G.R. No.
L-57438 January 3, 1984 On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco filed
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner.
Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and
resolution of the defunct Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
dated April 27, 1981. and June 26, 1981. respectively, dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172
entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus Judge Jesus R. De Vega and Pelagio
Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner Feliciano Francisco
challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting execution pending
appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing respondent herein, Pelagio
Francisco, in his instead.
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
showed that:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania
San Pedro in Special Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On August
30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin
of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of
the incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and
for the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco.
Among other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the
guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to
render an accounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting
but failed to submit an inventory, for which reason the court on March
20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days within which to do so,
otherwise he would be removed from guardianship Petitioner
thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondent Pelagio
Francisco filed an objection on the ground that petitioner actually
received P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not
P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in
his inventory. The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and,
in his order of April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered
his finding, relying on the deed of sale as the best evidence of the
price paid for the sale of the land. in his order dated September 12,
1980, respondent judge acknowledged that his finding was "rather
harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian." Nevertheless,
respondent Judge ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground
of old age. The order states in part as follows:
"... considering the rather advanced age of the present
guardian, this Court is inclined and so decrees, that he
should nevertheless be, as he is hereby, retired to take
effect upon the appointment by this court and the
assumption of office of his replacement, who shall be
taken from the recommendees of the parties herein. For
this purpose, the present guardian is hereby given twenty
(20) days from receipt of a copy of this order within which
to submit his proposal for a replacement for himself and
to comment on petitioner's recommendee and the latter a
like period within which to comment on the present
guardian's proposed substitute, after which the matter will
be deemed submitted for resolution and final action by the
court.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was
only 72 years of age and still fit to continue with the management of
the estate of his ward as he had done with zeal for the past twelve
years. In an order dated November 13, 1980 the court denied his
motion. Accordingly, on December 17, 1980, petiti/ner filed a notice of
appeal 'from the order issued by the court on November 13, 1980'
and paid the appeal bond. On February 2, 1981 he filed the record on
appeal. 1
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of private respondent,
required petitioner to submit within three days his nomination for guardian of
Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of September 12, 1980. In issuing
the order, the court stated that 'an indefinite discontinuance in office would defeat
the intent and purpose of the said order of September 12, 1980 relieving the
present guardian.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. (referring
to CA-G.R. No. SP-1217)"
an "Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain guardian
from exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all properties of
the ward; and (3) appoint new guardian . 2
Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion
claiming that the same was premature. The trial court, however, disregarded the
3
opposition and required petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit within three (3)
days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its order
of September 12, 1980, the court holding that "an indefinite continuance in office
would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of September 12, 1980,
relieving the present guardian." 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, but the trial court
5
overruled the same on March 4, 1981. Subsequently, on March 11, 1981, the 6
court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of the
person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro. 7
On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the
execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years
older than petitioner, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent
portion of its decision reading as follows:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal "upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the case
at bar, the retirement of petitioner was ordered on the ground of old
age. When this ground is considered in relation to the delay of the
petitioner in the making of an accounting and the submission of an
inventory, the order amounts to a finding that petitioner, considering
his "rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing the
estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear that
petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the best interest of
the ward.
It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final.
Considering the time -it normally takes for appeals to be finally
determined as well as the purpose of the order under appeal, which
would be frustrated if it is not immediately executed, we cannot say
that respondent acted with grave and irreparable damage and that
the order of September 12, 1980 is not yet final, petitioner has not
demonstrated that in ordering execution pending appeal, the
respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within the
sound discretion of a court. Appellate courts win not interfere to
discretion, unless it modify control or inquire into the exercise of this
be shown that there has been an abuse of that discretion. (2 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 260 [1979].
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing the
following arguments: that to grant execution pending appeal would render
petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the,
grounds raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court a
quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact
that private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner. 9
The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the court finding it unnecessary to repeat
the discussion of the arguments which it had already considered and only
entertained the argument regarding the competency of the respondent as the
new guardian. On this point, respondent Court ruled:
The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco as
guardian was never assailed in the petition in this case. As already
stated, this case concerns the validity only of the orders of January
27, 1981 and March 4, 1981 which required petitioner to recommend
his own replacement, otherwise the court would appoint a new
guardian. It does not appear that petitioner objected to the
appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground now invoked,
namely, that Francisco is in fact older than petitioner. Nor does it
appear that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
March 11, 1981, calling attention to the fact that respondent
Francisco is older than petitioner, In short, the point now raised does
not appear to have been urged in the lower court so that the latter
could have rectified the error, if it was error at all, For this reason, it is
not proper ground for certiorari before this Court, much less for a
motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of Appeals
has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the removal of petitioner
as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old age is a good
1
ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal; and (b) The Honorable
Court of Appeals committed grave misapprehension and misinterpretation of
facts when it declared that petitioner did not question the appointment of private
respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground that the latter is older than the
former by five (5) years.

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one

person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs.11 A guardianship is designed to
further the ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve
the ward's property, as wen as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care
and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of
one in loco parentis as well. 12

Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and
welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider
the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past
history of a prospective appointee, as wen as the probability of his, being able to
exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which
guardianship will be necessary. 13

A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by

mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as
to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office. 14 A guardian,
once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise
incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an
account or make a return.15

We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for
petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person
and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by
the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old
(petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the trust cannot be
disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support
in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain
petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age
alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to
be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration. 16

Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a

guardian, We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano Francisco
as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate
court.

With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing respondent

Pelagio Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the latter's appeal was
still pending, We hold and rule that respondent appellate court correctly
sustained the propriety of said execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and
compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on
the part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court will not interfere, control or
inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been an abuse
thereof, 18 which We find none herein.

Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the
protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate
execution of the lower court's judgment for the replacement of the first guardian.
We agree with the reason given by the appellate court in sustaining execution
pending appeal that "an indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent
and purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian
(Feliciano Francisco)."

As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco as

the new guardian, We likewise agree with the respondent appellate court in
denying in its resolution of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner questioning the appointment of private
respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also find no abuse of discretion committed by
the appellate court.

The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues
brought before it for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin Servidad,
107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597; Director of Lands
vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and

resolution of the respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

2
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-
appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine
Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those
damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3,
1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board
was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus
voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief
board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated
September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled
thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870.
There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments,
the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon
the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1,
1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed
its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief
fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the
following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still
in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the
persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were
made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine
Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the
Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or
their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette
instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was entered
in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of
the cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of
errors:
1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars
($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so
given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such
sum of money to the Spanish Government of these Islands, within
eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme
Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by the
former government.
2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been
cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present the
exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros.
3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the
Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in its
rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a
national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3,
1863, in these Island.
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109,
passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912, is
unconstitutional.
5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title
for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular Government
against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the
reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to it by
the late Spanish Government of these Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the sum of eighty
thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the
present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal interest thereon
from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was directed to inform the home Government in what manner the
indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board,
the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake might be entitled, in order
to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed
toward the donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February
1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which
reads:
Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.
Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the funds
which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been
exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum of one
thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and
day after tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit of the
establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations
suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your
Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the
funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury
derived form the national subscription for the relief of the distress
caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury
there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board
over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by order of
your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the
Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth: That in the
straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to
avert impending disaster to the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of
that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the
disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to the Monte
de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same
conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the
Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any
reason, either because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to
approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the
application to the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the
subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the
earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of
the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may
have received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the whole
thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from
whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate
upon the security of pawned jewelry. — This is an urgent measure to
save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis and the board of
directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and
that of the other officials who have take part in the transaction.
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:
GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of
directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that
the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all
invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account remaining will
scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for
which reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance
of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that
there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the
funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for
the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said
board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for
any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose it will
procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated
further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled
to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so
beneficient an institution; and in view of the report upon the matter
made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the
fact that the public treasury has on hand a much greater sum from
the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this
general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M.
Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the
proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a
surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a
donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution,
believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors would be faithfully
interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve
distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by
the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the
pernicious effects of usury; and
Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of
the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, and that the great
and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and
laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted, since
the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably
damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep
distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present
juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order
because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from
the late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can
mitigate the effects of such poverty; and
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting
the request herein contained, for the funds in question are sufficiently
secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not
approve the recommendation mentioned, this general Government, in
the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in
conformity with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves
as follows:
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out
of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands obtained from
the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of
1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may require, in
installments of $20,000.
3
 Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of December 3,
bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of
resolution. eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this
Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I
must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said pious
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made
preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole
papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to of the sum which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds.
may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de Piedad of
having to suspend its operations may be averted.
The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite
action taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish Government in
H. M. Government shall be advised hereof. l awphi 1.net

regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.

(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.

By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at
the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February
1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names were published in
the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been
established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right
to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general Government
shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to
such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial status," and
finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have
been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of
claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in
the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall
require, after first consulting the relief board and your general Government and
taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and
those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order that
all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the
earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore
mentioned comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-
General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to
the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the
Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury:
February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000;
June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows:
"To the public Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863,
$80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without
interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it
was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra,"
which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the
Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra"
account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal entry for
January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two
account which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo.
Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of
these institutions, $95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for
information concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the following reply:
MANILA, March 31, 1902.
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of
the Philippine Islands.

SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of
request information from this office as to when and for what purpose
the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order No. 1044 of
the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty
December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained
thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened in connection
losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year
with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that
1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent
might be useful for the report which your office is called upon to
from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules specified in
furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these
the said royal order, one of them being that before making the
Pious Institutions, and which have been consulted for the purpose,
payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to
show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a
money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed
reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which
since they were turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands,
they deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on
were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part
each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said year,
besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and
1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of
another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities.
twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. —
On January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the
(Signed) Emilio Moreta.
fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to
this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is,
for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the
being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.
sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different
way from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia believed
the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of Manila, November 19, 1913
the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos (Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
which, by decree of your general Government of the date of February Secretary
1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad)
obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H.
M. Government did not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's (Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, Managing Director.
thus complying with the provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be
supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which
de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to
took place between the Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on
return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so
the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000.
had arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the
The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its
assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that
express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the
without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during
disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000
which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to their
to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board."
persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de
The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be
Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It
from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole
did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General,
amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent interests,
after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government
the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor
has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which,
on interest what the former had gratuitously received. But the Monte
after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to,
de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the
may remain as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a
sum, after repeated demands refused to return the money on the
donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution," and
ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury),
"considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request
is entitled to order the reimbursement, taking no account of the fact
herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the
that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign
understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly
command, the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to
bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so
order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which
received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted
it received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not that the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the
received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of
$80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred
this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order
from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of the
which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription
transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that
raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the
Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason
loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de
that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892,
Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation
to inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake
whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription
fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de
raised for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February
the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of the interpretation
there being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which
that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the
has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by
Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when
the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance there can
matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support
be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers expressly to the royal
thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency
order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure

4
the return of the $80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of
the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte
de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount
was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the
account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra
and subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and
considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a
returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest
doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or
deposit and not as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely
without foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in
their principal brief that:
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King
enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See and
Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to
protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his kingdoms,
especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de
Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the
Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a
special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the latter, as a result of
the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high
office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the
Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind
of foundation or pious work, for a charitable purpose in these Islands;
and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose,
the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus
thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things
involved, in the majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance with
the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon
him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very
closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government
though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its
policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately
maintained a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil
powers.
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even
without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which
apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor
of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American
Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting
the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de
Piedad. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to
take over such things would result in great inconvenience to the
American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such
a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply
religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was
ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government like
the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the
Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard; and
as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of
fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became impossible
of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in
these Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the contract has
been cleared thereof.
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1)
because such contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the sum in
question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because
the charity founded by the donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and
never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition has
already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second,
the record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and
definite purpose — the relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other
purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted
to that purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to the Philippine
Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including the King
of Spain and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the
disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official capacity, and the fact that
they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in
this matter. The church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in any way
whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an
institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in
question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain
and the Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and
as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and
not in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to
the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act would have
arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the
Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was completely
separated with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable
subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was the
Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were
certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is one of
trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the
Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being
the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or
not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly never
has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in
the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even
could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of
the donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have
accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen
original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It
follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the
action. The only persons who could claim to be damaged by this
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis
que trustent, and this Government is neither.
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish
Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of the fund to
the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It
needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as
trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change of
sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments
were something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to
determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to
examine the law in force at the time there transactions took place, which are the
law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the
Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)
The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by
royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to the Philippine
Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central
Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2
of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as
distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish
Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their
contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under
article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys
thus collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The
relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge
for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because
paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the
secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds,
should there be any, by assigning them to some other charitable purpose or
institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so
long as they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were
contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to
appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to
authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority
of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by
the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see
that the funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed .The
secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government,
exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in
complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their
governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the
contributors. It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as
we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to
return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out
on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine
Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true,
"must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to
the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the
obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending,
war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was
ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of
$20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to
the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public
highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged
to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the
$80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount
did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not
follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon
the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned
in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what
effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April
27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs.Manila
(220 U. S., 345), the court said:
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the
inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in
force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or
institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain.
(Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is
equally settled in the same public law that the great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force
until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character,
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost
their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if
they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and
domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have
been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is
clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political
in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right
and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and
charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident
institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in
securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer
(paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he
crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed.
5
Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U.
S.,1, 57), the court said:
The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of
Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts the
same force and effect.
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the
opinion of the court in a charity case, said:
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the
crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still
remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of
it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us
by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens
patriae.
Chancelor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue
of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where
no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United
States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment
of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it
is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised
in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves.
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital
(3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible
that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the
estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in
being, who cannot act for themselves, said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person
not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who
are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for
protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They
show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the
change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now
resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise
whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any
other cases whatever.
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power to institute the
action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the
people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an
action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The
court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the
duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities,
and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1
Younge & C. C., 417):
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands
of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the
public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for
the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally, the public
interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be
found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow
it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to
be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or
the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the
plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the
result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of
the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown.
They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries,
consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained.
They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original
sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to
institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the
$80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the
Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for
which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true
ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The
true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure,
public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was
intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and
became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of
the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the
Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity
and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.
As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the
constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we have
just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action.
The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to
exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as
contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In
fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject
to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the
Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it
existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory
that the city, under its present charter from the Government of the Philippine
Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of the old
city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate
entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the
city liable for the old debt, said:
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected,
and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of
the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities.
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as
the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by
the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had
prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying
upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the
Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because
the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government,
(b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not
prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against
the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived
by Act No. 2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de
Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as at
present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance
with the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of
Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin June, 1893, to return the $80,000.
The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books
of the Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred
to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its
legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received
as a reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January
30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was
one between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover
an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when
the statute of limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant
acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a
loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of
Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have
prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after
March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme
Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:
It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of
the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by
the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are
confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a
sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations,
unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be
so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14 Pet.,
301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U.
S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not
run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the King, and
that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws,
and was founded on the principle of public policy, that as he was
occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the
negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is applicable to
all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous
agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests and
property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the
statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights must be
prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is
expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a
nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State
can only apply to persons and thing over which the State has
jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the
operation of such statutes.
In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as
follows:
6
 In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute
of limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or
government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where
the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that the state must
necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in
concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to
enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or
government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party
because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign
functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when
the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. The United States having
in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that
tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the
Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of
limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since
it became the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.)
So where lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right
to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on
the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-
Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B.,
397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public
policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the Philippine Government.

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do
not question the amount of the judgment nor do they question the correctness of
the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or
in the equivalent in Philippine currency.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.

7
G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION
FELIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled
"Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano,"
which affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-
2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land
located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No.
17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the
subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with right to
repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of
the sale among themselves, each getting a share of ₱666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale") from
Dr. Corrompido in the amount of ₱300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and
Albino tendered their payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr.
Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after
Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale" of
₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco
and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last
paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to
the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the
execution of this instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching
the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of
respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit
to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of ₱176.34
from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that
Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido ₱966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelson’s
late father Alberto, i.e., ₱666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with
pacto de retro as well as his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of
the sum of ₱1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the former’s
share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to
his father’s hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his
uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his
intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that
he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective
shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of
the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped
from claiming any right over subject property considering that (1) petitioner Rito
had already received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of
the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the
court the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal redemption.
They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and
prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August 11,
2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his
death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land
when not one of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was
effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for
Alberto’s share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito
had no more right to redeem his share to subject property as the sale by
Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of
Court, was perfectly valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It held
that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to the property was
unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract
was effectively ratified by petitioner Rito’s receipt of the proceeds on July 24,
1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the
extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated
to Alberto’s rights when she repurchased his share to the property. It further
directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the
amount of ₱966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the
obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied
petitioner Nelson’s claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in
court the redemption money within the period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of
subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing
petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal
redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6) children,
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and
succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that "[i]f a widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has
in the succession the same share as that of each of the children." Verily, the
seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto,
petitioner Nelson’s father, inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as
the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of
law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to
his legal heirs – his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the rights
of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-
owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso
shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights
and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife
and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina,
Alberto’s mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled
by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs’
rights to the property when she repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a co-owner who redeemed the
property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property
remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a
mode of terminating a co-ownership.4 But the one who redeemed had the right to
be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon
the subject property for the amount due.5 Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed
for Alberto’s heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject
property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she
redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and
held a lien upon the property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result
is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained
ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to
respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then
minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were
held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon
reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code6 state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to
the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property,
subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental
authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the
child does not exceed two thousand pesos.7 Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7
of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial
appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed two thousand
pesos,8 thus:
8
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without
the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter)14 seeks
to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the
date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule,
to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of
alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two. 1aw ph!1

appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of

subject property was ₱1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos.
However, Rule 96, Sec. 110 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall have
the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his
estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian
of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the
ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian
was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after
the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner
Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records
show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the
sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that
petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his
intention to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But
he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12,
1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about the sale.

Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the
minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the
latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to
do so.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of
the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the
sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge
thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the
notification of redemptioners.

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given
no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito
was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of
the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of
ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was
void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other
co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or
encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly
authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property.
She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject
property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred
title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner
Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained
ownership over their undivided share of subject property.12
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner
Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner
Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By
January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption
and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant case,
hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice.15
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer
redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with
respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte
is ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu
thereof a new certificate of title in the name of respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his
mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.
SO ORDERED.

But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses? Articles
1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by
the vendor.

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners

who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in
common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito
became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he
lost his right to redeem subject property.

However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner

Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of their
ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from notice in
writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we held
in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 thus:

x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is
a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x x

x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give
effect to the lawmaker’s will.

9
G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-1 and NATIVIDAD
CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169217
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and
TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to
the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the
latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left
Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three
children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and
Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu
inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively
estimated at ₱50 million in 1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was
then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her
"violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her
estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary
education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties.
Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's
properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix
and petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulu’s real properties. In
1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed
amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision.4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu
that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property5 was under litigation. Thus, Lulu
signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma.
Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly
authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company
for ₱18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-
hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for ₱58,500
per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been
dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the
basement of petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly
daily allowance of ₱400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and
smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit
by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given
a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor
hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination.
Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from
which she was suffering several complications.8
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulu’s
estate from petitioners.9 However, the demand was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship10 in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of
weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the
same.
Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her
late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly
part of their conjugal partnership.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulu’s
competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court
ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the
properties for her to manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the
consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma.
Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be
determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject
of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision
was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family.
However, because the "sale" between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974,
questions regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of limitations.
Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy
and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and
described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She
claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these
properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious"
lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and
half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which
revealed the alarming state of her health.11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted
with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,12 she also had an
existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her
obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s intelligence
level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able
to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,13 the RTC concluded that, due to her
weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal
guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an
incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property
of Lulu on a ₱1 million bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the ₱1 million bond was
grossly insufficient to secure Lulu’s ₱50-million estate against fraudulent loss or
dissipation.14 The motion, however, was denied.15
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the
RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).16The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25,
2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.17 It held that
respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her
illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of
herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard
to the respondent’s appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since
Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal
guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to
1avv phi 1
appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.
Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in
a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.18
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment)
and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in
November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita
immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu
somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation,
Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that
Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been
maltreating her.19
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the CA
alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an
undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that
Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. 21
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in
a resolution dated July 12, 2005.22 Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No.
166470.
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an
incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person
and property.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians23 regarding her
mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in
psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered
her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or
in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed
to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,24 legitimate
brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each
other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a
quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial
rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since
2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being
10
physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and imaginary pets she called
"Michael" and "Madonna."25 The November 21, 2005 medical report26 stated Lulu
had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant
improvements in her behavior.

We find the petition to be without merit.

Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give
his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.27 Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that
her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.

Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not

necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.30 Here, the
trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she
testified before the RTC.

Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself
and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus,
since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a
reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
involves questions of fact.

As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for
review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional
circumstances, none of which is present in this case.32 We thus adopt the factual
findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. 1avvph!1

Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’
finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of
Lulu.33 We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is
tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well. 34

Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was

proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or

by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for
and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have
custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was
unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.36

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.

Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu’s legal

guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they
unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San
Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted,
the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in
connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s estate
and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.

