Spec Pro Digest 2011 PDF

SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS
DIGEST COMPILATION
Submitted to
Judge Gina Bibat-Palamos
SY 2011-2012
Submitted by:
3-S
Guttierez, Myron Dei Pastores, Cherie Mae

Lingao, Cherylette Porquez, Jonalyn
Lucaylucay, Maicha
3/2 6/2 01 2
CON TE NT S
RULE 72 11
Lucaylucay, Maicha 11
Rufina Luy Lim vs. Court Of Appeals, Auto Truck Tba Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributors,
Alliance Marketing Corporation, Action Company, Inc. 11
Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio S. Manalo, Orlando S. Manalo, And Isabelita Manalo vs. Hon. Court Of
Appeals, Hon. Regional Trial Court Of Manila (Branch 35), Purita S. Jayme, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M.
Orillano, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo S. Manalo, Roberto S. Manalo, Amalia Manalo And Imelda Manalo 13
Patricia Natcher vs. Hon. Court Ofappeals And The Heir Of Graciano Del Rosario – Leticia Del Rosario, Emilia
Del Resorio – Manangan, Rosalinda Fuentes Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes, Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn Del Rosario, And
Eduardo Del Rosario 15
Erlinda A. Agapay vs. Carlina (Cornelia) V. Palang And Herminia P. Dela Cruz 17
Dr. Olivia S. Pascual, In Her Capacity As Special Administratrix Of The Estate Of The Late Don Andres Pascual
And As Executrix Of The Testate Estate Of The Late Doña Adela S. Pascual vs. Court Of Appeals; Judge Manuel
S. Padolina, Regional Trial Court Of Pasig, Branch 162; Deputy Sheriff Carlos G. Maog; And Atty. Jesus I. Santos
19
Natividad P. Nazareno, Maximino P. Nazareno, Jr. vs. Court Of Appeals, Estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr.,
Romeo P. Nazareno and Eliza Nazareno 21
Angel T. Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate Of Pedro O. Fragrante, deceased 23
Angela Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, et al. vs. Hon. Juan De Borja, as Judge of the Court Of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch III, Anatolia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan, 25
RULE 73 27
Porquez, Jonalyn 27
Heirs of Spouses Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. vs. Alex A. Lina 27
Porquez, Jonalyn 29
Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court Of Appeals (Sixth Division) and Honor Moslares 29
RULE 74 31
Porquez, Jonalyn 31
1
Jose McMicking, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose vs. Benito Sy Conbieng, administrator of the
estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco 31
Porquez, Jonalyn 32
Carlos Ilustre Vs. Cornelio Alaras Frondosa 32
Porquez, Jonalyn 33
Cresencia Hernandez vs. Zacarias Andal 33
Porquez, Jonalyn 34
Verona Pada-Kilario and Ricardo Kilario Vs. Court Of Appeals And Silverio Pada, Respondents. 34
Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 36

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as
administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of
Josefa Tangco, appellees, vs. TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, appellant. . 36

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ. SATURNINA M. VDA. DE LOPEZ, administratrix-appellee,
vs. DAHLIA LOPEZ and ROY LOPEZ, minors, represented by their mother and natural guardian LOLITA B.
BACHAR, movants-appellants. 37

BENITA TOMIAS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants, vs. CONRADO TOMIAS, ET AL., defendants appellees. 39

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F.
MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and
BELEN F. MARQUEZ, respondents. 40

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al 42

LEE vs. RTC 44
Pastores, Cherie Mae 47

Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave vs. Reyes 47

Manotok Realty Inc vs. CA 48

Dolores Vda de Gil vs. Agustin Cancio 49

Eusebio Godoy vs. Orellano et al 50

Julian Boñaga vs.Roberto Soler, Et Al. 50
2
RULE 75 52

Mang-oy vs. CA 52

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA 53
Lingao, Cherylette 55
Spouses Alvaro Pastor Jr. and Ma. Elena Pastor vs. The Court of Appeals, Juan Reyes, Judge of Branch of CFI of
Cebu, and Lewellyn Quemada 55
Remedios Nuguid vs. Feliz Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid 56
Emilio Reyes vs. Apolonio Diaz 58
Maninang vs. Court of Appeals 58
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals 59
In re Kaw Singco alias Co Chi Seng 62
Sy Oa, administratrix-appellee vs Co Ho, Oppositor and Apellant 62
Guttierez, Myron 63
Bernabe Vs Vergara 63
Guttierez, Myron 64
Castro vs. Gallegos 64
RULE 76 65
Guttierez, Myron 65
Acain vs Iac 65
Guttierez, Myron 66
Codoy vs. Calugay 66
Guttierez, Myron 67
De Aranz vs. Galing 67
Guttierez, Myron 68
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa 68
Guttierez, Myron 69
Fernandez vs. Tantoco 69
3
RULE 78-90 70
BEATRIZ F. GONZALES vs. HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro
Manila and TERESA F. OLBES 70
ROGELIO R. RAMOS vs. JUDGE EUSEBIO M. BAROT, Presiding Judge, 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 2,
Aparri-Calayan, Cagayan 71
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS vs. THE HON.
FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM 73
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR. vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO 75
Porquez, Jonalyn 78
Serapia De Gala vs. Apolinario Gonzales And Sinforoso Ona 78
Porquez, Jonalyn 79
Natividad I. Vda. De Roxas vs. Potenciano Pecson, Judge Of First Instance Of Bulacan, Maria Roxas And Pedro
Roxas 79
Porquez, Jonalyn 81
th
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals (5 Division) and Nelia S. Silverio-Dee 81
Porquez, Jonalyn 82
Rolando Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez And Myrna T. Sanchez vs. The Honorable Court
Of Appeals, Rosalia S. Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn Lugod-Ranises And Roberto S. Lugod 82

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth
Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE
RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG 84

JOSEPHINE OROLA, MYRNA OROLA, ANGELINE OROLA, MANUEL OROLA, ANTONIO OROLA and ALTHEA OROLA
vs. THE RURAL BANK OF PONTEVEDRA (CAPIZ), INC., EMILIO Q. OROLA, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAPIZ and
THE EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ 86

RICARDO SIKAT, Judicial Administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Mariano P. Villanueva vs.
QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA, Judicial Administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Pedro
Villanueva 90
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DOMINADOR DANAN, represented by its Administratrix, ADORACION F. VDA. DE
DANAN, and the HEIRS of the late DOMINADOR DANAN, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. FELIPE V. BUENCAMINO,
4
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch II, Guagua, Pampanga,
BENITO MANALANSAN, et al., respondents. 92
ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Puentevella,
assisted by her husband, RENE ECHAUS, petitioner,  vs. HON. RAMON BLANCO, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the late Charles Newton Hodges, AVELINA A. MAGNO, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges, respondents. 94
Alan Sheker vs Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victoria S. Medina 96
ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES VS. LILIA J. HENSON -CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, AND ANTONIO J.
HENSON 97
Gutierrez, Myron Dei 99

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE 99

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City,
and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents 101

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS
OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE, petitioners, vs. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent 102

J. GONZALES-ORENSE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMA M. CAGUIAT-ALBA, respondents. 105

SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO, Petitioner, vs.OLIVIA SENGCO PASCUAL and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents. 106

*
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner, vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, ELENA FIGURACION-
ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents. 108

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and
JOSEFINA P. PAJONAR, as Administratrix of the Estate of Pedro P. Pajonar, respondents. 109

TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y
Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee. 110
RULE 101 112
5
CHIN AH FOO vs. PEDRO CONCEPCION 112
RULE 102: 113

Gregorio Zagala vs. Eustacio Ilustre 113

FELIPE GONZALES vs. FLORENTINO C. VIOLA and VALENTIN MANIQUIS 113

EFREN C. MONCUPA vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 114

Juan Cruz vs. The Director of Prisons 116

FRED M. HARDEN vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 117

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ, ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS LAZARO, REYNALDO MACLANG,
MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N. DIESMOS, RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. DE
OCAMPO, VICTORIANO C. AMADO and MAC ACERON, vs. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL COUNSEL
OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, and THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 120

ROGER CHAVEZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN
OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA 122

S/SGT. JOSE SANTIAGO vs. LT. COL. CELSO ALIKPALA, ET AL., 126

IGNACIO P. PAGUNTALAN vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 129

ANTONIO DIRECTO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 130

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA 131
Porquez, Jonalyn 133

EDEN D. PAREDES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 133

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF AMZI B. KELLY, FOR THE ISSUANCE OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR IVON
PUMUTKIN ET AL. VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 135
6
FRANCISCO SALVAÑA and MODESTA SALIENDRA vs. LEOPOLDO GAELA 135

In the matter of the petition for Habeas corpus of SUSANA MACAZO and PACITA NUÑEZ GUILLERMO MACAZO
vs. BENILDO NUÑEZ, EFIGENIA NUÑEZ 137

POLICARPIO REAL vs. JESSIE TROUTHMAN 138

ARTURO RAFAEL SR. and ESPERANZA S. RAFAEL vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Presiding Judge of Branch IV,
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliuag Bulacan and RICARDO A. CORPUS 139

FORTUNATO MEDINA VS. GEN. MANUEL T. YAN, BRIG. GENERAL RAVAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS 140

ALFREDO B. SAULO vs. BRIG. GENERAL PELAGIO CRUZ, ETC. 141

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. 143

FELIPE GONZALES vs. FLORENTINO C. VIOLA and VALENTIN MANIQUIS 144

TUNG CHIN HUI vs.RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration and the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation 145

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES for and in behalf of the Deporation Board, The Commissioner of Immigration
and The Chief of Security Officer, Immigration, Detention, Engineer Island, Manila vs. Hon. GAUDENCIO
CLORIBEL, Judge of the Court of the First Instance, Manila (Branch VI), MACARIO M. OFILADA, as Sheriff of
Manila, and VICENTE KHO alias TAN SE CHIONG 147
Sydiongco, Jacqueline Carlotta 148

Lee Yick Hon vs. The Insular Collector of Customs 148

Efren C. Moncupa vs. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. 149

Honorato Galvez and Godofredo Diego vs. Court of Appeals 150
RULE 103 151

REPUBLIC vs. HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE 151
7
CONSUELO CALICDAN BAYBAYAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 151

IN RE PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JOSELITO YU. 152
JOSELITO YU, represented by his guardian ad litem, JUAN S. BARRERA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 152

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE NAME OF ONG HUAN TIN TO TERESITA TAN ONG. HUAN TIN vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 153

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JESUS NG YAO SIONG. 154
JESUS NG YAO SIONG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 154

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF SURNAMES OF MINORS: CESAR UN TO CESAR TIU, NORBERTO ON TO
NORBERTO TIU, URSULINA ON TO URSULINA TIU, SUSANA RENDORA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 156

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
and LUA ONG representing the minor BABY ONG, alias LUA AN JOK 157

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet and PANG CHA QUEN representing the minor, MAY SIA alias MANMAN HUANG 158

LEONCIA SAN ROQUE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 160

HAW LIONG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 161

CHIU HAP CHIU vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 162

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA
DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 163

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMES. JOSEFINA ANG CHAY and MERCEDITA ANG CHAY, petitioners-appellees,
 vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. 164
Guttierez, Myron De 165

CANDIDO UY alias RICARDO UY, petitioner-appellee,  vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
165
Guttierez, Myron Dei 165

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,  vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor. 165
8
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ANA ISABEL HENRIETTE ANTONIA CONCEPCION
GEORGIANA, ISABEL VALDES JOHNSTON, petitioner-appellant,  vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellee. 166

ELAINE A. MOORE, petitioner-appellant,  vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee. 167

TERESITA LLANETA (known also as TERESITA LLANETA FERRER and TERESITA FERRER), petitioner,  vs. The
Honorable CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, as Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, respondent. 168

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF MA CHIK KIN A MINOR, MA ING CHAO, petitioner-appellee,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. HON. FLORENDO P. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija and JOHN LI KAN WA respondents. 169

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and ANDREW BARRETTO, respondents. 170

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME, GO CHIU BENG, petitioner-appellee,  vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. 171

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAMES OF SECAN KOK and MARILYN SE, SECAN KOK, petitioner-appellee,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,  VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMO WONG, RESPONDENTS.
172

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y
ANDRADE, respondents. 173
RULE 108 174

Virginia Ansaldo vs. Republic of the Philippines 174

Chua Wee and Pacita Topenio vs. Republic of the Philippines 175
9
In Re: Petition for the Correction of Name in the Civil Registry of Manila, 176
Saturnina Vda. De Castro vs. Republic of the Philippines 176

Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Malabon 177

Republic vs. Rafael De la Cruz, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch
III and Felicisima Velarde 177

Kumala Salim Wing vs. Ahmad Abubakar 178

Rosales vs. Castillo Rosales 180

Sison vs. Republic 181

Wong vs. Republic 182

REPUBLIC VS CFI of DAVAO ORIENTAL 183

TAN VS. REPUBLIC 183

TOLENTINO VS PARAS 184

REPUBLIC VS Hon. GEORGE P. MACLI-ING 185

REPUBLIC VS VALENCIA 186

CHIAO BEN LIM VS Hon. MARIANO A. ZOSA 187

REPUBLIC VS Hon. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO 187

ELEOSIDA vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY 188
RULE 109 190

DAIS vs. Hon. GARDUÑO 190
10
RULE 72
Lucaylucay, Maicha
RUFINA LUY LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING,
INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC.
G.R. NO. 124715 JANUARY 24, 2000
BUENA, J.:
FACTS:
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Rufina Luy Lim, as surviving spouse and represented by her
nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for the administration of the estate of before
the RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory, filed a motion for the
lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. The RTC
granted the motions
On petitioner’s motion, it reinstated the notice of lis pendens on the TCTs and the inclusion of the
properties. The probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion, contending that it
was within the jurisdiction of the court to resolve
The Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the decision nullifying the
order of the lower court.
Lim came to the SC through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in in reversing the orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or
provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the deceased?
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate
of a deceased person?
HELD:
The provisions of Republic Act 7691 ("An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", approved on 25 March 1994.) which
introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon
the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate
court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, we defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in the
determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
11
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private
respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs. ALCID is of great essence and finds
applicability:
If a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be
given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner
to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D.
1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens
Title.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law
possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to
shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held
liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from
its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the
alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity
should come to naught.
To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and
convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
Petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale
the veil of corporate fiction.
12
Lucaylucay, Maicha
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, AND ISABELITA MANALO
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S.
JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO,
ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO AND IMELDA MANALO
G.R. NO. 129242 JANUARY 16, 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14,
1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,
Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo. He left several real properties located
in Manila and in the province of Tarlac
Eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the RTC for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother,
Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs
The trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the
reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. It set this order of general default aside
upon motion of petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and
Orlando.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order denying the hearing of the oppositor’s affirmative defenses
as grounds for dismissal, declaring that it acquired jurisdiction over the oppositors, denying their motion
for inhibition, and setting for hearing Romeo’s application for appointment as administrator.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Was the case an ordinary civil action involving the same members of the family, and if so did the CA err in
upholding the orders of the RTC despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts
toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the
petition but that the same have failed?
HELD:
Petitioners claim that the case is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family.
Consequently, according to them, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a
condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein
failed to aver in the petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members
of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
13
The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his
residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to
be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room
for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an
ordinary civil action. Petitioners took advantage of the said defect in the petition in an apparent effort to
make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has
limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be
properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that
the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in
the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. So
it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to
justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough.
The provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it
refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a
right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions.
14
Lucaylucay, Maicha
PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO –
LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, AND EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 133000 OCTOBER 2, 2001
BUENA, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon
the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael,
Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February
1954, adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the
agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said
property.
Said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into
several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the
land. It was further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the 2nd land to
Patricia. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
The children filed a complaint against Natcher for reconveyance, alleging that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired. Natcher alleged that during Graciano's lifetime,
Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, they may not anymore claim
against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.
The RTC Manila declared the deed of sale in favor of Natcher a nullity, and that it cannot be regarded as a
valid donation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision.
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
RTC, in trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/ annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction.
Natcher elevated the case to the SC through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
HELD: No
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term
"special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application
or motion."
15
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating
to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to
our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo and
Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then
Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode
of practice "which may be waived".
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six
children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to
rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the
trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario.
16
Lucaylucay, Maicha
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY VS. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG AND HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ
G.R. NO. 116668 JULY 28, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16, 1949. On October 1949, he left to work
in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire
duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife
and child. As early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good
in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier (on May 17, 1973) Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square
meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their
names. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly
by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter, whereby they agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel
died.
Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, instituted the case at bar, an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
The lower court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little
evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel
Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher
Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUES:
Who owns the two properties?
Was the trial court correct in resolving the issue of Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate
son and heir to Miguel's estate?
Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-defendant in the case?
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code.
17
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household,
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and
sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the
subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only
around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited.
Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we
cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in
Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property
in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975.
Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or
without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment
which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property
and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, the testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance
for the property reveals that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code.
Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court
or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil
action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.”
Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda
cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar.
18
Lucaylucay, Maicha
DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, IN HER CAPACITY AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE DON ANDRES PASCUAL AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DOÑA
ADELA S. PASCUAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS; JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG, BRANCH 162; DEPUTY SHERIFF CARLOS G. MAOG; AND ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS
G.R. NO. 120575 DECEMBER 16, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 and was survived by (1) his widow, Doña Adela
Soldevilla Pascual; (2) the children of his full blood brother. Wenceslao Pascual Sr.; (3) the children of his
half-blood brother Pedro Pascual; (4) the intestate estate of his full blood brother Eleuterio T. Pascual; and
(4) the acknowledged natural children of his full blood brother Eligio Pascual (including Olivia S. Pascual,
petitioner).
On December 11, 1973, Doña Adela (the surviving spouse) filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Pasig, Rizal, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her husband. To assist her with said
proceedings, Doña Adela hired, on February 24, 1974, Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as
her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the gross estate of the decedent.
When Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 took effect, the petition was reassigned to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, Branch 162. The heirs of the decedent moved for the approval of their Compromise Agreement,
stipulating that three fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doña Adela and one fourth (1/4) to the other
heirs.
While the settlement was still pending, Doña Adela died, leaving a will which named the petitioner as the
sole universal heir. The latter filed at the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, a petition for the
probate of said will.
Six years after Doña Adela's death (January 19, 1994), Judge Padolina rendered a Decision partitioning the
property of Don Pascual, ¼ to his heirs and ¾ to the estate of Doña and awarded the attorney's fees of Atty.
Jesus Santos equivalent to 15% of the 3/4 share of the estate of Doña Adela S. Pascual.
After said Decision had become final and executory, the Santos filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution insofar as the payment of his attorney's fees was concerned. It was granted, and issued to be
implemented against the 3/4 share of Doña Adela S. Pascual.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration and the quashal of the Writ of Execution but was denied. She filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for annulment of the award of attorney's fees. The CA dismissed.
ISSUES:
Did the Court have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?
Were the heirs of Doña Adela Were Not Deprived of Due Process?
Were there Factual and Legal Bases of the Award of Attorney's Fees?
HELD:
The death of Doña Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require
him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had he filed the claim
19
against Doña Adela personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don
Andres. Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court, which requires the appointment of a new administrator.
The rule does not have the effect of divesting the instance court of jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction subsists
because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct and separate from that of
Doña Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doña Adela was merely a representative
party and the claim was an item of the administrative expenses of Don Andres' estate. It is well-settled that
a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her acts of administration,
in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is
pending.
Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate court to
determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as administrative
The Court required in Lacson the payment of a separate docket fee, since the lawyer's "motion for
attorney's fee" was in the "nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his client." In contrast, the
private respondent filed a claim for his attorney's fees against the estate of Don Andres. The difference in
the modes of action taken in Lacson is inapplicable to the case at bar.
In addition, where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleadings, or if specified, its amount
was left for the court's determination, the additional filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment. In its
Order dated April 19, 1994, the intestate court required the payment of the docket fee for the claim. In fact,
the private respondent paid the prescribed docket and additional filing fees.
If admitted by the administrator or executor, a claim according to Rule 86 of Section 11 may be allowed by
the court without any hearing. Respondent court found that the claim was indeed admitted and
uncontested.
Besides, the petitioner had ample time to contest the claim. From her appointment as special administratrix
until January 19, 1994 when the RTC Decision was rendered, she had all the time to oppose the claim. This
was the proper time to raise any objection. When she received said Decision on February 8, 1994, again she
had the chance to question the claim in a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, and yet she opted not to
take advantage of these remedies.
Such facts conclusively prove that petitioner was not deprived of due process, the essence of which is the
right to be heard. Where a person is not heard because he or she has chosen not to give his or her side of
the case, such right is not violated. If one who has a right to speak chooses to be silent, one cannot later
complain of being unduly silenced.
The legal and factual bases of the award were stated in the body of the January 19, 1994 RTC Decision. In
recounting the "significant events leading to [the] eventual culmination" of the case, the trial court revealed
the importance of the services of private respondent who represented the estate, argued for the intestate
court's approval of the Compromise Agreement, and rendered legal advice on the final distribution of the
properties of the estate.
The awards of attorney's fees herein is not in the concept of damages based on Article 2208 of the Civil
Code which, as an exception to the general rule not to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, is but a
compensation for services rendered.
The Court finds no evidence to show that the stipulated amount of attorney's fees was illegal immoral or in
contravention of law, good morals, good customs, public order or public policy. It is therefore enforceable
as the law between the parties.
20
Lucaylucay, Maicha
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF
MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO AND ELIZA NAZARENO
G.R. NO. 138842 OCTOBER 18, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while
Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico,
and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino,
Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.
During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City and
in the Province of Cavite.
After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case. Romeo was appointed administrator of his
father’s estate.
Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real
properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. Natividad sold Lot 3-B to Maximo Jr., which had been occupied
by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969.
Maximino, Jr. brought an action for recovery of possession and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of
Maximino, Jr. In CA-G.R. CV No. 12932, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., the present case for
annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr.
The trial court rendered a decision, declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970. Except
as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the
rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court modified its decision.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot
3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots
10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.
ISSUES:
Was the lone testimony of Romeo sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to a
notarized document?
Was the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was declared final by this Court in G.R. No. 107684,
where the CA upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot 3-B binding in this case?
Did the fact that Maximino, Sr. and Aurea execute several deeds of sale during their lifetime, show their
intention to dispose of their real properties such that the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 should be
deemed valid?
Was the Deed an indivisible obligation, and therefore, cannot be annulled by one of them?
21
Was there an implied trust?
HELD:
The lone testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient. In this case, the testimony of Romeo that no
consideration was ever paid for the sale of the six lots to Natividad was found to be credible both by the
trial court and by the Court of Appeals and it has not been successfully rebutted by petitioners. We,
therefore, have no reason to overturn the findings by the two courts giving credence to his testimony.
The fact that the deed of sale was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As held in
Suntay v. Court of Appeals:
Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is
not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the
parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.
That case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were
Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in
the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and
Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party
complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party complaint
concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though Romeo
represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from
the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot
3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover
properties which were wrongfully disposed.
This is a non-sequitur. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino, Sr.
and Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 is valid.
Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale. The question, however, is whether
these sales were made for a consideration. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the Nazareno
spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes.
It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to make simulated transfers of ownership of real
properties to their children in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29
January 1970 void and of no effect. In the case of Suntay vs. Court of Appeals (251 SCRA 430 [1995]), the
Supreme Court held that badges of simulation make a deed of sale null and void since parties thereto enter
into a transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound.
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever may be the nature of the
thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not to the object thereof.
In the present case, the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to Natividad. The
obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise
the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility
of a contract on the number of obligors.
In any case, the validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone affected by it. A void contract is
inexistent from the beginning. Hence, even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone contests the validity of the
sale, the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all.
22
It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo
testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only
“female and the only unmarried member of the family.” She was thus entrusted with the real properties in
behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event
the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor.
There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, DECEASED
G.R. NO. L-770 APRIL 27, 1948
HILADO, J.:
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its
decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and
to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City. The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the
case
ISSUES:
Was there an error on the part of the commission in allowing the substitution of the legal representative of
the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for?
Was the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act?
Can it be considered a "citizen of the Philippines?
HELD:
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute
his application before the commission to its final conclusion.
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public
Service Commission is not an "action".
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.
23
Manresa says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as
immovable and movable things rights which are not material.
Corpus Juris states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things, "an option",
and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line"
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every species
of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed.
In the instant case there would be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a
"person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results
to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone
those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the
estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among
the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein
the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of
said estate along with the other plaintiffs
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a
deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of
the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
decedent by the mere fact of his death
It has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations
which survive after his demise.
Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and
fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be
no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and
to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for
certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations
of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate
which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one
involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in
the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from
the opposite course.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he
would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has
suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen.
In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also
Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining
them from inheriting it.
Separate Opinions
24
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by
which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They
inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for
their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been devised
to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact, intended
to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of
the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
The heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the Commission upon evidence that the party should be
present. It should also determine the dummy question raised by the petitioner.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. VS. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN AND ADELAIDA JACALAN,
G.R. NO. L-21993 JUNE 21, 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez
On March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963,
petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal,
and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of
the estate.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at
8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R.
No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The Court of First Instance denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did
not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other. It held that the movants clearly filed the intestate
proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings".
ISSUE:
Who had jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
25
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the
will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and
place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even
if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed.
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the
Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was
domiciled in Rizal province. We cannot disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as a parish priest in
Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some
animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan
court lacked jurisdiction.
The power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile
of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither party denies that the late
Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan. That is
sufficient in the case before us.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that
court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong
venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners.
Their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to
the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the
precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was
not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the
administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of
testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action".
26
RULE 73
Porquez, Jonalyn
HEIRS OF SPOUSES REMEDIOS SANDEJAS AND ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. VS. ALEX A. LINA
G.R. NO. 141634 FEBRUARY 5, 2001
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the
FACTS:
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. was granted letters of administration for the settlement of the estate of his wife
Remedios Sandejas. After the granting of the letters of administration, the records of the proceeding were
burned when the 4th floor of Manila City Hall caught fire on November 19, 1981.
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case which was granted by the
lower court. Alex A. Lina filed an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene, alleging, among others, that
Sandejas bound himself to sell parcels of land which formed part of the estate of Remedios Sandejas and
that the Eliodoro Sr. received earnest money in the total amount of P170,000 to be deducted from the
purchase price of P1M. Lina further alleged that Eliodoro informed him that he had already filed a motion
with the court for authority to sell the parcels of land but there was delay because the records of the
proceedings were still under reconstitution. The lower court granted the intervention of Alex Lina.
The administrator, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died in Canada sometime in November 1984. His counsel
alleged among others that the matter of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina became a money claim to be
filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas.
The, lower court issued an Order directing, among others, that the counsel for the heirs move for the
appointment of a new administrator, which it reiterated since the heirs did appoint a new administrator.
Alex A. Lina, as petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for petitions
for letters of administration and for the consolidation of the present case with the special proceeding for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. Hence, the court consolidated the two cases.
Initially, Lina filed a Motion for his appointment as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
Sandejas, stating that he would be willing to give way to any other qualified administrator among the heirs.
When the heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as new
administrator, Lina filed no opposition thereto on the condition that Sixto Sandejas be also appointed as
administrator of the intestate estate of his father, Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.
The lower court granted the said Motion and substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the
said petitions.
As Intervenor, Lina filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between the
latter and Eliodor Sr. and for the execution of the deed of absolute sale by the heirs of the Sandejas spouses
in favor of Lina.
The lower court rendered the disputed Order granting the Intervenor’s motion for the approval of the
Receipt of Earnest Money With Promise to Sell and to Buy dated June 7, 1982; furthermore, the lower court
ordered Lina to pay the balance of the contract and the Administrator to execute the proper deeds.
27
On appeal, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sr.and Lina was merely a contract to sell and that
the ownership of the parcels of land remained with the estate of Remedios Sandejas since it was subject to
the approval of the probate court. That approval was a positive suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of
which was not tantamount to a breach.
The CA further ruled that Section 1, Rule 89 for the order of sale of personalty was inapplicable since there
was no written notice to the other heirs signifying bad faith on the part of Elidoro Sr.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in modifying the trial court’s decision in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of the
disputed properties even if the suspensive condition of a court approval had not been fulfilled.
Whether the settlement court has jurisdiction to issue the order
Whether respondent-intervenor has standing to file an application for approval of the sale of realty in the
settlement case
Whether Eliodoro Sr. was in bad faith in selling the properties without court approval
RULING:
1. The agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent Lina was not a contract to sell as posed by
petitioners but a contract of sale. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition, fulfilment of which gives rise to the obligation of the vendor to convey the title to
the property. On the other hand, the contract between Eliodor Sr. and respondent Lina is subject to the
suspensive condition of court approval, and not the payment of the purchase price. After the intestate
court granted the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent, petitioner was obligated to
execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor, the contract having been perfected.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to
dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership.
The heirs can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A
stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards
the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with
the court's permission.
Since petitioners did not consent to the sale of their share to respondent, the CA was correct in limiting
the scope of the Receipt of Earnest Money With Promise to Sell and Buy to Eliodoro Sr.’s pro-indiviso
share of the estate.
2. The settlement court has jurisdiction to enforce the execution of the contract. Section 8, Rule 89, allows
action to proceed. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates and the
probate of wills of deceased persons, and extends to matters incidental and collateral thereto.
3. The respondent has legal standing to apply for the approval of the sale. Unlike Section 2 and Section 4
of Rule 89, Section 8 does not specify who should file an application for the approval of the sale of
realty. As a consequence thereof, any party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
entitled to the avails of the suit may file an application
4. The Court agreed that bad faith could not be attributed to Eliodoro Sr. in entering into a contract with
Lina since he informed respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the sale of the lots, and
he did not promise that he could obtain the approval.
28
Porquez, Jonalyn
PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION)
AND HONOR MOSLARES
G.R. NO. L-62431-33 AUGUST 31, 1984
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS: During the lifetime of Nicolai Drepin, Honor P. Moslares, the President of GM Management
Phils. executed a deed of sale with mortgage in favor of Drepin wherein Moslares purchased 80.3980
hectares of land from the decedent, Drepin for a consideration of P2,600,000. Moslares paid a
downpayment of P300,000; while the balance of P 2,300,000 was secured by a mortgage on the land. The
parties further stipulated that the sale of the land shall not be registered until Moslares paid Drepin
P1,300,000, and P1,000,000 to Drepin’s creditors.
Subsequently, Moslares and Drepin entered into a “Joint Venture Agreement” whereby Drepin, as owner of
the lots, and Moslares as developer, converted the lands into a residential subdivision. Afterwhich, Drepin
died.
During the probate of Nicolai Drepin’s holographic will, the will listed 22 creditors, only twelve (12) of
which filed their respective claims. The Estate of Drepin consisted of the three (3) parcels of titled land,
with a total area of eighty (80) HA and another parcel of land with an area of eighty-one (81) that was still
pending registration. The lands were to be sold in public auction to pay for the debts of the estate, and the
balance of which would be distributed among the heirs.
There were nine (9) offers to purchase the Drepin lands, one of which was made by GM Management Phils.
through its President, Honor P. Moslares who based its offer on the deed of sale with mortgage. Moslares
informed Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the Judicial Administrator, that he was already the owner of the properties
which were made the subject matter in the Special Proceedings and that he should be allowed to pay the
balance according his agreement with the decedent.
The probate court approved Mosrales’ offer with the condition that he would pay the balance of P
2,600,000 by February 28, 1979. During the hearing on October 19, 1979 Mosrales made a tender of P
1,600,000 which was opposed by Atty. Ramon Encarnacion, counsel for the heir Cornelia Trejano. Atty.
Encarnacion contended that Mosrales had only until February 28, 1979 to pay the balance; he further
offered to buy the properties for P 3,000,000 by Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.
On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order which authorized the Judicial Administrator to
finalize the sale with GM Management Phils. and for the latter to pay the balance within ten (10) days,
failure of which would result to the automatic rescission of the authority to sell and permission for the
Administrator to accept other offers.
Mosrales was not able to pay within the period provided and he further requested for an extension of time.
The Judicial Administrator filed a motion to authorize it to accept new offers since two (2) cheques drawn
by Mosrales for the amount of P500,000 and P 2,500,000 bounced for having been drawn against
insufficient funds, and there was a stop payment on the current cheque held by the Administrator for
P300,000.
The court granted the motion of the administrator to screen new offers. As a result of which, a Deed of Sale
was executed in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc.
Mosrales filed a civil case with the CFI of Rizal to determine ownership of the Drepin lands; he also filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, who ruled in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals
declared null and void the Deed of Undertaking and the Deed of Sale executed in favour of Pio Barretto
Realty Development, Inc.
29
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent judge (Judge R. Honrado) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude the parcels of land involved from the testate proceedings of
the Drepin estate; and
Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the impugned orders dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980, and
October 20, 1980, which in sum resulted to the execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty
Inc.
RULING:
The respondent court still acted within its jurisdiction when it did not exclude the three titled lots as part of
the Drepin estate.
The probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should". The probate court
is of limited jurisdiction and questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from
the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. The petitioner is not without remedy
since it may file a separate suit to determine ownership over the disputed land.
Consequently, the Supreme Court, in merely reviewing the decision of the CFI as a probate court, could not
also resolve the issue of ownership over the disputed lands with finality. The issue on ownership decided
by a probate court is provisional in nature and the Supreme Court cannot enlarge the scope of the limited
jurisdiction of the CFI by passing upon the title of ownership with finality.
On the issue of whether the probate court had jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with Mortgage
executed between the deceased and Moslares.
The Supreme Court ruled that the joint venture agreement entered between Drepin and Mosrales still listed
Drepin as owner of the subject lands, provisionally recognizing ownership of the titled lands as vested in
the estate. When Moslares offered to buy the property during the settlement of the estate of the deceased,
he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Moreover, the act of offering to buy the Drepin lands is not the normal conduct of the owner of the
property. Also, the court gave Moslares preference and priority over other persons and he is estopped
therefore for asserting that the court had no jurisdiction for having submitted himself to the court.
The probate court cannot determine the property rights of the decedent which depends on the contract; but
the probate court did not adjudicate the rights of the parties in the contract, instead the dealings of the
respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of
Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court separate distinct from that
which he had with the decedent.
Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a particular sale
would be beneficial to the estate. Nevertheless, respondent could have prevented the sale of the Drepin
Lands by posting a bond to be fixed by the court as provided in Section 3, Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Since a probate court’s jurisdiction remains merely for the settlement of the estate, respondent may
have sought the rescission of the sale and determination of ownership of the property in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court), dated June 30, 1982 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The permanent restraining order issued against the trial court is hereby DISMISSED. The impugned orders
of the probate court dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980 and October 20, 1980 are
accordingly REINSTATED.
30
RULE 74
Porquez, Jonalyn
JOSE MCMICKING, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARGARITA JOSE VS.
BENITO SY CONBIENG, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF PIO DE LA GURDIA BARRETTO SY
PIOCO
G.R. NO. L-6871 JANUARY 15, 1912
PONENTE: Moreland, J.
FACTS:
When Margarita Jose died, Engracio Palanca was appointed as administrator with the will annexed of the
estate. Mariano Ocampo and Dy Cunyao became the sureties of Palanca for the sum of P60,000. Mariano
Ocampo died on the 22nd of April 1904, a fact made known to the CFI of Manila where the proceedings were
pending.
Palanca was again made to furnish a bond of P60,000 to replace the bond with Mariano Ocampo as surety
with Dy Cunyao, which Palanca posted.
With respect to the estate of Mariano Ocampo, Doroteo Velasco was appointed as administrator, while
Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto served as sureties of the said administrator for the sum of
P30,000. Doroteo filed a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased Mariano Ocampo;
all the parties interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo entered into an agreement on July 28, 1904 to
partition among themselves extrajudicially the estate of the decedent Ocampo.
On March 30, 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of Margarita
Jose for failing to render an account of the property and disobeying the orders of the court; petitioner Jose
McMicking was appointed in his stead.
McMicking instituted a claim against Palanca and his sureties. The court directed that the claim against
Mariano Ocampo, as surety, be paid by Doroteo Velasco, as administrator of Velasco. No payment had been
made to the said estate of Margarita Jose.
Hence, McMicking instituted a claim against the sureties of Doroteo Jose, namely Pio de la Barreto, as
represented by his administrator Benito Conbieng. The committee constituted to determine the claim of
the estate of Margarita Jose against Palanca and his sureties disallowed the claim against Pio de la Barretto.
McMicking appealed the disallowance of his claim against the estate of Pio dela Barretto to the CFI of
Manila who also denied the claim.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Margarita Jose may hold the surety of the administrator of a surety liable for
defalcation of the administrator
RULING:
No. Doroteo Velasco himself as administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo would not have been made
liable for the action, more so will the surety of Doroteo Velasco not be liable for the claim.
The heirs of Mariano Ocampo voluntarily partitioned the property among themselves. At the time partition
was made, there were no outstanding claims against the estate, with the exception of the alleged claim
arising by virtue of his having been the surety of Palanca. Doroteo Velasco incurred no liability since the
estate was partitioned among the heirs, and the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator.
31
When partition occurred, a claim against the estate may have been brought within two years to subject the
property to the claim; however it did not necessarily follow that Doroteo Velasco would again be the
appointed administrator.
After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no
further administration of the estate can be had unless the following requisites occur:
There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and
distribution of estate."
The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an
administrator.
If these requisites are lacking no administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if improperly appointed he is
powerless to administer. The statute must be strictly complied with in every essential before it operates.
Every essential requirement must be fulfilled before it will be permitted that a partition which has the clear
sanction of the law and which is strictly in accord with the public policy of the estate shall be set aside and
destroyed with all the evil consequences thereby entailed.
The court further deduced that the appointment of an administrator after partition of the estate ought not
be permitted unless the heirs who partitioned the estate were given the opportunity to satisfy the claim.
Otherwise it would be a deterrent to the purpose of partition, which was to avoid administration in the first
place.
In the case at bar, no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the
partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even
discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far
as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo
was fixed.
Porquez, Jonalyn
CARLOS ILUSTRE VS. CORNELIO ALARAS FRONDOSA
G.R. NO. 6077 NOVEMBER 17, 1910
PONENTE: Johnson, J.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Batangas
FACTS:
Carlos Ilustre was appointed as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Francisco Calzado, who died
either on the 9th or 10th of December 1903. Six years after the death of the decedent, Ilustre, as
Administrator, filed an action for the recovery of property alleged to belong to the estate.
The defendant, Cornelio Alaras Frondosa filed a demurrer to the complaint, alleging among others that he is
the owner of the properties in dispute after purchasing it from the heirs of Calzado after the latter’s death.
The demurrer was granted, from which Ilustre filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs may dispose of their property to Frondosa prior to the appointment of an administrator
32
RULING:
The sale to Alaras Frondosa is valid since the appointment of an administrator is not necessary before the
heirs may dispose of their property. The provisions of the Civil Code provide that the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death. In the absence of debts of the estate,
and any minors among the heirs, they may enter upon the administration of the properties immediately.
The property belonged to the heirs from the time of death of the decedent, hence the sale of their interests
in the property, subject of the action, to Frondosa is valid. Therefore, the administrator has no authority to
intervene with the partition of the heirs, much less demand the return of the property from Frondosa.
If there are any heirs who have not received their inheritance from the estate, that heir may petition for
partition of the estate.
Porquez, Jonalyn
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ VS. ZACARIAS ANDAL
G.R. NO. L-273 MARCH 29, 1947
PONENTE: TUASON, J.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia
Hernandez, are brother and sisters who inherited from their father a parcel of land known as Lot No.
120073. The siblings entered into a verbal partition of the land, after which, Maria and Aquilina sold their
share of 1800 sq. m. to Zacarias Andal, the defendant for P860.
On February 3, 1944, Cresencia offered to purchase the lots sold to Andal for P150, the amount Andal had
allegedly paid for Maria and Aquilina’s Hernandez share, which Andal refused. After the institution of the
complaint, Andal answered that he had no objections to reselling the property to Cresencia but he was
unwilling to accept the P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his expenses.
Cresencia filed a supplemental complaint wherein she alleged that on March 8, 1944, she announced in
open court her willingness to repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for
his expense; that on the 29th of March she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case
was again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened and Andal resold the land fictitiously to
her sisters for P970.
When defendant tried to establish the fact of partition through testimony, counsel for the plaintiff objected
since the best evidence was the document evidencing partition; the objection was sustained. Defendant’s
attempt to prove by parol evidence the fact of partition was also deemed inadmissible.
Thereafter, the court ruled that the resale to Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith, but
did not make any pronouncement that the resale was simulated.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence to prove the fact of partition
RULING:
The court ruled that the execution of a public instrument is not a substantial requirement in a contract of
partition.
33
In general principle courts have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed,
independently and in spite of the statute of frauds. Parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel, it may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the
partition by exercising acts of ownership or recognizing the existence of the partition.
With respect of Rule 74, Section 1, the Court ruled that the requirement for an extrajudicial settlement is
not constitutive but merely evidential of partition. Unlike other substantive laws such as laws governing
donations, the Mortgage Law, the law governing wills and testaments, where the law intends a writing or
other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions, there is no such express or
clear declaration that the execution of a public instrument is constitutive of a contract of partition.
Moreover, the Rules of Court were promulgated by the Supreme Court under authority to deal with matters
of procedure; if Section 1 of Rule 74 were to be construed as substantive the court would be to
transcending its rule-making power. The precursor of Section 1, Rules 74 is Section 596 of Act No 150
stated that the heirs may apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them “and not otherwise”. Section 1 of Rule 74 deleted the
phrase “and not otherwise” signifying an intention that the public document is not constitutive of partition.
The court further opined that the requirement that partition be exhibited in a public document is intended
for the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves. The registration of the partition would be a
constructive notice of the fact of partition and is not mean to affect the intrinsic validity of the partition.
The court had the case remanded for the admission of evidence of the fact of partition, which was not
required to be in a public document.
Porquez, Jonalyn
VERONA PADA-KILARIO AND RICARDO KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SILVERIO
PADA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 134329 JANUARY 19, 2000
PONENTE: DE LEON, JR., J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and reversing the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in an ejectment suit.
FACTS:
Jacinto Pada permitted his half-brother Feliciano Pada to build a house on Cadastral Lot No 5581, in which
petitioner, grand-daughter of Feliciano, has been living since 1950.
When Jacinto Pada died intestate, his six (6) children namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta, executed an extrajudicial partition of his estate in a private document which was never
registered in the Register of Deeds of Leyte. Of the six children, Cadastral Lot No5581, which is the subject
of the controversy, was allocated to Ananias and Marciano.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For
this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, sold Ananias’ share of the c o-ownership to Engr. Ernesto
Panderes. When Marciano died, his daughter Maria, sold her father’s share of the co-ownership to her
34
cousin Silverio Pada. Silverio demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises so that the former’s family
could utilize the area.
After the institution of the complaint, the heirs of Amador Pada, executed a Deed of Donation transferring
to petitioner Verona their share of Cadastal Lot No 5581. The petitioner-spouses contended that the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of
attorney was executed by Marciano, Higino and Amador, in favor of their children who represented them
during the partition and that the partition was executed only through a private document.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner-spouses. The trial court made
the pronouncement that since the extra judicial settlement was made in a private document its genuineness
and due execution was doubtful, and most of the heirs were not present or validly represented since their
children were not armed with a special power of attorney.
Meanwhile the Regional Trial Court ruled that the conveyances of Juanita (daughter of Ananias) and Maria
(daughter of Marciano) were never assailed by the other co-heirs for more than 40 years; and even if the
other co-heirs had an interest in the property, it was lost by prescription if not by laches or estoppel. It
further ruled that the Deed of Donation executed by the heirs of Amado was illegal and invalid since it was
executed only after 40 years from the extrajudicial partition in 1951, and the donors had no right in
donating the property. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial partition is invalid for having been executed in a private document, consequently
making petitioners co-owners of the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Donation
RULING:
The extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada was valid even if it was an unregistered
private document. There is no law which requires partitions be executed in public instruments for their
validity. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court requires the execution of the public document only for the
purpose of protecting the interest of the creditors and the heirs themselves, against tardy claims. It serves
as a constructive notice to others. The partition does not have to appear in a public document to be effective
against the heirs themselves.
Partition is also not deemed a conveyance of real property but rather a confirmation of the right to
property of an heir which another renounces.
The extrajudicial partition, having been executed voluntarily, is conclusive in the absence of debts existing
against the estate. The donation executed by the heirs of Amador Pada after 44 years from the time of
partition produced no legal effect since the donors were not owners of the land.
Finally, petitioners themselves admitted in their answer that they were occupying the property under the
tolerance of the Pada family; hence, their possession thereof may be terminated at any time.
35
Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, ADMINISTRATOR-APPELLEE; JOSE DE BORJA,
AS ADMINISTRATOR, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA AND CRISANTO DE BORJA
(DECEASED) AS CHILDREN OF JOSEFA TANGCO, APPELLEES, VS. TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA,
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE BORJA, APPELLANT. .
G.R. NO. L-28040 AUGUST 18, 1972
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the
probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941.
In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator. In 1952, their son, Jose de Borja,
was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted
testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix.
The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order
to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, by and
between "The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and
as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr."
Some of the essential terms and conditions in the compromise agreement are the following:
That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal,
presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal).
That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount
of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as
his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc.
No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively xxx."
Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances.
The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable.
Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now
Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval
(G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but
its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter
into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same
36
involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco;
and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid
RULING:
YES. The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an
examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of
said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco-shall be
considered as full - complete payment - settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco
de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or
purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at
bar. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance to Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There
is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's
estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such CAUSANTE or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even
if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ. SATURNINA M. VDA. DE
LOPEZ, ADMINISTRATRIX-APPELLEE, VS. DAHLIA LOPEZ AND ROY LOPEZ, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN LOLITA B.
BACHAR, MOVANTS-APPELLANTS.
G.R. NO. L-23915 SEPTEMBER 28, 1970
PONENTE: Makalintal, J.
FACTS:
On October 13, 1962, Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased (Sp.
Proc No. 3740), filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her
legitimate children with the deceased.
In an order dated March 30, 1964, the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the
intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes."
Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez,
represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a
petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-
marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in
the estate given to them.
The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been
ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees. Secondly, the
37
reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action
against the individual distributees.
On October 6, 1964, the Court found that the said petition to reopen is not in order. The said proceeding
was already ordered closed and that the property was divided to their respective heirs. In the opinion of
the Court, under the law, reopening is not the proper remedy (Tomias, et al. vs. Tomias, et al., G.R. No. L-
3004, May 30, 1951). The movants asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereupon appealed
directly to this Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late;
Whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
RULING:
NO. Appellants' motion to reopen, as well as the petition attached thereto, is based on their claim that they
are illegitimate children of the deceased. On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and
hence entitled to share in his estate. Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial
administratrix - and approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby.
The case of VDA. DE MARBELLA VS. KILAYKO, et. al., 104 Phil 41, citing LAJOM VS. VIOLA, 73 Phil 563,
expresses the general governing principle:
“A judicial partition in probate proceedings (and the same thing can be said of partition in intestate
proceedings) does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto… Partition is of the nature of a
conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own
true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such
definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share,
such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province
where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated.”
The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not
become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary
actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or
orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this
case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure.
The remedy was therefore invoked on time.
YES. The remedy pursued by appellants was proper. The court that approved the partition and the
agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud,
and the petition must be filed in the course of the intestate proceedings. It is generally admitted that the
probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the
proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this case within a reasonable
time thereafter.
The order of the trial court sought to be reviewed cites the case of TOMIAS, ET AL. VS. TOMIAS, ET
AL., 89 Phil. 216. That case is not here applicable, since it involved the annulment of the decision in
ordinary action for partition which had already become final.
More to the point here is the following statement of this Court in RAMOS VS. ORTUZAR, 89 Phil. 730:
“…The better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
38
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.”
Finally, in the recent case of URIARTE VS. URIARTE, ET AL., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970, this
Court, thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that there are two alternatives for an acknowledged natural
child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to intervene in the
probate proceeding if it is still open and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.
The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding,
with costs against appellee.

