G.R. No.

162894 February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR.

TINGA, J.

FACTS:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines.

Respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit
against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and
RUST to pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed and dismissed
respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to this Court
but was dismissed in a Resolution which became final and executory.

Respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI
and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated
the allegations in the labor case.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of
money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged
obligation of the said companies. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per
the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales
Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.

RULING:

No. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The civil case filed is an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as
party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter,
are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues
of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions
on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant
case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.
Petitioners,
Vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondents

Facts:
Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon) is a Japanese consultancy firm
providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments where
respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Janapese national permanently residing in the Philippines, entered into
with an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) to extend a professional services. Respodent was
assigned to work as project manager for the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project in the Philippines.
When the STAR has come near to its end, the DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon
to Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.
Petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division, informed
respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would
be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000,
just in time for the ICA's expiry.
Kitamura requested for a negotiation and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project,
however, Nippon denied. Thus, Kitamura filed a Civil Case for specific performance and damages with RTC-
Lipa City.
Petitioners contended that the case should be dismissed as the ICA was perfected in Japan and
that it was a contract between Japanese nationals. Likewise, the claim for the improper pre-termination of
Kitamura’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of
lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and also their motion for reconsideration. The
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was likewise dismised by the CA for lack of statement of material dates
and for insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping. Also, the second Petition for
Certiorari was likewise dismissed on the ground that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable
to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court validly exercised jurisdiction over the instant controversy despite
the fact that the contract subject matter of the proceedings a quo was entered into by and between two
Japanese nationals, written wholly in the Japanese language and executed in Tokyo, Japan.

Ruling:
Yes. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases
are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court
apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application
of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always
provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be
applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction
to enter a judgment
For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over
the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the
issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is
further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all
or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot
act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
The petition raised as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where
a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where
a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract
and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law
to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract
was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
When a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because
of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case
and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived
from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is
not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed
on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts
principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
The RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by
respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and
appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
 G.R. NOS. 178382-83 September 23, 2015
CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH BASSO, respondent.
JARDELEZA, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under
the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the Philippines.
On 1990, respondent Basso, a US citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a General
Manager position. CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso retaining his
position as General Manager. Thereafter, Basso received a letter informing him that he has agreed to work
in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.” Hence, Basso wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected
by CMI.

Thereafter, Basso filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the CMI. Alleging the presence of
foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since
the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.”
Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws.

The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily
submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the
legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case. The CA ruled that the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of the case. The employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it
originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from
exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process
of service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily
appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in
requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the
foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-laws issue.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume
jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here.
 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS MORADA and HON. RODOLFO ORTIZ
G.R. 122191 October 8, 1998

FACTS:
In 1988, SAUDIA hired Milagros Morada as flight attendant based in Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-
over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a disco with her co-employees. When they stayed in the room
in the hotel, Thamer attempted to rape Morada but due to a roomboy and other security personnel of
the hotel. The Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Al-Gazzawi.

In Saudi, officials of SAUDIA requested her to withdraw the case against the two Arabian nationals
which will cause the release of the accused. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she
did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect.

However, through the intercession of Arabian government, Thamer and Al-Gazzawi were
deported back to Saudi. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. Morada was
then transferred plaintiff to Manila.

She was then brought back to Saudi because her superior needs to talk to her. Eventually, she was
brought to the police station and took her passport and pressured her to make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Al-Gazzawi. Morada was not allowed to board the plane on her return to Manila.
She was forced to sign a document. Later, the Saudi court, convicted her for the crimes of adultery,
socializing with male crew and going to disco in violation of Islamic laws.

Fortunately, the prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. She was then terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

Morada filed an action for damages against SAUDIA and Al-Balawi, its country manager. On the
other hand, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of absence of cause of action
against SAUDIA, the demand set forth in the complaint has been waived or abandoned and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to try the case. SAUDIA claims that Morada’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Saudi Arabia. It alleged that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case
for the application of the law of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of lex loci delicti commissi rule.

In an Amended Complaint, Morada dropped Al-Balawi as a party defendant. A motion to dismiss

was filed by SAUDIA which was later denied by the court. The trial court explained that since Article 21 of
the Civil Code applies in this case, the action falls within the jurisdiction of the court.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the
complaint rests its basis for recovery of damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction of the case?

2. Whether or not the Philippine law/s shall apply in this case?

RULING:
 1. The Court ruled that RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Pragmatic
considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favour of the RTC assuming
jurisdiction. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum vex, harass or oppress the defendant by inflicting upon him needless
expense and disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed.

By hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff should be upheld.

The trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. Private
respondent has voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. SAUDIA filed several motions
praying for the dismissal of the complaint. What is very patent is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs
under the premises. Undeniably, SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by
praying for the dismissal of the complaint.

2. As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant
facts occurred in two or more states? And to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation. It is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall.