Treble costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

11
G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.
On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape.
In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of
the commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, appellant was
accused of raping AAA,2 allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting
father of complainant who was then _________ years of age, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
with [AAA] by means of force and intimidation and against the will of
the complainant.3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial
conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts:
1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;
2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant
and his wife since AAA was one and a half years old.4
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The following facts are undisputed:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,5 since she was just a few
months old.6 BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for
six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and
BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to
2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week.
Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim
herself, Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor),
P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran).
The prosecution’s version of the facts follows—
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was
sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her
thighs. AAA could see appellant’s face as there was a light coming
from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she asked appellant
why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her
not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw appellant went
back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA immediately went back
to sleep.
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at
work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.
AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and
BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she
suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing
the knife at AAA’s neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as
AAA’s pajamas. He slowly parted AAA’s legs and inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellant’s
shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out
of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting
his organ into AAA’s vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at
least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October
2002, when she was 14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did
not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend,
Marvin.7
On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00
p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told
Marvin that appellant would spank her for going home late. Marvin
asked AAA if there were other things that appellant might have done to
her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged
that she has been raped by appellant. Marvin told AAA to file a
complaint.8
AAA stayed at her mother’s friend’s house and came back on 18
October 2002. She, together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon
Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in
apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to escape. 9
PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Women’s and Children
Desk of Makati Police Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the
statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to
the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal examination.10
P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal
examination on AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the
medico-legal report, show that the "hymen is with presence of deep
healed laceration at 1 o’clock and shallow healed laceration at 2
o’clock positions at the time of examination." Said report concluded
that AAA is in a "non-virgin state physically."11 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined
that the lacerations could have been caused by any solid object, like
the penis inserted at the genitalia.12
Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at
the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were
summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting on the
complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of
appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to
board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and asked appellant to alight
therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant
voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought to the police
station.13
Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he
was a strict father to AAA in that he would scold and spank her
whenever the latter would ran away, he denied raping AAA.14 He
alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was even
once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled
that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked permission to go out to buy a
"project." She never came home.15
On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO
FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized
by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article
266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted
daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender
is the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and
to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of
rape.16
The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the
commission of the crime of rape through the testimony of the victim,
which the trial court deemed "straightforward, consistent and credible."
The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive father of
AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth
certificate, testimonies of witnesses, and admission made by
AAA.17 Finally, the trial court dismissed appellant’s defense of denial as
self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAA’s positive testimony.18
Upon denial of appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the case was
initially elevated to the Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to
People v. Mateo.19 However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case
in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file his appellant’s
brief.20 When the case was brought before us on automatic review, we
set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals and remanded it back
for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review by the
Court of Appeals of the trial court’s judgment imposing the death
penalty is automatic and mandatory.21
On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that
AAA was raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts.
The fallo of the Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered
as follows:
12
 1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal
Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty
on the ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted;
2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal
Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim
AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case),
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count.22
The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last
incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261,
respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.23 With respect to the other incidents, according to the appellate
court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations
that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week from
February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court
concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove
the other charges of rape.24
On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of
Appeals’ Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court
required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file
any Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their
Appellant’s and Appellee's Briefs, respectively.25
Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or
resist the alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of
AAA live only meters away from her and the frequency of the alleged
molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for them not to
notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the
circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for the imposition
of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent is not
included within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an
adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent, appellant
argues that the term "adopting parent" must be given a definite and
technical meaning in that the process of adoption must first be
undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must have been
issued.26
The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical
testimony of AAA that appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with
the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to establish
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed
to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of
rape.27
The OSG insists that AAA’s failure to report promptly the previous
incidents of rape does not dent her credibility. Appellant’s exercise of
moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she was under physical
threat during those times, could have instilled fear on AAA from
reporting said incidents.28
The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.29
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to
overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were
committed within the span of three (3) years or from February 1999
until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord with the acquittal of
appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with
appellant’s conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
In rape cases, "the victim’s credibility becomes the single most
important issue. For when a woman says she was raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus, if
her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof."30
Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAA’s testimony
credible. The RTC considered it "straightforward and consistent on
material points," while the Court of Appeals described it as
"spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions."
Well-entrenched is the legal precept that when the "culpability or
innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those
of the trial court, when duly supported by sufficient and convincing
evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this
Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal."31 We see no reason in
this case to depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due
deference to the trial court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility, having
had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.32
Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a
minor, says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her."33
Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the
prosecution was only able to prove two counts. Applying the ruling in
People v. Garcia,34 the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus:
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260)
imputed against accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on
general allegations that she was raped by the accused-appellant on
the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15
October 2002. AAA’s bare statement is evidently inadequate and
insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every
charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the
indefinite testimonial evidence that the victim was raped three times a
week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the
guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the required quantum of
evidence.35
As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how
appellant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, thus:
Q: What happened after two (2) weeks?
A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head.
Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened,
when you said you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?
A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up
your bed?
A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.
xxxx
Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed
and who was holding a knife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: "Papa"
Q: When you said "Papa," you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: "Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko" and he removed
his shorts.
Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing
then?
13
 A: He undressed me.
Q: Which one did he remove?
A: My pajama.
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: He did not remove.
Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and
removed your pajama, what happened?
A: He slowly parted my legs.
Q: And then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was
doing that?
A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He
was strong.
Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?
A: "Hinampas ko po siya sa braso."
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
A: "Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg
ko."36
Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed
by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years
of age. At that time of the commission of the first incident of rape, AAA
was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her birth certificate.37
As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002,
AAA narrated:
Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3)
times a week, until when?
A: The last time was in October 15, 2002.
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen
again?
A: In our house.
Q: At about what time?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife,
pointing it to me and he removed my shorts and he also
undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after
the incident, he left the house.38
Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the last incident of rape, the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which
states that rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a
woman through force, threat, or intimidation.
AAA’s testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by
the medical findings of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep
healed and shallow healed laceration only confirms AAA’s claim of
rape.
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code in imposing the penalty of death, which was later
modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It relied on the established fact that AAA was still a minor when she
was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian.
One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is
when the victim is a minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this
point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we hold
that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying
circumstance of relationship.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant
is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this
admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the
crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its
penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot
be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of
stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity
and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty,
the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove
during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender."39
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has
legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be
legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People v. De
la Cruz.40 The issue in said case was whether the aunt of a rape victim
could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victim’s
father was still living and residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-
General contended that the aunt was the legal guardian of the victim,
thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court rejected this
contention and ruled as follow:
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o
abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada,
o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al
ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos." Without
passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian)
may file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or
grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot
accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the temporary
custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of
a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article
344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil
Procedure.41
Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused
will be considered a "guardian" as a qualifying circumstance in the
crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl.
The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in partner of
the victim’s aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a
guardian in the contemplation of the amendment to the law on rape
such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the
higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in
the negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was
explained in this discourse:
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the
offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the
sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In
People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the
law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on
civil procedure.
xxxx
14
It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third
paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and
grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from
the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is
also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the
victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him
with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the
prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the
enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason,
therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that
is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter
article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress
on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the
concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances
added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took
note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape
but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the
courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without
the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was
1âwphi1
assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto
guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the
guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its
amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural
guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a
judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape
and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The
obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant
circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the
crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed
the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof
punishable by the higher penalty of death.
deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a
legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established
either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by
adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent
nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian"
contemplated by law.46
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was
not even mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was
that appellant was the "adopting father" of AAA, which the prosecution
nonetheless failed to establish.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of
simple rape, and not qualified rape.
We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals’ award of civil indemnity from
P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to
P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.47 The award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be increased
to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo.48 While no aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of rapes, it was established
during trial that appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the
crime. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro
Flores y Lagua of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and
03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that he is
held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape only
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count. He is also ordered, for each count of rape, to pay the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the

consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which
impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and
normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations
do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person
similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's
property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the
exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the

guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the
category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the
same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of
[AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is
actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over
whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary
period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real
guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659,
since he does not fit into that category.42

People v. De la Cuesta43 adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere

fact that the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she
was away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as
contemplated by law.44

Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar45 where it

was held that the "guardian" envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic
Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In
said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least
two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish
filiation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However,
this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty
pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the
term "guardian" in this manner:

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct

construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may
be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is found or with which it is associated. 87 Section 31(c) of R.A.
No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition
of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within
the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that
the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all
denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely
15
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals and
1
its resolution denying reconsideration reversing that of the Regional Trial Court,
2
Iloilo, Branch 32 and declaring void the special proceedings instituted therein by
3
petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose
condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court,
to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and
son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal, business
and medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the
one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law,
the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other
hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s
suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of
any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein
respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza
spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991,
filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from
competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and
dissipation of the Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for a
court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein that
Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda
Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that
in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated,
mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and
all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and
covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself
filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of
the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner
Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband,
who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo
Doctor’s Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband’s
medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to
several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to
sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements.
Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued
an Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient
in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The
scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda
Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s
attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered
its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was
necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization.
The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L.
Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings
sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June
13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioner’s husband, to be incapacitated
and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of
Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names
of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings standing
thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to
the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner
being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on
the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for
consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument that the
petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration,
and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules
governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require
procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardeleza’s petition can be prosecuted
by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective
one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be
impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his
share in the conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings. He then
restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with
Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and
the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial
obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s hospitalization. He alleged that
the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million
Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also
pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a
monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s industry, labor and service to his
fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family.
Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid
assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient
cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors’ Hospital which can be off-set
against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on
installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s attending physicians
are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement
to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that
summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions
on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under
the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which
contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he
argued that were one spouse is "comatose without motor and mental faculties,"
the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by
absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda
Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed
Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under
date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for
approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely
filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2)
the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the
motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he
would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court,
who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime
formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex "I"). The case
was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and approving respondent
Jardeleza’s motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court ruled
that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by "oppositor",
Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel,
this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-
Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed
the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family
Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor
L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant petition
considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both
still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L.
Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among
others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey
of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names of
16
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of
absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L.
Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby Costs against petitioners.
approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale
and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
SO ORDERED.

"SO ORDERED." 4

On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing

the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special
proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void. 5

On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, however,

6

on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent
and compelling reason to disturb the decision. 7

Hence, this appeal. 8

The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of
land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the
approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own
daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.

The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the
procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family
Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of
himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him
comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the
person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964
Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for
judicial guardianship.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership

property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors. (165a)."

In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation
contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do
not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a
victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties,
and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a
9

judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of

Court.

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law
provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same
powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. 10

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator

of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court,
not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the
Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
1âw phi1

requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus,
the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it
did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be

heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The
doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government
the impress of nullity. A decision rendered without due process is void ab
11

initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. "A decision is void for lack of
12

due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being

heard." "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly
13

or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any

action or proceeding where it is invoked." 14

17
A.M. No. P-08-2549 June 18, 2010
ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
EMMA BALDONADO CURAMEN, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court,
Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court
Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty
and falsification of a public document.
The Facts
On 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an
anonymous complaint1 charging respondent with falsification of a public
document and simulation of birth. The complaint alleged that respondent
registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen
in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the child’s
purported birth certificate2 to show respondent misrepresented that she was the
child’s biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological
father. Complainant claimed respondent was, in fact, the child’s maternal
grandmother. Complainant submitted the child’s original birth certificate3 to show
that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents
were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According
to complainant, respondent included the child as additional dependent in her
income tax declaration.
In his Report,4 Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 24) of Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and
Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the same child. Judge Caspillo confirmed
that the child was, in fact, respondent’s granddaughter. The child’s real mother,
Olga, was one of respondent’s children. On 27 November 2005, Olga gave birth
to a child named Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino. The fact of birth was registered in
the Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2005-
15495. The birth certificate indicated that the child’s parents were Olga Mae
Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino.
Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006, respondent executed an affidavit
for delayed registration of the alleged birth of her child. Respondent claimed that
her supposed child, Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen, was born on 30 November
2005. Respondent’s application was given due course and the supposed birth of
Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006-507. This second birth certificate of the
child indicated that the child’s parents were respondent and her husband.
In her Comment,5 respondent admitted that the real parents of the child were
spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino. Respondent claimed
that the child’s parents, being unemployed, were unable to support themselves
let alone their child. She asserted that the child’s parents actually depended on
her and her husband for support. According to respondent, it was the child’s
parents themselves who proposed to register the birth of the child anew.
Respondent insisted she had no intention to conceal the true identity of the child.
Respondent justified her act as an example of a common practice among
Filipinos to extend help to family members. As to the alleged falsification of her
income tax return, respondent denied listing the child as additional dependent.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
As to the alleged falsification of the child’s birth certificate, the OCA, in its Report
and Recommendation,6 found respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. According to the OCA, respondent’s act created a
negative impression in the minds of the public that court officials could violate the
law with impunity. As for the alleged falsification of respondent’s income tax
return, the OCA found no evidence that respondent claimed the child as
additional dependent. The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended
from the service for six months and one day, thus:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this Honorable Court are our
recommendations that:
1. this administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
2. respondent Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I,
Municipal Trial Court, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, be found GUILTY of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and be
SUSPENDED FROM THE SERVICE for a period of six (6) months
and one (1) day, the same to take effect immediately upon receipt by
the respondent of the Court’s decision;
3. Ms. Carmelita N. Ericta, Administrator and Civil Registrar General,
National Census Statistics Office, be FURNISHED a copy of the
Court’s decision, the Certificate of Live Birth of Rica Mae Baldonado
Curamen, and the Affidavit for Delayed Registration of Birth executed
by the respondent so that appropriate amendments relative to the
true circumstances of the birth of one "Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino"
can be effected; and
4. the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija be FURNISHED with a
copy of the Court’s decision on this administrative matter for
appropriate action.7
The Court’s Ruling
As to the alleged falsification of respondent’s income tax return, we find no
evidence on record showing that respondent listed the child as additional
dependent. Respondent presented a certification8 issued by the Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Office of Rizal, Nueva Ecija as well as her income tax
returns for taxable years 2005 and 2006 to prove that the only dependent she
claimed was her 90-year old father, Rafael Baldonado. Against this, complainant
has nothing but bare allegations. Whoever alleges a fact must prove that fact by
convincing evidence.9 Complainant failed on this score.
With respect to the alleged falsification of the child’s birth certificate, we find
respondent guilty of dishonesty and falsification of a public document. A birth
certificate, being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of
filiation.10 The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and
falsification of a public document.
Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any
intention to conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to
the child’s true filiation to the child’s prejudice. When public documents are
falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth the document proclaims.11
Respondent’s justification for her act – that the true parents of the child are
unable to support the child as they are fully dependent on respondent for their
own support – is an affront to common sense. It taxes one’s imagination how
concealment of the child’s true parents, through falsification of the child’s birth
certificate, will make it easier for respondent to support the child. Respondent
can very well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in
Filipino families, without having to tamper with the child’s birth certificate.
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material
fact in securing one’s examination, appointment, or registration.12 Dishonesty is a
serious offense which reflects a person’s character and exposes the moral decay
which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity.13 It is a malevolent act that
has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts
a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in
the judiciary.14
1avv phi 1
No doubt, court officials occupy an exalted position in society. They enjoy
authoritative influence, which leaves the innocent public unlikely to raise any
objection. Unfortunately, this is also the reason why they have more opportunities
to commit dishonest acts. But dishonesty has no place in the judiciary and the
Court will not hesitate to remove from among its ranks those found to be
dishonest.
Under Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and
falsification of a public document are considered grave offenses punishable by
dismissal for the first offense.
Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of
the performance of official duties.15 If a government officer is dishonest, even if
the conduct is not connected with the official function, it affects the discipline and
morale of the service.16 The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest
employee, even if official duties are performed well. Respondent cannot separate
her private life as a registrant of the child’s false birth certificate from her public
life as a court official. She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a
dishonest act, whether in her private life or in her public life.
However, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed,
especially where mitigating circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of
penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of a public
document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that
this is respondent’s first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in
her favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded
by the proper party.17 But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate
the mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by
respondent.18
We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which is
suspension for six months and one day without pay with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I in the
Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, is found GUILTY of dishonesty and
falsification of a public document and SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one
(1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva
Ecija for appropriate action, including the possible filing of a special proceeding
for the cancellation of the Certificate of Live Birth of Rica Mae Baldonado
Curamen as well as the Affidavit for Delayed Registration of Birth executed by
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
18
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997 Circular No. 12 that she should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT complainant, with the preparation of the home and case study reports.
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN
Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain
terms that:
REGALADO, J.:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of

In this administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare
Officer IV of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field
Office No. 1 stationed in San Fernando, La Union, respondent Judge Antonio M.
Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is
charged with rendering an erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article 33
of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth
Welfare Code," and the corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely,
Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986.
Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case
of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of
the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective
adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations
on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of
Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after
such case study, that the petition should be denied.

Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court

Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding
the provisions of the same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with the
aforementioned special proceeding.
precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in
respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the
child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively
directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:

As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora
Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a
verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea,
which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of the Regional Trial Court
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due time,
respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992,
after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as
their own.
(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru
its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency
thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the
aforesaid decree . . .

Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent Judge based his decree xxx xxx xxx
primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting
parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if
developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been
any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and
demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided
Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such
and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Said DSWD findings and
case study. . . .
recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment, are contained
in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the
local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña.1 The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too
evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge
should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case
travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the
study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which
United States, the department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous
undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the
adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have
court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover,
any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order
respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for
from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study
the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption
Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge
proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such
for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on
coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the
the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption
other requirements of the law.

As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed
administrative complaint against respondent judge charging him with violating
in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that petitions
consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a
for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted
better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in
a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents. It was
this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer
also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaña had asked for an
concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that
undisclosed amount of money from the adopting parents in order to expedite the
pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD
adoption case with the DSWD. 2
in the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to
make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to
In its 1st Indorsement dated April 19, 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator act.
(OCA) of this Court required respondent to comment on the letter-complaint of
the DSWD. Respondent judge, in compliance therewith, claimed that he directed
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the
respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case study, and thereafter submit
embodiment of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence. 5 It
the required reports thereon, precisely because the same are among her duties
need not be stressed here that among the prime duties to which a judge of the
under the Manual for Clerks of Court. Since these functions were so provided to
law must ever be faithful is that of being abreast with the law and jurisprudence,
be performed by her, there was no need for him to order said respondent social
since, as has so often been advanced, the administration of justice requires the
welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine
continuous study of law and jurisprudence. 6 Respondent judge has obviously not
procedure for her to do so. In addition, respondent judge contends that, except
been able to achieve the level of this expectation.
only for direct coordination with the DSWD in the preparation of said reports, no
approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports and it
need not be furnished therewith. Finally, he says that he based his adoption In like manner, respondent Elma P. Vedaña has imprudently acted beyond the
decree not only on the recommendations of respondent Vedaña but also upon all bounds and strictures of her duties as a Social Welfare Officer II of the Regional
the other evidence submitted in the adoption proceeding. 3 Trial Court. As an employee of court of justice, she should have been well aware
not only of the scope of her duties and responsibilities but that she should have
likewise been familiar with current laws, rules and regulations pertinent to her
In the Informal Preliminary Inquiry report dated August 16, 1996 and addressed
position as such social welfare officer. By her misfeasance, she has
by way of a memorandum to the Office of the Chief Justice, the OCA
compromised the prescribed process in the administration of justice in
recommended that respondent judge be administratively punished for violating
proceedings such as the one under consideration.
Circular No. 12 of this Court, dated October 2, 1986, and Article 33 of
Presidential Decree No. 603. Respondent Elma P Vedaña, on the other hand,
was asked to explain her failure to coordinate with the DSWD regional office in We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when he
the preparation of the pertinent reports and to comment on the allegation that she stated in his decision that the DSWD submitted the required reports to his court
asked for money from the adopting parents. through respondent Vedaña, presumably in the belief that it was standard
procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in
coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with the findings of the OCA that
In her comment, respondent Vedaña pointed out that there never was any
there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaña sought to obtain any
directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD concerning
amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the affidavit of the
the adoption in question. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and
child's natural mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal
submit her report thereon to the court at least one week before the initial hearing
view on the charges against respondents.
of the case, as was also the practice in the other Regional Trial Courts. She flatly
denied that she ever asked for money from the prospective adoptive parents of
the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. 4 ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge
Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen,
On November 27, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the administrative matter
Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree
against the two respondents to the OCA for evaluation, report and
No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña,
recommendation. Thereafter, the said office reiterated the fact that respondent
Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of
judge definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the provisions of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and of Circular No. 12 of this Court.
Additionally, while the act of corruption attributed to her was not proved,
respondent Vedaña, on her part, likewise failed to comply with the requirement in SO ORDERED.

19

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for
adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On
23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children,
whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents.
The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of
petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their
school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died.
On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American
citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed
as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of
the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by
their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed
an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts
of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification
for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c),
Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was
denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court
ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c),
Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband
would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption
is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is
the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare
of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed
lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is
not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was
25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age.
Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated
having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by
her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s
decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity
and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of
the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity;
or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
20
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated
from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application
for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that
joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for
dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees
are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in
SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since
the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is
untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the
person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates
parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates
the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate

son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled
to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born
to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to
love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered
a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from
their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and
successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They
are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family,
as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose.
The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity
in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education
for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the
trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)1avv phi1.zw+

21
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the
instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to
"Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in
the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by
law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for
and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound
to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since
her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may
use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an
adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting
parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname
of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4)
adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right
to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be
an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily
the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code
and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so
that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he
is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished
from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must
have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs
and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by
law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in
life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she
shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using
her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were
still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall
be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other
direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
22
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the
wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the
child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him
but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the
surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.
the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the
Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24,
Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or
claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one
normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Article 364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the
mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David
but they all call him Justice David.
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to
the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the
father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the
Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in
the appropriate chapter.
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may
tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It
will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law."28

xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use
their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the
Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we
find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s
surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.

xxx
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the
decree of adoption.
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on
the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second SO ORDERED.
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added
that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name.
What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the
adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to

the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows

23
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without
children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin
enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like
their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting
Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On
05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more
intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping
with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose
Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999,
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred
— "Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to
revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give
to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in
the future.
xxx xxx xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all
his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx xxx xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the
care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected
of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner,
the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his
alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463
for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis
for its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The
new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault
or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no
cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner
asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should
not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the
adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and
Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having
been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95
Phil. 365).
of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family
Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired
under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right
should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules.
From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant
petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is
ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the
subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in
the family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of
adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the
adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to
preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and
still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.8Spain itself
which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the
Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the
archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption
which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an
overriding consideration.9 In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of
children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child
of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,10followed by the
United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11 were written instruments
that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil
Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14 gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the
United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption
was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and
privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of
the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect
her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction
to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code,
the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of
due process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
new obligations created after the right has become vested.17 Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute,
unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
24
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision
and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband
and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be
dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by
the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D.
No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without
being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested.
In Republic vs. Miller,21spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to
adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the
action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of
adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was
enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In
discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled
that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the
time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil
Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its
earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552
had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court
and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the
lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in
statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare
of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of
an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at
anytime before it has been exercised.28

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a

consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by
a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

25
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which
reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner
herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of
America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August
31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5 and
Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos;
their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children
by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution
of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and
her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23,
2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is
a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server.
She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children
gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after
publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor
children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by
the petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow the family name
of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not
later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition.11 The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance12 but deputized the
City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was
unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the
eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her
siblings.15 The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said
consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD,
Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all
surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to
their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of
her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they
need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is
hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in
the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors
developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her
as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian
who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really
need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their
protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors
Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their
maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to
be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close
attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May
2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal
interview concerning the adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was
conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The
paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother
were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While
preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay
with minors and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing
the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized
that her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not
provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that
the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present
and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also
finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her
children.18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed
to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the
adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption,
rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations
obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared
for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial
custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long
been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the
surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac
for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of
the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002.
In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A
POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It
held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos, the children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the
petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was
executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a
Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable
enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA
denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26 on September 7,
2004, assigning the following errors:
26
 1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED
AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF
CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial
court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written
consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them,
she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether
the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies
with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting
the adoptees.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the
opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
is not such an abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.36

The Court’s Ruling

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to
prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s
The petition is denied for lack of merit. testimony on that matter follows:

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every communicated with the family?
reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29
A None, sir.

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the liberality
Q How about with her children?
with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out
the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the
adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is A None, sir.
the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its
proper context and perspective. The Court’s position should not be misconstrued
or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the
natural rights of the parents over the child.31 A I do not know, sir.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
Act of 1998, provides:
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the Q From whom did you learn that?
adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child; A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

Q Where is your mother now?

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
A In Italy, sir.

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended
to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by A After my father died, sir.
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child A Two years old, sir.
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with
failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. you?

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview A No, sir.38
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May
2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the following:
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.

