.
CA
is
applicable
in
this
case,
where
it
was
stated
that
while
it
may
be
true
that
passenger
had
not
signed
the
plane
ticket,
he
is
Kyna’s
notes:
nevertheless
bound
by
the
provisions
thereof.
"Such
provisions
have
been
ALG:
This
approach
is
called
by
Salonga
as
the
Center
of
gravity
rule.
In
the
held
to
be
a
part
of
the
contract
of
carriage,
and
valid
and
binding
upon
the
absence
of
an
effective
choice
of
law,
the
courts
have
usually
applied
the
local
passenger
regardless
of
the
latter's
lack
of
knowledge
or
assent
to
the
law
of
the
State
of
departure,
sometimes
on
the
stated
ground
that
is
was
the
regulation.
place
of
making
or
the
center
of
gravity
of
the
contract.
The
forum
has
a
sound
legitimate
basis
for
the
application
of
the
policy
found
on
its
own
internal
law
On
the
other
hand,
the
ruling
in
Shewaram
v.
Philippine
Air
Lines,
Inc.,
provided
“when
it
is
the
center
of
gravity
of
the
contract
and
has
the
most
significant
for
the
exception
to
the
rule,
where
the
Court
held
that
the
stipulation
limiting
relationship
to
the
parties
and
the
contract.”
the
carrier's
liability
to
a
specified
amount
was
invalid,
finds
no
application
in
the
instant
case.
It
was
held
that
the
conditions
printed
at
the
back
of
the
FACTS:
ticket
were
so
small
and
hard
to
read
that
they
would
not
warrant
the
Pakistan
Intl
Airlines
(PIA)
executed
2
separate
contracts
of
employments
in
presumption
that
the
passenger
was
aware
of
the
conditions
and
that
he
had
Manila,
one
with
Farrales
and
the
other
with
Mamasig.
The
pertinent
portions
freely
and
fairly
agreed
thereto.
In
the
instant
case,
similar
facts
that
would
of
the
contract
state
that
(1)
the
agreement
is
for
a
period
of
3
years,
but
can
make
the
case
fall
under
the
exception
have
not
been
alleged,
much
less
shown
be
extended
by
the
mutual
consent
of
the
parties;
(2)
notwithstanding
anything
to
exist.
to
contrary
as
herein
provided,
PIA
reserves
the
right
to
terminate
this
agreement
at
any
time
by
giving
the
EMPLOYEE
notice
in
writing
in
advance
The
Court
also
rectified
the
misconception
that
the
Warsaw
Convention
which
one
month
before
the
intended
termination
or
in
lieu
thereof,
by
paying
the
limits
a
carrier's
liability
to
US$9.07
per
pound
or
US$20.00
per
kilo
in
cases
of
EMPLOYEE
wages
equivalent
to
one
month's
salary;
(3)
this
agreement
shall
be
contractual
breach
of
carriage
is
against
public
policy.
It
is
a
valid
provision.
construed
and
governed
under
and
by
the
laws
of
Pakistan,
and
only
the
Courts
of
Karachi,
Pakistan
shall
have
the
jurisdiction
to
consider
any
matter
104.
PAKISTAN
INTERNATIONAL
AIRLINES
V.
OPLE
arising
out
of
or
under
this
agreement.
1990
1
year
and
4
months
before
the
expiration
of
the
contracts
of
employment,
PIA
CHOICE
OF
LAW
sent
separate
letters
to
Mamasig
and
Farrales,
advising
them
that
their
services
as
flight
stewardesses
would
be
terminated.
Farrales
and
Mamasig
filed
a
DOCTRINE:
GR:
Lex
loci
intentionis
governs
(choice
of
law
and
choice
of
forum).
complaint
for
illegal
dismissal
and
non-‐payment
of
company
benefits
and
EXC:
(1)
When
the
contract
is
affected
with
public
interest
such
as
a
labor
bonuses.
PIA
contended
that
F
&
M
were
habitual
absentees
and
had
the
habit
contract
and
(2)
when
there
are
multiple
substantive
contacts
between
Phil.
of
bringing
in
from
abroad
sizeable
quantities
of
personal
effects.
laws
and
courts
and
the
parties.
ISSUE:
The
first
clause
cannot
be
invoked
to
prevent
the
application
of
Phil.
labor
laws
Whether
the
provisions
in
the
contract
that
the
agreement
shall
be
governed
and
regulations
to
the
subject
matter
of
the
case.
The
ER-‐EE
relationship
by
the
laws
of
Pakistan
and
that
only
the
courts
of
Karachi,
Pakistan
shall
have
between
PIA
and
F&M
is
affected
with
public
interest
and
the
applicable
Phil.
jurisdiction
over
any
controversy
arising
out
of
the
agreement,
may
be
given
laws
and
regulations
cannot
be
rendered
illusory
by
the
parties
agreeing
upon
effect
some
other
law
to
govern
their
relationship.
The
second
clause
cannot
also
be
invoked
because
the
circumstances
of
the
case
shows
multiple
substantive
HELD:
contacts
between
Phil.
law
and
Phil.
courts
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
No.
The
first
clause
cannot
be
invoked
to
prevent
the
application
of
Phil.
labor
relationship
between
the
parties
on
the
other.
laws
and
regulations
to
the
subject
matter
of
the
case.
The
ER-‐EE
relationship
CONFLICT
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between
PIA
and
F&M
is
affected
with
public
interest
and
the
applicable
Phil.
*N.B.:
Case
is
very
similar
to
question
#8
part
2
in
the
midterms
but
the
ruling
laws
and
regulations
cannot
be
rendered
illusory
by
the
parties
agreeing
upon
in
this
case
was
not
used
as
a
basis
as
an
answer.
some
other
law
to
govern
their
relationship.
The
second
clause
cannot
also
be
What’s
the
distinguishing
fact?
invoked
because
the
circumstances
of
the
case
shows
multiple
substantive
contacts
between
Phil.
law
and
Phil.
courts
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
1.
There’s
a
recruiter,
which
is
a
domestic
corporation.
relationship
between
the
parties
on
the
other:
contract
was
executed
and
2.
Subject
contract
was
approved
by
POEA.
See
Manila
Hotel
Corp
v.
NLRC
partially
performed
in
the
Phil.,
F&M
are
Filipino
citizens
and
PIA
is
licensed
to
(2000)
do
business
in
the
Phil.,
and
F&M
were
based
in
the
Phil.
in
between
their
flights.
All
the
above
contacts
point
to
the
Philippine
courts
and
administrative
This
is
not
to
say
that
Philippine
courts
and
agencies
have
no
power
to
solve
agencies
as
a
proper
forum
for
the
resolution
of
contractual
disputes
between
controversies
involving
foreign
employers.
Neither
are
we
saying
that
we
do
not
the
parties.
The
challenged
portion
of
the
employment
agreement
cannot
be
have
power
over
an
employment
contract
executed
in
a
foreign
country.
If
given
effect
so
as
to
oust
Philippine
agencies
and
courts
of
the
jurisdiction
Santos
were
an
“overseas
contract
worker”,
a
Philippine
forum,
specifically
vested
upon
them
by
Philippine
law.
Finally,
and
in
any
event,
PIA
did
not
the
POEA,
not
the
NLRC,
would
protect
him.
He
is
not
an
“overseas
contract
undertake
to
plead
and
prove
the
contents
of
Pakistan
law
on
the
matter;
it
worker”
a
fact
which
he
admits
with
conviction.
must
therefore
be
presumed
that
the
applicable
provisions
of
the
law
of
Pakistan
are
the
same
as
the
applicable
provisions
of
Philippine
law.
TRUE
or
FALSE?
As
long
as
a
Filipino
enters
into
an
employment
contract,
Philippine
public
policy
shall
apply.
FALSE.
There
must
be
sufficient
Philippine
As
to
the
dismissal
of
Farrales
&
Mamasig,
they
were
illegally
dismissed
and
are
contacts
before
Philippine
public
policy
applies.
entitled
to
3
years
backwages
without
qualification
or
deduction.
PIA’s
right
to
procedural
due
process
was
observed
as
it
was
given
the
opportunity
to
submit
Av:
The
fact
that
an
employment
contract
concerns
a
Filipino
does
not
mandate
a
position
paper
and
present
evidence.
Also,
the
provisions
of
the
employment
the
application
of
Phil.
Laws
and
regulations
automatically
(Manila
Hotel
v.
contract
must
not
be
contrary
to
law,
morals,
good
customs,
public
order,
NLRC).
However,
if
in
applying
the
center
of
gravity
rule,
Phil.
Laws
and
public
policy.
The
employment
contract
prevents
security
of
tenure
of
F&M
regulations
is
found
to
be
the
center
of
the
gravity
of
the
contract
and
has
the
from
accruing.
most
significant
relationship
to
the
parties
and
the
contract
(PIA
v.
CA)
then
it
will
be
applied.
This
is
supported
by
the
ruling
that
despite
a
choice
of
law
105.
TRIPLE
EIGHT
INTEGRATED
SERVICES
V.
NLRC
clause
(PIA
v.
CA)
or
in
the
absence
of
such
clause
(Triple
Eight),
the
courts
of
G.R.
No.
129584
|
3
December
1998
the
forum
will
not
enforce
any
foreign
claim
obnoxious
to
the
forum’s
public
policy
(Triple
Eight).
DOCTRINE:
The
rule
simply
prescribes
a
“certification
by
a
competent
public
health
authority”
and
not
a
“Philippine
public
health
authority.”
The
GR:
Choice
of
law
governs
requirement
for
a
medical
certificate
under
Article
284
of
the
Labor
Code
EXC:
1.
Center
of
gravity/sufficient
contacts
with
the
law.
cannot
be
dispensed
with;
otherwise,
it
would
sanction
the
unilateral
and
2.
Obnoxious
to
public
policy.
arbitrary
determination
by
the
employer
of
the
gravity
or
extent
of
the
employee’s
illness
and
thus
defeat
the
public
policy
on
the
protection
of
labor.
FACTS:
In
1992,
Osdana
was
recruited
by
Triple
Eight
for
employment
with
Gulf
The
law
of
the
place
where
the
contract
is
made
governs
in
this
jurisdiction.
Catering
Company
(GCC),
a
firm
based
in
the
Kingdom
of
Saudi
Arabia.
Osdana
The
contract
was
perfected
here,
so
the
Labor
Code
applies.
The
courts
of
the
was
engaged
to
work
as
a
food
server
for
36
months
with
a
salary
of
SR550.
She
forum
won’t
enforce
any
foreign
claim
obnoxious
to
the
forum’s
public
policy.
claims
that
she
was
required
by
Triple
Eight
to
pay
a
total
of
11,950
pesos
in
placement
fees,
without
receipts.
She
was
asked
to
undergo
a
medical
CONFLICT
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examination,
too.
It
also
asked
Osdana
to
sign
another
‘Contractor
Employee
competent
public
health
authority
in
Saudi
Arabia,
thereby
heading
off
any
Agreement’
which
provided
that
she
would
be
employed
for
12
months
as
a
complaint
for
illegal
dismissal.
ND
waitress
with
a
salary
of
$280.
This
2 employment
agreement
was
approved
by
the
POEA.
The
requirement
for
a
medical
certificate
under
Article
284
of
the
Labor
Code
cannot
be
dispensed
with;
otherwise,
it
would
sanction
the
unilateral
and
Osdana
left
for
Riyadh,
Saudi
and
commenced
working
for
GCC.
She
was
arbitrary
determination
by
the
employer
of
the
gravity
or
extent
of
the
assigned
to
the
College
of
Public
Administration
of
the
Oleysha
University
and
employee’s
illness
and
thus
defeat
the
public
policy
on
the
protection
of
was
made
to
wash
dishes,
cooking
pots,
etc.
which
were
in
relation
to
being
a
labor.
As
the
Court
observed
in
Prieto
v.
NLRC,
“The
Court
is
not
unaware
of
‘waitress.’
She
was
made
to
work
a
12-‐hour
shift,
without
overtime
pay.
the
many
abuses
suffered
by
our
overseas
workers
in
the
foreign
land
where
they
have
ventured,
usually
with
heavy
hearts,
in
pursuit
of
a
more
fulfilling
Osdana
suffered
from
numbness
and
pain
in
her
arms,
and
had
to
be
confined
future.
Breach
of
contract,
maltreatment,
rape,
insufficient
nourishment,
sub-‐
from
June
18
to
August
22,
and
wasn’t
paid
her
salaries.
She
was
allowed
to
human
lodgings,
insults
and
other
forms
of
debasement,
are
only
a
few
of
the
resume
work
as
Food
Server,
where
she
worked
7
days
a
week,
but
was
not
inhumane
acts
to
which
they
are
subjected
by
their
foreign
employers,
who
paid.
She
was
again
confined.
probably
feel
they
can
do
as
they
please
in
their
country.
While
these
workers
may
indeed
have
relatively
little
defense
against
exploitation
while
they
are
She
was
re-‐assigned
to
the
Oleysha
University,
like
her
first
assignment.
She
abroad,
that
disadvantage
must
not
continue
to
burden
them
when
they
return
was
diagnosed
as
having
Bilateral
Carpal
Tunnel
Syndrome.
The
pain
then
to
their
own
territory
to
voice
their
muted
complaint.
There
is
no
reason
why,
became
unbearable,
and
she
underwent
two
surgical
operations.
She
wasn’t
in
their
own
land,
the
protection
of
our
own
laws
cannot
be
extended
to
them
nd
given
any
work
assignments
in
between
operations.
After
her
2 operation,
in
full
measure
for
the
redress
of
their
grievances.”
she
was
dismissed
from
work
allegedly
on
ground
of
illness,
even
after
being
given
a
certificate
that
she
was
fit
to
work.