The Court ruled that there is reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion that although
she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would
merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the
attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for
very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

There is a logical basis on record that it is the petitioner who fraudulently cause the conviction of
the respondents which the Prince of Makkah eventually found out to be wrongful that caused her release.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places where the tortuous conduct occurred. And that is in the Philippines,
for this is where petitioner SAUDIA deceived the private respondent. That is when respondent was
made to believe that SAUDIA has a good intention of requesting her to go again in Saudi.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) and BRENDA BETIA vs. MA. JOPETTE REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH
SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH CRISTOBAL, and LORAINE SCHNEIDER-CRUZ

GR No. 198587. January 14, 2015.

Leonen, J.

FACTS: Saudia is a foreign corporation from, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that has a Philippine
office at Makati City. Saudia hired respondents as Temporary Flight Attendants. Eventually, they became
Permanent Flight Attendants. They signed Cabin Attendant Contracts. Respondents informed Saudia of
their pregnancies, and filed their maternity leaves. Saudia, instead of granting their leaves, demanded
their resignation since their employment contract rendered their employment void by reason of lack of
medical fitness due to pregnancy. Before the Labor Arbiter, respondents filed for illegal dismissal against
Saudia. Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the LA on the ground of forum non conveniens, which was
favored. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision. On petition, the CA upheld the NLRC decision.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether Philippine courts may exercise jurisdiction over Saudia and apply Philippine laws in the
present dispute.

HELD: Yes Saudia’s contention that the LA and NLRC had no jurisdiction over it because the summons
were never served on it but on “Saudia Manila” does not hold water. There is no basis for concluding
that “Saudia Jeddah” and “Saudia Manila” are distinct from each other. What is clear is Saudia’s
statement in its own Petition that it has a Philippine office at Makati City. Under the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991, “doing business” shall include… opening offices, whether called liaison offuces
or branches…” As such, Saudia is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Thus, Saudia
may be sued in the Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine Tribunals. Service of
summons to Saudia’s office in Manila sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia’s person in Philippine
tribunals.
 G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BUENA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of California, United States of America while private respondent American Realty Corporation
(ARC) is a domestic corporation.

BANTSA on several occasions granted multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to corporate
borrowers. Upon the loan maturity, the corporate debtor failed to pay and BANTSA filed 4 collection cases
in the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong) against the corporation debtors. Simultaneously, BANTSA
also filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the
real estate mortgage and said was sold in public auction.

The private respondent ARC filed an action for damages against BANTSA due to the act of
foreclosing the real estate mortgage extrajudicially despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts
to collect the principal loan. BANTSA contends that the respondent is not made a party on the collection
case before the foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign
courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate
action is filed in the Philippines to enforce such judgment and that under the English law which is the law
governing in the principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil
action for sum of money. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent ARC declaring
that the filing of civil suit on collection of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the
security of the mortgages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BANTSA can judicially foreclose the real estate mortgages despite pendency of
the civil suits before English courts.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to
petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall
apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter. In a
long line of decisions, the Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, the courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what the Court refer to as the doctrine of
processual presumption.

SC further held that even assuming arguendo that English laws were proven, said foreign law
would still no find applicability. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The
public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting of a single cause of action. Moreover, the foreign law should not be applied when
its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION VS.

JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS

In 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., (Eastern) a company incorporated in Singapore applied
w/, & was granted by the Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility in the max amount of Singapore
$200,000 (w/c amount was subsequently increased to Singapore $375,000) w/ interest at 3% over HSBC
prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility. As a security for the
repayment by Eastern of sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982,
Jack Sherman, Dodato Reloj, and a Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of Eastern at such
time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby Sherman, Reloj and Lowe agreed
to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by Eastern to HSBC under the aforestated
overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: “This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities
arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.”

Eastern failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment of the obligation from Sherman &
Reloj, conformably w/ the provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as Sherman & Reloj
still failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against them. Sherman & Reloj
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the complaint, and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.

ISSUE

Whether or not Philippine courts should have jurisdiction over the suit.

RULING

YES. While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and
Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the
stipulation that "this guarantee and all rights, obligations & liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed & determined under & may be enforced in accordance w/ the laws of the Republic of
Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in
International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Indeed, as pointed-out by HSBC at the outset, the instant case presents a
very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign
tribunal, w/ more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, Sherman & Reloj are Philippine
residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them
before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience,
than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Their stance is hardly comprehensible, unless
their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.

The defense of Sherman & Reloj that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely
on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause
them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass Sherman & Reloj.

The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest,
has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In
International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons
and things w/in its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction
over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign
military units stationed in or marching through State territory w/ the permission of the latter's
authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive w/in and
throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by
making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.
No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR,
Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years. In
1913 he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary till the time of his death. However,
during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself as a citizen of
California. In his will executed in the Philippines, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen, as his only heir, but left a legacy of a sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the
successional rights of illegitimate children under the Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the
child Maria Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply international law of
California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator could dispose off any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law, the will of the deceased giving
the bulk of the property to Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional
rights of his heirs.

