DBC - Handbook On Development & Building Works in RPZ PDF

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Railway Protection Zone) Regulations and the Rapid Transit System (Railway Protection, Restricted
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Handbook on
Development &
Building Works
in Railway
Protection Zone
January 2005 Edition
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Development
and Building Control Department, Land Transport Authority.
Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone

PREFACE
The Code of Practice for Railway Protection covers the submission

procedures and requirements for obtaining approval for development and
building proposals, permit to commence engineering works within the
railway protection zone and railway corridor. Technical requirements for
compliance at the design and construction stages of development are also
stipulated.
This Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection

Zone illustrates the interpretation of the technical requirements in the Code
of Practice for Railway Protection and the safety considerations that would
be required for carrying out any development and building works within the
railway protection zone. Examples of design by architects and engineers that
have adopted the ‘alternative solution’ approach are also illustrated and
discussed.
As part of the Authority’s continual efforts to be more business friendly, the

Authority embarked on the review of this Handbook in March 2004 and has
completed this new edition. We welcome any suggestion or feedback from
all users on the latest version of Handbook for improvement of future
editions.
Development & Building Control Department

Land Transport Authority
Singapore

Contents
Page
Guide to Users of Handbook

1 Introduction 1
2 Structure of handbook 1
3 Step-by-step guide 2
4 Referencing of code and handbook 3
5 Glossary of acronyms 4
6 Useful references 4
Complying with Technical Requirements

Chapter 1 Meeting performance requirements
1.1 Framework for developing solutions 5
1.2 Objectives 6
1.3 Performance requirements 6
1.3.1 Structural safety 6
1.3.2 Operational safety 7
1.3.3 Fire safety 7
1.3.4 Flood protection 7
1.3.5 Inspection and maintenance 7
1.4 Solutions 7
1.5 Assessment methods 9
1.5.1 Documentary evidence 9
1.5.2 Verification methods 9
1.5.3 Expert judgement 10
1.5.4 Comparison with deemed-to-satisfy provisions 10
Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions
Chapter 2 Site preparation works
2.1 Mobilisation works 11
2.1.1 Demarcation of reserve lines 11
2.1.1.1 Above ground RTS structures 11
2.1.1.2 Underground RTS structures 13
2.1.2 Storage of materials 14
2.1.2.1 Allowable imposed load on RTS structures 15
2.1.3 Erection of temporary structures 16
2.1.4 Access under viaduct 18

Page
2.2 Demolition works 19

2.2.1 Method of demolishing buildings 19
2.2.2 Method of demolishing station structures 21
2.2.3 Monitoring of vibration levels 23
Chapter 3 Substructure works

3.1 Footing and raft 24
3.2 Piling and drilling works 25
3.2.1 Clearance from RTS 25
3.2.2 Construction method 27
3.2.3 Debonding 31
3.2.4 Ground anchors or tie backs 32
3.3 Excavation works 32
3.3.1 Construction of basements, pilecaps and shallow 32
foundations
3.3.1.1 Design of temporary works 32
3.3.1.2 Excavation works 33
3.3.2 Construction of tunnels 36
Chapter 4 Building works

4.1 Building adjacent to an above ground RTS structure 38
4.1.1 Building setback 38
4.1.2 Risk of falling objects 41
4.2 Building under a RTS viaduct 42
4.3 Building over the trainway 51
4.4 Building interfaced or integrated with a RTS station 53
4.4.1 Safety considerations 57
4.4.1.1 Structural safety 57
4.4.1.2 Fire safety 57
4.4.1.3 Flood protection 66
4.4.1.4 Watertightness 68
4.4.1.5 Mechanical and electrical services 68
Chapter 5 Instrumentation
5.1 Introduction 70
5.2 Planning considerations 71
5.3 Criteria for monitoring 77
5.3.1 Ground and RTS structure monitoring 77
5.3.2 Structure and track limits 77
5.4 Monitoring of RTS structure 77
5.4.1 Total movement in any direction (underground RTS) 77
5.4.2 Differential movement in transverse plane 78
5.4.3 Differential movement along the track 79
5.5 Monitoring of RTS track 79
5.5.1 Track distortions 79
5.5.2 Twist 80
5.5.3 Vertical dip or peak 81

Page
5.5.4 Horizontal versine 82

5.6 Case studies: Underground RTS 82
5.6.1 Engineering work comprising construction of bored 82
piles and a basement
5.6.2 Engineering work comprising installation of soldier 84
piles and construction of 3-level basement
5.7 Case studies: Aboveground RTS 90
5.7.1 Piling works and 1-level basement construction 90
Alternative Solutions
Chapter 6 Alternative Solutions
6.1 Meeting performance requirements 92
6.2 Suggested process and methodology 92
6.3 Case examples 93
6.3.1 Case example no. 1 94
6.3.3.1 Structural considerations 98
6.3.3.2 Operational considerations 99
6.3.3.3 Enhanced monitoring 100

Guide to Users of Handbook
1. Introduction
Understanding and application of the Code of Practice for Railway

Protection [herein referred to as the Code] may differ amongst users of the
Code. Therefore, the aim of this handbook is to provide guidance to assist
architects and professional engineers in their design of the development and
building works within the railway protection zone.
This handbook contains explanatory commentary and supplemental material

to guide the user through the technical requirements of Code. The
commentary consists of the following components:
Interpretation of requirements
Application of requirements
Illustrative figures
Tables
Case examples
2. Structure of handbook
This handbook has been structured in an easy to read manner as shown in the
diagram below:
Complying with Technical Requirements
Chapter 1 Meeting Performance Requirements
Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions Alternative Solutions
Chapter 2 Site preparation works Chapter 6 Alternative Solutions
Chapter 3 Substructure works
Chapter 4 Building works
Chapter 5 Instrumentation
Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 1

3. Step-by-step guide
Methods of pile installation that

are likely to generate excessive
vibrations are not acceptable
within the 2nd reserve of RTS The commentary text in
structures. Some examples of the this handbook is
methods not acceptable are:
designed to help users
Use of down-the-hole understand and apply
drilling technique (see 1 the requirements of the
Figure 3-7) Code. It explains the
Use of percussively driven
concrete piles, steel H-piles,
rationale behind the
sheet-piles or timber piles, requirements and
etc. illustrates proposals
Use of rock chopping which are acceptable
chisels (or not acceptable).
Use of vibratory method of
installing or extracting
sheetpiles, H-piles or steel
casings (see Figure 3-8)
Helpful illustrative
2
figures are provided to
aid the user in
understanding the
requirements of the
Code.
Figure 3-6
View of a hydrofaise machine
Underground, Transition, Sub- Above Ground

aqueous & At Grade Structures Structures
Daily Twice weekly Tables that visually

organize complex
3 information for easy
Daily Twice weekly
access are featured in
Daily Nil this handbook.
(Trice weekly -critical
cases only)
Table 5-1
Typical instrumentation & frequency for construction
activities within the railway protection zone

Case examples
This section discusses three examples of
development sites within the railway
protection zone that have adopted the Actual case studies are
‘alternative solutions’ approach. They are: given to show how the
4 requirements of the
Design and construction of a retail Code can be satisfied.
podium above Novena Station
These case studies walk
Design and construction of an the user through
underground link from Bugis Junction potentially complicated
to Bugis Station scenarios.
Deep excavation adjacent to and
tunnelling below the existing RTS
tunnels
4. Referencing of code and handbook
When making a reference to a particular provision, drawing or table in the

Code, the following expressions are used:
I {in blue italic} Part

9 {in blue italic} Section
9.3 {in blue italic} Clause
9.3.3 {in blue italic} Clause
9.3.3.1{in blue italic} Clause
LTA/DBC/CPRP/008 {in blue italic} Drawing
Table 9.1(a) {in blue italic} Table
When making a reference to a particular provision in this handbook, the

following expressions are used:
3 {in black normal} Chapter

3.2 {in black normal} Section
3.2.1 {in black normal} Paragraph
3-2 {in black normal} Figure & Table

5. Glossary of acronyms
In this handbook, the following acronyms are used:
BCU – Building Control Unit
DBC – Development and Building Control Department
NEL – North East Line
LRT – Light Rail Transit
LTA – Land Transport Authority
MRT – Mass Rapid Transit
PUB – Public Utilities Board
QP – Qualified Person
RTS – Rapid Transit System
6. Useful references
Rapid Transit Systems (Development and Building Works in Railway

Corridor and Railway Protection Zone) Regulations
Rapid Transit Systems (Railway Protection, Restricted Activities)

Regulations
Code of Practice for Railway Protection (Oct 2004 edition)
Guide to Carrying Out Restricted Activities within Railway Protection

and Safety Zones

Chapter 1
Meeting Performance Requirements
Quick preview
The primary consideration in railway protection is public’s safety. In this context,

the Code has identified a set of objectives and the performance requirements. The
objectives spell out the basic criteria that need to be satisfied to ensure safety of
the rapid transit systems. To meet these objectives, performance requirements are
spelt out. These provide quantifiable means for architects, engineers and
contractors to work out suitable solutions using the appropriate assessment
methods. This chapter provides further insight into the above objectives,
performance requirements, solutions and assessment methods.
1.1 Framework for developing solutions
The framework for developing solutions for development and Part II

building works in the railway protection zone are formulated in Diagram 7.1
the following hierarchy:
Objectives
Performance requirements
Solutions
Assessment methods
The objective guides the designer to interpret the Code’s

requirements. Performance requirements outline the areas that
need to be considered to achieve the objectives. All solutions
must comply with the objectives and the performance
requirements. Solutions developed to meet the deemed-to-
satisfy provisions (as given in Part II Section 9 of the Code)
will meet the performance requirements (as given in Part II
Section 8 of the Code).

1.2 Objectives
The objectives (as given in Part II Section 8 of the Code) Part II

define broadly the goals to be fulfilled for the protection of the Clause 7.1(a)
railway.
There are five basic objectives relating to:
Structural safety
Operational safety
Fire safety
Flood protection
Inspection and maintenance
Architects, engineers, contractors, etc. must meet the above

objectives in developing solutions from inception stage
through planning, designing and constructing their
development and building works; including associated works
such as advance works and temporary works for the protection
of the railway system.
1.3 Performance requirements
The performance requirements (as given in Part II Section 8 of Part II

the Code) define fundamental areas that need to be considered Clause 7.2
Clause 8.1
in working out solutions to meet the objectives.
The application of relevant performance requirements on

development and building works within the railway protection
zone are illustrated in Figures 1-2 and 1-3.
1.3.1 Structural safety
Development and building works could affect the integrity and Part II
durability of the RTS structures. Construction activities could Clause 8.2
also physically damage the RTS structures. The objectives are
to ensure that, in working out any solutions for carrying out
these works, they do not create a situation that would damage
or affect the integrity of the RTS structures.
It is important for the QP and/or the appointed expert(s) to

fully understand the design of the RTS structures, their present
condition and the effects of the development and building
works on the RTS structures due to the proposal.