BENITA TOMIAS, ET AL., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS, VS. CONRADO TOMIAS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS
APPELLEES.
G.R. NO. L-3004 MAY 30, 1951
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Eustaquio Tomias died intestate in 1920, leaving seven (7) children named Leon, Benita, Monica,
Bernabela, Toribia (alleged to known also as Enrica), Agustina, and Josefa, all surnamed Tomias.
Possessed of property at the time of his death, he was succeeded in the possession and enjoyment thereof
by his seven children. Two of these, however, later died, Leon in 1931 and Josefa in 1944. It is claimed that
Josefa was survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who had married twice, was
survived by 4 children — Conrado Magdalena, Dolores, and Anicetas — the first two, by the first marriage,
and the other two by the second marriage. It is claimed, however, that he also had a natural son named
Filemon Tomias
On January 19, 1948, Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or
Filomena Tomias filed a complaint (civil case No. 857) against their aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica,
and Agustina, alleging that their deceased grandfather Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of the 15
parcels of land in Occidental Negros of the total assessed value of P8,290 and that since the death of Leon
Tomias the defendants had continued in possession of said land and had been refusing to divide it among
the heirs and to give plaintiffs their share of the products.
Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and accounting. For refusing to join as plaintiffs, Dolores Tomias
and Anicetas Tomias (the other two legitimate children of Leon Tomias) were included as defendants.
Through their counsel Atty. Jose M. Millares, the defendants appeared and filed their answer; but as this
was merely a general denial, the plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Hence, the court
rendered its decision, declaring plaintiffs and defendants owners in common of the 15 parcels of land
described in the complaint, together with the improvements thereon, in the proportion of one--seventh
each to Josefa, Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, all surnamed Tomias, and one--twenty--
eighth to each of the 4 legitimate children of the deceased Leon Tomias, namely, Conrado Tomias,
Magdalena Tomias, Dolores Tomias, and Anicetas Tomias.
The above decision was rendered on April 21, 1948, and no appeal having been taken therefrom, it became
final in due time. But some 5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon Tomias, an alleged
natural son of Leon Tomias, sought to annul it by filing an action for that purpose on the ground (1) that the
court did not have jurisdiction over the case because some of the parcels of land partitioned among the
heirs did not belong to the deceased Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons not made parties to the suit
39
and (2) that not all of the heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural
child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.
On motion of the defendants the action to annul was dismissed by the court on the ground that it raised
issues already raised and decided in the former case. Plaintiffs asked for a reconsideration of this ruling,
alleging for the first time that Toribia Tomias, one of the children of the deceased Eustaquio Tomias, had
not been served with summons implementing the allegation with the affidavit of Toribia Tomias to the
effect that she had received a copy of the complaint in the partition case nor authorized Atty. Millares to
appear for her in that case. Plaintiffs also filed an affidavit of Filemon Tomias to the effect that he was an
acknowledged natural son of the deceased Leon Tomias.
The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding (1) that Filemon Tomias was not an
indispensable party to the action in the absence of a judicial decree declaring him to be an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Leon Tomias and (2) That Toribia Tomias, she being known by this name in
the locality where she lives and among members of her family. A second motion for reconsideration having
been denied, plaintiffs have appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision in Civil Case No. 857 should be annulled
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled in the following manner:
The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere allegation that some of the parcels of
land partitioned were the property of persons not made parties to the suit when none of those persons has
come to the court to protest.
There is no showing that Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the
inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same person.
There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more.
The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged natural son of Leon Tomias does
not call for the annulment of the decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in separate
action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to whom the latter's share in the inheritance was
adjudicated in the partition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed without prejudice to the proper action which the appellant
Filemon Tomias may bring against the legitimate heirs of Leon Tomias. With costs against the appellants.

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ,
ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, AND RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ AND BELEN F. MARQUEZ, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 125715 DECEMBER 29, 1998
FACTS:
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely:
(1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8)
Rafael, Jr.; (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired
a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly
described in TCT No. 47572, wherein they constructed their conjugal home.
40
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an
“Affidavit of Adjudication” vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No.
47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 was issued in his name on June 16,
1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Jr. executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” covering
the land described in TCT No. 33350 as well as the house constructed thereon to (only) three of his children
namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners
herein. As a result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in private
respondents’ name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents (Alfredo and Belen) were in actual possession of the
land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they immediately
demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective
share over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private
respondents ignored petitioners’ demands.
In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on
May 31, 1991 for “Reconveyance and Partition with Damages” before the trial court alleging that both the
“Affidavit of Adjudication” and “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” were fraudulent since the private
respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents.
Private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was already barred by the statute of limitations, since
the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
After due proceedings, the trial court on April 29, 1993, rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners,
saying that “prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a document which is void ab
initio does not prescribe. Both the ‘Affidavit of Adjudication’ and the ‘Donation Inter Vivos’ did not produce
any legal effect and did not confer any right whatsoever.”
On appeal, the trial court’s finding was reversed on April 29, 1996 relying heavily on the case of Gerona vs.
De Guzman which declares that an action based on fraud must be filed within four years from the date of
discovery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for reconveyance has prescribed
RULING:
NO. By virtue of the fraudulent “Affidavit of Adjudication” and “Deed of Donation,” wherein they were
allegedly deprived of their just share over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was created.
Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under
Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent
herein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr.
When Rafael Marquez, Sr. for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was
the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. Constructive
trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against
one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purposes of this
case, the prescriptive period began to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued on June 16, 1982. Thus,
41
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later,
it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.
The Court of Appeal's reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman, is misplaced. In Amerol v. Bagumbaran, we ruled
that the doctrine laid down in the earlier Gerona case was based on the old Code of Civil Procedure which
provided that an action based on fraud prescribes within four years from the date of discovery. However,
with the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive period are
now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or constructive trust are obligations created by law,
then the prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years.
The disputed land was the conjugal property of the spouses Rafael Sr. and Felicidad, so ownership of the
same is to be equally divided between both of them. Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife’s share,
cannot validly donate this portion to the respondents. As expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code:
“Art. 736. Guardian and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.”
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as to the
award of attorney’s fees which is hereby DELETED, the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 60887 is
REINSTATED.

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL
G.R. NO. 118680 MARCH 5, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before
the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On
August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel
and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguel’s estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the
private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of
224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the
heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel
2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. The total land area
allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34, 250 square meters.
42
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to
secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a
joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the
validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not
their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation “that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed.”
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the following
grounds:
That the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition,
and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is
likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
That the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her
inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
The action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond
the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code; that fraud and/or bad faith was never
established.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition” had
already prescribed
RULING:
No. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1
of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part
in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-
year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153
(1964), which held that the action to annul a deed of “extrajudicial settlement” upon the ground of
fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten
months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her
action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to
be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of
43
the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an
heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she
excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article
1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria
Elena’s adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that
their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they
executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26)
years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from
inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual
setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to
defraud Maria Elena.
Furthermore, to say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria
Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her
own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes’ interests did not
include Miguel’s estate but only Pilar’s estate.
Given the circumstances in this case, the properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all
registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such
purpose.
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition” executed by private respondents on March 11,
1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100, 000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be
paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.

LEE VS. RTC
G.R. NO. 146006 FEBRUARY 23, 2004
FACTS:
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children
(Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private
respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all
surnamed Ortañez).
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch
(now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Dr. Ortañez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for
letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a
special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose
Ortañez joint special administrators of their father’s estate. As ordered by the intestate court, special
administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included,
among other properties, 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company
(Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
44
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares
of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein
petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C.
Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership
thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that
he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said
shares with right to repurchase also in favor of FLAG, represented by its president, Jose C. Lee. After one
year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose
Ortañez failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings), Juliana
Ortañez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum
of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez,
partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings (private respondents Enderes et al.) filed
a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. The intestate court
granted said motion and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife
shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the
partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. These motions were opposed by
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special administratrix of
the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to
administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez
for the approval of the deeds of sale. Meanwhile, on August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued an order
granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982
memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate declaring that it is “partially void ab
initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned.”
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it
was denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the
Supreme Court dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His motion for reconsideration was denied
with finality on January 13, 1999. On February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the
petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of
entries of judgments.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for
execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997 because the orders of
the intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court) had long
became final. Respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose
Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife but petitioners ignored the
same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution.
45
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736 which was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the decedent can dispose of the latter’s estate without the approval of the
intestate court
Whether or not the intestate court can execute its order nullifying an invalid sale
RULING:
NO. In this case, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate
among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and
before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties
by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale
thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
Jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of
estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
YES. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized
sale of estate property; otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or
probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate
property before final adjudication.
The issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of the estate is not being dealt with here
because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by the
decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the sale made by the
decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the required approval of t he intestate
court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the intestate court was merely
provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is incorrect.
The sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate
or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
46
Pastores, Cherie Mae
ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE VS. REYES
GR NO. L-29407 JULY 29, 1983
Facts:
A parcel of land situated in Sitio Tibambam, Barrio Tibambam, Municipality of Sigaboy (now Governor
Generoso) is owned by Amadeo Matute Olave. Sometime in April 1965, herein private respondent
Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a civil case with the Court of First Instance
against Carlos Matute and Matias Matute, in their capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo
Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of Php 19,952.11 and attorney’s fees. It was
October 20, 1967, the parties in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Davao, submitted to the
respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate of Amadeo Mutate Olave was
conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim which was not approved by the court nor notice
thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.
Despite the opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene and despite the utter lack of approval of
the probate court in Manila, the said Amicable Settlement was approved by respondent judge giving the
same the enforceability of a court decision which in effect, ceded the property to SAMCO in payment of its
claim.
SAMCO and respondent judge, among others, contend that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved
by the probate court, “the same having been entered into in another independent action and in another
court of co-equal rank”.
The heirs thru its Judicial Administrator, questioned the amicable settlement entered into by the parties
and prayed that it be set aside.
Issue:
Whether or not, the Amicable Settlement entered into by the parties have a legal effect despite the lack of
approval of the probate court?
Held:
No, the amicable settlement was declared null and void.
The claim of the SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amadeo Matute Olave. The purpose of presentation of claims against the decedents of the estate
in the probate court is to protect the estate of the deceased persons.
It is clear that the purpose of the private respondent SAMCO in filing the civil case in the Court of First
Instance in Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the
conveyance to SAMCO of the land belonging to the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim,
without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, who had the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate. It
was a mistake on the part of the court to have given due course to the Civil Case.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that “the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts”. The
law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate court.
47
MANOTOK REALTY INC VS. CA
GR # L-35367 APRIL 9, 1987
Facts:
Vicente Legarda, was authorized as a special co-administrator to sell the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision
of the estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. On December 10, 1952, Vicente Legarda, as a co-
administrator allegedly sold an area of about 280 square meters of the subdivision to Abelardo Lucero
situated at Dinalupihan, Tondo, Manila. The sale was on an installment basis and Lucero, the same day, took
possession of the lot.
In 1953, Lucero leased the lot to six persons, one of whom is herein private respondent. Like the other
tenants, respondent constructed a house on the lot. On July 1956, the probate court of Manila issued
another order authorizing the Philippine Trust Company as administrator, to sell the subdivision at the
earliest possible time at the best obtainable price. Sometime in 1957, the lessees of Lucero, including the
private respondent, defaulted in payment of rentals. Separate actions for ejectment were filed against them.
Later on, the petitioner was subsequently awarded the sale of the entire subdivision. On March 13, 1959,
the deed of sale was executed by and between petitioner and Philippine Trust Company and the same was
approved by the probate court. It caused to be published in the Manila Times and Taliba notices addressed
to all the “squatter-occupants” of the subdivision advising them to surrender the material and actual
possession of the portions occupied by them otherwise judicial action would be taken. Lucero, despite his
awareness of the circumstances, executed a deed of assignment of the lot in question in favor of his lessees.
The RTC ruled that Lucero’s title to the land is of no merit. The CA reversed the decision. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a consummated sale between Legarda and Lucero?
Held:
No, it does not conform to the legal requirements provided for in the law.
The alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public instrument in
accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have been duly registered with the Register of
Deeds to make it binding against the third persons. The authority given by the probate court to Legarda
specifically required the execution of necessary documents. Lucero not only failed to obtain a deed of sale
for Legarda but also failed to secure any kind of writing evidencing the contract of sale other than the
receipt issued by Legarda.
The questioned sale cannot be enforced against the third persons such as petitioner by the private
respondent who only derived his right to the property from Lucero. Furthermore, the alleged sale was on
an installment basis and thus, necessitated court approval because the same was patently not in accordance
with the express terms and conditions specified in the authorization to sell by the probate court.
An administrator under the circumstances of this case cannot enjoy blanket authority to dispose of real
estate as he pleases, especially where he ignores specific directives to execute proper documents and get
court approval for the sale’s validity.
48
DOLORES VDA DE GIL VS. AGUSTIN CANCIO
GR # L-21472, JULY 30, 1965
FACTS:
Carlos Gil Sr. Died testate in Manila on November 1943, instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isabel
Herreros subject to the condition that should the latter die, the estate, if any, would be inherited by Carlos
Gil Jr, the decedent’s adopted son. In due time, the decedent’s will was duly admitted to probate, the widow
Isabel having been appointed as the administrix of the estate.
During the Japanese occupation, the widow Isabel and adopted son Carlos sscured from one Agustin Cancio
a loan of 89,000php and in payment thereof they agreed to transfer to Cancio the two lots after the same
had been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two heirs. Subsequently, Carlos died and Isabel, the
widom filed a motion in the testate proceedings praying for an order to authorize her to execute the
necessary deed of transfer of the two lots including the house erected thereon to Agustin Cancio or his
heirs. The motion was thereon approved by Judge Ramon San Jose on condition that the original of the deed
of transfer should be submitted to the court for approval.
Isabel died 1956, before being able to execute the deed of transfer in favor of Cancio, said deed was
executed by Carlos in her capacity as co-administrator and vendor of the properties, which deed was attach
to a motion filed in the testate proceeding. Accordingly, the court approved the motion and issued an order
directing the co-administratix to pay the estate and inheritance taxes due on the properties covered by the
sale before passing upon the motion filed for the approval of the aforesaid deed of sale.
Apparently, nothing was done on the matter. When Agustin Cancio himself filed a motion in probate
proceeding, Carlos the co-administrator strongly opposed the motion. Carlos, contend that the sale between
them has no legal effect because it was without the authority of the court. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Agustin Cancio has a legal right to effect his property right?
HELD:
Yes, the claim of Agustin Cancio must be granted.
It should be noted that when Isabel and Carlos obtained load from Agustin Cancio on condition that the
same would be paid by transferring him the two lots and house, said estate was already under the
administration of Isabel because she was then the administratix duty appointed by the probate court, and
under the provision of the will of the widow Isabel was instituted as the exclusive heir subject to the
condition that should the latter die, the properties would thereby be inherited by Carlos Jr. On the other
hand, it should be borne in mind that in Article 1430 of the Civil Code, the widow and the children of the
deceased are entitled to certain allowances for their support our of the estate pending its liquidation and
until their shares have been delivered to them. It is probably the reason that both the widow and the
adopted son, who were the prospective heirs, borrowed money from Cancio in order that they may have
means to support themselves in the interregnum since the estate was then unproductive.
As a matter of fact, Dolores Vda de Gil Jr, co-administratix of the estate, is now estopped from disputing the
sale because she herself in her capacity as co-administratix filed the petition in court asking for the
approval of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not appear in the record.
49
EUSEBIO GODOY VS. ORELLANO ET AL
GR # L-16584 NOVEMBER 17, 1921
Facts:
On January 1919, in consideration of the amount of Php 1,000 received by the appellant, Felisa Pangilinan, a
document was executed by her giving the appellee Eusebio Godoy, an option to buy a dredge for the sum of
10,000php. It appears from that document that the dredge is the common property of the vendor and of the
brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo and Paz, all surnamed Orellan, and that Godoy was to pay the
whole price of the dredge within 20 days. The option sale was granted by the court in accordance with the
power of authority executed by the co-owners who reserved right to ratify whatever sale might be made.
The latter’s co-owner did not ratify the option sale contract. Before the expiration of the 20-day period,
Godoy was ready to make the complete payment of the price, but Felisa Pangilinan failed to deliver the
dredge. Godoy filed a suit against Felisa Pangilinan, praying that they ordered to deliver the dredge or
return the Php 1,000 he had paid if the sale made was impossible of performance.
Issue:
Whether or not Eusebio Godoy has the legal right to have the dredge delivered to him?
Held:
No, Godoy does not have a legal right to the dredge.
In the sake of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to comply with
the provisions of Sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said sections prescribed the
proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate may sell personal or real property
and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining to an estate may be sold or
disposed of by the administrator. Unless compliance is had with the provisions of these sections, the sale of
the aforesaid dredge by the administratrix or her promise to sell is null and void.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of the properties like the one under
consideration. The power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the Administratrix
without the authority of the probate court has no legal effect. Since the two heirs were under aged and the
others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney, there is more
reason that it is null and void.

JULIAN BOÑAGA VS.ROBERTO SOLER, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-15717 JUNE 30, 1961
Nature:
Direct appeal from the dismissal of the complaint by the CFI of Camarines Sur
FACTS:
Following the death of the spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac in 1935 and 1940, respectively, intestate
proceedings for the settlement of their estate were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur with Juan Garza appointed as administrator of the estate.
50
Juan Garza was authorized by the probate court to sell properties of the estate allegedly to pay its liabilities,
which he sold to Roberto Soler. The heirs of Maria Isaac also sold all their shares and interests over certain
parcels of land in favor of appellee Soler.
During the war the records of the case were destroyed and upon reconstitution Julian Boñaga, was issued
letters of administration of the estate of the deceased spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac.
Boñaga filed an action to annul the sales made in favor of Soler for the reason that the transactions were
fraudulent, not being beneficial to the estate, and the heirs of Alejanro Ros were not notified, who at the
time the sales took place were in Spain.
Soler filed two motions to dismiss, reiterating the same grounds, namely the ground of lack of capacity to
sue and failure to state a cause of action. Both motions were denied. Soler filed a third motion to dismiss on
the ground of prescription, estoppel and non-inclusion of necessary parties, namely the sellers.
The CFI granted the third motion to dismiss ruling that Boñaga was estopped from questioning the acts of
his successor-in-interest, Garza.
ISSUES:
Whether the CFI erred in dismissing the case without giving Boñaga the opportunity to present his case
Whether Boñaga is estopped from questioning the acts of Garza
Whether the action to have the sale annulled has prescribed
RULING:
The CFI should have given Boñaga the opportunity to present his case since the sale of 21 parcels of land
was not established to have been made to satisfy the liabilities of the estate, nor was there any evidence
that there was no sufficient personal property to satisfy the claims against the estate. Moreover, the heirs of
Alejandro Ros were recognized in the order granting the sale, but there is no showing that they were
notified of the proceedings, neither was it shown that they received any benefit from the transaction.
As to the plea of estoppel, the rule is that a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the
validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land , more so will a successor not be estopped from
questioning the acts of his predecessor.
An action to declare the inexistence of contracts does not prescribe. Also, the sale made by the heirs of
Maria Isaac were subject to the contingency of the result of the administration proceedings.
The registration of the lands in the name of Soler gave rise to an action for reconveyance. Assuming that
there was constituted a constructive trust, still, the action has not prescribe since there is no showing when
the alleged fraud was discovered. Hence, it cannot be said that prescription tolled the action.
51
RULE 75

