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Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1)
the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must
consider the same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land
subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Rulings/Principles:
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS;
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification
comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.
d. Cariño vs Insular Gov’t Mar 25, 1907;
Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land
he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo
averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs
Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute owner.
2. Lands of the Public Domain;
a. Republic vs Herbieto May 26, 2005;
Summary: The applicants for judicial title was challenged by the government for failing to comply with the length of ownership required by law of
two parcels of land just recently classified as alienable and disposable.
Rule of Law: A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the
land through publication and service of notice.
Facts: The Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a single application for registration of two parcels of land located in
Consolacion, Cebu. They claimed to be owners having purchased the lots from their parents.
The government opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto's failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2)
their evidence were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not
subject to private appropriation.
The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing. A copy of the Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the
municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on August 2, 1999 and The Freeman Banat
News on December 19, 1999.
b. Omandam vs CA Jan 18, 2001;
FACTS: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling,
Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title Certificate in his name.
On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that
petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent
before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who
executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.
On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty years.
After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their
predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of
the petitioners.
On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject land and
surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private
respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners'
action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of
possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application
and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?
RULING: Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands
primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire
into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree.
Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error.
DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions
stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the
grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners
free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office). The subject land was previously owned by
Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty.
[3]
Samson Binag. On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
[4] [5]
Management Bureau). On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as
the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent
[6] [7]
application. The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey, and the free patent applications uniformly
identified the subject land as Lot322. The deeds covering the second and
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third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land. On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners
free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23,
[9]
1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates the
[10]
area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents].
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this
lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;
2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as included in Lot No. 258;
3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical description of x x x
[11]
Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office
denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling.
Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner
[12]
acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot322. On appeal, the DENR Secretary
[13]
affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of
Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The
DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty.
Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner
[14]
really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of
contracts be granted;
2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322 xxx.
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims
of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot
322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership
over a real property matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine. The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. On the contrary,
the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters
within the competence of the courts. The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the
evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag
identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag),
tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present
possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation. The petitioner also invites our
attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on the
respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they
already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty.
Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already
substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.
Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence
to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title. In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any
reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his
arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
THE RULING
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case,
the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual
boundaries in accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are instances where the Court departs
from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized
[21] [22]
exceptions. On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR
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Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts, and even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall
consequently confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.
The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of lands of the public domain
[24]
The petitioner insists that under the law actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those
involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending
before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering the
respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.
[25]
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties written agreement reflects their true intention. In the present
case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court
resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to
[26]
prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the
process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such
revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.]
(Underscoring supplied.)
[29]
Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the
[30]
DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141) by having direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners free patent
application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both
parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with direct
control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the
[31]
DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free patent in their favor since it merely
ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival
claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of
[32]
the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists.
After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related
[33]
issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction, such as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same
property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property, identified as Lot 322, - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA
found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the
[34]
subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of
step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid
authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal
[35]
power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.
The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public lands
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right
over Lot 322) does not require the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts,
appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular courts.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
[36]
fact
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means
that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
[37]
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need
only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined.
[38]
Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served. (Emphases added.)
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this
issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public
[39]
character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and management of public lands fall within
[40]
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of
[41]
jurisdiction over possessoryactions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations), the respondents
d. Gordula vs CA Jan 22, 1998;
FACTS: Petitioner Gordula filed an application for a free patent over a land, which he had been in possession since 1949, in January, 1973. The Free
patent was issued on January 01, 1974. The subject land in 1973 was still part of the Caliraya- LumotRiver Forest reserve and was no longer open to
private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. Thereafter, on November 18, 1987, the REPUBLIC, thru the
NAPOCOR, filed an action for annulment of petitioner’s Free Patent, cancellation of titles and The CA also held that the petitioners could not claim
ownership by acquisitive prescription since 1969; Gordula had been in possession of the property for only 25 years. The period of Gordula’s
occupancy after 1969 should not be tacked to the period from 1944 since by then the property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation.
HELD: Forest lands/reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof however long can not convert them into private
properties. (Director of Lands vs. CA). This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Further, no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the State. Gordula did not acquire title to the said land prior to its reservation under Proc. . He filed his application 3 years after said
Proclamation was issued in 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya- Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private
ownership as it has been classified as “public forest reserve for public good.”
3. Classification of Public Lands;
a. Republic vs Fabio Dec 23, 2008
Facts: The heirs of Juan Fabio filed an application for registration of title to a Lot which they claim to have been in the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest for more than 100 years. One of the documents they presented as evidence is an approved survey plan which contained a
notation that reads "this survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation xxx." Conversely, the Republic of the Philippines opposed the
application, claiming that the Lot sought to be registered falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation
as placed under the exclusive use of the military through three presidential proclamations. The heirs, on the other hand, maintain that they have
acquired a vested right over the Lot by acquisitive prescription.