1.3.2 Operational safety
In order for trains to operate safely, the rapid transit system Part II
tunnel and track alignment must not be subjected to excessive Clause 8.3
deformation and changes. If the design limits are exceeded,
there will be a possibility that the train would not be able to
travel at the optimum speed, the comfort of passengers may be
affected or in the worst scenario cause train to derail.
1.3.3 Fire safety
The rapid transit systems are designed and constructed so that Part II
in the event of a fire the safety of people is not compromised. Clause 8.4
During development and building works, especially where
works may affect the means of escape from the station,
adequate fire safety measures and protection systems must be
provided.
1.3.4 Flood protection
The rapid transit systems are designed to meet flood threshold Part II
levels as approved by the Drainage Department of the PUB. Clause 8.5
Any underground links to the RTS structures, services
connections, etc. during construction or permanent stage must
not subject the rapid transit systems to any risk of flooding.
1.3.5 Inspection and maintenance
Development and building works around, above and in the Part II

vicinity of the rapid transit systems must not cause obstruction Clause 8.6
or inaccessibility for the inspection and maintenance of the
rapid transit systems.
1.4 Solutions
In order for designers to provide innovative and creative Part II

solutions which are practical and technically sound, the Code Clause 7.1
allows the architects, engineers, contractors, etc. to choose any
of the processes below in developing a solution:
Complying with the deemed-to-satisfy provisions as given

in Part II Section 9 of the Code; or
Formulating an alternative solution which meets the

performance requirements (as given in Part II Section 8 of
the Code) or is shown to be at least equivalent to the
deemed-to-satisfy provision; or
a combination of above

Relevant performance provisions:
Structural Safety
Operational Safety
Fire Safety
Inspection & Maintenance
Figure 1-2
Performance provisions applicable to development and building located
adjacent to above ground RTS station and viaduct
Relevant performance provisions:

Structural Integrity
Operational Safety
Fire Safety
Flood Protection
Figure 1-3
Performance provisions applicable to development and building linked to an
underground RTS station

The term ‘deemed to satisfy provision’ means exactly what it
implies: if a design complies with all the relevant deemed to
satisfy provisions, then the design is deemed to satisfy the
corresponding performance requirements, and is therefore
eligible to be approved.
An alternative solution is a design that can be shown to comply

with the relevant performance requirements.
1.5 Assessment methods
In developing solutions either to meet the deemed-to-satisfy Part II

provisions or alternative solutions, it is necessary to adopt a Clause 7.3
suitable methodology to assess whether they comply with the
performance requirements.
When adopting an alternative solution, it is imperative that

proper assessment methods must be adopted to predict the
effects of the proposed development and building works on the
RTS.
The assessment of a proposed alternative solution can be

undertaken by one of the following assessment methods or a
combination of methods below:
Acceptable documentary evidence
Verification methods
Comparison with deemed-to-satisfy provisions
Expert judgement
1.5.1 Documentary evidence
This assessment method shall be supported with documentary Part II

evidence that clearly shows that a similar solution had been Clause 7.3(a)
proven to be suitable and successful in meeting the objectives
in similar circumstances.
1.5.2 Verification methods
In developing solutions to meet the performance requirements, Part II

either to show that they meet the deemed-to-satisfy provisions Clause 7.3(b)
or alternative solutions, it is crucial that the methods used to
model or simulate the actual conditions are suitable for use in
similar situations. Sensitivity studies would be needed where
necessary to check that the parameters used are reasonable.

Besides these, a system to monitor and check that the results of
the evaluation during construction shall also be worked out.
Necessary mechanisms must be in place to determine whether
any re-evaluation or review needs to be considered during the
implementation of the alternative solutions so that actions can
be taken and decisions could be made if the situation develops
differently from forecast and before a dangerous condition
arises. This would therefore include a hazard analysis and
measures to mitigate those risks identified.
1.5.3 Expert judgement
Alternative solutions must be prepared by an expert(s) who has Part II

the necessary experience, skills and knowledge in the relevant Clause 7.3(d)
field. The basis to demonstrate whether the solution complies
with the performance requirements thus fulfilling the
objectives of railway protection should be clearly spelt out and
substantiated in the assessment.
1.5.4 Comparison with deemed-to-satisfy provisions
Alternative solution is deemed to satisfy performance Part II

requirement if it is demonstrated to be equivalent to the Clause 7.3(d)
deemed-to-satisfy provisions by comparison.

Chapter 2
Site Preparation Works
Quick preview
In this chapter, we present the salient safety considerations for carrying out
mobilisation and demolition works in the railway protection zone. Acceptable
practice of demarcating RTS reserve lines on site, method of carrying out
mobilisation works, demolition works, etc. are explained with photographs taken
from development sites. These good practices should be considered to ensure the
safety of the railway.
2.1 Mobilisation works
Mobilisation works within the railway protection zone must Part II

satisfy the requirements of Part II Clauses 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 of Clause 9.2.1
the Code as described below. Clause 9.2.2
Safety considerations relating to carrying out any restricted

activity in the railway protection zone are available in the
Guide to Carrying out Restricted Activities within Railway
Protection and Safety Zone.
2.1.1 Demarcation of reserve lines
All railway reserve lines must be pegged and demarcated Part II

clearly on site by a registered land surveyor based on an Clause 9.2.1(a)
approved certified survey plan. These reserve lines must be
maintained throughout the entire duration of works. The
purpose of demarcating the reserve lines on site is to enhance
the recognition of the various reserves by QPs, contractors,
sub-contractors, resident engineers, clerk-of-works, crane
operators, etc.
2.1.1.1 Above ground RTS structures
For demarcating the 1st reserve line on site, the details given in
Figure 2-1 must be adopted. An example of such a provision is
shown in Figure 2-2. No demarcation markers should be
erected higher than the viaduct beam level as they may fall
onto the viaduct in the event of any collapse.

6m
500x300mm
Red Flag
Pole
MRT/ (To PE’s Design)
LRT 450x450mm
Viaduct Metal signboard
White base with red
wording
‘1ST RESERVE’
Footing
(To PE’s Design)
Note: Demarcation poles must not be spaced at more than 15m interval
Figure 2-1
Demarcation details for first reserve line of above ground RTS
Figure 2-2
Provision of first reserve line demarcation on site

2.1.1.2 Underground RTS structures
Before work commences, the exact location of the RTS

structures and the 1st reserve line must be established. This
is to ensure the following:
Drilling work is done as approved and there will be

no possibility of drilling into the underground RTS
structure.
Load bearing piles falling within the zone of

influence are debonded or alternatively checked so
as to prevent imposing additional load on the tunnel
lining.
The 1st, 2nd and 3rd reserves (see Figure 2-3) of an

underground RTS structure must be displayed on site at all
times during the construction period.
Min 450mm
1st
Reserve 450mm Visible
Min Height
Support on firm and stable

structure to Authority’s
approval
Note: All materials to be non-combustible unless approved by

Authority.
Figure 2-3
Details of MRT reserve markers

Figure 2-4
Prominent display of MRT third reserve on site
2.1.2 Storage of materials
Site activities involving any storage or placement of Part II

construction materials, temporary storage of flammable fluid, Table 9.1(a)
gas cylinders, etc. are not allowed within the 1st reserve of any
RTS structure (see Figure 2-5).
The main safety concerns relating to the storage or placement

of materials near the RTS structures are as follows :
Fire hazard to the above ground RTS structures.
Combustible material on fire may cause smoke and

fumes to enter the underground station (through vent
shaft or station entrance).
Additional stress onto the underground RTS structures

should not exceed the allowable limits in the Code.
Safety considerations relating to the storage and placement of

materials within the railway protection and safety zones are
available in the Guide to Carrying Out Restricted Activities
within Railway Protection and Safety Zones.

Kentledge
RTS tunnels
under the road
Silos
1s Reserve
Figure 2-5
Placing of heavy equipment, erection of silos, setting up of kentledge, etc. at
the above site arel outside the 1st reserve
2.1.2.1 Allowable imposed load on RTS structures
The allowable imposed load is define as the load applied at the

finished ground level directly above, straddling or to the side
of the RTS structure, that give the most onerous effect to the
Ground level (when

the tunnel was
originally designed)
IMPOSED LOAD (I.L.)
450
Zone of
RTS Tunnel Influence
Tunnel Axis Level
6m 6m
Figure 2-6
Allowable imposed load forRTS structures not under the roadway

2.1.3 Erection of temporary structures
Part II
Erection of temporary structures such as site offices, workers' Clause 9.2.1(b)
quarters, hoarding, scaffolding, concrete batching plants, etc.
near the RTS structure, in particular above ground structures,
should take into account the following safety measures:
Materials used for the erection of any temporary

structure (for example, hoarding shown in Figure 2-7)
located within the 1st reserve are to be non-combustible
to prevent a fire hazard.
No fire risk activities are to be carried out within any

temporary structure located within the 1st reserve.
Scaffolding is to be designed such that it is stable,

robust and suitably tied back to prevent any collapse
onto the above ground RTS structure.
Nets or other suitable screens are provided to prevent

any debris, tools, etc. from falling onto the tracks.
If temporary structures such as hoarding, passageway, etc. Part II

have to be erected next to/ within RTS station and its Clause 9.4.5
entrances, conditions in Part II Clause 9.4.5 of the Code must
be satisfied. The following measures must be considered:
Provide fire compartment to work area .
Maintain clear minimum width for fire escape in

station.
Ensure safe and protected passageway access in and out

of RTS station.
The structures must not interfere with the free flow of

air into and out of the RTS ventilation shafts.
Provide sufficient ventilation facilities in passageway.
Must not affect the existing fire safety and fire

protection system.
Provide adequate directional signages and lightings to

passageway.

6m
1st Reserve
Non-Combustible
hoarding
Figure 2-7
Non-combustible hoarding located below and within 6m from the edge of
viaduct is constructed using non-combustible material
Figures 2-8 and 2-9 show some examples of temporary

structures erected within the station that provide fire
compartment to work site, ventilation facilities, proper
lightings , signages, etc. for passagers safe use.
Figure 2-8
A 2 hours fire rated hoarding for works site within station

Closed
Temporary passageway
passageway
Figure 2-9
A safe and protected temporary passageway is provided during the
construction of a commercial development
2.1.4 Access under viaduct
Construction equipment or vehicles could be higher than the Part II

Clause 9.2.1(c)
vertical clearance below the viaduct. To prevent such vehicles
from hitting the viaduct beam, all accesses under the viaduct
must be provided with temporary height restriction gantries on
both sides of the viaduct (see Figure 2-10).
Such gantries are to be adequately designed by a Professional

Engineer (Civil). Reflective paint is to be provided on the steel
structure to enhance visibility. Full drawing details of a
temporary height restriction gantry can be found in the Guide
to Carrying Out Restricted Activities within Railway
Protection & Safety Zones.