MANG-OY VS. CA
GR # L-27421 SEPTEMBER 12, 1986
FACTS:
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed a “last will and testament”. Two days later, Old Man
Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them by their father, apparently in
obedience of the wish of Old Man. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, 23 years later. November of
1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Man
Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-
quoted documents. By virtue of the partition, Old Man Tumpao’s title was cancelled and another one was
issued in favor of Bando Tumpao, Lambia Tumpao, and Abito Tumpao. Jose Tumpao, who was a son of the
second wife of Old Man Tumpao, asked the court for reconveyance, which was sustained by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the CA reversed the order of the reconveyance in favor of Jose Tumpao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament executed by Old Man Tumpao has a legal effect even without the
will being probated?
HELD:
No, the last will and testament executed by Old Man Tumpao has no legal effect.
The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of
1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said
article reads as follows:
Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos or by will,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
On this score, we agree with the trial court’s decision. While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Article
816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity
to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his last will and testament. The will alone, would be
inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated; however, when the persons who were named
therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save
themselves from the expenses of probate, and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the
testator, then it must be held to be binding between them.
We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao’s will
did not have to be approved by the Director of Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative
Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a
conveyance of properties or property right.
The court ordered the reconveyance to the petitioners of their respective shares.
52
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES AND LUISA REYES VS. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA
G.R. NO. L-23638 OCTOBER 12, 1967
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
FACTS:
On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition
for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and
annexed to the petition.
Petitioners, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate on the
grounds of forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of
the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the
proponent in 1943 and 1944
The Court of First Instance, found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution
on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely
presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision. The
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserve[ed]
unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue on whether the execution by the
testatrix of deeds of sale had revoked her testament, the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and
held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes was "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
1. The appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance. Namely it ruled that:
2. The probate of the will had become final for lack of opportune appeal
3. It was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation
4. There had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because
the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself.
ISSUES:
1. Did the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate become final for lack of
appeal?
2. Did the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-
appellants become final?
3. Was the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance
in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944?
53
HELD:
It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it
is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same
had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review
the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was
correctly dismissed.
We have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are
requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which
are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal
limits.
It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not
the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently
unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and
1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.
“No consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby
rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely
intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or
departure therefrom.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the
particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation
of the legacies , if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the
subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that
it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the
execution of the deeds of sale
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was not
expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it cannot be concluded, either,
that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy.
The transferor is not expressing his real intent, and it cannot be held that there was in fact an alienation
that could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
54
Lingao, Cherylette
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR JR. AND MA. ELENA PASTOR VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN REYES,
JUDGE OF BRANCH OF CFI OF CEBU, AND LEWELLYN QUEMADA
JUNE 24, 1983 GR. NO. L-56340
FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor Sr. died on June 1996, followed by his wife four months later. He had two legitimate children,
Pastor Jr. and Sofia, and one illegitimate child in the name of Lewellyn Quemada.
The illegitimate child filed a petition for probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of the
deceased, Pastor Sr.
The CFI appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of his father, whether or not
covered or affected by the holographic will. Aside from that, the will was also allowed for probate.
Meanwhile, Quemada also instituted an action for reconveyance of the properties which were already in the
name of Spouses Pastor, herein petitioners. Feeling aggrieved, Pastor Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their
opposition to the petition for probate and the appointment of Quemada as administrator.
They went up the CA but the Court affirmed the probate court’s decision to allow the will for probate. The
Supreme Court likewise dismissed the case in a minute resolution and remanded the probate for further
proceedings.
After two years of inaction by the probate court, it set a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will on March
5, 1980. However, it was suspended due to the pendency of a reconveyance suit in another branch of CFI.
Pending the reconveyance case, the probate court issued an order of Execution and Garnishment regarding
the Royalties payable by ATLAS Mining to Pastor Sr., which should be then be given as legacy to Quemada.
The probate court directed Atlas to remit directly the 42% of Royalties to the estate of Pastor Sr., 75% of
which shall be given to Quemada. Moreover, 33% of the share of Pastor Jr.., was ordered to be garnished to
answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada.
Very much aggrieved by an illegitimate child, Pastor Jr. and his wife found it was time to file a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of the probate court’s grave abuse of discretion by resolving the ownership
of Royalties and ordering payment of Quemada’s legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will.
They went up to the CA but the same was denied. While an MR was pending in the CA, the spouses Pastor
filed in the same court a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court.
Both petition and motion were denied; hence they went to the SC by Petition for Review by Certiorari with
prayer for a write of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the resolution on the issue of ownership of the Royalties was valid
2. Whether or not it was valid for the probate court to rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.
55
HELD:
1) Nowhere in the dispositive portion of the CFI’s decision is there a declaration of ownership of specific
properties. On the contrary, ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus
it allowed and approved the holographic will "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having
been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that
the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before
Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu."
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section
9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.
2) Since the death of Pastor Sr., there has been no liquidation of the community property of his and his
wife’s property. Thus, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the
assets of the estate of Pastor Sr.
There was no appropriate determination of debts of the decedent and his estate, thus it was only on
December 1972 that the probate court ordered that a notice be issued and published in pursuant to
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court requiring all persons having money claims against the deceased to file
them in Court.
There has also been no payment of estate tax nor an inventory of the assets made. Hence, all the
deficiencies considered, the court has not actually determined the intrinsic validity of the will until its
March 25, 1980 order to do so.
Lingao, Cherylette
REMEDIOS NUGUID VS. FELIZ NUGUID AND PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
JUNE 23, 1966 GR NO. L-23445
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants, leaving her parents and six brothers and sisters as heirs.
One of the sisters, Remedio Nuguid, filed a holographic will for probate which allegedly was left by the
deceased Rosario and she prayed for the granting of letters of administration in her favor.
Their parents, herein respondents, filed an opposition for the probate of the will, claiming that there was
preterition in accordance with Article 854 because the compulsory heirs from the direct ascending line
were omitted, hence the institution of heirs shall be void.
The Trial court dismissed the petition and held that the will is a complete nullity, thus, Intestate succession
follows.
56
Remedios filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied causing her to appeal to the Supreme
Court. She contends that:
1. The trial court if limited only to the examination and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and
not on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will, the legality of the devise, or legacy therein.
2. The will is not a complete nullity because there is a term she calls “ineffective disinheritance” rather
than one of preterition hence, Article 854 does not apply to the case at bar.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the will is intrinsically null and void and whether the SC can rule on the validity of
the will
2. If there is preterition, can the will remain valid with respect to the free portion of the estate?
HELD:
1. According to the Supreme Court, the will is intrinsically null and void. In the High Court's words:
“If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-
on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.”
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara
siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. To “annul" means to abrogate, to make void (In re
Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6)
The one-sentence will institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Court held that the nullity is
complete.
2. No, the entire will is a nullity. The claim of Remedios that the will should only be nullified to the part of
the legitime is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be
expressly stated in the will. Such was not present. Article 854 is also clear that there is total annulment
of the institution of heirs when there is preterition and it results in intestacy.
57
Lingao, Cherylette
EMILIO REYES VS. APOLONIO DIAZ
NOVEMBER 26, 1941 G.R. NO.48754
FACTS:
Apolonio Diaz questioned the validity of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Emilio Reyes. They went up to
the Supreme Court to have the issue of jurisdiction of the Trial court resolved. It contains an issue on
whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Both parties agree that if there is due filing made by Emilio Reyes regarding his certificate of candidacy,
then the trial court has jurisdiction but if it is not proven, then the case shall be dismissed.
The parties do not question as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law but they
question a matter of fact on whether the certificate of candidacy has been duly filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of filing of the certificate of candidacy is a question of jurisdiction
HELD:
It has been held that the term jurisdiction as used in the Constitution and other statutes means “jurisdiction
over the subject matter, unless an exception arises by reason of its use in a broader sense.
The question of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter calls for the interpretation and
application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among different courts in the
Philippines, and the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to the Supreme Court to rule
on such matter.
The question raised by the parties is not a question of jurisdiction over a subject matter, but a question of
fact which until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law as distinguished from jurisdiction over the issue.
Jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred by the pleadings or by consent of the parties whether
expressly or impliedly.
Lingao, Cherylette
MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
JUNE 19, 1982 G.R. NO. L-57848
FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta died at the age of 81, single and leaving a holographic will instituting Soledad Maninang
as heir. Soledad then presented the will for probate while Bernardo Maninang claimed to be the only son
and universal heir of Clemencia. Hence both issues were joined in the same proceeding.
Bernardo claims that the holographic will does not bequeath him anything and being a compulsory heir, he
was preterited, thus the will is null and void, intestacy follows. Soledad opposes this claim by saying that
the probate court’s inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will
and that Bernardo was effectively disiniherited by Clemencia.
58
The motion was granted in favor of Bernardo and a motion for reconsideration of Soledad was denied. The
Court appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate and a petition for certiorari was filed
with the Court of Appeals by Soledad. Petition was denied, hence Soledad resorted to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed the testate case of Clemencia
Aseneta.
HELD:
Yes, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the
probate of a will is mandatory.
“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. (Art. 838, NCC)”
The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
Only in the case of Nuguid vs Nuguid did the SC apply that when “practical considerations” so demand, the
intrinsic validity of the will may be passed upon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid
disinheritance making the will void. However, in this case, the exception to the rule does not apply because
as the parties in the Nuguid case agree that the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the
will, this case is insisted only by petitioners dwells only on the resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will
Lingao, Cherylette
ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
JANUARY 29, 1996 G.R. NO. 118671
FACTS:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will instituting his children and grandchildren namely Edmond Ruiz,
his only son, adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The
testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed
under undue influence.
59
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde
IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline was leased
out by Edmond to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after
deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate
court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were
issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch
Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the
filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's
motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise
reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed
for another year.
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the
funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from
their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent
Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors.
On appeal, CA affirmed probate court’s decision, hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the
testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of
all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
60
HELD:
1) The grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court
to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
2) The probate court erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to
private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order
releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. Notwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such
terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules. And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses
of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or
of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled to the same…
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment
of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate
had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must
be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a
bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares
in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet
been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.
3) Petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of
all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can
only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
61
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. An
executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father's estate. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits
thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity,
propriety and justness.
Lingao, Cherylette
IN RE KAW SINGCO ALIAS CO CHI SENG
SY OA, ADMINISTRATRIX-APPELLEE VS CO HO, OPPOSITOR AND APELLANT
JUNE 30,1943
Nature:
Mandamus
Facts:
Respondent Co Ho seeks the reconsideration of an earlier Supreme Court decision when it ordered the
remand of the case to the Court of Appeals for the determination of venue for probate of the will of the
deceased. The remanding of the case was decided by the SC when the issue presented as a matter of fact
and not a matter of law, whether or not the deceased at the time of his death was residing in Camarines Sur
or in Manila.
Co Ho, is asking the SC to have jurisdiction over the case by pointing out the erroneous interpretation of the
Constitution under Article 8, Section 2(3) and the Revised Administrative Code Section 138(3) regarding
the term jurisdiction. The interpretation of jurisdiction is used as jurisdiction over the subject matter only
and nothing else in a broader sense.
Issue:
Whether or not place of residence is an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held:
No. Section 600 of Act 190, providing the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where
he had last resided could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the
subject matter because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters and as the Court has said, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another.
The law of jurisdiction confers upon the Court of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Act 190 Section 600 fixes the venue where each
case shall be brought.
62
Hence, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. The Rules of Court provide that the province where the estate of the deceased person shall
be settled is properly called “venue”.
Guttierez, Myron
BERNABE VS VERGARA
FACTS:
Victoriano Zafra died and was survived by three children: Benito, Apolonia, and Dominga. Benito died
leaving a daughter named Irinea. Apolonia died leaving three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara.
The plaintiffs are the heirs of Benito and Apolonia and the defendants were Dominga and the persons to
whom she sold her share in the common property.
Dominga in her answer with counterclaim alleged that she paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia, the
deceased mother of the plaintiffs. These debts constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by
Apolonia. At the trial, evidence was presented as to such debts and the trial court awarded the plaintiffs
one-third of the common property and ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother Apolonia in
the amount of P350. They appealed to the Court of Appeals and no question was raised as to the jurisdiction
of the trial court to render the judgment in the said amount of P350. The Court of Appeals assumed
jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money.
HELD:
YES. There can be absolutely no doubt that the trial court had such jurisdiction not only because there was
a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the proceeding
was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased
ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case.
The question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of question that confers
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter but at
most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. This kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished
from jurisdiction over the subject matter, the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either
express or implied of the parties.
Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made
thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved.
At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires
nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as to call for
the intervention of the Supreme Court.
It is held that the question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only unsubstantial but is also not
the kind of question that may deprive the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case. The
case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for hearing and decision on the merits.
63
Guttierez, Myron
CASTRO VS. GALLEGOS
G.R. NO. L-3880 MARCH 9, 1908
FACTS:
Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house and lot in Cebu. On October 17, 1986, she executed a
nuncupative will before a notary and the proper number of witnesses under which she died and wherein
she disposed the lot in Cebu and of some furniture and credits of small importance. In the will, she
bequeathed 10 pesos to each one of her nephews, the children of her brother Valentin, named Godofredo,
Mateo, Quitin, Romana, Salud, and Constancia, all of the surname of Cuico y Rodis.
Of these, Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and another of the name of Ignacio, together with Teopista Castro
challenged the will, after Mateo and Quintin had on the 19th of January, 1897, received their legacies filing
their complaints on the 15th of October, 1902, against certain persons, and on the 22nd of September,
1903, against others.
Under the will Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed executors, and in compliance
with clause 4 of the same they sold the house and ground for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut on
the 22nd of January, 1897, and afterwards Ferragut on the 10th of February following, sold it for the same
price to Tomas Osmeña; the later in turn on the 18th of January, 1902, sold it to Martinez Gallegos, and the
latter finally on the 28th of May, 1903, sold it to Ramon Velez y Santos for the price of 2,500 pesos.
The heirs asked that that judgment be entered in their favor "declaring them to be the owners of the
property of the late Marcelina Cuico y Rodis; for the possession of said property, or in case that the same
could not be found, for the sum of P4,000 pesos as indemnity, and for the sum of 1,500 pesos for the loss
and damage suffered and the products not received, for costs in the proceedings, and any other remedy
which may be considered just.
The trial court ruled that the will is a nullity and that Marcelina Cuico was not of sound mind, nor in control
of her mental faculties, nor was she capable of disposing of her property at the time and place of its
execution. Also, the signature of Jose A. Casals which appears as the signature of the will is not in law
sufficient as the legal signature of said Marcelina Cuico, nor by anyone in her name, or at her request.
However, it has been proven by the testimony of the surviving witnesses to the will, Francisco Reyes and
Brigido Famador, that the testatrix dictated her will to the notary, that she was in the full enjoyment of her
mental faculties, that she was in the free use of her speech, and that she had asked the witness Casals to
sign for her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will should have been allowed.
HELD:
YES, the will should have been allowed. The will in question was executed in 1896 under the laws then in
force. It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain, among
them in those of October 28, 1864, and January 29, 1885, that "wills executed with the formalities of law are
presumed valid." It is also a legal doctrine established among others by the decision of the 31st of
December, 1883, that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law." And
finally, it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions in that of the 13th of February, 1889, "that is
not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the
notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of
executing the will, was of sound mind."
64
RULE 76
Guttierez, Myron
ACAIN VS IAC
G.R. NO. 72706 OCTOBER 27, 1987
FACTS:
In 1960, Nemesio Acain made a will giving all his properties to his brother Segundo, or, in case Segundo
predeceases Nemesio, to Segundo’s children: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores,
Antonio and Jose. Consequently, Segundo predeceased Nemesio. In 1984, after the death of Nemesio,
Constantino petitioned the court to have the will probated. This was opposed by Rosa Diongson, Nemesio’s
wife, and Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted child of Nemesio and Rosa. The trial court denied this; hence
Diongson and Fernandez went to the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate petition on the ground of preterition.
Constantino went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, contending that the Court of Appeals
cannot rule on the intrinsic validity of the will before it is admitted for probate.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals could rule on the intrinsic validity of the will before the will is
probated.
Whether or not there is preterition.
HELD:
YES, the Court of Appeals could rule on the intrinsic validity of the will. The general rule is that the probate
court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors
to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the
motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On
appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations.
The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate
or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the
issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse
is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the
direct line.
However, insofar as Virginia is concerned, there is preterition. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
65
were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she has been totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator.
Guttierez, Myron
CODOY VS. CALUGAY
G.R. NO. 123486 AUGUST 12, 1999
FACTS:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will.
They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on August 30, 1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was forged. Evangeline Calugay presented
six witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the
case bearing the signature of the deceased. The second witness was an election registrar who was made to
produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to, as the same was already destroyed and no longer
available. The third was the deceased’s niece, and claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the
deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various
tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the
deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was
a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the
signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased was not really sure. The fifth was an employee of
the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The sixth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived
with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing
on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s filed a demurrer to evidence and was granted by the lower court. However, it was
reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare
the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s
holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES, Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature
in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory. The word “shall” connotes a
mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
2. NO, the witnesses did not sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s
holographic will. The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing
in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the
voter’s affidavit for verification, as it was no longer available. The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared
receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or
66
write a note. The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting
in issue her motive. Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a
document. The former lawyer of the deceased is not sure as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will. Also, a visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator. Hence, the records are
remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.
Guttierez, Myron
DE ARANZ VS. GALING
G.R. NO. 77047 MAY 28, 1988
FACTS:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin Infante filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat Infante y
Pola. His petition named several individuals with the surname Infante-Roxas as legatees and devisees.
The probate court issued an order for the requisite hearing and the judge complied with the mandatory
three-week publication of the order. On the date of hearing, no oppositor appeared and the judge reset the
hearing date. Later again, no oppositors appeared, compelling the judge to request for the submission of
evidence ex-parte. Joaquin Infante presented evidence alone.
After two days, the ten petitioners made an appearance contesting the probate on the ground that no notice
was ever sent to them and requested ten days to file an opposition. Petitioners contend that failure to notify
them as the devisees and legatees deprives the court of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate may proceed notwithstanding the failure of personal notice to the devisees and
legatees.
HELD:
No, the failure of personal notice to the devisees and legatees deprives the court of its jurisdiction. Under
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated
or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed
to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10)
days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
Probate is a proceeding in rem and personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must
be made for the validity of such proceedings. The will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to
have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in
the probate and allowance of wills. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
67
Guttierez, Myron
SUMILANG VS. RAMAGOSA
G.R. NO. 25489 SEPTEMBER 8, 1926
FACTS:
On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of
a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959.
Said document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the
testator.
The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors, the appellants, who questioned the due
execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the
deceased to be his last will and testament. Aside from merely opposing the petition for probate, the first set
of oppositors — Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa — also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were
entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors representing themselves simply as next
of kin, appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the will.
Oppositors alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and
his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's death the titles
to said lands were no longer in his name.
The petitioner contends that the oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of
personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the testator and that oppositors have no
valid claim and interest in the distribution of the estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right
whatsoever.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a stranger may oppose the probate of a will
HELD:
No, a stranger may not oppose the probate of a will. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may
be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in
the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. The reason for the rule
excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from learning
facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants
should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate
which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.
68
Guttierez, Myron
FERNANDEZ VS. TANTOCO
G.R. 25489 SEPTEMBER 8, 1926
FACTS:
On September 9, 1925, Basilia Tantoco, aged 62 years, executed an instrument purporting to be her will,
she being at the time a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital in the City of Manila. Her death occurred a
few days after the will was executed, and application for probate was made by Fr. Vicente Fernandez,
parish priest of Malolos. Opposition to probate was made by three brothers and a nephew of the deceased.
At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will, the proponent
introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Atty. Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay,
and Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law of the deceased who had been in attendance upon
her at the hospital. The instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, but the trial judge
refused to allow it to be probated, for the reason that the three attesting witnesses are not in harmony upon
the point whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place when the testatrix
and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will should be allowed despite the witnesses are not in harmony.
HELD:
Yes, the will should be allowed. The testimony of Atty. Vicente Platon, is in every effect respect worthy of
credit, and gives a detailed account of the incidents connected with the execution, which could have been
only by a person who had his attention fixed upon the occurrences connected therewith. He shows that the
testatrix understood the contents of the instrument and that its provisions were found to be in conformity
with her wishes. At the time of the execution of the instrument she was sitting up in her bed and was able to
affix her signature in a clear and legible hand at the close of the will and upon each of its pages, as the law
requires.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who
has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to
greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course
that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the
attorney, being conversant with the requisites of the proper execution of the instrument, is more likely to
become fixed on details; and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.
It is admitted by all of the witnesses that Aurea Gaspar was present in the room at the time the will was
executed, and she corroborates Atty. Platon upon the point that all of the witnesses were present
throughout the ceremonies attending the execution of the will.
With respect to the will now in question, a prima facie case for the establishment of the document was
made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was properly drawn and attested and that all of the
signatures thereto are authentic. These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone
the will should, be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity
occurred.
69
RULE 78-90
Lucaylucay, Maicha
BEATRIZ F. GONZALES VS. HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
143, MAKATI, METRO MANILA AND TERESA F. OLBES
G.R. NO. 74769 SEPTEMBER 28, 1990
FACTS:
Doña Ramona is survived by her 4 children: Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia
Favis-Gomez.
On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and Teresa Olbes as co-
administratices of the estate.
While Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving
medical treatment in that country, Teresa Olbes filed a motion, to remove Beatriz as co-administratrix, on
the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.
In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to
Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix, stating that the two administrators had
not seen eye to eye with each other and most of the time they have been at loggerheads with each other to
the prejudice of the estate. Beatriz F. Gonzales has been absent from the country since October, 1984 and
has not returned even up to this date so that Teresa F. Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate.
Beatriz moved to reconsider but was denied. She went to the SC to have the order nullified on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the
grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Was the removal proper?
HELD:
No.
The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of
the estate of the deceased who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing him but also of
the heirs and the creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may appoint one,
two or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented.
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific
causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it
however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with harmonious
relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries,
without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and,
70
perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if
unresolved by the co-administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate
and its heirs.
The court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the 2 co-
administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the
fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence,
or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially
endangers the interests of the estate. Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and
the other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the
heirs; and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to
warrant the probate court into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.
Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to administer the estate.
Petitioner explained to the court a quo that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to
accompany her ailing husband to the United States for medical treatment.
Petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss
in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify
one to be an administrator of the estate.
The removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of
the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration
Lucaylucay, Maicha
ROGELIO R. RAMOS VS. JUDGE EUSEBIO M. BAROT, PRESIDING JUDGE, 8TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 2, APARRI-CALAYAN, CAGAYAN
A.M. MTJ-00-138 JANUARY 21, 2004
FACTS:
Rogelio R. Ramos and Dominador C. Ramos filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a
complaint against Judge Eusebio M. Barot, Presiding Judge, 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Aparri-
Calayan, Cagayan, Branch 2, of (a) violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and (b) Grave Misconduct.
They alleged that they owned, possessed and cultivated parcels of land, formerly part of the Estate of
Florencio Barot, which were later covered by Emancipation Patents issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). According to the complaint, on February 26, 1997, certain individuals entered their rice
fields and, without authority, harvested the standing rice crops, upon the unlawful orders of one Atty.
Nuelino B. Ranchez and respondent judge.
Respondent judge is the attorney-in-fact for his uncle Florencio A. Barot and represented the latter in
DARAB Cases for Annulment of Emancipation Patents filed by Florencio Barot against Dominador Ramos,
among others.
The Regional Adjudicator rendered judgment in favor of Florencio Barot and ordered the cancellation of the
Certificates of Land Transfer and the Emancipation Patents issued in favor of Dominador Ramos and his co-
defendants
71
Respondent, however, denied any participation in the alleged unauthorized harvesting of the rice crops
claimed by herein complainant. According to respondent, the administrative complaint filed against him
was nothing more than a cheap stunt and a fabrication instigated by one Atty. Edgar Orro, who had a
grudge against the Barot family. Respondent claimed that the complainant was merely being utilized as a
willing tool of Atty. Orro to ruin respondent's reputation.
In a resolution, the SC referred the matter to Executive Judge Antonio Laggui of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan for investigation, report and recommendation.
The investigating judge rendered his report and recommendation. Judge Laggui found that respondent had
violated Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Laggui held that while it is true that the
acts complained of were not related to respondent's judicial functions, it does not follow that a judge cannot
be administratively charged for acts of a private character. He recommended that respondent be ordered to
pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning but exonerated respondent judge of the charge of Grave Misconduct
for lack of merit.
The OCA affirmed the findings of Judge Laggui, but recommended that the fine be increased to P3,000.00.
ISSUE:
Did respondent judge violate Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
HELD:
Yes.
Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of "other fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06.
As a noun, "fiduciary" means "a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to
that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and
candor which it requires." A fiduciary primarily acts for another's benefit, pursuant to his undertaking
as such fiduciary, in matters connected with said undertaking.
When respondent acted as attorney-in-fact for his uncle, Florencio Barot, he likewise undertook
to perform all acts necessary to protect the latter's interests. These would include attending
scheduled hearings in the DARAB case, among others, as pointed out by OCA. The possibility of a
scheduled hearing for the DARAB case conflicting with his own calendared hearings in his sala is not
altogether far-fetched. But far worse is the possibility that respondent's official position and stature
might have affected the outcome of the DARAB case.
The Code of Judicial Conduct lays down the guidelines with respect to fiduciary activities that judges
may engage in. The thin line between what is allowed and what is not allowed is set forth in Rule 5.06, and
therein made very specific. As a general rule, judges cannot serve as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or other fiduciary, except if he acts in a fiduciary capacity for the estate, trust or person of
a member of his immediate family. The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited to the spouse
and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. Clearly, respondent's paternal uncle does not
fall under "immediate family" as herein defined. Hence, his appointment as attorney-in-fact for his
uncle is not a valid exception to the rule.
72
Lucaylucay, Maicha
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN AND GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS
VS. THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA AND HELEN TAN RACOMA,
REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM
G.R. NO. 166520 MARCH 14, 2008
FACTS:
Gerardo Tan died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. Respondents, claiming to be the children of Gerardo
Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners, claiming to be
legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, praying that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners opposed arguing
that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not
residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity,
experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto
administratrix of his estate since his death.
Atty. Clinton Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratrix to deposit the money and cash of the estate to the account of the court and to submit a
financial report. After a year, on Urgent Ex-parte motion of respondents, Vilma was given another 10 days
to comply with the directive. No compliance was made.
Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
On certiorari, the CA issued a decision denying the petition.
ISSUE:
Should the court have given the petitioners primacy in the administration of the estate? Was the
appointment of Romualdo proper?
HELD:
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision DOES NOT APPLY TO THE SELECTION OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave
abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
There was NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming
Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator.
73
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special
administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator
of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and
would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of
judgment in a Certiorari petition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-
petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that the DOCUMENTED FAILURE of petitioner Vilma TO COMPLY WITH THE
REPORTORIAL REQUIREMENTS after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates
against her appointment.
We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special
administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer
Gerardo’s estate.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular administrator
and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary
(in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind
no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal object of the appointment of a
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma
were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought
about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials.
74
Lucaylucay, Maicha
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, AND LEONARDO E. OCAMPO,
JR. VS. RENATO M. OCAMPO AND ERLINDA M. OCAMPO
G.R. NO. 187879 JULY 5, 2010
FACTS:
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively.
Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no
will and no debts. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, are
the legitimate children and only heirs.
Leonardo Ocampo died on January 23, 2004. Dalisay E. Ocampo, Vince E. Ocampo, Melinda Carla E. Ocampo,
and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. are the surviving wife and the children.
After the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re:
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M.
Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna.
They alleged that upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly
controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had
been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of
the estate. When Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to
the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and
the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide,
and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.
Respondents opposed, contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two
estates in a single proceeding. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as
special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima.
The RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses,
and required them to post a bond of P200,000.00 each.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be
appointed as administrator of the estate. They asserted their priority in right to be appointed as
administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law.
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory
and Accounting. Respondents claimed that they could not be compelled to submit inventory because there
was still a pending motion for the reconsideration of the order appointing Dalisay as co-special
administratrix with Renato.
The RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda.
The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima.
Petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond.
Eight months after the Order appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a
Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or
Appointment of Regular Administrator
75
The RTC granted petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as
joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of
the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the
submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of the estate. The RTC also
appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
and directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income statement of the subject estate.
The RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her duties and
responsibilities as regular administratrix.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA
rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on
their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without
conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such.
ISSUES:
1. Was the revoking of respondent’s appointment proper?

2. Was the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix proper?
HELD:
1. Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special
administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration
may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue
delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected
to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties
suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in
their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court
may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness
and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the
case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for Appointment as Joint Special Administrators,
respondents already prayed for their exemption to post bond should they be assigned as joint special
administrators. However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it issued its June 15, 2006 Order,
designating Renato and Dalisay as special administrators and enjoining them to post bond in the
amount of P200,000.00 each.
Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing
to post their administrators’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of
76
them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial
of respondents’ plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of
an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial
orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court;
and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule,
the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedent’s estate
requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account
for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person
appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to
receive them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the
obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent,
and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against
the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.
This Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment
of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice,
and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the
probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.
2. On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular administratrix
improper and abusive of its discretion.
Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the
prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the
termination of the special administration.
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact that
Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of
P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her the
following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008.
These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents’
estate, but her appointment should be CONVERTED into one of SPECIAL ADMINISTRATION,
pending the proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only
unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardo’s estate, which is not subject of this case,
judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.
77
Porquez, Jonalyn
SERAPIA DE GALA VS. APOLINARIO GONZALES AND SINFOROSO ONA
G.R. NO. L-30289 MARCH 26, 1929
Ponente: Ostrand, J.
FACTS:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will designating her niece, Serapia de Gala, as
executrix. Upon the death of the testator, Severina presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales,
nephew of the deceased, opposed the probate of the will contending that it did not conform with the
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court appointed Serapia as special administratrix for the estate of the deceased on April 2, 1927.
Serapia submitted an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927 and demanded Sinforoso Ona, the surviving
husband, the property inventoried in the latter’s possession.
When the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso to deliver the property to Serapia, the former instead
filed a motion asking for the cancellation of Serapia’s appointment as administratrix and his replacement in
her stead. In spite of the objection of Serapia and Apolinario, the court granted the motion to simplify the
proceedings since Sinforoso was already in possession of the properties of the estate. Furthermore, the
probate court declared the will valid and admitted it to probate.
Serapia de Gala appealed from the order of her removal as special administratrix, while Apolinario
Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona appealed from the order of the court allowing the probate of the will
contending that it did not comply with the form prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES:
Whether the probate court erred in removing Serapia de Gala as special administrator and
appointing Sinforoso Ona in her stead
Whether the will should be denied probate
RULING:
The appointment and selection of a special administrator is discretionary.
Section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which Serapia’s counsel rely their contention, can only
apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different
from that of regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court and no appeal therefrom may be taken. The function of such an administrator is only
to collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued
by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased.
The court merely prevented useless litigation in removing Serapia as special administrator and appointing
Sinforoso.
The will is valid and should be granted probate.
Apolinario and Sinforoso contend that the will should be denied probate on the ground that it was not
executed in conformity with the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the fact that the person requested by the
testator to sign her name did not state her own is remedied by Seferina’s thumb mark in each and every
page of the will. The act of affixing a thumb mark constitutes “signing” by the testator.
78
Furthermore, the fact that the witnesses did not state in the attestation clause that the will was signed in
their presence, on the other hand, is remedied by the last paragraph of the will which states that the affixing
of the thumbmark was done in the presence of the three attesting witnesses.
Porquez, Jonalyn
NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS VS. POTENCIANO PECSON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN,
MARIA ROXAS AND PEDRO ROXAS
G.R. NO. L-2211 DECEMBER 20, 1948
PONENTE: FERIA, J.
NATURE:
Petition for certiorari filed against the resolution of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which appointed
two special co-administrators for the estate of Pablo Roxas, one for the conjugal properties, and the other
for the exclusive properties of the deceased
FACTS:
When the decedent, Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan, his brother and sister, Pedro and
Maria Roxas filed on August 3, 1946 a petition for the administration of the former’s estate docketed. The
petition was docketed as Special Intestate Proceeding 1707 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (CFI).
Upon an ex-parte petition of Pedro and Maria, the CFI of Bulacan appointed Maria Roxas as special
administratrix. On August 10, 1946, Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of the decedent, filed a petition for the
probate of the will of the decedent and for her appointment as executrix of the estate, docketed as Special
Proceeding 172. The will sought to be probated bequeathed half of the decedent’s estate to Natividad, and
the other half to Reynaldo, Roxas, an adulterous child of the decedent.
Upon agreement of both parties, the CFI closed the intestate proceeding, Special Proceeding 170, and
appointed Natividad as special administratrix, in view of the objections of Maria and Pedro for the probate
of the will.
On September 10, 1946, the court rendered a decision denying the probate of the will on the ground that it
did not state the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator.
Maria and Pedro filed a petition for Maria’s appointment as special administratrix, or co-administratrix. The
court granted the petition, rendering a resolution appointing Natividad as special administrator of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased only while Maria as the special administrator for the capital or
properties belonging exclusively to the deceased.
Natividad filed a petition for certiorari contending that the respondent judge acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it appointed two special co-administratrices of the estate in the person of Maria and
Natividad
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI erred in appointing two special adminsitrators, one for the conjugal properties of the
deceased, and the other for his exclusive properties
RULING:
79
The probate court erred in appointing two special administrators for the separate administration of the
conjugal property and the exclusive property of the deceased.
The law does not provide to whom should be appointed as special administrator of the estate of the
decedent, or the qualifications he must possess. The judge of the probate court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed in such position.
The judge took into consideration the beneficial interest of the widow, herein petitioner; however, the
appointment of petitioner as special administrator of only the conjugal property of the deceased, and the
appointment of Maria as special administrator of the exclusive property of the deceased does not conform
with logic. Even after the disapproval of the probate of the will, the surviving spouse retains the same
interest over the properties of the deceased. The denial of the probate of the will does not limit her interest,
since she continues to have the right of usufruct over one-half of the exclusive property of the decedent,
aside from her share of the conjugal partnership.
Section 2, Rule 75 provides that “when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.” The Rules also provide that “letters testamentary,
or letters of administration with the will annexed, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines”. Therefore, the administrator appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive property of
the deceased has the right to administer, liquidate and distribute the community property of the deceased,
because half of the community property is included in the estate of the deceased.
Under the law, only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the
estate of a deceased spouse, therefore only one special administrator may be appointed since a special
administrator merely administers temporarily in lieu of the general administrator.
80
Porquez, Jonalyn
RICARDO SILVERIO, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS (5TH DIVISION) AND NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE
GR. NO. 178933 SEPTEMBER 16, 2009
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J,
NATURE:
Review on Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) granting
a TRO against Judge Quilala and the CA’s decision setting aside a Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate
directed against Nelia Silverio-Dee
FACTS:
During the settlement of the estate of Beatriz Silverio, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio Sr. was
appointed as administrator of the estate, in which capacity he authorized Nelia Silverio-Dee to occupy No. 3
Intsia, Forbes Part, Makati City.
Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed a petition to remove Silverio Sr. as administrator, which was granted by the court
and Silverio Jr. was appointed as new administrator.
As administrator for the estate of the decedent, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an “Urgent Motion for an Order
Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/ Stay/ Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the
Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.”
The RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property in Forbes Part,
among others. Nelia received the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005 and filed a motion for
reconsideration on June 16, 2005. On December 12, 2005, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
On January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006 from the Order dated
December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20, 2006 was filed on January 23, 2006.
The RTC denied the appeal for being filed out of time, on the other hand the Court of Appeals granted the
appeal contending that it was a final order subject to appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in allowing the Notice of Appeal
RULING:
The Court of Appeals grave abused its discretion in finding that the Notice of Appeal was filed on time.
Firstly, the May 31, 2005 Omnibus Order which ordered respondent Nelia to vacate the Forbes property is
interlocutory, hence not appealable. The order of the probate court directing respondent Nelia to vacate the
premises of the Forbes property is not a final determination of the case of the issue of distribution of the
shares of the heirs in the estate of their rights therein. Until the estate is partitioned, the heirs merely have
an inchoate right to the properties.
Once an action for settlement of the estate is filed with the court, the properties are under custodial legis, in
which case even the administrator may not take possession of the properties without prior authority of the
Court.
81
Nelia’s purported authority from Silverio Sr. as administrator was without approval of the probate court,
and she, therefore, had no real interest in the property. The decision of the RTC dated May 31, 2005 must
therefore be considered as interlocutory and not subject to an appeal
Porquez, Jonalyn
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ AND MYRNA T. SANCHEZ VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-
RANISES AND ROBERTO S. LUGOD
G.R. NO. 108947 SEPTEMBER 29, 1997
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
NATURE:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23,
1992 which declared the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even without court
approval
FACTS:
Upon the death of Maria Villafranca, her only legitimate child, Rosalia S. Lugod petitioned for letters of
administration and was appointed as administrator of the estate, the surviving spouse, Juan Sanchez, being
at the time in a state of senility.
Before the administration proceedings of the estate of Maria Villafranca was terminated, Juan Sanchez died,
and his illegitimate children, herein petitioners, filed a petition for letters of administration over the
intestate estate of Juan Sanchez, which was opposed by Rosalia.
The parties instead entered into a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties of
the late Juan Sanchez, dated October 30, 1969.
On November 3, 1969, Rosalia was appointed as administrator for the intestate estate of her late father.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to set aside the compromise agreement or require the delivery of 24
hectares alleged to be a deficiency. Instead, the parties executed a memorandum of agreement, modifying
the compromise agreement.
On January 19, 1970, the petitioners filed a motion requiring the administratrix, Rosalia, to deliver a
deficiency of 24 hectares or to set aside the compromise agreement. The parties instead executed a
memorandum of agreement modifying the compromise agreement on April 30, 1970.
Nine years afterwards, on October 25, 1979, the petitioners filed a motion requiring Rosalia to sumbit a
new inventory and render accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They
further prayed that the compromise settlement be annulled on the allegations of fraud against Rosalia
Lugod. On May 12, 1980, the petitioners further prayed that a new administratrix be appointed, to which
Rosalia opposed.
The trial court issued an order, which among others, annulled the deeds of sale made by the deceased
spouses in favor of Rosalia and her legitimate children as simulated and fictitious, set aside the compromise
agreement, and directed Rosalia to submit a project of partition. The Court of Appeals annulled the order of
the trial court and declared the compromise agreement valid and binding.
ISSUES:
82
Whether certiorari is available as a remedy to set aside the order of the trial court annulling the deeds of
sale in favor of respondents
Whether the compromise agreement partitioning the inherited properties is valid even without approval of
the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner
RULING:
Yes, certiorari is available as a remedy to set aside the annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of respondents.
The general rule is that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. However, this rule is subject to
exceptions, one of which is when the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction.
As a probate court, the trial court exercised limited jurisdiction. As such, it may pass upon questions of title
only provisionally. In annulling the deeds of sale in favor of respondents, the lower court therefore passed
upon title of the property with finality which it may not do so.
Yes, the compromise agreement is valid and binding between the parties.
The compromise settlement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, but judicial
approval is not necessary to shroud it with validity. The parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement and were adequately assisted by their respective counsels.
The agreement denominated as a compromise settlement is actually a deed of partition. Its validity is
governed by Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which requires the concurrence of the following: (1)
the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the
heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial
guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds; all of which are present in the instant case.
The petitioners raised the issue of minority of some of the respondents for the first time on appeal and
therefore was not entertained by the court.
The parties further assail the provision on waiver 8, contending that it constitutes a relinquishment of
“right to properties which were not known”, and that such relinquishment is contrary to law, public policy,
morals or good customs. The court ruled that such waiver was valid since the parties were actually
relinquishing something known, namely their hereditary right which was vested upon them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Juan Sanchez.
Furthermore, the petitioners actuations of fraud on the part of Rosalia in the execution of the compromise
agreement is debunked by the absence of evidence on record showing fraud on the latter’s part. In fact, the
petitioners entered into a memorandum of agreement with Rosalia to correct errors in the compromise
agreement upon finding that the properties belonging to Juan Sanchez were less than was initially
inventoried by Rosalia. Moreover, the petitioners are contesting a compromise agreement in which they
had already consummated and availed of the benefits. The petitioners are evidently estopped to question
the validity of the compromise agreement.
The Court of Appeals also did not err in deeming the proceedings “Closed” and “Terminated”. Under Section
1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court “an order for the distribution of the estate’s residue must contain the names
and shares of the persons entitled thereto.” The records show that these were complied with in the case
since the indebtedness of the estates of Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca were shouldered by Private
Respondent Rosalia. Also the compromise of the parties already contain the names of the heirs and their
respective shares.
Finally the allegations of fraud on the part of Rosalia was not sustained by the court since the parties
executed a memorandum of agreement reducing the land area from 48 hectares to 36 hectares only. The
83
land was allegedly 48 hectares was in fact only 24 hectares when surveyed is without fault of Rosalia, and it
is for this reason that the distributive share was reduced to 36 hectares in the memorandum of agreement.
Courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision different
therefrom. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise,
foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what
he was doing" and "a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there
was a mistake of law or fact.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, EXECUTOR VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG
PUNO, J.:
Nature of the case:
A petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and the
resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA- GR. SP 33045.
FACTS:
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The
testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will. On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria
Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate
and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz, Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle
Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline —
was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond
to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond
turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14
for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00. On May 14, 1993, Edmond
withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993,
84
admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch
Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. On August 26, 1993, the probate
court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of
petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three
granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed
to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's
motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise
reiterated his previous motion for release of funds. On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease
contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year. Despite petitioner's
manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but
only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the
inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the
three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's
debts and obligations, has the authority:
(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
HELD:
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated
December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with
the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and
ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set
aside.
(1) It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate. It is settled that
allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age,
civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.
The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education,
subsist even beyond the age of majority. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
85
provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to
"widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity.
(2) Also, the court erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to
private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order
releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy

or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and
upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not
be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon
compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.
(3) It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic
validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated.
JOSEPHINE OROLA, MYRNA OROLA, ANGELINE OROLA, MANUEL OROLA, ANTONIO OROLA AND
ALTHEA OROLA VS. THE RURAL BANK OF PONTEVEDRA (CAPIZ), INC., EMILIO Q. OROLA, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAPIZ AND THE EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
A petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35724 reversing,
on appeal, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No. V-5452.
FACTS:
On July 16, 1969, Trinidad Laserna Orola died intestate. She was survived by her husband Emilio Orola and
their six minor children, namely, 10-year-old Antonio, 12-year-old Josephine, 16-year-old Manuel, and
other siblings, Myrna, Angeline and Althea. Emilio Orola, who, in the meantime, had married anew,
executed a waiver of all his rights and interests over the said property in favor of his children by Trinidad
Laserna, namely, Josephine, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, all surnamed Orola.
In 1973, Emilio Orola retired as cashier of the Philippine National Bank. He filed a petition for his
appointment as guardian over the persons and property of his minor children. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. V-3526. The petition was granted, and Emilio Orola was appointed guardian not
only over the persons of his minor children but also over their property. On November 6, 1973, Emilio filed
a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of his deceased spouse, Trinidad Laserna, and his
appointment as administrator of her estate. The RTC issued an order appointing Emilio Orola as
administrator of the estate of his deceased spouse. As such administrator of the estate, Emilio took
possession of the said parcels of land. He opened an account in the name of the estate with the PNB. He
embarked on a massive sugar production and, with prior approval of the court, negotiated with banking
86
institutions for financing loans to purchase the required equipments. However, in 1976 and 1977, there
was a sudden collapse of the sugar industry. Emilio Orola found it necessary to develop the swampy portion
of the estate for the production of fish. To finance the endeavor, he needed at least P600,000.00. On
September 11, 1980, Emilio Orola filed a motion in Sp. Proc. No. V-3639 for authority to negotiate a
P600,000.00 loan from the Central Bank of the Philippines for the full and complete development of the
fishpond portion of the estate, and to transfer the sugar account of the estate from the PNB to the Republic
Planters Bank .
On September 12, 1980, the court granted the motion of the administrator and authorized him to negotiate
the loan through the Rural Bank of Capiz (Rural Bank of Pontevedra, Capiz) and to transfer the sugar
account of the estate to the RPB in Roxas City. Emilio then filed an application with the Rural Bank for a
financing loan of P600,000.00. However, the bank informed him that the said loan would have to be
processed by the Central Bank and that it would take some time. He was informed that there would be no
need for the Central Bank to intervene if the loan of P600,000.00 would be broken down into three parts
of P200,000.00, each to be applied for by three applicants to whom the property to be used as collateral
would be leased by the estate. Emilio agreed and talked to his children, Josephine, Manuel and Antonio,
about the bank’s proposal. The three siblings agreed. The Estate of Trinidad Laserna, through its
administrator, Emilio, as lessor, and Josephine, Manuel and Antonio, all surnamed Orola, as lessees,
executed separate contracts of lease over the aforesaid property of the estate. On September 20, 1982, the
intestate estate court issued an Order approving the contracts.
It turned out that the lessees would not qualify for the loans; the bank required a lease period of at least 10
years from the time the court approved the same. On May 20, 1982, Emilio, Antonio, Manuel and Josephine
Orola filed a Manifestation with the intestate estate court, praying that its order be amended to state that
the periods of the leases were to commence from court approval of the said contracts. However, on
December 15, 1982, the estate, through Emilio, as lessor, and Josephine, Antonio and Manuel Orola,
executed separate Amended Contracts of Lease covering the same property. The periods of the lease were
extended to 12 years, to commence from their approval by the intestate estate court. The lessees were also
authorized to negotiate loans for the development of the leased premises not to exceed P200,000.00, and to
bind the leased premises by way of real estate mortgage as security therefor.
On December 15, 1982, Emilio filed an Ex Parte Motion in the intestate estate court for the approval of the
amended contracts of lease appended thereto. On December 17, 1982, Angeline, Myrna and Althea Orola
filed their Joint Affidavit of Conformity to the motion. On December 17, 1982, the court granted the motion
of Emilio and approved the amended contracts of lease. On December 20, 1982, the Rural Bank notified
Emilio that the loan applications of his children had been approved.
Antonio, Manuel and Josephine signed separate Promissory Notes on March 21, 1983 in which they
promised and bound themselves to pay their respective loans in 10 years in stated annual installments.
Antonio Orola, for and in behalf of his father Emilio Orola, executed a Real Estate Mortgage over Lot 1088
as security for the payment of his loan. Manuel Orola, also as attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the
estate, likewise, executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the Rural Bank over the said lots as security for
his loan. Josephine Orola, as attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the estate, executed a separate real
estate mortgage agreement over a portion of Lot 1088 and Lot 1071 as security for her loan. However, the
real estate mortgage contracts were not submitted to the guardianship and intestate estate courts for
approval. Neither were Myrna, Angeline and Althea aware of the said loans.
The net proceeds of the loan, in the total amount of P582,000.00, were deposited in the Rural Bank on May
9, 1983 in Emilio’s account. From the said proceeds, the Rural Bank deducted the amount of P229,771.20,
the accommodation loan Emilio secured from the Rural Bank. As of September 9, 1983, the balance of the
said deposit amounted to only P4,292.79. Emilio, thereafter, failed to pay the amortizations of the loans to
the Rural Bank.
This prompted the Rural Bank to write separate letters of demand to Josephine, Manuel and Antonio,
demanding payment of the balance of their accounts within seven days from the receipt thereof, otherwise
the Rural Bank would cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. Emilio Orola pleaded
87
to the Rural Bank not to foreclose the mortgages. However, on June 15, 1985, the Rural Bank filed an
application with the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgages over Lots 1071 and 1088.The lots were sold at public auction on April 14, 1986 with the Rural
Bank as the winning bidder. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed separate certificates of sale in favor
of the Rural Bank. On September 1, 1987, the guardianship court terminated the guardianship and
dismissed the case. On September 21, 1987, Josephine, Myrna, Manuel and Antonio Orola executed a Deed
of Acceptance of Waiver or Donation in which they accepted their father’s waiver of his rights, interests and
participation over their mother’s estate.
On October 1, 1987, Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, filed a
Complaint against the Rural Bank, their father Emilio and the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the
nullification of the Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgages executed by Josephine, Manuel and
Antonio Orola, and the sale of the property subject of the said deed at public auction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the real estate mortgage executed by Manuel, Antonio and Josephine Orola in favor of Rural
Bank was considered valid even without submitting the real estate mortgage contract to the guardianship
and intestate estate court for approval
HELD:
The petition was meritorious.
Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon application of the administrator and on written
notice to the heirs, the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage so much as may be necessary of
the real estate for the expenses of the administrator, or if it clearly appears that such mortgage would be
beneficial to the persons interested:
Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and
legacies through personality not exhausted. – When the personal estate of the deceased is not
sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such
personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and
where a testator has not, otherwise, made sufficient provision for the payment of such debts,
expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator and on
written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the
executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise, encumber so much as may be
necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts,
expenses, and legacies, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be
beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the
sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is
necessary or beneficial under the circumstances.
Section 7 of Rule 89 provides the rules to obtain court approval for such mortgage:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the
deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the
estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale,
mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the
nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or
by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication or
otherwise, as it shall deem proper;
88
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond, in such sum as the
court directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale,
mortgage, or other encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been complied with, the court, by
order stating such compliance, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale the
court may authorize it to be public or private, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. The
executor or administrator shall be furnished with a certified copy of such order;
(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving notice of the time and place of the sale shall be
governed by the provisions concerning notice of execution sale;
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with
the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be as valid as if the deed had
been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
After the real estate mortgage is executed in accordance with the foregoing regulations, the said deed must
be submitted for the consideration and approval or disapproval of the court.
The Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that respondent Orola failed to secure an order from the
intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage the subject lots and execute a real estate mortgage
contract in favor of respondent Rural Bank. What the intestate estate court approved in its December 17,
1982 Order was the authority incorporated in the amended contracts of lease respondent Orola gave to
petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so that the said lots could be mortgaged to the respondent
Rural Bank as security for the P600,000.00 loan under their respective names. In fine, the intestate estate
court authorized the petitioners, not respondent Orola, to mortgage the said lots to respondent Rural Bank.
Moreover, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, only the executor or administrator of the estate
may be authorized by the intestate estate court to mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence, the
order of the estate court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the realty of the estate to the respondent
Rural Bank is a nullity.
89
RICARDO SIKAT, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED

MARIANO P. VILLANUEVA VS. QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED PEDRO VILLANUEVA
VILLA-REAL, J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
The present case was commenced by virtue of a complaint filed by Ricardo Sikat, as judicial administrator
of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, as judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on
claims and appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit
of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial administratrix, be
ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid,
and the costs.
FACTS:
Both the plaintiff and defendant are both of age, the former is residing in the municipality of Malinao, and
the latter in the municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, P. I. Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action
as judicial administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, duly appointed in place of the former
administrator, Enrique V. Kare, by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The defendant is the judicial
administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, duly appointed by the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila. The intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Albay, and Julio V. Quijano was appointed administrator. The intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, were also commenced therein as civil case No. 3011, upon
application of Julio V. Quijano, for the purpose mentioned in the order of the court, dated August 14, 1919, a
copy of which is attached and made a part of this agreed statement of facts. An order dated August 19,
1919, the Court of First Instance of Albay appointed Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva administratrix of the estate
of Pedro Villanueva, and on September 11, 1919 Tomas Almonte and Pablo Rocha were appointed
commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal.
On September 16, 1919 the then administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, Julio V. Quijano, filed
with said committee a written claim for the same sums as now claimed, according to Exhibit B, attached to
and made a part of this agreed statement of facts, and adduced evidence in support thereof before the
committee. In view of the fact that Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and upon appeal the
Supreme Court decided (see decision of October 21, 1921, a copy of which is attached to and made a part
hereof as Exhibit C) that said Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said
intestate proceedings, at the instance of both parties, the committee composed of Tomas Almonte and
Pablo Rocha abstained from making any report on the aforementioned claim to the Court of First Instance
of Albay.
Also, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court of First Instance of Albay incompetent
to take cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro Villanueva, these proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila through the application of Enrique Kare, as judicial
administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva in case No. 28244, filed on June 18, 1925,
upon the ground that when Pedro Villanueva died he owed the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of
P10,192.92, with legal interest from June 15, 1919. The Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed
Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and Mamerto Roxas and
Nicanor Roxas as commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as
90
administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with the committee on September 22,
1925, and that the same claim appears in the present complaint.
Said committee on claims and appraisal, composed of Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas, admitted the
claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing their report with the court
accordingly. The defendant administratrix, Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, took a timely appeal from this
report, and so the present complaint has been filed. The evidence presented to this committee on claims
and appraisal by the parties to the present case, and the rulings and decisions of said committee upon all
the claims and counterclaims filed with it, are contained in the record entitled "Report of the Committee on
Claims and Appraisal" of the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva, No. 28244 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the aforesaid claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate
against Pedro Villanueva estate has already prescribed
HELD:
There is no question that at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate
to collect the credit against him by virtue of the abovequoted acknowledgment of indebtedness had not yet
prescribed.
Section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 703. CERTAIN ACTIONS SURVIVE. — Actions to recover the title or possession of real estate,
buildings, or any interest therein, actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, and actions to recover the possession of specific articles of personal property,
shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or administrator;
but all other actions commenced against the deceased before his death shall be discontinued, and
the claims therein involved presented before the committee as herein provided.
If in pursuance of the legal provision just quoted, all actions commenced against a debtor shall be
discontinued upon his death, and the claims involved filed with the committee on claims and appraisal
appointed in the testate or intestate proceedings unless they are actions to recover the title or possession of
real estate, buildings, or any interest therein, damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
or the possession of specific articles of personal property, which actions shall survive and may be
commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or administrator, then with a greater reason should
credits that have not prescribed at the debtor's death, and upon which no action had been brought, be
presented before the committee on claims and appraisal for collection.
The court hold that whenever a creditor's claim presented in the intestate proceedings of the estate of his
debtor is not allowed because the court has no jurisdiction, and such creditor permits more than three
years to elapse before instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the claim is barred by
laches, applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by analogy.
91
Lingao, Cherylette
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DOMINADOR DANAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATRIX,

ADORACION F. VDA. DE DANAN, AND THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DOMINADOR DANAN, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FELIPE V. BUENCAMINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, BRANCH II, GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, BENITO
MANALANSAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
G. R. NO. L-57205 DECEMBER 14, 1981
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Dominador Danan died intestate on November 7, 1970. Service Engineers Inc. claimed to be a creditor of
the deceased in which it filed a petition for the appointment of an administrator in favor of Engineer Carlos
Navarro. The Special Proceeding however was ruled in favor of Danan’s widow, appointing her as the
adminstratix of the estate.
On November 13, 1973 the court issued an order directing all persons having money claims against the
estate to file them within six months after the date of first publication, which was on December 10, 1973.
On June 12, 1974, Benito and Ines Manalansan filed a contingent claim of P98, 411.17 plus interest in
anticipation of a deficiency after the spouses shall have foreclosed a real estate mortgage which the
deceased and his wife executed in their favor.
The administrator filed an answer to the contingent claim, admitting the existence of debt which was
secured by mortgage. However, she prayed that it be denied because the mortgage has not been foreclosed
yet, hence, no deficiency can yet be claimed. The hearing on the contingent claim took place but only Ines
Manalansan was present. The counsel for the administrator was reported to be sick hence he did not
appear.
The court, at the request of Manalansan’s counsel, allowed the claim to be heard without prejudice to
present rebuttal evidence.
Ines Manalansan testified to the existence of a final judgment, unpaid attorney’s fees, and damages. On
October 28, 1980, spouses Manalansan’s filed a Motion to Resolve Claim Against the Estate attached to it
the statement of the deficiency judgment the administrator should pay amounting to P294, 298.23.
The court only gave 10 days from receipt for the administrator to file her comment. The record does not
show that the administrator filed her comment hence the court acted upon the motion filed by the spouses.
It was only on January 8, 1981, that the administratrix filed an Opposition to Contingent Claim against
Estate. There the administratrix questioned the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the claim "for being
exorbitant and shocking to the senses and that the same was filed out of time or beyond the reglementary
period provided by law."
An MR was filed by the administrator on the ground that the claim was "exorbitant, shocking to the senses
and that the same was filed out of time or beyond the reglementary period provided by law." However, it
was denied for lack of merits. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Can a trial Judge legally and validly consider, take cognizance of and render judgment on a claim
filed against the Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding when said claim was filed outside the period
prescribed by Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court?
2. Can a trial Judge adjudicate and render judgment on a contingent claim against the Estate in an
92
Intestacy Proceeding on the basis merely of the direct testimony of a claimant, and that the adverse
party against whom the claim is being asserted not having had the opportunity to adduce
controverting or rebutting evidence?
3. Can a claim against the Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding that is not supported by the evidence on
record be awarded?
HELD:
1. On the first issue, there is no question that the contingent claim was filed two (2) days beyond the six-
month period stipulated in the order which directed all persons having money claims against the estate
to file them. However, it is to be noted that the claim was filed on June 12, 1974, whereas the timeliness
of its filing was raised only on January 8, 1981, in the Opposition to the Contingent Claim against Estate.
She is not only estopped by her conduct but laches also bar her claim.
Moreover, Rule 86, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court gives the probate court discretion to allow claims
presented beyond the period previously fixed provided that they are filed within one month from the
expiration of such period but in no case beyond the date of entry of the order of distribution. The
contingent claim of the Manalansans was filed within both periods.
2. True it is that the probate court gave opportunities to the administratrix to contest the contingent
claim. Thus she filed an answer thereto on July 11, 1974; a hearing was held on September 2, 1974, but
she did not appear; the hearing on October 3, 1974 was re-set to November 18, 1974 at her request but
she failed to appear on the latter date; she did not interpose objection to the exhibits offered by the
Manalansans as stipulated in the order of November 18, 1974; and lastly the administrator was
given ten days within which to file her comment to the Motion to Resolve Claim Against the
Estate.
However, the SC held that the opportunities given to administrator were not ample enough and
do not meet the minimum requirements of due process.
On June 12, 1974, when the claim was filed it amounted to only P98,411.17. However, on January 3,
1981, when the probate court approved the claim it had ballooned to the amount of P294.298.26. The
order approving the claim does not explain how it reached that amount.
3. The probate court should not have been satisfied with merely asking for objections or
comments from the administratrix but it should have conducted a full dress hearing on the
claim by using its coercive powers if necessary.
93
Lingao, Cherylette
ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF LUIS PUENTEVELLA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, RENE ECHAUS, PETITIONER,  VS. HON.
RAMON BLANCO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, AND PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-30453 DECEMBER 4, 1989
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel the presiding judge of the RTC of Iloilo to issue an order
directing Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as administrator of Charles Newton Hodges to pay
Angelina Echaus 851,472.83 as adjudged in Civil Case No. 6628.
Angelina Puentevella Echaus in her capacity as the Administratrix of her father Luis Puentevella filed a
complaint against Charles Newton Hodges for the accounting of the business covering Ba-Ta subdivision,
recovery of her share in the profits and assets, and payment of damages.
During the pendency of the case, C.N Hodges died. Two years later, the trial court ordered the substitution
of PCIB as administrator of the estate of Hodges as defendant of the case.
After Hodges’ death, a petition for settlement of his estate was instituted and which a notice to creditors
was published in a newspaper of general circulation during March 13, 20, and 27 of 1963.
On November 12, 1966, the parties in the Civil Case submitted a stipulation of facts in which a judgment
was rendered on December 6, 1966 ordering PCIB to pay Angelina Exhaus P851,472.83 with legal interest
from date of judgment until paid.
On January 21,1967, the court issued an order granting Echaus’ motion for issuance of writ of execution
against PCIB. However, the writ was not enforced because Angelina opted to file a claim against the estate
proceedings of C.N. Hodges.
The administrator of the estate of the Hodges opposed the motion.
Meanwhile, a Petition of Relief from Judgment was filed by Avelina Magno in the civil case won by Angelina
Echaus. This caused the judge holding the Special Proceeding of Hodges’ estate to suspend the resolution of
payment of judgment to Angelina Echaus until the Petition for Relief from Judgment is resolved by the RTC
of Iloilo.
The motion of Avelina Magno was denied because she was not a proper party in the case. Angelina then
filed a motion to direct payment of judgment credit held in abeyance since the petition by Avelina was
already dismissed and no appeal was further taken.
Judge Blanco reiterated his order of denial of payment due to the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Supreme Court. However, the writ of preliminary injunction notes that the judge is not restrained from
approving final deeds of sale executed by PCIB covering properties of Linnie Hodges and Charles Hodges,
and can act on other routinary matters necessary for the preservation of the estate.
It is in this light that petitioner filed a petition for mandamus seeking to set aside Judge Blanco’s 1969 order
and to order PCIB to pay judgment credit in the Civil case which petitioner won.
94
She contends that the judgment has become final and executor and it is a ministerial duty of the court to
order execution. While private respondents challenge that the judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. They contend that “money claims against a defendant who dies without a judgment having
been rendered shall be dismissed and prosecuted as a claim against the estate proceedings” in which was
not followed in the Civil case 6628. And even if the judgment is valid, the claim is barred by the statute of
non-claims based on Rule 3, Sec. 21 stating that when the action for recovery of money, debt, or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment, it shall be dismissed and to be prosecuted in the
manner provided in these rules.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the money claim in the civil case should have been dismissed and instituted as a
money claim in the special proceeding of the estate of C.N Hodges
2. Whether or not Mandamus is a proper for payment of judgment credit
HELD
1. No.
The SC says that the conclusion of the Civil Case in favor of Angelina Echaus is not null and void despite
it being pursued in an ordinary proceeding rather than being dismissed and filed as a money claim in a
special proceeding.
Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment as judicial proceedings are entitled to respect. Moreover,
PCIB did not object when it was ordered to substitute as administrator for defendant Hodges after his
death. Of greater importance is that the Civil Case has passed with finality in the Supreme Court (PCIB
vs. Blanco, GR No. 30013) in which the decision for petition for relief from judgment was dismissed.
The procedure chosen by Angelina was right because although the judgment in the civil case has
become final and executory, execution is not the proper remedy to enforce payment but for the
claimant to present a claim before the probate court to settle the claims of indebtedness against the
estate of the deceased and order the administrator or executor the payment thereof.
2. No.
The question of whether an order to direct payment is compellable by mandamus is doubtful.
Even if Angelina’s judgment credit was allowed as a claim against the estate, immediate payment by
administrator is not a matter of right.
A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of
administrator, the amount ascertained to be due and it shall not create a lien upon the property
of the estate, or give the judgment creditor any priority in payment (section 13, Rule 86, Revised
Rules). The time paying for debts and legacies is to be fixed by the probate court having
jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased.
95
Lingao, Cherylette
ALAN SHEKER VS ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA
G.R. NO. 157912
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The RTC of Iligan City admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and then issued an order for
all creditors to file their respective claims against her estate.
In compliance with the order, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent claim on October 7, 2002 for his
commission amounting to about P206,250 in the event of the sale of parcels of land belonging to the estate
and P275,000 for the reimbursement on expenses incurred in the course of negotiation.
It was when he filed for a contingent claim that the executrix of the estate of Alice Sheker moved for the
dismissal of the money claim based on failure to pay docket fees, failure to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping, and failure to attach a written explanation why money claim was not filed personally.
The RTC ruled in favor of the defendant, ordered the dismissal of the money claim.
Motion for reconsideration by petitioner was denied hence, it filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding needs a certification of forum
shopping
2. Whether or not failure to pay docket fees in a contingent claim a cause for dismissal
3. Whether or not a contingent claim can be dismissed for failure to contain a written explanation on the
service and filing by registered mail
HELD: All issues were resolved in the negative.
In the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as
much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceeding. Provisions of the Rules
of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service, and filing of docket fees, are applicable to special proceedings.
1. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
The whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the
decedent’s will. Under Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 86, after granting letters of testamentary of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the
court and the administrator otherwise they will forever be barred.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action and so is the contingent claim since
claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, his money claim
not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
2. The trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim even without payment of docket fees because
the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the ROC. After
all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Non-
payment of filing fees is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
3. In this case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City while counsel for respondent and the
RTC are both in Iligan City. Considering the distance between said cities, it is indeed impracticable to
96
serve and file money claim personally. Thus, failure to serve a written explanation shall not dismiss the
money claim in the interest of substantial justice.
Lingao, Cherylette
ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIO NES VS. LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, AND ANTONIO J.
HENSON
G.R. NO. 159130, AUGUST 22, 2008
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her deceased mother, Luz J. Henson. Ruby’s
sister, Lilia, opposed the petition praying that it be disallowed and that she be appointed as administrator
because Ruby acted in bad faith in managing the estate of Luz.
The court granted Lilia’s motion but appointed Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch as Interim
Special Administrator. The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special
Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment. During his administration, the follow-
ing events took place:
1. On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrator's Final Report for the
approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing
eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.
2. The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an
opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of
income and disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones' claim for
commission and that he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.
3. On February 21, 2002, the respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones
filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of
the estate.
4. In an Order dated March 12, 2002, the trial court granted the request for audit and appointed the
accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.
5. The respondents moved for the reconsideration of Order dated March 12, 2002, alleging that in
view of the partition of the estate there was no more need for a special administrator. They also
clarified that they were not asking for an external audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to
examine the receipts, vouchers, bank statements, and other documents in support of the Special
Administrator's Final Report and to examine the Special Administrator under oath.
The trial court resolved the issues through Order dated April 13, 2002, which states the:
1. Designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of
the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson;
2. Suspension of the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
On April 29, 2002, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349. The petition assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002
97
which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which
reiterated the appointment.
On another case, the heirs filed a notice of Appeal to the RTC when it directed the payment of the
commission of Atty. Briones. Herein petitioner opposed the appeal on the ground of forum shopping, which
the trial court affirmed. The respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the appellate court, claiming
that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial duty to approve their seasonably-
perfected appeal.
They refuted the trial court's finding of forum shopping by declaring that the issues in their appeal and in
their petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) are not identical, although both stemmed from the same
Order of April 3, 2002. The appeal involved the payment of the special administrator's commission, while
the petition for certiorari assailed the appointment of an accounting firm to conduct an external audit.
To prove that forum shopping transpired, the petitioner cites the respondents' petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) that prayed for the annulment of the assailed Order of
April 3, 2002 in its entirety.
The Court of Appeals granted the Mandamus and held that the trial court had neither the power nor the
authority to deny the appeal on the ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial court to dismiss an appeal, either
motu proprio or on motion, may be exercised only if the appeal was taken out of time or if the appellate
court docket and other fees were not paid within the reglementary period.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari on September 4, 2003 on the ground that the CA refused to
resolve the issue of forum shopping in its Decision of February 11, 2003 and its resolution of July 17, 2003.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment of an auditor is an interlocutory order, hence not appealable
2. Whether or not the suspension of the approval of the report of the special administrator is
interlocutory as well and not appealable
HELD:
1. The terms of the trial court's order with respect to the appointment or "designation" of the accounting
firm is clear: "to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the
estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate."
Given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones' Final Report in the administration of the
estate of the decedent, its preparatory character is obvious. It is a prelude to the court's final settlement
and distribution of the properties of the decedent to the heirs.
In the context of the RTC’s Order, the court's designation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling
on the pending estate proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net
estate of the deceased and distributing it to the heirs) or on the merits of any independently
determinable aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for purposes of confirming the accuracy of the
Special Administrator's Final Report, particularly of the reported charges against the estate. In other
words, the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any
independently determinable issue therein, and left much to be done on the merits of the case. Thus, the
April 3, 2002 Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so far as it designated an accounting firm to audit the
petitioner's special administration of the estate.
98
2. “Suspension of the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.”
Under these terms, it is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently

determinable issue, the special administrator's commission - is the court's definite and final word
on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the
court's ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's commission is no less a claim
against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes
this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.”
Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate. - If the executor or administrator has
a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof in writing, to the court, and the
court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the
same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the
settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay the special
administrator necessary funds to defend such action.
Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate "is appealable as
in ordinary cases.”
Section 13. Judgment appealable. The judgment of the court approving or disapproving a claim,
shall be filed with the record of the administration proceedings with notice to both parties, and is
appealable as in ordinary cases. A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that
he pay, in due course of administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create
any lien upon the property of the estate, or give to the judgment creditor any priority of payment.
Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator's
commission - effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate - is the lower
court's last word on the matter and one that is appealable.
Gutierrez, Myron Dei

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) AND
NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE
FACTS:
Beatriz Silverio died leaving an estate. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the
administrator of the subject estate. The RTC then issued an Order granting the petition and removing
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new
administrator. Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the
property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and
Record on Appeal, she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. This motion for reconsideration was
denied.
99
The RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the
reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the order against
private respondent to vacate the premises. As a result, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the CA. The CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a
TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the order dated December 12, 2005 are
interlocutory orders and are not appealable under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
HELD:
Yes, the orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s appeal was
against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Petitioner contends that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the order which denied
her motion for reconsideration, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus,
petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and
should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead.
To distinguish, a final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely
but leaves something to be decided upon.
Moreover, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally
cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to.
In this case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the
premises of the property in question. Thus, the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue
of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The alleged authority of Nelia
Silverio-Dee, which she supposedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate
court. Therefore, the order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an
appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. Such
improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, and this means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal.
100
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 120, CALOOCAN CITY, AND RAMON G. NICOLAS, RESPONDENTS
FACTS:
Estrellita is one of the five children of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales. The private respondent
Ramon is a brother of Estrellita.
Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land in Valenzuela which was afterwards sold to Amelia Lim
and Natividad Chiu. Estrellita purchased again from Premier Homes a parcel of land in Paranaque with
improvements. After that, an unfortunate event happened when Estrellita and her daughters were killed. As
a result, Lauro entered into an “Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde with Waiver of Shares” with his wife’s parents. The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the
total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael and the other fifty percent (50%)
to Lauro. The car and the property were given to Lauro and to Estrellita’s parents but the latter waived all
their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said properties.
Afterwards, Rafael died. To settle his estate, Teresita (one of his children) instituted an instestate estate
proceeding and prayed to be appointed Special Administratix of Rafael’s estate. She also sought to be
appointed as Salud and Ricardo’s guardian of which Ramon filed an opposition. Private respondent filed
another opposition alleging that Estrellita was given the Valuenzela property and later, he filed his own
petition averring that the legitime of Salud and Ricardo should come from the collation of all the properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that Lauro is one of Rafael’s children
by right of representation as the widower of the deceased legitimate daughter, Estrellita. In a consolidated
order, RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita was appointed as the
Special Administratix of Rafael’s estate however, Ramon was afterwards removed as guardian for selling
his wards’ property without the court’s knowledge and permission.
The RTC ordered Lauro to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as
the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by Ramon and
Teresita. Lauro filed a Manifestation stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of
Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. Yet, despite this manifestation, Ramon
moved to include Lauro in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paranaque property, the car
and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property be collated, which the trial court
granted. Lauro filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Lauro filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in Paranaque may be subject to collation.
HELD:
No, the Paranaque property is not subject to collation. The basic principle of collation is stated in Article
1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the
inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass the property which they received from him, so
that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
101
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.
The facts here do not make a case of collation:
1) The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding.
Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of the latter’s compulsory heirs;
2) As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which
may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is
subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
In this case, however, the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to
determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that
the transfer between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true
intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside
the probate court’s jurisdiction;
3) The order of the probate court subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is premature. Records
indicate that the intestate estate proceeding is still in its initiatory stage;
4) Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case, the probate court, nonetheless, made a
reversible error in ordering collation of the Paranaque property. We note that what was transferred to
Estrellita by way of deed of sale is the Valenzuela property. The Paranaque property which Estrellita
acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply
by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis; and
5) it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not Valenzuela property may be brought to
collation.