Petitioner
likewise
attempts
to
sidestep
the
medical
certificate
requirement
by
contending
that
since
Osdana
was
working
in
Saudi
Arabia,
her
employment
Upon
her
return
to
the
Philippines,
Osdana
sought
the
help
of
Triple
Eight,
but
was
subject
to
the
laws
of
the
host
country.
Apparently,
petitioner
hopes
to
to
no
avail.
She
was
constrained
to
file
a
complaint
before
the
POEA
for
the
make
it
appear
that
the
labor
laws
of
Saudi
Arabia
do
not
require
any
unpaid
and
underpaid
salaries,
for
the
unexpired
portion,
and
damages.
Under
certification
by
a
competent
public
health
authority
in
the
dismissal
of
the
Migrant
Workers
and
Overseas
Filipinos
Act,
the
case
was
transferred
to
employees
due
to
illness.
the
arbitration
branch
of
the
NLRC
and
assigned
to
Labor
Arbiter
Canizares.
The
labor
arbiter
ruled
in
favor
of
Osdana.
NLRC
affirmed.
MR
was
denied.
Again,
petitioner’s
argument
is
without
merit.
ISSUES:
First,
established
is
the
rule
that
lex
loci
contractus
(the
law
of
the
place
where
Whether
there
was
GAD
because
of
ruling
in
favor
of
Osdana
even
if
there
was
the
contract
is
made)
governs
in
this
jurisdiction.
There
is
no
question
that
the
no
factual
or
legal
basis
for
the
award
(illegal
dismissal)
contract
of
employment
in
this
case
was
perfected
here
in
the
Philippines.
Please
see
below
for
issues
regarding
Conflict
of
Laws
Therefore,
the
Labor
Code,
its
implementing
rules
and
regulations,
and
other
laws
affecting
labor
apply
in
this
case.
Furthermore,
settled
is
the
rule
that
the
HELD:
courts
of
the
forum
will
not
enforce
any
foreign
claim
obnoxious
to
the
forum’s
No.
Petitioner
entirely
misses
the
point,
as
counsel
for
private
respondent
public
policy.
Here
in
the
Philippines,
employment
agreements
are
more
than
states
in
the
Comment.
The
rule
simply
prescribes
a
“certification
by
a
contractual
in
nature.
The
Constitution
itself,
in
Article
XIII
Section
3,
competent
public
health
authority”
and
not
a
“Philippine
public
health
guarantees
the
special
protection
of
workers,
to
wit:
authority.”
If,
indeed,
Osdana
was
physically
unfit
to
continue
her
employment,
her
employer
could
have
easily
obtained
a
certification
to
that
effect
from
a
CONFLICT
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“The
State
shall
afford
full
protection
to
labor,
local
and
overseas,
organized
into
their
contract
“as
a
set
of
terms.”
By
such
reference
to
the
provisions
of
the
and
unorganized,
and
promote
full
employment
and
equality
of
employment
foreign
law,
the
contract
does
not
become
a
foreign
contract
to
be
governed
by
opportunities
for
all.
the
foreign
law.
The
said
law
does
not
operate
as
a
statute
but
as
a
set
of
contractual
terms
deemed
written
in
the
contract.
It
shall
guarantee
the
rights
of
all
workers
to
self-‐organization,
collective
bargaining
and
negotiations,
and
peaceful
concerted
activities,
including
the
A
basic
policy
of
contract
is
to
protect
the
expectation
of
the
parties.
Such
right
to
strike
in
accordance
with
law.
They
shall
be
entitled
to
security
of
party
expectation
is
protected
by
giving
effect
to
the
parties’
own
choice
of
tenure,
humane
conditions
of
work,
and
a
living
wage.
They
shall
also
the
applicable
law.
The
choice
of
law
must,
however,
bear
some
relationship
participate
in
policy
and
decision-‐making
processes
affecting
their
rights
and
the
parties
or
their
transaction.
There
is
no
question
that
the
contracts
sought
benefits
as
may
be
provided
by
law.
to
be
enforced
by
claimants
have
a
direct
connection
with
the
Bahrain
law
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x.”
because
the
services
were
rendered
in
that
country.
This
public
policy
should
be
borne
in
mind
in
this
case
because
to
allow
foreign
FACTS:
employers
to
determine
for
and
by
themselves
whether
an
overseas
contract
This
case
is
an
offshoot
of
a
service
contract
entered
into
by
a
Filipino
worker
may
be
dismissed
on
the
ground
of
illness
would
encourage
illegal
or
construction
firm
with
the
Iraqi
Government
for
the
construction
of
the
arbitrary
pre-‐termination
of
employment
contracts.
Institute
of
Physical
Therapy-‐Medical
Center,
Phase
II,
in
Baghdad,
Iraq,
at
a
time
when
the
Iran-‐Iraq
war
was
ongoing.
106.
PHIL.
EXPORT
AND
FOREIGN
LOAN
GUARANTEE
CORP.
V.
V.P.
EUSEBIO
CONSTRUCTION
INC.
In
a
complaint
filed
with
the
RTC
Makati,
petitioner
Philippine
Export
and
2004
Foreign
Loan
Guarantee
Corporation
(hereinafter
Philguarantee)
sought
reimbursement
from
the
respondents
of
the
sum
of
money
it
paid
to
Al
Ahli
Kyna’s
notes:
Bank
of
Kuwait
pursuant
to
a
guarantee
it
issued
for
respondent
V.P.
Eusebio
A
and
B
entered
into
a
contract
and
was
agreed
by
both
parties
that
NY
law
Construction,
Inc.
(VPECI).
should
apply.
On
November
8,
1980:
State
Organization
of
Buildings
(SOB),
Ministry
of
Important
factors
to
consider:
Housing
and
Construction,
Baghdad,
Iraq,
awarded
the
construction
of
the
1.
NY
law
should
not
be
against
public
policy
of
the
Philippines
(not
obnoxious
Institute
of
Physical
Therapy–Medical
Rehabilitation
Center,
Phase
II,
in
to
public
policy)
Baghdad,
Iraq,
(Project)
to
Ajyal
Trading
and
Contracting
Company
(Ajyal),
a
2.
There
must
be
significant
contact
with
the
law
firm
duly
licensed
with
the
Kuwait
Chamber
of
Commerce
for
ID5,416,089/046
See
Cadalin
v.
POEA’s
Administrator
(or
about
US$18,739,668)
We
read
the
overseas
employment
contracts
in
question
as
adopting
the
March
7,
1981:
3-‐Plex
International,
Inc.
represented
by
Spouses
Eduardo
and
provisions
of
the
Amiri
Decree
No.
23
of
1976
as
part
and
parcel
thereof.
The
Iluminada
Santos
a
local
contractor
engaged
in
construction
business,
entered
parties
to
a
contract
may
select
the
law
by
which
it
is
to
be
governed.
In
such
a
into
a
joint
venture
agreement
with
Ajyal.
However
since
it
was
not
accredited
case,
the
foreign
law
is
adopted
as
a
“system”
to
regulate
the
relations
of
the
under
the
Philippine
Overseas
Construction
Board
(POCB),
it
had
to
assign
and
parties,
including
questions
of
their
capacity
to
enter
into
the
contract,
the
transfer
all
its
right
to
VPECI.
VPECI
entered
into
an
agreement
that
the
formalities
to
be
observed
by
them,
matters
of
performance,
and
so
forth.
execution
of
the
project
will
be
under
their
joint
management.
Instead
of
adopting
the
entire
mass
of
the
foreign
law,
the
parties
may
just
agree
that
specific
provisions
of
a
foreign
statute
shall
be
deemed
incorporated
To
comply
with
the
requirements
of
performance
bond
of
ID271,808/610
and
CONFLICT
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an
advance
payment
bond
of
ID541,608/901,
3-‐Plex
and
VPECI
applied
for
the
otherwise,
the
Philippine
government
,
through
the
Philguarantee
and
the
issuance
of
a
guarantee
with
Philguarantee,
a
government
financial
institution
Central
Bank,
would
become
instruments
of
the
Iraqi
Government
in
empowered
to
issue
guarantees
for
qualified
Filipino
contractors
to
secure
the
consummating
a
clear
act
of
injustice
and
inequity
committed
against
a
Filipino
performance
of
approved
service
contracts
abroad.
contractor.
Subsequently,
letters
of
guarantee
were
issued
by
Philguarantee
to
the
Central
Bank
authorized
the
remittance
to
Al
Ahli
Bank.
Philguarantee
informed
Rafidain
Bank
of
Baghdad.
Al
Ahli
Bank
of
Kuwait
was,
therefore,
engaged
to
VPECI
that
it
would
remit
US$876,564
to
Al
Ahli
Bank,
and
reiterated
the
joint
provide
a
counter-‐guarantee
to
Rafidain
Bank,
but
it
required
a
similar
counter-‐ and
solidary
obligation
of
the
respondents
to
reimburse
the
Philguarantee
for
guarantee
in
its
favor
from
the
Philguarantee.
the
advances
made
on
its
counter-‐guarantee
but
they
failed
to
pay
so
a
case
was
filed
in
the
RTC.
The
Surety
Bond
was
later
amended
to
increase
the
amount
of
coverage
from
P6.4
million
to
P6.967
million
and
to
change
the
bank
in
whose
favor
the
RTC
and
CA:
Against
Philguarantee
since
no
cause
of
action
since
it
was
expired
petitioner's
guarantee
was
issued,
from
Rafidain
Bank
to
Al
Ahli
Bank
of
Kuwait
because
VPECI.
Inequity
to
allow
the
Philguarantee
to
pass
on
its
losses
to
the
SOB
and
the
joint
venture
VPECI
and
Ajyal
executed
the
service
contract
for
the
Filipino
contractor
VPECI
which
had
sternly
warned
against
paying
the
Al
Ahli
construction
of
the
Institute
of
Physical
Therapy
–
Medical
Rehabilitation
Bank
and
constantly
apprised
it
of
the
developments
in
the
Project
Center,
Phase
II,
in
Baghdad,
Iraq.
It
commenced
only
on
the
last
week
of
implementation.
August
1981
instead
of
the
June
2
1981
ISSUE:
Prior
to
the
deadline,
upon
foreseeing
the
impossibility
to
meet
it,
the
surety
W/N
the
Philippine
laws
should
be
applied
in
determining
VPECI's
default
in
the
bond
was
also
extended
for
more
than
12
times
until
May
1987
and
the
performance
of
its
obligations
under
the
service
contract
Advance
Payment
Guarantee
was
extended
three
times
more
until
it
was
cancelled
for
reimbursement.
HELD:
Yes.
A
corollary
issue
is
what
law
should
be
applied
in
determining
whether
the
On
26
October
1986,
Al
Ahli
Bank
of
Kuwait
sent
a
telex
call
to
the
petitioner
respondent
contractor
has
defaulted
in
the
performance
of
its
obligations
demanding
full
payment
of
its
performance
bond
counter-‐guarantee
VPECI
under
the
service
contract.
The
question
of
whether
there
is
a
breach
of
an
requested
Iraq
Trade
and
Economic
Development
Minister
Mohammad
Fadhi
agreement,
which
includes
default
or
mora,
pertains
to
the
essential
or
Hussein
to
recall
the
telex
call
on
the
performance
guarantee
for
being
a
drastic
intrinsic
validity
of
a
contract.
action
in
contravention
of
its
mutual
agreement
that
(1)
the
imposition
of
penalty
would
be
held
in
abeyance
until
the
completion
of
the
project;
and
(2)
No
conflicts
rule
on
essential
validity
of
contracts
is
expressly
provided
for
in
the
time
extension
would
be
open,
depending
on
the
developments
on
the
our
laws.
The
rule
followed
by
most
legal
systems,
however,
is
that
the
negotiations
for
a
foreign
loan
to
finance
the
completion
of
the
project.
intrinsic
validity
of
a
contract
must
be
governed
by
the
lex
contractus
or
“proper
law
of
the
contract.”
This
is
the
law
voluntarily
agreed
VPECI
advised
the
Philguarantee
not
to
pay
yet
Al
Ahli
Bank
because
efforts
upon
by
the
parties
(the
lex
loci
voluntatis)
or
the
law
intended
by
them
were
being
exerted
for
the
amicable
settlement
of
the
Project.
VPECI
received
either
expressly
or
implicitly
(the
lex
loci
intentionis).
The
law
selected
may
be
another
telex
message
from
Al
Ahli
Bank
stating
that
it
had
already
paid
to
implied
from
such
factors
as
substantial
connection
with
the
transaction,
or
the
Rafidain
Bank
the
sum
of
US$876,564
under
its
letter
of
guarantee,
and
nationality
or
domicile
of
the
parties.
Philippine
courts
would
do
well
to
adopt
demanding
reimbursement
by
Philguarantee.
the
first
and
most
basic
rule
in
most
legal
systems,
namely,
to
allow
the
parties
to
select
the
law
applicable
to
their
contract,
subject
to
the
limitation
that
it
is
VPECI
requested
the
Central
Bank
to
hold
in
abeyance
the
payment
by
the
not
against
the
law,
morals,
or
public
policy
of
the
forum
and
that
the
chosen
Philguarantee
"to
allow
the
diplomatic
machinery
to
take
its
course,
for
law
must
bear
a
substantive
relationship
to
the
transaction.
CONFLICT
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particular
issue,
has
the
most
significant
relationship
to
the
occurrence
It
must
be
noted
that
the
service
contract
between
SOB
and
VPECI
contains
no
and
the
parties.
express
choice
of
the
law
that
would
govern
it.
In
the
United
States
and
Europe,
the
two
rules
that
now
seem
to
have
emerged
as
“kings
of
3.