Figure 2-10
Temporary height restriction gantries are provided on both sides of the
viaduct beam
2.2 Demolition works
Demolition works within the railway protection zone must Part II

satisfy the requirements of Part II Clause 9.2.2 of the Code. Clause 9.2.2
Demolition of buildings is acceptable in all reserves. However,

special care should be taken during demolition works to
prevent any physical damage to the RTS structures, in
particular those with shallow underground station. The
contractor must not stockpile the debris within the influence
zone of RTS. He is responsible to clear the debris as soon as
possible such that the allowable surcharge load on the RTS
structures will not be exceeded.
2.2.1 Method of demolishing buildings
Vibration to the RTS structures arising from any demolition Part II

works must not exceed 15mm/sec (peak particle velocity). It is, Clause 9.1.4
therefore, important to adopt a method of demolition that
minimises vibration to the RTS structures.

Examples of acceptable methods of work are:
Use of a hand-held breaker
Use of a crusher (see Figure 2-11).
Provision of a cushion to the ground with energy

absorbing material to reduce the impact on the
ground from demolition rubble when demolishing a
building.
Discharge of all demolition rubble at locations that

are outside influence zone of RTS structure.
The method of demolition must take into consideration the risk

of equipment toppling onto the above ground RTS structure.
Figure 2-11
Use of a crusher for demolition helps to minimise the impact of vibration

2.2.2 Method of demolishing station structures
Removal of parts of the RTS structures such as the station

walls, columns, beams, etc. is sometime necessary as part of
the construction of linkages to the station. In this aspect, the
safety considerations would include the following items:
Minimise the vibration induced on the station Part II

structure (not exceeding 15mm/sec peak particle Table 9.1.4
velocity).
Minimise the generation of dust and noise

disturbance or inconvenience to the commuters
during train operation hours.
Maintain the flood protection level of the stations Part II

(for more details on flood protection of stations, Clause 9.4.4.3
please refer to Chapter 4)
Examples of acceptable demolition methods include:
Stitch coring (see Figure 2-12)
Use of a diamond cutter (see Figure 2-13) or

diamond wire saw (see Figure 2-14)
Use of a hydro-jet (subject to measures to ensure no

flooding will occur) (see Figure 2-15)
Figure 2-12
Stitch coring method for cutting wall panels helps to minimise vibration and
noise levels

Figure 2-13
Use of a diamond saw for cutting station structure helps to minimise
vibration and noise levels
Figure 2-14
Use of a diamond wire saw for cutting station structure helps to minimise

Figure 2-15
Use of a hydro-jet for demolition helps to minimise dust, fire hazard,
2.2.3 Monitoring of vibration levels
During the period of demolition, vibration levels on the nearby

RTS structure are to be closely monitored. This can be done by
installing vibration sensors on the RTS structure (refer to
Figures 5-17 and 5-18) to provide a continuous monitoring of
the vibration levels induced by the demolition works. More
information relating to vibration monitoring is available in
Chapter 5.

Chapter 3
Substructure Works
Quick preview
This chapter discusses the considerations for carrying out excavation and
construction of substructure works in the railway protection zone. Requirements
relating to the set back of these substructures from the RTS structures, acceptable
method of construction in the railway protection zone, etc. are illustrated with
sketches and photographs.
3.1 Footing and raft
The design and construction of footings or rafts within the Part II

railway protection zone must satisfy the requirements of the Clause 9.1
Code. Clause 9.3.1
For footings and rafts within the 1st reserve, the following
requirements must be complied with:
Additional load on the underground RTS structure must Part II

Table 9.1(a)
not exceed the allowable limit in the Code.
Works must not affect the integrity of waterproofing

system of the underground RTS structures.
Works must not affect the viaduct drainage and

lightning protection system.
If RTS facilities are affected, it must be suitably diverted,

repaired and reinstated to the Authority’s satisfaction.
If the RTS facilities fall within the development boundary,

access must be given for the railway operator to carry out
maintenance.
An example of footing being constructed next to the MRT

column is given in Figure 3-1.

MRT
Column
Footing
Figure 3-1
Footing constructed next toMRT column
3.2 Piling and drilling works
The design and construction of piles, temporary or permanent Part II

earth retaining walls and any drilling work must take into Clause 9.1
consideration the following requirements: Clause 9.3.2
Clearance from RTS structures
Construction method
Allowable load transfer
3.2.1 Clearance from RTS
Piling works are generally not allowed within the 1st reserve of
all types of RTS structures. However, on a case-by-case basis, Part II
the following may be allowed : Table 9.3.2
Piles that are located less than 6m but more than 3m

horizontally from the extreme edge of an underground
Toes of raker piles must be at least 3m from the edge

of the RTS structures.
Limited bakau piling terminating at least 3m above the

crown of tunnels or underground RTS structures (see
Figure 3-2).
Diaphragm walls within or near the 1st reserve must

have installation panel width of not more than 3m.

Where piles or retaining structures are proposed to be located
less than 6m but more than 3m horizontally from the extreme
edge of an underground RTS structure, the following must be
considered :
The bored hole or trenches must be fully supported at

all time to prevent soil collapse.
Piles must not be installed by percussive or

displacement method.
Positions of piles are to be pegged on site by a registered

surveyor based on the approved certified survey plan.
Frequent checks on pile vertical alignment must be

carried out during installation.
Where bakau piles terminating at least 3m above the crown of

tunnels or underground RTS structure are proposed, some
examples of safety measures to be provided are:-
Close supervision by competent person.
Install piles in pre-determined lengths to control

penetration.
Limited bakau piling Pile foundation allowed

on case by case outside 1st reserve
First Reserve
3m
clear
6m clear
RTS Tunnels
Figure 3-2
Above pile configuration may be considered on case-by-case basis
Where piles are to be installed near viaduct piers supported on

raker piles, they must be kept at least 3m clear from the toes of
the viaduct raker piles on plan.

3.2.2 Construction method
Pile installation must not cause ground movement, Part II

displacement or vibration at the RTS structures, exceeding the Table 9.3.2
Code limits. Table 9.1(b)
The stability of the bored holes within the railway protection

zone of an underground RTS structure should always be assured
by suitable methods such as the use of casing or drilling mud
(stability checks are required) to prevent collapse of bored holes,
as appropriate.
Some examples of pile installation methods within the railway

protection zone that minimise the effect of vibration at the
underground, transition or sub-aqueous RTS structures are:
Augering (see Figure 3-3) or reverse circulation

drilling techniques
Oscillatory method (see Figure 3-4)
Silent piler (see Figure 3-5)
Hydrofaise (see Figure 3-6)
Figure 3-3
Pile installation by augering method

Figure 3-4
Pile installation by oscillatory method
Figure 3-5
Sheetpile installation by a silent piler

Figure 3-6
View of a hydrofaise machine
Methods of pile installation that are likely to generate

excessive vibrations are not acceptable within the 2nd reserve of
RTS structures. Some examples of the methods not acceptable
are:
Use of down-the-hole drilling technique (see Figure 3-

7)
Use of percussively driven concrete piles, steel H-

piles, sheet-piles or timber piles, etc.
Use of rock chopping chisels
Use of vibratory method of installing or extracting

sheetpiles, H-piles or steel casings (see Figure 3-8)
The above methods are acceptable for above ground RTS Part II
Clause 9.1.4
structures and within the 3rd reserve of underground RTS
structures subject to satisfying the vibration limits of the Code.
Automatic and continuous monitoring of vibration levels at the

nearest RTS structure should be provided during the
installation of piles within the railway protection zone,
especially near RTS structures including above ground
structures.

Figure 3-7
Pile installation by down-the-hole drilling technique
Figure 3-8
View of a vibro-hammer

3.2.3 Debonding
To prevent any load transfer, load bearing piles (except those Part II
supporting light structures) located within the zone of influence Clause 9.3.3
of the underground (see Figure 3-9) and transition RTS LTA/DBC/CPRP/001
LTA/DBC/CPRP/002
structures are to be debonded. LTA/DBC/CPRP/008
LTA/DBC/CPRP/009
Some salient considerations for carrying out debonding to load
bearing piles are summarised below :
For double left-in casings for piles within the 1st

reserve, the outer casing is used to support the
borehole during boring and must be left-in.
The annular space between the debonding membrane

and the outer casing or soil has to be grouted with a
weak bentonite-cement grout (eg. ratio of 3:1 for
bentonite-cement mix).
Provision should be made to prevent concrete from

entering the annular space through the gap at the
bottom of casing.
Measures should be taken to prevent any damage to

the debonded casing during the installation process
(say, using spacer shown in Figure 3-10).
The debonding material must not be subjected to

shear and disturbance etc. which may undermine the
effectiveness of the debonding system after the
debonding is installed.
1st 2nd
reserve reserve
Double Casing
Debonding
3m
clear Single Casing
6m Debonding
clear
45 deg
allow
tolerance
RTS Tunnels
construction
tolerance
Figure 3-9
Care must be taken to protect the debonding membranes from any damage
during installation

Spacer
Debonding
membrane
Figure 3-10
Spacer provided to prevent the debonding membranes from any damage
during installation
3.2.4 Ground anchors or tie backs
The installation of ground anchors is allowed in the railway Part II

Clause 9.3.4
protection zone in accordance with the following:
Table 9.3.4
There must be no encroachment of the ground anchors into

the 1st and 2nd reserve of tunnels, underground stations,
transition structures and at grade structures.
Ground anchors must fall outside the 1st reserve of above

ground structures where there are no raking piles for the
RTS foundations. Should there be raking piles for RTS
structures, ground anchors should be 3m clear on plan
from the toe of the raking piles.
3.3 Excavation works
3.3.1 Construction of basements, pilecaps and shallow foundations
Excavation works in the vicinity of the existing railway must Part II

satisfy the requirements of the Code. Clause 9.1
Clause 9.3.7
3.3.1.1 Design of Temporary Works
The retaining system adopted should minimise impact on the

RTS structures. The design of temporary works for excavation
should be in accordance with acceptable codes of practice.
The load factors adopted should comply with the

acceptable code with no reduction allowed.
The design strength of material should not exceed that

stipulated in the acceptable code or manufacturer’s
recommendations.