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND
REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE, PETITIONERS, VS. LCN
CONSTRUCTION CORP., RESPONDENT
FACTS:
Raymond Triviere died on December 14, 1987. On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his
intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the
widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate
of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the
payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as
well as litigation expenses.
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their
litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate
under administration, the RTC denied it.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata, also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as
the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
On September 6, 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf
and for their respective clients, claiming for the payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
102
LCN Construction Corporation, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late
Raymond Triviere filed its Comment on Opposition to the motion. LCN countered that the RTC had already
resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
expenses of the estate as required by the court. LCN also claimed that the administrators and the heirs of
the late Raymond Triviere had earlier agreed to fix the former's fees at only 5% of the gross estate, based
on which, per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even overpaid P55,000.00.
LCN also asserted that contrary to what was stated in the second Motion for Payment, Section 7, Rule 85 of
the Revised Rules of Court was inapplicable, since the administrators failed to establish that the estate was
large, or that its settlement was attended with great difficulty, or required a high degree of capacity on the
part of the administrators.
Lastly, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the award in favor of the heirs is already a distribution of the residue of the estate.
2. Whether or not the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the co-administrators should be nullified.
HELD:
1. Yes, the award is a distribution of the residue of the estate. While the awards in favor of petitioner
children and widow made in the RTC Order dated June 12, 2003 was not yet a distribution of the
residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did
constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow
were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or
provided for.
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance distribution of the
estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. Notwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such
terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
set forth in Rule 90 of these rules.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of
the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or
any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs."
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: (1) only
part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of
advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and (2) the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow
their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two
requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of June 12, 2003 is
completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated
that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective shares from the estate after all
these years. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere
allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the
103
estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
2. Yes, the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the co-administrators should be nullified. Nothing in the
records reveal that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was indeed a substitute administrator
for Atty. Quasha upon his death.
The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of administration
to a person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to serve as such, following the procedure laid
down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in clear and unequivocal terms the
modes for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator, to wit: Section 2.
Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal . x x x.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or

administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with
him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable
person.
The records of the case have no evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty.
Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of
letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the
demise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention
that while it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time
of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never
even issued letters of administration.
The attorney's fees, therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the third paragraph of Section 7,
Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against the estate professional fees
for legal services rendered by them.
On the other hand, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from
the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P100,000.00 as prayed for in the Motion for Payment dated September 3, 2002, and as awarded by the
RTC in its 12 June 2003 Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon
final distribution of the estate, in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as
counsel and not as administrator, representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children
in the settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
104
J. GONZALES-ORENSE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PRIMA M. CAGUIAT-ALBA,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Orense was hired by Alba to represent her in the probate of her husband's will. He claimed the stipulated
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the estate, but the probate court allowed him only P20,000.00 on the
basis of quantum meruit. He filed a notice of appeal from this order, and the probate court then transmitted
the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. Orense submitted the appellant’s brief and Alba replied with
the appellee’s brief.
The CA however declared Orense’s appeal abandoned and dismissed for his failure to submit his record on
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not when an award of attorney's fees by the probate court is elevated to the CA, a record on
appeal is necessary.
HELD:
Yes, when an award of attorney's fees by the probate court is elevated to the CA, a record on appeal is
necessary. Under Rule 109, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it states that the fees of the lawyer representing
the executor or administrator are directly chargeable against the client for whom the services have been
rendered and not against the estate of the decedent. However, the executor or administrator may claim
reimbursement of such fees from the estate if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to
its benefit.
As Orense’s claim for attorney's fees is not a claim against the estate of Alba’s husband, he could have filed
it in an ordinary civil action, in which event an appeal therefrom will not be regarded as involved in a
special proceeding requiring the submission of a record on appeal. It appears, however, that it was not filed
in such separate civil action but in the probate case itself, which is a special proceeding and so should be
deemed governed by Rule 109 on appeals from such proceedings. The appeal would come under
Subsection (e) thereof as the order of the probate court granting the challenged attorney's fees "constitutes,
in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing." The
consequence is that the record on appeal should be required.
Rule 50, Section 1 provides that an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, for (b) Failure to file, within the period prescribed by these rules, the notice of appeal, appeal
bond or record on appeal. On the basis of this rule, the resolution of CA dismissing Orense’s appeal cannot
be faulted.
It is noted, however, that the question presented in this case is one of first impression; that Orense acted in
honest if mistaken, interpretation of the applicable law; that the probate court itself believed that the
record on appeal was unnecessary; and that Alba herself apparently thought so, too, for she did not move to
dismiss the appeal and instead impliedly recognized its validity by filing the appellee's brief. In view of
these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that Orense should be given an
opportunity to comply with the rules by submitting the required record on appeal as a condition for the
revival of the appeal.
105
SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO, PETITIONER, VS.OLIVIA SENGCO PASCUAL AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
FACTS:
There are two estate proceedings involved in this case: 1) that of Doña Adela Pascual and 2) that of her
husband Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres, who predeceased his wife, died intestate while Doña Adela left
behind a last will and testament.
The intestate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. 7554) for the settlement of the estate of Don Andres was
commenced by his widow Doña Adela. Apart from his wife who bore him no children, Don Andres was
survived by several nephews and nieces from his full-blood and half-blood brothers. This proceeding
proved to be the source of many controversies since Olivia and Hermes Pascual, both acknowledged natural
children of Don Andres’ brother, Eligio, attempted to be recognized as heirs of Don Andres. However, a
Compromise Agreement was entered into by the other heirs of Don Andres over the objection of Olivia and
Hermes Pascual, whereby three-fourths of the estate of Don Andres would go to Doña Adela and one-fourth
to the other heirs of Don Andres. In the case of Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista (GR No. 84240, March 25,
1992), the denial of the Intestate Court of the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
In the meantime, Doña Adela died on August 18, 1987. She left behind a last will and testament executed in
1978 which designated Olivia Pascual as the executrix and the principal beneficiary of her estate. The will
also bequeathed several legacies and devises to several individuals and institutions.
Olivia Pascual then engaged the services of petitioner, a professional law partnership, in connection with
settlement of the estate of Doña Adela. Their agreement as to the professional fees due petitioner is
contained in a letter signed by Atty. Esteban Salonga in behalf of petitioner and Olivia Pascual. It is
stipulated therein that the final professional fee “shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits
thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned from the time of
Olivia’s appointment as executrix of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the court
of the agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the estate.”
Olivia Pascual, represented by petitioner, commenced a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of Doña Adela. The Probate Court rendered a decision allowing the 1978 Last Will and Testament
of Doña Adela and disallowing a purported 1985 will presented by a certain Miguel Cornejo, Jr. and siblings.
After, petitioner filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien equivalent to 3% of the total gross estate and the fruits
thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate, pursuant to the retainer agreement between
petitioner and Pascual. On November 4, 1993, the Probate Court ruled that petitioner’s notice of lien must
be noted as a lien that must be satisfied chargeable to the share of Olivia Pascual. Accordingly, petitioner
filed a Motion to Annotate Attorney’s Lien on Properties of the Estate of Doña Adela Vda. De Pascual.
It was at this stage on January 19, 1994, that the Intestate Court rendered a decision in Sp. Proc. No. 7554
finally giving judicial approval to the aforementioned 1985 Compromise Agreement. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioner’s attorney’s lien estimated at P1, 198,
097.02. Further, the petitioner noted that the stated values must be considered as only provisional and
without prejudice to an updated appraisal of the properties comprising the gross estate of Doña Adela.
Olivia Pascual, on the other hand, filed her comment and opposition to the Motion for the issuance for a
writ of execution on attorney’s fees. She argued that a lawyer of an administrator or executor should charge
106
the individual client for professional fees and not the estate. She also claimed that the counsel claiming
attorney’s fees should give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the estate and that such was not
accomplished by petitioner considering that no notices were given to the several legatees designated in
Doña Adela’s will. Furthermore, she argued that the motion for execution was premature because the
proceedings before the Intestate Court had not yet been terminated.
The Probate Court decided in favor of Olivia Pascual. It issued an order denying the motion for writ of
execution in view of the fact that bulk of the estate of Doña Adela is still tied up with the estate of Don
Andres Pascual.
Olivia Pascual then filed with the Probate Court a Motion to Declare in General Default and Distribution of
Testamentary Dispositions with Cancellation of Administrator’s Bond. It was noted that no creditor had
filed a claim against the estate of Doña Adela despite due notice and that the proceedings before the
Intestate Court had already been terminated. It was also manifested that two of the properties that formed
part of the estates of the spouses, “the Ongpin Property” and “the Valenzuela Property” had in fact already
been partitioned between the estate of Doña Adela and the heirs of Don Andres at the ratio of three-fourths
and one-fourth, respectively.
In response, petitioner filed a Comment/Manifestation praying that an order be issued ordering of the
annotation of attorney’s lien on the properties comprising the estate of Doña Adela Pascual. Petitioner also
prayed that a writ of partial execution be issued for the satisfaction of the attorney’s lien in relation to the
Ongpin and Valenzuela properties for the amount of P635,368.14, without prejudice to the issuance of a
writ of execution after the re-appraisal of the present market value of the estate. This motion was denied by
the Probate Court for being prematurely filed as there is no exact estate yet to be inventoried and re-
appraised.
The twin orders of the RTC were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court noted that the
attorney’s lien issued by the Probate Court was only chargeable to the share of Olivia Pascual and not to the
estate of Doña Adela. This is because it was Olivia Pascual who entered into the agreement with petitioner
for the payment of attorney’s fees in connection with the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela. Citing
Lacson vs. Reyes, the Court of Appeals asserted that as a rule an administrator or executor may be allowed
fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a lawyer who renders legal services to the executor or administrator of an estate can
claim attorney’s fees against the estate instead of the executor or administrator
2. Whether or not the Motion for Writ of Execution satisfies the requisites set in the case of Escueta
for a claim of attorney’s fees directly chargeable against the estate
RULING:
1. Yes. As a general rule, it is the executor or the administrator who is primarily liable for attorney’s fees
due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator who in relation to the
settlement of the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate if it
can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate. However, if the
executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney’s fees, the lawyer has two modes of recourse.
First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator in his personal capacity and
not as an executor or administrator. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney’s fees as an expense of administration.
If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be
made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the
necessity of his employment. This is the governing rule on the matter as held in the 1905 case of
Escueta vs. Sy-Juilliong.
107
The case relied upon by the appellate court, Lacson vs. Reyes, is not correct. The said case involved an
executor who also happened to be the lawyer for the heirs who had filed the petition for probate. It was
pronounced therein that the administrator or executor cannot charge professional fees for legal
services against the same estate, as provided under Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.
2. No. The requisite notice to all heirs and interested parties has not been satisfied. Doña Adela’s will
designated 19 other individuals apart from Olivia Pascual and four different institutions as recipients of
devises or legacies. However, only Olivia Pascual was served with a copy of the Motion for Writ of
Execution. Such notice is material to the other heirs of Doña Adela. The payment of attorney’s fees
necessarily diminishes the estate of the decedent and may effectively diminish the value of the
testamentary dispositions made by the decedent.
Attorney’s fees are in the nature of administration expenses. Hence, any party interested in the estate
may raise objections to the attorney’s fees sought, such as that these fees were not necessary expenses
in the care, management and settlement of the estate. Indeed, there was sufficient cause to dismiss
outright petitioner’s Motion for Execution filed with the Probate Court. Nonetheless, the Court deemed
it proper in order not to protract further the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela to mandate the
Probate Court to treat the aforesaid motion as a PETITION for the payment of attorney’s fees as
expenses of administration. This is subject to the condition that petitioner give due notice to the other
devisees and legatees designated in the will after setting for hearing its claim for attorney’s fees to
determine the value of the services of the petitioner and the necessity of engaging petitioner as counsel.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, PETITIONER, VS. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA

FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN
FIGURACION AND MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, RESPONDENTS.
PONENTE: Corona, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Leandro and Carolina Figuracion, now both deceased, had six children: the petitioner and
respondents herein. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six
children. When Leandro died, he left behind two parcels of land, a portion of Lot 2299 and 705 in Urdaneta,
both of which he inherited from his deceased parents.
Another parcel of land, Lot 707, was inherited by Carolina and her half-sister Agripina when their father
Eulalio Adviento died. Agripina then executed a quitclaim over the one-half eastern portion of the lot in
favor of petitioner, Emilia, who died single and without any issue. Before her half-sister’s death, however,
Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the entire Lot 707 which
she later sold to respondents Felipe and Hilaria.
Petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. When she returned, she
built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. Sometime later, petitioner
sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents. The Regional
Trial Court of Urdaneta City, upon a complaint filed by petitioner, rendered judgment nullifying Carolina’s
affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. The RTC, however, dismissed the
complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that reliefs prayed for cannot be granted
without any prior settlement proceedings.
108
The CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner’s action for partition for being premature but reversed the
decision with respect to the nullification and the deed of absolute sale. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an accounting of
the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses and liabilities and taxes, etc.) before the
properties can be partitioned or distributed
RULING:
Yes. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to
the estate. Although petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and respondents are
the only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those related
to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, with respect to Lot 2299, the
heirs have to submit their father’s estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot
be done in an action for partition. The heirs or distributees, however, may take possession of the estate
even before the settlement of accounts as long as they file a bond conditioned on the payment of the
estate’s obligations.
With respect to the partition of Lot 705, partition was deemed premature since ownership of the lot is still
in dispute. As regards Lot 707, the Court made no ruling on the validity of Carolina’s affidavit of self-
adjudication and deed of sale since a separate case is still pending in the same Division of the Court.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX

APPEALS AND JOSEFINA P. PAJONAR, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF PEDRO P.
PAJONAR, RESPONDENTS.
PONENTE: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Pedro Pajonar was a member of the Philippine Scout, Bataan Contingent, during the Second World War. He
was a part of the infamous Death March, by reason of which he suffered shock and became insane. His sister
Josefina Pajonar became the guardian over his person while his property was placed under the
guardianship of the Philippine National Bank by the Dumaguete City RTC.
After Pajonar died, the PNB filed an accounting of the decedent’s property under guardianship. The PNB,
instead of filing an estate tax return, advised Pedro Pajonar’s heirs to execute an extrajudicial settlement
and to pay the taxes on his estate. The estate of Pedro Pajonar paid taxes in the amount of P2, 557 pursuant
to the assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In 1988, the estate again paid P1, 527,790.98
pursuant to a second assessment by the BIR for deficiency estate tax. Josefina, having been appointed as the
regular administratrix of Pedro Pajonar’s estate, filed a protest with the BIR praying for a refund or at least
some portion of the payment returned.
Josefina filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) even without awaiting the
resolution of the protest filed with the BIR. The CTA ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
refund the amount of P252, 585. 59 representing erroneously paid estate tax for the year 1988. The amount
of P60, 752 representing the notarial fee for the extrajudicial settlement and the amount of P50, 000 as the
attorney’s fees in the guardianship proceedings were among the deductions from the gross estate allowed
by the CTA.
109
Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the CTA modified its
previous ruling by reducing the refundable amount to P76, 502.43 since it found that a deficiency interest
should be imposed. However, the tax court upheld the legality of the deductions.
The petition for review in the CTA filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was likewise denied,
hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement and the attorney’s fees in the
guardianship proceedings may be allowed as deductions in the gross estate of the decedent in order to
arrive at the value of the net estate
RULING:
Yes. Deductions are limited to such administration expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in the
collection of assets of the estate, payment of the debts and distribution of the remainder among those
entitled thereto.
It was clear that the extrajudicial settlement was for the purpose of payment of taxes and the distribution of
the estate to the heirs. The execution of such extrajudicial settlement necessitated the notarization of the
same. Hence the Contract of Legal Services of March 28, 1988 entered into between respondent Josefina
Pajonar and counsel was presented in evidence for the purpose of showing that the amount of P60, 753.00
was for the notarization of the Extrajudicial Settlement. It follows then that the notarial fee was incurred
primarily to settle the estate of the deceased Pedro Pajonar. Said amount should then be considered an
administration expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the collection of the assets of the estate,
payment of debts and distribution of the remainder among those entitled thereto. Thus, the notarial fee of
P60, 753 incurred for the Extrajudicial Settlement should be allowed as a deduction from the gross estate.
On the other hand, the guardianship proceeding was necessary for the distribution of the property of the
deceased Pedro Pajonar. The PNB was appointed guardian over the assets of the deceased and that
necessarily the assets of the deceased formed part of his gross estate. It is clear therefore that the attorney's
fees incurred in the guardianship proceeding were essential to the distribution of the property to the
persons entitled thereto. Hence, the attorney's fees incurred in the guardianship proceedings in the amount
of P50, 000.00 should be allowed as a deduction from the gross estate of the decedent.
TIRSO T. REYES, AS GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS AZUCENA FLORDELIS AND TIRSO, JR., ALL
SURNAMED REYES Y BARRETTO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS.LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-
DATU, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
PONENTE: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died, he left his share of his
properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff’s wards and to his daughter Lucia Milagros
Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters. The usufruct on the fishpond situated in
Hagonoy, Bulacan was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. The latter, having been appointed as the
administrator of his husband’s estate, prepared a project of partition which was signed by her in her own
behalf and as a guardian of the minor Milagros. Said partition was approved by the court, thus, the delivery
of the shares of the heirs followed.
110
When Maria Gerardo died, it was discovered that she left two wills. The first of which she instituted both
Salud and Milagros as her heirs while in the second will, she revoked the same and left all her properties to
Milagros. The second will was allowed for the reason that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria
Gerardo by her husband, Bibiano Barretto.
Since plaintiff failed to share in the estate of Maria Gerardo as a legitimate heir, he filed an action to recover
one-half share in the fishpond being the share of plaintiff’s wards, minor heirs of the deceased Salud
Barretto. The lower court however dismissed the complaint and declared that the project of partition
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto to be null and void on the
basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code then in force which provides that “A partition in which a person was
believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void. It further ordered the
return of the properties received under the project of partition in favor of Milagros as the only true heir of
Bibiano Barretto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition in question was void and contrary to law
RULING:
No. First, Article 1081 has been misapplied to the present case. The fact that Salud wnot to be the daughter
of the testator does not preclude her from being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament. Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomever he chooses. While the one-half
share of Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of the late Barretto.
Second, the action was already barred when in August 31, 1956, Milagros filed her counterclaim contesting
the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto’s estate. More than four years have elapsed from the time her
cause of action accrued to contest the court decree distributing her father’s estate on the ground of fraud.
Finally, Milagros was not only made a party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the
proceedings through her guardian, Maria Gerardo. She therefore cannot escape the jurisdiction of the
Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father’s estate.
Thus, the decision of the CFI of Bulacan was reversed and the Court ordered the return of the records to the
court of origin to proceed with the action for the partition of the fishpond.
111
RULE 101
CHIN AH FOO VS. PEDRO CONCEPCION
G.R. NO. L-33281 MARCH 31, 1930
MALCOLM, J.:
PETITION OF THE CASE:
The question for decision in this certiorari proceeding concerns the power of a Judge of First Instance, who
has in effect acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and who has ordered the
confinement of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently to permit the insane person to leave the
asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Otherwise stated, the factor determinative of the
question has to do with the effect, if any, of section 1048 of the Administrative Code on article 8 of the Penal
Code.
(SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS – INSANE PERSONS; DISCHARGE FROM CUSTODY; RESPECTIVE POWERS OF

TRIAL JUDGE AND DIRECTOR OF HEALTH; ARTICLE. 8, PENAL CODE AND SECTION. 1048 ,
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE)
FACTS:
A Judge of the Court of first Instance acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and has
ordered the confinement of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently permitting the same to leave the
asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code
discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in
an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution by the Director of Health.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may
be discharged from an insane asylum. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by
section 1048 of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the
same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health.
HELD:
No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both
can stand together in such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are
complimentary to each other.
The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined
by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any
person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be
discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or
not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.
112
RULE 102:

GREGORIO ZAGALA VS. EUSTACIO ILUSTRE
G.R. NO. L-23999
Gregorio Zagala was prosecuted for, and convicted of, a violation of Act. No. 1780 and light threats, and
sentenced to pay fines in the sums of P5 and P6 in criminal cases Nos. 4777 and 4890 respectively of the
Court of First Instance of Bantangas.
FACTS:
The accused, Gregorio Zagala, filed a petition in which he prayed that after the proceedings being held, the
clerk of court is ordered immediately to release him and receive the fines thereon.
However, the respondent denied that the accused had ever offered to pay the fines and that he had ever
rejected payment thereof. Also, he denied having detained the defendant or in any manner that would
deprived him of his liberty. After hearing, the trial court held judgment denying the petition made by
Gregorio Zagala and hereby dismissed the proceedings. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus be applied in the case, as for Gregori Zagala
HELD:
The clerk of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, as a ministerial officer, who acts in accordance with the
mandate of the law, has no authority to detain any accused for any reason whatsoever, and consequently he
cannot deprive the accused of his liberty, and should he do so against the latter’s will, he would be
criminally liable.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of liberty of the
defendant by the respondent. The special remedy of habeas corpus may not be invoked in this case, because
there was no showing of actual and effective deprivation of liberty of the defendant. A nominal or moral
restraint is not sufficient. It is used only to determine the question of jurisdiction and test the legal
authority of the warden to have the petitioner under his legal custody.

FELIPE GONZALES VS. FLORENTINO C. VIOLA AND VALENTIN MANIQUIS
G.R. NO. L-43195 AUGUST 23, 1935
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, denying the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by the appellant. The order of denial was entered by the court below after due
hearing, on the ground that the appellant was legally detained.
113
FACTS:
On January 18, 1935, at about 11:30am, Felipe Gonzales was placed under arrest by order of the Florentino
Viola and Valentin Maniquis and he was detained in the municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. At
the same day, a criminal complaint was filed against him, and was released on bail at 8:00pm. The
appellant, however, filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. It was denied and hence, the case before
us.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge in the Court of First Instance, Province of Bulacan erred in denying the petition
for writ of habeas corpus filed by the appellant?
HELD:
When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the court, the appellant (Gonzales)
was already out of bail.
The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a
mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. "There is no very satisfactory definition to be found in
the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the
writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This can hardly be expected from the variety
of restraints for which it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and criminal process may be so
relieved. Wives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or guardian, persons
held under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in a mad-house, as well as those under military
control, may all become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent and
character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the control which is
asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ is prayed. ... Something more than moral restraint is
necessary to make a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or the present means of
enforcing it." (Wales vs. Whitney, supra.)
Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would have been justified in refusing the writ
solely on the ground that the appellant was not, within the meaning of section 525 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty; and upon that very ground the order appealed from is
affirmed with costs against the appellant.

EFREN C. MONCUPA VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
G.R. NO. L-63345 JANUARY 30, 1986
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The respondents' contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied.
Efren C. Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary
release, however, preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule warrant this
Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may
be illegal.
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:
114
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
FACTS:
On April 22, 1982, Efren Moncupa together with others, have been arrested at about 10:50pm, Quezon City.
On the next day, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against him together with others on the
allegation that he was a staff member of National Democratic Front. Two separate investigations were
instigated, but however, it was ascertained that Mr. Moncupa was not a member of the NDF. Both
investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate information were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of
firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City
Court of Quezon City. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further
proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower
court. The petitioner filed the alleged petition.
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that
the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President.
The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the
present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.”
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These
are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of
respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case
petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview
conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or
information that is inimical to the interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary
release.
HELD:
No, the temporary release of the Mr. Moncupa did not render the instant petition moot and academic but
that, it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions
imposed by the respondents. The restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and
illegal restraint on his freedom.
115
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of Mr. Moncupa
constitutes restraints on his liberty. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is
not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to
Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change
their domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila.
Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila
and expressed the hope that it’s "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of
laws and to protect individual liberty from Legal encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic.
Other precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.
A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free
from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the
light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf
may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. The respondents have failed to show why the writ
may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted. Hence,
the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared
null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared absolute.

JUAN CRUZ VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. NO. 6497, NOVEMBER 3, 1910
TRENT,J.:
On October 14, 1910, there was presented in this Court a petition on behalf of Juan Cruz, praying that a writ
of habeas corpus issue directed to the warden of Bilibid Prison, requiring him to bring the body of the
petitioner into court.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Juan Cruz was tried, convicted and sentenced by one of the Courts of First Instance of the
city of Manila in criminal cases, he being sentenced in the first case to imprisonment for a term of 3-years,
to pay fine of P1,000 and to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the
payment of the fine, and in the second case, to a term of 2-years imprisonment and to pay a fine of $2,000.
An order was issued requiring the warden of Bilibid Prison to show cause, if any existed, why the writ
should not issue. The warden made return, which he admitted that the petitioner was undergoing the
sentences imposed by him, that the petitioner having commenced to serve these sentences on November
15, 1905, the same will expire on November 15, 1910 (as good for 5-years imprisonment), that for good
conduct, under the provisions of the Act No. 1533, (the petitioner was not allowed the full time for good
conduct on account of certain violations of prison regulations), and that the petitioner is now serving the
subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to pay the fines imposed on a judgment against him.
The respondent admits that the terms of imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner, after giving him the
time to which he is entitled for good conduct, expired on June 4, 1910.
116
In the case at bar, the petitioner was tried and convicted for having violated the provisions of Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, which wnt into effect on November 4, 1901. Furthermore, Act No. 1732, which
went into effect on November 1, 1907, provides that when a fine is imposed as a whole, or as any part of the
punishment for any criminal offense, the court shall also sentence the guilty person to subsidiary
imprisonment until the fine is satisfied, provided that such subsidiary imprisonment shall not, in any case,
exceed 1-year, but in case the court imposed both fine and imprisonment, the subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed 1/3rd of the term of imprisonment imposed by such sentence.
The penalty of 3-years and a fine of P1,000 having been imposed upon Juan Cruz long before this Act No.
1732 went into effect, its provisions are not applicable to the question under the case at bar, such as the
penal statute, cannot have a retroactive effect for the reason to such effect would not be beneficial to the
petitioner. Prior to the passage of the Act No. 1732, the court of First Instance has no authority to impose
subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay fines in cases of conviction for violations of the Acts of the
Philippine Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has the jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary
imprisonment in the case of insolvency in the payment of the fine imposed?
HELD:
No, the court has no such power to do so.
In the case at bar, the Court of First Instance, had jurisdiction of the offense described in the complaint for
which the petitioner was tried. It had jurisdiction of the prisoner who was properly brought before it,
however, it did not have the power to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in case of insolvency. It is therefore; clear that part of judgment is void.
This court at this time has no power to correct this error committed by the court below, neither has it
power to remand the case to the trial court for that purpose. The fact that the petitioner did not appeal
cannot be said to affect the question as to the penalties imposed. The courts uniformly hold that where a
sentence imposed a punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to
the excess, and some of the courts holds the sentence is in void in toto; but as to the weight of authority, it
sustains the proposition that such sentence is void only as to the excess.
The rule being that the petitioner (Juan Cruz) is not entitled to his discharge on writ of habeas corpus
unless he as served out so much of the sentence was considered valid. The petitioner has served, according
to the return of the respondent to the order to show cause, the entire part of the sentences which the court
below had power to impose, and adhering to the rule that the part of the sentences imposed by the court
below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, the petitioner is entitled to his release.

FRED M. HARDEN VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. NO. L-2349 OCTOBER 22, 1948
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner was confined in prison for contempt which arose from a civil case between his wife, Mrs.
Harden, involving the administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that
case, a receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his
co-defendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a valuable consideration and with
117
the consent of the court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets,
real or personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of said
defendants or either of them.
On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash to
Virginia Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000. On
September 9, 1947, Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts and to
redeposit them with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China.
After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Mr. Harden and after various motions were filed and heard,
Judge Peña, on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which was a modification of that of October 7, 1947,
directing Harden to deposit with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within
five days from receipt of a copy of this order the money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong,
without prejudice to passing upon later on the different amounts that the defendant has spent according to
his attorney, after he has submitted to the court an itemized account of those expenses.
On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to comply with the above order and
prayed that he be ordered to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt. On August 1, 1947,
Harden filed a perfunctory compliance, and in order dated August 2, 1947, he was required to "make a
detailed report of the stock certificates which have been duly registered in accordance with Republic Act
No. 62."
In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons therein stated, that defendant
Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co. shares either to the
Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after registering them pursuant to
Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948, Harden filed a motion stating that the registration of shares of
stock under Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until June 30, 1948, and prayed that he "be allowed to
register the stock certificates in question within such period as by law or regulations is or may be
provided." It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition made by Fred Harden will lie on the grounds of (1) deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights, (2) lack of jurisdiction f the court to impose the sentence or (3)
excessive penalty.
HELD:
The petition was denied.
While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts
thereof, yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to property beyond the territorial
limits of its jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the court's orders with reference to its
custody or disposition. Whether the property was removed before or after the appointment of the receiver
is likewise immaterial.
Furthermore, the punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its
objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court which provides that "when the
contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may
be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it. If the term of imprisonment in this case is
indefinite and might last through the natural life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way
is left open for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders of the court, and in this
manner put an end to his incarceration. In these circumstances, the judgment can not be said to be
excessive or unjust.
118
At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if it is taken, as it should be
taken, in connection with the orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the charges for
contempt. It expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as the grounds for the
warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them part of it. The orders of October 7, 1947, and
March 27, 1948, in turn clearly specify the acts with the petitioner were commanded to fulfil. It is equally
clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner is in a position to bring back to the
Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.
Whether or not in truth the court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence is a different matter; it is a
matter of fact which can not be reviewed by habeas corpus. This Court has steadfastly held that habeas
corpus does not lie to correct errors of fact or law.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order
or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus can not be made to
perform the function of a writ of error; and this holds true even if the judgment, orders or decree was
erroneous, provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment or issued such
an order or decree. So whether the act charged has been committed or can still be performed is
conclusively determined by the order or judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein the
petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. However, the writ of habeas corpus will lie on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court pronouncing his conviction.
Separate Opinion:
Perfecto, J.:
Respondent's authority for confining petitioner is based on the order of Judge Emilio Pena, of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, issued on April 28, 1948, which reads as follows:
It appearing that the defendant Fred M. Harden of the defendant to this date complied with
the orders of this court of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948;
As prayed for, the court orders the arrest of the defendant Fred M. Harden as well as his
confinement at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he complies with the
aforementioned orders.
The order of October 7, 1947, requires Harden to return from abroad within a period of 15 days, the
amount of P1,000,608.66 to the Philippines and to redeposit the same with the accounts of the Plaza Lunch
of the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.
The order of March 27, 1948, requires Harden to deposit with the same bank the money and drafts that he
has actually in Hongkong and the certificate covering 368,553 Balatoc Mining Company shares, after
registering them, as required in the order of January 18, 1948. The provision is characterized by such an
extreme of arbitrariness that is comprehensible only under a dictatorial system of government. We held
that the lower court erred in issuing the order of April 28, 1948, in so far as it orders that petitioner be
confined for an indefinite period of time.
We disagree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion, limiting the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus and issuing in favor of the lower court in patent of infallibility on the factual question of whether or
not the act ordered to be performed is still in the hands of petitioner to perform. Such pronouncement is
not supported by law or by any principle of substantial justice. Regardless of the length of the chain of
erroneous decisions supporting such pronouncements, the errors shall continue to be errors.
119
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ, ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS LAZARO,
REYNALDO MACLANG, MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N. DIESMOS,
RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. DE OCAMPO, VICTORIANO C. AMADO AND MAC ACERON, VS.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL COUNSEL OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34,
AND THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
G.R. NO. L-54558 MAY 22, 1987
EDUARDO OLAGUER, OTHONIEL JIMENEZ, REYNALDO MACLANG AND ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ VS.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, AFP,
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
NO. L-69882 MAY 22, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:
Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein the fundamental question is whether or not a military
tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. The two
Petitions have been consolidated inasmuch as the issues raised therein are interrelated.
FACTS:
The petitioners were arrested by the military authorities, sometime on December 24, 1979. They were all
initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to the detention
center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention at Camp
Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980 and was,
thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent
Judge Advocate General and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense. The case was
designated as Criminal Case No. MC-34-1. On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed
against the petitioners.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to this Court and
filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus." They sought to enjoin the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release from
detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military commissions
have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offense alleged to have been committed during the period of martial
law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in
gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.
Thus, on February 14, 1985, petitioners Olaguer, Maclang and Othoniel and Ester Jimenez went to this
Court and filed the other instant Petition, this time for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
They also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondents named in the Petition
are the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Military Commission No. 34, the Judge
Advocate General, the Minister of National Defense and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.
120
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses
allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open and functioning?
(2) Whether or not, the writ for habeas corpus will prosper?
HELD:
(1) The Court held that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and
validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-
in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of
the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an
individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary.
It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities.
And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable
by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process
of the civilian concerned.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the
jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as
observed by the Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Court held that Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial
law in the Philippines and abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the national emergency
effectively divests the respondent Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that
matter) of its supposed authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners.
At this juncture, the court held it is appropriate to quote a few paragraphs from the ponente of Mr.
Justice Gutierrez in Animas v. The Minister of National Defense , viz —
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian(s) accused at a time
when all civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest
chapters in the history of the Philippine judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of military tribunals, the instability
and insecurity felt by many members of the judiciary due to various causes both real and imagined,
and the many judicial problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which effectively eroded
judicial independence and self-respect will require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure.
The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which properly belong to them is only a beginning.
(2) Hence, the Petitions for habeas corpus are dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are hereby granted the creation of the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 to try civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional and all its
proceedings are deemed null and void. The temporary restraining order issued against the respondents
121
enjoining them from executing the Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is hereby
made permanent and the said respondents are permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal
Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence rendered by the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for being null and
void, and all the items or properties taken from the petitioners in relation to the said criminal case
should be returned to them immediately.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C. J., concurring:
The total unacceptability of military trials for civilians may be appreciated from the fate and ordeal of
petitioners. Since their arrest on December 24, 1979, they had been continuously confined for over five
years (without physical access to lawyers, witnesses and court records in the case of Eduardo Olaguer) and
spent seven Christmases in confinement, before their provisional release on January 23, 1986 (save
petitioner Ester Misa Jimenez whose provisional release was earlier granted in January, 1981). The extreme
difficulties encountered by civilian counsels in defending them before respondent military commission can
best be seen from their written motions/manifestations of withdrawal as such counsel. Former Senator
Lorenzo M. Tanada and Atty. Wigberto Tanada had previously withdrawn as civilian counsel for petitioner
Eduardo Olaguer.
These substantial checks by the legislature as well as by the judiciary on the Chief Executive's power to
proclaim martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were meant to forestall a
recurrence of the long and horrible nightmare of the past regime when one single clause, the Commander-
in-Chief clause of the Constitution then in force that authorized the President to declare martial law was
held to have nullified the entire Constitution and the Bill of Rights and justified the then President's taking
over "absolute command" of the nation and that the people could "only trust and pray that, giving him their
own loyalty with utmost patriotism, (he) will not fail them." Thus, persons held under Presidential
Commitment or Detention Orders were detained indefinitely without charges, yet had no recourse to the
courts. Even if they were acquitted in court, the military would not release them until and unless the then
President lifted the preventive detention order.

ROGER CHAVEZ VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA
G.R. NO. L-29169 AUGUST 19, 1968
SANCHEZ, J.:
The petitioner invokes that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the
ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be
compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his
appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court
for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
FACTS:
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Quezon City.
122
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here
reproduced:
COURT:
The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA:
Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:
I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the Fiscal
in presenting him as his witness. I object.
COURT:
On what ground, counsel? .
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without
my being notified by the Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want
to say in passing that it is only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the
prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a]
state witness?.
FISCAL GRECIA:
I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.

I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
ATTY. CARBON:
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT:
The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to
his client about the giving of his testimony.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: [after the recess]
Are the parties ready? .
FISCAL:
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON:
123
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my
client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this
morning after I have explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand
including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose
his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this
witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which
would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand.
ATTY. CARBON:
I submit.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something
so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony
this witness will bring about. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.
ATTY. CRUZ:
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are
those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time
within which to prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
124
Call the witness to the witness stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila
Police Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what
the prosecution events to establish by calling this witness to the witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal
Grecia".
Notwithstanding, the petitioner was convicted of the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle owned by
Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten
(10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and
to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to
Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the court ruled to dismiss the appealed petition and
directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by
the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment
below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Hence, the
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the petition for writ of habeas corpus taken by the petitioner will prosper on the ground
that the Court highly disregard and deprived him his constitutional rights?
HELD:
Under the Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear
picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper.
125
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and
the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This
writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus,
failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.
The court held that Roger Chavez was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer
to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions in spite of his fear of
being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him.
His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed
participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he
chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his
testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J., dissenting :
When the court in the case at bar required the petitioner to testify, it in effect undid the libertarian gains
made over half a century and overturned the settled law. The past was recreated with all its vividness and
all its horrors: John Lilburne in England in 1637, refusing to testify before the Council of the Star Chamber
and subsequently condemned by it to be whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take a legal
oath;" the Filipino priests Gomez, Burgos and Zamora in 1872 condemned by the Inquisition to die by their
own testimony.
The petitioner has been variously described by the trial court as "a car agent ... well versed in this kind of
chicanery" "a self-confessed culprit," and "a man with at least two convictions for acts not very different
from those charged in [the] information." But if he has thus been described it was on the basis of evidence
wrung from his lips. If he was ultimately found guilty of the charge against him it was because of evidence
which he was forced to give. In truth he was made the "star witness for the prosecution" against himself.

