Mustang Lumber v Court of Appeals; G.R. No.

104988; 18 Jun 1996;

FACTS:
Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
petitioner’s lumberyard, a team of foresters and policeman was organized and sent to conduct
surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber. The driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the seizure of the truck and its cargo without warrant was unlawful.

RULING:
NO. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause.

Petition is DENIED.

Tan vs director of forestry

G.R. no. L-24548

Facts:

On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging operations on a
public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated
Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses
where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary
timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting secretary,
revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally was the same date the
license for petitioner was signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio

2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the license

Held:
Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to
December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked.

b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on
January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the
license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such
void license.

2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise.

Petition denied.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.