There should be adequate factor of safety for stability of
retaining system.
For strutting system, the struts should be effectively

restrained in both major and minor axes; king posts should
abut the struts to effectively restraint the struts in the major
axis. Walers should be continuous for effective load
distribution.
Jet grouting must comply with the requirements of BS EN

12716.
Ground movements, movements of the RTS structures and

ground water draw-down at various stages of excavations
should be assessed and tabulated for monitoring. The
allowable limits in the Code should not be exceeded,
otherwise an alternative solution should be adopted.
The allowable limits for the monitoring instrumentation

should not exceed the design values.
3.3.1.2 Excavation Works
Excavation for the construction of basements or pile caps

would result in the relief of stresses in ground leading to
settlement/ heave and lateral movement of the ground. Loss of
ground water to the excavation area also causes lowering of the
ground water level and pore water (piezometric) pressure
leading to consolidation settlement.
These factors may have detrimental effects on the RTS

structures particularly tunnels in marine clay, foundation of
viaducts and stations, non-suspended apron slabs and utilities
serving the rapid transit systems such as sewer lines. Measures
to minimise ground movement and reduction in the pore water
pressure must be implemented during excavation work.
The design and construction of earth retaining systems should

pay special attention to the following :
Retaining walls should be sufficiently rigid and

adequately strutted and braced to minimise lateral
ground movement (see Figure 3-11).
Lateral supports to earth retaining walls should be

installed immediately after each stage of excavation.
Excavation should be carried out in a

compartmentalised manner to minimise the ground
movement (see Figure 3-12) where appropriate.

Earth retaining walls should be sufficiently watertight
to prevent ground water draw-down and gaps between
individual pile of temporary earth retaining walls
should be sealed. For example, grout piles can be
used to seal up the gaps in the temporary earth
retaining wall (see Figure 3-13).
Toe of earth retaining walls should be deep enough to
cut-off the seepage of water and stability of retaining
wall should be checked.
Basement walls and slabs should be watertight and
designed for full hydrostatic pressures with no
pressure relief.
The bottom of an excavation should be provided with
blinding concrete immediately after reaching the
formation to minimise lowering of ground water.
Where lowering of the groundwater table is anticipated to

occur even with the provision of a cut off wall, additional
measures to minimise groundwater lowering should be
provided before commencement of excavation works. Such
measures include the use of recharging wells, designed,
installed and tested before work starts. QP should design these
wells sufficiently large with area well covered to ensure their
effectiveness in maintaining the groundwater table.
Potential changes to the resistance against flotation of the

station and tunnels due to excavation works both in the
temporary and permanent states must be checked and measures
implemented to prevent any uplift affecting stability of the
RTS structures.
Strut
Figure 3-11
Struts and bracing help to minimise ground movement due to excavation

Excavation in
compartment
Figure 3-12
Carrying out excavation in small compartments helps to minimise ground
movement
Earth Face
Grout piles seal up the gaps
Contiguous bored pile wall
Figure 3-13
Grout piles can be used to seal up any gaps in temporary earth retaining
wall

3.3.2 Construction of tunnels
Tunnelling could result in ground loss which is highly Part II

dependent on the tunnelling or construction technique Clause 9.1
Clause 9.3.6
employed and the ground conditions. The construction method
adopted should minimise risks related to the following:
Movement to RTS structures.
Safety of the rapid transit systems associated with

ground collapse.
Danger to the operation of the railway and the integrity

of the existing RTS structures.
Vibration levels which may influence the integrity of

the RTS structures and operation of the railway.
In order to mitigate the risk to the rapid transit systems, the

following measures should be considered and provided where
relevant.
The tunnel should be continuously and fully

supported with a permanent lining (see Figure 3-14)
designed to support the full overburden including
water load with minimal deformation during the
work. Technique such as NATM method where the
ground is not immediately supported after excavation
is not acceptable unless the inherent risks are reduced
to acceptable levels.
Ground loss from the face and tail void or over-break,

etc should be minimised by providing adequate
support to the face and continuous tail void grouting
(see Figure 3-14).
Ground improvement measures such as grouting, pipe

arch roof techniques should be adopted to prevent
ground collapse or ravelling of soil, etc.
Use of blasting technique to remove hard strata or

obstruction is not acceptable unless the inherent risks
are reduced to acceptable levels.
Measures to prevent ingress of water with fines/ soil

must be implemented.

Where a proposed tunnel is required to ‘break-in’ or ‘break
out’ at a construction shaft located near the existing RTS
structures, the following should be considered :
Stability of temporary wall erected for the shaft

construction during the ‘break-in’ or ‘break-out’.
Adequacy of the permanent shaft wall for the creation

of the opening for the tunnel.
Vibration induced at the nearby RTS structures Part II

during the breaking of permanent shaft wall should Clause 9.1.4
not exceed the limit in the Code.
Water draw-down through any gap between the shaft

and temporary wall to be avoided.
Excavated tunnel must be fully

supported with permanent lining.
Lining should be made watertight
Tail void must be

grouted continuously Break-in
Construction
Shaft
TBM
Maintain adequate face

pressure for tunnelling
Treated poor
and ground stability
ground
Figure 3-14
Precautions to be taken during tunnelling works

Chapter 4
Building Works
Quick preview
In this chapter, technical requirements relating to the carrying out of building works
in the railway protection zone are highlighted. Four scenarios are considered,
namely, a building adjacent to an above ground RTS structures, a building below a
RTS viaduct, a building over a trainway and a building that interfaces or integrates
with the RTS station.
4.1 Building adjacent to an above ground RTS structure
The design and construction of any building located adjacent to Part II

an above ground RTS structures must take the following into Clause 9.1
consideration: Clause 9.4.1
Building setback
Risk of falling objects
4.1.1 Building setback
A building proposed to be located adjacent to the above ground Part II

RTS structures is required to be setback by a distance as shown in Clause 9.4.1.1(a)
Figure 4-1 to 4-5 which is governed by the following :
6m clearance; or
Separation distance calculated in accordance with the

requirements of the Fire Code
whichever is greater as measured from the outermost edge of the

RTS structures.

Part II
Clause 9.4.1.1
Diagram 9.4.1.1(a)
Note: X must comply with the distance stipulated in the Fire Code
Figure 4-1
Separation distance - viaduct outside development boundary
Part II
Clause 9.4.1.1
Diagram 9.4.1.1(b)
Note: Y must comply with the distance stipulated in the Fire Code or at least 6m
from the outermost edge of viaduct
Figure 4-2
Separation distance – viaduct within development boundary

Part II
Clause 9.4.1.1
Diagram 9.4.1.1(c)
Note: X must comply with the distance stipulated in the Fire Code
Figure 4-3
Separation distance – station outside development boundary
Part II
Clause 9.4.1.1
Diagram 9.4.1.1(d)
Note: Y must comply with the distance stipulated in the Fire Code or at least 6m
whichever is greater
Figure 4-4
Separation distance – entrance (without habitable room) within development
boundary

Part II
Clause 9.4.1.1
Diagram 9.4.1.1(e)
Note:
Z1 & Z2 must comply with the distance stipulated in the Fire Code.
Z1 + Z2 must be at least 6m
Figure 4-5
Separation distance - station entrance (with habitable room) within development
boundary
4.1.2 Risk of falling objects
The safe operation of the railway can be jeopardised by objects Part II

being thrown onto the track through openings or windows facing Clause 9.4.1.1(b)
the RTS structures. It is, therefore, preferable to have the
buildings orientated with end walls facing the RTS structures.
Where it is unavoidable to have the building with openings facing

the RTS structures, adequate measures should be implemented to
mitigate the risk of fallings objects, litters, etc. (see Figures 4-6
and 4-7).

Figure 4-6
A multi-storey car park with façade opening facing the viaduct is provided with
a protective screen
Figure 4-7
A multi-storey car park with façade opening facing the viaduct is provided with
a protective screen
4.2 Building under a RTS viaduct
The design and construction of a building under the viaduct must:
Not affect the existing fire fighting facilities. Part II

Clause 9.4.2.2.1(a)
Provide a 25mm thick plaster to RTS columns enclosed within Part II
the building. Clause 9.4.2.2.1(b)

Provide 2-hour fire rated wall and roof within 6m from the Part II
edge of the viaduct. The fire rated wall must meet the criteria Clause 9.4.2.2.1(c)
of stability, integrity and insulation. If sprinkler protection is
provided, the fire resistance rating can be reduced to at least 1
hour (see Figure 4-8). There must be no opening on the fire-
rated roof. For windows and other openings on the fire-rated
walls, 2-hour fire rated doors or shutters must be provided.
Provide an automatic fire sprinkler system to building with Part II

compartment larger than 150m2 and below 4000m2. It must Clause 9.4.2.2.1(d)
conform to SS CP 52 with pump sized according to design
flow and pressure. A storage tank of minimum 30 minutes
water supply (see Figure 4-9(a)) is to be provided. For building
with compartment larger than 4000m2, the sprinkler system
must be designed to meet the requirements of the Fire Code
(see Figure 4-9(b)).
Provide an automatic fire alarm system (see Figure 4-10). Part II

Clause 9.4.2.2.1(e)
No liquefied petroleum gas is used or flammable liquid or Part II
highly combustible substances are stored (see Figure 4-11). Clause 9.4.2.2.1(f)
Provide gas monitoring system consisting of a safety cut-off Part II

valve that also interlocked with the fire alarm system for Clause 9.4.2.2.1(g)
development that uses low-pressure gas.
Equip cooking facilities and kitchen hood (if any) with

automatic fire extinguishing system. (see Figure 4-12)
Engage a qualified person to carry out annual testing of the Part II

automatic fire protection and detection systems, fire safety Clause 9.4.2.2.1(h)
measures, gas monitoring system, etc.
Allow at least 0.75m clear distance below the viaduct beam Part II
soffit level. Clause 9.4.2.2.2(a)
Not to place equipment such as air-con condenser above the Part II

building roof. Clause 9.4.2.2.2(b)
Provide proper access for the inspection and maintenance of Part II

the RTS structures. Clause 9.4.2.2.2(c)
Not transfer any loading on to the RTS structures including Part II

that arising from any viaduct bearing replacement. Clause
9.4.2.2.2(d),(e)
Ensure that building drainage system does not discharge into Part II
Clause 9.4.2.2.3(a)
the viaduct drainage system.
Ensure that viaduct drainage and lightning protection systems, Part II

if affected, are suitably diverted, reinstated and tested. Clause 9.4.2.2.3(b)
The space beneath the viaduct can be used for commercial,

institutional and other purposes as shown in Figures 4-13 to 4-21.