STATE-‐INTEREST
ANALYSIS
the
hill”
are
(1)
the
parties
may
choose
the
governing
law;
and
(2)
in
the
Where
the
forum
can
reasonably
assert
an
interest
in
the
application
absence
of
such
a
choice,
the
applicable
law
is
that
of
the
State
that
“has
the
of
its
law
and
policy,
as
against
the
interest
of
another
State,
the
most
significant
relationship
to
the
transaction
and
the
parties.”
Another
forum
should
apply
its
own
internal
law.
authority
proposed
that
all
matters
relating
to
the
time,
place,
and
manner
of
performance
and
valid
excuses
for
non-‐performance
are
determined
by
the
law
4.
CAVER’S
PRINCIPLES
OF
PREFERENCE
of
the
place
of
performance
or
lex
loci
solutionis,
which
is
useful
because
it
is
When
a
state
has
no
codal
or
statutory
provision
as
to
the
law
that
should
undoubtedly
always
connected
to
the
contract
in
a
significant
way.
regulate
the
question
of
tort
liability
in
conflicts
cases,
its
courts
should
be
guided
by
certain
rules
or
principles
in
determining
which
of
the
conflicting
In
this
case,
the
laws
of
Iraq
bear
substantial
connection
to
the
transaction,
rules
of
two
or
more
affected
states
should
apply
to
an
alleged
tort,
in
since
one
of
the
parties
is
the
Iraqi
Government
and
the
place
of
performance
every
case
where
there
is
a
true
unavoidable
conflict.
is
in
Iraq.
Hence,
the
issue
of
whether
respondent
VPECI
defaulted
in
its
obligations
may
be
determined
by
the
laws
of
Iraq.
However,
since
that
foreign
THE
PHILIPPINES
FOLLOWS
THE
“STATE
OF
THE
MOST
SIGNIFICANT
law
was
not
properly
pleaded
or
proved,
the
presumption
of
identity
or
RELATIONSHIP”
RULE
AS
ENUNCIATED
IN
SAUDI
ARABIAN
AIRLINES
V.
CA.
similarity,
otherwise
known
as
the
processual
presumption,
comes
into
play.
Where
foreign
law
is
not
pleaded
or,
even
if
pleaded,
is
not
proved,
the
111.
SAUDI
ARABIAN
AIRLINES
V.
CA,
supra
presumption
is
that
foreign
law
is
the
same
as
ours.
DOCTRINES:
In
applying
the
“State
of
the
most
significant
relationship”
rule,
the
XII.
TORT
AND
CRIMES
following
contacts
are
to
be
taken
into
account
and
evaluated
according
to
their
relative
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue:
(a)
the
place
where
the
injury
occurred;
(b)
the
place
where
the
conduct
causing
the
injury
LIABILITY
AND
DAMAGES
FOR
TORTS
IN
GENERAL
–
LEX
LOCI
DELICTI
COMMISSI
occurred;
(c)
the
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
(LAW
OF
THE
PLACE
WHERE
THE
DELICT
WAS
COMMITTED)
place
of
business
of
the
parties;
and
(d)
the
place
where
the
relationship,
if
any,
between
the
parties
is
centered.
MODERN
THEORIES
AND
RULES
ON
TORT
LIABILITY
[SECS]
That
certain
acts
or
parts
of
the
injury
allegedly
occurred
in
another
country
is
1.
THE
GERMAN
RULE
OF
ELECTIVE
CONCURRENCE
of
no
moment.
What
is
important
here
is
the
place
where
the
over-‐all
harm
or
Tort
is
committed
in
both
the
place
where
the
actor
engages
in
his
the
totality
of
the
alleged
injury
to
the
person,
reputation,
social
standing
and
conduct
and
in
the
place
where
the
effects
of
his
conduct
occur.
The
human
rights
of
complainant,
had
lodged,
according
to
Morada.
injured
person
may
choose
to
sue
under
one
law
or
the
other;
he
can
elect
the
law
most
advantageous
to
his
demand,
but
he
is
not
(1)
What
legal
system
should
control
a
given
situation
where
some
of
the
permitted
to
cumulate
the
benefits
flowing
from
more
than
one
law.
significant
facts
occurred
in
two
or
more
states;
and
(2)
to
what
extent
should
the
chosen
legal
system
regulate
the
situation.
2.
THE
“STATE
OF
THE
MOST
SIGNIFICANT
RELATIONSHIP”
RULE
The
rights
and
liabilities
of
the
parties
with
respect
to
an
issue
in
tort
FACTS:
are
determined
by
the
local
law
of
the
state
which,
with
respect
to
the
In
1988,
SAUDIA
hired
Milagros
Morada
as
a
Flight
Attendant
for
its
airlines
CONFLICT
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based
in
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia.
In
1990,
while
on
a
lay-‐over
in
Jakarta,
flight
and
took
away
her
passport
and
told
her
to
remain
in
Jeddah,
at
the
crew
Indonesia,
Morada
went
to
a
disco
dance
with
fellow
crew
members
Thamer
quarters,
until
further
orders.
After
a
few
days,
a
SAUDIA
legal
officer
again
Al-‐Gazzawi
and
Allah
Al-‐Gazzawi,
both
Saudi
nationals.
Because
it
was
almost
escorted
plaintiff
to
the
same
court
where
the
judge,
to
her
astonishment
and
morning
when
they
returned
to
their
hotels,
they
agreed
to
have
breakfast
shock,
rendered
a
decision
sentencing
her
to
5
months
imprisonment
and
to
together
at
the
room
of
Thamer.
When
they
were
in
the
room,
Allah
left
and
286
lashes.
Only
then
did
she
realize
that
the
Saudi
court
had
tried
her,
shortly
after,
Thamer
attempted
to
rape
her.
Fortunately,
a
roomboy
and
together
with
Thamer
and
Allah,
for
what
happened
in
Jakarta.
The
court
found
several
security
personnel
heard
her
cries
for
help
and
rescued
her.
Later,
the
Morada
guilty
of
(1)
adultery;
(2)
going
to
a
disco,
dancing
and
listening
to
the
Indonesian
police
came
and
arrested
Thamer
and
Allah
Al-‐Gazzawi,
the
latter
as
music
in
violation
of
Islamic
laws;
and
(3)
socializing
with
the
male
crew,
in
an
accomplice.
contravention
of
Islamic
tradition.”
When
plaintiff
returned
to
Jeddah
a
few
days
later,
SAUDIA
officials
She
was
denied
any
assistance
by
SAUDIA
thus,
she
then
asked
the
Philippine
interrogated
her
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
They
then
requested
her
to
go
Embassy
in
Jeddah
to
help
her
while
her
case
is
on
appeal.
Meanwhile,
to
pay
back
to
Jakarta
to
help
arrange
the
release
of
Thamer
and
Allah.
Morada
did
for
her
upkeep,
she
worked
on
the
domestic
flight
of
SAUDIA,
while
Thamer
not
cooperate
in
the
negotiation
with
the
Indonesian
police
because
she
was
and
Allah
continued
to
serve
in
the
international
flights.
Because
she
was
afraid
that
she
might
be
tricked
into
something
she
did
not
want
because
of
her
wrongfully
convicted,
the
Prince
of
Makkah
dismissed
the
case
against
her
and
inability
to
understand
the
local
dialect.
She
also
declined
to
sign
a
blank
paper
allowed
her
to
leave
Saudi
Arabia.
Shortly
before
her
return
to
Manila,
she
was
and
a
document
written
in
the
local
dialect.
However,
she
learned
that,
terminated
from
the
service
by
SAUDIA,
without
her
being
informed
of
the
through
the
intercession
of
the
Saudi
Arabian
government,
the
Indonesian
cause.
authorities
agreed
to
deport
Thamer
and
Allah
after
2
weeks
of
detention.
Eventually,
they
were
again
put
in
service
by
defendant
SAUDIA.
In
September
In
November
1993,
Morada
filed
a
Complaint
for
damages
against
SAUDIA,
and
1990,
SAUDIA
transferred
Morada
to
Manila.
Khaled
Al-‐Balawi,
its
country
manager
in
the
trial
court.
SAUDIA
filed
an
Omnibus
MTD
which
raised
the
following
grounds,
to
wit:
(1)
that
the
In
1992,
Morada’s
superiors
requested
her
to
see
Mr.
Ali
Meniewy,
Chief
Legal
Complaint
states
no
cause
of
action
against
SAUDIA;
(2)
that
defendant
Al-‐
Officer
of
SAUDIA,
in
Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia.
When
she
saw
him,
he
brought
her
Balawi
is
not
a
real
party
in
interest;
(3)
that
the
claim
or
demand
set
forth
in
to
the
police
station
where
the
police
took
her
passport
and
questioned
her
the
Complaint
has
been
waived,
abandoned
or
otherwise
extinguished;
and
(4)
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
Not
until
she
agreed
to
do
so
did
the
police
return
that
the
trial
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
try
the
case
on
the
basis
of
Art.
21
of
her
passport
and
allowed
her
to
catch
the
afternoon
flight
out
of
Jeddah.
the
NCC,
since
the
proper
law
applicable
is
the
law
of
the
KSA.
The
trial
court
denied
the
MTD.
One
year
and
a
half
later,
in
Riyadh,
a
few
minutes
before
the
departure
of
her
flight
to
Manila,
Morada
was
not
allowed
to
board
the
plane
and
instead
Consequently,
SAUDIA
filed
its
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Prohibition
with
ordered
to
take
a
later
flight
to
Jeddah
to
see
Mr.
Miniewy
again.
When
she
Prayer
for
Issuance
of
Writ
of
Preliminary
Injunction
and/or
TRO
with
the
CA,
did,
she
was
brought
her
to
a
Saudi
court
where
she
was
asked
to
sign
a
which
ruled
that
the
Philippines
is
an
appropriate
forum
considering
that
the
document
written
in
Arabic.
They
told
her
that
this
was
necessary
to
close
the
Amended
Complaint’s
basis
for
recovery
of
damages
is
Art.
21,
and
thus,
clearly
case
against
Thamer
and
Allah.
As
it
turned
out,
plaintiff
signed
a
notice
to
her
within
the
jurisdiction
of
respondent
Court.
to
appear
before
the
court
on
June
27,
1993.
She
then
returned
to
Manila.
ISSUE:
Shortly
afterwards,
SAUDIA
summoned
plaintiff
to
report
to
Jeddah
once
again
Whether
the
Philippine
Law
should
govern.
where
a
Saudi
judge
interrogated
her
through
an
interpreter
about
the
Jakarta
incident.
After
one
hour
of
interrogation,
when
she
was
about
to
return
to
HELD:
Manila,
a
SAUDIA
officer
told
her
that
the
airline
had
forbidden
her
to
take
Yes.
As
to
the
choice
of
applicable
law,
we
note
that
choice-‐of-‐law
problems
CONFLICT
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ATTY.
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AY
2015-‐2016
seek
to
answer
two
important
questions:
(1)
What
legal
system
should
control
or
done.
The
lex
fori—the
law
of
the
forum—is
particularly
important
a
given
situation
where
some
of
the
significant
facts
occurred
in
two
or
more
because,
as
we
have
seen
earlier,
matters
of
‘procedure’
not
going
to
the
states;
and
(2)
to
what
extent
should
the
chosen
legal
system
regulate
the
substance
of
the
claim
involved
are
governed
by
it;
and
because
the
lex
situation.
fori
applies
whenever
the
content
of
the
otherwise
applicable
foreign
law
is
excluded
from
application
in
a
given
case
for
the
reason
that
it
falls
Before
a
choice
can
be
made,
it
is
necessary
for
us
to
determine
under
what
under
one
of
the
exceptions
to
the
applications
of
foreign
law;
and
category
a
certain
set
of
facts
or
rules
fall.
This
process
is
known
as
(8)
the
flag
of
a
ship,
which
in
many
cases
is
decisive
of
practically
all
“characterization,”
or
the
“doctrine
of
qualification.”
It
is
the
“process
of
legal
relationships
of
the
ship
and
of
its
master
or
owner
as
such.
It
also
deciding
whether
or
not
the
facts
relate
to
the
kind
of
question
specified
in
a
covers
contractual
relationships
particularly
contracts
of
affreightment.
conflicts
rule.”
The
purpose
of
“characterization”
is
to
enable
the
forum
to
select
the
proper
law.
Considering
that
the
complaint
in
the
court
a
quo
is
one
involving
torts,
the
“connecting
factor”
or
“point
of
contact”
could
be
the
place
or
places
where
Our
starting
point
of
analysis
here
is
not
a
legal
relation,
but
a
factual
the
tortious
conduct
or
lex
loci
actus
occurred.
And
applying
the
torts
situation,
event,
or
operative
fact.
An
essential
element
of
conflict
rules
is
the
principle
in
a
conflicts
case,
we
find
that
the
Philippines
could
be
said
as
a
indication
of
a
“test”
or
“connecting
factor”
or
“point
of
contact.”
Choice-‐of-‐ situs
of
the
tort
(the
place
where
the
alleged
tortious
conduct
took
place).
law
rules
invariably
consist
of
a
factual
relationship
(such
as
property
right,
This
is
because
it
is
in
the
Philippines
where
SAUDIA
allegedly
deceived
contract
claim)
and
a
connecting
factor
or
point
of
contact,
such
as
the
situs
of
Morada,
a
Filipina
residing
and
working
here.
According
to
her,
she
had
the
res,
the
place
of
celebration,
the
place
of
performance,
or
the
place
of
honestly
believed
that
SAUDIA
would,
in
the
exercise
of
its
rights
and
in
the
wrongdoing.
performance
of
its
duties,
“act
with
justice,
give
her
due
and
observe
honesty
and
good
faith.”