RULING:

The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any general
American Law, because there is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the private law of the state of which
the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its
citizens, an internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason demands that the California conflict of law rules should
be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar. Since the conflicts of rule of California refers back the
matter to the Philippines (the place of domicile), our courts have no alternative but to accept the
referring back to us. If our courts will to otherwise and throw back the matter to California, the problem
would be tossed back and forth between states concerned, resulting in “international football.”
 G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate
children with his first wife whom he divorced, three legitimate children with his second wife who survived
him and, finally, three illegitimate children. Six (6) years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two (2)
wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their
legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased
wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights

RULING:

The Phillipine law shall be applied. Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Where the testator was a citizen of
Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since
Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes,
is valid. The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the
texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.
 G.R. No. 133876. December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BUENA, J.
Facts:

The respondent is a third party mortgagor who executed real estate mortgages as additional
security for the restructured loan of its foreign affiliates, who are the principal borrowers. The Bank of
America granted the loan to the foreign corporations (principal borrowers) secured by a real estate
mortgage by the respondent. Upon the loan maturity, the corporation debtors failed to pay and the
petitioner bank filed 4 collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong) against the
corporation debtors. At the same time it also filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a public auction. The
respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to the act of foreclosing the real estate
mortgage extrajudicially despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal
loan. Petitioner contends that the respondent is not made a party on the collection case before the foreign
courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign courts and thus decisions
rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action is filed in the
Philippiness to enforce such judgment and that under the English law which is the law governing in the
principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil action for sum of
money. The court rendered judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on
collection of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the security of the mortgages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors before
foreign courts constitutes a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

RULING:

The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides that “if two or
more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” A mortgagor creditor may
either institute against the mortgage debtor a personal action for collection of money or foreclosure of a
mortgage but cannot avail of both remedies. In Philippine jurisdiction, these remedies are alternative and
not cumulative. Thus, choosing one remedy is a bar to avail of the other remedy. Plaintiff cannot split up
a single cause of action by filing both remedies as expressly prohibited by the rules on civil procedure.

On the contention of the petitioner that the English law should apply to the principal agreements
that states that the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of
money, the court held that a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as fact. If not pleaded, the
court will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is the
DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION.

Granting however that the English law is applicable in the Philippine court, such law is contrary to
sound and established public policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting of a single cause of action.
A foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment
or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is the country upon which the case is
filed. Therefore the filing of a collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is a waiver for the remedy
of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
 G.R. No. L-5397 September 26, 1952

LAURETO A. TALAROC, petitioner,

vs.

ALEJANDRO D. UY, respondent.

Facts:

Alejandro D. Uy was elected to the office of municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on
November 13, 1951. The petitioner Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same office,
brought the instant action of quo warrant on the ground that the Uy is a Chinese national and therefore
ineligible to be elected. The court below found the petition well-founded and declared the position in
question vacant.

The respondent's contentions, which the court below rejected, were that his father was a subject of Spain
on April 11, 1899 by virtue of Article 17 of the Civil Code; that his mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino
citizenship upon the death of her husband on February 17, 1917, and the child followed her citizenship;
and that the respondent is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of his birth therein.

Issue: Whether Uy is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

Yes. This Court held that Article 17 of the Civil Code "is sufficient to show that the first paragraph
affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of birth or jus soli. Citing various decisions,
authorities, and opinions of the United States Attorney General, it found that the decided weight of
authority was to the effect that the marriage of an American woman with an alien conferred his
nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the
husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts showed that she
elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and if she opted to reacquire her former nationality,
her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her nationality with the proviso that they
may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.

Alejandro D. Uy undoubtedly was considered a full-fledged Philippine citizen on the date of the
adoption of the constitution. By making the jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the
determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the
Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
 ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,

vs.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,

respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991

FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
Now the petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the ground that
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines. However, HRET found for the private
respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied by the HRET. Hence,
these petitions for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Ong is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as naturalborn citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of “natural-born” cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. There is no dispute that the
respondent’s mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue
of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
 To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
 No. L-20169 February 26, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YU KIAN CHIE TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES
YU KIAN CHIE, petitioner-appellee
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant
PAREDES, J

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellee named Yu Kian Chie is a Chinese citizen who aims to be a naturalized Filipino
citizen. He then filed a petition for naturalization before the Court of First Instance Manila. The
jurisdictional requirement document contains an information declaring that petitioner has an average
yearly income of P3,000. Also, attached therein are the affidavits of two witnesses acting as character
witnesses.