Figure 4-8
Fire separation for building under RTS viaduct
Figure 4-9(a)
Provision of sprinkler for building under RTS viaduct

Figure 4-9(b)
Provision of sprinkler for building under RTS viaduct
Note: Where sprinkler is provided in a building, the sprinkler system’s

flow switch can be allowed to activate the fire alarm system. In such case,
detector(s) may be omitted in sprinkler protected areas.
Figure 4-10
Provision of automatic fire alarm system for building under RTS viaduct

Figure 4-11
High fire hazard material is prohibited within building
under RTS viaduct
Figure 4-12
Cooking facilities and cooker hood (if any) provided with fire
protection system for building under RTS viaduct

Min. 750mm
Figure 4-13
A convenience store located under the viaduct
Figure 4-14
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate shops

Figure 4-15
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate a café
Figure 4-16
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate an eatery

Figure 4-17
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate a fitness centre/ station
Figure 4-18
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate a park

Figure 4-19
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate a children playground
Figure 4-20
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate a bicycle park

Figure 4-21
Land below the viaduct can be used to locate a linkway
4.3 Building over the trainway
A proposed building to be constructed over the trainway (see Part II

Figures 4-22 and 4-23) must provide the following to safeguard Clause 9.1
Clause 9.4.3.1
the trainway:
4-hour fire resistance to elements of structure around the

trainway.
Emergency ventilation, emergency lighting, dry main system

and signages, etc. within the trainway complying with the
Standard for Fire Safety in Rapid Transit Systems.
Adequate space around the trainway to satisfy structural gauge

clearance, space for viaduct beam replacement.
Adequate screening of windows or openings of building facing

the RTS structures.

Figure 4-22
Fire safety requirements for building above and around RTS viaduct
Figure 4-23
View of structures above and around the trainway

4.4 Building interfaced or integrated with a RTS station
Part II
Clause 9.1
Building may integrate or interface with an RTS station in the Clause 9.4.4
following manner: Clause 9.4.4.1
Building integrated or interfaced with the entrance of an

underground RTS station (see Figures 4-24 to 4-26)
Building linked to an underground RTS station (see Figure 4-

27)
Building interfaced with RTS fire safety facilities (see Figure

4-28)
Building interfaced with RTS ventilation shaft (see Figure 4-

29)
Any structures and facilities to be handed over to the Authority

for railway operation upon completion must comply with LTA’s
prevailing design criteria such as:
Civil Design Criteria for Road & Rails Transit Systems
Material & Workmanship specification
Architectural Design Criteria
Engineering Standards (Environmental control systems, fire

protection and electrical systems) and specification (lifts,
escalators, etc).

Figure 4-24
Development integrated with the entrance of an underground RTS station
Novena Station Entrance
Figure 4-25
Development integrated with an entrance of an underground RTS station

Figure 4-26
Development integrated with an entrance of an underground RTS station
Underground Shopping Mall
Figure 4-27
Development linked to an underground RTS station

Door to
Firemen’s Staircase
Figure 4-28
Development interfaced with existing RTS fire staircase
Extended
Vent Shaft
Figure 4-29
Building with RTS ventilation shaft extended from the existing one at ground
level

4.4.1 Safety considerations
Building that interfaces or integrates with a RTS station must not

affect the station in terms of :
(a) Structural safety
(b) Fire safety
(c) Flood protection
(d) Watertightness
4.4.1.1 Structural safety
Building which integrates or interfaces with a RTS station must Part II

not imposed loading or surcharge exceeding the allowable limit of Table 9.1(a)
the Code
4.4.1.2 Fire safety
(a) Building with integration/interface with the entrance of a RTS Part II

station Clause 9.4.4.2.1
Clause 9.4.4.2.1(a)
The station entrance is a means of fire escape for the public. In
the event of a fire, there is a requirement for the public to be
evacuated from the station to a point of safety (see Figure 4-30)
within 6 minutes or less. It is, therefore, important to ensure that
unobstructed egress path from the entrance is maintained at all
times.
Point of Safety
Figure 4-30
Point of safety is at ground level outside the station entrance

The proposed building is to be separated from the station entrance Part II
(see Figure 4-31) with fire barriers having at least 2-hour fire Clause 9.4.4.2.1(b)
resistance. A feasible solution to meet this requirement is by
providing a fire shutter as shown in Figures 4-34 to 4-36.
There must be no opening within 3m of ventilation opening Part II

located in the external wall of the entrance (see Figure 4-31). Clause 9.4.4.2.1(c)
A 500mm deep smoke barrier/screen must be provided at the

interface to prevent smoke at the ceiling level of the proposed
building from entering the station entrance (see Figure 4-32).
External
Corridor
PROPOSED BUILDING
No unprotected
Fire Separation opening
>3 m
500 mm deep
smoke barrier
STATION
No
ENTRANCE
unprotected
opening
>3 m Building Line
Figure 4-31
Locations of ‘fire separation’, ‘no unprotected opening’ and smoke barrier at
interface

Lowest ceiling level / or facial
beam at external facade
500mm
Smoke barrier
Proposed building
Interface boundary
Sectional View
Figure 4-32
Provision of smoke barrier at interface
Part II
Where an automatic fire shutter is provided, it must be: Clause
activated by smoke detectors installed at both sides of fire 9.4.4.2.1,(d),(e),(f)
shutter.
activated by fire alarm of the zone immediately next to the

opening in the development.
activated by station’s public area fire alarm.
status (open/ close) of the fire shutter monitored at Passenger

Service Centre of the RTS station.
maintained regularly and tested annually by a qualified person.

Slab Above
Station public
area fire alarm
ITB
Ceiling
S S
Development
Link to Station immediate zone fire
Passenger Service alarm signal system
Centre by developer Status of fire shutter
to Station Passenger
Service Centre
Legends
S Smoke Detectors
2-hr fire rated
Boundary line shutter by developer Interface Terminal Box
(ITB)
RTS Premises Integrated Development Shutter Control Box
Figure 4-33
Typical arrangement for fire shutter at interface of RTS and development
Figure 4-34
Provision of fire-rated shutters at interface of proposed building with an
underground RTS station

Automatic Fire Shutter
Figure 4-35
An automatic fire shutter at the interface between a commercial development
and station entrance
Automatic Fire Shutter
Figure 4-36
An automatic fire shutter at the interface between the commercial development
and station entrance

Where an entrance to the underground RTS station is integrated
with a commercial development, there should be adequate
openings to allow replacement air to be supplied to the station.
Figure 4-37 shows automatic louvered vents and automatic doors
which are designed to open upon activation of the station smoke
purging system or the emergency ventilation for the trainway.
Automatic louvered vents
Automatic door
Figure 4-37
View of an enclosed entrance at RTS station
Where an existing entrance of an underground station is Part II

integrated into a proposed building and can no longer provide a Clause 9.4.4.2.1(g)
protected fire escape route to the external, a new replacement
entrance must be provided (see Figure 4-38). The new
replacement entrance must comply with the following:
Exit capacity must not be less than the existing exit capacity.
Exiting time from the most remote point on station platform

public area to point of safety must not be more than six
minutes.
Existing fire safety and fire protection system must not be

affected.
Proper directional signs that comply with the relevant code/

standard must be provided.
Adequate lighting system, ventilation requirement and all

necessary equipment and fixing that comply authority's
requirement must be provided

Existing
Entrance
New
Entrance
Figure 4-38
Provision of a new station entrance at a commercial development
(b) Building linked to a underground RTS station
Where a building is linked to an existing station (see Figure Part II

4-39), it must be separated by a 2-hour fire rated automatic Clause 9.4.4.2.2
shutter. The requirements for this shutter are as explained in
Section 4.4.1.2(a). The location of the fire separation is
shown in Figure 4-40.
Separation with
fire shutter
Figure 4-39
Building linked to RTS station

Fire Separation
CONCOURSE PAID AREA

++ +
+
++ ++
ANCILLARY
++
++
SC R
AREA
CONCOURSE UNPAID
AREA
2-hour fire-rated shutter
Proposed
Building
Figure 4-40
Location of fire separation between a proposed underground link and an
existing station
(c) Building interfacing with firemen’s facilities Part II

Clause 9.4.4.2.3
Where development interfaces with the firemen's staircase, the
following must be complied with:
The entrance to the firemen’s staircase must be visible from

the fire engine access (see Figure 4-41).
The distance from firemen’s staircase must not be more than

18m from the fire engine access. Discharge from the existing
firemen’s staircase must not be affected by any development
work.
The existing firemen's staircase must have a direct discharge or

via a new passageway to external. This new passageway must
not be a shared means of escape for the proposed building.
It should be designed to comply with prevailing Standard for

Fire Safety in RTS.

Door to
Firemen’s
Stairs
Fire engine access
Figure 4-41
The firemen’s staircase cum emergency exit at RTS station
If there is any temporary diversion of fireman's facilities, the

developer must:
Appoint a QP in relevant discipline to prepare plans of the

temporary diversion of fire safety works.
Obtain approval from the Authority.
Co-ordinate with the railway operator on the temporary

diversion.
Ensure that the QP submits to the Authority a copy of letter to

confirm that the said works have been carried out in
accordance with the approved plan when diversion work is
completed.
Reinstate the RTS facilities/ structures to the satisfaction of the

Authority.
If the diversion of fireman’s facilities is permanent, the QP must

also obtain approval from the Building Control Unit (BCU) for
the proposed fire safety works under the Fire Safety Act.
Where a breeching inlet or a firemen’s intercom (see Figure 4-42) Part II

is interfaced with the proposed building, the breeching inlet or Clause 9.4.4.2.3(f)
firemen’s intercom must be visible and not more than 18m from
the fire engine access road.

<18m
Firemen’s Breeching
inlet and intercom
Fire engine access
Figure 4-42
Fireman's facilities visible from fire engine access that is within 18m
(d) Building interfaced with ventilation shaft during construction Part II

stage Clause 9.4.5(d)
During the construction stage, dust, exhaust fumes, etc. must be

controlled at site such that they are not directed towards the
ventilation shafts and affect the operation of the RTS. Some
protection measures such as the provision of filters and debris
netting, etc. around the ventilation shaft can be provided.
4.4.1.3 Flood protection
The proposed platform level of a building that is linked to the Part II

RTS station must satisfy the following: Clause 9.4.4.3
Minimum platform level specified in "Code of Practice for Part II

Surface Water Drainage or 1m above the existing ground level Clause 9.4.4.3(a)
whichever is greater (see Figure 4-43).
The connections to the station from the proposed building must Part II
be designed to prevent inflow of water to the station during the Clause 9.4.4.3(d)
temporary construction stage or in the permanent stage.
Provide swan neck connections to discharge pipes & sewer

pipes (see Figure 4-44) to prevent flooding at a station
integrated with the proposed building.
Developer/ owner to carry out regular maintenance of all flood Part II

Clause 9.4.4.3 (e)
protection systems to ensure they are in good functional
condition.