IV. Background of the Case:

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother
is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for
Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care
of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
provided for the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother,
had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by
twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with
the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in
the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and
during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to
the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an
uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still
living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but
very minimal.39

27
 xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She
helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages
openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under
his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at
the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to
act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the
acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any,
are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply
with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a
private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the makers.47

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia
recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her
husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of
her husband’s relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her
parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked
as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the
care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she
died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They
became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2
years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month
through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his
(sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously
providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.41
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable
enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing,
support and commitment of her children and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts
this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14
years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not
less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again
in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner
has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial
backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The
law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide
support in keeping with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it
follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the
means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the Department of

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or
to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to
her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted
her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to
send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to
what her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will
have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia,
and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance
and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest
of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted
by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer
any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.44
Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already
adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition,
petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning
$5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in
adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at
Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized.
Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the
adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US.
She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims
that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the
OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that
her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to
support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the
CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her
nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the
ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition
for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of SO ORDERED.
Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children45 was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply
with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a

foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador,

minister, secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments
of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him,
and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under
his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before
a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the

28
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any
other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 in JDRC Case No. 2964.
1
Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change
of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p
petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the
2
jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their
qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances
under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought.
In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first
name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with
which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has
been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when
he arrived at private respondents' residence. 3
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for
change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated
May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for
4
adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing
that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial
court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from
all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his
natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known
as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van
Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition
on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final
and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and
Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be
annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this
case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born.
Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t)
herewith. 5
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by
petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications
under the law to be adopters, and have amply complied with the procedural
6
requirements for the petition for adoption, with the findings of the trial court being
7
recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court
dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was
published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila
Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. "B" to "E" and
submarkings). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor
derogatory record (Exhs. "K" to "V"); and are physically fit to be the
adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their
qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds
support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD
through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature
and friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy;
mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin
Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph.
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs.
They unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him.
They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy
and secure home life.
"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under
the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new
environment. His stay with the Munsons during the six months
trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and
Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the
adoption of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and
Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court,
when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high
respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Accordingly, we fully
9
uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the
petition, for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly
as follows. (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the
change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in
the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the
change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper
name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from
and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of
law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption
and an authority to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee, the
respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the
substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of
the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and
Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with. 10
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and
rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of
name. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the
11
surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter
and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is
the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve
a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective
requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. 12
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption
with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows
permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is
argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption
and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action
in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of
action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have
been met. 13
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of
name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of
identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice. Private
14
respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of
the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern
that should be addressed in the instant proceeding. 15
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that -
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl
Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing
that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The
strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule
103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing
fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be
prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said
rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over
a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in
any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his
behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for
seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no
way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action
for change of Kevin Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any possible
doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was
caused to be published together with the petition for adoption. 16
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of
adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the
adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
29
 authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses;
and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and
other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear
the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the
change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural
and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of
the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview
of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the
adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders
17
otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the
civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of
the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the
application is made should normally make its decree recording such change. 18
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the
name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial
court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by
some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three
years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and
the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made
and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon
satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge
that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy
of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with
all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
19
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot
be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident
or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken
20
together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in
form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order
therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to
effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the
latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination
and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of
action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements
in Briz vs. Brit, et al. and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. is misplaced. A restatement
21 22
of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore,
appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant
the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
23
two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under
certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in
the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action
arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be
joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a
25
multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever
this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these
ends, they are liberally construed. 26
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant,
Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one
complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules
on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise
out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for
demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the
same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a
complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the
parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at
minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such
multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being
of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that
related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time;
and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of
27
promoting the efficient administration of justice. 28
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to
encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred
rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard
definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where
there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to
29
join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be
some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue
and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 30
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it
to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring
31
a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited
joinder.32
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name,
we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common
question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short,
these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular
sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate
issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate
the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring up and
educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665).
On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family
relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the
propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately
assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the
other.33
The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder
may be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship
and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed
out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for
change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other
and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While
what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter's
fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name
may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds
supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not
determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of
name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view
of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is
just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common
ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly
sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer
vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both
cases, the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so
pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the
management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for
declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an
action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution
proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which stands
out in both cases does not characterize the present action for
adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find
no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two
actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not
indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for
30
 further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and
implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of
the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary
stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally
accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions are not
satisfactorily met.34
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make
for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of
adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated,
the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to
the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity
of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is
addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and
dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled
by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject
matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best
taken up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court clarified the rule on permissive
35
joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory
rule, as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of
jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action
and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules,
the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite
several causes of action although they may be included in one of the
classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiff's option
whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action,
and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal
to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining
cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules
under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name
in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent
judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided
that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the
Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike
would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to
ensure its proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict
36
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 37
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants
or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor
may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. 38
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome
rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or
whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al.
39
that:40
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration
of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive
law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often
been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never
be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood.
As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of
law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution
of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive
rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. . . . While it is true that
a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the
Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice
of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their
just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such
that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice,
will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations,
the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the
rules. 41
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to
descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his
welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an
exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be
prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural
interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious
maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or
failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper
determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of
the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as
relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial
court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. They are
42
matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or
regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their
singular convenience. 43
In Garcia vs. Republic, we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of
44
the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:
. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not
confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create
confusion in the application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving
stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting
the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by both statutory
and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this
case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the
teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for
change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only
justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptee's
baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since
he came to live with private respondents. 45
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the
grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to
him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed
for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely echoes the
opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of
naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as
the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child. 46
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this
point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select
the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which
the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no
other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by
a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of
the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their
petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. 47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of
respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or
combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished
from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest
that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts:
the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The giver or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 48
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil
register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That
is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially
49
entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with
its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 50
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally
is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
51
the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that
may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As
earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem,
impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites
31
therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein
renders the proceedings a nullity. 52
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not
a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the
adoptee after such right to name the child had already been
exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents have not been
conferred such right by law, hence, the right assertes by private
respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee
cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating
judicial consent upon compelling grounds. 61

duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny

the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized
to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his
birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. 53
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar
as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted
child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
62

understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient
to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is
based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. 54
to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or
given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore
been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of
the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of
identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively
authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when,
for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change
may merit judicial approval.

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was
baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used,
has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of
55
name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name
56
and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally
authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church records or
57
elsewhere or by which be is known in the community - when at variance with that
entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real
name. 58
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed
and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name
an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most
noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently
cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the
adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not
lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual
realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are
what are of concern to the Court.

The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings
of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the
change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as
Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it
was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives
and friends from, the time he came to live with private respondents. Apart from
59
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents' privilege to legally change the proper or
given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time,
via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is
conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and
satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.

suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of

the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by
private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have
long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the
adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the
civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been
frowned upon. 60
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent
judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents
shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a
change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects,
the order is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed
order that -

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select
the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which
the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no
other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by
a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming
of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their
petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.

and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of

Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein
enunciated.

The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at
bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his
surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor of
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of
majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala,
which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of
the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and
relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim
Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and
social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of
name sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the
surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.

It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name,
and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it
was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof
of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity of
seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures.

Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a

child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against
one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his
natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be
disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case,
there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select
and give the child's first name for every person, including juridical
persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In
the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents,
in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor

32
G.R. No. L-16779 March 30, 1921 R. C. L., p. 530.) Moreover, it is well settled that a person cannot be held liable
for contempt in the violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial order unless
the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined,
LEE YICK HON, petitioner-appellee, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing
vs. is forbidden or required. (U.S. vs. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 146 Fed., 176, 183.) A
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant. party cannot be punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified in
the order. (13 C. J., 15.) In the case before us, the deportation of the petitioner
was not forbidden by any order of the court, and hence that act cannot be
Attorney-General Feria for appellant.
considered as disobedience to the court.
No appearance for appellee.

STREET, J.:
This is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from the action of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in imposing upon him a fine of P50 for an alleged
contempt of court. The circumstances connected with the incident which gave
rise to the proceeding are these:
It appears that on July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila by one Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had
lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the
Philippine Islands, but was presented from so doing by the Insular Collector of
Customs, who was detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV of
said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ
of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. This citation was served at
about 11 a.m., at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the
deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong
at noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design the Insular Collector
failed to contermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. The result was
that Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular
Collector had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas
corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against the
Insular Collector, with the result already stated.
We are of the opinion that the action of the lower court in imposing fine on the
appellant cannot be sustained; and the judgment must accordingly be reserved.
The conditions under which a person can be punished for contempt are precisely
defined in sections 231 and 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and unless the
reprobated conduct legitimately falls under those provisions, it cannot be
punished as for contempt. The first of these sections contemplates misbehavior
in the presence of the court or so near the court of judge as to obstruct the
administration of justice. With this situation we are not here concerned, as the act
which constitutes the alleged contempt was committed away from the presence
of the court and if punishable at all, it falls under subsection (1) of section 232,
wherein it is declared that nay person may be punished as for contempt who is
guilty of "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment,
or command of the court or injunction granted by a court or judge."
In this case before us, if it be asked what lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of the court or judge below was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant,
the answer must be: None whatever. The citation that was served upon the
appellant required him to appear at a stated time in the Court of First Instance of
Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not
issue. That citation was literally complied with when, on July 30, 1920, the
Attorney-General, on behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, wherein it
was in effect stated that the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly passed
upon by the special Board of Inquiry, and that it had been found that he had
entered the Philippine Islands in contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion
Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. That answer,
so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient; and
the sole ground relied upon to sustain the judgment finding the appellant guilty to
contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the conditions
stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for
which application had been made.
Upon principle the point is clear; and although no case exactly identical with the
present one has been called to our attention from the decisions of American
courts, something very similar is found in Ex parte Lake (37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 656;
66 Am. St. Rep. 848). The facts involved in that case were these: One Edwards
had been charged with the commission of a criminal offense in Oklahoma, but he
fled to the State of Texas; and upon requisition from the Governor of Oklahoma,
a warrant was issued by the Governor of Texas for his arrest in that State. Upon
his being arrested, application was made in his behalf before on of the Texas
courts for the writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. During the period
when the propriety of granting the writ was under consideration in said court, one
Lake, the legally appointed extradition agent, acting under the authority of a
proper warrant issued by the Governor of Texas, obtained the custody of
Edwards from the sheriff who had him in charge and hurriedly departed with the
prisoner for Oklahoma. The result was that the proceedings upon the application
for the writ habeas corpus were frustrated and the writ was in fact never issued
— as occurred in the case now before us. The judge before whom the application
for the writ of habeas corpus was pending thereupon caused Lake to be arrested
and fined him 50 dollars for the supposed contempt. It was held by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals that his action could not be sustained and the
judgment was reversed.
Among the reasons stated for this decision was the fact that the alleged
contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the judge, for there was none of
any character made in the case, "and there was no order, decree, writ, or any
other process in existence, forbidding him form doing just what he did". Speaking
further of this aspect of the case, the court said: "We have found no case
authorizing punishment by contempt for such conduct as is attributed to Lake,
and we believe none can be found. The authorities have been closely and
exhaustively examined, and the rule deducible therefrom, is that unless the court
has jurisdiction of the supposed contemner, or some order, decree, or process
has been resisted or disobeyed, the court has no jurisdiction to punish for
contempt. Jurisdiction over the party will not confer power to punish for contempt
unless some order, decree, or process has been disobeyed or the party is guilty
of some act of the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the
reasonable rules of the court". (Ex parte Lake, supra.)
The considerations found in that decision are applicable to the case now before
us and corroborate the conclusion to be inevitably drawn form our own provisions
relative to contempt, namely, that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon by the Insular
Collector under the circumstances stated was not a contempt of court.
Judgment is reversed and the defendant absolved, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.

At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause,
a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector of Customs on July 23,
1920, is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding
the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time
and place therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas
corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and appropriate
forms are supplied in section 534 of said Code and in section 82 of General
Orders, No. 58. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary
citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory
writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this
character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has, as all legal
practitioners are aware, become common in our courts; and upon considerations
of practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases where the
necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory writ is not manifest.
Nevertheless in a case like that now before us, it is necessary to take account of
the difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas
corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the
citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself
in contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported.

Of course if the judge issuing the citation had his attention directed to the fact
that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon was imminent, and there had been any
reason to fear that the Collector of Customs might proceed with his deportation
notwithstanding the service of the bare citation, his Honor could have penned a
few additional words, adding to the citation an admonition to the effect that the
petitioner should not be deported until his application for the writ of habeas
corpus should be heard. If a temporary restraining order of that kind had been
issued, it would no doubt have been respected.

In proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of court, it is not

to be forgotten that such proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in their
nature even when the acts complained of are incidents of civil actions. For this
reason the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings
are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. (6

33
G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010 On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner, and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or
vs. restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.12
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, , Respondents. On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:
Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being
illegally detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest
DECISION
Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April
PEREZ, J.:
23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 651 of the Rules of Court
Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1
assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an
Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the
administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-
petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in
charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position,
behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan2 (PO1 Ampatuan).
respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No.
Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned
178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under
at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by
restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of
his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan,
R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under
Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to
restrictive custody during the pendency of administrative case for grave
Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police
misconduct.
(PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial
Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan
Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The
was ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before April
next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City
23, 2008.
Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila.
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention,
Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to
meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is
policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director
none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty
Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then
must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must
conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the
be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.
killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then
Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot
detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1
simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It
Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of
cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism
the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D.
and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to
Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1
place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of
Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in
R.A. 8551.
Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3
The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by
Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police
Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4 The Order
officer.
was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent
Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1
Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same
PO1 Ampatuan.
could not be accepted by this Court. It must be stressed that the resignation has
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC
1avv ph!1

not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the
of Manila, Branch 37.5
administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of
Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated
the PNP.
that at around 7:08 o’clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby
year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC
DISMISSED.13
Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil
Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under
Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25
(MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1
April 2008. The issues are:
Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto,
MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;
rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF
recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4,
On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1
R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE
Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
CHARGE SHEET
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named
DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO
respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant
ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE
to Section 52 of R.A. 85516 in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-
CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS.14
024, committed as follows:
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.15
Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the
member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45
issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:
pistol, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
RULE 102
shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of his
HABEAS CORPUS
body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds which directly
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly
cause (sic) his death.
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.7
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital
thereto.
Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
custody, thus:
the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by
1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of
the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law,
PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig
and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be
and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.
made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of
2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section
First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may
52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody
also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and
during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him
at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against
district.
such police personnel.
xxxx
3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the
Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty.
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
custody.
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
4. For strict compliance.8
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008,
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.9
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
E. Acuña, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional
lawful judgment.
Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is
Restrictive Custody
valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the
legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application
Regional Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum
for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it
from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).
may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:10
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that
application.16
the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally
be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be
grounds.11
issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution
valid judgment.17
Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled
placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained
to Branch 37.
34
via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.18 Fundamentally, In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
action.19 deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack
not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a of merit.
writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal Costs against petitioner.
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and SO ORDERED.
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.20
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire
into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such
restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the
writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.21
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as
a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the
court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.22
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of
respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against
him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was
served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case
filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of
PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant
of arrest issued by any judicial authority against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition.
Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had
recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said
recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that
was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to
other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case,
PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They
cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,24 where this Court held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.25
The Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as
the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the
disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly
designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal
discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 – x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary
punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or
any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180)
days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to
place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal
complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that
a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.26
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.27
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative case
filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since
19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have already
been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered
moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551,
which provides:
SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however,
That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the
complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of
the accused PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower
than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That the preventive
suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the
respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner
lifted by the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the
Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, we have to dismiss the petition.

35
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001,
merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the "Bouncing Checks Law." When the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone --
instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the Circular requires a
review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or
future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect.
Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the October 10, 20012 and the October 11, 20013 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio City.4 The October 10, 2001 Order released
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement and required him to pay a
fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. The October 11, 2001 Order disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in
this case, the instant petition for Habeas Corpus should be, as it is
hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail Warden is hereby ordered to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless he is being
held for some other lawful cause other than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus
dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC 4,
Baguio City. Further, the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of
₱100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint
Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999."5
The Facts
The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued
to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee
bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the
reason "account closed."6 Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts
of violation of BP 227 under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.8 After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4)
rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases.
The dispositive portion reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the
evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the
penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify
the offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five
Thousand Pesos (₱1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing
from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ on
December 13, 1995, to pay attorney’s fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs." 9
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.10 On
May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.11 There
being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on
February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.12
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of
Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial
court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.13
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC
Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the
final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him.14 The arguments raised in that Motion were
reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on
February 28, 2001.15
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
Dimagiba.16 On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the
service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition17 for a writ of
habeas corpus. The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing
for October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order were served on respondent’s counsels
and the city warden.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order
directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him
to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the
July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched upon.19 A subsequent Order,
explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
was issued on October 11, 2001.20
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v.
Court of Appeals21 and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-
2000,22 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a
habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in
favor of Dimagiba.23 It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and an
employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his
imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy
of his properties.24
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11, 2001.25 That Motion was denied on
January 18, 2002.26
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.27
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
"1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a
final and conclusive decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4,
dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated
September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court,
Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from
confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final
and conclusive judgment;
"2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the
proper remedy, the Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of
merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated
in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x
"3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to
the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa
Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000,
the minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million
and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (₱1,295,000.00) up to
double the said amount or (₱2,590,000), not just the measly amount
of ₱100,000; and
"4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and deciding [Dimagiba’s]
Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without affording
procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the
Office of [the] City Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the
Solicitor General."28
In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for
habeas corpus was validly granted. Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues
as they intertwine with this main question.29
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
in which individuals are deprived of liberty.30 It was devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically,
to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful
custody.31 It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under
which a person is detained.32
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment.33 However, as a post-conviction remedy,
it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has
been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.34
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the
ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the
imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent
sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the
penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition
appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of
his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration35 of the MTCC’s Execution Order
and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.36 Both were
denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a
judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he
had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary
remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of
36
the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the
execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he
had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already
become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum
shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy
instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment
of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or
more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed
₱200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.37
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,38 established a rule of
preference in imposing the above penalties.39 When the circumstances of the
case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred
penalty.40 The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a
fine rests upon the trial judge only.41 Should the judge deem that imprisonment is
appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.42
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The
competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.43
Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy
enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a "first time offender."44 This
circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves
the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the
peculiar circumstances of each case.45 It is the trial court’s discretion to impose
any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:
"x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of
both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be
considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination
of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely
upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
xxxxxxxxx
"2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether
the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;"
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the
alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22
offenders.46 On this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was
violative of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be
imposed on others similarly situated.47
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if
favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal
Code,48 has been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws.49
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail
Warden of Batangas City,50 which we quote:
"Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao that a convicted person
is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law,
citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by
SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.
"First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases
pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by
final judgment.
"Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P.
Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the
law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith
or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the
penalty to be imposed."51
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a
guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed
to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the
appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer
any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final
judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering
the decision against the accused.52That decision is subject only to appeal on
grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority.
Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual
circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the
judgment has become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant
circumstances from which respondent’s conviction and sentence were based.
The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the
conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the
Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to
modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws53 does not apply for the same reasons as
those on retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law
that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule
of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar
circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration,
because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his
contention.54
Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,55 in which the final judgment
of conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence
of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from an
"Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,"56 not from an
unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The
Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the execution of
a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of
justice or by supervening events.57 The supervening event in that case was the
petitioner’s urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the
direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have been
equivalent to a death sentence.58
The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case.
Respondent’s supposed "unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-pass
operation, and aggravated by hypertension," cited by the RTC in its October 10,
2001 Order,59 is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that
respondent did not make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus.
Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment
submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor
on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.60 Citing Griffith v.
Court of Appeals,61 he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is no longer
justified after the settlement of the debt.
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that
convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had
already paid his debt (from which the checks originated) was contrary to the
basic principles of fairness and justice.62 Obviously, that situation is not attendant
here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the
properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with
his conviction.63 Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been
used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early
settlement would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a
circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his
appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.64 What is punished in the
latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that
subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.65 The
Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is
criminalized:
"The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public
interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private
interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest
of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order." 66
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent’s Petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the
re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
37
G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167570
JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171946
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of
the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY. FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M.
MACAAYAN, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for
review on certiorari to set aside the October 25, 2004 Decision1 and February 16,
2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed
the Decision3 dated January 6, 2004 and Order4 dated May 3, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding
the preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the
corresponding Charge Sheet5 dated July 3, 2001, and the deportation
proceedings thereunder conducted.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari,
seeks to set aside the December 8, 2005 Decision6 and March 13, 2006
Resolution7 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.
Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court
resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per
Resolution8 dated February 26, 2007.
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit9 for deportation initiated by
Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino
citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not
so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued
by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s
citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s
birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears
to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred
that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified
documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport
from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,10 averring that the complaint
for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust
him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is
no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born
Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese
father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 411 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth
Act No. 62512 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of
Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of
Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were
registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration
was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in
the 1952 and 1955 elections.13 He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines
as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this
country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was
born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and
Tagalog.14
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he
maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the
employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his
Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the
said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship
appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of
that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.15 As
regards the entry in his siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and
Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was
erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father.16
In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L.
Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy.
Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino
citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to
Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said
dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out of
time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason
of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation
and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy,
charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9)19 in relation to Section 45(c)20 of Com.
Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,21 as
amended, committed as follows:
xxxx
1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as
evidenced by a copy of his birth certificate wherein his citizenship
was recorded as "Chinese";
2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to
subsequently cover up his true and actual citizenship as Chinese and
illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T.
GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, in violation of the above-cited provisions of the
Immigration Act[;]
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially
represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a citizen of the Philippines,
for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of the
immigration laws, also in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.22
On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition23 with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the
March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet,
and the proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of
the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision24 dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No.
ADD-01-117, ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby
Orders the apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO
and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without prejudice,
however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other proceedings that
are pending in court or before the prosecution arm of the Philippine Government,
if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry into the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.25
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a
supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition26 before the trial court and
reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining
the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision.27 Later, however, the trial
court dissolved the writ in a Decision28 dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence
of the dismissal of the petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise
denied.29
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a
warrant of deportation30 which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy
commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed
by reason of his provisional release on bail.31
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They
imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their
citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the
nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.32 It did not find merit in their
argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper
court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has
jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised
the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that
they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was
never extended to the Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to one’s
38
claim of Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal found
that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of
three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that the
belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of
allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of election was
executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their
filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate
tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily had to rule on
the substantial and legal bases warranting the deportation proceeding in order to
determine whether the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that due process
was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to the claim
of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having
been denied,33 Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court, respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of
Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of
Deportation No. AFF-04-00334 dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17,
2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the apprehension
and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center,
pending his deportation to China.35
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas
corpus36 before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his
appeal and his release on recognizance.
In an Order37 dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said petition
ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order
of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau.
Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the
trial court in an Order38dated December 28, 2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until
the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The Court of
Appeals held as follows:
xxxx
…the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof
whatsoever of his violation of the bail conditions [that he was previously granted]
is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the grant of his bail
should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said bail. Although a deportation
proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, yet considering
that it is such a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived in the
Philippines, where he has established his family and business interests, one who
appears to be not completely devoid of any claim to Filipino citizenship, being the
son of a Filipina, whose father is alleged to also have elected to be a Filipino, the
constitutional right of such person to due process cannot be peremptorily
dismissed or ignored altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it later turns
out that the petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager Immigration
authorities would have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in
fact be a Filipino by blood.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the Warrant
of Deportation issued by the BID is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.,
Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized agents, are
ENJOINED from deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, until
the issue of petitioner’s citizenship is finally settled by the courts of justice.
SO ORDERED.39
Their motion for reconsideration40 having been denied on March 13, 2006, Hon.
Alipio Fernandez, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity
as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are before this Court as
petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.
The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions:
G.R. No. 167569
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO
IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER
CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER
CARLOS GO SR.’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER
THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS
IN THE COURT A QUO.
III.
A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV.
ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF
COM. ACT NO. 625.
V.
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE "PRESUMPTION OF
CITIZENSHIP."
VI.
RESPONDENT’S "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.41
G.R. No. 167570
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO
IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER’S
FATHER, CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL AND
VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
III.
THE B.I.D.’S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER JIMMY T.
GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.
… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER’S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID
RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND
NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE
HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.42
G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ENJOINING
RESPONDENT’S DEPORTATION.43
Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of
action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether the
deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an
indispensable party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and
Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to
oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings
in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage;
(d) whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the
Board; and (e) whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are
merely a rehash of the arguments they adduced before the appellate tribunal and
the trial court. Once again, they raised the same argument of prescription. As to
Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the government to have
acquired Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to
him on September 11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer be questioned at this
late date. As for Jimmy, he contends that the Board’s cause of action to deport
him has prescribed for the simple reason that his arrest was not made within five
(5) years from the time the cause of action arose, which according to him
commenced in 1989 when he was alleged to have illegally acquired a Philippine
passport.
In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified
altogether for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein. Jimmy
posits that the deportation case against him was made to depend upon the
citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification to order his
deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even though the latter
was never made a party in the deportation proceedings. They argue that the
Board could not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question
39
the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos the opportunity to
adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine citizenship would be the height
of injustice. For failing to accord him the requisite due process, the whole
proceeding should perforce be stuck down.
While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an
alleged alien, they insist that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the
claim to citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim to Philippine citizenship,
they said, is clearly shown by the fact that they were born, had been raised and
had lived in this country all their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo;
they engage in businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their right
to suffrage; they enjoy the rights and privileges accorded only to citizens; and
they have no record of any Alien Certificate of Registration. More importantly,
they contend that they were validly issued Philippine passports. They further
posit that the judicial intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the
proceedings below, but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the
rules of evidence are strictly observed.
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present
controverting arguments to sustain his claim to Philippine citizenship,
notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the
deportation proceedings.
Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of jus
soli failed to accord him Philippine citizenship for the reason that the same was
never extended to the Philippines. He insists that if his Philippine citizenship is
not recognized by said doctrine, it is nonetheless recognized by the laws
enforced prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly the Philippine Bill of
190244 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of
1916).45
According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916
deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as well as their children born
after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of
the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his father’s citizenship.
Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him. Said
constitutional provision reads:
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
xxxx
Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he
followed the citizenship of his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and that
he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the
requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is being disputed is not
whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his
compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period following the
interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice46 to Article IV, Section 1(4)
of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is
not an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same decision held that such period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.47
We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed
is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the
citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed
out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,48 we
said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the purpose.49 Indeed, if the issue of one’s
citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to
future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be
precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so
when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Jimmy’s invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of
Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37. …
xxxx
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section
at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless
the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the
cause of deportation arises….
xxxx
As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section
37(a)(9),50 in relation to Section 45(e)51of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing
provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years
from the time the cause for deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it
ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the time
when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing
the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of
prescription.52 Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326,53 as amended, entitled "An
Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"
provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
xxxx
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued
because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the
government been aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or there
were certain anomalies attending his application for such passport, it would have
denied his application.
As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an
indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.54 To
be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.55 Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does
not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is
the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal
issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy
claims that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3),56 Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen.57 Since his citizenship hinges on
that of his father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the
latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos’ citizenship will in no
way prejudice him.
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike
other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of
decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata may be applied in cases
of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation
sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be
rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As
neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an
indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine
the deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine also the
question of citizenship raised by him.60 However, this Court, following American
jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the
deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board61 wherein we
stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that
the claim is correct.62 Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.63
While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be
allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper
proceedings.64 After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim
of citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not therefore
subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts,
after the deportation proceedings.66 The decision of the Board on the question is,
of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.671avv phi 1
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced
that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with
the deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly
the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and
Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the
Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered
as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal.
The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow
immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond
this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of facts.68 None of the
exceptions69 in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to
exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they
presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached.
40
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is
the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth.
To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of
jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of jus soli
was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s
citizenship.70 However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in
the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor.71 Since then, said doctrine only
benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines
by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.72
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 190273 nor the Jones Law of 191674 make Carlos
a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a
resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without
any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father
and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and
follow her nationality.75 Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a
Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
himself.76 However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving
that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established
rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on
Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it
did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to
make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."77
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The
1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the
age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years.
In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of
election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of
State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.78
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may
be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be
that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance was
sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that
Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate
such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine
citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not
validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as
a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino
citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person
may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges
of citizens of this country.79
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.80
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor
presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the
Board’s jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we
are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do.
This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to
determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a
judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said
proceedings should not be enjoined.
In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not
observed in the deportation proceedings must likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and
need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court
proceedings.81 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.82 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.83 Although Jimmy
was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as
alleged by him, the trial court found that he was given ample opportunity to
explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus:
x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001
signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy
T. Go admitted that when his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about
the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution dated February 14, 2001
and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on
October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum"
and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days
to submit his required memorandum. x x x84
This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.
As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate
tribunal erred in enjoining Jimmy’s deportation.85
Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the
existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the petition
for certiorari as was done in this case. They point out that the appeal period in
habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an
ordinary appeal is the more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must
be the one availed of.86 Since the decision of the trial court was not properly
appealed, the same may be said to have attained finality, and may no longer be
disturbed.87
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial
court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the
determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy’s
apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board
dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already attained
finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on
April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from
the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the
lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and detention.88
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on
recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent
apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the
power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under
investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by
the Board.89 Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis.
Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be
dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has
been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy.90Nonetheless, they
claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is
no longer being detained.91
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the
availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his
cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in
ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of
the extraordinary writ.92 Contrary to the petitioners’ stand, Jimmy argues that the
April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the
availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually
void because it was rendered without due process.93 He also insists that the bail
issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship
before the proper courts.94 Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas
corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention,
and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.95As in his petition in G.R.
No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void
for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full
blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.96
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in
G.R. No. 171946 meritorious. a1f
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of
certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate
remedy is available for the correction of the error.97
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed
of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period
demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be
wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is
to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the
writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 498 of Rule
102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.99
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy
would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The
writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released
had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context includes
quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.100 Likewise,
the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus.
When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant
to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts
have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings
because there is no law authorizing it.101
41
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered
arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the
Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This
being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by
respondents regarding the same subject.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The
Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated February 16, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R.
No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2005 and
Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December
28, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby
REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