S/SGT. JOSE SANTIAGO VS. LT. COL. CELSO ALIKPALA, ET AL.,
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a court-martial proceeding was challenged in the lower court on due process grounds to
show lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On December 17, 1962, the arraignment of S/SGT. Jose Santiago, was held for purpose of avoiding the
prescription pursuant to Article of War 38, as one of the offenses which was charged against the Jose
Santiago, and was allegedly committed on or about December 18, 1960. Prior to the arraignment held, there
were no written summons or subpoena was issued addressed to S/SGT Jose Santiago or his counsel,
126
informing them of said arraignment. It was through telephone call made by Col. Eladio Samson,
Constabulary Staff Judge Advocate to the First Sergeant Manuel Soriano with the instruction to send the
petitioner herein to HPC, Camp Crame, QC, under escort for arraignment.
It was on the day (December 17, 1962) itself that the petitioner learned that he will be arraigned for the
alleged violation of Articles of War 85 and 97, after being informed by one of the respondents, Capt. Palma,
as Trial Judge Advocate. Petitioner’s counsel having objected to his client’s arraignment asserting that a
general court-martial then convened was without jurisdiction, as there was no special order designating
respondents to compose a general court-martial for the purpose of trying petitioner, as petitioner was not
furnished a copy of the charge sheet prior to his arraignment as required in the Manual for Court-Martial,
except on the very day thereof, and as there was no written summons or subpoena served on either the
petitioner, as accused, or the counsel. Respondents, acting as the general court-martial, overruled the above
objections, and the Trial Judge Advocate was then ordered to proceed to read the charges and specifications
against petitioner over the vigorous objections of counsel.
Having the trial postponed to February 21, 1963, petitioner's counsel had in the meanwhile complained to
the Chief of Constabulary against the proceedings on the ground of its nullity, and sought to have
respondents restrained from continuing with the trial of petitioner due to such lack of jurisdiction but the
Chief of Constabulary ruled that he could not act on such complaint until the records of the trial were
forwarded to him for review. With such a ruling, and with the denial of two other motions by petitioner
upon the court-martial being convened anew on February 21, 1963, one to invalidate his arraignment on
December 17, 1962, and the other to quash the complaint based on the denial of due process and lack of
jurisdiction. The present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a valid
court martial is concerned and the proper notice be given to the petitioner, amounts to a denial of due
process?
HELD:
Yes, such will amount to denial to the petitioner of his right to due process. It is to be admitted that there is
no controlling and precise definition of due process which, at the most furnishes a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order to impress with the stamp of validity any deprivation of life,
liberty or property.
A recent decision of this Court, in Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila treated the matter thus: "It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
A recent decision rendered barely a month ago, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, is even more in point. Here,
again, habeas corpus was relied upon by petitioner whose constitutional rights were not respected, but, in
addition, the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus were likewise availed of, in view of such
consequent lack of jurisdiction.
There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court-martial, were not
convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a
desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or
tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed
authority to try petitioner. The writ of certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower
court, to repeat, ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily. The significance of such insistence on
127
a faithful compliance with the regular procedure of convening court-martials in accordance with law cannot
be over-emphasized.
It is even more indispensable, therefore, that such quasi-judicial agencies, clothed with the solemn
responsibility of depriving members of the Armed Forces of their liberties, even of their lives, as a matter of
fact, should be held all the more strictly bound to manifest fidelity to the fundamental concept of fairness
and the avoidance of arbitrariness for which due process stands as a living vital principle. If it were
otherwise, then, abuses, even if not intended, might creep in, and the safeguards so carefully thrown about
the freedom of an individual, ignored or disregarded. Against such an eventuality, the vigilance of the
judiciary furnishes a shield. That is one of its grave responsibilities. Such a trust must be lived up to; such a
task cannot be left undone.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J., concurring:
The history and development of courts-martial as tribunals for the enforcement of discipline in bodies of
military character underscore several time-honoured tenets: a court-martial is an instrumentality of the
executive power, to aid the President as commander-in-chief in properly commanding and controlling the
armed forces and enforcing discipline therein; it has only such powers as are expressly vested in it by
statute or as may be derived from military usage.
As in fact it is stipulated by the parties, that the general court-martial in question was constituted to try
Captain Egmidio Jose. Nothing in the phraseology of the order that created it authorized it to try the
petitioner staff-sergeant Santiago. It could not therefore proceed in any manner, which we can view as
properly coming within the periphery of its limited powers, with respect to the charge against Santiago.
When it arraigned Santiago on December 17, 1962, it was absolutely without legal power to do so, and the
arraignment was a futile ceremony, as meaningless as it was inefficacious
As I see it, the arraignment of the petitioner by the general court-martial constituted to try Captain Egmidio
Jose was a desperate measure resorted to remedy a desperate situation — solely to interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period provided by Article of War 38. This action was not only completely devoid of any
semblance of legality; it likewise conclusively evinces gross negligence on the part of the military. Why
nothing was done toward the creation of a court-martial to try Santiago within the two years following the
commission of the crime is not explained by the record, and I venture the opinion that there can be no
satisfactory explanation therefor. The military authorities allowed that long period to lapse without any
assiduous effort at bringing the petitioner to the forum of a duly constituted general court-martial. This
should never come to pass in the Armed Forces where disciplinary measures of whatever specie or
character, by law and tradition and usage, should be swiftly administered. For, the officer of average
military learning knows or should be cognizant of the proliferation in the Articles of War of provisions
designed to insure speedy trial of accused persons.
In fine, it is my considered view that at the time the petitioner was arraigned, there was no court-martial
validly in existence that could legally take cognizance of the charge against him. At best, the general court-
martial in question, vis-a-vis the petitioner, was disembodied if not in nominate, with neither shape nor
substance
128
IGNACIO P. PAGUNTALAN VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. NO. L-37959 AUGUST 31, 1932
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed by prisoner Ignacio P. Paguntalan praying that after
proper proceedings the Director of Prisons be ordered to set him at liberty immediately, on the ground that
he is being illegally detained.
FACTS:
On January 7, 1915, Ignacio Paguntalan was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros
to 2-years, 4-months, and 1-day of prision correccional for the crime of abduction, and set at liberty on
March 4, 1917. On December 8, 1921, the same petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Manila to 2-months and one day of arresto mayor for the crime of estafa. On December 9, 1921 Igancio
Paguntalan was again sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to 3-years, 6months, and 21-days
of prision correccional for the crime of robbery.
On the same day, December 9, 1921, the petitioner was sentenced by the municipal court of Manila to 2-
months and one day of arresto mayor, and an indemnity of P145 for the crime of estafa. On January 31,
1922, the same petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to 1-year, 8-months, and
21-days of prision correccional for the crime of robbery.
Having served the last three sentences, the petitioner was released on September 14, 1926. On October 24,
1927, he was again sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Batangas to 10 years' imprisonment for the
crime of robbery, besides an additional penalty of five years for habitual delinquency. The petitioner filed a
petition, invoking a review of his sentence that the court was in error in consisting that, instead of counting
the various convictions of the petitioner as one, the same were considered separate crimes of which he was
convicted, establishing habitual delinquency.
The illegality of his detention consists, according to the petitioner, in that he is not a habitual criminal,
according to the definition given in Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency.
— Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the
purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the
last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods; and
129
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for
the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the
offender, in conformity herewith shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period of
ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus was properly filed by the petitioner in the case at bar?
HELD:
Ignacio Paguntalan, being committed in Bilibid Prison by virtue of a legal and valid judgment without
having served his full sentence, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby denied, for being improper.
The court has repeatedly held that mere errors of fact or law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by
a court in the exercise of its functions, having jurisdiction over the crime and over the defendant, cannot be
corrected through the special remedy of habeas corpus.
This error could have been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an undue
exercise of judicial powers which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding.

ANTONIO DIRECTO VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. NO. L-37108 MARCH 28, 1932
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Antonio Directo against the Director of Prisons, praying
for the reason given that the latter are ordered to set him at liberty at once.
FACTS:
January 1931, Antonio Directo was committed to Bilibid Prison under a final sentence of the Court of First
Instance of Manila for 5-years, 5-months, and 11- days of prision correccional, and to pay an indemnity of
P3,2000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the crime of estafa (criminal case No.
38915).
At the instance of the petitioner himself, Antonio Directo, the Court of First Instance of Manila, taking into
account Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, and finding that the penalty fixed in Article 315, case No. 2, of
said Code is more favorable to the accused, on January 26, 1932 amended its original decision rendered on
January 12, 1931, and reduced the penalty therein imposed under article 534, No. 4 of the old Penal Code,
from five years, five months, and eleven days, to one year and one day of prision correctional.
The Court of First Instance having discovered its own error in amending its first decision on such case, it re-
amended the judgment fixing the penalty at 1-year, 8 months and 20 days in accordance with Article 315,
130
case 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner, filed for writ of habeas corpus, praying that he may be
released at once at liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in denying and dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by the
petitioner?
HELD:
No, the denial of the writ is improper.
The court held that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which makes penal provisions retroactive so far as
they favor the accused, provided he is not an habitual criminal, does not authorized a court whose sentence
has become final and executory to make a substantial amendment, and any amendment made in such
sentence, though it be to give effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused, would be null and void for
lack of jurisdiction; and that the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused when the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner herein not having extinguished the penalty of the Revised Penal Code.
It is evident that the Court of First Instance of Manila amended its original decision after it had become final
and when the defendant was already serving the sentence imposed upon him. The lapse of the time fixed by
the law for an appeal, which causes a decision to become final, and the partial or total service of the
sentence therein imposed, deprive the trial court of all jurisdiction over the cause, and such court has no
power to amend it, except for the correction of clerical errors. Inasmuch as the Court of First Instance of
Manila lost all jurisdiction over criminal case No. 38915, it was without jurisdiction when it amended the
original sentence on January 26, 1932. And if the amended sentence was void for lack of jurisdiction of the
court which imposed it, the re-amended sentence imposed on February 2, 1932 was also void, although its
purpose was to enforce the provision of the Penal Code which makes penal laws retroactive so far as they
favor the accused, for the remedy in such a case would be the writ of habeas corpus.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARTIN SIMON Y SUNGA
G.R. NO. 93028 JULY 29, 1994
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Martin Simon y Sunga was charged with a violation of Section4, Article II of RA No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. It was alleged that on or about December 22, 1988 at
Guagua, Pampanga, he sold 4-tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command poseur-buyer in consideration
of P40.00 which tea bags when subjected to the forensic chemist who examined the tea bags, found positive
for marijuana.
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his re-arrest following his
escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, he pleaded not
guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, after which trial on the merits ensued and
was duly concluded.
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in
question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family in their house
when three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly, arrived. Relying on the assurance that they
131
would just inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He
was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route.
While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was
handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he
refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the
dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover,
the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted
having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle,
Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he
consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District
Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three days.
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The
four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court erred in (1) not upholding his defense of “frame-up”, (2) not declaring the receipt
of Property Seized/Confiscated inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act
HELD:
In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea
bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal
possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein.
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain
that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The
prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale
took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward,
positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the
former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more entitled to credence.
To top it all, appellant was caught red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited
chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic
chemist therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags
confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. Thus,
the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.
132
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter
since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is
that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the
prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or
discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty. Besides, there was clearly a mere
imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the
drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the
investigator of their unit.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised
Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in
se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature
of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties
(Article 61), among others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which
is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised
Penal Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate
sentence to be meted on the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional.
Porquez, Jonalyn
EDEN D. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 89989 JANUARY 28, 1991
PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
While Ceferino S. Paredes Jr. was still the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, he applied for a free patent
for Lot No. 3097-A.
Eight years later the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur sought the
recovery of Lot No. 3097-A since it had already been reserved as a school site through Resolution 40, which
was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Consequently Civil Case No. 512 was filed with the RTC of
Agusan del Sur seeking the annulment of Atty. Paredes’ title over the said lot.
During the pendency of said civil case, a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act was filed by the former vice-mayor against Paredes who allegedly used his office as Provincial
Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in
Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.
133
Summons to appear at the preliminary investigation was sent to Attorney Paredes but it never reached the
latter. Nevertheless, a preliminary investigation was conducted where a prima facie case of violation of RA
3019 was found to exist.
An information was filed against Atty. Paredes, which at that time was already Governor of Agusan del Sur,
in the Sandiganbayan (Crim. Case No. 13800) and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his
provisional liberty, was issued and served upon him.
He refused to post bail and was detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco. His wife, Mrs. Eden Paredes,
filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that her husband’s arrest was void because the preliminary
investigation was void.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the arrest and detention of the petitioner after a preliminary investigation that was conducted
by the Tanodbayan without notice to him, are valid, and
(2) Whether the crime charged against him has already prescribed.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
The fact that the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed does
not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information
or otherwise render it defective
The accused should instead demand, as a matter of right, that a preliminary investigation be conducted. The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case; the court
should suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
In such an event, the court, instead of dismissing the information, would merely suspend the trial and order
the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
With respect to the contention that the offense charged had already prescribed, the defense of prescription
should be pleaded in the criminal action, and not in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for
whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a
special proceeding of habeas corpus.
134
Porquez, Jonalyn
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF AMZI B. KELLY, FOR THE ISSUANCE OF HABEAS
CORPUS FOR IVON PUMUTKIN ET AL. VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
GR NO. 20478, MARCH 14, 1983, 44 PHIL 623
PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
Sixteen young Russians, members of the crew of a fleet of boats were confined in Bilibid Prison at the
request of the Admiral of the Russian ships. In behalf of the Russian prisoners, Amzi B. Kelley, a member of
the Philippine Bar, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
It was stated in the return of the writ by the Attorney-General that the detained Russians did not desire that
a writ of habeas corpus be issued in their behalf, and that the latter were willing to abide by the decision of
the Governor-General with respect to their cases. An affidavit, subscribed and sworn to by the sixteen
Russians was attached to the return.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would lie wherein the person for whom it is
filed is not involuntarily detained
RULING:
The petition must fail. The writ of habeas corpus is available to a person unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty or by some person in his behalf. The writ ought not to issue if the restraint is
voluntary.
Porquez, Jonalyn
FRANCISCO SALVAÑA AND MODESTA SALIENDRA VS. LEOPOLDO GAELA
G.R. NO. L-34115 FEBRUARY 21, 1931
PONENTE: VILLA-REAL, J.
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Francisco Salvaña and Modesta Saliendra filed an action to recover the custody of their
daughter, 15-year old Felicisima Salvaña, who is in the custody of respondent Leopolda Gaela, justice of the
peace of Lucban, Tayabas, with the CFI of Tayabas.
Respondent Gaela contends that he never had any intention of detaining the minor, Felicisima Salvaña, who
was staying with the judge upon agreement of the parents and the minor herself, who no longer desires to
live with her parents.
The minor decided to stay with the judge after her parents tried to force her into marrying a certain
Ambrosio Daza, and refusing to give their consent for her to marry another man with whom she was six-
months pregnant with.
135
Judge Anastacio Teodoro, that presiding judge of the CFI of Tayabas, denied the petition and ordered the
appointment of a guardian as soon as possible.
ISSUE:
Whether habeas corpus will lie to recover the custody of an unemancipated minor who is under the custody
of a third person of her own free will
Whether the fact that the parents sought to compel their minor daughter to marry a man against her choice,
and refused to give their consent to marry a man she desires is a ground to deny parental power and
custody
RULING:
Under Article 154 of the Civil Code, the father or, in his default, the mother may exercise parental power
over their unemancipated legitimate children; and article 155 imposes upon them the duty of keeping such
children in their company, educating and instructing them.
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted.
The petitioners-appellants are entitled to the custody of their minor daughter Felicisima Salvaña,, they are
also entitled to recover her by habeas corpus, in accordance with the provision of section 525 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now Rule 102).
Where a right to the possession of the minor is claimed, the right to retain such possession by force may be
assumed. Even if the minor acted with her own free will, the writ of habeas corpus is still an available
remedy.
The grounds relied upon to deny parental power, namely that the parents have sought to marry the child to
man not of her choice and refused to consent her to marry a man of her choosing was found by the court to
be insufficient to deny the Salvaña spouses of the custody of the child..
Both the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure consider the best interest and welfare of the child in
regulating the relations between parents and children. The authority of the courts to extinguish or
withdraw parental authority of the child under Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited in those
instances mentioned in Art 171 of the Civil Code, namely
if they treat their children with excessive cruelty or, by orders or advices given them or example set them,
tend to corrupt them, and Section 770 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to wit: "when the parent or parents of
any minor child shall be unable through vagrancy, negligence, or misconduct to support such child, or if
able, shall neglect or refuse to support such child, or when such parent or parents shall unlawfully beat or
otherwise habitually maltreat such child, or cause or allow it to engage in common begging. . . .".
The court ruled that:
“[n]either the act compelling their unemancipated minor daughter to marry against her will, nor the act of
refusing to give their consent to her marriage, is included in the causes established by the laws we have cited
for depriving parents of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children.”
Furthermore, there is no showing that the parents of the minor Felicisima Salvaña insist upon her marrying
against her will. Even if Felicisima would be happier marrying the man who impregnated her than living
with her parents, unemancipated minors need the “counsel, care and guidance of their progenitors”
136
Porquez, Jonalyn
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF SUSANA MACAZO AND PACITA
NUÑEZ GUILLERMO MACAZO VS. BENILDO NUÑEZ, EFIGENIA NUÑEZ
G.R. NO. L-12772 JANUARY 24, 1959
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Susana Macazo, a deaf mute without parents, was a minor when she came under the employ of respondent
Benildo Nuñez, as a laundry-woman, at the request of her eldest brother, Teofilo Macazo.
During the time Susana was under the employ of the respondents, she gave birth to Pacita Nuñez, which
respondent Benildo Nuñez admitted in open court as his child.
Susana’s second eldest brother, Guillermo Macazo instituted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
the respondent, which was denied by the CFI of Isabela. According to the lower court, there is no showing
that Susana and her child were being held against their will, and that there is no showing that Guillermo is
entitled to custody of Susana and her child, not being among those enumerated as entitled to the exercise of
substitute parental authority.
ISSUES:
Whether the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will lie even if the person for whom the writ is requested is
not restrained of her liberty
Whether the second eldest brother is entitled to custody of his deaf-mute sister
RULING:
The Court ruled that the lower court should not have dismissed the case, even if Susana expressed her
willingness to remain with the respondents and even if petitioner, as the second oldest brother, is not
among those enumerated under Art 349 of the Family Code as having substitute parental authority. In
dismissing the case, the lower court virtually sanctioned the continuance of the adulterous and scandalous
relationship between the minor and respondent. The minor may not choose to continue an illicit relation
that morals and law repudiate.
Even if the eldest brother was the one who requested that Susana be placed under the employ of
respondent, there is no showing that he would agree that the employment relationship continue in view of
the adulterous relationship among the parties.
The technicality that Teofilo Macazo did not file the petition, nor was he made a party to the case, should
not prevail. The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus should be granted.
137
Porquez, Jonalyn
POLICARPIO REAL VS. JESSIE TROUTHMAN
G.R. NO. L-23074 MAY 24, 1967
PONENTE: BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
Policarpio Real filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that Jessie Trouthman, a married man persuaded
his daughter, Lilian Real, by means of deceit, force, threats, intimidation and misrepresentation, to elope
and live with him, without the knowledge and consent of her parents and has been detained by Trouthman
since then,
Trouthman filed an answer alleging that Lilian Real went with him voluntarily. Attached to the answer was
Lilian's affidavit attesting to her voluntary deed; hence, the case was considered closed by the Police
authorities.
After hearing, the lower court found that Lilian Real had attained the age of majority on May 16, 1964, and
consequently dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus will prosper, notwithstanding the fact that the party in
whose behalf it is sought, has attained majority age during the pendency of the petition
RULING:
The Court dismissed the petition.
Article 403 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above twenty-one but below
twenty-three years of age cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or mother in
whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the
father or mother has contracted a subsequent marriage.
Upon attaining the age of majority, Lilian Real was no longer within the coverage of Article 403, rendering
the petition already moot and academic.
138
Porquez, Jonalyn
ARTURO RAFAEL SR. AND ESPERANZA S. RAFAEL VS. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH IV, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BALIUAG BULACAN AND
RICARDO A. CORPUS
PONENTE: FERNANDO, J:
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed with respondent Judge Puno by Ricardo Corpus. The respondent
issued an order requiring petitioner-spouses, Arturo Rafael Sr. and Esperanza S. Rafael, to appear on
October 14, 1976 at 1:30 PM before Branch IV of the CFI of Bulacan, to produce the minor Rommel Corpus
and to show cause why the petition filed by Ricardo should not be granted.
On October 14, there was no afternoon session, the judge being indisposed; hence the Clerk of Court reset
the hearing for October 21, 1976.
Counsel for the petitioners, Attorney Jose Ma. Abola, appeared before the said court on October 21, 1976,
only for the purpose of making a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan to hear
the petition and requested 24-hours to file a written motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent judge did not consider the position posed by the petitioners’ counsel and instead ordered the
arrest of petitioners for contempt. The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the Supreme Court who issued a restraining order prohibiting the arrest of the petitioners
pending the resolution of their petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge of the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Corpus wherein the subject minor and the respondents are all residents of Manila.
RULING:
The petition was granted and the respondent judge was ruled without jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for the writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus that may be issued by a Court of First Instance is enforceable only within his
judicial district. Since the petitioners live in the City of Manila, which is in the Sixth Judicial District, while
the City of Bulacan belongs to the Fifth Judicial District, the petitioners are beyond the reach of the writ of
habeas corpus filed with the CFI of Bulacan. Since the issuance of the writ was no longer within the
jurisdiction of respondent judge, it necessarily follows that the contempt order made in connection
therewith is also null and void.
139
Porquez, Jonalyn
FORTUNATO MEDINA VS. GEN. MANUEL T. YAN, BRIG. GENERAL RAVAL AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS
PONENTE: Fernandez, J.
FACTS:
In the morning of November 23, 1968, petitioner Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen employed as a laborer
in an American company in Saigon Vietnam, was arrested by South Vietnam police and some members of
the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) upon instance of the Philippine Attaché in in Saigon. Petitioner
was flown to Manila that evening and was transferred from one police enforcement body to another, was
confined in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 1st Zone Headquarters at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and delivered to the 174th PC Command Officer at Bano, Arayat Pampanga. Petitioner was confined in the
Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga at the time a petition for habeas corpus was filed directly
with the Supreme Court on November 29, 1968.
The Supreme Court issued the writ on the same day and made the writ returnable before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Quezon City. On trial on the merits, Judge Masakayan of Branch V of the CFI of Rizal
ordered the respondents to set free and release petitioner form custody.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The records of the case were
transmitted to the Court of Appeals accordingly. Atty. Amelito Mutuc, petitioner’s counsel, filed a motion to
have the case appealed with the Supreme Court. The motion was opposed by the Solicitor General
contending that the appellate court with jurisdiction is the Court of Appeals, and an appeal with the
Supreme Court will deprive appellants from raising questions of fact, effectively depriving them of due
process.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for certification of appeal with the Supreme Court. When
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the motion was again denied,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court, praying that its motion for reconsideration be granted.
Petitioner contends that when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the Supreme Court is made
returnable with the lower court only for the purpose of receiving evidence and any judgment by the lower
court in such capacity should be with the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of
Branch V of the CFI of Rizal in a petition for the writ of habeas corpus originally filed with the Supreme
Court and made returnable to the CFI
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In doing so, it ruled that
the lower court to which the writ was made returnable does not merely act in a recommendatory capacity,
but that it acquires the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertaining to the
petitioner’s alleged illegal detention, and order his liberation if his detention is found illegal.
The Supreme Court further ruled that there is no reason why a writ filed and made returnable to the CFI is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, and a writ filed with the Supreme Court and made returnable with the
CFI should be made returnable to the Supreme Court.
140
Since the CFI or Quezon City had jurisdiction to try the habeas corpus case and render judgment thereon
even though it was originally filed with the Supreme Court, its decisions are appealable to the Court of
Appeals, wherein the parties may raise both questions of fact and law.
Porquez, Jonalyn
ALFREDO B. SAULO VS. BRIG. GENERAL PELAGIO CRUZ, ETC.
G.R. NO. L-15474 AUGUST 31, 1960
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Three criminal cases (Nos. 13681, 19166, and 39253, with the CFI of Manila) were filed against Alfredo B.
Saulo, who successfully evaded arrest until he was voluntarily surrendered himself with the Indonesian
Embassy, who turned him over to the Philippine Government. Since his arrest until the filing of the petition
with for the writ of habeas corpus, Saulo had been detained at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
One of the criminal cases was dismissed, and Saulo placed bail for the two remaining cases; however, his
provisinal release was withheld on account of another criminal case, No. 46410. While said case was
undergoing preliminary investigation, Saulo applied for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.
The Court granted the writ and ordered respondent Pelagio Cruz, as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary, to submit, within five (5) days from notice, an answer returnable to the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
After respondent filed an answer, the lower court rendered a decision finding the filing of Criminal Case No.
46410 as amounting to delivery of petitioner Saulo to the proper court, and effectively denying the petition
for the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner appealed from the decision of the lower court; however the appeal was filed out of time or eleven
days after petitioner had notice of the decision of the lower court when appeals for petition for a writ of
habeas corpus must be filed within twenty-four hours from notice of the judgment.
ISSUES:
Whether the reglementary period is jurisdictional
Whether the CFI of Manila had jurisdiction to render the decision considering the petition was originally
filed with the SC
RULING:
It has been consistently held that the reglementary period for appeal is not mandatory but jurisdictional on
the courts and that an appeal filed out of the time may be sought to be dismissed at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court.
With respect to the jurisdiction of the lower court, the court ruled that although the petition was originally
filed with the Supreme Court, it was made returnable before the CFI of Manila.
When a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made returnable to a court other than that issuing the
writ, the court to which the writ is returned, or the judge thereof, possesses full authority to examine all
issues raised in the case and to settle the same.
141
In other words, the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination
on the merits, and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his continued custody,
if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case.
142
Porquez, Jonalyn
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. VS. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-14639 MARCH 25, 1919
PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
The Mayor of Manila, Justo Lukban, segregated and closed the district of women of ill-repute. The women
were kept confined in their houses from October 16, to 25, 1918 until in the middle of the night on October
25, 1918 they were hustled in patrol wagons and placed onboard steamers bound for Davao, all the while
the women were thinking they were being brought to the police station for investigation.
The women arrived in Davao on October 29, 1918 and were receipted for as laborers of Francisco Sales,
governor of Davao, Feliciano Yñigo, and Rafael Castillo. Governor Sales and the haciendero Yñigo was not
aware that the women were prostitutes from Manila. Some of the women were able to find their way back
to Manila.
An attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an
application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court, alleging that the women were illegally
restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban.
During the hearing for the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the city fiscal, in behalf of the respondents,
prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not the proper parties, the action
should have begun in the CFI of Davao and respondents did not have the custody and control of the women.
The CFI of Manila awarded the writ and directed the respondents to bring the women before the court.
However, none of the women in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court; respondent
Governor Sales answered that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Court because the women were
not under his custody and control and were in fact at liberty in Davao.
Hence, the court issued a second order whereby it directed the respondents to bring the women who were
not in Manila before the court, unless they execute written statements renouncing such right or it is shown
that compliance cannot be made for other legal motives.
The respondents brought eight women from Davao with their consent, eighty-one women were found in
Davao who renounced the right through sworn statements; fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located.
ISSUES:
Whether the Supreme Court should not have assumed jurisdiction
Whether habeas corpus may lie where the persons in whose behalf the petition was filed were not in
restraint of their liberty
RULING:
Although the writ may have been asked from the CFI o Davao or it could have been made returnable before
that court; nevertheless, the Supreme Court may grant the petition. The Supreme Court also has the
discretion to determine which court it should be made returnable to.
143
In the case, the parties were situated in different parts of the Philippines, it was shown that the women
were imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its
purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court.
The Supreme Court, in granting the writ, considered the adverse consequence of denying the writ based on
the defense that the women were no longer in the custody of the Respondent Lukban. If such defense were
contended, the chief executive of any locality may simply forcibly and illegally place a citizen beyond the
boundaries of the municipality and claim that he no longer has control and custody of such person.
The fact of the matter is these women were forcibly taken from Manila and deposited them in a distant
region depriving them of “freedom of locomotion, just as effectively as if then had been imprisoned”.
The Court therefore ruled that a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy since there
was in fact a restraint of liberty which began in Manila and continued until the women were returned to
Manila and released or until they waived their right to return.
The place of confinement is not important in granting the relief if the guilty party is within reach of process.
The Court further found that respondent failed to comply with its first order but found substantial
compliance with the second order.
The respondents may have complied with the first order by three manners
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
They could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or
They could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present.
The respondents did none of these aside from a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers.
The court may have cited the respondents in contempt, but deferred from such action to avoid a clash
between the executive officials and the judiciary; and instead issued a second order to which the court
substantially complied.
Porquez, Jonalyn
FELIPE GONZALES VS. FLORENTINO C. VIOLA AND VALENTIN MANIQUIS
G.R. NO. L-43195 AUGUST 23, 1935
PONENTE: ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
On January 18, 1935, at about 11:30 a.m., appellant, Felipe Gonzales was placed under arrest by order of
the appellees, Florentino Viola and Valentin Maniquis and detained in the municipal jail of San Miguel,
Province of Bulacan. A few hours later, Maniquis filed a criminal complaint against appellant in the justice
of the peace, and around 8 p.m. on the same day, appellant Gonzales was released on bail.
At the time of the hearing of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the appellant was already out on bail.
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan denied the petition for the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
appellant was legally detained.
144
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will lie even if the petitioner for whom the writ is prayed is
already out on bail
RULING:
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court, finding that the appellant is no longer restrained of his
liberty.
Generally, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not lie is the person in whose behalf it is prayed is no
longer restrained of his liberty. Only when there is restraint is the court required to inquire into the cause,
which if found unlawful would warrant the granting of the writ.
The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a
mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. The extent and character of the restraint which justifies
the writ must vary according to the nature of the control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf
the writ is prayed.
A person out on bail is no longer restrained of his liberty which would warrant the granting of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Porquez, Jonalyn
TUNG CHIN HUI VS.RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
G.R. NO. 141938 APRIL 2, 2001
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tung Chin Hui, is a Taiwanese national who arrived in the country on November 5, 1998, as a
temporary visitor was arrested a few days after, and turned over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID).
Petitioner was charged and a Summary Deportation Order was issued after a finding that petitioner was
guilty of possessing a tampered passport which was earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. The trial
court granted the petition on January 7, 1999.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on January 29, 1999.
This was received by respondent on February 11, 1999; and they filed a Notice of Appeal on February 16,
1999. The trial court granted the appeal and the appellate court in its July 30,1999 decision reversed the
decision of the trial court, denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
Whether appeal should be made within forty-eight hours from notice or within 15-days
Whether a petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy
145
RULING:
The petition was denied.
The appeal was seasonably filed because what was appealed from was the “judgment” of the trial court
granting the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
In G.R. No. 137571 the Supreme Court already ruled that appeal from an order granting a petition for the
writ must be filed within fifteen days from notice under Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Moreover, the appeal is interrupted by a timely filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding the former to produce the
body of the person for whom the writ is prayed in a designated time and place.
It extends to all cases illegal confinement or detention by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Its objective is to determine whether the petitioner’s
confinement is valid or lawful.
In the case, petitioner’s detention was in accordance with Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended. Petitioner was properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for illegally
entering the Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another person and cancelled by the
Taiwanese government in 1995.
Petitioner contends that there was no proof that he was an “undocumented” alien; however the return of
the writ properly shows that petitioner was properly charged and ordered to be deported for being an
undocumented alien.
Furthermore there were official correspondences from the Taiwanese government showing that petitioner,
whose real name is Chen Kuan-Yuan, used the canceled passport of a man named Tung Chin Hui.
The petitioner’s contention that there was lack of notice was not supported by evidence and there is a
presumption that official acts were performed regularly.
Moreover, an alien has the burden to prove that he entered the Philippines lawfully and this burden was
not sufficiently discharged by petitioner.
Even assuming that the detention was illegal in the start, supervening events bar petitioner’s release since
at the time the petition was filed, petitioner had already been charged and an order of deportation issued
by the Board of Commissioners.
146
Porquez, Jonalyn
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE DEPORATION BOARD, THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND THE CHIEF OF SECURITY OFFICER, IMMIGRATION,
DETENTION, ENGINEER ISLAND, MANILA VS. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE, MANILA (BRANCH VI), MACARIO M. OFILADA, AS SHERIFF
OF MANILA, AND VICENTE KHO ALIAS TAN SE CHIONG
G.R. NO. L-20458 OCTOBER 31, 1963
PONENTE: BENGZON, C.J.
FACTS:
Vicente Kho, an alien residing in the Philippines, was found to have willfully and fraudulently evaded the
payment of taxes of more than one million pesos by the Deportation Board and was recommended to be
deported as an undesirable alien.
The President issued a deportation order in 1957 but it was never carried out because of a motion for
reconsideration filed by Kho. When a new President was elected a new deportation order was issued and
Kho was taken into custody.
Kho filed a motion for reconsideration of the second order of deportation which was denied. Thenafter, Kho
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of First Instance of Manila, during the pendency of which
he asked for bail and was granted bail by the CFI. The Solicitor-General filed an injunction case with the
Supreme Court to prevent Kho’s release on bail.
Kho’s petition for habeas corpus is grounded upon the counsel’s belief that the President would reconsider
or suspend the order of deportation, but only presented a telegram wherein the President assented to the
conduct of a reinvestigation. Respondent Kho also contended that it had filed a petition for revision of its
tax liabilities with the Court of Tax Appeals, but such petition was made only after he had been found liable
to deportation.
ISSUES:
Whether the Court of First Instance may grant bail in a deportation order
Whether respondent is unlawfully detained, warranting the grant of the petition for habeas corpus
RULING:
The Court of First Instance has no authority to grant bail. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration for deportation, the CFI has no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings since there is no law allowing it.
Also, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus will not lie. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus is
grounded only on the mere expectancy of respondents counsel that the President would grant its motion
for reconsideration of its second order of deportation. This cannot be relied upon for the granting of the
petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Also the petition for revision with the CTA was made only after
respondent Kho was already made liable for deportation; therefore the petition for the writ will not lie.
147
Sydiongco, Jacqueline Carlotta
LEE YICK HON VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
G.R. NO. L-16779, MARCH 30, 1971
PONENTE: STREET, J
FACTS:
A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Lee Yick Hon.
He alleged that he had arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view of entering the Philippines but
was prevented from doing so by the Insular Collector of Customs who was detaining him for deportation.
The said court cited the Collector to appear and show cause in writing why the habeas corpus should not be
issued as prayed. The citation was served at about 11 in the morning at which house arrangement had
already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for
Hongkong at noon on the same day.
The Insular Collector, either by oversight or design, failed to countermand the order for his embarkation on
that boat. As a result, Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had
been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon, contempt
proceedings were instituted against the Insular Collector resulting to an imposition of a fine of P50 upon
the appellant which appealed in the herein case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of a fine on the appellant was proper
RULING:
No. There was no lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge that was
disobeyed or resisted by the appellant. The citation that was served upon the appellant required him to
appear at a stated time in the Court of First Instance of Manila and show cause why the writ prayed for
should not issue. That citation was complied with when the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Insular
Collector, filed his answer. It was stated in his answer that the case of Lick Yee Hon had been regularly
passed upon by the Special Board of Inquiry and that it had been found that he had entered the Philippines
in contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his
deportation.
It must also be emphasized that the order to show cause served on the Insular Collector was not the
peremptory writ of habeas corpus. A peremptory writ unconditionally commands the respondent to have
the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. Instead, the order
served in this case was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause
why the writ should not be granted. In view thereof, it is obvious that the appellant did not put himself in
contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to de deported.
148
EFREN C. MONCUPA VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-63345, JANUARY 30, 1986
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts:
Petitioner Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 in the evening at
the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Tuazon was subsequently brought to MIG-15 Camp
Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On the following day, a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) was issued against him and eight others on the allegation that he was a member of National
Democratic Front (NDF).
After two separate investigations, it had been recommended that the petitioner be prosecuted only for
illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No.
33.
Consequently, two separate information were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of
firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of PD 33 before the City Court
of Quezon City. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, his arraignment and further proceedings had not
been pursued.
On the other hand, the respondents, in their return of the writ, justified the validity of petitioner’s detention
on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended to the petitioner. Furthermore, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the President. They were
contending that the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the
petitioner was free and no longer under the custody of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner’s temporary
release
Ruling:
No. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the
petitioner constituted restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limited the freedom of
movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas
corpus.
A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free
from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the
light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf
may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
In the instant case, the respondents failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the
petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.
149
HONORATO GALVEZ AND GODOFREDO DIEGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 114046, OCTOBER 24, 1994
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Honorato Galvez, then mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged
in three separate information with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide. Both accused filed
their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention.
Thereafter, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Subsequent Proceedings to enable him to review the evidence on record and determine once more the
proper crimes chargeable crimes against accused which was granted by Judge Villajuan. Pursuant to an
order by the Department of Justice, Prosecutor Dennis Vila-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial
prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the criminal cases.
Subsequently, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed an ex-parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases.
The motion was granted and the cases were withdrawn from the docket of the court. Nevertheless,
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations on the same day against petitioners for murder, two
counts of frustrated murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
The case having been raffled to the sala of Judge Pornillos of the Trial Court of Bulacan, he ordered the
arrest of the petitioners.
Petitioners filed before Judge Pornillos a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction. Such
motion was however denied. This prompted Galvez and Diego to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. This again was denied, hence, this petition arose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed with the petition for certiorari and
mandamus
RULING:
No. The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect
to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the
jurisdictional matters but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a
writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, habeas
corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be
permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or
irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter.
The writ could not be granted at this stage since a writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for
the functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial
should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not
ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. It has to be an
exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. In the absence of
special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner
in advance of a determination of his case in court. In the case under consideration, petitioners had dismally
failed to adduce any justification or exceptional circumstance which would warrant the grant of the writ.
Hence, their petition therefore has to be denied. In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.
150
RULE 103
Lingao, Cherylette
REPUBLIC VS. HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE
FEBRUARY 26, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.;
FACTS:
Anita Po alias Veronica Pao filed a petition for change of name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. She also
sought the court’s permission to have her birth record corrected in that her father’s name be corrected
from Po Yu to PAO YU and mother’s name PAKIAT CHAN to HELEN CHAN.
She alleges that her mother’s maiden name is Helen Chan and Pakiat only came from her maternal
grandmother, while her father’s name is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously written on her birth
certificate and her real surname is PAO.
While Veronica is her Christian name and since childhood, she had always been known and referred to as
Veronica Pao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for a change of name and correction of certain entries in the civil registry be
joined in the same proceeding
HELD:
No. The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be
substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory
the provisions of the Rules of Court. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings, all the
requirements of Rule 103 and 108 must be complied with.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
CONSUELO CALICDAN BAYBAYAN VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-20717 MARCH 18, 1966
FACTS:
Consuelo Calicdan Baybayan, filed a petition in court on October 12, 1962, praying that the certificate of
birth of her son, Bartolome Calicdan Baybayan, Jr., be corrected "to make it appear in said certificate that
the place of birth of his father, Bartolome E. Baybayan, is Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and his citizenship is
Filipino" on the ground that petitioner's mother, Valentina Garcia, whom she had requested to register the
birth of the boy in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bugallon, Pangasinan, made a mistake in giving
the birthplace of her husband as Balungao, Pangasinan, and his citizenship as American.
The Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal opposed the petition, claiming that the court had no
jurisdiction to order such substantial changes as those prayed for in a summary proceeding under Article
412 of the Civil Code, as repeatedly decided by this Supreme Court.
The court overruled the opposition and ordered the corrections
151
ISSUE:
Did the court have jurisdiction?
HELD:
No
Substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the Civil
Registry records, can not be ordered by the court unless first threshed out in an "appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented" and that the
summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or
clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding
In Ansaldo vs. Republic, the Court said:
For changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are grave
and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only
of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to seek said changes, it is necessary to file a proper suit
wherein not only the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties
defendants or respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be
made with due process of law and on the basis of facts proven.
The impropriety of the appealed judgment becomes all the more patent when it is considered that the party
whose domicile and citizenship are sought to be altered, Bartolome E. Baybayan, does not appear to have
been served with a copy of the petition, nor has he appeared in court to be heard and manifest his
conformity or objections.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
IN RE PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JOSELITO YU.
JOSELITO YU, REPRESENTED BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, JUAN S. BARRERA VS. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-20874 MAY 25, 1966
FACTS:
Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed
to Ricardo Sy. It is averred that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of
Manila for more than three years prior to the filing. It is alleged as grounds that he has been using the name
"Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he
is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also
stated."
The court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court
may not be invoked by aliens.
ISSUES
1. May an alien avail himself of Rule 103