Trial ensued and the two witnesses were opposed by the Solicitor General on the ground of
having no credibility and did not testify as to the petitioner’s character and good reputation. The trial
court then ruled in favor of Yu Kian Chie and was admitted as Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General made
an appeal but the petitioner filed a motion to reopen the case to enable the latter to present additional
documentary proof of income on the ground that his income has increased from P3,000.00 to P5,
100.00 and P5,200.00 with the inclusion of a little salary appraisal and bonuses. The motion was granted
and the Solicitor General moved for the reversal of the said decisions on the ground that the documents
presented cannot prove that the petitioner has a lucrative income.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an allowances and bonuses should be considered as part of the income of an
applicant for naturalization to prove that he has a lucrative income

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Bonuses and allowances are dependent on the profit
which company realizes every year from its business and thus cannot be considered part of petitioner’s
regular income.

Records showed that Petitioner is only receiving a living allowance of P150.00 every month in
consideration of the services he made for the Republic Hardware and thus this is his true income and
not his claim of P3,000.00 per year. The declared income included his other allowances and bonuses
which can only be given by the company voluntarily in the event that the business is doing well. Thus the
Supreme Court ruled that it is not safe to consider that the annual income of the Petitioner is P3,000.00.
An income of P150.00 monthly cannot be regarded as a lucrative income considering that he is a
married man. Furthermore, the Court is not swayed that the company can give the Petitioner such
allowances and bonuses since the company has not shown proof that it was making a good profit and
that the raise of salary was given during the pendency of the naturalization case. Granting arguendo that
he receives a monthly salary of P400.00 in 1962, such is still cannot be regarded as lucrative considering
he got married in 1961.

The decision appealed from is reversed and petition for Philippine citizenship was denied.
 G.R. No. L-25411 October 26, 1968
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO,
as (Acting) Commissioner of Immigration, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, CHUA PIC LUAN,
UY KOC SIONG and UY TIAN SIONG, respondents.
REYES, J. B. L., J.

Facts:

Private respondents herein, a Chinese mother and her two minor children, arrived from Hongkong
and were admitted in the Philippines as temporary visitors in October 1960, with an initial authorized stay
of three (3) months. The husband and father of these aliens applied for naturalization, to which the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila granted in April 1961. Meanwhile, the said temporary visitors applied for
an indefinite extension of their stay. In accordance with a Cabinet Resolution in 1956 granting them
concurrent jurisdiction to act on petitions for extension of stay of temporary visitors, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, granted the change in category from temporary visitors to that of special non-immigrants
under the Immigration Law for a period up to April 1963. However, the petitioner, Commissioner of
Immigration, refused to recognized the said extension further than June 1962, on the ground that the new
Secretary of Justice ruled that the 1956 Cabinet Resolution had no force and effect. The respondents did
not leave the country on the date specified, but instead filed a petition for mandamus with injunction to
restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from issuing a warrant of their arrest. The court then denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction. In July 1962, respondents refiled the same petition alleging that the
extension of their stay up to April 1963 was approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice,
and that they were due for eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the granting of the
husband/father’s petition for naturalization. The judge issued ex parte and without hearing an order
granting the preliminary injunction. The Immigration Commissioner filed his answer stating, among others
that the extension of their stay up to April 1963 was invalid; that it is the Commissioner of Immigration
who is vested by law with power to grant extensions of stay, and that even if the husband/father will
become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to
show that she, herself, can be lawfully naturalized. In 1965, or after three years without the case having
been heard, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for the unreasonable length of time that
the petitioners had failed to prosecute the case. The CFI denied the motion. Thus, the Commissioner filed
with the Supreme Court an action for certiorari against the res1pondent court

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the mother automatically became a naturalized Filipino by virtue of the
naturalization of his husband.
2. Whether or not the minor children automatically became a naturalized Filipino by virtue of
the naturalization of their father.

RULING:

1. No. The wife, Chua Pic Luan, does not, under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a naturalized Filipino
citizen, since she must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
 disqualifications for naturalization. By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and
administrative authorities that she came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in
fact, her intention was to stay permanently; and for having intentionally delayed court
processes the better to prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her
incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, that she must be of good moral character and must have
conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her
residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government. And, having
lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16 October 1960 to 16 June 1962,
she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the required qualification of continuous residence in
the Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being illegal.
2. No. As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship "if dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent." "Dwelling" means lawful
residence. Since prior to the time the father of respondent-visitors was supposed to have
taken his oath of citizenship ... their lawful period of stay had already expired and they had
already been required to leave, they were no longer lawfully residing here. Nor can these
temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous with the result of the naturalization
proceeding of their husband and father, Uy Pick Tuy, because their authorized stay was for a
definite period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the termination of the
naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and can not be set at a definite date. It is
contended for the respondents that two-year old respondent Uy Tian Siong cannot, under
Article 363 of the Civil Code, be separated from his mother; that husband Uy Pick Tuy has the
right to fix the residence of the family (Article 110), to the company of his wife (Article 109)
and those of his minor children (Article 316), and said wife and children are obliged to obey
and live with him (Articles 109, 311, 357); and that to make said wife and children depart from
the Philippines is destructive of family solidarity (Articles 218-221). These arguments are
beside the point. Said laws govern the relations between husband and wife inter se or
between private persons, not the relations between visiting alien and the sovereign host
country. Respondents seem to have forgotten that they came here for a visit, and, as visitors,
they have no right to impose upon their host a period of stay of their own choosing.
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).
 G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG vs. THE COMMISSIONER
OF IMMIGRATION