42
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
(detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-
relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of
Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and
second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on the
1
basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the
petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo de Villa, we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his
2
niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and
ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of
the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the
rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza
charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information dated January 9,
1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on
January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."3
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of
April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her
family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top of
her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for
help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill
her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his
penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner
ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was
noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When
confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her. Aileen's
parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a
criminal complaint against petitioner. 4
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight
months pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00
positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom she
named Leahlyn Mendoza. 5
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was
already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of
having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had been holding a
grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he
interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in
his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. 6
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount
of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn
Mendoza. 7
On automatic review, we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was
8
medically consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that
Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the
prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old
baby by normal delivery. Thus, we affirmed petitioner's conviction for rape, in a
9
Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua and ordered to pay the
offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child
Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.
SO ORDERED. 10
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with
the question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges
that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test
that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's
child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the
automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity. This information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal
11
Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as
counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type
test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly
conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision
12
of February 21, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. The 13
Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November 20,
2001. Hence, the Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.
14 15
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that
DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-
relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate
of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn16
readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the
petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as "Container A."
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing
labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI). During 17
transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample
given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of
the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made
known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory. 18
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21,
2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the
pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other
samples, including Leahlyn's. 19
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT
PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN
MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT
THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED
RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE. 20
xxx xxx xxx
A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW
OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED. 21
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial
in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn
Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his
conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said child.
Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001
conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new
trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-
discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted
and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second,
the propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those
seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very
broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto". Issuance of the writ
22
necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated
case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, we stated that "[a]ny restraint which will preclude
23
freedom of action is sufficient." 24
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained
via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to
this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a
judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired
jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly
in the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of
habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the
recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that review of a judgment of
25
conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
43
or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to standard of reasonableness. For the petition to succeed, the strong presumption
46

such excess. 26
that the counsel's conduct falls within the wide range or reasonable professional
assistance must be overcome. 47

In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final
judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to
anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's
counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably
withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation that he was
"leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition
filed in his favor." In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an
48

impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this withdrawal in a

In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the handwritten "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel's
review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court" received by this Court on
the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case of Abriol v. September 14, 1999. Petitioner alleged that his counsel's withdrawal is an
49

Homeres, for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas
27
"untimely and heartbreaking event", considering that he had placed "all [his] trust
corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas and confidence on [his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and dignity." 50

corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or

tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his
liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that
acting squarely within their jurisdiction. The reason for this is explained very
28 there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a
simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals: a habeas corpus petition
29 denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that the proceedings
reaches the body, but not the record of the case. A record must be allowed to
30 were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the
simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa,
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes,
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are
correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case,
these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to
prescribed by law. In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court's
31 present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition.
appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
corpus, as this is not the function of said writ. A survey of our decisions in
32

habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is
a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. We have been categorical in
33
seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn
our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a Mendoza.
substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus
is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered by a court
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to
or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated that there
the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza
was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an
is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the
individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.
father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we ruled that the
51

fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the writ of habeas corpus was
34
determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential
held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was
against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an accused's fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment
constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore in determining an individual's guilt.
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused. That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn
the function of habeas corpus. Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of
35

Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on
Prisons, this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown
36

the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given
to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction
credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on
and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
automatic review.
detention. Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals this Court was inclined to allow
37 38

the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that case, we laid down the general
rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent
rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject
to exception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows good
ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege
and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such
process. 39
The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil
award of child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's
guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did not sire
Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the
acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.

Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous
legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the scope of
40
new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a
review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. We limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of
ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at
orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15)
circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a
writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121
within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may
thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of
jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves as the SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on
basis of imprisonment or detention. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
41 any of the following grounds:
conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa,
we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant probably change the judgment.
of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with petitioner's plea,
a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which
the petitioner was unduly deprived. In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-
discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly
excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas
corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of
counsel. In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors committed
42
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of
by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far
effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence
alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney's performance was presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the
deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the outcome statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".
of the trial would have been different with competent counsel. The purpose of the
43

right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only
fair trial.
44

The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, one must examine whether counsel's conduct undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that the trial
if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is
52

did not produce a fair and just result. The proper measure of attorney
45
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
performance is "reasonable" under the prevailing professional norms, and the locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. 53

defendant must show that the representation received fell below the objective
44
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after
the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-
discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing

until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge
of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of
petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this
negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame
his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. A client is
54

bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter's mistakes and
negligence. It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who
55

seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure. 56

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by
petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled
to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza,
his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and
positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly
57

so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of
rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court
58

that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that

conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is
not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial
evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on
appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus
and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

45
G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF
KUNTING, Petitioner.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,1 Philippine
National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before
this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.
The antecedents are as follows:
On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of
the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian
Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task
Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region. Kunting
was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165.
Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at
Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police
Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the
PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-
IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed
for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the
RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog, thus:
xxx
The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of
this Court, who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case
(Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his instruction, accused As[h]raf Kunting
y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of
Arrest issued in this case, however considering that the accused is a high
security risk, he should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary
security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment
order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by
the prosecution.
Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.2
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn
over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.
On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for
representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial
from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several
intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort
will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting
from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big
possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in
Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to
the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-
accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-
1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the
crime/s charged.
On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set
Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting.
The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to
the court.1avvphil.net
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R.
Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to
facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case, citing the same
grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to
Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that
occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-
free.
On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the
Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a
pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No.
3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this
Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated
February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended
until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty
since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael
Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He
alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he
requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the
RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who
allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001
in Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he
promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He
was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño
for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his
case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on
the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation
on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court
or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in
the records as "for safekeeping purposes only."
The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person,3 and if found illegal,
the court orders the release of the detainee.4 If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.5
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.6
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the
RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by
Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary
detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial
court.1av vphil.net
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-
1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above,
the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been
charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds that "once
the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005
reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two
years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case.
The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to
request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan
to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion
for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for
Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief
Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on
said motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to
turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
46
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778,
790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained
undiminished up to the present. The respondents' contention that the petition has
become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may
have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his
temporary release, however, preclude freedom of action and under
the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his
involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22,
1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay,
Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he
was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.
After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo
Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second,
by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that
the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both
investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under
Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one,
for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against
the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as
amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the
Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is
significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued.
And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's
detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to
the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the
approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free
and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for
habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot
and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release.
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions
imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the
approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also
required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not
"participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the
interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.
The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an
improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the
legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the
respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr.
Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is
not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and
transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint.
Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking
for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet,
the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action,
fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to
bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from Megal encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not
become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not
wanting.
The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to
a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail
her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make
less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another, from to choose one's
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the
will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection
of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illigally deprived
of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:
Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not
signify that petitioners could once again enjoy their full freedom, the
application could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by
the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the
hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for
petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner
when he set forth the above allegations in his manifestation of August
30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners,
while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also
alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as
labor union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the
Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in Macaraig as
well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting was to take place in the
business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever efforts
they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition
against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable.
If so, the moot and academic character of the petition was far from
clear.
More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary
release from detention renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon.
Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released
from detention. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released and their
case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners insisted,
however, that their case may be considered moot and academic only "if their
release would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said:
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic
when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either
temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases.
But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be
resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a
person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has
absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one
suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners
being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at
anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction.
We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of
laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a
person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be
detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic
and elementary that it needs no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary
restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his
behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the
restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary
release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,
SO ORDERED.
47
G.R. No. 170924 July 4, 2007
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and
JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner,
vs.
Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN.
ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the
Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which dismissed
the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Roberto Rafael Pulido (Pulido)
in behalf of Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner the
penalty of censure, and its Resolution2 dated 6 January 2006 denying his motion
for reconsideration.
The facts are not disputed.
At around one o’clock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twenty-one
(321) junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere
Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue,
Makati City. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and
planted explosives in its immediate surroundings.
The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their
grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of support from the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP – President Arroyo – and demanded her
resignation and that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the
AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
At about one o’clock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she
issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all
reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and
quell the "rebellion."
After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government
negotiators, the former agreed to return to barracks, thus ending the occupation
of Oakwood.
Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and
Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf
that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before the Court of Appeals.
On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a
directive3 to all Major Service Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) regarding the Custody of
Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof,
Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their Service Commander.
Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the
Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch
61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup
D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case
entitled, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al." was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On 18 November 2003, a Commitment Order was
issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to
the Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City.4
On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged5 from military
service.
On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678 entitled, "People v. Ramon B.
Cardenas" pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, on the ground
that the cases are founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a series of
offenses of similar character.6
In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 2004, Commodore Normando
Naval, Commander of Naval Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to
relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and Mesa and that the latter be
transferred to the Makati City Jail.7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC
relieved him of his duty but ordered the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the
Naval Base Cavite in Sangley Point, Cavite City, to the Philippine Marine Brigade
Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
custody of the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.8
In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the
accused-soldiers. It admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-
accused to bail pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each.9
On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail.10 On 20 July 2004, the
RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps,
Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, to release Gonzales and Mesa from his
custody.11 Despite said orders and their service to the marines, Gonzales and
Mesa were not released.
On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved for partial
reconsideration12 of the order granting bail. Prior to the resolution of said motion,
Jovencito R. Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel F. Llena,
Judge Advocate General, to defer action on the provisional release of Gonzales
and Mesa "until the Motion for Reconsideration shall have been resolved and
attained finality."13 On 26 October 2004, the RTC denied the motion for partial
reconsideration.
With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the
Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asking for the nullification and setting
aside of the orders dated 8 July 2004 and 26 October 2004 of Judge Oscar B.
Pimentel for having been issued without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari
was raffled to the Seventh Division and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Oscar B. Pimentel, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148." The Court of Appeals
(Seventh Division) did not issue a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas
Corpus14 was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and raffled to the Third Division. In
support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer
subject to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service on 8
December 2003, and since they are not charged before a court martial, the
military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and there is no legal
ground to detain them further because a court order for their release had already
been issued.
On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus directing respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and
Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all
persons acting in his stead and under his authority, to produce the bodies of
Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and show the cause and
validity of their detention.15
On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
made.16 Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed
primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is
justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the
order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before
the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and
(2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the
petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals
and pending before its 7th Division.
On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (7th Division) rendered its decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 dismissing the petition that questioned the propriety of
the granting of bail to Gonzales, Mesa, and twenty-five of their co-accused.17
On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition
for Habeas Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It
ratiocinated:
A reading of the parties’ submissions reveals a threshold issue – the
charge of forum shopping and the related falsity in the certification
supporting the petition. We must initially resolve these issues
because a finding that the petitioner violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court can lead to the outright dismissal of the present
petition. x x x
xxxx
The records show that the present petition contained the following
certificate of non-forum shopping:
"I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with office address at
Unit 1601, 16th Floor 139 Corporate Center Valero Street,
Makati City, after having been duly sworn in accordance
with law, do hereby state that:
1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned case;
2. I have read the Petition and caused it to be prepared.
All the contents thereof are true to my own personal
knowledge and the record;
3. I have not heretofore commenced any action or
proceeding involving the same issues, in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency and to the best of my knowledge, no action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; except for the
related cases of "Eugene Gonzales et al. vs. Gen.
Narciso Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007 and "Humabono
Adaza et al., vs. Gen. Pedro Cabuay et al., G.R. No.
160792, both awaiting the resolution of the Supreme
Court.
48
 5. (sic, should be 4) If I should learn of any similar action
or proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I
undertake to report such fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Court.
The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show
that the petitioner never mentioned the pendency before the Seventh
Division of this Court of the certiorari case, SP 88440, for the
annulment of the lower court’s order granting the soldiers-accused’s
petition for bail, when this same lower court order is cited as basis for
the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa in the present petition.
All that the certification mentioned were the related cases pending
before the Honorable Supreme Court. Neither did the petitioner
comply with his undertaking under his certification to inform this Court
within five (5) days of the pendency of any similar action or
proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, as in fact the certiorari case
was already pending with this Court when the present petition was
filed. The certiorari case was only brought to our attention after the
respondents filed their Return of the Writ.
To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the counsel for the accused
Gonzales and Mesa in the criminal case before Branch 148 RTC
Makati City and who represents Gonzales and Mesa as private
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the
pendency of the certiorari case. Why he deliberately kept the
pendency of the certiorari case hidden from us, has not been
sufficiently explained. We have no doubt, however, that his deliberate
act of withholding information on a material fact directly required to be
disclosed by the Rules of Court cannot but have legal consequences.
The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and
posted by Gonzales and Mesa. This is very clear from the petitioner’s
argument that "The continued detention of the enlisted personnel
constitutes violation of the lawful orders of the civilian court." He cited
in support of this argument the grant and the posting of the bail, and
the issuance of the release orders by the lower court. He did not
disclose, however, what subsequently happened to the order granting
bail. He deliberately omitted in his narration the fact that the People
moved to reconsider this order. Thus, he gave the impression that the
order granting bail immediately became enforceable and that
Gonzales’ and Mesa’s continued detention is illegal because their
constitutional rights to bail, which have received judicial imprimatur,
were continuously being violated by the respondents.
The petitioner next omitted the fact that after the denial of its motion
for reconsideration of the order granting bail, the People filed the
certiorari case before this Court, seeking to annul the lower court’s
order. While we are aware of the rule that – the mere pendency of a
petition for certiorari will not prevent the implementation of the
assailed order unless the court where the petition was filed issues
either a temporary restraining order or a writ or preliminary
injunction – the filing of a petition for habeas corpus while the order
granting bail is being questioned on a petition for certiorari raises
issues beyond the immediate execution of the lower court’s bail and
release orders. They raise questions on the propriety of filing the
habeas corpus petition to seek the release of persons under
detention, at the same time that a petition regarding their continued
detention and release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner wanted
to avoid these questions, prompting him to actively conceal the
subsequent motion for reconsideration of the bail order and the
petition for certiorari directly questioning this same order. In short,
the petitioner conveniently omitted in his narration of facts the
material factual antecedents detrimental to his cause; he chose
to narrate only the factual antecedents favorable to his cause.
That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the
certiorari case is beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same
coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the
release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower court’s grant of
bail. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of
Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the
order granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks
to implement through a petition for habeas corpus the provisional
release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question
this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for
habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the release
under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?
We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as
this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has
been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same
coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured
through separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise
and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be sure, we
clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because
the effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will depend on the
nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis
for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the
certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For this very same
reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the matter
before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will
be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and Mesa’s release.
The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore
footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives
home this point.
To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention and immediate release
that are now before the two Divisions of this Court are likewise
properly within the jurisdiction of the lower court who has original
jurisdiction over the criminal case and who has issued the order
granting bail in the exercise of this jurisdiction. If indeed there is a
question relating to the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa
pursuant to the lower court’s order pending the determination of the
certiorari issues, such question should be brought before the lower
court as the tribunal that has ordered the release, or before the
Seventh Division of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory
powers over the lower court. The Decision recently promulgated by
the Seventh Division of this Court ordering the release on bail of the
soldiers-accused effectively demonstrates this point.
The inter-relationships among the criminal case below, the certiorari
case and the present petition, as well as among the courts where
these cases are pending, show beyond doubt that the petitioner
committed forum shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e., the
attempt by a party, after an adverse opinion in one forum, to seek a
favorable opinion in another forum other that through an appeal or
certiorari. The "adverse" aspect for the petitioner, while not an
opinion, is no less adverse as he has failed to secure the release of
Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court and before this Court in
the certiorari case (as of the time of the filing of the present petition);
thus, he came to us in the present petition. That the Seventh Division
of this Court has ordered the release on bail of the soldiers-accused,
thus rendering the present petition moot and academic after the
finality of the 7th Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this legal
reality.18
The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure for the aforesaid
violation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the
petition for violation of and pursuant to Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner, Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, is
hereby CENSURED for these violations. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished the Honorable Supreme Court, to be attached to the
petitioner’s record as a member of the Bar, as a RECORD OF
CENSURE that may be referred to and considered in any future
similar act.19
On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the
Court of Appeals (Special Former Third Division) denied in its resolution21 dated 6
January 2006.
Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
NATURE OF THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO
THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONER
THE PENALTY OF CENSURE.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE
EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO
DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI GONZALES.
Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
be reversed and set aside, and an order be issued ordering respondents to
immediately release Gonzales and Mesa. He further prays that the censure
against him be also reversed and set aside.
Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with leave of
court, a Motion to Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of Julius Mesa
and Cezari Gonzales.22 Petitioner informed the Court that the Commanding
General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of Gonzales and Mesa
and surrendered their persons to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus,
Mesa and Gonzales are now enjoying temporary liberty by virtue of the release
orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC. Petitioner asks that the prayer for
the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be dismissed but asks that the
other prayers in the petition be granted.
In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that the habeas corpus petition
has been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of Mesa and
Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an actual case or controversy, it
is impractical to consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of
their detention, including the alleged refusal of the Court of Appeals to resolve
said issues.
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic.23 With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the
Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no
actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic,
there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of
the same of no practical value.24 This Court will therefore abstain from expressing
its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.25
49
The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum
shopping? (2) Should petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the
3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which
asked for the annulment of the RTC’s order granting Gonzales and Mesa’s
petition for bail?

To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner asserts
that the issues in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not
similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of respondents’ filing of the motion for
reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that the same has
no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed
said petition, the order granting bail subsisted and has not been reversed or
modified; and no TRO or injunction has been issued that would affect the efficacy
or validity of the order granting the bail and the order directing the release of
Mesa and Gonzales.

For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is
precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping.