Instead,
SAUDIA
failed
to
protect
her.
That
certain
acts
or
Note
that
one
or
more
circumstances
may
be
present
to
serve
as
the
possible
parts
of
the
injury
allegedly
occurred
in
another
country
is
of
no
moment.
What
test
for
the
determination
of
the
applicable
law.
These
“test
factors”
or
“points
is
important
here
is
the
place
where
the
over-‐all
harm
or
the
totality
of
the
of
contact”
or
“connecting
factors”
could
be
any
of
the
following:
alleged
injury
to
the
person,
reputation,
social
standing
and
human
rights
of
complainant,
had
lodged,
according
to
Morada.
All
told,
it
is
not
without
basis
(1)
the
nationality
of
a
person,
his
domicile,
his
residence,
his
place
of
to
identify
the
Philippines
as
the
situs
of
the
alleged
tort.
sojourn,
or
his
origin;
(2)
the
seat
of
a
legal
or
juridical
person,
such
as
a
corporation;
Moreover,
with
the
widespread
criticism
of
the
traditional
rule
of
lex
loci
delicti
(3)
the
situs
of
a
thing,
that
is,
the
place
where
a
thing
is,
or
is
deemed
to
commissi,
modern
theories
and
rules
on
tort
liability
have
been
advanced
to
be
situated.
In
particular,
the
lex
situs
is
decisive
when
real
rights
are
offer
fresh
judicial
approaches
to
arrive
at
just
results.
In
keeping
abreast
with
involved;
the
modern
theories
on
tort
liability,
we
find
here
an
occasion
to
apply
the
(4)
the
place
where
an
act
has
been
done,
the
locus
actus,
such
as
the
“State
of
the
most
significant
relationship”
rule,
which
in
our
view
should
be
place
where
a
contract
has
been
made,
a
marriage
celebrated,
a
will
appropriate
to
apply
now,
given
the
factual
context
of
this
case.
In
determining
signed
or
a
tort
committed.
The
lex
loci
actus
is
particularly
important
in
the
State
which
has
the
most
significant
relationship,
the
following
contacts
contracts
and
torts;
are
to
be
taken
into
account
and
evaluated
according
to
their
relative
(5)
the
place
where
an
act
is
intended
to
come
into
effect,
e.g.,
the
place
importance
with
respect
to
the
particular
issue:
(a)
the
place
where
the
injury
of
performance
of
contractual
duties,
or
the
place
where
a
power
of
occurred;
(b)
the
place
where
the
conduct
causing
the
injury
occurred;
(c)
the
attorney
is
to
be
exercised;
domicile,
residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation
and
place
of
business
(6)
the
intention
of
the
contracting
parties
as
to
the
law
that
should
of
the
parties;
and
(d)
the
place
where
the
relationship,
if
any,
between
the
govern
their
agreement,
the
lex
loci
intentionis;
parties
is
centered.
(7)
the
place
where
judicial
or
administrative
proceedings
are
instituted
CONFLICT
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LAWS
AV
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176
ATTY.
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AY
2015-‐2016
With
these
guidelines
in
mind,
the
trial
court
must
proceed
to
try
and
adjudge
clashes
between
our
laws
and
those
of
other
nations
which
could
result
in
the
case
in
the
light
of
relevant
Philippine
law,
with
due
consideration
of
the
international
discord."
As
an
exception,
a
local
law
may
be
applied
foreign
element
or
elements
involved.
Nothing
said
herein,
of
course,
should
be
extraterritorially,
when
a
statute
gives
a
clear
indication
of
an
extraterritorial
construed
as
prejudging
the
results
of
the
case
in
any
manner
whatsoever.
application.
108.
FILARTIGA
V.
PENS-‐IRALA
Nothing
in
the
ATS's
text
evinces
a
clear
indication
of
extraterritorial
reach.
630
F.
2d
876
(2d
Cir,
1980)
Violations
of
the
law
of
nations
affecting
aliens
can
occur
either
within
or
outside
the
United
States.
And
generic
terms,
like
"any"
in
the
phrase
"any
civil
DOCTRINE:
Under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute,
which
grants
district
courts
original
action,"
do
not
rebut
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality.
jurisdiction
to
hear
tort
claims
brought
by
an
alien
that
have
been
"committed
in
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
or
a
treaty
of
the
United
States."
*1.
Law
of
FACTS:
nations
or
2.
Treaty
of
the
US
Dr.
Filartiga's
17y/o
son
Joelito
was
kidnapped
and
tortured
to
death
by
Pena,
former
Police
Inspector
General
in
Paraguay.
Filartiga
(P),
a
long
standing
Official
torture
had
been
prohibited
by
the
law
of
nations.
The
prohibition
was
opponent
of
Pres.
Stroessner,
claims
this
was
done
in
retaliation
for
his
father's
clear
and
unambiguous
and
admitted
no
distinction
between
treatment
of
political
activities
and
beliefs.
P
brought
a
criminal
case
in
Paraguayan
court,
aliens
and
citizens.
The
court
determined
that
deliberate
torture
perpetuated
but
his
attorney
was
arrested,
threatened
with
death,
and
supposedly
under
color
of
official
authority
violated
universally
accepted
norms
of
the
disbarred
without
just
cause.
Four
years
later,
another
man
confessed
to
the
international
law
of
human
rights,
regardless
of
the
nationality
of
the
parties.
murder,
claiming
he
found
Joelito
and
his
wife
together,
and
said
the
crime
was
one
of
passion,
but
he
was
never
convicted,
and
also
the
evidence
showed
that
Under
international
law,
any
state
that
engages
in
official
torture
violates
jus
Joelito's
death
"was
the
result
of
professional
methods
of
torture."
cogens.
In
1978,
Dolly
Filártiga
and
(separately)
D
(Peña)
came
to
the
US.
Dolly
applied
*N.B.:
for
political
asylum,
while
Peña
stayed
under
a
visitor's
visa.
Dolly
learned
of
Torts
à
UN
Declaration
à
Customary
law
Peña's
presence
and
reported
it
to
the
Immigration
and
Naturalization
Service,
who
arrested
and
deported
Peña
for
staying
past
the
expiration
of
his
visa.
Kyna’s
notes:
But
see
Kiobel
v.
Royal
Dutch.
The
latter
case
limited
the
When
Peña
was
taken
to
the
Brooklyn
Navy
Yard
pending
deportation,
Dolly
application
of
Filartiga
case.
The
Court
in
Kiobel
held
that
corporate
liability
lodged
a
civil
complaint
in
U.S.
courts
for
Joelito's
wrongful
death
by
torture,
claims
are
not
actionable
under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute.
In
this
regard,
the
asking
for
damages
in
the
amount
of
$10
million.
presumption
against
extraterritoriality
applies
to
claims
under
the
ATS.
ISSUE:
Av:
Filartiga
stated
that
official
torture
is
a
violation
of
jus
cogens
It
is
Whether
U.S.
courts
can
punish
non-‐U.S.
citizens
for
tortious
acts
committed
prohibited
by
the
law
of
nations,
without
discrimination
between
treatment
of
outside
the
U.S.
that
were
in
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
or
any
treaties
to
aliens
and
citizens.
Thus,
torts
claims
committed
in
a
foreign
state
against
which
the
U.S.
is
a
party.
aliens
may
be
brought
in
the
courts
of
a
domestic
state.
HOWEVER,
Kiobel
v.
Royal
Dutch
stated
that
the
GR
is
a
presumption
against
extraterritoriality,
that
HELD:
is
a
local
law
does
not
apply
extraterritorially.
In
other
words,
when
a
statute
Yes.
This
case
extended
the
jurisdiction
of
United
States
courts
to
tortious
acts
gives
no
clear
indication
of
an
extraterritorial
application,
it
has
none.
There
is
a
committed
around
the
world.
presumption
against
extraterritoriality,
that
is
a
local
law
does
not
apply
extraterritorially.
The
presumption
"serves
to
protect
against
unintended
The
appellants
argued
that
Peña's
actions
had
violated
wrongful
death
statutes,
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the
U.N.
Charter,
the
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights,
the
American
109.
IN
RE
ESTATE
OF
FERDINAND
MARCOS
Declaration
of
the
Rights
and
Duties
of
Man,
and
other
customary
international
1994
U.S.
App.
Lexis
14796
(9th
Circ.,
1994)
law.
Petitioner
claimed
the
U.S.
courts
had
jurisdiction
to
hear
the
case
under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute,
which
grants
district
courts
original
jurisdiction
to
hear
OVERVIEW:
During
the
ex-‐President
of
Philippines'
tenure,
several
people
were
tort
claims
brought
by
an
alien
that
have
been
"committed
in
violation
of
the
allegedly
tortured,
executed,
or
disappeared
at
the
hands
of
military
personnel.
law
of
nations
or
a
treaty
of
the
United
States."
This
case
interpreted
that
The
ex-‐President
and
his
family
fled
to
Hawaii.
Plaintiff
subjects
of
the
ex-‐
statute
to
grant
jurisdiction
over
claims
for
torts
committed
both
within
the
president
filed
suit,
claiming
that
they
had
been
tortured,
or
were
the
families
United
States
and
abroad.
of
people
tortured
and
executed.
A
preliminary
injunction
was
granted
to
prevent
defendant
from
transferring
or
dissipating
any
assets
in
order
to
The
U.S.
courts
eventually
ruled
in
favor
of
the
Filártigas,
rewarding
them
preserve
the
possibility
of
collecting
a
judgment.
Defendant
appealed,
roughly
$10.4
million.
Torture
was
clearly
a
violation
of
international
law
(aka
challenging
jurisdiction
over
plaintiffs'
action
under
the
Foreign
Sovereign
"the
law
of
nations"),
and
the
U.S.
did
have
jurisdiction
over
the
case
since
the
Immunities
Act
(FSIA),
28
U.S.C.S.
§§
1330,
1602,
and
the
Alien
Tort
Act,
28
claim
was
lodged
when
both
parties
were
inside
the
United
States.
U.S.C.S.
§
1350,
and
contending
that
any
cause
of
action
had
abated
upon
the
Additionally,
Peña
had
sought
to
dismiss
the
case
based
on
forum
non
ex-‐president's
death.
On
appeal,
the
court
affirmed
the
district
court's
decision,
conveniens
(saying
that
Paraguay
was
a
more
convenient
location
for
the
trial),
finding
that
the
district
court
had
subject
matter
jurisdiction
because
the
but
did
not
succeed.
alleged
acts
were
not
taken
within
any
official
mandate
and
were
therefore
not
acts
of
an
agency
of
foreign
state
within
FSIA.
The
court
stated
that
the
district
Official
torture
had
been
prohibited
by
the
law
of
nations.
The
prohibition
court
applied
the
correct
law
and
correctly
ruled
that
money
damages
would
was
clear
and
unambiguous
and
admitted
no
distinction
between
treatment
be
an
inadequate
remedy.
of
aliens
and
citizens.
The
court
determined
that
deliberate
torture
perpetuated
under
color
of
official
authority
violated
universally
accepted
FACTS:
norms
of
the
international
law
of
human
rights,
regardless
of
the
nationality
Shortly
after
being
deposed
as
president
of
the
Philippines
in
February
1986,
of
the
parties.
Ferdinand
Marcos
(“Marcos”)
and
his
wife
Imelda
fled
to
Hawai‘i,
taking
with
them
dozens
of
crates
filled
with
gold,
jewelry,
and
cash.
President
Corazon
Accordingly,
we
must
conclude
that
the
dictum
in
Dreyfus
v.
von
Finck,
supra,
Aquino,
who
replaced
Marcos
as
president,
created
the
Presidential
534
F.2d
at
31,
to
the
effect
that
"violations
of
international
law
do
not
occur
Commission
on
Good
Government,
an
official
agency
charged
with
recovering
when
the
aggrieved
parties
are
nationals
of
the
acting
state,"
is
clearly
out
of
the
assets
of
the
Republic
from
the
Marcos
family
and
its
associates.
tune
with
the
current
usage
and
practice
of
international
law.
The
treaties
and
accords
cited
above,
as
well
as
the
express
foreign
policy
of
our
own
These
assets,
which
have
never
been
comprehensively
identified
in
any
government,
all
make
it
clear
that
international
law
confers
fundamental
rights
litigation,
originally
included
U.S.
and
Philippine
real
estate
holdings,
valuable
upon
all
people
vis-‐a-‐vis
their
own
governments.
art
works,
cash
and
other
property
seized
by
U.S.
Customs
officials
in
Hawai‘i,
and
funds
in
bank
accounts
in
California
and
Switzerland.
The
Republic
Whenever
an
alleged
torturer
was
found
and
served
with
process
by
an
alien
contends
that
the
Marcoses
and
their
associates
obtained
these
assets
through
within
the
borders
of
the
United
States,
federal
jurisdiction
was
appropriate.
misuse
of
Marcos'
official
position,
and
Philippine
law
provides
for
the
The
court
determined
that
its
jurisdiction
was
appropriate.
The
court
reversed
forfeiture
to
the
national
treasury
of
property
unlawfully
obtained
by
public
the
decision
of
the
district
court,
which
dismissed
appellants'
complaint
for
officials.
want
of
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
A
number
of
lawsuits
were
filed
against
the
Marcos
family
in
American
courts.
Among
them
were
five
suits
filed
in
the
Northern
District
of
California
and
the
District
of
Hawai‘i
by
individuals
alleging
that
they
or
their
relatives
had
been
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arrested,
tortured,
or
executed
by
military
intelligence
personnel
acting
Estate
in
the
Philippines
worth
$672
million,
as
well
as
$2
million
of
the
$409
pursuant
to
martial
law
declared
by
Marcos
in
1971.