FACTS:

Petitioner Lau Yuen Yueng filed applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines. She was
granted stay for a period of one month. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay for atleast a
year in the country. However, before the expiration of her visa, she contracted marriage with the
petitioner Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo who is a Filipino Citizen. The Commissioner of
Immigration then ordered her arrest and deportation. The petitioners then filed a writ of injunction
against the order of the herein respondent which the Court of First Instance denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen

RULING:

Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed and Lua Yuen Yeng is
considered as a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao who is a Filipino citizen.
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245, G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. He filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was “merely forced upon himself
as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agents abroad.”
He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy.

The private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not
a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American
citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this
defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code, and the Omnibus Election Code.

In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not “impressed with voluntariness.” In support he cited the Nottebohm Case,
[1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national’s naturalization in Liechtenstein was not
recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have
repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created
for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy
that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the
laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for
the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo’s contention that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization
as an American citizen was not “impressed with voluntariness.”?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor
of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order
dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the
Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he
had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of
any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses,
recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually
and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected.

Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had
declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he
was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with
which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the
nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in
fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented
to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other
nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to
Section 1 of the said Convention providing that “it is for each State to determine under its law who are
its nationals.”

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his natu ralization in Liechtenstein whereas in the
present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as
his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of
his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo’s contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that
body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would
open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim
back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their
allegiance to the Philippines. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He
contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions—surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had
not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done,
or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)
FRIVALDO- petitioner
Vs
COMELEC & RAUL LEE
Facts:
This case stemmed when Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on
the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January
1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to
his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10
days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo is qualified to be the Governor of Sorsogon despite he is a naturalized
citizen of America.

Held: NO
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial
and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo‘s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitor
‘s stance is assumed to have been taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It
therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the
certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that
he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not
find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization,
or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. The anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact
that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer ‘s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

NOTE: There is already a new law which allows former Filipino who is now a naturalized citizen of another
country to re-acquire its Filipino Citizenship.

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
GR 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON LABO JR. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND LUIS LARDIZABAL

FACTS:

Petitioner Labo Jr. was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City while respondent Lardizabal obtained the
second highest number of votes in the election. Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto which
according to the petitioner may not be valid because the filing fee was not paid yet. While the petition for
quo warranto was being argued, the question of the petitioner's citizenship was brought about. Petitioner
was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Petitioner contends that his:

1. marriage to an Australian National did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship.
2. naturalization in Australia made him a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship.
3. alleged lack of citizenship is a futile technicality that should not frustrate the will of the electorate
of Baguio City who elected him by reasonant and thunderous majority.

Through the records from the Australian Embassy, it was found that the petitioner, who had married an
Australian citizen, acquired an Australian passport and returned in the Philippines in 1980 for the reason
that his marriage became void because of bigamy. It was also stated that he was granted

Australian citizenship in 1976.

ISSUE:

Whether Labo is a Filipino Citizen

RULING:

NO. Ramon Labo Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on July 28, 1976. It was not his marriage that
made him an Australian. He formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance
to the government of Australia. He renounced all other allegiance and swore to be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Queen Elizabeth of Australia and to fulfill his duties as an Australian Citizen.

He did not deny that he obtained an Australian Passport which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980 when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and
registered under Alien Certificate Registration. Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is not a Filipino citizen anymore because
of the following requisites based on the Constitution:

a.) He is already a naturalized citizen in a foreign country;

b) He renounced his Filipino citizenship by

c) taking and pledging to the oath of allegiance of the foreign country promising to faithfully observe the
laws and fulfill the duties of an Australian citizen.

He also did not reacquire his Filipino citizenship by doing the following methods of reacquiring
Philippine Citozenship:

a) reacquiring by direct act of Congress;

b) by naturalization; and

c) by repatriation.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation.
It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he
has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his
office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and
executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
 Aznar vs. COMELC

Facts:

The private respondent, Emilio Osmeña, filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
governor in the province of Cebu. Petitioner, Jose Aznar filed a disqualification case against the
respondent alleging that he is not a Filipino citizen. Aznar used the Alien Certificate of Registration and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Mirriam Defensor Santiago. While the canvassing continued, the COMELEC ordered to suspend the
proclamation. In his defense, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino citizen because he is a legitimate
son of Dr. Osmeña, a Filipino and the son of the late President Osmeña. Furthermore, he also stated that
he has a subsisting Philippine Passport and resides in the Philippines since birth and did not leave the
country for more than six months and a registered voter since 1965. The COMELEC, after obtaining the
highest number of votes, proclaimed the respondent as governor. The petition was dismissed for not
having been filed timely and lack of sufficient proof. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

Yes. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that the respondent is a
Filipino remains. The petitioner failed to prove that the respondent had lost his citizenship. Considering
the fact that the respondent is both Filipino and American and a holder of a Certificate stating that he is
an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. The petitioner cannot even show any express or
implied renunciation of Philippine citizenship made by the respondent. Therefore, the Court declared the
respondent as Filipino and can be proclaimed as governor of Cebu.
Republic of the Philippines v. William Li Yao

GR No. L-35947 20 October 1992

Romero, J.