It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Thus, it has been held that there is forum
shopping — (1) when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; OR (2)
if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files a motion
before the Court of Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals
in the hope that even in one case in which a particular allowable remedy sought
for is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open; OR
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after
failing to obtain the same from the original court.26

The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the
rule against forum shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of parties;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27

As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by

petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of
Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for Habeas
Corpusbecause the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for
in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to
whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the
presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are
substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in
the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus
guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari
case, petitioner clearly violated his obligation to disclose within five days the
pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as mandated in Section 5(c),
Rule 728 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 90546 dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

50
G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES,
and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition assails the Decision 1dated November 10, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari
against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 03-004.
Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution 2dated March 19, 2004
denying reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived
with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C.
Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that
they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left
the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of
his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On
January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the
Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and
Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before this Court
the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this
Court, who is directed to immediately make a return.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
but the same was dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court
affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its January 23,
2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was
simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The
appellate court held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a
summary proceeding, on the cause of the minor’s detention and the matter of his
custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following
grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an
order for the petitioner-mother to first show cause why her own three-year old
child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called "restraint" despite
no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal
unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender years. The
assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals are clearly void;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is
not warranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and
considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby
negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own
son of tender years. The petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the
writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case
supports rather than negates the position of the petitioners.
4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence
to the tender-years-rule
5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to
present prima facie proof of any compelling reason of the unfitness of the
petitioner-mother;
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES
AS REMEDY. 6
Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the trial court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 and
February 24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 7 of the Family Code,
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They
maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling
reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the
proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but
not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against
the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist
there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There
was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very
own child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners’ argument based on Article 213 of
the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the
custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as
the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available
against any person who restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice
versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had
petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with
the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates
specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial
court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie
Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges
that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of
her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody
of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003
Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but
merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they
are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still
pending before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1 8 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not
appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under
Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent
upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
from a person entitled thereto. 9Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority
over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In
the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still
entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition. 11 Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.
The Child and Youth Welfare Code12 unequivocally provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration. 13
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any
of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line
with the directive in Section 9 14 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC 15 that within fifteen days
after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the
court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present
the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court.
Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s petition for
custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.
Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child
under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003
and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated November 10, 2003
and the Resolutiondated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
51
G.R. No. 190108 October 19, 2010
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO
GUISANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A. VICENTE, National Center for Mental
Health, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 190473
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO
GUISANDE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions:
(1) A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against
Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente
(Dr. Vicente) of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH),
docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and
(2) G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the
NCMH, assailing the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
rendered in open court on December 3, 2009, in the case docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039.
The antecedents are:
Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of
habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande
(Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge
Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-
threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital
ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state
of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense.
Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was
committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center
(MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by
Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood
Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal
psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan.
Acting on the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to Refer Accused’s Illness to a
Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for
an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if
she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.
Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused
Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to
have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would
issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility
upon the NCMH’s determination that she was ready for trial.
Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead
of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section, where female court case patients
are usually confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith, Dr. Vicente issued a
special Memorandum on November 9, 2009, reiterating existing hospital policies
on the handling of court case patients undergoing evaluation procedures to
foreclose any possibility of malingering2 on the patient’s part, specifically patients
accused of a non-bailable crime.
Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her
confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and
violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of
counsel, accused Guisande and her father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed
a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong City,
and the present petition in G.R. No. 190108 for the issuance of the writs of
habeas corpus and amparo.
On the Motion for Relief filed with RTC Mandaluyong City, Judge Tacla issued
the following Order:
The Court rules to Grant accused’s [Guisande’s] motion subject to the condition
that only the accused’s counsel and the accused’ physician on her hypothyroid
condition are allowed to visit the accused in coordination with the respective
psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric examination
upon accused.3
On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, this Court issued a Resolution on
November 24, 2009, to wit:
G.R. No. 190108 (David E. So, in Behalf of his Daughter Maria Elena So
Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong,
Branch 208, Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente, National Center for Mental Health). –
Acting on the Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, the Court
Resolved to
(a) ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO;
(b) REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i)
IMMEDIATE RAFFLE among the Members of the said Court; (ii)
HEARING on December 3, 2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii)
DECISION within ten (10) days after its submission for decision; and
(c) ORDER the respondents to make a verified RETURN of the Joint
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amparo before the Court of Appeals,
Manila, on December 1, 2009, and to COMMENT on the petition
before said date.4
As directed by this Court, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente appeared before the CA
on December 1, 2009 and, in the afternoon, filed their Consolidated Return of the
Writ.
On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the RTC
Mandaluyong City:
ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS:
Review of the history and clinical reports from Makati Medical Center revealed
that Ma. Elena So-Guisande was diagnosed and managed as Bipolar I Disorder.
On the other hand, based on a series of mental status examinations and
observations at our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of
psychosis at the present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe depressive
episode was manifested during her confinement at our center, despite voluntarily
not taking her medication is. Although she is complaining of mood symptoms,
these are not severe enough to impair her fitness to stand trial.
Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and objective of
the court proceedings and the possible consequences of her cases. She is
likewise capable of communicating with her counsels.
She is therefore deemed COMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CA’s Special
Seventeenth Division held a hearing. Thereafter, Justice Normandie B. Pizarro
(Justice Pizarro), to whom the petition was raffled, disposed, in this wise:
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
The essence of the deliberation this morning is on the proceedings that obtained
pursuant to the September 22, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
208, Mandaluyong City. The parties heard the arguments of the Petitioner on the
right of the subject patient, Ma. Elena, to avail of extended medical treatment
citing the Constitution and the Geneva Convention on Human Rights.
In the course of the proceedings this morning, Judge Tacla, Jr., informed this
Court that the NCMH submitted to him a report consisting of eight (8) pages at
about 8:46 this morning. The parties, specifically the petitioner, were shown the
said report. Afterwards, Judge Tacla’s opinion on the matter was heard and he
did not interpose any objection thereto. The Accused, subject of this case, Ma.
Elena So-Guisande, may now be discharged from the custody of the NCMH and
is considered fit for the rigors of trial. The parties were heard on the matter and
all of them were in accord with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid report.
After a prolonged discussion on the matter, and without objection on the part of
the parties, as the Accused should now proceed to trial in accordance with law,
and at the same time recognizing the right of the Accused to avail of further
medication, this Court decrees the following set up that should cover this
proceedings: The trial of this case shall resume and the arraignment at the Court
a quo shall push through as originally scheduled on February 2, 2010. To
balance the situation, the right to seek medical treatment of the subject is hereby
recognized by all and the patient shall be confined at the St. Clare’s Medical
Center, 1838 Dian St., Palanan, Makati City, her hospital of choice, under the
headship of Dr. Yat, subject to the twenty-four (24) hour custodial control of the
NBI.
xxxx
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
Dr. Yat is directed to submit, again by agreement of the parties, a periodic report
every fifteen days to the RTC, Branch 208, for its evaluation. The first report shall
be submitted on or before December 18, 2009.
In this regard, the Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to
cause the transfer from NCMH to the St. Clare’s Medical Center of the subject
Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or three (3) security
personnel to the Accused after making the proper coordination with the RTC,
Branch 208. Director Mantaring is to submit a one (1) page compliance on the
52
matter within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution – furnishing Judge
Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof.
xxxx
It is understood that the case pending before RTC, Branch 208, involves a non-
bailable offense where normally the Accused should have been confined in jail.
But considering the peculiarities of this case, the parties have all agreed to the
set up as provided in this Order. It is also understood by the parties that
henceforth the control of the trial proceedings as well as the control over the
custody of the accused/patient shall be in the hands of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 208, Mandaluyong City.
STATE SOL. DE VERA:
Your honor, the Hospital fees to be settled before the transfer, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
As committed in open-Court, Atty. Carpio shall insure the settlement of the fees
for the confinement of Accused/patient at the NCMH, as a pre-condition for her
release therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for Habeas
Corpus and Amparo is considered CLOSE and TERMINATED. All parties are
notified in open court of this Order.
xxxx
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
Let copies of this Order be furnished the RTC, Br. 208, Mandaluyong City, the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation as well as the Supreme Court,
and all the parties.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190473, filed by
the OSG, which was consolidated with G.R. No. 190108.
During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which
ultimately led to the incident before this Court, i.e., a Manifestation and
Motion6 dated March 11, 2010, filed by the OSG on behalf of public respondents,
Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, to wit:
1. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor’s January 25, 2010 Motion
to Withdraw Information, public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. MC019-12281. Hence, their Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before this Honorable Court has been
rendered moot and academic. A copy of the February 4, 2010 Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 is attached herewith as Annex "A."
2. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from
which the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed
before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R.
SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473)
stemmed from, these cases and pending incidents thereon should be dismissed
for having been rendered moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No.
190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for
Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) and all other pending incidents thereon
be DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.
Petitioner So filed a Comment7 refuting the OSG’s motion to dismiss G.R. Nos.
190108 and 190473. Through counsel, and using strong words, he vehemently
opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed criminal complaints
and an administrative case against respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as
well as the NCMH and an attending doctor thereat, for purported violations of
accused Guisande’s rights during her confinement at the NCMH. Adding to the
flurry of cases, petitioner So filed a Verified Petition to cite Judge Tacla and Dr.
Vicente in contempt before the CA for their supposed submission of an altered
and falsified document, which was attached to, and formed an integral part of,
their Consolidated Return of the Writ.
Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a Motion to
Admit Reply8 with its Reply9 to the Comment of petitioner So attached thereto.
The OSG clarified and denied outright petitioner So’s allegation in the Comment
that the criminal case for Qualified Theft against accused Guisande was a
prevarication and concoction of private complainant10 and that Judge Tacla had
conspired to falsely accuse petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande. In all, the OSG
reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been rendered moot and
academic with the dismissal of the criminal case for Qualified Theft against
Guisande.
Significantly, on August 25, 2010, the OSG filed another Manifestation and
Motion11 informing this Court of the following:
(1) Resolution dated June 7, 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa D.
Escobar-Pilares (Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares), dismissing the
charge of petitioner So against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente and their counsels
for Falsification under Article 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed
as I.S. No. XV-07-INV-10B-01371, for insufficiency of evidence;12 and
(2) Resolution dated July 27, 2010 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, where
petitioner So’s verified petition for contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and
where the CA ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo closed and
terminated.13
Likewise, the OSG reiterated its motion to dismiss the instant consolidated
petitions.
We completely agree with the OSG. Accordingly, we deny the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 190108 and 190473 for having been rendered moot and academic by the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC09-12281 for Qualified Theft pending before
the RTC Mandaluyong City.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus
and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner
So’s daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and
circumstances of his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH
was "life threatening"; although Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense,
the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to
balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of
the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a non-
bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St.
Clare’s Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case,
there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since accused
Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was charged with a
non-bailable offense.
Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in
the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of
petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH
was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge
Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande
to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed
government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So’s and
accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or
omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and
custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life,
liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the
foregoing rules. In Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy
Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon,
P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana,
Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B.
Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman,14 we qualified:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized
and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings
and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to
and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than
the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.15
In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC,
Manila, Branch 37, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias,
PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson,16 we
intoned:
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted
via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally,
in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.
53
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or
not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire
into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such
restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the
writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as
a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the
court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.17
Likewise, respondents’ statement that [Guisande] is "facing non-bailable
offenses" is not absolutely false. Respondents satisfactorily explained that at the
time of the filing of their pleading, they believed in good faith that she was facing
more than one non-bailable offenses (sic) as she was charged with Qualified
Theft before the Mandaluyong City RTC, Branch 208 and Syndicated Estafa
before the San Juan Prosecutor’s office. While it may be true that [Guisande] has
only one (1) non-bailable offense pending in court, respondents proved with their
evidence that she had others pending at the time in other forum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
charges for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
filed against all respondents namely: (1) Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., (2) Dr.
Bernardino A. Vicente, (3) ASG General Magtanggol M. Castro, SSS Diana H.
Castañeda-de Vera, SS Charina A. Soria and AS Jefferson C. Secillano, be
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.21
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
190108 and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot and
academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which
hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused
Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition.18 In
addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH
for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand
trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically
to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City,
although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the
arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial
court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the
non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue
medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice. 1avv phi 1

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande,
she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the
NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical
and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the
lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now
been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,19 is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value."

Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares,

unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:

We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies
to this Court when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-
bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of
amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1)
non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the
number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for
habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was
whether or not Elena’s confinement at NCMH was lawful.

Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt
of court, is rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already
rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to
[David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.

Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge
Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by
the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant petition for
habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.20

In XV-07-INV-10B-01371 for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the

Revised Penal Code, the Assistant City Prosecutor made the following findings:

x x x [T]he undersigned finds no probable cause that respondents committed the

charges filed against them.

Examination of the Contract of Confinement which was claimed to have been

falsified reveals that it was merely a photocopy. The supposed full photocopy of
the original copy of the subject contract did not contain any alteration (change) or
intercalation (insertion) that could have changed its meaning or that could have
made it speak of something false. The contents of the contract depicting that
[Guisande’s] yaya (Ms. Galleto) was indeed confined at the NCMH as claimed by
respondents to accompany [Guisande], [So’s] daughter who was confined
thereat remained the same. Respondents explained that they were unaware of
the inadvertent partial reproduction of the document and supported the same
with an affidavit of good faith executed by an NCMH clerk explaining why it was
only partially reproduced.

54
G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008 In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
vs. exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents. unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
DECISION
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
CORONA, J.: person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)

This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and
September 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying
the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by petitioner
Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor
state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She was living with
petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and
Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made
repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that
respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof
that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to
the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution
dated February 2, 2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a
person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider legal
custody or custodial rights. The writ of habeas corpus is available not only if the
rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the person entitled thereto but
also if the person who disappears or is illegally being detained is of legal age and
is not under guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who
are not under the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is
alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas
corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that
will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire
into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty.14 If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such
restraint exists.15 If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the
writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.16 Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as
a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.17 Judicial discretion is
called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ.18 It is only if the
court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.20
In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was
being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained
of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she
was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents,
being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.21 (emphasis
supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters
of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption,
respondent Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister8 while respondent Teresita was
Eufemia’s niece and petitioner’s sister.9

Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with
Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the
rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.

Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the "encargado" or

administrator of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased
Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and
transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the
respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.

In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory
and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These demands were
unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were compelled to file a
complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents
decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter willingly went
with them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to prove either his right to the
custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.

We rule for the respondents.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a
person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto.10 It is issued when one is
either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.11 Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1)
deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled
to such custody.

In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully
withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty.
Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of
Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to
her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is
important is Eufemia’s personal freedom.

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action.12

55
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698 June 23, 2005
DANTE VICENTE, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated July 21, 2000, addressed to then Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo, Dante Vicente charged respondent Judge Jose S.
Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 23,
with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality,
praying that he be administratively disciplined and terminated from the service.
The instant administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases
involving a certain Evelyn Te of General Santos City. The factual and procedural
antecedents leading to the instant administrative case is summarized in this
Court’s Resolution of February 19, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 entitled, People
of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Te, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
In a joint decision dated May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
General Santos City, found Evelyn Te guilty on four counts of violation of B. P.
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentenced her to
two (2) months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and
executory after this Court had denied Te’s petition for review from the affirmance
of the trial court’s decision by the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she
should serve her sentences successively or simultaneously. In an order, dated
May 25, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences
successively, but ‘for humanitarian reason’ and in accordance with Art. 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, it held that ‘instead of serving imprisonment of EIGHT
months, the prisoner EVELYN TE should serve only six months.’
On June 2, 2000, Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also
considered as a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v.
Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), in which the sentence of imprisonment
of a party found guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to
double the amount of the check involved, Te prayed that her sentence be
similarly modified and that she be immediately released from detention. In a
supplemental motion, Te argued that she had been denied equal protection of
the law because the trial judge in another case involving multiple counts of
robbery directed the accused to simultaneously serve his sentences.
On June 20, 2000, the trial court denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that Te was detained by virtue of a final
judgment.
On June 22, 2000, Te filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the
ground that she had been in jail since March 15, 2000 and had fully served the
three months minimum of her total sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. In the alternative, Te prayed for release on recognizance.
On June 23, 2000, Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order of June
20, 2000, alleging that the finality of the joint decision against her did not bar her
application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending determination
as to whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail
pursuant to Rule 102, §14.
On July 5, 2000, the trial court allowed Te to post bail in the amount of one
million pesos, holding that it would order her release upon the approval of her
bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has
concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus.
On July 7, 2000, the trial court approved Te’s bail bonds in the reduced amount
of ₱500,000.00 and ordered her release. The trial court also directed its clerk of
court to certify the proceedings to the Court.
On July 11, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved
for reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution of July 5, 2000.
On July 18, 2000, Te filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated June 20,
2000, and the resolution, dated July 5, 2000, of the trial court.
On July 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the
Assistant City Prosecutor. It also denied due course to Te’s notice of appeal on
the ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the Court of Appeals
because it had already ordered that the whole records be forwarded to this Court
pursuant to Rule 102, §14.1
In the present case, complainant, who claims to be the station manager of Radyo
Bombo, General Santos City, alleges that while Te was in prison, respondent
judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that
she was suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that
respondent judge approved Te’s application for bail as part of habeas
corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of Te was
filed and docketed. As a result of respondent judge’s order allowing the
provisional liberty of Te, the local media in General Santos City made an uproar
and criticized respondent judge for his action on the said case. In retaliation,
respondent judge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen who published
a critical article against him. Complainant contends that respondent judge will not
hesitate to use his clout and power to stifle criticism and dissent. In addition,
complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent judge allowed the
release of the accused without the posting of the necessary bail. On the basis of
the above allegations, complainant prays that respondent judge be investigated
and if warranted, be terminated and removed from service.2
In his Comment, dated October 17, 2000, respondent judge submitted the
following contentions which we quote verbatim:
1. The certified records of the above-mentioned cases against Evelyn
Te were forwarded to the Supreme Court on August 5, 2000, upon
the order of undersigned by the Branch Clerk of Court for review of
our questioned Order (attached as ANNEX ‘1’ of letter Complaint);
2. On June 2, 2000, Evelyn Te’s counsel filed not only a motion for
reconsideration denying our previous order denying her motion for
release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the
same cases;
3. In the exercise of sound discretion and after hearing the comment
of the public prosecutor, we issued the questioned Order, which is
self-explanatory;
4. We believed then that we had the discretion to allow her to be
released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court;
5. We were thinking then that in such a dilemma, whether or not to
release her on bail, it was a better judgment to release her from bail
on a writ of habeas corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her
contention that she is considered to have served her sentences
simultaneously. If we denied her petition for Habeas Corpus, and on
appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the Supreme Court,
surely, she could return and charge us with a graver offense of
ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion. She could even file
other cases against us under the Revised Penal Code, such as
rendering an unjust order, or under the Civil Code for moral damages
in millions of pesos;
6. To obviate such a possible move on Te’s part, we opted to allow
her release on bail through the writ of habeas corpus proceedings.
Anyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on that matter;
7. Therefore, we are of the view that the letter complaint of Mr. Dante
Vicente is legally premature as it concerned cases which are
still sub judice;
8. Besides, we are of the opinion that Mr. Vicente has no personality
as a third party to charge us with anything as he has not shown any
damage that he could have suffered because of our Order;
9. We are convinced that Mr. Vicente is trying to pre-empt our move
to charge his radio station for libel or cite the announcer for indirect
contempt of Court when his radio station and announcer had been
reviling and attacking us for many days on the air for having allowed
Evelyn Te to be treated and confined in a hospital upon
recommendation of a government doctor and for having allowed her
release from imprisonment on bail; a certified Xerox copy of the letter
of the Regional Director of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (National Telecommunications Commission) dated
August 9, 2000, in reply to our request for copies of the broadcast
tapes, is attached herewith as ANNEX "1";
10. As to the charge that we are stifling criticism by the print and
broadcast media, we are of the view that if media has the privilege to
criticize the Courts and the Judges, we have also the right to charge
them for indirect contempt of Court and libel, because there are laws
regarding this matter. The article of a certain Joseph Jubelag is now a
subject of an indirect contempt charge before us, which we are about
to resolve;
11. Regarding our Order in Criminal Case No. 14072 in the case of
‘People vs. Jhoyche Gersonin-Palma’, RTC Br. 36, it was done with
sound discretion on our part because it was already 6:30 in the
evening and the offices were closed and being a Friday, the accused
would be detained for two days and three nights, unless we accepted
and approved the bail bond. Besides, the law requires judges to
approve bail even during the holidays. Immediately, on Monday, the
money in the amount of ₱6,000.00 was deposited with the Clerk of
Court as shown in the official receipt (ANNEX ‘6’ of letter complaint);
12. Regarding our competence, honesty and integrity, modesty aside,
as a judge for the last thirteen years in General Santos City, the
records of the Municipal Trial Court and RTC, Branches 23 and 22
(being a pairing judge of the latter court since October last year) show
that most of our decisions appealed to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court have been sustained or affirmed;
13. As to our reputation in the community, let other members of the
media and a member of the Philippine Bar speak about it. We are
enclosing herewith a Xerox copy of a news clipping of Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 8, 2000 issue (attached herewith as ANNEX ‘2’), about
how we tried and decided the celebrated case
of Peoplevs. Castracion, et. al. when the Supreme Court assigned us
to hear the evidence of the defense and decide the case. We did our
work in that case as best we could as we have done in all cases
being tried and decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our work with
56
 faithful diligence, honesty, and integrity. We do not expect praises
from others as we do not also wish to be criticized or attacked by
Radio Bombo station in General Santos City especially by its
manager, Mr. Dante Vicente, without basis or competent proof and
evidence. Atty. Rogelio Garcia, who vouched for our honesty,
competence and integrity is a former assemblyman of South
Cotabato and General Santos City, and an ex-Assistant Minister of
Labor. He has known us in the community for almost twenty five
years;
14. Complainant Dante Vicente is just a newcomer to General Santos
and he and his radio station have a bad and notorious reputation of
attacking the character and good name of some people here as
shown by cases for libel filed in our courts.3
In its Report dated March 11, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
confirmed that Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460 were indeed certified by
respondent to this Court.4 However, this Court in its Resolution of February 19,
2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18, resolved to return the records of the consolidated
cases to the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23, and to order the said court
to give due course to Evelyn Te’s notice of appeal from the Order denying her
petition for habeas corpus and from the Order requiring her to post bail in the
amount of one million pesos for her release from detention. This Court made the
following pronouncements:
Rule 102, §14 provides:
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. – If it
appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically
charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he
shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or
restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he
may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the
court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum
as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the
prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance
before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or
judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the
bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall
be recommitted to confinement.
The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the
writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not
where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. Indeed,
Rule 102, §4 disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is ‘suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.’
The certification of a case under Rule 102, §14, moreover, refers to cases where
the habeas corpus court finds that the applicant is charged with the noncapital
offense in another court. Thus, the certification of this case to this Court is clearly
erroneous.5
On the basis of the above-quoted Resolution and the provisions of Section 24,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the OCA, in its Report in the present case, found
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he
be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00.6
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for the recommended
penalty.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the
grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to
serve sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. – An accused shall not be
allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for
probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the
offense being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused
has applied for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but
if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow
his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has
commenced to serve sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when the
convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence,
provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.
In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 on four counts and imposing upon her the penalty of imprisonment for two
months on each count has already become final and executory. She did not
apply for probation. At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was
already serving her sentence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent judge
contends that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, he has the
discretion to allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court reiterates its
pronouncement in its Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18
that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases where the
applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge
against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present
controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final
judgment.
The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that respondent judge’s
ignorance or disregard of the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 and Section 14,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.7 It is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines.8 He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth,
to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.9 When
the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.10
In the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the
litigation of criminal cases before trial courts, we are not impressed with the
explanation of respondent judge in granting bail to Te. Respondent judge
contends that he was caught in a dilemma whether or not to grant bail in favor of
Te. However, he thought that it would be better for him to release Te on bail
rather than deny her application; for if such denial is later found out by the
appellate courts to be erroneous, Te could charge him with gross ignorance of
the law and abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an unjust order or
for damages. Hence, to obviate such possible move on Te’s part, he simply
allowed her to be released on bail and relieved himself of any burden brought
about by the case of Te by certifying the same to this Court contending that,
"[a]nyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on (the) matter."
The Court finds respondent’s reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot
simply shirk responsibility by conveniently passing the buck, so to speak, to this
Court on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter. This is hardly the
kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion or fear of criticism. In Dimatulac vs. Villon,11 we held that:
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of
duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for the administration of
justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest
"in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge
must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and
confidence reposed in him.12
In the present case, respondent judge fell short of the above-cited ideals
expected of a magistrate.
Complainant’s allegation that no petition for habeas corpus was filed does not
hold water. As borne by the records, the Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer
D. Lastimosa, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
shows that Evelyn Te’s petition for habeas corpus was incorporated in the
pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460, although no docket fees
and other charges were paid.13 There is no showing that respondent should be
held administratively liable for the non-payment of docket and other lawful fees.
At any rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal taken by Te, as earlier
adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.
Complainant further claims that on several occasions, respondent judge allowed
Te to be released and confined at a local hospital on account of false illnesses.
However, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to prove this charge. On the
contrary, records on hand show that the confinement of Te in the hospital is
recommended by a panel of government doctors and that such confinement is
made without the objection of the public prosecutor.14Hence, the Court finds
respondent judge’s act of allowing the temporary confinement of Te in the
hospital as justified. The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that in the
absence of contradictory evidence, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty should be upheld in favor of respondent judge.15
The Court likewise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent judge guilty of
the charge that he uses his clout and power to stifle criticism and dissent. In the
present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in his act of requiring a
number of journalists to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect
contempt. Freedom of speech and of expression, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is not absolute.16 Freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.17 In the instant case, the Court finds
nothing whimsical or despotic in respondent judge’s act of issuing the subject
show-cause order. Instead, respondent is merely exercising his right to protect
his honor and, more importantly, the integrity of the court which he represents.
As to the issue that respondent judge allowed the release of an accused in
Criminal Case No. 14072, entitled People vs. Jhoyce Gersonin-Palma, without
the required bail bond being posted, it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to
resolve the same on the basis of the OCA Report as it is already the subject of a
separate administrative case against respondent.18
Having found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law, as discussed
earlier, the Court now determines the proper imposable penalty. Section 8(9),
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the
law or procedure as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the
imposable penalties, in case the respondent is found culpable of a serious
charge, range from a fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not more than
₱40,000.00 to dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, except accrued leaves, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
However, on February 24, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the
compulsory retirement age of 70.19Considering that respondent can no longer be
dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no recourse but to impose the
penalty of fine.
57
Further, it is noted that on July 8, 2002, the Third Division of this Court, in
Administrative Matter No.10874-Ret., concerning the compulsory retirement of
respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside
₱100,000.00 thereof in view of several administrative cases still pending against
him.20

In the administrative complaints filed against respondent, two cases have, so far,
resulted in his being fined. In Chan vs. Majaducon,21 respondent was found guilty
of violating among others, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial conduct and was meted the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00.
In the more recent case of Alconera vs. Majaducon,22 respondent was found
guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and was fined ₱40,000.00. In view of the
foregoing, it is proper to impose the maximum fine of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted
from the ₱100,000.00 set aside from respondent’s retirement benefits in A.M. No.
10874-Ret.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law

or procedure. He is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the
₱100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

SO ORDERED.