The
district
courts
million
in
cash
that
the
Estate
had
deposited
in
Swiss
banks.
It
claimed
that
the
dismissed
all
five
suits
on
the
ground
that
the
Act
of
State
doctrine
precluded
Republic
had
sold
$481
million
worth
of
stock,
held
in
the
Meralco
Foundation
liability.
for
the
benefit
of
the
Estate,
and
had
appropriated
the
proceeds
to
itself.
It
also
asserted
that
the
Republic
and
the
Estate
entered
into
two
agreements
on
26
In
an
appeal
of
those
decisions
to
this
court,
the
Republic
filed
an
amicus
curiae
June
1992,
to
transfer
works
of
art
from
the
United
States
to
the
National
brief
urging
the
U.S.
courts
to
exercise
jurisdiction
over
the
human
rights
Museum
of
the
Philippines,
and
to
divide
the
Estate's
other
assets
between
the
claims.
This
court
reversed
in
two
unpublished
decisions. The
human
rights
Estate
and
the
Republic.
cases
were
subsequently
consolidated
in
the
district
court
in
Hawai‘i
and
certified
as
a
class
action
suit
against
the
Estate.
On
12
September
1994,
the
district
court
heard
argument
on
the
motion;
the
Republic
appeared
specially
and
asserted
its
sovereign
immunity.
The
district
Meanwhile,
in
a
separate
action
filed
in
the
Central
District
of
California,
the
court
the
following
day
issued
an
order
identifying
the
Republic
as
a
Republic
sued
the
Estate
and
Imelda
Marcos,
asserting
RICO
and
pendent
state
“representative,
agent,
aider
or
abettor”
of
the
Estate,
and
subjecting
it
to
the
law
claims,
and
seeking
the
recovery
of
$1.55
billion
allegedly
plundered
from
injunction.
On
23
September
1994,
the
Republic
filed
an
appeal
from
this
order.
the
Philippines
treasury.
On
25
June
1986,
the
district
court
enjoined
the
Marcoses
and
their
associates
from
disposing
of
any
assets
anywhere
in
the
On
18
January
1995,
a
jury
in
Hawai‘i
awarded
Hilao
$766
million
in
world.
We
affirmed
the
injunction.
compensatory
damages.
On
3
February
1995,
the
district
court
entered
a
final
judgment,
which
included
a
permanent
injunction
against
the
Estate
and
its
The
Republic's
suit
against
the
Estate
was
settled
in
October
1991
and
“aiders
and
abettors”
and
a
finding
that
the
Republic
is
an
aider
and
abettor
of
dismissed
on
4
November
1991.
As
part
of
the
settlement,
the
Estate
and
the
Estate.
On
6
February
1995,
the
Republic
filed
a
notice
of
appeal
(No.
95-‐
Imelda
Marcos
agreed
to
transfer
the
Estate
assets
impounded
by
U.S.
Customs
15259)
from
this
final
judgment.
officials
in
Hawai‘i, except
for
some
personal
items
and
the
cash
in
three
accounts
at
a
Los
Angeles
bank, to
the
Republic. ISSUE:
Whether
such
acts
are
covered
by
sovereign
immunity
The
assets
in
Swiss
banks
were
not
transferred
under
the
terms
of
the
settlement,
perhaps
because
the
Swiss
courts
had
frozen
all
Marcos
assets
in
HELD:
Switzerland
in
1986
at
the
request
of
the
Republic
and
had
agreed
that
the
The
Estate
argues
that
the
Alien
Tort
Act
is
a
purely
jurisdictional
statute
which
assets
would
be
returned
to
the
Philippines
if
criminal
prosecutions
against
the
does
not
provide
the
plaintiffs
a
cause
of
action.
The
Estate
contends
that
Sec.
Marcos
family
in
the
Philippines
succeeded. 1350,
like
the
Sec.
1331
"arising
under"
jurisdictional
provision,
does
not
grant
a
cause
of
action.
(the
"Judicial
Code,
in
vesting
jurisdiction
in
the
District
The
injunction
freezing
the
Estate's
assets
was
dissolved
as
part
of
the
Courts,
does
not
create
causes
of
action,
but
only
confers
jurisdiction
to
settlement.
However,
the
district
court
in
Hawai‘i
granted
Hilao's
request
to
adjudicate
those
arising
from
other
sources
which
satisfy
its
limiting
have
the
injunction
reinstated
on
19
November
1991.
We
upheld
the
injunction
provisions").
on
16
June
1994.
In
the
meantime,
Hilao
had
won
a
favorable
liability
verdict
on
24
September
1992.
On
23
February
1994,
the
jury
awarded
Hilao
$1.2
However,
in
contrast
to
section
1331,
"which
requires
that
an
action
'arise
billion
in
punitive
damages.
under'
the
laws
of
the
United
States,
section
1350
does
not
require
that
the
action
'arise
under'
the
law
of
nations,
but
only
mandates
a
'violation
of
the
law
On
20
July
1994,
Hilao
filed
a
motion
to
modify
the
injunction
to
identify
the
of
nations'
in
order
to
create
a
cause
of
action."
It
is
unnecessary
that
Republic
as
an
agent,
representative,
aider
or
abettor
of
the
Estate
subject
to
international
law
provide
a
specific
right
to
sue.
International
law
"does
not
the
injunction.
Hilao
contended
that
the
Republic
had
seized
assets
of
the
require
any
particular
reaction
to
violations
of
law....
Whether
and
how
the
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United
States
wished
to
react
to
such
violations
are
domestic
questions."
110.
TRAJANO
V.
MARCOS
"[N]othing
more
than
a
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
is
required
to
invoke
113
S.
Ct.
2959
(1993)
section
1350."
DOCTRINE:
All
states
believe
that
torture
is
wrong,
all
that
engage
in
torture
Actionable
violations
of
international
law
must
be
of
a
norm
that
is
specific,
deny
it,
and
no
state
claims
a
sovereign
right
to
torture
its
own
citizens.
Under
universal,
and
obligatory.
See
Filartiga,
630
F.2d
at
881
("This
'international
international
law,
any
state
that
engages
in
official
torture
violates
jus
cogens.
tort'
must
be
one
which
is
definable,
obligatory
(rather
than
horatory),
and
universally
condemned")
OVERVIEW:
The
mother,
a
foreign
citizen,
claimed
that
the
official
had
orchestrated
the
The
allegations
in
this
case
satisfy
the
specific,
universal
and
obligatory
torture
and
death
of
her
son
in
the
Philippines,
so
the
mother
filed
a
wrongful
standard.
"Under
international
law,
...
official
torture
violates
jus
cogens."
death
suit
in
the
district
court.
The
district
court
entered
a
default
judgment
for
the
mother.
On
appeal,
the
official
challenged
the
district
court's
subject
[T]he
right
to
be
free
from
official
torture
is
fundamental
and
universal,
a
right
matter
jurisdiction
over
the
suit,
claiming
that
the
Foreign
Sovereign
deserving
of
the
highest
stature
under
international
law,
a
norm
of
jus
cogens.
Immunities
Act
(FSIA)
made
her
immune
from
the
suit.
The
court
held
that
the
The
crack
of
the
whip,
the
clamp
of
the
thumb
screw,
the
crush
of
the
iron
official
was
not
acting
within
any
official
mandate
when
the
tort
occurred,
so
maiden,
and,
in
these
more
efficient
modern
times,
the
shock
of
the
electric
the
FSIA
was
not
triggered
and
could
not
provide
subject
matter
jurisdiction
cattle
prod
are
forms
of
torture
that
the
international
order
will
not
tolerate.
over
the
suit.
The
court,
however,
held
that
the
district
court
properly
asserted
To
subject
a
person
to
such
horrors
is
to
commit
one
of
the
most
egregious
jurisdiction
under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute
because
the
torture
of
the
victim
was
violations
of
the
personal
security
and
dignity
of
a
human
being.
clearly
a
violation
of
international
law,
which
triggered
the
district
court's
exercise
of
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
The
court
rejected
the
official's
claim
that
(torture
is
violation
of
customary
international
law)
("the
proscription
of
official
the
extension
of
jurisdiction
to
the
district
court
violated
the
"arising
under"
torture
[is]
a
principle
that
is
embodied
in
numerous
international
conventions
clause
of
U.S.
Const.
art.
III.
and
declarations,
that
is
'clear
and
unambiguous'
...
and
about
which
there
is
universal
agreement
'in
the
modern
usage
and
practice
of
nations'
");
Filartiga,
FACTS:
630
F.2d
at
880-‐84
(prohibition
against
official
torture
is
"universal,
obligatory,
In
August
of
1977,
Ferdinand
Marcos
was
President
of
the
Philippines,
Marcos-‐
and
definable").
The
United
States
signed
the
Convention
Against
Torture
and
Manotoc
was
the
National
Chairman
of
the
Kabataang
Baranggay,
and
Fabian
Other
Cruel,
Inhuman
or
Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment,
39
U.N.
GAOR
Ver
was
in
charge
of
military
intelligence.
Archimedes
Trajano
was
a
student
at
Supp.
(No.
51),
23
I.L.M.
1027
(1987),
to
which
the
United
States
Senate
gave
the
Mapua
Institute
of
Technology.
On
the
31st
of
August,
Trajano
went
to
an
its
advice
and
consent.
Siderman,
965
F.2d
at
716.
The
prohibition
against
open
forum
discussion
at
which
Marcos-‐Manotoc
was
speaking.
When
Trajano
summary
execution
or
causing
"disappearance"
is
similarly
universal,
definable,
asked
a
question
about
her
appointment
as
director
of
an
organization,
he
was
and
obligatory.
kidnapped,
interrogated,
and
tortured
to
death
by
military
intelligence
personnel
who
were
acting
under
Ver's
direction,
pursuant
to
martial
law
We
thus
join
the
Second
Circuit
in
concluding
that
the
Alien
Tort
Act,
28
U.S.C.
declared
by
Marcos,
and
under
the
authority
of
Ver,
Marcos,
and
Marcos-‐
Sec.
1350,
creates
a
cause
of
action
for
violations
of
specific,
universal
and
Manotoc.
obligatory
international
human
rights
standards
which
"confer[
]
fundamental
rights
upon
all
people
vis-‐a-‐vis
their
own
governments."
Filartiga,
630
F.2d
at
After
former
Philippine
President
Ferdinand
Marcos
and
his
daughter,
Imee
885-‐87.10
The
plaintiffs
state
a
cause
of
action.
Marcos-‐Manotoc,
fled
to
Hawaii
in
1986,
they
were
sued
in
federal
court
by
Agapita
Trajano,
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
who
then
lived
in
Hawaii,
for
the
torture
and
wrongful
death
of
Trajano's
son,
Archimedes,
in
the
Philippines
on
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August
31,
1977.
Marcos-‐Manotoc
did
not
appear
and
a
default
judgment
was
Marcos-‐Manotoc
argues
that
there
is
no
extraterritorial
jurisdiction
over
civil
entered
against
her.
actions
based
on
torture.
She
urges
that
Filartiga
has
been
undermined
by
intervening
acts
of
the
legislative
and
executive
branches
which
indicate
that
The
court
concluded
that
this
violation
of
fundamental
human
rights
the
United
States
is
not
obliged
to
open
its
courts
for
the
redress
of
torture
constitutes
a
tort
in
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1350,
and
occurring
in
another
country.
First,
Marcos-‐Manotoc
points
to
the
fact
that
awarded
damages
of
$
4.16.
1350
provides
that:
"The
district
courts
shall
when
the
Senate
ratified
the
United
Nations
Convention
Against
Torture
and
have
original
jurisdiction
of
any
civil
action
by
an
alien
for
a
tort
only,
Other
Cruel,
Inhuman
or
Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment,
G.A.
Res.
39/46,
committed
in
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
or
a
treaty
of
the
United
States."
39
U.N.
GAOR
Supp.
No.
51
at
197,
U.N.
Doc.
A/RES/39/708
(1984),
reprinted
in
23
I.L.M.
1027
(1984),
it
attached
an
understanding
to
Article
1416
that
a
state
On
appeal,
she
contends
that
the
district
court
lacked
subject-‐matter
is
required
to
provide
a
private
right
of
action
only
for
torture
committed
in
jurisdiction
under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute,
28
U.S.C.
§
1350,
and
that
the
Foreign
territory
under
its
jurisdiction.
From
this
she
infers
that
it
is
inappropriate
to
Sovereign
Immunities
Act,
28
U.S.C.
§§
1330,
1602-‐11,
does
not
authorize
a
rely
on
principles
of
international
law
to
give
victims
of
torture
enforcement
federal
court
to
assert
jurisdiction,
over
actions
taken
by
a
foreign
government
rights
outside
their
own
country.
Nothing
in
the
understanding,
however,
goes
against
its
own
citizens.
so
far.
Even
if
it
could
be
read
to
reach
transitory
torts
such
as
wrongful
death,
the
understanding
does
not
prohibit
the
United
States
from
providing
a
forum
ISSUE:
for
claims
by
aliens
for
torture
occurring
elsewhere.
The
understanding,
Whether
a
United
States
district
court
had
subject
matter
jurisdiction
over
a
accordingly,
sheds
little
light
on
the
scope
of
§
1350.
claim
of
official
acts
of
torture
committed
outside
the
United
States
The
same
is
true
of
the
fact
that
the
Department
of
Justice
has
changed
its
HELD:
position
on
whether
a
plaintiff
such
as
Trajano
has
a
cause
of
action
cognizable
Yes.