FACTS:

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on 3 June 1949. After
several hearings, the Court of First Instance of Manila granted his petition and declared him a
naturalized Filipino citizen in its decision on 25 October 1950.

On 20 November 1952, Li Yao was granted the execution of the decision, and that he be allowed
to take his oath of allegiance, having complied with the two-year probation period.

Fifteen years later, on 5 January 1968, the Solicitor General filed a motion to cancel William Li
Yao’s certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained, claiming
that Li Yao was not qualified to acquire Filipino citizenship at the time of the filing of the petition due to
the following reasons:

1. He did not possess good moral character, having engaged in illicit relationships with
women other than his wife
2. He did not conduct himself in an irreproachable manner as he had been using
unauthorized aliases, has been evading taxes through underdeclaration of income
tax returns, had been violating anti-dummy laws, and had falsified the baptismal
certificate of an illegitimate child he fathered.
Li Yao opposed the motion; the trial court, however, ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of naturalization based on Li Yao’s tax evasion. The court likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.
Li Yao appealed, but he died after both partied had filed their respective briefs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased Li Yao is
valid.

RULING:

Yes. In his motion filed on January 5, 1968, the Solicitor General asked for the cancellation of the
naturalization certificate of appellant on the ground that it was "fraudulently and illegally obtained."
This based on Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act, which
provides that a naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization
certificate was obtained fraudulently and illegally." The certificate may be cancelled if it is subsequently
discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact.
 Li Yao, having misled the court as to his moral character, is not entitled to the citizenship. Even
assuming that he had settled these liabilities, this does not cure his lack of good moral character, but
only serves to remove civil, criminal, or administrative liability in so far as the evasion case is concerned.
Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer
upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and
upon strict compliance with the law
 G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
OH HEK HOW
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion
alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be
allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of
naturalization. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing
the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was
issued to him. The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of
February9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to
judgment having been final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the oath is valid.
Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior
of Nationalist China.

RULING:

The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not — and up to the present has not become
final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government.

It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of
an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled
by any foreign law. However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is
necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by
those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of
the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous
permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides, however, that before the naturalization
certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which"
he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former
nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two
nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except
that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino citizen
from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce
loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege
to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign
country from which citizenship is required.
 G.R. No. L-1812 August 27, 1948

EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner,

vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.

FACTS:
In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization, accompanied
with supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper
notice of the hearing. The petition was finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on
that date because the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case
remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation in March,
1945. The case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and the evidence was presented on August
28 and September 30, 1947. On the same day resolution was issued granting the petition.
Petitioner is a native-born Russian, joined the armed forces during World War I and fled to the
Philippines as a refugee during Soviet Civil War after refusing to join the enemy forces of the White
Russians.
He has established a residence in Camarines Sur, where he had a Filipino wife and a son. During
World War II, he joined the guerilla army until the liberation in 1945.
He is a shop superintendent and receives an annual salary of P13,200 with free quarters and house
allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies.
He speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. He has a good moral character and believes in
the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of any crime.
Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the
present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging
to no State, much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly
opposed.
ISSUE:

1. Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and insufficient as a
basis for the petition of naturalization
2. That the court erred in not finding that the appellee cannot speak and write any of the
principal Philippine languages
3. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding the appellee stateless and not
Russian citizen.

RULING:

1. Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to

establish the fact that appellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for
permanent residence.
 The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines
for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed
to have been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested petitioner if his
residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is
enjoying permanent residence legally. That a certificate of arrival has been issued is a
fact that should be accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed statement in his
declaration of July, 1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving
official would have accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned therein
as attached thereto.

2. There is a reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken
considering the fact that, after he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the Naga
prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol region, took part in encounters and
skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the guerrilla until the Americans
liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of Bicol was able to get
along with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the resistance movement, we
believe that his knowledge of the language satisfies the requirement of the law.

3. We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless.
Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known
fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a
large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without
flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them
to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only
natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries
should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their
fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees.

The appealed resolution is affirmed.

Antonio Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro C. Cruz

GR No. 142840 7 May 2001

Kapunan, J.

FACTS:

Teodoro C. Cruz, private respondent, was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
on 27 April 1960, when the applicable law was the 1935 Constitution.

On 5 November 1985, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of
allegiance to the United States without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. As a consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country." He was eventually naturalized as a US citizen on 5 June 1990.