58
G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the
names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex,"
"James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. name is included in the "Order of Battle."30
ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents. On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s
house in Quezon City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave
petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail
DECISION address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the
handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly
warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward
PEREZ, J.:
will happen to her and her family.36

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the
August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a
cellular phone given to her.37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored
petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo
and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular
(Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court
phone with a SIM card.
of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection
order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of
the decision reads: any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this
Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby
uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the
grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the
distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined
similar papers relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas;
from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be
alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident.
issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort
Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of
Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce
the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is
documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not
no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or
limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division,
torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this
its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4)
incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible.
respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any
Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her
document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any
family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment,
name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to
intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3
petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external
hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and
We begin with the petitioner’s allegations. her ₱15,000.00 cash.40

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States,
petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which
she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various
provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to
join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz,
Tarlac for a future medical mission.7
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their
verified written return.42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the
Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9 The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage
managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely
on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito
Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the
Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the
purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two
house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents
in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in
drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s
the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled
house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her
by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding
companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can only
that they open up.11
mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it
must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside petitioner and her companions themselves.48
and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The
armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader,
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as
were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13
actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5)
days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily produced
on her and tied her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists
herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a and knee caps.50
nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against her vigorous
resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very
arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
authenticity of petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside
police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims
her.17 The van then sped away.
of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner
to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and mileage to her and the group that she represents.51
Jandoc were ordered to alight.19 After she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public
People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and
respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition
was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its
based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria
metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of
Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,52 and (b) as
planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that
against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any
she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least
authorized, the commission of such atrocities.53
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture.23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to
her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold."24 The torture, on the other
ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and
hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.25
military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following
manner:
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds
even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was
Police Action
allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman
named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated
her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28 Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in
the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came

59
to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed
men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police
station launched an initial investigation.56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who
informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—
later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward
Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the
abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by
about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58Other
witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue
van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no
plate numbers.59
At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash
Message to the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort
to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the
effort yielded negative results.60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special
Report61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by
public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent
Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the
abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of
the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special
Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-
depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background
examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the
motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the
perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan
and the Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights—organizations trusted by
petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation in the ongoing
investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for
the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had
been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus
Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their
latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a
definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductors—a fact that
task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her
fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came
to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of
the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their
return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed
to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an
inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor
S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to
public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the
Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation
on the abduction of the petitioner.74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public
respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A.
Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of
the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding
the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported
abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva
tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
conduct the investigation.76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation
Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described
petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any
involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the
petitioner’s version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture
for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by
which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was
thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is
merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly
taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the
petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are
reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her
harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her
abductors onto their van.82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against
the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact
and monitor her, even after she was released.83 This threat, according to the
Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police
authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the
appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by
directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as
continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction.85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to
informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of
investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-
NPA.86The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a
photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list
representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which
allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative
Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-
NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of
Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of
media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute
a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on
her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the
privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain
from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to
petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction
and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced
that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the
government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the
petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus,
the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the
abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as
against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her
immunity from suit.92
Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings
were denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order
also met the same fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public
respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to
this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her
prayer for the return of her personal belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard
while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by
her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government
involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command
responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she
impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from
this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her
abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents
in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and,
by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in
an amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command
responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine
is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is
"an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is
made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
(Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative
60
case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in
the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation
of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While the principal objective
of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does
not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether
that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive
law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has
been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts
in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which
case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command
responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in
relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission,
in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner
in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on
their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had
condoned her abduction and torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was
government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls
attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture—i.e., the
forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization
of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way
enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state
forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysay—a conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required
to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner
does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police
personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of
abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances
does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is
concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the
involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence
based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court
cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly
and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits,114 the cartographic sketches115of several of her abductors whose faces
she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches
have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner,
this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in
such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any
military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was
not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the
place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat.
Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and
observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they
were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that
she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With
nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her
abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military
or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that
petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion
of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this
insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the
public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal
belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by
reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were
involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind
of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is
doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement
of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the
liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive
proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable
in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner,
lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already
subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines
the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her
prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military
involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort
Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the
Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to
the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow
a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the
claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making
a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from
the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not
require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the
supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie
case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong
enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay,
an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot
issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or
causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the
CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised
as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an
error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in
granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant
portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports
and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa
Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner
claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay
61
Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us,
Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where
they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who
wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover
claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner
holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training
exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said
video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa
Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature
have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner’s abduction
where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts
which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be
continuously made available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will
certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have
strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption
without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right
to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to
grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the
right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ
may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by
the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA,
was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of
the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to
the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid
of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be
actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference
regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right
to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the
grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency
to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents,
revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this
case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must
be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of
the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant
to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for
the protection of human rights,"128must be tapped in order to fill certain
investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not
able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government
complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and
one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward"
situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by
law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and
is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any
amparo case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent
safeguard—requiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to
prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless
and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the
amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their
investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the
Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military
investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows
modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of
the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on
the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to
other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors
of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a
logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its necessity is
clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of
the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with
allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on
the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less
than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.131 While it may be
conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the
progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the
former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN
not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant
leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner
cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of law—
they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be
pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence
required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports
still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus
Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The
reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr.
Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one
who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any mask. 1avvphi 1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the
sketches included in petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were
prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the
latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be
unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken.
This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete
investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the
right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the
deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real
perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay,
necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the
abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the
petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have
advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in
terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final
resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and
appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner,
also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting
further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps:
(a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches
submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to
pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP,
or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of
the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its
personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and
torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the
reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations;
and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner
62
 during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in
hereinafter be determined by this Court. CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are
AFFIRMED.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining SO ORDERED.
whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already
be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at
least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall
submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to
accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby

render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of
her personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection

of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without

prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may make on
the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted
to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be

undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as

the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights
shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or
continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the
persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted
by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to
pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction
and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine

National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or
his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the Commission on Human Rights,
including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of
its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the

Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to
this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations
and their recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights

(a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on
its investigation and its corresponding recommendations;
and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the
petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until
such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for
the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by

the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and

recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture
of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under
any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this
determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from

receipt of the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which
shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL
of the petition as against the public respondents who
were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the
APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA
RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this

petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.

63
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the
world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional
protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers
all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security
in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and
set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo
and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein
petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders,
and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment;
and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise
restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and
other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition,
to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be
granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs
prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after
hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all
other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as
a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents
requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written
return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We
REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary
hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide
the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which
reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days
from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of
the investigation undertaken in connection with their case,
except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment
of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within
five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports,
records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the
signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly
authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made
apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this
directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by
herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before
February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the
CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San
Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not
informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he
passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing
white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he
was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and
nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his
house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to
stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his
mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael
de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all
acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in
Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly
taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan
and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was
blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took
him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was
about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house
and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old.
Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and
about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and
made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he
recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The
van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms
left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for
about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room
and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers
asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he
was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his
comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members
he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the
soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with
respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw
their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that
the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers.
One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes,
instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents
and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents'
abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the
guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond
was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond
was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his
stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol,
punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning
wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe,
they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room.
Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the
next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to
get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still
awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand
from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad
and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his
chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an
Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry,
asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort
Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing
him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought
him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He
was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They
poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called,
saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers
ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo
was detained.20
64
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their
wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture
resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a
room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring
1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels,
bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort
Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One
room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad
and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also
sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body
and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they
were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs
were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in
white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines,
including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the
results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and
take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter,
medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias
Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While
there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to
monitor and take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with
Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment
in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two
weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there,
Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside
the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang,
Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a
basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan
was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which
Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him.
Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if
he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be
because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di
ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon
na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin
mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa
Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa
magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami
na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not
do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men -
the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house.
Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because
he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond
relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,
Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they
continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again.
The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave.
He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario
and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in
a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told
him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for
him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and
would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the
side of the military and warned that they would not be given another
chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his
picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen.
Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one
capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine.
The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon
waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at
Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce
himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan.
While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his
house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson
under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a
big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a
30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was
kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean
outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was
also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the
University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his
arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen
and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to
know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the
24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At
times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up.
In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They
were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue
along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006
to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in
his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There
were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some
soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with
their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They
were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some
other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers
of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he
witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA
members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond
was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they
arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him
and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred
to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed
with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales
from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the
camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami.
Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng
silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o
marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang
bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos
sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang
Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na
binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng
sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay
nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at
ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo.
Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga
bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong
sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya.
Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong
gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel
dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel,
65
 wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo
ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig
at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena
mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong
kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na
raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil
magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo
ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa
gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told
respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of
the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and
were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for
Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from
where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid
Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved
Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular
phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A
phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned
some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed
in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted
respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not
have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio.
In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking
session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When
none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs.
They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit
insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that
when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces
of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the
soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When
Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely
beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because
Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and
punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in
Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal
Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous
area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a
military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along
Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del
Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was
also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different
houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was
blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once
outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and
Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp
Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was
connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of
human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was
requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after
their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents
were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The
examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents'
escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in
conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In
compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return
of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement
therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time
arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado,
disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by
petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the
24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of
the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in
his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU),
namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula
dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents
therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of
Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed
at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no
evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in
the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27,
2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack
of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the
remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers
and ordered them to release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein
petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office
only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged
abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual
military directional operations, neither does he undertake command
directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage
the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of
National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to
the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces
of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable
Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to
institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of
the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise,
in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have
issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the
AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of
the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death
or disappearance of the person identified in the petition
which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of
death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice
that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent
court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached
to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did
the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of
the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the
result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate
conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s,
dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG,
71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached
as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or
to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has been
furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units
relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994)
filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño
pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert
earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the
disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had
complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of
justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence
that may be gathered in the process.50
66
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe
Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case
in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among
others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the
24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately
went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no
untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held
captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in
the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further
inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding
the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was
reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to
inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to
be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such
beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used
by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the
affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured
in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col.
Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based
in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this
Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry
Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of
the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of
Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU
auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la
Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-
CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He
was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this
particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction
of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was
happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them
execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29,
2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in
the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the
individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other
sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other
witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to
him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six
persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet
them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in
the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to
the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but
Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign
their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power
failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of
their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the
Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his
investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and
finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006
for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14
February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were
forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims
filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein
suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz,
Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged
members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29
May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy.
Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete
building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some
neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being
informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of
the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation
that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated
him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who
abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and
CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement
on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd
29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan.
He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors
are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also
knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA
Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged
abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of
the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of
those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his
residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the
incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by
Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated
him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at
Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much
aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he
also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando
Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house
of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived
home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they
implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal
charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is
an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently
denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006
in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar
to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew
them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the
incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2)
brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and
CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with their family
particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their
brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He
claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his
father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian
vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo
brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006
in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA
based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio
mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA
and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any
participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and
learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his
barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated
because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his
brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod
and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the
Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are
active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating
within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb
2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in
their place and he learned only about the incident which is the
abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy.
Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the
matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation
against him as being one of the abductors and he considers
everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal
to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular
case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and
67
 disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on
14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement
theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to
indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the
past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by
@ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish
a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of
revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused
claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the
CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place,
they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors
and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting
their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside
their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is
concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged
charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents
has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to
indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability.
It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman
dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela
Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's
assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007
Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO
THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND
OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS)
TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE
COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE
CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL
REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY
TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO
INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006
UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on
July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-
based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in
mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an
exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in
the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings"
are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in
Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in
Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review
in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejón, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the
exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by
the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific
case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the
statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional
right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore
the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines
the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on
judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It
enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the
entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually
evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each
country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme
Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal
heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful
history conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of
public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several
purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent
to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for
the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted
an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights,
including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany
and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ
of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the
writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our
charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The
Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the
Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo
libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S.
common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause
through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a
writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy
provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence,
or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in
that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it
is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the
goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic
rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They
also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment
of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on
October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court
granted their motion.
68
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners'
first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and
giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated,
contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of
petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is
metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of
action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof
required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006
and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and
tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his
memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang
tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol
ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga
bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may
palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga
kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng
cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na
lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent
Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently
identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six
armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were
military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots,
and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de
la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the
brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU
members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was
sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent
incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners,
validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the
suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of
the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre,
who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the
abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided
version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might
be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established.
At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the
hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any
other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond
that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in
Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do
or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire
situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of
military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable
command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely
tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and
without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special
Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr.,
member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear
and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had
anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's
involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline
Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not
testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white
L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their
houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario
participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the
petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort
Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in
Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least
a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and
then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three
months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners
came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought
the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners'
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay
the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that
occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see
their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights
violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four
Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse)
with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen.
Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health.
(Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the
petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction
and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The
participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse
and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally
involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of
their participation is overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements
were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit
of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by
forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's
familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in
his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training
Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said
military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in
finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents
of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and
tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly
based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by
Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her
recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of
the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns
on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette
burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated
on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of
their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or
oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify
in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes
as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ
of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are
no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free
in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for
fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against
(in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in
any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
69
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life,
liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are
under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed,
which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this
right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights
based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment."
Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture
and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the
general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo."
They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to
security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching
in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful
only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that
liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that
amounted to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and
surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed
been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to
security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the
extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court
in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and
to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The
right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual,
whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence.
(Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right
against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of
his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right
to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the
right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The
life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life
lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to,
will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life
and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of
man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in
a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment
of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of
those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas"
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that
"a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration
of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that
"freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the
word "security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to
security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right
and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to
well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination,
strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation"
Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of
the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched
or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger
to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity.
When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal
or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise
of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free
will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-
discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons
under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced
disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more
be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against
torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent
case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained,
alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby
violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article
3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed
on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied
heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of
domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have
been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and
to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply
with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has
also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may
also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of
person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built
into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II,
70
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner
and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State
as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests
that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or
upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by
the government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government
protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights
Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right
to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article
9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily
be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.
In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion
teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed
from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate
paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the
view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and
detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the discussions of
the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other
provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the
right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt
with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the
Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is
to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended
to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations
of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties
have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States
can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their
jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to
take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An
interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to
ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons
within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the
guarantees of the Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political
activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed,
and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena
of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v.
Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the
abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic
reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's
partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his
investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an
assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right
to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but
imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to
liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1)
of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had
been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's
requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved
futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to
security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law
but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed
control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must
be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures
to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a
person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at
bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents'
right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to
respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped,
their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was
tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see
him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be
killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from
captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily
freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their
ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in
Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his
affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena
mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they
were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is
apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in
the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other
persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño,
and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment
and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and
security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their
movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded
from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show
evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written
threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government.
Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by
themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also
miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents'
abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners'
own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry
Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial,
and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to
ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for
other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the
family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a
Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in
the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity
of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence;
identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of
the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification
and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent
court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting
that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense
and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive
to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and
undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day,
however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been
furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant
petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the
conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat"
is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners
question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of
the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
71
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the
production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a
search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely:
(1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3)
there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause
must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the case
at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and
vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified
declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are
only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also
argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but
this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the
abduction has not been shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under

the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand
of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of

documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the

court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge,

under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production
and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground
that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the
argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot
be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the
Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to
provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the
disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution
of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily
compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military
officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of
personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.

Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers
can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation
and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is
also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents
and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent
guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

72
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES
GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to
Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of
amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br.
5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the
Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP
Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and
the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson
(the "private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006
for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay
Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga,
Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the
"petitioners") and other John Does numbering about 120. The private
respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners
under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio
Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were
the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and
carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering
120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents'
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material
allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual
and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title
to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the
private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible
entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the
Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to
248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is
shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the
land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter
fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p.
248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years
ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and
sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired
the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex
'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the
construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of
Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that
the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in
question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic)
when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz
entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the
same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio
Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L.
Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their
confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint
p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land
in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the
incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards,
however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to
contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons
by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road
and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11)
inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the
proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F',
Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date
April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to
File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4,
2005, they were already occupants of the property, being indigenous
settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous,
adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4,
Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question
is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs
sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and
reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs
where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from
1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the
defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud,
19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from
1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession
must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot
be recognized at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly
entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants'
Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their
allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land
in question that they built structures on the land in question only on
April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246
to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical
statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in
their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that
on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the
property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These
armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their
homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed
men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of
forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19,
2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the
security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted
in their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not
noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by
the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these
structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land
in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and
cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the
land in question prior to April 19, 20066."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC,"
Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin
("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February
2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a
bond. The writ7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision
- was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent
Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the
imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ;
the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in
an Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, a Petition for Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC
of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate
and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition
last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance
of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally,
the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present
factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons.
Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the
disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The
73
material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12
gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the
defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired
their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m.
two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire
fence put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders.
Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who
resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL
LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-
an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants
reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON
were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The
terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely
IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their
intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing
Acts of Violence against women and children, which is
aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and
unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents
Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential
with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in
dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced
into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses
who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore
disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada.
Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that
the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid
to unjustly evict the defendants.13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33
of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to
or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of
the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally
cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to
where the MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on
the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data
fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition,
that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed
out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with
the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders
now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in
the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The
CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007,
which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of
the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest.
The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than
eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is
separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders
by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60)
days15 from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a
seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached
"Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme
Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the
Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to
counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their
counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that
the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best
to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule
65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The
Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from
the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It
is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is
thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately
from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the
appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the
context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date
for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even
directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows.17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have
been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at
the very least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also
assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly
because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner
(sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case
moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and
the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of
LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the
petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is
attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION
because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable
of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the
resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007
but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is
attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the
appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners'
intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body
of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while
stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the
intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order
to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the
action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the
present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the
same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court
and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that
are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that
can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the
combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule
46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules
of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals
and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation
where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory
orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by
any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one
forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal
or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts,
abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court
dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt."20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in
violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all
in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only
five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the
basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically
alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or
misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts
have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before
the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as
opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the
assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions
based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained.
Separately from accion interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the
right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery
of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer
to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in
which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As
the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed
no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
74
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the
reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for
the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to
wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown
or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual
allegations heretofore quoted,23that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of
the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda,
supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior
possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts
committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19
April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the
illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against
minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially
corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson
Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed
land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R.
Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the
security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking
and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza,
narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain
Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is
the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties.
If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements
of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical
and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other
hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y
Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was
"accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in
the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These
findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-
blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending
parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-
appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop
of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof)
that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the
RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate
court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory
incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as
the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of
amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be
purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners
wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable,
the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than
on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our
action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling
independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying
the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously
wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point
the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present
recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the
assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the
appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern
this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their
obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary
remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from
forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary
course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo -
extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute.
The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute
for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these
processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides
for rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed
criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ
of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were
adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the
issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security -
the personalconcern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger
or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar,
however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure
the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order
enjoining the act complained of; and
75
 (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed

for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the
homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against
them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the
petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the

Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report
pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in
dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was
conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires
as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged,
much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum,
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
"fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas
data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In
these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present

petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body
and attachments.

SO ORDERED.