The
district
courts
shall
have
original
jurisdiction
of
any
civil
action
by
an
in
federal
court
for
a
violation
of
international
law
condemning
torture.
alien
for
a
tort
only,
committed
in
violation
of
the
law
of
nations
or
a
treaty
of
Marcos-‐Manotoc
suggests
that
the
executive
branch's
withdrawal
of
support
the
United
States.
for
Filartiga
and
the
Senate's
refusal
to
obligate
federal
courts
to
hear
actions
such
as
Trajano's
demonstrate
that
the
United
States
does
not
recognize
a
There
is
no
doubt,
as
the
district
court
found,
that
causing
Trajano's
death
was
private
right
of
action
for
torture
having
no
nexus
with
the
United
States.
We
wrongful,
and
is
a
tort.
Nor,
in
view
of
Marcos-‐Manotoc's
default,
is
there
any
do
not
read
the
executive
branch's
flip
on
this
issue
as
signifying
so
much;
its
dispute
that
Trajano's
death
was
caused
by
torture.
And,
as
we
have
recently
change
of
position
in
different
cases
and
by
different
administrations
is
not
a
held,
"it
would
be
unthinkable
to
conclude
other
than
that
acts
of
official
definitive
statement
by
which
we
are
bound
on
the
limits
of
§
1350.
Rather,
we
torture
violate
customary
international
law."
We
believe,
therefore,
that
are
constrained
by
what
§
1350
shows
on
its
face:
no
limitations
as
to
the
Trajano's
suit
as
an
alien
for
the
tort
of
wrongful
death,
committed
by
military
citizenship
of
the
defendant,
or
the
locus
of
the
injury.
intelligence
officials
through
torture
prohibited
by
the
law
of
nations,
is
within
the
jurisdictional
grant
of
§
1350.
Nor
do
these
acts
by
the
Senate
and
the
Department
of
Justice
support
Marcos-‐
Manotoc's
argument
that
general
principles
of
international
law
may
Marcos-‐Manotoc
argues,
however,
that
the
district
court
erred
in
assuming
not
provide
a
basis
for
federal
court
jurisdiction
under
§
1350.
Regardless
of
jurisdiction
of
a
tort
committed
by
a
foreign
state's
agents
against
its
nationals
the
extent
to
which
other
principles
may
appropriately
be
relied
upon,
the
outside
of
the
United
States,
and
having
no
nexus
to
this
country.
If
§
1350
prohibition
against
official
torture
"carries
with
it
the
force
of
a
jus
cogens
were
construed
to
confer
jurisdiction
under
these
circumstances,
she
asserts,
it
norm,"
which
"
'enjoy[s]
the
highest
status
within
international
law.'
As
our
would
exceed
the
constitutional
limits
on
federal
court
jurisdiction
under
survey
of
the
scholarly
and
judicial
opinion
in
Siderman
reflects,
there
is
Article
III
of
the
Constitution.
We
disagree.
widespread
agreement
on
this;
"all
states
believe
[torture]
is
wrong,
all
that
engage
in
torture
deny
it,
and
no
state
claims
a
sovereign
right
to
torture
its
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own
citizens.
Under
international
law,
any
state
that
engages
in
official
torture
The
district
court's
approach
comports
with
the
view
that
the
First
Congress
violates
jus
cogens."
We
therefore
conclude
that
the
district
court
did
not
err
in
enacted
the
predecessor
to
§
1350
to
provide
a
federal
forum
for
transitory
founding
jurisdiction
on
a
violation
of
the
jus
cogens
norm
prohibiting
official
torts
(a
tort
action
which
follows
the
tortfeasor
wherever
he
goes),
see
torture.
Filartiga,
630
F.2d
at
885
(tracing
transitory
tort
doctrine
to
1774
decision
of
Lord
Mansfield),
whenever
such
actions
implicate
the
foreign
relations
of
the
Marcos-‐Manotoc
finally
argues
that
the
district
court's
interpretation
of
§
1350
United
States.
See
Banco
Nacional
de
Cuba
v.
Sabbatino,
376
U.S.
398,
427
n.
would
open
the
floodgates
to
"foreign"
cases
in
the
federal
courts.
She
also
25,
84
S.Ct.
923,
940
n.
25,
11
L.Ed.2d
804
(1964)
(citing
§
1350
as
example
of
suggests
that,
contrary
to
the
original
purpose
behind
§
1350,
to
permit
cases
congressional
intent
to
make
claims
implicating
foreign
affairs
cognizable
in
of
this
sort
would
invite,
rather
than
avoid,
controversy
with
foreign
nations.
federal
courts);
("As
best
we
can
tell,
the
aim
of
section
1350
was
to
place
in
We
do
not
share
these
concerns
in
this
case.
As
Siderman
makes
clear,
the
federal
court
actions
potentially
implicating
foreign
affairs.
The
intent
was
not
prohibition
against
official
torture
occupies
a
uniquely
high
status
among
to
provide
a
forum
that
otherwise
would
not
exist
...
but
to
provide
an
norms
of
international
law.
The
Philippine
government
has
no
objection
to
a
alternative
forum
to
state
courts.").
The
district
court's
approach
also
allows
United
States
District
Court's
entertaining
Trajano's
claim,
so
there
can
be
no
the
"law
of
nations"
and
"treaty"
prongs
of
§
1350
to
be
treated
consistently,
in
unwarranted
interference
with
its
domestic
affairs.
that
the
cause
of
action
comes
from
municipal
tort
law
and
not
from
the
law
of
nations
or
treaties
of
the
United
States.
This
avoids
the
anomalous
result
which
For
these
reasons,
subject-‐matter
jurisdiction
was
not
inappropriately
troubled
Judge
Bork
in
Tel-‐Oren,
that
whereas
Filartiga
found
a
private
right
of
exercised
under
§
1350
even
though
the
actions
of
Marcos-‐Manotoc
which
action
by
implying
it
from
principles
of
international
law,
no
private
cause
of
caused
a
fellow
citizen
to
be
the
victim
of
official
torture
and
murder
occurred
action
can
ever
be
implied
from
a
non-‐self-‐executing
treaty.
outside
of
the
United
States.
For
these
reasons
we
affirm
the
judgment
in
Trajano's
favor.
Her
suit
as
an
At
most,
Marcos-‐Manotoc
argues,
the
district
court
had
jurisdiction
under
§
alien
against
Marcos-‐Manotoc
for
having
caused
the
wrongful
death
of
her
son,
1350
to
determine
whether
Trajano
had
a
separate,
substantive
cause
of
by
official
torture
in
violation
of
a
jus
cogens
norm
of
international
law,
action;
none
exists,
she
contends,
because
neither
the
treaties
set
out
in
the
properly
invokes
the
subject-‐matter
jurisdiction
of
the
federal
courts
under
§
complaint
nor
the
law
of
nations
provides
a
private
cause
of
action.
Thus,
to
1350.
the
extent
the
court's
decision
relies
upon
either
treaties
or
international
law,
Marcos-‐Manotoc
submits
it
is
erroneous.
107.
SS
LOTUS
CASE
P.C.I.J.
SER.
A,
NO.
10,
P.
4
(1927)
The
district
court
in
fact
agreed
with
Marcos-‐Manotoc
that
§
1350
is
simply
a
jurisdictional
statute
and
creates
no
cause
of
action
itself.
It
proceeded
to
OCCURENCES
IN
HIGH
SEAS
determine
damages
on
default
under
Philippine
law.
From
this
we
assume
that
the
court
did
not
rely
on
treaties
or
international
law
to
provide
the
cause
of
PREVAILING
DOCTRINE:
Only
the
flag
state
or
the
state
of
which
the
alleged
action,
only
to
establish
federal
jurisdiction.
Indeed,
the
complaint
alleges
that
offender
was
a
national
had
jurisdiction
over
sailors
regarding
incidents
Trajano's
claims
arise
under
wrongful
death
statutes,
as
well
as
international
occurring
in
high
seas.
(High
Seas
Convention)
law.
Since
Marcos-‐Manotoc's
appeal
is
only
to
the
extent
the
district
court
founded
Trajano's
right
to
sue
on
treaties
or
the
law
of
nations,
it
lacks
merit
Kyna’s
Notes:
because
the
tort
is
admitted.
That
it
was
committed
in
violation
of
international
Basic
Ratio
for
the
principle
upheld
in
this
case:
International
law
is
based
on
law
supplies
the
jurisdictional
key
to
federal
court
under
§
1350.
We
cannot
say
the
consent
of
states.
the
district
court
erred.
The
Lotus
principle
or
Lotus
approach,
usually
considered
a
foundation
of
international
law,
says
that
sovereign
states
may
act
in
any
way
they
wish
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so
long
as
they
do
not
contravene
an
explicit
prohibition.
The
application
of
question
is
one
for
which
Turkish
law
prescribes
a
penalty
involving
loss
of
this
principle
–
an
outgrowth
of
the
Lotus
case
–
to
future
incidents
raising
the
freedom
for
a
minimum
period
of
three
years;
"(2)
there
is
no
extradition
issue
of
jurisdiction
over
people
on
the
high
seas
was
changed
by
article
11
of
treaty
or
that
extradition
has
not
been
accepted
either
by
the
government
of
the
1958
High
Seas
Convention.
The
convention,
held
in
Geneva,
laid
emphasis
the
locality
where
the
guilty
person
has
committed
the
offence
or
by
the
on
the
fact
that
only
the
flag
state
or
the
state
of
which
the
alleged
offender
government
of
his
own
country."
was
a
national
had
jurisdiction
over
sailors
regarding
incidents
occurring
in
high
seas.
The
French
government
protested
the
arrest
and
the
conviction
and
requested
The
principle
has
also
been
used
in
arguments
against
the
reasons
of
that
the
case
be
transferred
to
a
French
court.
Turkey
proposed,
and
France
the
United
States
of
America,
for
opposing
the
existence
of
the
International
agreed,
to
pose
the
following
question
to
the
Permanent
Court
of
International
Criminal
Court
(ICC).
Justice
(PCIJ):
“(1)
Has
Turkey…
acted
in
conflict
with
the
principles
of
international
law—and
if
so,
what
principles—by
instituting…
criminal
proceedings
in
pursuance
of
Turkish
law
against
M.
Demons…?”
FACTS:
On
August
2,
1926,
the
S.S.
Lotus,
a
French
steamship,
collided
on
the
high
seas
The
French
government
invoked
the
1923
Convention
of
Lausanne
in
arguing
with
the
Boz-‐Kourt,
a
Turkish
collier.
The
Boz-‐Kourt
split
in
two
and
sank,
and
against
Turkish
jurisdiction.
Article
15
of
the
Convention
indicated
that
“all
eight
of
its
crew
members
were
killed.
The
Lotus
remained
to
assist
the
questions
of
jurisdiction
shall,
as
between
Turkey
and
the
other
contracting
survivors
of
the
Boz-‐Kourt,
including
its
captain,
Hassan
Bey,
and
then
Powers,
be
decided
in
accordance
with
the
principles
of
international
law.”
continued
with
the
survivors
to
Constantinople.
Turkish
authorities
France
maintained
that
such
principles
precluded
criminal
jurisdiction
in
this
subsequently
requested
that
Lieutenant
Demons,
the
officer
of
the
watch
on
case.
The
Court,
somewhat
significantly,
condensed
the
positions
of
the
parties
board
the
Lotus
when
the
collision
occurred,
to
come
ashore
to
give
evidence.
in
the
following
way—Turkish
Courts,
in
order
to
have
jurisdiction,
should
be
At
the
conclusion
of
the
questioning,
Turkish
authorities
placed
Demons
and
able
to
point
to
some
title
to
jurisdiction
recognized
by
international
law
in
Hassan
Bey
under
arrest
pending
trial
on
charges
of
manslaughter.
At
trial,
favor
of
Turkey.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Turkish
Government
takes
the
view
Demons
argued
that
the
Turkish
court
lacked
jurisdiction,
but
the
court
that
Article
15
allows
Turkey
jurisdiction
whenever
such
jurisdiction
does
not
convicted
both
Demons
and
Hassan
Bey,
sentencing
each
to
a
term
of
come
into
conflict
with
a
principle
of
international
law.
imprisonment.
The
decision
was
based
on
Article
6
of
the
Turkish
Penal
Code,
Law
No.
765,
which
runs
as
follows:
ISSUE:
Whether
international
law
is
essentially
permissive
or
prohibitive
[Translation]
"Any
foreigner
who,
apart
from
the
cases
contemplated
by
Article
whether
criminal
jurisdiction
does
or
does
not
exist
in
this
case.
whether
or
not
4,
commits
an
offence
abroad
to
the
prejudice
of
Turkey
or
of
a
Turkish
subject,
the
principles
of
international
law
prevent
Turkey
from
instituting
criminal
for
which
offence
Turkish
law
prescribes
a
penalty
involving
loss
of
freedom
for
proceedings
against
Lieutenant
Demons
under
Turkish
law.
a
[p15]
minimum
period
of
not
less
than
one
year,
shall
be
punished
in
accordance
with
the
Turkish
Penal
Code
provided
that
he
is
arrested
in
Turkey.
HELD:
The
penalty
shall
however
be
reduced
by
one
third
and
instead
of
the
death
Turkey,
by
instituting
criminal
proceedings
against
Demons,
did
not
violate
penalty,
twenty
years
of
penal
servitude
shall
be
awarded.
"Nevertheless,
in
international
law.
such
cases,
the
prosecution
will
only
be
instituted
at
the
request
of
the
Minister
of
Justice
or
on
the
complaint
of
the
injured
Party.
"If
the
offence
Relevant
Findings
of
the
Court:
committed
injures
another
foreigner,
the
guilty
person
shall
be
punished
at
the
Establishing
Jurisdiction:
Does
Turkey
need
to
support
its
assertion
of
request
of
the
Minister
of
Justice,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
set
out
in
jurisdiction
using
an
existing
rule
of
international
law
or
is
the
mere
absence
of
the
first
paragraph
of
this
article,
provided
however
that:
"(1)
the
article
in
a
prohibition
preventing
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction
enough?