On 17 March 1994, he reacquired citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He later ran
and was elected as the representative of the 2nd district of Pangasinan, wherein he won by a margin of
26,671 voted over petitioner Bengson III.

Bengson III filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam wih HRET, claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen, a
he had to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. The HRET dismissed the case
and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teodoro Cruz is a natural-born citizen.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had
to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable.

Cruz reacquired citizenship through repatriation, not naturalization. Repatriation, on the other
hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5) political and economic necessity. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. As such, Cruz
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
 Caasi vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In this consolidated case, the petitioners seek for the disqualification of the private respondent
Merito Miguel for the position of Mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan. The petitioners alleged that Migeul should
be disqualified as Mayor on the ground that he is a green card holder and a permanent resident of
America. In his defense, Miguel admitted that he is a green card holder but denied the allegation against
him as a permanent resident of America. Furthermore, he explained that he became a green card holder
only for his medical examination in America and his green card allowed him to freely enter America. Lastly,
he stated that his permanent residence is in Bolinao, Pangasinan and he is a registered voter of the said
city. The COMELEC dismissed the case but Commissioner Badoy, Jr. dissent on the decision. Before the
Court of Appeals, the decision of the COMELEC was affirmed. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is correct.

Ruling:

No. Miguel’s immigration to America in 1984 constitutes his abandonment of domicile and
residence. He did not go to America to merely visit his children or doctor but to permanently live there.
As evidenced by his application for his green card, his intention was not to merely visit but to reside there
permanently. For him to be qualified to run for elective office, he must waive his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country before being elected. This waiver cannot be impliedly applied
by his filing of certificate of candidacy. It should be manifested by independent act or acts before the filing
of certificate of candidacy. Therefore, he is disqualified to run from any elective office
GR L-6379 September 29, 1954

In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines. WILFRED
UYTENGSU VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6,

1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where,
from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the
same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. On July 15, 1950, Petitioner filed an
application for naturalization. He returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in
chemical engineering. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until
October 13, 1951. The hearing set on July 12, 1951 was postponed on motion of petitioner’s counsel.
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the aforesaid provision
of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical
absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in,
and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being,
merely to study therein. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.

RULING:

NO. "While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence
combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for
a time, for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all
the while, to return to the true domicile." There is a difference between domicile and residence.
"Residence" is used to indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. "Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means necessarily as, since no
length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. Where the petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath,
that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of the filing of his petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor. In short, the Court
is of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and,
accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor. REVERSED, but without
prejudice to the filing of another application, if he so desires, in conformity with law
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same
position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended
certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said
certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She
claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of
the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for
disqualification meritorious.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative

Held: YES

For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the
qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided
in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents;
Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to
Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with
the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile
because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner
married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired
the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
Ujano vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 147, No. L-22041 May 19, 1966

FACTS:

Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. He is married to Maxima O.
Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines for the
United States of America in 1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was
admitted merely for a temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in
Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the
Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He has no record of conviction and it is
his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that petitioner did
not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.

The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: “One of the qualifications for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant ‘shall have resided in the Philippines at least six
months before he applies for naturalization’ [Section 3 (1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This residence’
requirement in cases of naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where be lives and stays permanently, and to
which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other
words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this
country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually
present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his
stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the
present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into
this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present
petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such being the
case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before
filing his present petition.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner meets the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship?

HELD:

One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant shall have resided in
the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act
No. 63].

The term “residence” in Commonwealth Act No. 63 has already been interpreted to mean the actual or
constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays
permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his
domicile. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus manendi. “Residence” imports not only an
intention to reside in a f ixed place but also presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention
(Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, Jan. 31, 1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). So an alien who has been
admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of
health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here
because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his
coming is accomplished.

Since legal residence for six months is required for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, the
applicant should secure a quota for permanent residence here. A permit for temporary residence would
not be sufficient. He is not qualified to reacquire Philippine citizenship.
 G.R. No. L-43314 December 19, 1935

A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody vs.

JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue

FACTS:

The decedent Arthur Moody died in India. However, he executed a will in the Philippines wherein
he bequeathed all of his property to his only sister, Ida Palmer who is a citizen of the United States of
America. After being declared by Philippine courts that Ida Palmer is the sole heir of the decedent, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) prepared an Inheritance Tax Return and an Income Tax Return against
the estate of the decedent. The estate of Arthur Moody paid such assessments on protest but such
payment in protest was overruled by the BIR. They then filed an action to recover the amount paid on the
ground that the decedent was not domiciled on the Philippines which means that the estate is not
required by law to pay estate taxes. The Court of First Instance dismissed the said complaint. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decedent Arthur Moody was domiciled in the Philippines

RULING:

Yes. The Civil Code defines domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence". The
record before the Court leaves no doubt that the "usual residence" of Arthur Moody was in Manila where
he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited
during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile,
there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the
place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of
abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a
new domicile in a foreign country.