2. Does the change of name affect family and personal rights of an alien, and therefore be governed by
the laws of his country?
152
HELD:
1. Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name.
Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of
First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino
citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of
the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the
petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing;
(b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule
is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino
citizenship is not one of them.
2. The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and since under Article
15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad, the
converse of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an alien
must be governed by the laws of his own country.
But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change
in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it
create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination
of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of appellation
for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. The
situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or an alien.
To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by
parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby
acquire certain families with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously
impressed on the public mind. But this is precisely the purpose of the judicial application — to
determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. As held by this Court
in several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is not a matter
of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will likely follow. In not one of those cases, however, has it been ruled that an
alien is not entitled to file a petition at all.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE NAME OF ONG HUAN TIN TO TERESITA TAN
ONG. HUAN TIN VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-20997 APRIL 27, 1967
FACTS:
Ong Huan Tin filed a petition to change the name to Teresita Tan. Due publication was had. But, before the
petition could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order, expressed the opinion "that an
alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and thereupon
denied the petition.
ISSUE:
May an alien petition for a change of name?
153
HELD:
In a recent judicial test (In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25,
1966), we held that Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to
change name; and, that, accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name.
WHETHER EVERY ALIEN IN THIS COUNTRY MAY PETITION FOR A CHANGE OF NAME
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and controlled by the lex
domicilii. Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if he be
domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means "permanent home, the place to which, whenever
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense
that they disclose intent."
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right to change his name. For,
what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for a short period of time? It would not be of much benefit
to him; court proceedings for the purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary effects flowing
from a change of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved.
We, accordingly, lay down the rule that only alien domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change
of name in the courts thereof.
Considering that the petition herein complies with the requisites set forth in the Rules of Court, we direct
said Court to proceed with the hearing and determination of the petition
Lucaylucay, Maicha
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JESUS NG YAO SIONG.
JESUS NG YAO SIONG VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-20306 MARCH 31, 1966
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names: (1) Jesus Ng, in his birth
certificate and certificate of residence, (2) Jesus Uy, Keng Lee, in his school records, (3) Uy Keng Lee Jesus,
also in his school records, (4) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, (5) Uy Keng Lee, in his
income tax returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration.
He avers that the names "had caused much confusion in his school records and unnecessary delay and
embarrassment to him in his dealing with the public" petitioned the court to be known only by one name —
Keng Lee Uy.
The city attorney of Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged that there is no necessity for the change of
name and that petitioner is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surnames. The
judgment — after hearing — went for petitioner.
ISSUES
1. Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case? Was the publication valid?
2. Can a court of justice lawfully grant an application for a change of name where he has violated a
law regarding the use of aliases?
3. Was there a proper and reasonable cause to allow the change?
154
HELD:
1. No
Change of name is a judicial proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition therefor,
by law, is acquired after publication of the "order reciting the purpose of the petition" and the "date
and place for the hearing thereof" — for three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object "to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established".
But, for that publication to be effective, it must give correct information. To inform, the
publication should recite, amongst others, the following facts: (1) the name or names of the
applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and (3) the new name asked
for.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is that the
civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real name. And
correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A name given to
a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community — when at
variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real
name.
We therefore rule that for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376
of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in
the civil register.
The title of this case was published as follows: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao
Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner." But Jesus Ng Yao Siong the name appearing in the petition, the
order of publication, and the publication itself, is not the true name of petitioner. As heretofore
stated, his name appearing in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" without the Yao Siong. The
name is to be changed, if any, Jesus Ng — not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. It thus results that there is no
name to be changed in the petition.
It is our view that this failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be
changed is fundamental; such failure is non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication; it
is fatal; and the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case
Petitioner's other names are recited in the body of the order of publication. Petitioner himself admits
that he is known by all these names. This gives rise to the necessity of including his aliases in the
title of the petition — not only in the body thereof.
The reason for this is obvious. Notices in the newspapers, like the one under consideration, usually
appear in the back pages. The reader, as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is
only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to read down further.
The probability is that the portions in the publication heretofore quoted will escape the reader's notice.
The purpose of which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved.
We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title
thereof should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any.
2. Petitioner was never authorized to use an alias by a competent court pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to regulate the use of aliases". None of the names he
used is a "pseudonym for literary purposes", or a name "by which he had been known since his
childhood" or "authorized by a competent court". This use is prohibited by that law, in violation of
155
Section 1 of said Commonwealth Act 142, punishable with imprisonment ranging from 1 month to 6
months pursuant to Section 4 of said statute. Neither did he use these other names as "pen names"
or "stage names"; and another statute prohibits him from using the same. To grant the petition here is
to sanction an unlawful act which might reach the proportions of a crime.
3. The petition and petitioner's testimony are one in the claim that his various names caused much confusion
in the school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public.
This does not constitute proper and reasonable justification to legally authorize a change of name
for him. Petition not being supported by weighty reasons, the condition for the grant thereof is
non-existent; and, nothing is left for the court but to dismiss the petition.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF SURNAMES OF MINORS: CESAR UN TO CESAR TIU,
NORBERTO ON TO NORBERTO TIU, URSULINA ON TO URSULINA TIU, SUSANA RENDORA VS.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-26198 OCTOBER 16, 1970
FACTS:
On August 7, 1965, Susana Rendora filed below a petition for authority to change the surname of her minor
children known is Cesar UN, Norberto ON and Ursulina ON, to TIU — the surname of their father. The City
Fiscal of Ormoc City, filed an opposition.
Judgment was rendered in favor of Rendora.
ISSUES:
1. Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction?

2. Did petitioners prove a proper and reasonable cause to justify the change of their respective
surnames?
HELD
1. The record discloses that the birth certificate of Cesar UN gives his name as Cesar ON HIA TIAN and
that of his father as ON HIA TIAN; that the birth certificate of Norberto UN records his name as
Norberto TIAN and that of his father as ON HIO TIAN, while the birth certificate of Ursulina ON records
the name of her father as YUTIAN UN.
For legal purposes, the true name of a person is that given him in the Civil Register, and that for
the purpose of a petition such as the one filed by petitioners, what is or may be chanced is their
true or official name as recorded in the Civil Register. Consequently, the publication required by
law, must give that true or official name of the petitioners to enable the State to undertake the proper
investigation regarding the truth of the allegations made in their petition. As the order published in
connection with the present proceeding did not give the true or correct surnames of the
petitioners, said publication was rendered ineffective in law.
2. Testifying in support of the petition, Susana Rendora, mother of the minors whose surnames are sought
to be changed, testified that she wants them "to bear the family name of TIU but then proceeded to
answer the question of what was the family name of her husband by saying that it was TIU HONG.
Moreover, the alien certificate of her husband shows that he was also known under an alias, to wit, TIU
SONG PIN. Moreover, while Susana Rendora claims to be married to TIU HONG, no marriage contract
was presented as part of the evidence, nor did her husband testify. Neither was evidence presented
that TIU HONG was authorized to use the alias TIU SONG PIN, or that he is the same person as the one
156
whose name was given in the birth certificates of their children as YUTIAN UN, ON HIO TIAN and ON
HIA TIAN.
Upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the evidence of record is utterly
insufficient to support the decision appealed from.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND LUA ONG REPRESENTING THE MINOR BABY ONG, ALIAS LUA
AN JOK
G.R. NO. L-31563 NOVEMBER 29, 1971
FACTS:
On June 11, 1968 Lua Ong, father of the then minor Baby Ong, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
with Judge Santiago O. Tañada presiding, a petition for change of the name of his son Baby Ong to Lua An
Jok.
On the day of the hearing, because no one, not even the provincial fiscal in representation of the Solicitor
General, appeared to interpose any objection to the petition, the respondent judge referred the case to his
deputy clerk of court, requiring him to submit a report on the evidence adduced.
Respondent judge issued an order granting the petition. The assistant provincial fiscal, on behalf of the
Government of the Republic, interposed an appeal
ISSUES:
1. Did the court acquire proper jurisdiction?

2. Was there proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason to justify the change of name applied
for.
HELD
1. Publication to be valid and effective should contain the correct information as to (1) the name or names
of the applicant, (2) the cause for the change of name, and (3) the new name sought. Moreover, the title
of the petition should include (1) the applicant's real name and (2) his aliases or other names, if any.
The title should recite the name sought to be adopted. All these, notwithstanding that the body of the
petition or of the order includes all the information aforementioned.
The respondent claims that the name Lua An Jok is not an alias of the applicant but his true and
correct name. Concededly, the name Lua An Jok does not constitute alias within the definition
set forth in section 17 of Commonwealth Act 142, otherwise known as the Anti-Alias Law, for it
is the name by which the applicant has been known since his childhood. The applicant, the
respondent alleged never made himself known as Baby Ong and has never use of such name in
any record. Therefore, the respondent concludes, no necessity exists for the inclusion of the
name Lua An Jok in the title of the petition or the caption of the published order.
The respondent's argument, however, instead of supporting his stance, weakens the same. Thus, aside
from requiring the inclusion of the name Lua An Jok in the title of the petition and in the caption of the
published order because such name constitutes the new name sought by the respondent for his son, the
foregoing provides another reason for such inclusion. With the non-inclusion of the name Lua An Jok
in the title of the petition and in the caption of the published order, persons who know the
applicant Lua An Jok and who have an interest contra the petition, upon reading the title of the
157
petition or the caption of the punished order, would not readily know that Lua An Jok and Baby
Ong refer to one and the same person and would not thereby be afforded the opportunity to
come forward with anything affecting the petition.
The incomplete and, consequently, invalid publication of the order dated June 25, 1968 does not
effectively confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo to take cognizance of the respondent's petition.
2. To justify a change of name there must exist a proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason. The
following have been held to constitute proper and reasonable causes or compelling reasons: (1) a
ridiculous name, a name tainted with dishonor, a name extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) a
change of civil status; and (3) need to avoid confusion.
Lua Ong is the name of the respondent who is a Chinaman; Lua is his family name, Ong his first name.
The attending midwife was apparently never advised by the child's parents of the name the latter gave
to it. So, perfunctorily accomplishing the required report to the civil registrar, the midwife found it
expedient to place therein the name "Baby Ong." The resulting mistake was obviously engendered by
an erroneous impression on the part of the reporting midwife that "Ong" is the family name of the
father, because "Ong" follows "Lua." Hence the name "Baby Ong." Under the circumstances above
stated, the insistence of the respondent that the entry "Baby Ong" in the civil registry be changed
to "Lua An Jok" could very well be motivated, there being no evidence to the contrary, solely by
an honest desire to make the civil registry speak the truth.
The above notwithstanding, the petition below cannot be given due course because of the fatal
failure, hereinbefore adverted to, on the part of the respondent to comply with jurisdictional
requirements.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO AND BENGUET AND PANG CHA QUEN REPRESENTING THE MINOR,
MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG
G.R. NO. L-31065 FEBRUARY 15, 1990
FACTS:
On March 30, 1968 Pang Cha Quen filed a verified petition for the name of the minor child May Sia alias
Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. She alleged that she is a
citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had resided in Baguio
City since her birth; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist
China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huan. She caused her daughter to be registered
as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's father had
abandoned them. Her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at home and in school. As her
daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she desires
to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall
be Mary Pang De la Cruz. Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at the bottom of
the pleading
When the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's counsel,
respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the evidence of Pang Cha Quen.
Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969 authorizing the name of the minor,
May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
158
ISSUES:
1. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the case?

2. Was there proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias
Manman Huang"?
HELD:
1. In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained the reason for the rule
requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of the
applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order. It is that the ordinary
reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a
special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of
the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The
probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are
mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang" in the captions of the court's order and of the
petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the petitioner
which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we held that all aliases of the applicant must
be set forth in the title of the published petition, for the omission of any of such aliases, would
be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are mentioned in the body of the petition.
2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:
1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
3) when the change will avoid;
4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his
alien parentage; or
5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and
not to prejudice anybody.
Petitioner did not provide valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of
name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where
none actually exists. In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not
authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow them
to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of
their paternity.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed by the proper
party, as provided in Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The petition for change of name
must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by
some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May
Sia.
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the
age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason
for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her
personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood,
she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.
159
Lucaylucay, Maicha
LEONCIA SAN ROQUE VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-22035 APRIL 30, 1968
FACTS:
On February 26, 1960, Leoncia San Roque filed with a verified petition captioned "In RE: Petition To Correct
Name In The Birth Certificate Of Leoncia San Roque", alleging among other things, that the name appearing
on her birth certificate on file with the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Polo, Bulacan, is Lucia San
Roque; that since birth, she had been using, and had always been known by the name of Leoncia San Roque
and not as Lucia San Roque, and praying that her name appearing in said civil registry be corrected so as to
read "Leoncia San Roque".
The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, in representation of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition
to the petition contending that, as it did not allege that a clerical error bad been committed in the recording
of the name "Lucia" in the civil registry, its correction could not be made in the proceedings commenced by
the petitioner.
The CFI rendered a decision allowing petitioner to change her name.
ISSUE:
Is the change or correction of the name in the birth record summary in nature or substantial and therefore
cannot be done in the proceeding at bar?
HELD:
The correction is summary in nature and proper.
The present case does not concern appellee's civil status, much less her citizenship.
In the Ty Cong Ting case We held that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code is
summary in nature and does not cover cases involving controversial issues; that said article
contemplates mere corrections of mistakes, clerical in nature, and not those which may affect the civil
status or the citizenship of the persons involved; that if the purpose of the petition is merely to correct a
clerical error, the Court may issue an order for the correction thereof, but that if the petition prays for a
substantial change that affects the status or citizenship of the petitioner, the matter should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved, and such action may
be found "at random in our substantive and remedial laws, the implementation of which will naturally
depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties".
In the Chomi case, we also held that the real name of a person is that given him in the Civil Register, not
the name by which he was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the community, or
which he has adopted; that the only way to change that name legally is for the interested party "to file the
special proceedings outlined in Act No. 1386 and now embodied in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court". This is,
substantially, what appellee herein did.
Essentially, the petition admitted that appellee's real name was Lucia San Roque which, according to the
Chomi case, was her true name because it was the one appearing in the Civil Register, but that this
notwithstanding, she had been using continuously since birth and had been known under the name of
Leoncia San Roque. These allegations were not denied by the oppositor and were duly proven during the
hearing. Ultimately, therefore, notwithstanding the imperfection of language employed, the petition
was, in essence, one to secure judicial authority for appellee to change her name from Lucia to
Leoncia — a petition which falls reasonably within the provisions of Rule 103. That the petition was
entitled one "to correct name in the birth certificate of Leoncia San Roque" and prayed that petitioner's
160
name appearing in her birth certificate be corrected accordingly did not necessarily make the petition fall
under the provisions of Rule 108, because even under the provisions of Rule 103 the judgment or order
rendered in connection with said Rule shall be furnished the Civil Registrar of the municipality or city
where the Court who issued the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register
(Section 6).
The record discloses, upon the other hand, that the provisions of Rule 103 — similar to those of Rule 108 —
had been strictly and fully complied with and that the State had been given ample opportunity to state and
prove its case.
We, therefore, conclude that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in considering the
petition as one filed under the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
HAW LIONG VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-21194 APRIL 29, 1966
FACTS:
Haw Liong seeks to change his name to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance
of Leyte. He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia Trading Company;
that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; that he wants to change his name to
Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido
Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the
Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no
pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he
is willing to appear and answer the same.
The court allowed the change of name.
ISSUE:
Was the allowance proper?
HELD:
No
This Court has already had occasion to state the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or
civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant
the grant of a petitioner for change of name:
1. when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
2. when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural
child is acknowledged or legitimated; and
3. when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
161
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change
of name. His claim, which is merely supported by his own testimony, cannot overcome the fact that
the name given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in
his landing certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no
moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is Haw
Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen. This indirectly belies his
claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin because that is the family name of his father
"to conform with the customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons."
The true situation however is, as was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with
other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to be
called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friends asked him how he
was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since then they started calling him by that name;
and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong and has not contracted with any person under the
name of Alfonso Lantin. We find, therefore, no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of
name desired by petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
CHIU HAP CHIU VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-20018 APRIL 30, 1966
FACTS:
Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance
of Davao. He testified that he was 30 years old, single, a doctor of medicine, and a resident of Davao City;
that the name given him at birth was Lo Hap Chiu; that during his school days, or from elementary school to
college, he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason he desires to have said name
adopted instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use of his name; and that the name given him in
his alien certificate of registration is Chiu Hap Chiu.
The court granted.
ISSUE:
Was there justifiable reason for the change of name?
HELD:
No
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for change of
name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged reason that that is the name given
him in his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but his claim was not satisfactorily proven, for
aside from his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of
Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is
nothing in the record to show that he used said name from grade school to college for he failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove it.
The truth is that he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and in all the
clearances secured by him from said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby
indicating that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He has not shown that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu
Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of Davao. Since the State has an interest in the
162
name borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a rule is established by the
name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no plausible reason for authorizing the
change of name desired by petitioner.
Lucaylucay, Maicha
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-51201 MAY 29, 1980
FACTS:
On April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty.
Rosauro Alvarez, filed a verified petition praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner was born, registered at
the local Civil Registrar's Office and baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. Her parents are
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector
Alfon.
Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for 23 years. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she
was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the
same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.
The court partially denied the change of name. The change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The lower court
invoked Article 364 of the Civil Code which provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
ISSUE:
Was the partial denial proper?
HELD:
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as
legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father
invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child
should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
In Haw Liong vs. Republic, the Court said:
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant
the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor,
or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the
change is necessary to avoid confusion.
163
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon
although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from
the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished
her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised
the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her
petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to
avoid confusion.

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMES. JOSEFINA ANG CHAY AND MERCEDITA ANG CHAY,
PETITIONERS-APPELLEES,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-28507 JULY 31, 1970
FACTS:
Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay prayed for the change of their respective names to Josefina
Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez, upon allegations that they were both of legal age, single and
residents of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, at least years prior to the filing of the petition; that
having elected Philippine citizenship on 7 February 1966, they would like to use Filipino names by having
their surnames "Ang Chay changed to "Hernandez", the surname that they have been using from the time
they started schooling until they finished their studies and went into employment, and by which surname
they have come to be known by everybody.
The petition was opposed by the government, on the ground that the reason adduced therefor was not
proper and reasonable. After hearing, judgment was entered for the petitioners, and their surnames were
decreed changed from "Ang Chay to "Hernandez", for all legal intent and purposes. It is from this decision
that the oppositor Republic of the Philippines is appealing on the same issue of the propriety and
reasonableness of the ground for petitioners' action for change of their name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of names of Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay, to Josefina
Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez, respectively, should be allowed.
HELD:
Yes, the petition for change of names of Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay, to Josefina Hernandez
and Mercedita Hernandez, respectively, should be allowed. It has not been shown that petitioner has any
fraudulent intent in seeking a change of name. No criminal, civil, tax or any other liability on his part, which
he may avoid by the change of name, has been suggested. Nothing has been presented to show any
prejudice to the Government or to any individual should the petition be granted. In the absence of prejudice
to the State or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alien
nationality, which unduly hamper social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for a change of
name. It is not trivial, whimsical and capricious. Therefore, the change of names should be allowed.
164
Guttierez, Myron De
CANDIDO UY ALIAS RICARDO UY, PETITIONER-APPELLEE,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-22712 NOVEMBER 29, 1965
FACTS:
A petition for change of name was filed on March 10, 1961 in the Court of first Instance of Pampanga by
Candido Uy alias Ricardo Uy. Specifically, he wanted to change his name from Uy to Baluyot. He is a
businessman, and having the Chinese surname "Uy," however, he is frequently mistaken for and identified
as a Chinese citizen, according to him, to his chagrin, embarrassment and disappointment.
For a new surname he chose "Baluyot" after former Secretary Sotero Baluyot. It is of record that Sotero
Baluyot has been close to petitioner's family since pre-war days, is the godfather of petitioner's father, has
interposed no objection and granted his written consent to petitioner's adoption of his family name,
following accepted practice in our country.
The Republic, through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, appeared to oppose the petition on the ground that
there was no sufficient showing that petitioner will be prejudiced by the continued use of his present name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name of “Uy” to “Baluyot” should be allowed.
HELD:
Yes, the petition for change of name of “Uy” to “Baluyot” should be allowed. In the present case, the trial
court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his desire to do away with all traces of his
former Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with the
policy of our naturalization laws that applicants for naturalization should fully embrace Filipino customs
and traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos.
It is true, as appellant points out, that the surname Uy is used by native-born Filipinos prominent in
government and prosperous in business. The fact remains that it is basically Chinese. And in the community
where petitioner resides said surname has been shown to be the source of his being taken for a Chinese in
view of his ancestry. So much so that his business suffers from time lost in having to explain in his dealings,
especially with government agencies that he is naturalized Filipino. Similarly, it has proved a social liability,
causing much difficulty for him in entering civil organizations, such as the Lions Club. Hence, the petition
for change of name of “Uy” to “Baluyot” should be allowed.
Guttierez, Myron Dei

ELISEA LAPERAL, PETITIONER,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR.
G.R. NO. L-18008 OCTOBER 30, 1962
FACTS:
Elisea Laperal married Enrique R. Santamaria but she got a decree of legal separation later on. During her
marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria. After she has been legally separated from Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to
live with him for many years, she filed a petition for change of name as believes that it is desirable that she
be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, Elisea Laperal.
165
\The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the
provisions of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name of Elisea Santamaria to her maiden name Elisea Laperal
after obtaining a decree of legal separation should be allowed.
HELD:
No, the petition for change of name of Elisea Santamaria to her maiden name Elisea Laperal after obtaining
a decree of legal separation should not be allowed. The contention of the Republic finds support in the
provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.
Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been
decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so
because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It
seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged
status for the benefit of all concerned.
Applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition at
bar — is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise
would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372. Therefore, the
change of name should not be allowed.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ANA ISABEL HENRIETTE ANTONIA
CONCEPCION GEORGIANA, ISABEL VALDES JOHNSTON, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,  VS. 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLEE.
G.R. NO. L-18284 APRIL 30, 1963
FACTS:
On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana
Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, then under the custody of the
Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage situated in the city of Manila. The petition for adoption was granted,
and the child was given the surname “Valdes”, being the surname of the petitioner.
The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname given to the minor
be "Valdes Johnston", bearing the surname of her husband instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was
denied by the lower court in its order of October 31, 1960. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of surname of the adopted child to the surname of the husband of the adopter
should be allowed.
HELD:
No, the change of surname of the adopted child to the surname of the husband of the adopter should not be
allowed. For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would
166
mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And
when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be
presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.
It is to forestall befuddling situations pointed out above and other possible confusing situations that may
arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil Code to the effect
that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by
marriage. Thus, the change of name should not be allowed.

ELAINE A. MOORE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
OPPOSITOR-APPELLEE.
G.R. NO. L-18407 JUNE 26, 1963
FACTS:
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that her child by a former
marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde
Moore, bearing the surname of her new husband. The Republic opposed the petition on the ground that it is
violative of the provisions on the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a child by former marriage may use the surname of the new husband of his mother.
HELD:
No, a child by former marriage may not use the surname of the new husband of his mother. Anent the first
issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our laws do not authorize a legitimate
child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code
specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Mention is
also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage
the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the surname of the father, and considering
by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a
decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.
The Court finds this observation of government's counsel tenable. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful
wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die
or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the
change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. Hence, the change of name should not
be allowed.
167
TERESITA LLANETA (KNOWN ALSO AS TERESITA LLANETA FERRER AND TERESITA
FERRER), PETITIONER,  VS. THE HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. L-32054 MAY 15, 1974
FACTS:
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one
child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had
relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought
her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer.
Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and
throughout her schooling.
When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon,
where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by
the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta — not Ferrer
— and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using
since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court
below on March 18, 1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After
trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of name of Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Ferrer should be allowed.
HELD:
Yes, the change of name of Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Ferrer should be allowed. The petitioner has
established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her
records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates
know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently
have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the
surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order
to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and
entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new
surname.
Also, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and
Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Thus, the proposed change of name would not
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in
general. Therefore, the petition for change of name should be allowed.
168
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF MA CHIK KIN A MINOR, MA ING CHAO,
PETITIONER-APPELLEE,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-28051 JULY 28, 1970
FACTS:
On June 29, 1966, Ma Ing Chao filed a Petition for change of name, upon the ground that, prior thereto, said
petitioner had adopted Chik Tong, a minor, then 4 years of age. The order directed that, thereafter, his
surname shall be Ma, which is that of the adopting father; that the full name of the adopted minor should,
therefore, be Ma Chik Tong; that his Alien Certificate of Registration, is, however, in the name of Ma Chik
Kin; that since the minor began schooling in 1955, he had been using the name Ma Chik Kin and is known
by that name by his friends and schoolmates; that petitioner had "lately ... discovered," before the
institution of the present case, that such name is not in accordance with the aforesaid order of adoption;
and that petitioner want his adopted son to "continue using the name, Ma Chik Kin, not only because it is
the name by which he is commonly known to his friends, acquaintances and schoolmates, but, also because
it is the name appearing in his alien registration certificate.
The title of the case at bar is: "In the matter of the change of name of Ma Chik Kin, a minor." The order of the
trial court, directing the publication of the corresponding notice, bore the same title, which is, also, that of
the notice published accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether or the petition for change of name of Ma Chik Tong to Ma Chik Kin should be allowed.
HELD:
No, the petition for change of name should not be allowed. The true name of the party whose name is
sought to be changed should be set forth in the title of the case and of the notice published in connection
therewith, and that failure to do so is fatal to the application for a change of name and precludes the Court
from having jurisdiction to entertain the same.
It is our view that this failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be changed is
fundamental; such failure is non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication; it is fatal; and the
court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case. Hence, the petition for change of name should not be
allowed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,  VS. HON. FLORENDO P. AQUINO, JUDGE OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND JOHN LI KAN WA RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-32779 MAY 25, 1979
FACTS:
John Li Kan Wa filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto, alleging (a) change of his status from
Chinese to Filipino as a result of his election of Filipino Citizenship; and (b) the previous confusion resulting
from being registered as John Li Kan Wa and using a different name since childhood which is John Sotto.
After due hearing, the court granted the petition for change of name; hence, the instant petition for review,
filed by the Republic, thru the Solicitor General and found that the petition did not state in the title the new
name sought for.
169
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name of John Li Kan Wa to John Sotto should be allowed despite
the failure of the petitioner to include the new name asked for in the title of the petition.
HELD:
No, the change of name should not be allowed. Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of Court, the
petition for change shall set forth inter alia, the name asked for. The requirement is mandatory and
compliance therewith is essential, for it is by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction. It was held in
Republic vs. Reyes, that failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition, and
consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a substantial jurisdictional infirmity.
The name Li Kan Wa was given in the title, and the name John Sotto was not mentioned. Omission in the
title of the petition of the name asked for is fatal, and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Non-compliance with the rules did not vest the court with authority to act on the petition and therefore, the
questioned decision is null and void. Therefore, the change of name should not be allowed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,  VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF BRANCH III
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND ANDREW BARRETTO, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Andrew Barretto filed a petition for the change of his name from Andrew Barrette to Andrew Velez, alleging
as reason for his petition that Velez is the surname of his stepfather with whom he was living. The Republic
of the Philippines opposed to the petition, alleging that the proposed change of name is unwarranted in the
absence of any showing that the present surname of respondent Andrew Barretto is ridiculous and/or
tainted with dishonor. It was also contended that the ground given for the proposed change of name does
not constitute proper and reasonable justification for the grant of the petition.
The Republic of the Philippines also filed a motion to dismiss, alleging mainly that the title and caption of
the petition for change of name and the order of publication failed to state and include the proposed new
name of the petitioner Andrew Barretto. It was also alleged in said motion that the petitioner had no legal
capacity to file the petition as he was then a minor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of name of Andrew Barretto to Andrew Velez should be allowed.
HELD:
No, the change of name of Andrew Barretto to Andrew Velez should not be allowed. The publication itself is
defective on three counts: (1) the name Andrew Barretto appearing therein may not be the petitioner's real
name; (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought does not appear therein; and (3) the name
sought to be adopted does not appear in the title or caption of the published order. Thus, the petition for
change of name should not be allowed.
170
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME, GO CHIU BENG, PETITIONER-
APPELLEE,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-29574 AUGUST 18, 1972
FACTS:
Go Chiu Beng filed a petition for change of name to that of "Reynaldo Bingo," as prayed for in his amended
petition, instead of "Reynaldo Gosibeng," as prayed for in his original petition.
Upon a review of the records, it is manifest therefrom that the decision appealed from must be set aside as
null and void for want of jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition for change of name, it being
undisputed, as it appears from petitioner's Exhibit "A", that the only name given in the title of the notice of
the order about the filing of appellee's amended petitions was that of Go Chiu Beng; that no other name was
given in said title, despite the fact that, in both his original and amended petition, appellee alleged that he
had "always" been known, "since his arrival in the Philippines," as "Reynaldo"; and that his own certificate
of naturalization, Exhibit "B", shows that he is likewise known as "Jimmy Go."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name of Go Chiu Beng should be allowed.
HELD:
No, the petition for change of name should not be allowed. It was ruled that all aliases should be included in
the title of the petition, not only in the body thereof, because the reason for this is obvious. Notices in the
newspapers, like the one under consideration, usually appear in the back pages. The reader, as is to be
expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title
interests him, that he proceeds to read down further. The probability is that the portions in the publication
hereto quoted will escape the reader's notice. The purpose which the publication is made, that is, to inform,
may thus be unserved. The Court then ruled that "for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be
valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and, second, his aliases, if any.
The non-inclusion of all names and/or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or the title of the
petition defeats the very purpose of the inquired publication. Hence, the petition for change of name should
not be allowed.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAMES OF SECAN KOK AND MARILYN SE, SECAN KOK,
PETITIONER-APPELLEE,  VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-27621 AUGUST 30, 1973
FACTS:
On May 18, 1964, appellee Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter Marilyn Se
respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok although his petition mentions his other minor children,
namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr. Finding the petition meritorious, the court
granted the name as prayed for. The name of the petitioner, Secan Kok, is hereby changed to Antonio
Cuakok Petitioner's daughter's name, Marilyn, is hereby changed to Gloria Cuakok.
171
On January 7, 1966, petitioner-appellee filed a motion for supplemental judgment, alleging that the Bureau
of Immigration refused to change the surname of his wife Lucia O. Tee and their aforesaid six (6) minor
children to Cuakok.
The government, thru the Assistant City Fiscal, opposed the motion on the ground that (a) the order dated
July 28, 1965 of the trial court authorizing the change of his name from Secan Kok to Antonio Cuakok, and
the name of his daughter from Marilyn Se to Gloria Cuakok has long become final and therefore can no
longer be supplemented; and (b) that his wife Lucia O. Tee, being of age, should file a separate petition to
change her name, such a petition being an individual and personal matter and not a collective one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of names of the wife and children should be allowed.
HELD:
No, the change of name should not be allowed. A change of name granted by the court affects only the
petitioner. A separate petition for change of name must be filed for his wife and children. Inceptively, a joint
peititon for all the qualified members of said family, as co-petitioners, would have been permissible and
should have ben th appropriate remedy. Thus, the change of names should not be allowed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,  VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMO
WONG, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 97906 MAY 21, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When
he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala,
was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents, adopted by spouses Hoong
Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering
student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It
was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends,
as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being
ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive
mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name of Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, his name before he was
adopted should be allowed.
HELD:
Yes, the change of name should be allowed. The assumed family name “Wong”, a Chinese surname was
subjecting him to ridicule and affecting his business and social life in the Muslim community where he
resides. This fact was attested to by the surviving adopting mother who gave her consent to the petition for
that purpose. After all, a change of name does not change one’s existing family relations or the rights or
duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity, status or citizenship; what is altered is only
the name. Hence, the change of name should be allowed.
172
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,  VS. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 158, PASIG CITY AND
SPOUSES VAN MUNSON Y NAVARRO AND REGINA MUNSON Y ANDRADE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 117209 FEBRUARY 9, 1996
FACTS:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y
Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being
the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called
by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents'
residence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adopters can change the first name of the adopted child in the petition for adoption.
HELD:
No, the adopters cannot change the first name of the adopted child in the petition for adoption. The
practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child
presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is
registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification,
the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must
remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its
change may merit judicial approval.
A decree of adoption grants the adoptee the right to use the adopter’s surname but not to change the
former’s first name which relief must be sought in a discrete petition for change of name under Rule 103.
Thus, the adopters cannot change the first name of the adoptee in the decree of adoption; a separate
petition for change of name is proper.
173
RULE 108