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The
first
principle
of
the
Lotus
case
said
that
jurisdiction
is
territorial:
A
State
cases
result
in
paralysing
the
action
of
the
courts,
owing
to
the
impossibility
of
cannot
exercise
its
jurisdiction
outside
its
territory
unless
an
international
citing
a
universally
accepted
rule
on
which
to
support
the
exercise
of
their
treaty
or
customary
law
permits
it
to
do
so.
This
is
what
we
called
the
first
[States’]
jurisdiction”
(para
48).
Lotus
Principle.
The
PCIJ
based
this
finding
on
the
sovereign
will
of
States.
“Now
the
first
and
foremost
restriction
imposed
by
international
law
upon
a
State
is
that
–
failing
the
existence
of
a
permissive
rule
to
the
contrary
–
it
may
“International
law
governs
relations
between
independent
States.
The
rules
of
not
exercise
its
power
in
any
form
in
the
territory
of
another
State.
In
this
sense
law
binding
upon
States
therefor
emanate
from
their
own
free
will
as
jurisdiction
is
certainly
territorial;
it
cannot
be
exercised
by
a
State
outside
its
expressed
in
conventions
or
by
usages
generally
accepted
as
expressing
territory
except
by
virtue
of
a
permissive
rule
derived
from
international
principles
of
law
and
established
in
order
to
regulate
the
relations
between
custom
or
from
a
convention.”
(para
45)
these
co-‐existing
independent
communities
or
with
a
view
to
the
achievement
of
common
aims.
Restrictions
upon
the
independence
of
States
cannot
The
second
principle
of
the
Lotus
case:
Within
its
territory,
a
State
may
therefore
be
presumed”
exercise
its
jurisdiction,
on
any
matter,
even
if
there
is
no
specific
rule
of
international
law
permitting
it
to
do
so.
In
these
instances,
States
have
a
wide
[NB:
This
was
one
of
the
more
debated
aspects
of
the
judgement.
Some
argued
measure
of
discretion,
which
is
only
limited
by
the
prohibitive
rules
of
that
the
Court
placed
too
much
emphasis
on
sovereignty
and
consent
of
States
international
law.
(i.e.
took
a
strong
positivist
view)].
“It
does
not,
however,
follow
that
international
law
prohibits
a
State
from
Criminal
Jurisdiction:
Territorial
Jurisdiction
exercising
jurisdiction
in
its
own
territory,
in
respect
of
any
case
which
relates
France
alleged
that
the
flag
State
of
a
vessel
would
have
exclusive
jurisdiction
to
acts
which
have
taken
place
abroad,
and
in
which
it
cannot
rely
on
some
over
offences
committed
on
board
the
ship
in
high
seas.
The
PCIJ
disagreed.
It
permissive
rule
of
international
law.
Such
a
view
would
only
be
tenable
if
held
that
France,
as
the
flag
State,
did
not
enjoy
exclusive
territorial
jurisdiction
international
law
contained
a
general
prohibition
to
States
to
extend
the
in
the
high
seas
in
respect
of
a
collision
with
a
vessel
carrying
the
flag
of
application
of
their
laws
and
the
jurisdiction
of
their
courts
to
persons,
another
State
(paras
71
–
84).
The
Court
held
that
Turkey
and
France
both
have
property
and
acts
outside
their
territory,
and
if,
as
an
exception
to
this
general
jurisdiction
in
respect
of
the
whole
incident:
i.e.
there
is
concurrent
jurisdiction.
prohibition,
it
allowed
States
to
do
so
in
certain
specific
cases.
But
this
is
The
PCIJ
held
that
a
ship
in
the
high
seas
is
assimilated
to
the
territory
of
the
certainly
not
the
case
under
international
law
as
it
stands
at
present.
Far
from
flag
State.
This
State
may
exercise
its
jurisdiction
over
the
ship,
in
the
same
way
laying
down
a
general
prohibition
to
the
effect
that
States
may
not
extend
the
as
it
exercises
its
jurisdiction
over
its
land,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
other
States.
In
application
of
their
laws
and
the
jurisdiction
of
their
courts
to
persons,
this
case,
the
Court
equated
the
Turkish
vessel
to
Turkish
territory.
In
this
case,
property
and
acts
outside
their
territory,
it
leaves
them
in
this
respect
a
wide
the
PCIJ
held
that
the
“…
offence
produced
its
effects
on
the
Turkish
vessel
and
measure
of
discretion,
which
is
only
limited
in
certain
cases
by
prohibitive
consequently
in
a
place
assimilated
to
Turkish
territory
in
which
the
application
rules;
as
regards
other
cases,
every
State
remains
free
to
adopt
the
principles
of
Turkish
criminal
law
cannot
be
challenged,
even
in
regard
to
offences
which
it
regards
as
best
and
most
suitable.
This
discretion
left
to
States
by
committed
there
by
foreigners.”
Turkey
had
jurisdiction
over
this
case.
international
law
explains
the
great
variety
of
rules
which
they
have
been
able
to
adopt
without
objections
or
complaints
on
the
part
of
other
States
…In
these
“If,
therefore,
a
guilty
act
committed
on
the
high
seas
produces
its
effects
on
a
circumstances
all
that
can
be
required
of
a
State
is
that
it
should
not
overstep
vessel
flying
another
flag
or
in
foreign
territory,
the
same
principles
must
the
limits
which
international
law
places
upon
its
jurisdiction;
within
these
be
applied
as
if
the
territories
of
two
different
States
were
concerned,
and
the
limits,
its
title
to
exercise
jurisdiction
rests
in
its
sovereignty.”
(paras
46
and
47)
conclusion
must
therefore
be
drawn
that
there
is
no
rule
of
international
law
This
applied
to
civil
and
criminal
cases.
If
the
existence
of
a
specific
rule
was
a
prohibiting
the
State
to
which
the
ship
on
which
the
effects
of
the
offence
have
pre-‐requisite
to
exercise
jurisdiction,
PCIJ
argued,
then
“it
would…in
many
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taken
place
belongs,
from
regarding
the
offence
as
having
been
committed
in
XIII.
RECOGNITION
AND
ENFORCEMENT
OF
FOREIGN
its
territory
and
prosecuting,
accordingly,
the
delinquent.”
JUDGMENT
AND
FOREIGN
ARBITRAL
AWARDS
The
Lotus
Case
was
also
significant
in
that
the
PCIJ
said
that
a
State
would
have
territorial
jurisdiction,
even
if
the
crime
was
committed
outside
its
territory,
so
THE
LEX
FORI
ALWAYS
GOVERNS
RECOGNITION
AND
ENFORCEMENT.
long
as
a
constitutive
element
of
the
crime
was
committed
in
that
State.
Today,
we
call
this
subjective
territorial
jurisdiction.
In
order
for
subjective
territorial
RECOGNITION
jurisdiction
to
be
established,
one
must
prove
that
the
element
of
the
crime
Foreign
judgment
is
given
the
same
effect
that
it
has
in
the
state
and
the
actual
crime
are
entirely
inseparable;
i.e.,
if
the
constituent
element
where
it
was
rendered
with
respect
to
parties,
the
subject
matter,
and
was
absent
–
the
crime
would
not
have
happened.
the
issues
involved.
Extension
to
another
state
of
the
res
judicata
effect
of
a
judgment.
“The
offence
for
which
Lieutenant
Demons
appears
to
have
been
prosecuted
was
an
act
–
of
negligence
or
imprudence
–
having
its
origin
on
ENFOCRMENT
board
the
Lotus,
whilst
its
effects
made
themselves
felt
on
board
the
Boz-‐
Firstly,
implies
the
recognition
of
a
foreign
judgment.
Kourt.
These
two
elements
are,
legally,
entirely
inseparable,
so
much
so
that
In
addition,
affirmative
relief
is
given
to
a
party
entitled
to
it
because
of
their
separation
renders
the
offence
non-‐existent…
It
is
only
natural
that
each
the
foreign
judgment
should
be
able
to
exercise
jurisdiction
and
to
do
so
in
respect
of
the
incident
as
a
whole.
It
is
therefore
a
case
of
concurrent
jurisdiction.”
PHILIPPINES
Customary
International
Law
RULE
39,
SEC.
48
The
Lotus
case
gives
an
important
dictum
on
creating
customary
international
FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
IN
REM
law.
France
alleged
that
jurisdictional
questions
on
collision
cases
are
rarely
(Affects
the
personal
status,
Subject
is
property
within
the
Philippines,
heard
in
criminal
cases
because
States
tend
to
prosecute
only
before
the
flag
Relief
demanded
is
for
excluding
a
party
from
any
interest
in
the
State.
France
argued
that
this
absence
of
prosecutions
points
to
a
positive
rule
property)
in
customary
law
on
collisions.The
Court
held
that
this
“…would
merely
show
=CONCLUSIVE
UPON
THE
TITLE
TO
THE
THING
that
States
had
often,
in
practice,
abstained
from
instituting
criminal
proceedings,
and
not
that
they
recognized
themselves
as
being
obliged
to
do
so;
FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
IN
PERSONAM
for
only
if
such
abstention
were
based
on
their
being
conscious
of
having
a
duty
(Where
the
complaint
does
not
involve
the
personal
status
of
the
to
abstain
would
it
be
possible
to
speak
of
an
international
custom.
The
alleged
plaintiff
or
any
property
in
the
Philippines)
fact
does
not
allow
one
to
infer
that
States
have
been
conscious
of
having
such
PRESUMPTIVE
EVIDENCE
OF
A
RIGHT
AS
BETWEEN
THE
PARTIES
AND
a
duty;
on
the
other
hand,
as
will
presently
be
seen,
there
are
other
THEIR
=SUCCESSORS
IN
INTEREST
BY
SUBSEQUENT
TITLE
circumstances
calculated
to
show
that
the
contrary
is
true.”
In
other
words,
opinio
juris
is
reflected
in
acts
of
States
(Nicaragua
Case)
or
in
omissions
(Lotus
However,
such
foreign
judgments
may
be
repelled/impeached
by
evidence
of:
case)
in
so
far
as
those
acts
or
omissions
are
done
following
a
belief
that
the
[JUN
COFC]
said
State
is
obligated
by
law
to
act
or
refrain
from
acting
in
a
particular
way.
Want
of
Jurisdiction
of
the
court
Want
of
notice
to
the
party
Collusion
Fraud
Clear
mistake
of
fact
or
law
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If
no
right
or
title
adjudged,
no
occasion
for
recognition
or
Res
Judicata
enforcement
A
rule
that
judgment
on
the
merits
by
a
court
having
jurisdiction
is
Demurrer
or
prescription
doesn’t
allow
r&e
conclusive
between
the
parties
to
a
suit
as
to
all
matters
that
were
1. Final
judgment
litigated
or
that
could
have
been
litigated
in
that
suit
Provisional
or
interlocutory
decrees
are
not
recognized
or
enforced
2. Fraud
The
elements
of
res
judicata
are
as
follows:
Extrinsic
–
fraud
based
on
facts
not
controverted
or
resolved
in
the
the
former
judgment
or
order
must
be
final
case
where
judgment
is
rendered,
or
that
which
would
go
to
the
the
judgment
or
order
must
be
on
the
merits
jurisdiction
of
the
court
or
would
deprive
the
party
against
whom
it
must
have
been
rendered
by
a
court
having
jurisdiction
over
judgment
is
rendered
a
chance
to
defend
the
action
to
which
he
has
the
subject
matter
and
the
parties
meritorious
defense
there
must
be,
between
the
first
and
the
second
action,
3. Clear
mistake
of
law
identity
of
parties,
of
subject
matter
and
cause
of
action
Some
authors
does
not
consider
this
as
a
defense
since
there’s
nothing
to
show
that
the
forum
court
will
apply
the
law
better
than
the
foreign
Policy
of
Preclusion
court
Judgments
should
be
enforced
unless
there
are
reasons
for
denying
the
But
this
ground,
as
a
defense,
is
clearly
found
in
our
laws
so
we
have
to
enforcement
(JUN
COFC)
follow
it
4. Contrary
to
public
policy
Rationale
Should
only
be
used
under
exceptional
circumstances
protect
party
expectations
resulting
from
previous
litigation
Usually
intertwined
with
the
violation
of
some
law
to
safeguard
against
the
harassment
of
defendants
5. No
court
available
in
the
forum
to
insure
that
the
task
of
courts
not
be
increased
by
never-‐ending
6. Penal
judgments
and
penalties
litigation
of
the
same
disputes
Judgment
has
to
be
on
civil
or
commercial
matters
only
to
promote
the
goal
of
all
law:
“rest
and
quietness.”
Judgment
on
collection
of
taxes
and
administrative
proceedings
are
also
not
allowed
DEFENSES:
J4UN
COF2C
-‐
PNPO
Test
of
penalties:
where
it
appears,
to
the
tribunal
which
is
called
upon
to
enforce
it,
to
be,
in
its
essential
character
and
effect,
a
punishment
1.
Want
of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
an
offense
against
the
public,
or
a
grant
of
a
civil
right
to
a
private
The
foreign
tribunal
must
have
had
jurisdiction
according
to
the
law
of
person
the
forum
state
(so
if
enforcing
US
judgment,
the
American
court
must
7. Other
defenses
have
had
jurisdiction
according
to
the
phil
law?)
The
form
state
should
only
be
involved
in
enforcing
or
recognizing
the
2.
Want
of
jurisdiction
over
the
person
right/title,
not
fixing
the
amount
thereof
Due
process
must
be
followed:
Valid
notice
and
Opportunity
to
be
The
judgment
must
be
for
a
sum
certain
heard
Court
has
to
be
an
impartial
tribunal
3.