76
G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian,
Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the February 27, 2004 decision2 and the
May 14, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883,
which dismissed petitioner’s original action for annulment of judgment4of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent
Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition5 for cancellation of the following entries in the
birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit: (1) the surname "Herrera"
as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as
the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private
respondent to the child’s mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in
Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it
was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said
birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with
Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered
Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented certifications from the
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City6 and the National Statistics Office,7 both
stating that they have no record of marriage between private respondent and
Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended
petition,8 impleading Armi and "all the persons who have or claim any interest in
th[e] petition."9
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for
hearing on January 24, 1997, and directed the publication and service of said
order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate which is No. 418
Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and
the Solicitor General. The full text of the order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter
alia, that the following entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be
deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned
therein;
2. The surname "Herrera" appended to the child’s name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set
for hearing on January 24, 1997 at nine o’clock in the morning before this Branch
at Rooms 447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All interested parties are
hereby notified of the said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the
Petition should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in
the City of Manila, and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila with copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at
the address indicated in the subject Certificate of Live Birth.
SO ORDERED.10
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial
court issued an Amended Order11with substantially the same contents, except
that the hearing was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997. A copy of said
Amended Order was published in "Today", a newspaper of general circulation in
Manila in its January 20, 27, and February 3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were
also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, on January 17, 1997,
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Solicitor General.
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of
the Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the
other hand was not present. The return of the notice sent to her had the following
notation:
This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server]
personally served a copy of the Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated
January 13, 1997 to the private respondent, Armi Alba Herrera at … 418 Arquiza
St., Ermita, Manila, but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private
respondent is no longer residing at said given address.12
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and
executory on June 2, 1997.13 The dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry
under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and
the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date
and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise
ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for
proper correction and entry.
SO ORDERED.14
Private respondent filed a motion15 for amendment of the decretal portion of the
decision to include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the
father of petitioner minor. This was granted in the August 11, 1997 order of the
trial court as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the
entries under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of
the father Rosendo Caparas Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be
known as ROSENDO ALBA; and the entry under the date and place of marriage,
the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.16
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment
of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to know of the decision
of the trial court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her
son was enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent
with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioner minor’s surname
from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302
Plaza Towers Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila,
because such was her residence when she and private respondent cohabited as
husband and wife from 1982 to 1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was
born on March 8, 1985. Even after their separation, private respondent continued
to give support to their son until 1998; and that Unit 302 was conveyed to her by
private respondent on June 14, 1991 as part of his support to petitioner minor.
According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as
appearing in the birth certificate of their son, was entered in said certificate
through the erroneous information given by her sister, Corazon Espiritu. She
stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the
residence of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice
therein to prevent her from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his
purported cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as
"false statements coming from a polluted source."17
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding,
among others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed
fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. It further held that as an
illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his
mother.18 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
judgments may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud.19
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
and her minor child depends on the nature of private respondent’s action, that
is, in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against
a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing
itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation.20
Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res,21 which concerns the
status of a person,22 like a petition for adoption,23 annulment of marriage,24 or
correction of entries in the birth certificate,25 as in the instant case, are actions in
rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.26 The service of
summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.27
77
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation
vested the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations
of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person
may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court.28 Being a
proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is
therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the
publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently
complied with the requirement of due process, the essence of which is an
opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the birth certificate of
petitioner minor as the residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth
bears her signature, the entries appearing therein are presumed to have been
entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which binds the whole
world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding
is validated essentially through publication.29 The absence of personal service of
the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial court’s compliance with Section
4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for
correction/change of entries in a minor’s birth certificate to reflect the name of the
minor’s real father as well as to effect the corresponding change of her surname.
In seeking to annul said decision, the other children of the alleged father claimed
that they are indispensable parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure
to implead them is a ground to annul the decision of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition which was sustained by this Court on the
ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an indispensable party, the
failure to implead her was cured by the publication of the order of hearing. Thus –
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108.
Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s
share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew
of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed,
doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know
of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition.
For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina
amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort
on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4,
Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the
Order of January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22, 1983
Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the
case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the
December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over
the case and of its authority to continue trying the case. For, the rule is well-
settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until termination of the case.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and
not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties
thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any
sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.30
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondent’s alleged
concealment of Armi’s present address, was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists
when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully
his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party. Here, Armi contended that private respondent is aware of her present
address because they lived together as husband and wife in the condominium
unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private respondent continued to give
support to their son until 1998. To prove her claim, she presented (1) private
respondent’s title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to
private respondent for payment of homeowner’s or association dues; (2) a
photocopy of a January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the subject unit in favor of Armi;
and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter. However, these documents only
tend to prove private respondent’s previous ownership of the unit and the
subsequent transfer thereof to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the
parties. Neither does the sale prove that the conveyance of the unit was part of
private respondent’s support to petitioner minor. Indeed, intimate relationships
and family relations cannot be inferred from what appears to be an ordinary
business transaction.
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale31 stated that Armi resides at 1175 L.
Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private
respondent has knowledge of Armi’s address because the former objected to the
offer of the deed for being a mere photocopy.32 The counsel for petitioners even
admitted that they do not have the original of the deed and that per certification of
the Clerk of Court, the Notary Public who notarized the deed of sale did not
submit a copy of the notarized document as required by the rules.33 The deed
cannot thus be the basis of ascribing knowledge of Armi’s address to private
respondent inasmuch as the authenticity thereof was neither admitted by private
respondent nor proven by petitioners.
While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they
were only attached as annexes to the petition and not formally offered as
evidence before the Court of Appeals. More importantly, said letters/notes do not
have probative value because they were mere photocopies and never proven to
be an authentic writing of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits34 of
Armi and her sister, Corazon Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule
of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being
hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to
disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination.35 Inasmuch as
Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of Appeals to affirm the
veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and without
probative value.
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.36 Armi’s claim that private respondent is aware of her present
address is anchored on the assertion of a live-in relationship and support to her
son. Since the evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the
purported cohabitation and support, it follows that private respondent’s
knowledge of Armi’s address was likewise not proven. Thus, private respondent
could not have deliberately concealed from the court that which was not shown to
be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed the petition
for annulment of judgment on the ground of failure to establish extrinsic fraud.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in
an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, where only
questions of law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action
of certiorari will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file a petition for
review under Rule 45, which should be instituted within 15 days37 from receipt of
the assailed decision or resolution. The wrong choice of remedy thus provides
another reason to dismiss this petition.38
Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial
court’s decision. In an action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must
convince the court that something may indeed be achieved should the assailed
decision be annulled.39 Under Article 17640 of the Family Code as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes
their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname. In Wang v. Cebu
Civil Registrar,41 it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mother’s surname.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only
when said child is recognized that he may use his father’s surname, reflecting his
status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is
an illegitimate child because she was never married to private respondent.
Considering that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner
minor, the latter is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must
bear the surname of his mother.
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not
warrant the annulment of the trial court’s decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and
the May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
78
G.R. No. 140305 December 9, 2005
PLATON AND LIBRADA CERUILA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSILYN DELANTAR, represented by her guardian, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an
action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 97-818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving
Romeo Jaloslos. The RTC granted the Ceruilas’ petition in its decision dated
1
April 11, 1997 which was nullified, however, by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
2
June 10, 1999. The CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence the
3 4
present petition.
The antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar
(Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at
the Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a
petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother,
Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was granted by the RTC of Pasay
City, Branch 119 on November 9, 1996 and Simplicio’s motion to vacate said
judgment was denied by said court on January 20, 1997. 5 they are the parents of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the
On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila,
entitled "IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR," praying that
the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the
reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of
simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material
entries therein, as follows:
a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin;
b. The signature of informant referring to ‘Librada T. Delantar’ being a forgery;
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that, as
already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and co-guardian in fact of Maria
Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;
d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in
said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister and therefore
marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually
not legitimate;
f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father merely
made it appear that she was born at the time the informations for the birth
certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper recording;
g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of Maria
Rosilyn, being a fictitious ‘Dr. Santos’.
6
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on
March 19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated
that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment
or opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing. 7
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. However, no representative
8
appeared during the scheduled hearing. 9
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the
Ceruilas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria Rosilyn Telin
Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the office
of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics
Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage registers the entry of
the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto, if any.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Manila and the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED. 10
The RTC explained in its Decision thus:
During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find out if there
is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional requirements
(Exhibits "A" to "E"). Thereafter, petitioner husband Platon Ceruila was placed on
11
the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and after he completed his
testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following:
On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital in
Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth certificate as
Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit "I"). In the said birth certificate the name of
the child’s mother appear as Librada A. Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father
as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The birth certificate likewise shows that
the parents of the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married
on February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the
same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the child was 27 years
old when the child was born and that she was attended in her delivery thereof by
Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T.
delos Santos as the informant and mother of the child with her given address as
2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very certificate of live
birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of
Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit "J") and Librada Delantar (Exhibit "K") to prove that
they are full blood brother and sister and could not have been possible for them
to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal certificates, the names of the
parents of Simplicio and Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and
Carila Telen (Exhibit "J-1" and "K-1"). The Court is inclined to concur with the
observation of the petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of
Rosilyn would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that
baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered therein that she was born
on January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit "K-2"). Such being the
case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of
Rosilyn in stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth
certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at the time of
her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar as
secondary evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the
records of birth on file with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945
were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit "L"). And going for the jugular, so
to speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth
certificate (Exhibit "I") purporting to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature
of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner (sic) (Exhibit "A-6") are
so strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two different
hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern
such discrepancy in the writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioner’s claim
that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified document, the Court is left with no
other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the petition. To let the birth
certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of
the herein petitioners. 12
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed,
with the CA, a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for
cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. She claimed that she and her
13
guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and
learned about the same only from the news on May 16, 1997. She argued that
14
the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to
due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be
illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire
certificate, is the appropriate remedy. 15
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her
mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate;
Librada is not an interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the
father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the
birth; Librada’s allegations are also contradicted by (a) the "Records Based on
16
Cord Dressing Room Book … dated April 13-May 29, 1985," issued by Emelita
H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section and Admitting Unit of the
Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the petition for annulment as Annex "E"
and which states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the
Fabella Hospital and that her parents are Librada Telin and Simplicio
Delantar; and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment in
17 18
Sp. Proc. No. 96-419 regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the
19
petition to annul as Annex "F," where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of
Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority. 20
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of the
respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in Special Proceedings No.
97-81893.
With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED. 21
The CA reasoned that:
As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893
entitled "In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate of
79
Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar", herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by
her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent therein,…contrary
to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court …
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon Ceruila
and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or correction of an entry in
the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect sought to annul, cancel
or expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth certificate. With more
reasons, therefore, that all parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her
legal guardian, the DSWD, whose birth certificate was sought to be annulled or
cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but must be made a
party in the said petition.
… they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest which
would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her
birth which is being sought to be annulled and cancelled.
…
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial entries
in the certificate other than mere clerical errors, should be passed upon in an
appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons interested are made
parties therein… Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is indeed
wanting of the required notice to all the parties having claim or interest which
would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings, as disclosed in
the decision dated April 11, 1997…
… of the case, it would have deprived respondent of due process; and that in any
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11, 1997
null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner Rosilyn
Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the said decision. Also, the said decision
dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void for lack of due process there
being no adversarial proceedings (was) conducted by the public respondent
Regional Trial Court.
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory, and
had in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still the execution thereof
produces no legal effects. 22
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. Hence, the present
23
petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN
SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA
ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE THE SUBJECT
BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. 24
As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the entries in
the birth certificate of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be
liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified
documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code and Section 15, Rule 6 of the
25
Rules of Court and not as a special proceeding; petitioners were only
26
constrained to utilize the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of the
Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents which
happens to be a birth certificate in this case; since the present case involves an
ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA which are applicable only to
special proceedings should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an
indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile,
is not an indispensable party and granting that she is, she was deemed duly
impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the case;
respondent’s location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran
away from the custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition and the
order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial
notice and the requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with;
there was no adversarial proceeding in court because the parties were declared
in general default thus, just like an ordinary civil case, the court should receive
evidence ex parte. 27
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its
peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab
initio following the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab initio for being
contrary to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity;
otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases
anew to annul respondent’s birth certificate. 28
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that
the RTC judgment dated April 11, 1997 be reinstated. 29
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that:
since the petitioners chose to file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the
present action turn around and claim that their case is not a special proceeding;
in any case, due process was not complied with rendering the proceedings a
quo annullable; petitioners sought to establish Librada Ceruila’s status, i.e.,
whether or not she is the mother of respondent, thus, the action falls within the
ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court; petitioners did not allege that
30
a wrong, for their case to be categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the
Civil Code which is being invoked by petitioners is a general provision, while
entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by Republic Act No.
3753 (Civil Registry Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since
the law provides for a remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil registry
is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport
their case from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the correction of
entry to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document;
in Republic vs. Valencia, it was held that the parties who must be made parties
31
to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are the civil registrar and all persons who have or who are claiming
interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose
interests would be adversely affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to
the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice; respondent cannot be
declared in default since she was not properly notified. 32
Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to
rule on the merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the
petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the merits
case, respondent’s record of birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove
that she is not the mother of respondent. 33
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review
on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a ground for
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of the issues raised
herein, we shall treat the present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review
on certiorari.
34
Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an
ordinary civil action or a special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based
on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters
assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including
the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed
by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been
falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c),
Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the
negative.
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. As35
enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all possible indispensable parties
36
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling
much too short of the requirements of the rules. 37
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of
Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of
birth are at stake.
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the
proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in the caption of the petition.
Such reasoning is without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic where the mother sought
38
changes in the entries of her two children’s birth certificates:
…since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only
respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what
is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the
Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have
been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the
child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if
any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented . . .. (Emphasis supplied)
39
80
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons,
who, however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not
sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.

Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the
publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.

We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting
the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and
due process. This is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity
40

to protect her interest if she so chooses.

Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party
was not impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by compliance with
Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however, earnest efforts were
made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 41

Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the
proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did
petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General.

It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the
cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the
DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties
to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos,
where her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped
her into prostitution. In the criminal case, the defense contended that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court to prove
Rosilyn’s age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has
been cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding
antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in this regard, however, were thwarted
when the CA overturned Branch 38’s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos.
132875-76 considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyn’s age at the time of the
42

commission of the crime.

There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false
entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should
be nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in
exercise of its peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate.

The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, is not to replace the trial court’s decision sought to be annulled. The
action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:

Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and
void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.
However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve
the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

81
Adm. Matter No. 06-7-414-RTC October 19, 2007
RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of
cases conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who
compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006.
As of audit date, the RTC had a total caseload of 523 cases consisting of 309
criminal cases and 214 civil cases, including 33 unaccounted LRC cases. The
Audit Team made the following observations:
In the conduct of the audit, the Team used the case numbers in the Docket
Books from January 2003 up to [the] present as reference in the inventory of
cases. Entries in the docket books are insufficient especially in the special
proceedings cases which merely indicate the title of the case and the date the
case was filed and the word "decided."
During the audit, it was observed by the Team that there was no special
proceeding case records presented. Upon inquiry, Clerk of Court Paulino
Saguyod averred that mostly [sic] of these cases are for Petitions for Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry and mostly [sic] are already decided and there are
only few pending. Considering that the docket books have insufficient entries, the
Team Leader used as reference the case numbers filed from January 2003 up to
[the] present. During the random sampling of records, the same cannot be
produced as the records were already bundled. x x x
COC Saguyod gave the team four (4) [folder] copies of decisions in the special
proceedings cases. Initial findings reveal that the date of filing indicated in the
docket books and the date of decision was so near that it will be highly
improbable that the required publication will be complied with. Hence, the Team
demanded for [sic] the production of 608 case records of special proceeding[s]
cases.
In the copies of decisions presented, common in the second paragraph of the
pro-forma decisions, are statements that "finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, the same was set for hearing on x x x. On said date and
time, the petition was announced in open court. Nobody interposed any
objection. Accordingly, the counsel for petitioner presented documentary
evidence to prove jurisdictional facts ([Exh.] "A" and series). Thereafter, he
moved and was allowed to adduce further evidence before the Clerk of Court and
at [sic] the presence of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor who appeared in
behalf of the State." However, during the course of the audit it was observed by
the Team that almost all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by COC
Saguyod as ex-officio notary public. There are even unsigned, unverified and not
notarized petitions granted by the Court. Further, almost all of them have no
hearings conducted that it will be improbable if not possible that the court orders
be published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the Rules of
Court. The docketing of cases was not also in sequence as to its date of filing
(Annex "A").
Moreover, there are eighty-six (86) petitions [where] the date of filing were
simultaneous or ahead of the date of [the] alleged hearing/decision (Annex "B")
and fifty-eight (58) petitions [were] found to have either no [c]ourt action or no
further action for a considerable length of time (Annex "C"). Also, nine (9)
petitions have similar docket numbers and three (3) cases with the same docket
number (Annex "D") while one hundred seventy-nine (179) cases [sic] records
were not presented to the Team (Annex "E").
Further, in the reconciliation of the Semestral Docket Inventory for the period
July-December 2004 of Land Registration Cases, thirty-three (33) case records
are unaccounted [for] x x x.
The Team also observed that there is no Certificate of Arraignment attached to
[the] criminal case records. Minutes of the Hearing have no summary of what
transpired during the hearing of the case. Docket books for criminal and civil
cases are [sic] not updated. [The] [d]ocket book for special proceedings cases
merely indicated the title of the case and the date it was filed with [a] notation
"decided." There is no docket book shown for land registration cases.
Anent Election Protest No. 001-04, the Court in its order dated 04 June 2004
directed the protestant to make an initial deposit of [P]500.00 per ballot box (61
ballot boxes) as compensation for the revisors within five (5) days from notice.
There was no receipt attached to the records of the case. COC Saguyod
explained that the receipt was with the protestant and that the same was not per
official receipt and not deposited to [sic] the Fiduciary Account as the same will
be paid to the revisors. He claimed that he will also render an accounting of the
expenses incurred at the end of the hearing.
Likewise noted are the payments made in SP Nos. 1032 and 1033, both
undocketed petitions, [having] the same Official Receipts Numbers which when
compared with the original receipts[,] referred to other cases and/or transactions
x x x.1
In view of its observation, the Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum
dated 11 July 20052 that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be
directed to explain the following within ten (10) days from notice:
(a) why 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries
in the civil registry were granted without the required hearing and
publication, in gross violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure;
(b) why the dates of filing of 86 other petitions were either the same
as or ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision;
(c) why 70 petitions had no court action after their filing or no further
action/setting for a considerable length of time after the last
order/incident of the case;
(d) why nine (9) petitions had similar docket numbers and three (3)
other cases had the same docket number; and
(e) why the records of 179 special proceedings and those of 33 land
registration case were not presented to the Audit Team.3
It was also recommended that Clerk of Court Saguyod be required to: (a) explain
why the initial deposit of ₱500.00 per ballot box for 61 ballot boxes made by the
protestant in Election Protest No. 001-04 pursuant to the order of 4 June 2004
was not remitted to the Fiduciary Fund Account; and (b) explain the discrepancy
in the official receipts representing the payment of filing fees for Spec. Proc. Nos.
1028, 1029 and 1030 which appeared as payment for Spec. Proc. Nos. 1032 and
1033.4
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an Explanation dated 1
August 2005,5 giving the following reasons for their actions:
(a) As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and publication
—
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all of these
petitions may be covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 90486 which authorizes city
or municipal civil registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry
and/or change the first name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a
judicial order. The petitions were filed before the trial court because there was no
incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on
these petitions under R.A. No. 9048. Since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of
entries without hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents
are submitted, the trial court considered the same procedure as applicable to the
petitions for correction of entries filed before it. The Clerk of Court still held ex
parte hearings to receive the evidence. In resolving these petitions which are
summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court adopted the procedure in
civil cases where the defendant is declared in default and the court renders
judgment based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and grants such relief as may
be warranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial
court adopted this procedure to expedite the resolution of said petitions to afford
the court more time to devote to the resolution of criminal and civil cases that
required more attention.
(b) As to the 86 petitions that were resolved on the same date as the date of filing
or date of hearing —
These petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved innocuous errors
that may be subject of administrative corrections under R.A. No. 9048. The trial
court resolved these petitions with dispatch to accommodate the petitioners’
need to have their civil registry documents immediately corrected to conform with
their passport applications, applications to take board examinations and petitions
to travel abroad. The petitioners discovered the errors after they submitted the
required documents and yet they were given a limited period to secure the
correction of the erroneous entries. If the corrected documents were not
submitted on time, the applications of the petitioners would be denied and the
denials would mean lost opportunities, particularly for the applicants for overseas
contract work and applicants to take board examinations. Judge Sotero was
more lenient in such instances since in his view no substantial prejudice would
ensue. In any event, he resolved to adopt, henceforth, a stricter policy in cases
where no publication is required, by imposing a ten (10) day period for posting of
the petition after its filing and seeing to it that the petition is set for hearing only
after it is so posted.
(c) As to the 70 petitions where no court action was taken for a considerable
length of time after filing —
Some are petitions for adoption awaiting the submission of the Home Study and
Child Study Reports by the social welfare officers assigned to the cases. The
initial hearing cannot proceed without the reports being submitted to the court.
Others are petitions for correction of entry/ies where the petitioners have not yet
submitted the required supporting documents. They will be either dismissed for
lack of interest in due time or resolved within the next thirty (30) days.
The rest are petitions for judicial reconstitution of title which are still pending
because the reports and recommendation of the Land Registration Authority
have not yet been submitted to the court.
(d) As to the petitions with similar/same docket numbers —
According to the docket clerk, Mr. Ruben A. Gigante, the nine (9) petitions with
similar docket numbers were either cancelled or withdrawn by petitioner/s (they
bear the notation "no action taken").
As to the three (3) cases with the same docket number, Mr. Gigante admitted
that he failed to enter the first filed petition in the docket book, and that he
82
accepted for filing the succeeding petitions but assigned the same case number
without indicating a letter after the number to distinguish the second and third
petitions from the first.
It was admitted that the irregularity was the offshoot of inefficiency in the
docketing system. To avoid similar incidents, the Clerk-in-Charge of Civil Cases
was assigned to take charge of the docket in special proceedings and land
registration cases in place of Mr. Gigante who is only a utility clerk.
(e) As to un-audited records of 179 special proceedings and 33 land registration
cases —
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod reported that as of the time of the
submission of the explanation, the records of 124 special proceedings and 10
land registration cases had been accounted for. Thereupon, they requested
another 15 days to retrieve the remaining records which they believe were
soaked in floodwater in 2004.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum dated 8 May
2006,7 deemed the explanation bereft of merit or deserving of scant
consideration. The OCA noted that the petitions for change of name and/or
correction of entries in the civil registry are special proceedings governed either
by Rules 103 or 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 3, Rule 103 specifically
provides when the order for hearing of such petitions shall be issued and what
the order should contain, thus:
SEC. 3. Order for hearing.—If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks
in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
Sec. 4, Rule 108 similarly requires the issuance of an order of hearing and the
publication of the order in petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry,
thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The OCA maintained that the provisions of the Rules of Court on publication of
the order of hearing should have been strictly observed as publication is a
jurisdictional requirement. Hence, the OCA remarked, it is appalling that Judge
Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod favorably acted on the petitions even though
they were only pro-forma and notarized by Saguyod as an ex officio notary public
and still others were unsigned, unverified or unnotarized. Some 86 petitions were
found to bear dates of filing which are the same as or ahead of the date of the
alleged hearing/decision, clearly belying the claim of Judge Sotero that hearings
on these petitions were conducted or that they were referred to the Clerk of Court
for presentation of evidence ex parte. Said practices, according to the OCA,
constitute a mockery of established procedure under the Rules of Court,
especially since nothing in R.A. No. 9048 or its Implementing Rules and
Regulations would justify the procedure that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court
Saguyod adopted.
The OCA observed that what R.A. No. 9048 mandates is the administrative
proceeding for change of name/correction of entry in the civil registry which has
no application to a petition for change of name or correction of entry filed in court.
Thus, the OCA went on to say, Judge Sotero’s ratiocination for adopting the
procedure under R.A. No. 9048 or for treating the petitions in the same manner
as ordinary cases where the defendant is declared in default displays a
deplorable lack of grasp or total ignorance of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
notwithstanding his claim that he did so for the purpose of expediting the
resolution of the petitions.
As to the fifty-six (56) petitions where no action was taken by Judge Sotero for
almost one year, the OCA found him to be decidedly remiss in the performance
of his duties and responsibilities. As court manager, it was incumbent upon
Judge Sotero to adopt a system of record management since the prompt
disposition of the court’s business is attained only through proper and efficient
court management, the OCA added.
The OCA recommended that Judge Sotero be fined for gross ignorance of the
law and gross inefficiency in the amount of ₱100,000.00, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits, and that the amount of ₱50,000.00 be withheld from such
benefits pending the outcome of the financial audit.8
As to Clerk of Court Saguyod, the OCA recommended that he be directed to
submit a report of the actions taken on the civil and criminal cases then pending
before the RTC which Judge Sotero was directed to either decide with dispatch
or immediately act upon. Saguyod complied with the submission of his Report
dated 22 September 2006 which was in turn referred to the OCA for further
action.9
After careful consideration of the findings and recommendations of the OCA, the
Court agrees that indeed Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Articles 37610 and 41211 of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws covering
the alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry records are
public documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein,12 which is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9048,
changes or corrections thereof could be made only upon judicial authorization.
Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provide the procedure for such
alterations in the civil registry.
The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem and as
such strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on
publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction.13 The reason for
this is that a change of name is a matter of public interest.14
Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed
by Rule 108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature, as well as petitions which seek to effect
substantial changes or corrections in entries for as long as all the procedural
requirements in said rule are
followed. In Republic v. Bautista,15 citing Republic v. Valencia,16 it was declared
that the proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in
nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial and the procedure to
be adopted is adversarial.17 The procedure under Rule 108 becomes the
appropriate adversarial proceeding to effect substantial changes in the registry
only if the procedural requirements therein are complied with.18
R.A. No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles 376 and 412 of
the New Civil Code, to wit:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or
municipal registrar or consul general, without need of any judicial order.
At first glance, the seeming effect of the amendment is to remove from the ambit
of Rule 108 the correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of entries
in the civil register and to make Rule 108 apply only to substantial changes and
corrections to entries in the civil register. Hence, we clarified in Republic v.
Benemerito19that the obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is merely to make possible
the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors in entries and the
administrative change of first name or nickname in the civil register, leaving to
Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings. Hence, the question that now arises is whether trial
courts still have jurisdiction
over petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name and
nickname in the civil registry. Assuming that the trial courts retain such authority,
the corollary question is whether the summary procedure prescribed in R.A. No.
9048 should be adopted in cases filed before the courts, or should the
adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 be followed.
The answers to these queries are central to the resolution of the case at bar, as
they determine whether Judge Sotero had indeed acted with gross ignorance of
the law or whether his liability, if any, can be tempered as he acted in good faith
on a doubtful question of law.
A review of the deliberations on R.A. No. 9048 clearly shows that it was enacted
to give the people an option to have the erroneous entries in their civil records
corrected via an administrative proceeding before the local civil registrar that is
less expensive and more expeditious. In his sponsorship speech at the Senate,
the main proponent mentioned in particular that the judicial process under Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court for the correction of clerical errors is tedious
and expensive. To address the problem, it was proposed that Article 412 of the
Civil Code be amended by providing, by way of an exception thereto, that clerical
or typographical errors be corrected by the city or municipal civil registrar. The
sponsor specified that the errors that may be corrected under the proposal are
only those "committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as a misspelled name or place of birth which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to
other existing records," and that "in no case may the correction involve the
change of nationality, age, status or gender of a person."20 Further debate led to
the proposal to include change of first name or nickname which was approved.
However, such change of first name or nickname would only be allowed if based
on some reasonable ground such as when the name to be changed is
ridiculous.21
Subsequent deliberations revolved around specific provisions of the bill. Thus,
under the bill, any person who wants an entry corrected needs only to file a
verified petition supported by certain documents with the local civil registry office
of the city or municipality where the records sought to be corrected are kept and,
in case the petitioner has already migrated to another place, the petition may be
filed with the local civil registrar where he resides. Publication of the petition for
correction of entry is dispensed with and in lieu of publication, the petition needs
only to be posted in a conspicuous place in the office of the local civil registrar for
ten (10) consecutive working days. However, regarding petitions for change of
first name, the petition has to be published once a week for two (2) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, with the petitioner also submitting a
certification that he has no pending case or prior criminal record. The local civil
registrar is mandated to decide the petition not later than five (5) working days
after the prescribed posting period. The decision of the local registrar is subject
83
to the automatic review of the Civil Registrar General who shall act within ten Observance of the procedure under R.A. No. 9048 does not excuse Judge
(10) working days from receipt of the decision. If the Civil Registrar General finds Sotero’s blunders. It appears though that he could have acted under the false
1âw phi1