Entrance of
Above flood
Development Link
threshold level
to RTS's Station
Figure 4-43
Raised entrance at commercial development linked to RTS station
Swan neck
connection
Flood threshold level
Ground level
Integrated
structure
Sump
Figure 4-44
Swan neck connection for a discharge pipe

For flood protection of an underground station during Part II
construction stage, the contractor must prevent water inflow into Clause 9.4.4.3(c)
the RTS station. He has to construct and complete the integrated
structure above flood threshold level before he is allowed to
puncture the existing station structure.
Alternatively, he must erect temporary shelter structure with built

up wall of 1m above the existing ground level or flood threshold
level (whichever is greater) around the openings to prevent water
inflow. This is illustrated in Figure 4-45.
Non-combustible temporary
shelter over opening
Built up wall to flood threshold level

or min 1 m above ground level
1m
Ground level
Opening to underground station

Figure 4-45
Temporary flood protection measures provided for opening created in the RTS
structure
4.4.1.4 Watertightness
The joint between a proposed building and a RTS station must be

watertight at all time to prevent ingress of water into the station. Part II
At least two levels of defence against water ingress must be Clause 9.4.4.4
provided at every interface. The waterproofing system provided
must be robust and able to withstand the calculated hydrostatic
pressure and differential movements between the connecting
structures.
4.4.1.5 Mechanical and electrical Services
Any modification of the existing mechanical/ electrical systems Part II

Clause 9.4.4.5.1
or/ and building services of the RTS stations must comply with
the relevant Engineering Standards and specification. The QP
must submit his proposal on the modification of services to the
Authority for approval. These services include the following:
Fire fighting system - fire alarm system, sprinkle and hosereel

system, smoke control system, mechanical ventilation, etc.

Air-conditioning systems including cooling tower and supply
air grilles, etc.
Exit lighting and exit signs.
Voice communication system - public address speakers.
Electrical services including power supply, lightning

protection, etc.
Plumbing and sanitary system.

Chapter 5
Instrumentation
Quick preview
Instrumentation is an important provision for monitoring the effects of engineering

works. It has to be effective to capture the changes in ground conditions and the
effects on RTS. This will require understanding of the design of the RTS, the
ground conditions in its vicinity and the critical areas to monitor. In this chapter, the
considerations for planning instrumentation proposal are discussed. Key criteria for
monitoring RTS will be explained with examples of typical instrumentation for
monitoring. Some case studies for past development sites within the railway
protection zone are also included to illustrate compliance with the Code for
different situations.
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Instrumentation monitoring is an indispensable Part II

component of engineering works particularly within the Section 4
railway protection zone for various reasons including
the following:
verify design calculations and predictions
ensure public safety is not compromised
as a design tool to moderate under or over

provisions of engineering measures
enable remedial measures to be taken in time
5.1.2 Engineering calculations are just tools for predictions.

Software has limited ability to model complex ground
conditions. Inaccuracies will arise depending on the
assumptions made, numerical models, selection of
parameters, and etc. As such, actual results may deviate
significantly from that predicted. Instrumentation
provides a direct method for checking the impact of
works on to RTS due to the construction activities.
With monitoring, there is advance warning of
impending failure or adverse changes.

5.1.3 Instrumentation should be planned with the objective in
mind. The type of instrument and spacing should be
appropriate to capture the critical situation. It is also
important to establish monitoring criteria as a basis for
monitoring and frequency of monitoring that tie-in with
the engineering work.
5.2 Planning Considerations
5.2.1 A number of considerations should be bore in mind

when planning the instrumentation proposal. These
include:
Ground conditions
Development proposal
Construction activities
Type of RTS structure & its foundation
Past movement recorded by RTS structure and its

track caused by adjacent developments
Some typical monitoring frequencies are shown in

Tables 5-1.
5.2.2 The ground needs to be monitored as its compressibility Part II

has impact on the stability of RTS structures and its Clause 4.2
deformation and hence could affect the safe operation of
railway. How RTS structures are affected by the works
also depend on the type of RTS foundation; whether
they are supported on piles or directly on the ground.
5.2.3 Instrumentation is provided to monitor the construction

activities. The construction activities could be planned
and sequenced by adopting methods which minimises
adverse effects such as ground displacement, settlement,
ground water lowering, vibration, etc. By doing so,
some monitoring instruments may be omitted. For
example, if the demolition work is carried out using
crusher, and the vibration impact due to the works can
be controlled, vibration monitoring may not be needed.
Vibration monitoring would not be need if oscillator
instead of vibro-hammer is used for pile installation.
5.2.4 It should be noted that track access to underground RTS Part II

structure is limited to non-operation hours and its Clause 4.3
booking is subject to availability and approval from
railway operator. It is recommended to install automatic
type instruments in the train way whenever possible to
minimise track access.

5.2.5 There should be redundancy in the provision of
instrument to cater for possible damage and for
comparisons. Instruments should be protected and
located such that it will not suffer damage from
construction activities.
5.2.6 For planning suitable location of instruments, Part II

engineering analyses should be carried out to gauge the Clause 4.3.8
Clause 4.6.3
critical areas, impact of works and extent of the
influence zone of the proposed works (see Figure 5-1).
Instruments are then planned accordingly. It is
important that reference points are located outside the
influence zone. This applies to reference prisms for
automatic monitoring in tunnels or the toe of
inclinometers which should be anchored into competent
strata. The provision of instrumentation is highly
dependent on the engineering work and the method of
construction and the risk posed to the RTS. Typically
for monitoring of RTS structures, monitoring targets
within the influence zone should not be spaced further
than 3m apart except for massive part of RTS structure
such as the station. For these areas the spacing could be
increased to 5m.
Targets not more Targets not more Targets not more

than 5m apart than 3m apart than 5m apart
20m INFLUENCE ZONE 20m
MRT tunnels
Development
with basement
construction
Figure 5-1
Influence zone and extent of monitoring
5.2.7 Wherever possible, the prisms and protectors should be

located close to the rails to prevent tripping hazards.
Prism protectors on the floor should also be coated with
luminous paint to enhance visibility. For NEL system
for which the power supply and the pantograph are
located overhead at the tunnel crown, prisms should not
be installed near the pantograph whenever possible.

5.2.8 It is highlighted that should the predicted cumulative Part II
movement for underground or at grade RTS structure Clause 4.3.3
inclusive of past displacements exceed 5mm, automatic
monitoring shall be provided. If manual survey
monitoring is provided and results subsequently show
that the assessment for movement of RTS structure due
to the works is under predicted, engineering work shall
stop immediately and to be made safe. Work shall not
recommenced until the automatic remote control
monitoring system is commissioned incorporating the
displacements which had occurred. Automatic
monitoring of above ground RTS structure and
monitoring of its track is typically not required except
for critical cases where the RTS structure is located in
compressible ground and basement excavation is deeper
than 3m.
5.2.9 Before instruments are commissioned, there should be

verification tests to ensure the instrument provides
reliable readings. This could be done for example using
a calibrated load cell for strain gauge monitoring.
5.2.10 In cases where the impact of engineering works onto the

RTS may be varied, say due to variability of ground
conditions, complexity of engineering proposal,
monitoring instruments provided has to be automatic to
enable rapid response and control over the engineering
works before it is too late.
5.2.11 Some parts of the RTS structures had experienced

displacement, settlement and distortion due to past
construction activities and development works. The
instrument proposal must incorporate these movements
into the monitoring scheme and the RTS structures and
tracks must be monitored on criteria based on
cumulative basis.
5.2.12 Combustible materials must not be used for construction

of fixtures and instruments to prevent fire hazard. This
includes power and signal cables which should be made
of fire retardant, low smoke, halogen free materials. An
example of acceptable fixtures is by using pre-
fabricated welded brackets with bolted connections to
the RTS structure. In-situ welding is not allowed and the
anchoring system must be robust, designed for
redundancy and for failure of any anchorage or bolt (see
Figure 5-2).
5.2.13 Monitoring instruments may need to be removed for

periodic servicing and maintenance or to be replaced
when faulty. The monitoring proposal must have a
procedure to carry this out without affecting and
changing the monitoring results.

Figure 5-2
Total station in bored tunnel
5.2.14 The equipment for processing of the monitoring data is

usually placed within a metal box at the station platform
outside public area. Where tapping of electrical supply
from the station is required, the railway operator will
require installation of circuit breaker, additional
electrical outlet, etc. to safeguard the station.
Submission for the electrical work including electrical
line diagram duly endorsed by licensed electrical
worker, details of the works and electrical equipment,
location, size of storage box shall be submitted for the
approval of the railway operator. The set up must not
obstruct the facilities of the station and its operation. All
equipment must bear identification tag with project
reference and name of monitoring company (see Figure
5-3).

Figure 5-3
Tagging of cables for identification of monitoring company &
development project
5.2.15 For critical projects where frequent retrieval of results

are necessary say daily to ensure the safety of the
railway, the monitoring system should have the
capability to send results automatically to LTA through
email or dedicated line and computer (provided as part
of instrumentation proposal) at LTA premises (see
Figure 5-4). The system should also have an alert
system to notify key personnel via SMS when
monitoring results reached critical predetermined
values. The cost of all instrumentation provisions
whether at the RTS premises or at LTA office shall be
borne by the developer.
GSM
RTS
Monitoring
System
LT
Figure 5-4
Automatic data transmission to LTA's office

5.2.16 The above ground RTS structure comprises pre-stressed
post tensioned viaduct beams. For this reason, no
drilling of the viaduct beam will be allowed to install
instruments and fixtures. Prisms should be installed
using heavy duty double sided tape (see Figure 5-5).
Heavy duty tape
Prisms
Figure 5-5
Prisms installed in viaduct beam soffit
5.3 Criteria for Monitoring
5.3.1 Ground and RTS structure monitoring
5.3.1.1 Ground displacements and change in ground conditions Part II

depend on the engineering work proposal. QP has to Clause 4.3
assess the influence zone (see Figure 5-1) and provide
design and allowable values for each stage of work. The
assessment must take into consideration the location of
instruments in the assessment of results.
5.3.2 Structure & track limits

5.3.2.1 The allowable limits for RTS structures and tracks are Part II
shown in Tables 9.1(b) to 9.1(e) of the Code. Where no Tables 9.1(b) to
9.1(e)
allowable limit is provided, the allowable limits for
movement of structure and track shall be assessed by a
QP and submitted for acceptance.
5.4 Monitoring of RTS Structure
5.4.1 Total movement in any direction (underground RTS) Part II

Table 9.1(b)
5.4.1.1 Total movement refers to the bodily displacement of the
RTS structure or track. An example is illustrated in
Figure 5-6 for point A. The resultant displacement, m1
comprising components x1 and y1 must be less than the
allowable value.
Original position
Shifted position
Inclinometer
(i d)
A x1
y1
A1
m1
m1 = resultant displacement
Figure 5-6
Interpretation of total movement in any direction
5.4.2 Differential movement in transverse plane
5.4.2.1 This applies to the differential movement between 2 Part II

points in the transverse plane. The maximum elongation Table 9.1(b)
or shortening shall be limited to 15mm or less; or the
angular rotation of the RTS structural element that
would occur must also at the same time be less than
1:1000 as a result of any differential movement,
whichever is lesser. These are illustrated for a circular
tunnel section (see Figure 5-7).

Figure 5-7 shows squatting of the tunnel caused by
activities carried out in its vicinity. If point A moves to
A1 and point B moves from B to B1, the maximum
elongation or change in diameter of AB should not be
more than the allowable, ie A1B1-AB<allowable. The
B
angular rotation of the RTS structural element that

would occur must also at the same time be less than
1:1000. Combining the two criteria for total and
differentiate movements, point A can move to a point
anywhere within an acceptable zone of movement as
illustrated in Figure 5-7.
Similarly, in the case of ovalisation, the shortening of

tunnel diameter in the horizontal axis should also be less
than the allowable movement.
Original tunnel Y-axis

Deformed tunnel
1:1000
A1 A B B1 B
1:1000 X-axis
Acceptable zone of
movement of point A
Notes:
Point A moves to A1
Point B moves to B1
Figure 5-7
Differential movements in transverse plane
5.4.3 Differential movement along the track
The allowable differential movements between any 2 points

along the trackbed in the longitudinal direction shall be less
than 1:1000 (see Figure 5-8).

1:1000(limit)
A1 Shifted position
A
Point A & B - initial positions
Point A1 - new position
Figure 5-8
Differential movement in longitudinal plane
5.5 Monitoring of RTS Track
5.5.1 Track distortions
The allowable track distortions in the Code are Part II

applicable for the rapid transit systems that run on rail Table 9.1(e)
and not for LRT system which has rubber wheels. These
are not absolute values but relative values obtained
before development works and values measured during
the works. Track distortion criteria are dependent on the
bogie spacing of the RTS cabin as shown in Figure 5-9.
Measurements of track distortions can be made by

manual survey. In situations where the track conditions
are expected to be affected by the development work,
the survey prisms monitored automatically could be
correlated to provide real time measurements. Track
twist could also be monitored automatically using
electrolevels spaced at 2.5m interval.

A
A = Distance between bogie axles = 2.5m

B = Distance between bogie centres = 15.8m
Figure 5-9
Typical bogie axle spacing of trains used for NSL, EWL and NEL
5.5.2 Twist
Track twist measures the relative rotation of the bogie

axles. which are spaced 2.5m apart. The allowable value
is 1.5mm for the standard measurement distance of
2.5m (see Figure 5-10). This is proportioned
accordingly for measurements made at different
intervals.

Figure 5-10
Track twist measurement
5.5.3 Vertical dip or peak
This is a measurement of the vertical distortion of the

rail over a chord length of 5m. The average value for
both rails is used to check against the allowable value
(see Figure 5-11).
Crown of rail
V1 mm
5 m Chord
Average vertical dip = [V 1+V2]/2 (to be < 5mm)

V2 is to be measured in a similar manner from the
crown of the adjacent rail
Figure 5-11
Vertical dip or peak measurement

5.5.4 Horizontal versine
Similar to vertical peak or dip, horizontal versine is a

measurement of the change in horizontal curvature over
a 16m chord, the distance between two sets of bogies in
a carriage (see Figure 5-12). Again the average value for
the 2 rails is used. It should be noted that the existing
rail may have a design curvature and monitoring is
checked based on the change in condition before
development work commences.
16m chord
H1
H2
Crown
of rails
Average horizontal versine = [H1+H2]/2 < 6mm)
Figure 5-12
Horizontal verine measured over the centres of 2 sets of bogie
spaced at 16m
5.6 Case Studies: Underground RTS
5.6.1 Engineering work comprising construction of bored

piles & a basement
5.6.1.1 This subject site is within the 3rd reserve. The

engineering works include bored pile installation and
the construction of basement involving excavation of
about 3m deep. The excavation work is supported by a
strutted sheet pile wall system (see Figure 5-13)
5.6.1.2 The subsoil stratum consists of compressible soil of up

to 10m overlying residual soil. The ground water level
is at about 1m below the existing ground level. Ground
instrumentation comprising inclinometers, piezometers,
water standpipes and ground settlement monitoring
points (see Figure 5-13) were installed to monitor the
effects of the substructure work on the adjacent ground.

5.6.1.3 The closer southbound MRT tunnel to site was
monitored by manual survey as the predicted movement
is less than 5mm (see Figure 5-14). For monitoring of
vibration caused by bored piling work, a vibration
sensor was installed on the tunnel wall.
Figure 5-13
Layout plan for ground instruments

Figure 5-14
Layout plan for tunnel instrument
5.6.2 Engineering work comprising installation of soldier

piles and construction of 3-level basement
5.6.2.1 The development proposal comprises a 3-level

basement. The ground level is undulating and the
excavation depth ranges from about 9m to 13m with the
end facing the MRT tunnels. The ground conditions are
primarily weathered siltstone and sandstone of the
Jurong Formation.

5.6.2.2 The excavation was designed to be supported generally
by a H soldier pile and timber lagging system. At the
corners of excavation facing the tunnels, contiguous
piles were used. The middle section of this side was
designed as an open cut slope to facilitate the
excavation. Open cut was feasible in this case as the
ground conditions are very good (see Figures 5-15 & 5-
16). There is no concern on the impact of ground water
draw-down as the compressibility of the weathered
sedimentary rock is very low.
5.6.2.3 The ground instruments proposed at the side of the

excavation near the tunnels are water standpipe and
inclinometers. They are provided basically to monitor
the stability of excavation and check on the design
assumptions and predictions (see Figure 5-17).
5.6.2.4 The tunnel movement was predicted to be 5mm and the

nearer North Bound tunnel was to be monitored
automatically by a motorised theodolite. The influence
zone was assessed to be about 10m from the extreme
edge of excavation. Prisms targets were spaced at 3m
for this zone. Beyond this zone, prism targets were
spaced at 5m and for a distance of 20m.The South
Bound tunnel is manually surveyed for tunnel
displacement and distortion.
Three electrolevels and a vibration sensor were

provided to monitor the track twist and vibration due to
the proposed works (see Figure 5-18).

Figure 5-15
Sectional view of excavation at mid section

Figure 5-16
Sectional view of excavation at corners

Figure 5-17
Layout plan of ground instruments

MRT
tunnels
Figure 5-18
Layout plan of tunnel monitoring

5.7 Case Studies: Aboveground RTS
5.7.1 Piling works and 1-level basement construction
5.7.1.1 The piling work comprises of driven precast reinforced

concrete and bored pile installation within 18m and 40m
from the edge of the viaduct respectively. The
excavation work involves a one-level basement
excavation of up to 3m depth at each building block.
Piling work was completed first followed by excavation
work for the pilecap and basement construction. The
entire excavation was carried out by the open cut
method.
5.7.1.2 The RTS viaduct monitoring and ground

instrumentation layout plan is shown in Figure 5-19.
Only one inclinometer was installed in the ground.
Piezometers and water standpipes were not necessary as
the final excavation level is higher than the existing
water table.
5.7.1.3 Prisms and tiltmeters were installed on 4 viaduct

columns to monitor their displacement and tilt due to
the proposed works. Vibration sensors were also
installed on 2 viaduct columns to provide continuous
monitoring for the vibration caused by the vibro-
hammer used for the piling works.
Prism Tiltmeter Vibration sensor Inclinometer

(on column) (on column) (on column) (in ground)
Figure 5-19
Instrumentation layout plan

Underground, Transition,
Type of Instruments Sub-aqueous & At Grade Above Ground Structures
Structures
Inclinometer Daily Twice weekly
Water standpipe Daily Twice weekly
Nil
Ground
Piezometer Daily
(Trice weekly -critical cases only)
Nil
Extensometer Daily
(Trice weekly - critical cases only)
Nil
Surface settlement marker Daily
(Trice weekly -critical cases only)
Nil
ATMS Continuous
(Continuous -critical cases only)
Without
Weekly Twice weekly
Manual
ATMS
Survey
Rapid Transit Systems Structure
With Nil
Monthly
ATMS (Monthly -critical cases only)
Nil
Track survey Monthly
(Monthly -critical cases only)
Tilt meter Continuous Twice weekly
Continuous
Vibration sensor Continuous
(where applicable)
Weekly Weekly
Crack meter
(where applicable) (where applicable)
Note: Ground instruments may be monitored twice weekly for works within MRT 3rd reserve
Table 5-1
Typical instrumentation & frequency for construction activities within the railway protection zone

Chapter 6
Alternative Solutions
Quick preview
This final chapter provides you with some suggestions on the process and
methodology for formulating an alternative solution. Three examples of
development sites within the railway protection zone that have successfully
adopted the ‘alternative solutions’ are presented in this chapter.
6.1 Meeting performance requirements
Solutions that meet the deemed-to-satisfy provisions are given Part II

in Part II Section 9 of the Code. These solutions satisfy the Section 8
performance requirements of Part II Section 8 of the Code. Section 9
However, there could be situations where it may not be
possible to meet the deemed-to-satisfy provisions or where
innovative ideas offer greater benefits. In such cases, it is
possible to offer alternative solutions complying with the
performance requirements.
6.2 Suggested process and methodology
The engineer needs to have thorough knowledge and

understanding of the subject at risk and the safety measures
available to successfully develop an alternative solution. He
must be able to use techniques such as modeling, etc. where
possible to assist him in forecasting the outcome as accurately
as practicable.
It should be noted that designers must not develop solutions in

isolation of the construction process. Working towards meeting
the objectives of railway protection requires all parties
involved to work as a team.
The flowchart in Figure 6-1 demonstrates a suggested approach

for developing an alternative solution.
Handbook on Development and Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 92

Define Scope of Project
Agree on Objectives and Performance Requirements
Assess Hazards and Preventive and Protective Measures Available
Select Suitable Assessment Methods
Determine Extent and Type of Evaluation
Agree on Method of Analysis
Set Acceptance Criteria for the Analysis
Select Scenarios/ Load Cases & Parameters for Design
Carry out Analysis
Obtain Approval for the Proposed Solution
Implement Monitoring during Construction
Collate & Evaluate Results
Figure 6-1
Suggested approach for designing an alternative solution
6.3 Case examples
This section discusses three different development sites within

the railway protection zone that have adopted the ‘alternative
solutions’ approach. They are:
The design and construction of a retail podium above

Novena station
The design and construction of an underground link

from Bugis Junction to Bugis station
Deep excavation adjacent to and tunnelling below the

existing RTS tunnels

In these examples, a combination of assessment methods was
adopted to demonstrate that the alternative solutions meet the
performance requirements. Appropriate verification methods,
including a detailed assessment of the risks on the rapid transit
systems and the effective measures to mitigate these risks,
were proposed by the appointed experts.
6.3.1 Case example no. 1

Design and construction of a retail podium above Novena
station
Novena Station was originally designed to support the

additional loads from a development over a limited section of
the entrance at specific column locations. The rest of the
station was backfilled with about 2m of soil and designed to
support an additional live load of 5kN/m2. In designing the
retail podium, the architect decided that the integration would
be best served by having the retail podium over the whole of
the station within the boundary of the site. In order to
accommodate this concept which would benefit the
development and complement the station, the engineer
proposed to the Authority to remove the backfill over the
station roof and replace this load with the load from the retail
block (see Figure 6-2). A comprehensive study was carried out
to check the adequacy of the station structure and the effects on
the station during construction arising from this proposal. The
following were considered and checked:
A composite steel structure was adopted to meet the

loading requirements;
Removal of soil would subject the underground

station box to uplift. The sequence of construction
was therefore carefully planned so that sufficient dead
load from the superstructure would be in place before
the next portion of the backfill was removed;
Phasing of the construction so that the station

structure was not subjected to loads for which it was
not designed for;
The void created beneath the first floor slab would

also have to be constructed such that it is water tight
in the permanent situation; and
The existing ventilation shafts, sprinkler tank,

breeching inlets and other electrical and mechanical
services of the station were also affected. Careful
consideration was given to how and where these
facilities could be altered or relocated without
affecting safety and operation of the railway. The
sequence of works was also planned so that access to
and from the station and the escape provisions of the
transit system was not affected.

Ground level
Novena Station
Concourse Level
Platform
Level
Construction of retail superstructure and

removal of soil in phases to ensure the
station is not subjected to unbalanced
load or flotation and stays within the
design capacity of the structure
Ground level
Soil over station roof removed & void

made waterproof
Novena Station
Concourse Level
Platform
Level
Figure 6-2
Removal of backfill over the station roof and replacement with load from the
retail podium

Design and construction of an underground link from Bugis
Junction to Bugis station
In this development, the underground link connects basement

one (where the food court/ supermarket is located) of Bugis
Junction to the concourse level of Bugis Station (see Figure 6-
3). This link has facilitated pedestrian movements between
Bugis Junction and the adjacent station. It was noted during the
design stage that there was no knock out panel in the station
wall at the location where the underground link would break
into the station. Furthermore, this station is a civil defence
shelter.
To meet the objectives of railway protection, the QP conducted

a detailed study involving the following:
Structural adequacy of the station wall including

strengthening required both during the construction
and permanent stages;
Design of the earth retaining system for the

excavation works and evaluation of the effects of
temporary works on the station;
Fire separation in the temporary and permanent stage;

and
Flood protection of the underground station during

the construction and in the permanent condition
Opening for
underground link
Figure 6-3
An opening created in the wall at concourse level of Bugis Station

Deep excavation adjacent to and tunnelling below existing
RTS tunnels
A 27m deep excavation had to be built within 11m of the

operating railway. Two new 6.20m diameter tunnels were then
driven from the station excavation, passing less than 5m below
the existing lines (see Figure 6-4). Both the existing tunnels
consist of precast concrete segmental linings of 250mm thick.
Conventional straight bolts were used for the circumferential
joint connection. The internal diameter of the tunnel is
5300mm with 6 segments.
Ground level
Retaining wall
Existing tunnels
Struts
Pipe arch roof
Excavation
Level
Proposed tunnel
Figure 6-4
Deep excavation adjacent to and tunnelling below existing transit tunnels
The excavation and bored tunnelling were carried out in

predominantly highly and moderately weathered sedimentary
rocks of the Jurong Formation. Past experience has indicated
that this type of material is susceptible to ravelling. Sudden
movement could occur with little warning particularly during
tunnelling.

It was recognised that even with high standard of workmanship
employed during construction the criteria in the current code
could be reached and even exceeded as a result of the
cumulative effect of the proposed works. In particular the
works would cause differential settlement in the track or its
plinth in excess of 3mm in 6m (1:2000) movement in any
plane or a total movement in the rapid transit system structure
or tracks exceeding 15mm in any plane. As a result, it was
considered necessary to establish what effects these would
have on the existing tunnels and the operation of the railway.
In this respect a ‘performance based’ approach was adopted as
the way forward.
This study included a detailed survey of the tunnel positions,

track alignment and photographic survey of the tunnel
structures within the influence area of the construction works.
The data collected was processed to produce diagrams of the
tunnel crown, tunnel axis and the rails to show how the
existing works deviate from their design positions (wriggle
diagrams).
A number of ‘limit states’ were developed for the allowable

deformation of the tunnels. The proposed ‘limit states’ arise
from the structural and operational considerations below.
6.3.3.1 Structural considerations
Some possible effects on the tunnel structure and durability

that were considered include the following :
Ovalisation and Squat (see Figure 6-5)
Differential settlement (stepping) between rings (see

Figure 6-6)
Opening of circle joints (see Figure 6-7)
Additional water seepage
Increase in O riginal tunnel shape Increase in

vertical horizontal
diam eter diam eter
D eform ed shape
O valisation S quat
Figure 6-5
Tunnel ring deformation

Circle joint Tunnel segmental
lining ring
Circle joint
Tunnel segment Tunnel segment
step
Figure 6-6
Steps (settlement between rings) at tunnel joints
Opening of Circle joint
Circle
joint
Radial
joint
Tunnel lining segments
Figure 6-7
Opening of circle joint
6.3.3.2 Operational considerations

Some possible effects on the track due to tunnelling and
excavation works that were considered include the following :
Track geometry
Structure gauge clearance
Failure of track hold-down bolt

6.3.3.3 Enhanced monitoring
Having established all the limit states, it was then necessary to
develop an observational monitoring procedure based on the
measured movements within each limit state. The
instrumentation of the tunnels and the track was enhanced such
that elements such as track twist, opening up of circle joints,
vertical distortion of the rails could be measured. The action
plan was developed based on the critical levels of the
components calculated with the necessary action to be taken in
the event that they materialised.
To supplement the automatic trainway monitoring system, the

instrumentation was enhanced with the following items:
Manual survey to determine the track twist, dip and

peak of the track every alternate day during the
critical stage of work;
Automatic tiltmeter, electro-level and settlement cell

(see Figure 6-8) to monitor the change to the track
twist;
Measurement of opening of circle joints using a crack

meter (see Figure 6-8) and steps or differential
settlement between tunnel rings;
Borehole extensometers to determine in-ground

settlement.
The monitoring results were cabled back to the office computer

so that monitoring could continue 24 hours a day.
Crackmeter
Total
Reflecting
Station
Rail Prism
Vibration
sensor
Settlement cell Settlement cell
Figure 6-8
Provision of total station, prisms, crack meter, settlement cells and vibration
sensor in the railway tunnel

Useful References:
1. The Novena Square. An office cum retail development

over MRT station – Structural design and construction
considerations (2000) by Tan Guan & Allan K J Teo, TY
Lin South East Asia Pte Ltd
2. The Novena Square. An office cum retail development

over MRT station (2000) by DP Architects
3. New HDB Centre at Toa Payoh – Integration with Toa

Payoh MRT station by Lai Huen Poh, RSP Architects
Planners & Engineers (Pte) Ltd
4. Planning the monitoring required to confirm the movement

and rotation of tunnels and track work due to excavation
and tunnelling by J.N.Shirlaw, S.K.Tham-Lee, F.K.Wong,
L.P.Wong-Ang, D.C.Chen, N.Osborne, & C.G.Tan

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The information and materials contained in this disc are provided “as is” and “as available”.

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone

The Code of Practice for Railway Protection covers the submission

This Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection

As part of the Authority’s continual efforts to be more business friendly, the

Development & Building Control Department

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone

Guide to Users of Handbook

Complying with Technical Requirements

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone

2.2 Demolition works 19

Chapter 3 Substructure works

Chapter 4 Building works

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone

5.5.4 Horizontal versine 82

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone

Understanding and application of the Code of Practice for Railway

This handbook contains explanatory commentary and supplemental material

Complying with Technical Requirements

Chapter 1 Meeting Performance Requirements

Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions Alternative Solutions

Chapter 2 Site preparation works Chapter 6 Alternative Solutions

Chapter 3 Substructure works

Chapter 4 Building works

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 1

Methods of pile installation that

Underground, Transition, Sub- Above Ground

Daily Twice weekly Tables that visually

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 2

4. Referencing of code and handbook

When making a reference to a particular provision, drawing or table in the

I {in blue italic} Part

When making a reference to a particular provision in this handbook, the

3 {in black normal} Chapter

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 3

In this handbook, the following acronyms are used:

 BCU – Building Control Unit

 DBC – Development and Building Control Department

 NEL – North East Line

 LRT – Light Rail Transit

 LTA – Land Transport Authority

 MRT – Mass Rapid Transit

 PUB – Public Utilities Board

 RTS – Rapid Transit System

 Rapid Transit Systems (Development and Building Works in Railway

 Rapid Transit Systems (Railway Protection, Restricted Activities)

 Code of Practice for Railway Protection (Oct 2004 edition)

 Guide to Carrying Out Restricted Activities within Railway Protection

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 4

The primary consideration in railway protection is public’s safety. In this context,

1.1 Framework for developing solutions

The framework for developing solutions for development and Part II

The objective guides the designer to interpret the Code’s

Handbook on Development & Building Works in Railway Protection Zone 5

The objectives (as given in Part II Section 8 of the Code) Part II

There are five basic objectives relating to:

 Inspection and maintenance

Architects, engineers, contractors, etc. must meet the above

1.3 Performance requirements

The performance requirements (as given in Part II Section 8 of Part II

The application of relevant performance requirements on

1.3.1 Structural safety

It is important for the QP and/or the appointed expert(s) to

BCU – Building Control Unit

DBC – Development and Building Control Department

NEL – North East Line

LRT – Light Rail Transit

LTA – Land Transport Authority

MRT – Mass Rapid Transit

PUB – Public Utilities Board

RTS – Rapid Transit System

Rapid Transit Systems (Development and Building Works in Railway

Rapid Transit Systems (Railway Protection, Restricted Activities)

Code of Practice for Railway Protection (Oct 2004 edition)

Guide to Carrying Out Restricted Activities within Railway Protection

Inspection and maintenance

Complying with the deemed-to-satisfy provisions as given

Formulating an alternative solution which meets the

Acceptable documentary evidence

Comparison with deemed-to-satisfy provisions

Drilling work is done as approved and there will be

Load bearing piles falling within the zone of

Fire hazard to the above ground RTS structures.

Combustible material on fire may cause smoke and

Additional stress onto the underground RTS structures

Materials used for the erection of any temporary

No fire risk activities are to be carried out within any

Scaffolding is to be designed such that it is stable,

Nets or other suitable screens are provided to prevent

Provide fire compartment to work area .

Maintain clear minimum width for fire escape in

Ensure safe and protected passageway access in and out

The structures must not interfere with the free flow of

Provide sufficient ventilation facilities in passageway.

Must not affect the existing fire safety and fire

Provide adequate directional signages and lightings to