Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

100 Phil 168 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Obligations arising from human relations
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54 plane
as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had
sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting
of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would
determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against
CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.
Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working
committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending,
Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to
Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to
Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned
before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell
USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other
creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of
attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines
from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency
proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell
Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that
judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not
recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a
company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should
be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for
damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
 Tenchavez v Escano (1965)
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:

Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds
were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint
for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."

On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married
an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal
separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.

Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because
they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter
Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This
theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to
support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence
involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:

1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.

2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:

1. YES

At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject
to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce but only provides for legal separation.

For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared
policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means
do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.

Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled
to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.

2. YES

The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the
time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.

It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article
106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176)
expressly cited.

But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in
civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code
of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why
the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in
private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
 Pe vs Pe
TITLE: Pe vs. PeCITATION: 5 SCRA 200
FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque
who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was
given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried
to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy
due to their illicit affair.

HELD:Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even
used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
 Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez

12 SCRA 648 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 21 of the Civil Code – Moral Damages – Exemplary
Damages – Breach of Promise to Marry
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4,
1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent
a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said
wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed
and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was
made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a
breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of
promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable
withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is
supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Tanjanco v. CA
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas for carnal
knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition, she had to resign from her work. Because she
was unable to support herself and
the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the defendant to
recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.

Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman
has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and
such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly here there is voluntariness and mutual passion, for
had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.
 CECILIA ZULUETA v. CA, GR No. 107383, 1996-02-20
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and... cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence... in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring... him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering
Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit.
Issues:
the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"[3] is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks... herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,... as
prescribed by law."[4] Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding."[5]
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to... privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists.[6] Neither may be... examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.[7] But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to... share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
 ABERCA v. VER
FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against Communist-
Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search
warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of
threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted
the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was
replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified
to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. These
rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will
perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights
of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any
public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt them from
responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the illegal
arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is
merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot
suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as people
who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order,
and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who directly and
indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.
 PSI VS AGANA (GR NO. 126297 JANUARY 31, 2007)
Professional Services Inc. vs Agana
GR No. 126297 January 31, 2007

Facts: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her
to be suffering from Cancer of the sigmoid. On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical
City Hospital performed an Anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy on her sigmoid
area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the
consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After
Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision
after searching for the missing 2 gauzes as indicated by the assisting nurses but failed to locate it. After a couple of
days, Natividad complained of excruciating pains in her anal region but Dr. Ampil said it is a natural consequence of
the operation/surgery and recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were
not removed during the operation. Natividad and her husband went to the US to seek further treatment and she was
declared free from cancer. A piece of gauze portruding from Natividad’s vagina was found by her daughter which was
then removed by hand by Dr. Ampil and assured that the pains will vanished. However, it didn’t. The pains intensified
prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Guttierez
detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina – a foul smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vagina. A recto-vaginal fistula had forced stool to excrete through her vagina. Another
surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage.

Issue: Whether or not Dr. Ampil and Fuentes are liable for medical malpractice and the PSI for damages due to the
negligence of the said doctors.

Held: Yes. No. Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges
are properly removed and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to
the effect that such act is negligence per se.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this
kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not
have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply puts the elements are duty, breach, injury,
and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes,
from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad
about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination
by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury
could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that 2 pieces
of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link
between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate
concealment of this missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:

1. Occurrence of an injury;
2. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant;
3. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if those who had
control or management used proper care, and;
4. The absence of explanation by the defendant

Of the foregoing, the most instrumental is the “Control and management of the thing which caused the injury.”

Under the “Captain of the ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and
all personnel connected with the operation.

The knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City constitutes knowledge of PSI.

The doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of responsibilities for the care
of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. The hospital accordingly
has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and over see the treatment prescribed and administered by the
physician practicing in its premises.
Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel
plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.

Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal complaint against private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand.
However, there was a mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in the same
building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.

It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust filing of a
criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code against petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20
and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING:

No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What prompted petitioners to file
the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount
of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Private respondent, however, did nothing to
clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced
on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction
for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim
for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There
is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is
done with intent to injure.

There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private
respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be
held liable for damages.