VIRGINIA ANSALDO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-10226 FEBRUARY 14, 1958
PONENTE: MONTEMAYOR, J
FACTS:
On April 5, 1954, a baby was born to Virginia Ansaldo, a Filipina and Henry H. Wang, a Chinese, both single.
On the following day, the parents of the baby gave to the Sampaloc General Hospital where the baby was
born the data and information about the child and its parents. It now appears on the child’s birth certificate
that the baby was named James A. Wang, of Chinese nationality and is not legitimate. At the back of the
birth certificate is an “Affidavit to be accomplished in case of an Illegitimate Child” which was signed and
sworn to by both mother and father.
Virgina Ansaldo filed with the Court of Instance of Manila a “Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate”,
seeking to change the word “Chinese” under the child’s name James A. Wang and opposite the word
“Nationality” to Filipino.
The petition was opposed by the Solicitor General on the ground that entries in the civil register can be
corrected only if the alleged mistakes are clerical in nature and not those that would affect the status or
nationality or citizenship of the person involved, citing the Court’s ruling in Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic of the
Philippines. On the other hand, Ansaldo contended that the correction sought by her does not affect his
nationality or citizenship because her child under the law is a Filipino anyway since he follows the
citizenship of her mother having born out of wedlock to the effect that the child was not legitimate.
The lower court denied the petition to correct the birth certificate of James A. Wang. Hence, an appeal from
such decision was made by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition to correct the birth certificate of the child should be allowed under Article 412
of the Civil Code
RULING:
No. The court adhered to the ruling in Ty Kong Ting vs. Republic (94 Phil 321). Clerical errors which might
be corrected through judicial sanction under Article 412 of the New Civil Code would be those harmless and
innocuous changes. The petition under consideration does not merely call for correction of a clerical error.
It involves a matter which concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of his children. It is therefore
an important controversial matter that should only be threshed out in an appropriate action.
174
CHUA WEE AND PACITA TOPENIO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NO. L-27731 APRIL 21 1971
PONENTE: MAKASIAR, J
FACTS:
Petitioners Chua Wee, a Chinese citizen and Pacita Topenio, a Filipino citizen have been living as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. Out of their common-law marital relations, Roberto, Carlos, Lucita
and Mely were born in Manila. The entries in the records of the Manila civil registrar indicate that the four
children are Chinese citizens and the records show that they are all legitimate children except the fourth
child Mely.
Petitioners filed a petition with the Manila Court of First Instance for the correction of birth records in the
office of the local civil registrar of their four children by changing their nationality from Chinese to Filipino
and their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate.
The court set the petition for hearing and directed its publication in the Taliba once a week for three
consecutive weeks with notice to the local civil registrar of Manila. In its answer, the respond civil registrar
interposed the defense that the entries sought to be corrected are matters of substance and controversial in
nature, hence, he had no authority to institute the correction prayed for without a final judicial order.
The Solicitor General, also a named respondent, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that such petition
for the correction of the citizenship and status of the child is not the appropriate remedy. Meanwhile,
petitioners filed an opposition thereto contending that their petition is neither for a change of name under
Rule 103 nor for correction of registry entries under the summary proceeding contemplated by Article 412
of the Civil Code but pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which is a proceeding in rem. The court
however sustained the motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries of citizenship and status of legitimacy or non-legitimacy in the birth certificate
may be corrected in accordance with Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
No. The changes or corrections authorized under Article 412 which envisions a summary procedure relate
only to harmless and innocuous alterations such as misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding. Changes in the citizenship or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate are
substantial and controversial which can only be established in appropriate adversary proceeding as a
remedy for the adjudication of real and justiciable controversies involving actual conflicts of rights the final
determination of which depends upon the resolution of the issues of nationality, paternity, filiation or
legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and procedural laws provide.
175
IN RE: PETITION FOR THE CORRECTION OF NAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY OF MANILA,
SATURNINA VDA. DE CASTRO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-28520 JANUARY 17, 1985
PONENTE: RELOVA, J
FACTS:
Petitioner Vda. De Castro alleged that her son Ramon V. Castro was born on August 31, 1946 at St. Luke’s
Hospital. Ramon V. Castro is known as Ramon George Castro, Jr. in his baptismal certificate and George F.
Castro in the birth certificate. Petitioner contended that Ramon V. Castro is her child’s t rue and lawful name
since childhood, such name having been affixed in all transactions both in private and official documents.
The petitioner therefore prayed in a petition filed with Court of First Instance of Manila that an order be
issued to declare Ramon V. Castro, Ramon George Castro, Jr. and George F. Castro to be the names of one
and the same person namely Ramon V. Castro and to direct the local civil registrar to make the necessary
corrections in his records. The Solicitor General opposed the petition claiming that the correction of entries
in the civil registry contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code refers to clerical mistakes.
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner, hence, the state appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the correction of entries under the aforesaid circumstances may be allowed under the law
RULING:
No. The decision must be reversed.
It has been the consistent ruling of the Court since Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic that substantial alterations,
such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry Records cannot be
ordered by the Court unless first threshed out in an appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented.
The mistake in the case at bar is not the mistake contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code
which justifies the correction of the birth certificate. Article 412 allows only of clerical mistakes, not those
substantial changes which may affect the identity, personality, civil status or nationality of the persons
involved.
176
GO, ET AL. VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABON
L-29544 MAY 31, 1971
FACTS:
Saw Chui, better known as Jesus Go, a Chinese citizen was married to Cristeta Miranda, a Filipino citizen.
The couple had children namely Benito, Juanito, Anita, Rosalinda, Mercedes and Alberto, all surnamed Go.
They were both single when they started to live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. The
petitioner alleged that except as regards the third child of the couple, Ernesto Miranda, the surnames of the
other children were “Go” instead of “Miranda” as appearing in their birth certificates. In addition, Benito,
Alberto and Juanito’s citizenship in their respective birth records were recorded as “Chinese” while the
birth certificates of Juanito, Rosalinda and Mercedes each indicated their filiation to be “legitimate” instead
of “illegitimate”.
It was further averred that these errors should be corrected to conform to the truth and that the petition
had been filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code.
The lower court however denied the petition upon the ground the same embraced not merely clerical
errors but controversial matters. Hence, Benito and Juanito Go appealed from such denial of the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not correction of entries of citizenship and filiation in the birth certificates may be allowed
under Rule 108
RULING:
No. It has been repeatedly reiterated that only clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, not those
involving civil status, nationality or citizenship which are substantial and controversial may be corrected
under the provisions of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

REPUBLIC VS. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH III AND FELICISIMA VELARDE
NO. L-34079 NOVEMBER 2, 1982
PONENTE: GUERRERO, J
FACTS:
Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng had been living together as common-law spouses. As a result of such
cohabitation, petitioner gave birth to four children namely Ruben, Cynthia, Reynaldo, Roger, Roland and
Romeo, all surnamed Lee. The birth certificates of the minor children were duly recorded in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Naga City.
The children’s father Lee Tieng was familiarly called “Uping”, his Christian name was “Alipio” and his
mother’s surname was “Wee”. Because of these different names of Lee Tieng, his name was differently
recorded in the birth certificates of his children. In addition, petitioner’s status indicated on the birth
certificate of her oldest son Ruben Lee was “married” and the child was indicated as “legitimate” and a
“Chinese” citizen because Velarde told the attending nurse that she and Lee Tieng were married not
knowing that the information was to be used to fill up her child’s birth certificate. Consequently, Felicisima
was likewise recorded as “married” instead of “single” in the birth certificates of her other children in order
177
to conform to the previous entries made in the birth certificate of her eldest child. Petitioner was likewise
erroneously indicated as “Chinese” in the birth certificate of Roger and Romeo while her maternal surname
was erroneously spelled as “Olbila” and “Orbita” in the birth certificates of Roger and Rolando respectively
when it should have been “Olbita”.
The petition filed by Velarde with the Court of Instance of Camarines Sur for the correction of certain
entries in the birth certificate of her minor children was granted. After the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, such appeal by certiorari was commenced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the correction of certain in the birth certificates was proper
RULING:
No. The law on the matter of said cancellation or correction is Article 412 of the Civil Code which provided:
“No entry in civil registry shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. This legal provision has
been invariably interpreted since 1954 in the case of Ty Kong Tin vs, Republic as an authority for the Court
to direct the correction of mistakes that are clerical in nature. It does not extend to important controversial
matters such as those which affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.
In addition, the alleged errors in the name of the father of respondent Velarde’s children in their birth
certificates were not clerical or typographical. The names of Lee Uping, Alipio Lee and Ting Wee were
substantially different from the supposed true name of the father Lee Tieng and could easily refer to
different persons.
However, the Court allowed the change of the middle name of Olbila to Olbita in the birth certificate of
Roger Lee and the change also of the middle name of the mother from Orbita to Olbita in the birth
certificate of Rolando Lee. Such are typographical errors under the law which can be summarily corrected.

KUMALA SALIM WING VS. AHMAD ABUBAKAR
NO. L-25168 JANUARY 31, 1981
PONENTE: FERNANDO, C.J
FACTS:
Kumala Salim Wing, a Muslim woman and Filipino citizen was married sometime in 1955 to Wing Siong, a
Chinese citizen and a resident of Jolo, Sulu in a Muslim Ceremony. They married again in 1958 before the
Justice of Peace Ricardo T. Garcia of Jolo, Sulu because the Immigration Office of Jolo, Sulu refused to
register their Muslim marriage. After the registration of their civil marriage, petitioner as wife of Wing
Siong was issued an alien certificate of registration.
The couple had been married for at least ten years during the filing of the petition and has had six children
namely Bio Cheng, Man Way, Bio Heong, Seo Ming, Bio Chan and Wa Sang. All these children were living and
none had died.
The couple had all their children registered with the Immigration Office as aliens but that in the case of Bio
Heong, their third female child, there was a mistake as to her sex in the issuance of the child’s certificate of
live birth.
According to the petitioner, Bio Heong was delivered from her womb assisted by the attending nurse, Hadji
Kimjiok Denesa who instructed her clerk Andammi Labbay to prepare the Certificate of Live Birth. She
178
dictated the entries to be filled up in said document. It is not clear however whether it was Labbay’s
inadvertence or wrong reception of dictation or the attending nurse’s confused dictation that led to the
filling up in the sex of “M” to mean male instead of “F” to mean female.
The erroneous document was then filed with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Jolo without the
attending nurse or the parents of the child having known the mistake. This may have been attributed to the
couple’s lack of formal education and their want of understanding of the English language. It was only
during the time when the couple wanted to register their child Bio Heong with the Immigration Office in
Jolo that the error or mistake in child’s certificate of live birth was discovered.
The petitioner herein thereafter filed a petition with the lower court to make the necessary correction in
the certificate of live birth of minor Bio Heong Wing by changing the letter “M” appearing on the space for
sex “F” to mean female which is the true sex of the said minor child.
The lower court decided in favor of petitioner. Hence, a reversal of the lower court’s decision is sought by
appellant Civil Registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the necessary correction of the child’s sex from “M” or male to “F” or female may be allowed
under the circumstances
RULING:
Yes. The corroborative oral testimonies besides documents presented by petitioner were held as credible.
Among those presented were the nurse, Hadji Kimjiok Donesa, who attended to the deliveries of the first
five children of the petitioner and a public relations officer of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Jolo,
Alex Kho, who explained the Chinese characters representing “Bio Heong” which meant young girl,
beautiful and sweet like perfume. Moreover, all the first five children of the couple were presented in open
court and were found by the Court to look alike possessing similar features to that of their parents and that
Bio Heong was truly a girl.
The doctrine of the case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic and subsequent adjudications predicated thereon
forbade only the entering of material corrections or amendments in the record of birth by virtue of a
judgment in a summary action against the Civil Registrar.
In the case of the petitioner herein, an appropriate proceeding was conducted in the hearing of the petition
whereby all the parties concerned including the government and its agencies whose interest may had been
affected were either heard or given their opportunity to oppose said petition. Considering the publication
made, the appearance of the parties concerned and the presentation of the evidence during the hearing, the
petition was not summary in nature but an appropriate proceeding where the matter proved was threshed
out in a regular trial on the merits.
179
ROSALES VS. CASTILLO ROSALES
NO. L-31712, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
PONENTE: MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS:
Ernesto Rosales and Asuncion Castillo Rosales were married in Carmen, Cebu in 1942. As a result of their
marriage, four legitimate children were born. They separated in 1950 when the husband Ernesto left for
Iloilo to seek employment. After which, they ceased to cohabit and as a result of the separation, his wife
Asuncion had illicit adulterous relationship with one Vidal Rivera. As a result of such illicit relationship,
four children were born namely Teresita Castillo, Cecilia Rosales, Emmanuel Rosales and Miligros Socorro
Rivera.
Ernesto filed a petition for the correction and/or cancellation of entries in the Civil Registrar before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. He alleged that there were errors in the records of birth of the two minors,
Cecilia Rosales and Emmanuel Rosales. It appeared that the name of the father listed in the records of birth
is that of Ernesto Rosales and not that of Vidal Rivera. He contended that the errors were caused by Mrs.
F.L. Ramiro, the proprietress of the St. Anthony Maternity and General Clinic where these two minors were
born.
The court a quo issued an order setting the petition for hearing and further ordered the publication of the
order. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City through counsel filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the
correction sought by appellant is untenable under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 since said correction
is not clerical but substantial involving the paternity and filiation of the four children.
The court issued an order dismissing the petition, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the correction sought for may be allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
No. The correction involving the paternity and filiation of the minor children was substantial and could not
be corrected under Rule 108. The question of the legitimacy of the four minors was patently controversial
since they were born while the marriage of Ernesto and Asuncion still existed. The four children were
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate children of the married couple. This fact made the issue in the
case controversial and not appropriate for a cause of action in the proceeding.
Finally, the issue of the legitimacy of the child can only be resorted in a direct action brought for that
purpose by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
180
SISON VS. REPUBLIC
NO. L-58087, DECEMBER 27, 1982
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J
FACTS:
Antonio Sison, the father of petitioners, was one of the two children of Gertrudes Reyes with her first
husband Aurelio Sison whom she married in 1931. Antonio was born on May 10, 1935. Antonio’s mother
was married thrice. Her second husband was Laurencio de la Cruz and her third husband was Jose Delgado.
Antonio, then 27 years old, eloped and married Gloria Ibarra before the Municipal Mayor of San Juan, Rizal.
He used the surname of “de la Cruz” in the Marriage Contract. The couple begot two children Danilo and
Josephine. Their births were recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Rizal both under
the family name “de la Cruz”. However, when they were baptized in the Parish of Sta. Cruz, their surnames
were stated to be “Sison” and they were given the Christian names Danilo and Maria Jocelyn. They were
likewise registered as Danilo Sison and Jocelyn Sison in their subsequent schooling and became known to
relatives and friends by such names.
Antonio died of tetanus in 1978. Their mother Gloria now had been working as a nurse in Detroit, Michigan.
It appeared that when the minors were to go to the States to join their mother, it was discovered during the
processing of their travel papers that their surname in their birth registry was “de la Cruz”.
This is the reason for the petition filed by petitioners, assisted by their grandmother Gertrudes Reyes, as
they were minors to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for correction of their surnames from “de la Cruz” in
their respective birth certificates to “Sison”. After due publication, the State through the Solicitor General
filed an opposition alleging that the corrections requested were substantial or controversial in nature and
that the summary procedure for correction of entry in the Civil Registry under Article 412 of the Civil Code
in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to mere clerical errors or harmless or innocuous
changes.
The trial court denied the petition on the grounds raised in the Government’s opposition and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this instant recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition to correct the surname of the minor children was properly dismissed
RULING:
No. A petition for correction of surname as recorded in the registry of birth may be treated as a petition for
change of name. Procedurally, the only way by which a name can be changed legally is by appropriate
proceeding under Rule 103, that is, through a petition for Change of Name, since a person’s legal name is
what appears in the civil register, not the name by which he was baptized or by which he has been known
in the community. However, as in San Roque vs. Republic, the petition in this case may well be, in essence,
one for judicial authority to change names for the petition prays for “correction of names” and more
specifically for an order “to make the necessary corrections in the respective certificates of birth of
petitioners by registering their names therein as Danilo Sison y Ibarra and Josephine Sison y Ibarra.”
As found by the lower court, the petitioners had proved that their correct surname is “Sison”. It was error
for their father to have entered “de la Cruz” as his surname in his marriage contract and in the Birth
Certificates of his children for at the time of Antonio’s birth on May 10, 1935, his mother was then the wife
of Aurelio Sison. The law does not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is
not their father.
181
Similarly, copies of the petition and amended petition were served on the Solicitor General and the order of
court setting the petition for hearing was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week
for three consecutive weeks. Despite such fact, the State through Solicitor General did not present evidence
in support of its opposition. It has been held that a petition to correct a surname may be allowed where the
proceedings was not summary in character.

WONG VS. REPUBLIC
NO. L-29376 JULY 30, 1982
PONENTE: ESCOLIN, J
FACTS:
Mariano Wong, a citizen of the Republic of China as shown by his Alien certificate, was married to a Filipino
citizen, Ma. Sylvia Gustilo in the City of Iloilo. In his marriage contract, his citizenship was erroneously
indicated as “Filipino” instead of “Chinese”. According to petitioner, the mistake was committed by his
father who undertook the preparation of the necessary documents relating to his marriage.
As a result of the marriage of Wong and Gustilo, three children were born namely Mariano Jr., Audrey and
Richardson, all surnamed Wong. The nationality of the said minors and the nationality of their were
registered as Filipinos in their certificates of birth. It was argued by petitioner that the nurse who attended
their births erroneously reported to the office of the Local Civil Registrar the petitioner’s citizenship as
Filipino.
Petitioner contended that the errors appearing on the birth certificates were committed without his
knowledge and consent and were only made known to him when he asked for certified copies of the birth
certificates in connection with his petition for naturalization.
The petition filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Mariano Wong, in his own behalf and as a
guardian of his minor children, prayed for the correction of their nationality from “Filipino” to “Chinese”.
Such petition was granted by the lower court. Hence, this appeal by the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the correction in the citizenship from “Chinese” to Filipino” in the birth
certificates should be given due course
RULING:
No. Only clerical errors can be ordered corrected in summary proceedings for correction of the Civil
Registry. Entries which can be corrected under the summary procedure contemplated in the Article 412 of
the Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are clerical in
nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous.
In the instant case, the mistakes sought to be corrected could not categorized as mere clerical errors for
they involved controversial matter affecting the citizenship not only of petitioner Mariano Wong but of his
minor children as well.
182
Lingao, Cherylette
REPUBLIC VS CFI OF DAVAO ORIENTAL
AUGUST 20, 1979
GUERRERO, J;
FACTS:
A petition for review filed by the Solicitor General for the review of the decision in correcting the
registration of the record of birth of one Samuel Yu by changing Chinese to Filipino as his nationality and
Legitimate to Illegitimate as his status.
Hence, the Solictor General filed a petition for review assigning the following errors:
The decision of the lower Court is erroneous for the changers applied for are not within the purview of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower Court committed such error
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment under review.
The subject matter of correction only covers “clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature. Not those
involving civil status or citizenship, which are substantial and/or controversial”. The change from
legitimate to illegitimate and Chinese to Filipino are substantial and may not therefore be changed pursuant
to Article 412 of the NCC, neither may be effected under Rule 108 which only prescribes the judicial
procedure on the matter and which limits the entries to those corrections enumerated in Section 2.
Lingao, Cherylette
TAN VS. REPUBLIC
DECEMBER 26, 1984
CUEVAS, J.;
FACTS:
This is an appeal regarding the decision of the CFI of Manila denying the petition for correction of entry by
one Lamberto Tan.
Tan ought to have the following correction be made: That his birth certificate be corrected to make him and
his father as Filipino citizens from Chinese citizens.
Publication followed and the Solicitor General registered his opposition on the ground that the correction
prayed for is not a correction of clerical mistake.
In reply, counsel for petitioner contends that his client does not seek the correction of citizenship of his
father, much more of his own because they are already ‘Filipinos’. He merely asks for the correction of an
erroneous entry.
ISSUE:
183
Whether or not such change in citizenship is proper under Rule 108.
HELD.
No, the appeal is without merit.
Where the alleged errors to be corrected are not merely clerical, harmless or innocuous, but substantial in
nature, the correction should be made through an appropriate action where all adverse parties must be
notified, and not through a summary proceeding.
Moreover, the SC reviewed the petitioner’s case and it revealed no convincing proof that p etitioner and his
father are Filipino citizens. One does not become a Filipino citizen simply by declaring himself to be so.
Petitioner did not show any documentary proof whatsoever nor any credible witness to corroborate his
claim.
Lingao, Cherylette
TOLENTINO VS PARAS
MAY 30, 1983
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J;
FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed to reverse the respondent Court’s order dismissing petitioner’s
case for her “declaration as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of
his death certificate”
Petitioner, on a special proceedings case, sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death
certificate of Amado Tolentino from “Maria Clemente” to “Serafia G. Tolentino”, her name.
However, the lower Court dismissed the petition for lack of proper requisites under the law. Hence, she
filed a case against the private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar to declare her as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. Still, the case was dismissed for the
reasons of:
“1. The correction of entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the
issue involved is marital relationship;
2. The Court has not acquired jurisdiction as prescribed under Article 108 read together with Article 412,
publication is needed”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner resorted to the proper remedy for the declaration as surviving spouse and
correction of entry.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower Court’s orders and declared Serafia Tolentino as the surviving
spouse of the deceased.
Although the petitioner’s ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks judicial declaration that she is the awful
surviving spouse of the deceased, in order to lay the basis for the correction of entry in the death certificate
184
Amado. The suit is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary
proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent,
as the individual most affected, is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend
her interests.
Moreover, Amado has been convicted of Bigamy, hence this is enough evidence to prove marital status of
petitioner and the deceased. The second marriage being invalid, the entry made in the corresponding local
register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected.
Lingao, Cherylette
REPUBLIC VS HON. GEORGE P. MACLI-ING
MARCH 18, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J;
FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Republic of the Philippines seeks to annul the decision of the
respondent judge from allowing the correction of entry in the local civil registry of one Esteban Piao to Sy
Piao and one JOE SY to JOSE SY.
Petitioner’s opposition lies on the impropriety of the proceeding, as the changes sought are substantial in
nature.
The respondent judge conducted a full-dress hearing and authorized for the corrections, hence the appeal
on the correction of entry in the record of SY PIAO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not correction is allowed provided that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is only applicable to
changes contemplated in Article 412, those that are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are
not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.
HELD:
Judgment by the public respondent was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Where indubitable evidence exists
that the change of name is not substantial and the name Sy Piao and Estaban Sy are one and the same
person, the correction of entry is allowed. It is true that the change would necessarily affect the identity of
the person, hence it is substantial. However, the Alien Certificate of Registration of the person provides that
his name is Sy Piao. His immigrant Certificate of Residence also shows Sy Piao and so as his Income Tax
Return. The school records of his son, Oscar, shows that his father’s name is Sy Piao. Testimonial evidence
also showed that Esteban was his nickname by which he was known by his Filipino friends. That explains
why the Son’s birth records shows that his father’s name is Estban Sy and not Sy Piao.
Where the citizenship, paternity, filiation or status of children and their father is not in issue, correction of
entry in the birth certificate for a change of name may be granted.
185
Lingao, Cherylette
REPUBLIC VS VALENCIA
MARCH 5, 1986
GUTIERREEZ, JR. J;
FACTS:
A petition to review of the decision of respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas who ordered the local civil
registrar of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction in the entries of birth of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children filed with the CFI of Cebu for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of her two children. She seeks to have the necessary
corrections made:
Civil status and citizenship of the minors; from status of the mother as married to single, status of children
from legitimate to illegtimate, and citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition contemplates a summary
proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes and not those
involving substantial and controversial errors.
The lower Court rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering the Local civil registrar to make the
corrections. Hence, the Republic of the Philippines raised the error of the lower court in ordering the
corrections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the relief is the appropriate remedy used by Valencia since Rule 108 is summary in nature.
HELD:
The lower Court’s decision was affirmed, petition was denied.
Substantial errors in the Civil Registry may be corrected provided that appropriate remedy is availed of.
Although it is true that the subject matter of a petition not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but one involving substantial and controverted ones, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. The Supreme Court pronounced that it adhered to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided that the parties aggrieved by the error avail of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
In this adversary proceeding, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding that concern
substantial changes are the following:
1. the civil registrar
2. all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.
Thereafter, it becomes the duty of the court to issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing,
cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
If all the procedural requirements have been followed, a petition can no longer be summary in nature.
186
Lingao, Cherylette
CHIAO BEN LIM VS HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA
DECEMBER 29, 1986
CRUZ, J
FACTS:
The case is an appeal by certiorari from the two Orders of the public respondent dismissing a petition for
the correction of a wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as Chinese instead of
Filipino.
While the petitioner showed proof that his siblings are all Filipino citizens, the local civil registrar of Cebu
opposed and said that only clerical errors were allowed in the summary proceedings authorized under
Article 412 of the NCC and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Article 412 provides: “No Entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not substantial issues like citizenship can be covered by the summary proceeding in Rule 108
HELD:
The SC reversed the Orders of the respondent judge and further ordered the start of the appropriate
adversary proceeding to resolve the substantial issue on his citizenship found in his birth records.
The Court has adopted the Valencia ruling in deciding this case. Changes in the birth entry regarding a
person’s citizenship is now allowed, as long as adversary proceedings are held. Black’s law dictionary
defines adversary proceeding as:
“one having opposing parties, as distinguished from an ex parte application.”
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code. Where such a change is ordered, the Court will
not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil
registry as authorized by law.
Lingao, Cherylette
REPUBLIC VS HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO
JULY 31, 1987
PADILLA, J,;
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari regarding the matter of a special proceeding in the correction of
entry in the civil registry which the respondent judge ordered the changing of entry of birth of one
Innocencio Carag Tan from Chinese to Filipino.
187
Innocencio Tan filed a verified petition to correct an alleged erroneous entry on his citizenship. Thereafter,
notice to the Solicitor General and publication of the notice of hearing followed. Tan established that he was
the child of spouses Vicente Carag Tan, a natural child of a mother who was a Filipino citizen, and Anastacia
Pe. The respondent judge so ruled that the necessary correction be made.
Hence, this petition by the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that it is contrary to the well-settled
doctrine that “only mistakes in the entries in the Civil Register which can be corrected under Article 412 of
the NCC and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those that are merely clerical in nature and not those which
affect the civil status or citizenship of the person so involved.
ISSUE:
WON substantial changes may be made using the procedure in Rule 108
HELD:
Yes. Laying the doctrine found in the Republic vs. Valencia, the Supreme Court has now relaxed the
procedure. The decision states that:
“While the Court has indeed, previously ruled that the changes or corrections authorized under Art. 412 of
the NCC, which envisions a summary procedure, relate only to harmless and innocuous alterations, such as
misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding and that changes in the
citizenship of a person are substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in
appropriate adversary proceedings, the rule has been relaxed in Republic vs. Valencia.”
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the proceeding conducted by the lower court was an adversary
and appropriate proceeding in that all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed where the
opposing counsel have been given the opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
Lingao, Cherylette
ELEOSIDA VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY
MAY 9, 2002
PUNO, J.;
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the RTC’s Order which dismissed motu proprio the petition of
one Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The
birth certificate shows that chil’s full name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, born to Lourdes Eleosida
and Carlos Borbon on May 24, 1992. The birth certificate also indicates that the parents were married in
Batangas City on January 10, 1985.
The petitioner wants to have her child’s birth certificate be corrected with the following corrections:
1. surname be changed from Borbon to Eleosida

2. date of parents’ wedding be left blank
3. mother’s name be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida instead of Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon
She alleges that she gave birth to a son out of wedlock, that she was never married to Carlos Borbon, and
that the child is illegitimate and should follow her surname.
188
The trial court issued a notice of hearing and issued another order setting date for presentation and the
Solicitor General filed no opposition thereto. However, the court motu proprio dismissed the petition for
lack of merit on the ground of established jurisprudence that only clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature and not as those that may affect the civil status, nationality, or citizenship of the persons
involved.
ISSUE:
WON corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Art. 412 of the NCC and Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial in nature
HELD:
Yes.
Following the relaxed procedure as pronounced in the case of Republic vs. Valencia, even substantial errors
may now be corrected provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.1âwphi1.nêt
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three 3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to—(1)
issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as 'summary'.
189
RULE 109
Lingao, Cherylette
DAIS VS. HON. GARDUÑO
JULY 29, 1926
OSTRAND, J.;
FACTS:
The case is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit an appeal interposed
in a probate case by the petitioners.
Respondent Altavas filed a motion in the intestate proceedings of Serapion Dais, Civil Case No. 988 of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz, asking that the administrator of the estate be ordered to pay him the sum of
P5000 in settlement of his fees for legal services rendered and to be rendered in the said intestate
proceedings and in three more civil cases. The Court ordered that only partial payment be made because
the civil cases and the intestate proceedings are still pending and legal service has not yet been completed.
Another Court order was issued authorizing the administrator to sell in a public auction or private sale
some assets that consist of parcel of lands.
This order caused the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, in which the
respondent judge denied.
Petitioners gave notice of the intention to appeal requesting that the court fix the amount of appeal bond.
The court refused to fix the appeal bond on the ground that the orders were merely interlocutory in nature;
hence not appealable.
However, prior to the notice of appeal, the parcels of land were already sold and P4000 of the proceeds was
paid to Altavas. Thereupon, respondent Altavas moved to the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that
matters are already moot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was premature.
Whether or not the orders were interlocutory in nature
HELD:
An interlocutory order is one that does not of itself definitely settle or conclude any of the rights of the
parties to the action. Applying this test, it is clear that the orders in question were not of that kind; if carried
out they would operate to divest the estate of important property rights and amount to a final
determination of these rights.
The lower court may possibly have been misled by the provision in section 123 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that no ruling, order or judgment shall "be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court until final
judgment is rendered for one party or the other." This provision applies to ordinary civil action, but that it
cannot be accepted literally in regard to probate proceedings, is best shown by the extensive provisions for
special appeals contained in sections 773 to 783 of the same Code."
The failure to admit the appeal in the case may in the end lead to unfortunate results. In the order of
January 26, 1924, the fees of the respondent Altavas were fixed at P5,000 with the understanding that this
amount would be considered full compensation for his services until the termination of the cases
190
mentioned in the order and still pending. The respondent maintains that the word "termination" as
employed in the order meant the termination in the trial court only, and that the amount allowed did not
cover fees for services on appeal.
The Supreme Court did not sustain this contention.
“The order does not in any manner limit or qualify the word and it can therefore only have one
meaning, namely, the final determination of the litigation. The respondent Altavas took no exception to the
order and accepted partial payments under it; he can therefore not now be heard to say that it did not
express the true intent of the parties and of the court. No provision was made for prepayment of fees and it
can therefore not be argued that they were due until after the services were rendered. Notwithstanding the
fact that so far there appears to have been no complete termination of the litigation in any of the cases
referred to, the respondent has nevertheless been paid practically his entire fee, and in order to satisfy his
claim the court has authorized the sale of real property pertaining to the estate.”
The SC granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered that the respondent judge fix the appeal
bond.
191

Spec Pro Digest 2011 PDF

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Spec Pro Digest 2011 PDF

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

SPECIAL

Guttierez, Myron Dei Pastores, Cherie Mae

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 36

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 37

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 39

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 40

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 42

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 44

Pastores, Cherie Mae 47

Pastores, Cherie Mae 48

Pastores, Cherie Mae 49

Pastores, Cherie Mae 50

Pastores, Cherie Mae 50

Pastores, Cherie Mae 52

Pastores, Cherie Mae 53

Pastores, Cherie Mae 84

Pastores, Cherie Mae 86

Pastores, Cherie Mae 90

Gutierrez, Myron Dei 99

Gutierrez, Myron Dei 101

Gutierrez, Myron Dei 102

Gutierrez, Myron Dei 105

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 106

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 108

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 109

Sydionco, Jacqueline Carlotta 110

RULE 101 112

RULE 102: 113

Pastores, Cherie Mae 113

Pastores, Cherie Mae 113

Pastores, Cherie Mae 114

Pastores, Cherie Mae 116

Pastores, Cherie Mae 117

Pastores, Cherie Mae 120

Pastores, Cherie Mae 122

Pastores, Cherie Mae 126

Pastores, Cherie Mae 129

Pastores, Cherie Mae 130

Pastores, Cherie Mae 131

Porquez, Jonalyn 133

Porquez, Jonalyn 135

Porquez, Jonalyn 135

Porquez, Jonalyn 137

Porquez, Jonalyn 138

Porquez, Jonalyn 139

Porquez, Jonalyn 140

Porquez, Jonalyn 141

Porquez, Jonalyn 143

Porquez, Jonalyn 144

Porquez, Jonalyn 145

Porquez, Jonalyn 147

Sydiongco, Jacqueline Carlotta 148

Sydiongco, Jacqueline Carlotta 149

Sydiongco, Jacqueline Carlotta 150

RULE 103 151

Lingao, Cherylette 151

Lucaylucay, Maicha 151

Lucaylucay, Maicha 152

Lucaylucay, Maicha 153

Lucaylucay, Maicha 154

Lucaylucay, Maicha 156

Lucaylucay, Maicha 157

Lucaylucay, Maicha 158