Issue: Whether a lot under military reservation may be acquired through acquisitive prescription.
Ruling: No. Being a military reservation, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to which the Lot is a part of, cannot be subject to occupation,
entry or settlement. Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In
view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that it was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is
inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration.
d. Republic vs Iglesia ni Cristo Jun 30, 2009
Republic v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009
FACTS:
The subject of the case is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre located in Ilocos Norte.
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title
before the MCTC in Paoay Currimao. Appended to the application were the Sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo 1001047, the technical description of
subject lot, the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration No. (TD) 5080261 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale
executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application. Cadastral Court and Court
of Appeals = Rendered in favor of INC.
ISSUE:
May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945?
HELD: No.
It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is
indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on
May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is
the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of
the application for registration of title is filed. In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in
Naguit, the Court ruled that
the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed
.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is
also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors In interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945,
as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupation from Sabuco, including those
of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property.
These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses
4. Non-Registrable Properties;
a. Chavez vs Public Estates Authority Jul 9, 2002;
Facts: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain
Held: MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion
and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420
of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and
domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of
the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property
whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of
public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and
compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in O.P.N. possession;
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural
public land.
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against
the Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the
court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with
authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Ruling: Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No.
926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponce’s possessory
information. RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A.
d. Amunategui vs Director of Forestry Nov 29, 1983;
FACTS: Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar
Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry,
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed
to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being
classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime
Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
[6] [7]
declaring them open for disposition. These are Proclamation No. 461 and Proclamation No. 462, both series of 1965, excluding portions of the
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A. 7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to own,
[10]
hold and administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President and to dispose, after the lapse of a
[11]
number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less,
known as or are situated in what is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military
officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed
by the AFP on the JUSMAG area.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able
[12]
to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15084 - in its name to the bulk of, if
not the entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property covered thereby as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmang (sic)
Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057, being a portion of parcel 3 of plan
Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, FortBonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (1,320)
SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.)
[13]
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the
same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase
price as written in the conveying deed wasP11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of
the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The
results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR)
[14]
No. 815-1093. Its highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) containing the signature of
ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. designated as Q-961 .
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of SHAI containing the signature of ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.
... designated as Q-962.
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. were
written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted, under stereoscopic microscope and
magnifying lens, with the aid of photographic enlargement reveals that there exist fundamental, significant differences in writing
characteristics between the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner in execution of strokes; that of the
standard/sample signatures show free, rapid coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of letters/elements.
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a product of TRACING
PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION: Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO
G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same person. The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR." marked "Q-961" is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
REMARKS: The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." are still
[15]
in the process of examination.
[16]
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a
bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding
nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883 and eventually
raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph No. 5 of the
complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is spurious as
the purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged
payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No.
[17]
423.
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as
[18]
the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic is estopped to deny. SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price
indicated in the deed as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 6030203-C dated October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in
evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent,
then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it would appear that the
[19]
parties agreed to limit the issue to the due execution and genuineness of Exhs. A and B.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No.
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to review the finding of facts of
the [CA], summarized in and subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert
[27]
the same at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule, as articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, is
that the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the
rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as possible the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed
[28]
maneuverings. And lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in pre-trials is, as Bergano v. Court of Appeals teaches,
[29]
citing Gicano v. Gegato, subject to exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with
[30]
inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the demands of justice so require.
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-trial conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to
tackling the question of inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not really
present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is central to the Republics cause of action, was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the
[31]
CA and, before it, by the trial court and of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the land alleged sale was part of the
[FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do you know whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those government lands that has been
assigned to other government agencies that is no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that
[32]
because the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose under the DND . (Words in bracket added.)
[33]
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent SHAI. It even cross-examined said witness. The rule
obtains that the introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the pre-trial order amounts to implied consent conferring
[34]
jurisdiction on the court to try such issue.
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during
the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been
separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract
[35]
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such
tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.
[36]
Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private
[37]
appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public
[38]
land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by
[39]
presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a
purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it must be here. There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the
questioned October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic)
area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx (Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private respondents Exhibits 1 and 2, formed part of that wide expanse
under Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These
include, inter alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 located inside the now
renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu
[42]
2031 prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the
outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT
No. 15084, defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No.