that the correction is not clerical or typographical in nature or that it affects the
civil status of the person, he shall set aside the decision and advise the petitioner
to file the necessary petition with the RTC in accordance with the Revised Rules
of Court.
The authority or jurisdiction of the trial courts over petitions for correction of
entries and change of first name or nickname was never taken up at the
deliberations. In contrast, it is quite clear from the deliberations that the local civil
registrar is given the authority to act on such petitions filed before his office, yet
there was nary a mention or even insinuation that such petitions can no longer be
filed with the regular courts. In fact, it was clarified that the grounds upon which
the administrative process before the local civil registrar may be availed of are
limited under the law; hence, outside of such limited grounds, the judicial process
should be availed of. Indeed, there was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to
remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in
the civil registry. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has primary,
not exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and
change of first name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048 prescribing the procedure
that the petitioner and local civil registrar should follow.
impression that the petitions could be filed only with the local civil registrar and
not with the courts. Verily, he claims that he resolved the petitions with dispatch
in order to accommodate the need of the petitioners to have their civil registry
documents corrected with immediacy and that he was more lenient since no
substantial prejudice would ensue. His misapprehension affords him no
justification or extenuation. Moreover, his concern and compassion for the
petitioners are misplaced. As a member of the bench, he should be equipped
with the basic knowledge of rules of procedure, including Rules 103 and 108,
which govern the disposition of the petitions. Judge Sotero’s actuations clearly
exposed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles of law and
rudimentary rules of procedure, for which he should be held administratively
liable.
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is
expected to be proficient in the interpretation and application of our laws.
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial
office.26 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it, and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of
the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.27

Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceeding
before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same
procedure to petitions for the correction of entries in the civil registry before the
courts. The promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the
exclusive domain of the Supreme Court.22 Moreover, as observed by the OCA,
there is nothing in R.A. No. 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
that warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before the
courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution of said petitions.
Judge Sotero’s ignorance of the law is aggravated by his gross inefficiency in
failing to take prompt action on some of the petitions for almost one year. Proper
and efficient court management is ultimately the judge’s responsibility since he is
the administrator of the court. Canon 3, Rule 3.0828 and Rule 3.09,29 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct30requires judges to manage their dockets in such manner that
the work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch.31 Inefficiency
implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. There is
inexcusable inefficiency on the part of a judge when he fails to observe

Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if
R.A. No. 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in
the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be
followed by the courts. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and
108 still have to be complied with. In the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have
applied the procedure prescribed in Rules 103 and 108 in resolving the petitions
before him, not the procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 or the procedure
provided in Section 3, Rule 9 which applies in civil cases where the defendant is
declared in default.
in the performance of his duties that degree of diligence, prudence, and
circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of authority.32

Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge under Section 8 of

Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be signed and verified by
the person desiring a change of name, and set forth compliance with the
residency requirement, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and
the new name asked for. The court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, shall issue an order reciting the purpose of the petition and
fixing the date and place for the hearing of the petition, and direct the publication
of the order before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Any interested
person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition, with the Solicitor
General or city fiscal appearing on behalf of the Government. The court shall
grant the petition only when satisfactory proof has been presented in open court
that the order had been published as directed, the allegations in the petition are
true, and proper and reasonable causes appear for changing the name of the
petitioner.23
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline
of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001. It is penalized
either by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of
more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. The serious infractions
would have required the imposition of dismissal as penalty had respondent judge
not retired. So, instead, we now impose a fine in the maximum, i.e., ₱40,000.00,
as the infractions which correspond to the sheer number of the petitions decided
by Judge Sotero all in disregard of basic rules of procedure, are treated as
aggravating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent retired Judge Cesar M. Sotero of the
Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and FINES him in the

Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for cancellation or correction
of entry once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) to be deducted from the One
circulation in the province; and that the civil registrar and all persons who claim Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) withheld from him pursuant to the
any interest and who would be affected by the petition be made parties to the Court’s Resolution dated 27 March 2007. The remainder of the withheld amount
proceeding and be allowed to file their opposition to the said cancellation or is ordered released to him.
correction within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition or from the last date
of publication. It is only after a hearing that the court may either dismiss or grant
SO ORDERED.
the petition.24 Whether the proceeding under this rule is summary or adversarial,
depending on the type of errors to be corrected, the procedural requirements
under this rule still need to be complied with, the nature of the proceeding
becoming adversarial only when any opposition to the petition is filed and actively
prosecuted.

Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are
actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties
thereto but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication gives notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party to the case
and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.25

In the case at bar, the more than 300 cases for correction of entries filed before
the RTC of Paniqui and decided by Judge Sotero do not fall within the purview of
R.A. No. 9048. In other words, not all of said petitions pertain to the change of
first name or nickname or the correction of typographical errors in the entries of
the registry. Some of said petitions involve substantial changes in the registry
such as change of age, sex, status, and nationality, and even of middle names
and surnames of the petitioners. Judge Sotero’s conduct in acting on the
petitions, without full compliance with the procedural requirements under Rules
103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, is appalling. He explained that since
R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without need of hearing and
publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, the same
procedure under R.A. No. 9048 is applicable to the petitions filed before the
court. The explanation does not impress. The records of the cases show that
Judge Sotero did not comply with the administrative procedure under the said
law. Thus, while R.A. No. 9048 requires that the petition for correction of entries
be posted in a conspicuous place for ten (10) consecutive days, the records
show that some of the petitions were decided less than ten (10) days from the
date of filing. Clearly then, there was no way that the 10-day posting requirement
could have been accomplished. The petitions for change of name were also
granted even without publication of the order of hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation.

84
G.R. No. 160597 July 20, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS
BOLANTE, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the
Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated October 21, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74398 affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra in Special Proceeding Case No.
1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by herein respondent
Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the
following:
1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses
Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of
Bangued, Abra;
2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas
Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use
but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in
her other public and private records; and
4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be
changed to conform to the name she has always carried and used.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered
respondent, as petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of
notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001.
At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order
giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of
evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence
proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her
"Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional
Facts."
On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's express
March 26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001
hearing. Following another resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing
was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held. At that
session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents
without any objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial
prosecutor of Abra. Among the documents thus submitted and marked in
evidence were the following:
Exh. "A" - The Petition
Exh. "B" - The Notice of Initial Hearing
Exh. "C" - The Certificate of Posting
Exh. "D" - The Appearance of the Solicitor General
Exh. "E" - The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor
Exh. "F" - The Affidavit of Publication
Exh. "F-I" -The Newspaper Clippings
Exh. "G" - The Norluzonian Courier
Exh. "H" - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier
Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the
case, respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition
was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been
using thru the years. She also categorically stated she had not been accused of
any crime under either her registered name or her present correct name.
An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republic's petition
which cited the decision of the trial court:
At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante]
testified, among others, that she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr.
and presently residing at Bliss Angad, Bangued, Abra since 1995 but
before she resided in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth. She
presented her birth certificate and was marked as Exhibit J to
establish such fact of birth and to effect that the name Roselie Eloisa
B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and correct name but
instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during her
school days, while being a government employee, and in all her
public and private records.
She presented her professional license issued by the Professional
Regulation Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute
of Certified Public Accountant and a 'Quick Count' document all
issued in her name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which documents were
marked as Exhibit K and Exhibit L and Exhibit M respectively. She
likewise marked her marriage license as Exhibit N to prove her
marriage xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she
wanted to secure a passport and wanted that the same be issued in
her correct name and that she would not have filed the petition was
(sic) it not for the passport.
On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing
the petition is her realization that there will be a complication upon
her retirement.2 (Words in bracket added.)
On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic
petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby approved
and is granted by this Court for being meritorious.
The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:
a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth
from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
and,
b) To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with
Registry Regulations.
Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Bangued, Abra for recording and compliance.
SO ORDERED.3 (Underscoring added)
In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed
Decision of October 21, 2003,4 the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial
court.
Hence, the Republic's present petition on the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3, RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF
COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A
QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY,
UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED
FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v.
Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,5 citing pertinent jurisprudence,6 non-
compliance with these requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower
court to hear and determine a petition for change of name. The provisions
adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
85
 (c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that
a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a
week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, …. The date set for the
hearing shall not bewithin thirty (30) days prior to an election
nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
(Underscoring added.)
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot
be set within four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of such
hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication.
We are not persuaded.
As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on
October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued
on November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was published in the November
23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier.
Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the
initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month
prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court,
as did the CA,7 must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon
realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in
rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all concerned, the initial
hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001.
It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September
25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional
defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished.
Pressing on, the Republic would state – and correctly so – that the in rem nature
of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all
jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction thereover.8
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced
in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts."
With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of
name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she
started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa,
albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic
records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's
license, professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the
Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the
COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria
Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted.
But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be
allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing,
provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the
State or of other people.16
The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that
the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of
any entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration. Surely, the
issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification, while perhaps
apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of one's good
moral character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not
sought for any evil motive or fraudulent intent. Respondent's open court
testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which she was cross-examined,
that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered name or under
her present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of
the bona fides of her request for change of name. As the CA correctly
ratiocinated:
In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her
registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a different
name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned
enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less
cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.

The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to
to the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any and against the her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect
right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of
and decide it.9 proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records.
This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation
of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud
In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the
but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor
following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating
to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a
the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be
petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to
at least once a week for three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be
prove that the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud.
in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court
Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements
shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the
espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added).
petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice of the hearing.
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the
basic petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any
confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously
interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise,
when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action
the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the
thus taken.
Government.10 The government, as an agency of the people, represents the
public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the
government, effectively represents the public.11 In this case, the Solicitor General WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the Appeals dated October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised
of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for
a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. No pronouncement as to costs.

Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing SO ORDERED.
which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the
Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the
genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to
prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense,
therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case
and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the
proceedings a quo.

On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by

decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing
one's name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be
authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil
registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason
which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying
grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
will prejudice public interest.13

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary
issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the
court; it need not be the best evidence available.14 What is involved in special
proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a

86
G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M.
OGA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the
September 28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch
8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn
Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and
duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of
her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the
case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname
and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries.
"Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied"3 and removes
"correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the
ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are
substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.4
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect
the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar
therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly
act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic
Act 9048."5
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries
as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]
Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order,
dated June 10, 2005, which reads:
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that
the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning, at the Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan,
Dipolog City, on which date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the
petition shall state in writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the
petitioner and likewise file copies with this Court on or before the said date of
hearing.
Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City and of
general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga
del Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General of
(sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil
Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of
Dipolog, the Provincial Capitol Building, and of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the
Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to
reset the hearing on September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition,
counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte.
Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the
branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera.
On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of
documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that
Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private
transactions. On September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order6 admitting
Exhibits "A" to "I"7 and their submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the
case.
The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral
testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court:
Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City.
She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The
fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the
Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9,
2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not
Merlyn (Exhibit "C").
On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and
ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her
certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name
Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibit "D").
In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog
City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts
and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University,
Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary
Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits "E", "F",
and "G").
Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate
of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears
his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit "H").
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the
National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is
Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.
In its September 28, 2005 Decision,8 the RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and
directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name
appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the given name of
petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao
Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented
by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition.
Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until
she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was
convinced that the correction was justified.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside
of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera
of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief9 filed with the CA, the
OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of
name in a petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of
documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might
seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it
would modify or increase substantive rights."10 What the lower court actually
allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given name, which would have been
proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds
therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute one for the other for purposes of
expediency."11 Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground
recognized by the Rules, the lower court’s order in effect allowed the change of
one’s name in the civil registry without basis.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, 12 the appellate
court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA
assessed the controversy in this wise:
Appellant’s insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103
and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not
entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the
correction on an entry in petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which
she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No.
138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the
phrases "to correct" and "to change." Said the High Court:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil
Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or
distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be.
Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors.
After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain
the truths about the facts recorded therein.
That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to
the Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8
thereof—
xxxx
Anent the RTC’s error in admitting the photocopies of Mercadera’s documentary
evidence and in vesting probative value to Oga’s testimony, the CA cited the
87
well-established rule that "evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment."13
On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera,
the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed its Comment14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG
declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive
discussion on the following assigned errors:15
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER
RULE 103.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or
surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.16 This rule provides
the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the
status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in,
or with regard to, the rest of the community.17 In petitions for change of name, a
person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known."18 When granted, a
person’s identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or
appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of, or dealing with him."19 Judicial permission for a change of name aims
to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires
publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other
interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds
not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication
serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."20
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s
existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.21 However, "there could be instances
where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already
bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby
acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might
be erroneously impressed on the public mind."22 Hence, in requests for a change
of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
grant x x x."23
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction
or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code.24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons,"25 also as enumerated in Article 408 of the
same law.26 Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature
in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and
substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are
beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v.
Republic,27 this Court declared that,
x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule
108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412
of the new Civil Code."
In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
in a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements,
contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because "the
provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the
procedure to be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge De la
Cruz,29 the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the
same view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it
would allow the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would
thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly
forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be
implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors
not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the
aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere
implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x x x it
would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of
correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural safeguards having
only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered
as establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or
controversion, x x x the books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary
purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a
mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x
Finally in Republic v. Valencia,30 the above stated views were adopted by this
Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the
petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue
an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as
sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending
upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted
to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x
x."31 "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a
substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil
registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides
only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive
law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution."32
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to
"MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires
compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the
scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will
necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this
case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut
rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a
resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in
a person’s registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the
issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself
will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed
for.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103
can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for
change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change
and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official
name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be
adversarial proceedings.33
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 10834 also includes "changes of name," the
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say,
not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the
correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing
substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be
corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all,
the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts
recorded therein."35
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSG’s
assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All
that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws
of Mercadera’s petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention
was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented
by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case.
Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have
satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever since,
discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights
might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition
despite full compliance with the publication requirement.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule
108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct
simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute."36 From the allegations in her petition,
Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from
her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to
conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex
assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical
error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by
R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law
provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the
petition was clear in stating:
7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as
appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN
to conform to her true and correct given name that she had been
using and had been known within the community x x x.
8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such correction in her
Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City will not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by
herein petitioner from this Honorable Court because the Local Civil
Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent appointment
before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their
88
 office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this
petition. [Emphases supplied]

Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera’s case
which recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic37 it was held that "to
change ‘Sincio’ to ‘Sencio’ which merely involves the substitution of the first
vowel ‘i’ in the first name into the vowel ‘e’ amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,38 it was held that the change of
petitioner’s name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo"
was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was
appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter
"d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the
latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the
error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from ‘Midael
C. Mazon’ to ‘Michael C. Mazon’ cannot possibly cause any confusion, because
both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone
(tono, tunog, himig)."39

In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter
"i," so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a
rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn"
and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercadera’s
Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.

The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was
the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever
since she could remember.

It is worthy to note that the OSG’s reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez40 is flawed.
In that case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial
matter" and that it "cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that
would in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding." While this Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said
pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to
this case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely different factual milieu.
There was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding
change in the adoptee’s given name because "it would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the
absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at law." In the present
case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief
sought by Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This Court finds no
attempt on the part of Mercadera to render the requirements under Rule 103
illusory as in Hernandez.

Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still
cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an
adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the
OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding.
The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and
the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so,
it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally
defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why
the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting
and according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera.

WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

89
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having
an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration
of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but
was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.
It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted
to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse –
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered
still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
90
 (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition
is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the
bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status
of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper
entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata
effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect. 1avv phi 1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court,
for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to
the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE
the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch
11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
91
G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth1 shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed
on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition
to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The
petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION
FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its]
National Indices of Marriage."2 Respondent also submitted his academic records
from elementary up to college3 showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng,"
and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. 4 In
the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as
Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."5
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,6 respondent amended his
petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement
under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published
in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008,
November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.8 And a copy of the notice was
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was
entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex
parte.9
By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of
the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the
[respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for
FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied;
capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,11 hence, it, thru the OSG,
lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…INVOLVES THE
CHANGE OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM
LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE
MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS…
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENT’S
FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of
changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil
status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.13
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of
marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s
birth certificate,14 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in
accord with respondent’s prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of petitioner from
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the
Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the
said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the
premises.15 (underscoring supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the
Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of
copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days
before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact
that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.17Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as
one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines.18 In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to
use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use
the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in
her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s
surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to
allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his
legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his
legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . .
."
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded
in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should
be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or
corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to
the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati
where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-
mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither
the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote20 in support of his claim that
his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the
92
sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the
provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the
correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . .
(emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these
two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied
with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to
implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the
case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or
change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interestthat
would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child
in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil
registry.
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a
petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the
therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the
correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and
Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz
alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her
nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the
birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 Bulan" are
erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who
furnished the data in said birth certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the
local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her children’s birth
certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victoria’s
birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage to
"no marriage."
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the
trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order
directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her child
Victoria in light of the following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable
parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if
any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented.
The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially
impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."
Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting
from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact
that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the
nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the
Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which
directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes
or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said
rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under
Article 412 of the Civil Code.24 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly
mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is
that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is
through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such
as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which
provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which
to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.25 In that
case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the
birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June
Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughter’s
real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a "CONSTANCIA" wherein he
acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s
family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann
Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that
Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial court’s Order as Mary
Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-
intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in
Nadina’s petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But
since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the
affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of
Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
1awphi 1
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s
share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew
of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction.
Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108
would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of
a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the
legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but
were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the
civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of
entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and
correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and
his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of
their mother Epifania to "Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of the
word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because their
parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested the
correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of
marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their
marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also
sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to "Marivel."
The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she
was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents
rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and
the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of
hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the
Court noted that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in
the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the
petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito
respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the
Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their
mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not
married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3
of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and
legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of
entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is
inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be
affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is
notified through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED.
The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
93
G.R. No. 170243 April 16, 2008 From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion
for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30
days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal.
NANCY H. ZAYCO and REMO HINLO in their capacity as judicial co- They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time.
administrators of the Estate of Enrique Hinlo, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS V. HINLO, JR.,** respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 27, 2005 decision
and October 27, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
82129 affirming the January 5, 2004 order of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
RESOLUTION Occidental, Silay City, Branch 40 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
court is hereby directed to approve the notice of appeal and record on appeal
and, thereafter, to forward the same to the Court of Appeals.
CORONA, J.:

SO ORDERED.
This is a petition for review1 of the June 27, 2005 decision2 and October 27, 2005
resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82129.

After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his heirs filed a petition
for letters of administration of his estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Occidental, Silay City, Branch 40. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was
initially appointed as special administratrix of Enrique's estate. On December 23,
1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-
administrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could
no longer effectively perform her duties as special administratrix.

On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique

and heir to his estate by virtue of representation,3 filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of
petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique's estate.4 Petitioners opposed both the
petition and the motion.

In an order dated July 23, 2002,5 the RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners
as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the issuance of letters
of administration in favor of respondent on a P50,000 bond. Respondent posted
the required bond, took his oath as administrator and was issued letters of
administration.

Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on August 2, 2002 and
moved for its reconsideration on August 9, 2002. The RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in an order dated July 23, 2003.6

Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2003 order on July 31, 2003 and filed
a notice of appeal the same day. They submitted a record on appeal on August
29, 2003.

In an order dated January 5, 2004,7 the RTC denied the notice of appeal and
record on appeal. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the July
23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were interlocutory and not subject to appeal.
Even assuming that appeal was the proper remedy, it was filed late:

Granting [a]rguendo, that the Orders dated July 23, 2002 and July 23,
2003 maybe the subject of appeal, the Notice of Appeal and the
Record on Appeal were already filed out of time. Records will show
that the Order of this Court dated July 23, 2002 removing the former
co-administrators were received by them on August 2, 2002.
Subsequently, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 9[,
2002] which was denied by this Court in its Order dated July 23, 2003
and was received by them on July 31, 2003. A Notice of Appeal was
filed on July 31, 2003 but a Record on Appeal was only filed on
August 29, 2003. The 30 days reglementary period to file an appeal
in special proceedings started to run on August 2, 2002 when [the]
former [co-]administrators received the order of this Court and
stopped to run when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration and
started to run again [on] July 31, 2003 when they received the order
denying their Motion for Reconsideration until they filed their Record
on Appeal on August 29, 2003. Thus, from August 2, 2002 to
August 9, 2002, [the] former [co-]administrators already
consumed a period of 7 days and from July 31, 2003 to August
29, 2003, a period of 29 days[,] or a total of 36 days. x x
x8 (emphasis supplied)

Petitioners challenged the January 5, 2004 RTC order in the CA by way of a

petition for certiorari and mandamus. In a decision dated June 27, 2005, the CA
dismissed the petition.9 It ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC as the notice of appeal and record on appeal were in fact filed
beyond the prescribed period.

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and
July 23, 2003 orders were not appealable. They also claim that their notice of
appeal and record on appeal were filed on time.

We agree.

An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final

determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration,
management and settlement of the decedent's estate.10 It is a final order and,
hence, appealable.11

In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of

appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt
of the notice of judgment or final order.12 Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,13 the 30-day
period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from
the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

94