The
action
must
be
a
judicial
or
quasi-‐judicial
action
Includes
arbitration
awards
because
1.
Voluntarily
submitted
to
by
the
parties
and
2.
Enforceable
under
the
concept
of
res
judicata
(they
end
litigations)
4.
Judgments
on
the
merits
Sec.
39
=
evidence
of
a
right
or
title
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4. the
award
deals
with
an
issue
not
contemplated
by
or
not
falling
within
the
ARBITRATION
terms
of
the
submission
to
arbitration,
or
contains
matters
beyond
the
scope
of
the
arbitration
(subject
to
the
proviso
that
an
award
which
1958
Convention
on
the
Recognition
and
Enforcement
of
Foreign
Arbitral
contains
decisions
on
such
matters
may
be
enforced
to
the
extent
that
it
Awards
(The
New
York
Convention)
contains
decisions
on
matters
submitted
to
arbitration
which
can
be
separated
from
those
matters
not
so
submitted);
Widely
considered
the
foundational
instrument
for
international
arbitration,
it
5. the
composition
of
the
arbitral
tribunal
was
not
in
accordance
with
the
applies
to
the
recognition
and
enforcement
of
arbitral
awards
made
in
the
agreement
of
the
parties
or,
failing
such
agreement,
with
the
law
of
the
territory
of
a
State
other
than
the
State
where
the
recognition
and
enforcement
place
where
the
hearing
took
place
(the
"lex
loci
arbitri");
of
such
awards
are
sought,
and
arising
out
of
differences
between
persons,
6. the
award
has
not
yet
become
binding
upon
the
parties,
or
has
been
set
whether
physical
or
legal.
It
also
applies
to
arbitrations
which
are
not
aside
or
suspended
by
a
competent
authority,
either
in
the
country
where
considered
as
domestic
awards
in
the
state
where
recognition
and
enforcement
the
arbitration
took
place,
or
pursuant
to
the
law
of
the
arbitration
is
sought.
Though
other
international
conventions
apply
to
the
cross-‐border
agreement;
enforcement
of
arbitration
awards,
the
New
York
Convention
is
by
far
the
most
7. the
subject
matter
of
the
award
was
not
capable
of
resolution
by
important.
arbitration;
or
8. enforcement
would
be
contrary
to
"public
policy".
OBJECTIVE
PRINCIPAL:
Foreign
and
non-‐domestic
arbitral
awards
will
not
be
THREE
TYPES
OF
RESERVATIONS:
discriminated
against
and
it
obliges
Parties
to
ensure
such
awards
are
8. Conventional
Reservation
-‐
some
countries
only
enforce
arbitration
awards
recognized
and
generally
capable
of
enforcement
in
their
jurisdiction
issued
in
a
Convention
member
state
in
the
same
way
as
domestic
awards.
9. Commercial
Reservation
–
some
countries
only
enforce
arbitration
awards
ANCILLARY:
To
require
courts
of
Parties
to
give
full
effect
to
arbitration
that
are
related
to
commercial
transactions
agreements
by
requiring
courts
to
deny
the
parties
access
to
court
in
10. Reciprocity
Reservation
–
some
countries
limit
application
to
awards
from
contravention
of
their
agreement
to
refer
the
matter
to
an
arbitral
non-‐contracting
states
such
that
they
will
only
apply
it
to
the
extent
to
tribunal.
which
such
a
non-‐contracting
state
grants
reciprocal
treatment.
“Arbitral
awards"
shall
include
not
only
awards
made
by
arbitrators
appointed
Process
of
obtaining
recognition
or
award:
for
each
case
but
also
those
made
by
permanent
arbitral
bodies
to
which
the
The
party
applying
for
recognition
and
enforcement
shall,
at
the
time
of
the
parties
have
submitted.
application,
supply:
(a)
The
duly
authenticated
original
award
or
a
duly
certified
copy
GR:
Under
the
Convention,
an
arbitration
award
issued
in
any
other
state
can
thereof;
generally
be
freely
enforced
in
any
other
contracting
state,
only
subject
to
b)
The
original
agreement
referred
to
in
article
11
or
a
duly
certified
certain,
limited
defenses.
copy
thereof.
EXCS:
These
defenses
are:
[IVAN
TRIP]
1. a
party
to
the
arbitration
agreement
was,
under
the
law
applicable
to
him,
Republic
Act
No.
9285
|
April
2,
2004
under
some
incapacity;
ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
ACT
OF
2004
2. the
arbitration
agreement
was
not
valid
under
its
governing
law;
ARTS.
42-‐48
3. a
party
was
not
given
proper
notice
of
the
appointment
of
the
arbitrator
or
of
the
arbitration
proceedings,
or
was
otherwise
unable
to
present
its
case;
APPLICATION
OF
THE
NY
CONVENTION
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
187
ATTY.
ARIS
L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
The
New
York
Convention
shall
govern
the
recognition
and
The
losing
party
who
appeals
from
the
judgment
of
the
court
enforcement
of
arbitral
awards
covered
by
the
said
Convention.
confirming
an
arbitral
award
shall
be
required
by
the
appellant
court
The
recognition
and
enforcement
of
such
arbitral
awards
shall
be
filled
to
post
counterbond
executed
in
favor
of
the
prevailing
party
equal
to
with
regional
trial
court
in
accordance
with
the
rules
of
procedure
to
the
amount
of
the
award
in
accordance
with
the
rules
to
be
be
promulgated
by
the
Supreme
Court.
promulgated
by
the
Supreme
Court.
APPLICANT
SHALL:
[TAPS]
VENUE
AND
JURISDICTION
1. File
with
the
court
the
original
or
authenticated
copy
of
the
award
Deemed
as
special
proceedings
and
shall
be
filled
with
the
RTC
(i)
and
arbitration
agreement
where
arbitration
proceedings
are
conducted;
(ii)
where
the
asset
to
be
2. If
the
award
or
agreement
is
not
made
in
any
of
the
official
attached
or
levied
upon,
or
the
act
to
be
enjoined
is
located;
(iii)
where
languages,
the
party
shall
supply
a
duly
certified
translation
any
of
the
parties
to
the
dispute
resides
or
has
his
place
of
business;
or
thereof
into
any
of
such
languages.
(iv)
in
the
National
Judicial
Capital
Region,
at
the
option
of
the
3. Establish
that
the
country
in
which
foreign
arbitration
award
was
applicant.
made
is
a
party
to
the
New
York
Convention.
4. Provide
appropriate
security
if
the
RTC
considers
it
proper
NOTICE
The
Court
shall
send
notice
to
the
parties
at
their
address
of
record
in
the
arbitration,
or
if
any
party
cannot
be
served
notice
at
such
address,
NOT
COVERED
BY
THE
CONVENTION
at
such
party's
last
known
address.
The
notice
shall
be
sent
at
least
The
recognition
and
enforcement
of
foreign
arbitral
awards
not
fifteen
(15)
days
before
the
date
set
for
the
initial
hearing
of
the
covered
by
the
New
York
Convention
shall
be
done
in
accordance
with
application.
procedural
rules
to
be
promulgated
by
the
Supreme
Court.
The
Court
may,
on
grounds
of
comity
and
reciprocity,
recognize
and
enforce
a
99.
COMPAGNIE
DE
COMMERCE
V.
HAMBURG
AMERIKA
non-‐convention
award
as
a
convention
award.
G.R.
No.
L-‐10986
|
March
31,
1917
NOT
FOREIGN
JUDGMENT
EVEN
IF
Notwithstanding
the
fact
that
the
contract
was
executed
in
England,
in
the
1. Confirmed
by
a
court
of
a
foreign
country
absence
of
averment
and
proof
that
under
the
law
of
England
compliance
with,
2. Confirmed
by
the
RTC
or
an
offer
to
comply
with
such
a
stipulation
constitutes
a
condition
precedent
to
the
institution
of
judicial
proceeding
for
the
enforcement
of
the
contract.
REJECTION
A
party
to
a
foreign
arbitration
proceeding
may
oppose
an
application
N.B.:
for
recognition
and
enforcement
of
the
arbitral
award
in
accordance
Ruling
in
this
case
is
no
longer
true
because
of
the
New
York
Convention
and
with
the
procedural
rules
to
be
promulgated
by
the
Supreme
Court
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution
Act.
As
a
general
rule,
Philippine
courts
are
only
on
those
grounds
enumerated
under
Article
V
[IVAN
TRIP]
of
the
obliged
to
recognize
and
enforce
foreign
arbitral
agreements
and
awards
only
New
York
Convention.
Any
other
ground
raised
shall
be
disregarded
by
subject
to
certain,
limited
defenses.
[IVAN
TRIP]
the
regional
trial
court.
FACTS:
APPEAL
TO
THE
CA
HAMBURG
(German)
owned
a
steamship
named
SAMBIA,
which
proceeded
to
A
decision
of
the
RTC
confirming,
vacating,
setting
aside,
modifying
or
the
port
of
Saigon
and
was
taking
the
cargo
belonging
to
COMPAGNIE.
correcting
an
arbitral
award
may
be
appealed
to
the
CA
in
accordance
Apparently,
there
were
rumors
of
impending
war
between
Germany
and
with
the
rules
of
procedure
to
be
promulgated
by
the
SC.
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
188
ATTY.
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L.
GULAPA
AY
2015-‐2016
France
and
other
nations
of
Europe.
The
master
of
the
steamship
was
told
to
of
the
provision
in
the
charter
party
for
the
settlement
of
disputes
by
a
take
refuge
at
a
neutral
port
(because
Saigon
was
a
French
port).
So,
to
stop
reference
to
arbitration
in
London
that,
COMPAGNIE
asked
for
compulsory
detention
of
his
vessel
to
prevent
its
property
from
leaving
Saigon.
However,
the
Governor
of
Saigon
refused
to
HELD:
issue
an
order
because
he
had
not
been
officially
notified
of
the
declaration
of
No.
This
objection
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
appears
for
the
first
time
in
the
war.
defendant's
brief
on
appeal.
In
the
court
below
defendant
not
only
appeared
and
answered
without
objecting
to
the
court's
jurisdiction,
but
sought
The
steamship
sailed
from
Saigon,
and
was
bound
for
Manila,
because
it
was
affirmative
relief;
and
it
is
very
clear
that
defendant
cannot
be
permitted
to
issued
a
bill
of
health
by
the
US
consul
in
Saigon.
The
steamship
stayed
submit
the
issues
raised
by
the
pleadings
for
adjudication,
without
objection,
continuously
in
Manila
and
where
it
contends
it
will
be
compelled
to
stay
until
and
then,
when
unsuccessful,
assail
the
court's
jurisdiction
in
reliance
upon
a
the
war
ceases.
No
attempt
on
the
part
of
the
defendants
to
transfer
and
stipulation
in
the
charter
party
which
the
parties
were
at
entire
liberty
to
waive
deliver
the
cargo
to
the
destinations
as
stipulated
in
the
charter
party.
That
if
they
so
desired.
We
do
not
stop
therefore
to
rule
upon
the
contention
of
BEHN,
MEYER
and
COMPANY
(agent
of
HAMBURG
in
manila)
offered
to
opposing
counsel,
that
a
contractual
stipulation,
for
a
general
arbitration
purchase
the
cargo
from
COMPAGNIE,
but
the
latter
never
received
the
cable
cannot
be
invoked
to
oust
our
courts
of
their
jurisdiction,
under
the
doctrine
messages
so
they
never
answered.
announced
in
the
cases
of
Wahl
and
Wahl
v.
Donaldson,
Sims
&
Co.,
and
Cordoba
vs.
Conde;
and
that
this
doctrine
should
be
applied
in
the
case
at
When
a
survey
was
done
on
the
ship,
it
was
found
that
the
cargo
was
“weevily
bar,
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
the
contract
was
executed
in
England,
in
and
heating”
(sic),
so
BEHN
asked
for
court
authority
to
sell
the
cargo
and
the
the
absence
of
averment
and
proof
that
under
the
law
of
England
compliance
balance
to
be
dumped
at
sea.
The
proceeds
of
the
sale
were
deposited
in
the
with,
or
an
offer
to
comply
with
such
a
stipulation
constitutes
a
condition
court,
waiting
for
orders
as
to
what
to
do
with
it.
precedent
to
the
institution
of
judicial
proceeding
for
the
enforcement
of
the
contract.
BEHN
wrote
COMPAGNIE
again
informing
the
latter
of
the
disposition
which
it
made
upon
the
cargo.
COMPAGNIE
answered
that
it
was
still
waiting
for
orders
as
to
what
to
do.
COMPAGNIE
of
course
wanted
all
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
to
be
given
to
them
(damages
for
the
defendants’
failure
to
deliver
the
cargo
to
the
destinations
Dunkirk
and
Hamburg),
while
defendants
contend
that
they
have
a
lien
on
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
(amount
due
to
them
because
of
the
upkeep
and
maintenance
of
the
ship
crew
and
for
commissions
for
the
sale
of
the
cargo).
The
trial
court
ruled
in
favor
of
the
plaintiffs.
On
appeal,
the
defendants
made
the
ff:
assignments
on
appeal
(that
the
court
had
no
jurisdiction,
that
the
fear
of
capture
was
not
force
majeure,
that
the
court
erred
in
concluding
that
defendant
is
liable
for
damages
for
non-‐delivery
of
cargo,
and
the
value
of
the
award
of
damages).
On
appeal,
the
plaintiffs
also
contended
that
the
court
erred
in
not
giving
the
full
value
of
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether
court
below
was
without
jurisdiction
of
the
subject-‐matter
by
reason
CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
AV
DE
TORRES
189
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AY
2015-‐2016