423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter
Parcel No. 3 of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has
maintained all along this thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property is part of the reservation, the petitioner
Republic need only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved for military
purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance
[43]
of which courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to
the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered
inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind
eye on, certain admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5
(e) and (g) of its complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property covered by TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs
answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the complaint, the truth of the matter being that in the
Deed of Sale , the Director of Lands Certificate (sic) that he is authorized under the law to sell the subject property and that the
[44]
lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee. ( Emphasis and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers
denial to such allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No. 15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules
[45]
on pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it is so qualified or termed specific by the pleader. The
defendant must specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the
[46]
substance of the matters upon which he will rely to support his denial. Else, the denial will be regarded as general and will, therefore, be regarded
as an admission of a given material fact/s stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what, under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the
Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to
admit the reality of such averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than sufficiently established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of
land covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence
to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or
excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim
respecting the validity of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. A/1) and its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) rests on the postulate that what it purportedly
bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had
been withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it
wanted to, pointed to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its
[47]
own Exhibit 5, a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the
SHAI, cannot but be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be excluded from the military reservation. The Abadia
letter, with its feature dis-serving to private respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand how the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The
[48]
appellate court, apparently swayed by what SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that , then President Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded
from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square meters more or less. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 also located at
Fort Bonifacio containing an area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288] square meters covered
by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857
[49]
square meters or more or less 16 hectares .
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following disquisition:
The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to justify speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved
for military purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172
excluded a combined area of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of the disputed parcels of land having
been reserved for military purposes to a rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation because 6,892,338 square
meters had already been withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual speculations do not make for
proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and quite understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any
proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating the property covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying
the same as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a
military reservation remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such classification and
[50]
declared open to disposition. The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity,
could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent
SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area
[51]
is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were,
still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its
reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI.
[52]
The reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is not very
[53]
clear under existing jurisprudence, the fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring
alienable public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however,
without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the
authenticity of what appears to be Palads signature thereon .With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances and
inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent
[54]
states, without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding criminal prosecution. The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads
[55]
allegation on forgery. Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the
NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity,
Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to PasigCity to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry
and there stamped Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In
other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is
why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed
notarized.
[56]
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act. There is also
no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the
property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC,
[57]
Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry
[58]
pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29
October 1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.. An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove
[59]
payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence.
A Certification under date September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that OR # 6030203 in the amount of P11,977,000.00
supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB, Central Office.
[60]
A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any of the pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if
it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
[61]
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount
apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this and the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the
[67]
FactFinding Commission, so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation
[68]
Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in comparison. The members of private respondent SHAI may very well
have paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the
over P11 Million they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong
hands and did not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of such payment.At bottom, this disposition is nothing more
than restoring the petitioner Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There is nothing unjust to this
approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the
petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and, accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in
the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic. However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the
military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R.
No. 156951 could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end this ponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not
always right; that ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat
lightly any attempt to trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming respect to the majesty of the law and the
prerogatives of the Court is a must for the orderly administration of justice to triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the appealed CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. A/1) purportedly executed in favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis ofsuch deed are declared VOID. The Register of Deeds of Pasig
or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby
is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from
such reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately
upon the finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Act . Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same. SO
ORDERED.
h. Republic vs CA and Republic Nov 25, 1998(see J. Puno concurring opinion);
FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their
own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct,
maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and
entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of
the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the
commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC
rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUEs: Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area and Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area are
within the commerce of man.
HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes
the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a
low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International
Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify
the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
This case involves a 17,181 square meter land which is known as Lot No. 6278-M located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and
inherited by respondents from their parents who died in 1976 and 1986respectively.
During the pre-trial, the Court and the parties designated geodetic engineer Suasin to perform the task of verification and relocation survey
of said lot and which was accordingly executed on September 12-13, 2000.
In the written report of Engr. Suasin, it contained, inter alia, that the big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and a small portion
remain as dry land, and that some of the defendants have constructed buildings or houses inside the dry land.
In the Court’s judgment dated May 11, 2001, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No.
6278-M has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
Respondents appealed to the RTC, which subsequently concluded upon conducting two ocular inspections, that the disputed remaining
portion is not foreshore land because it remained dry even during high tides.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied. They also filed separate petitions for review withthe Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has become foreshore land which forms part of the public
domain, as contended by petitioners
HELD
The SC held that the disputed portion is private land and is rightfully owned by respondents, in contravention to the claim of petitioners
that is has become foreshore land and therefore owned by the public domain, and that they have foreshore lease permits from the DENR on claimed
foreshore land, albeit failing to present evidence to prove validity of such claim.
k. Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center vs CA Sep 30, 1976;
Facts: On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent Alejandro deJesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-
hectare land situated in barrio Libranon, Davao. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands through theDavao Land District Officer accepted the
sealed bids for the purchase of the subjected land. Irineo Jose bidded P20 per hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50 per hectare. The
director annulled the said auction for the reason that sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus failed to participate in the bid. Another bidding was held on
October 3, 1934 and Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equaled the bid submitted by Dr.Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as
10% deposit of the price of the land at P110.50 per hectare. That on November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issuedan award order to Eugenio de
Jesus with regards to the said lot stating the coverage of the land which is located in Davao with an area of 22 hectares at P100.50 per hectare or
P2210 for the whole tract. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands amended the sales application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the
said land is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes thereby excluding 12.8081 hectares which is the land in question. On
September 7, 1936, President Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 thereby declaring the said lot to be withdrawn from sale and settlement
and reserving the same for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de
Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8 and 10 installment for the 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the sales application was amended which did
not include the military camp. Thereafter, on May 15, 1948, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio deJesus for the tract of
land having an area of 20.6400 hectares. On the same date, the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources likewise granted a sales patent to
Eugenio de Jesus containing an area of 20.6400 hectares. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked the Proclamation No.85 and
declared the disputed lot opens to disposition under the provisions of Public
Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then on October 9, PresidentRamon Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation and reserved the
same lot for medical center site under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center applied for Torrens registration of the said lot with the Court of First Instance of Davao, claimed “fee simple” title to the Appellate Court
denied the motion on June 17, 1975. Forthwith, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court for appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of the
Proclamation No. 350 reserving the said land for medical site purposes.
Conclusion: Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the lot with area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No. 350
reserving such land for medical site purposes. The Supreme Court held that:
1. Proclamation No. 350 is free from infirmity and it proceeds from the recognized competence of the President to reserve alienable lands of the
public for specific public use or service. The law authorizes the President to designate tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for
the commonwealth of the Philippines. A special proprietary right was vested in Eugenio de Jesus when the sales award was issued to him in 1934
which was for 22 hectares (later found to be 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey). The privilege of occupying public lands confers no contractual or
vested rights and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by public, or to reserve them for public use may defeat
the imperfect right of a settler. Such proclamation of the President to reserve lands terminates any rights previously acquired by persons t not
proprietary right for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the
State
HELD: Cadastral cases initiated by the Government are judicial in nature and one in rem. Decisions therein are binding against the whole world,
including the government. After the finality of the degree, title of ownership becomes vested upon the adjudicatee and the land could no longer be
disposed of. Tho government had lost its right to convey the land by homestead grant. Homestead patent title issued by the Bureau of Lands wag the
result of administrative proceedings initiated by the homestead applicant. The proceedings are under the control and determination of tho Director of
Lands whose decisions on the contest are not final and conclusive. In view of the nature and manner of acquisition of appellees' title over the
disputed land, it must perforce give way to the appellant's title acquired by judicial adjudication.
d. Flores vs Bagaoisan Apr 15, 2010
5.3. Free Patent and Residential Free Patent under RA 10023(Free Patent Act);
e. Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Republic Oct 22, 2004
5.4. Sales Patent under CA 141(Public Land Act) and Sales of Agricultural Residential Land Under RA 730(Sales Patent Act);
h. Int’l Hardwood and Veneer Co. vs UP Aug. 13, 1991;
SUMMARY:
International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates from the public domain parcels
of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said Proclamation.
On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted fully ceding ownership over the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry charges from
Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for declaratory
relief.
The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception
is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area
ceded and transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to
the new owner, UP
DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to
existing concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public
CA cites as basis for its decision Sec. 48 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by RA 1942: Section 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Doldol, having occupied the lot for 32 years, acquired a right over the land.
RULING: No. While the laws provide for prescription as a way for acquiring ownership over a particular land, the CA erred in applying Sec. 48 of
the Public Land Act which is the outdated version of the said law. Sec. 48 has now already been amended by PD 1073, which now states that: (b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Under
the said act, a person acquires a right to a government rant over a particular land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, if: (a) The
land is alienable public land (b) The person has open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same which must be for
the period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12, 1945, or earlier. IN THIS CASE: The land is alienable and disposable, in accordance with
the District Foresters Certification. However, Doldol had been occupying the land reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law requires that
the possession of lands of public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. Thus, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title or a right to the disputed lot. He cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to
the school, given that the President has reserved the said lot as a school site. Having been reserved in its favor, Opol National School has a better
right of possession over the land in dispute. o The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested
right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public
use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
5.6. Friar Lands;
j. Pugeda vs Tnias Mar 31, 1962
Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal
properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the
widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered
evidence.
Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar Lands Act which at the time of his death were not
yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and
thereafter the title was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property not conjugal;
(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and
(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya,
et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion and declared the decision as final.
Ruling:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the
husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the
setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The doctrine
in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers
made by the husband without the approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made pro indiviso
in a project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.