As Moody’s legal domicile at the time of his death was the Philippines and his estate had its situs
here, the inheritance and income taxes involved were properly collected.
 G.R. No. L-15080 April 25, 1962
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR NORMA LEE CABER.
RICARDO R. CARABALLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, opponent-appellant.
PADILLA, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Ricardo Caraballo, an American citizen enlisted in the US Air Force as staff sergeant
detailed in in Angeles, Pampanga, where he and his wife live, filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Pampanga a verified petition for adoption of a five-day old baby named Norma Lee Caber. At the
hearing, nobody appeared to object the said petition, however, the Provincial and Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Pampanga moved for the dismissal of the petition for adoption on the ground that it states no
cause of action and that the petitioner, being a non-resident alien, is not qualified to adopt under Article
335 of the Civil Code. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss, Eventually, the CFI ruled in favor of the
petitioner and ordered Norma Lee Caber to be, for all legitimate intent and purposes, the child of
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is qualified to adopt under the law.

RULING:

No. Petition dismissed.

Article 335 of the Civil Code provides that:
The following cannot adopt —
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction;
(2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, before the final approval of his accounts;
(3) A married person, without the consent of the other spouse;
(4) Non-resident aliens;
(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations;
(6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, when the
penalty imposed was six months' imprisonment or more.

A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state where he has his abode and lives
there permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and voluntarily, although he may later on change his
mind and live elsewhere. A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently and to which
he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. Ricardo R. Caraballo,
the petitioner, an American citizen who now lives in Clark Field, municipality of Angeles, province of
Pampanga, Republic of the Philippines, because of his assignment as staff sergeant in the United States
Air Force — his stay in the Philippines then being temporary — is a non-resident alien who, pursuant to
clause 4 of the above quoted article of the Civil Code, is disqualified to adopt a child in the Philippines.
 No. 35980 February 20, 1932
Go CHEN and Go LEK, petitioners and appellees
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF CEBU, respondent and appellant.
VILLA-REAL, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners Go Chen and Go Lek, then aged 20 and 18 respectively, are the children of Tan Bon
from his first husband. The latter never resided in the Philippines during his first marriage. However,
when her husband died, she was admitted here in the Philippines as a Chinese merchant’s wife and
resided for eight years. Being a resident merchant who has a furniture business in Cebu, she ordered
herein petitioners to come to the Philippines and live with her. A month later, Go Lek left his mother’s
home and went to Talisayan, Misamis Province at the invitation of the former’s friend named Go Tian Ho
who has a store in that municipality.

Respondent-appellant Collector of Customs Cebu filed before the Court of First Instance Cebu
questioning the right of the petitioners to enter or remain in the Philippine Islands not as a consequence
of the exercise of patria potestad. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners and granted the writ
of habeas corpus that ordered that the same be set at liberty and permitted to remain in the Philippine
Islands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Chinese widow is entitled to bring in her minor children by the first marriage
considering she was admitted and acquired residence as wife of a Chinese merchant in her second
marriage

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The Chinese woman Tan Bon was admitted in the Philippines through that of her second
husband and not through her own. Based on that premise, her minor children from another husband
cannot enter the archipelago since the right will come from her second husband whom is not
petitioners’-appellees’ father. The mere fact of their being children of Tan Bon confers on them no right
of entry, inasmuch as she herself did not enter of her own right, and they cannot base their right on
hers.

The petitioners’ contention that their mother’s current status as a resident merchant having a
furniture business in the Philippines gives the latter the right to bring her minor children in the country
is untenable. The Supreme Court based on their previous ruling in the cases of Juan Co vs. Rafferty (14
Phil., 235), United States vs. Yu Wa (28 Phil., 1), United States vs. Sia Lam Han (29 Phil., 159) and United
States vs. So Hao Ka (31 Phil., 649). The fact that she became a merchant after coming into the country
did not give her the right to remain and acquired that right by virtue of being the wife of a Chinese
merchant who came into the country in that capacity. Hence, the minor children cannot acquire such
right accorded to her being she was not able to enter in her own right.
 The judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ of habeas corpus denied with costs
against appelles.
 DIEGO DE LA VIÑA vs. ANTONIO VILLAREAL

GR No. 13982. July 31, 1920.

FACTS: Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo against
Diego de la Viña for divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite int he sum of P400
per month. She alleged among others that the defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one
Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in
disgrace of the plaintiff. That because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the
conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established
her habitual residence. That the plaintiff, scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of support
and was living only at the expense of one of her daughters. Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint,
Narcisa Geopano presented a motion alleging, among other things, that since the filing of her complaint
she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which
belonged to the conjugal partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, to the prejudice of
the plaintiff, and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining and
prohibiting him in the premises. CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that
CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since his wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has exceeded his
power in granting the preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of marriage.

HELD: YES. When the husband has given enough reason for her to do so as example, cause of divorce.- The
law will recognize a wife as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and separate rights, in
those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself ought to be
dissolved- The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations
with third parties, and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves
as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings