SPECIAL

 CIVIL  ACTION  DIGEST  (2014-­‐2015)              ATTY.  JORGE  MELO  

 
G.R.  No.  L-­‐66371                  May  15,  1985   investigation  on  the  libel  charge  filed  against  him  by  respondent  
  judge.  
ANG  v.  CASTRO   • February  20,  1984  !  a  temporary  restraining  order  was  issued  
  to  grant  the  (2)  and  (3)  of  Ang’s  request.    
PONENTE:  RELOVA,  J.   o Fiscal   Narciso   T.   Atienza,   however,   explained   that   the  
  information   for   libel   had   been   filed   on   February   2,   1984  
BACKGROUND   -­‐   even   before   the   TRO   was   issued.   It’s   impossible   for  
• November   1983   !   Armando   Ang   filed   an   administrative   them   to   “stop”   the   preliminary   investigation   because  
complaint   against   Judge   Jose   P.   Castro   in   the   Office   of   the   the  same  had  already  been  concluded!  
Presidential  Assistant  on  Legal  Affairs  for  ignorance  of  the  law,   • Upon  learning  of  the  information  of  libel  filed  against  him,  Ang  
gross  inexcusable  negligence  concerning  Civil  Case  No.  Q-­‐35466.     filed  a  supplemental  petition  which  contained  his  request  (4)  to  
• December   23,   2983   !   Upon   learning   of   the   administrative   case   prohibit   respondent   Judge   Jose   P.   Arro   of   the   Regional   Trial  
filed   against   him   by   Ang,   Judge   Castro   ordered   petitioner   to   Court  of  Rizal,  Branch  CIII,  Quezon  City  from  proceeding  and/or  
appear   before   him   and   to   show   cause   why   he   should   not   be   conducting  a  hearing  on  the  criminal  complaint  for  libel  
punished   for   contempt   of   court,   for   malicious,   insolent,   • March   5,   1984   !   a   TRO   was   issued   enjoining   Judge   Arro   from  
inexcusable  disrespect  and  contemptuous  attitude  towards  the   proceeding  with  the  criminal  case  for  libel.  
court  and  towards  him.    
• January   9,   1984   !   Judge   Castro   held   Ang   in   contempt   and   ISSUES  TO  BE  RESOLVED  
sentenced  him  to  5  days  imprisonment,  and  ordered  his  arrest   1. Whether  or  not  Ang  may  be  held  for  contempt  on  the  basis  of  
for   his   failure,   despite   notice,   to   appear   on   the   scheduled   the  language  he  used  in  his  letter  complaints  to  the  Office  of  the  
hearing  of  the  contempt  charge  against  him.   President  and  to  the  Supreme  Court.  
• February   3,   1984   !   Ang   filed   for   notice   of   appeal   which   was    
denied  by  Judge  Castro.   RESOLUTIONS  AND  ARGUMENTS  
• Subsequently,  Judge  Castro  filed  a  criminal  case  of  libel  against   ISSUE  1  !  Whether  or  not  Ang  may  be  held  for  contempt  on  the  basis  
Ang   for   using   malicious,   insolent   and   contemptuous   language   of   the   language   he   used   in   his   letter   complaints   to   the   Office   of   the  
against   him   in   his   letter-­‐complaint   filed   before   the   Supreme   President   and   to   the   Supreme   Court.   !   NO.   The   alleged   malicious  
Court  (this  is  different  from  the  one  filed  with  the  Office  of  the   imputations   were   not   uttered   in   the   presence   or   so   near   respondent  
President).   Judge  Jose  P.  Castro  as  to  obstruct  or  interrupt  the  proceedings  before  
• Thereafter,   Ang   filed   a   petition   for   certiorari,   prohibition   and   him;   rather,   they   were   contained   in   the   pleadings   and/or   letters-­‐
mandamus   in   the   Supreme   Court   asking   (1)   for   the   order   complaint   filed   by   petitioner   before   the   Office   of   the   Presidential  
holding   him   in   contempt   to   be   set   aside,   (2)   to   enjoin   Judge   Assistant  on  Legal   Affairs   and   before   this   Court   in   the   aforementioned  
Castro  from  enforcing  the  order  of  arrest  of  Ang  on  the  ground   administrative  case  filed  by  petitioner  against  him.  
of  contempt,  (3)  to  restrain  respondent  Assistant  Fiscal  Narciso    
T.   Atienza   of   Quezon   City   from   conducting   preliminary   MAJOR   POINT   1:   Section   3(b)   and   (d),   Rule   71   define   indirect  
contempt.   The   language   found   in   the   letters   of   Ang   can,   at   most,   be  
 
RACHELLE  ANNE  D.  GUTIERREZ    
SPECIAL  CIVIL  ACTION  DIGEST  (2014-­‐2015)              ATTY.  JORGE  MELO  
 
held   as   indirect   contempt,   but   definitely   not   direct   contempt   was   proceedings,  provided  the  statements  are  pertinent  or  relevant  
what  is  being  alleged  by  Judge  Castro.   to  the  case.”  
• Judge   Castro   argues   that   failure   of   petitioner   to   appear,   despite  
notice,  on  the  scheduled  hearing  of  the  contempt  charge  for  the  
use   of   derogatory   language   in   his   two   letters   addressed   to   the  
Office   of   the   Presidential   Assistant   on   Legal   Affairs   and   to   this  
Court   in   an   administrative   complaint   against   him,   constitutes  
direct  contempt  as  the  acts  actually  impeded,  embarrassed  and  
obstructed  him  in  the  administration  of  justice.  
• The   SC   DISAGREES:   The   use   of   disrespectful   or   contemptuous  
language   against   a   particular   judge   in   pleadings   presented   in  
another  court  or  proceeding  is  indirect,  not  direct,  contempt  as  
it   is   not   tantamount   to   a   misbehavior   in   the   presence   of   or   so  
near   a   court   or   judge   as   to   interrupt   the   administration   of  
justice.  Stated  differently,  if  the  pleading  containing  derogatory,  
offensive   or   malicious   statements   is   submitted   in   the   same  
court  or  judge  in  which  the  proceedings  are  pending,  it  is  direct  
contempt   because   it   is   equivalent   to   a   misbehavior   committed  
in  the  presence  of  or  so  near  a  court  or  judge  as  to  interrupt  the  
administration  of  justice.  
 
MAJOR   POINT   2:   Ang   cannot   be   held   liable   for   libel   as   the   allegedly  
slanderous   language   found   in   his   letter   complaints   to   the   Office   of   the  
President   and   the   Supreme   Court   are   considered   as   privileged  
communication.  
• Santiago   v.   Calvo   (48   Phil.   922)   !   “a   communication   made   in  
good   faith   upon   any   subject   matter   in   which   the   party   making  
the  communication  has  an  interest  or  concerning  which  he  has  
a  duty  is  privileged  if  made  to  a  person  having  a  corresponding  
interest   or   duty,   although   it   contains   incriminatory   or  
derogatory   matter   which   without   the   privilege   would   be  
libelous  and  actionable;  x  x  x  that  parties,  counsel  and  witnesses  
are   exempted   from   liability   in   libel   or   slander   for   words  
otherwise   defamatory   published   in   the   course   of   judicial  

 
RACHELLE  ANNE  D.  GUTIERREZ