1. Rosario Enriquez Vda. De Santiago Vs. Antonio T.

Vilar/Government Services Insurance System

(GSIS) Vs. Antonio T. Vilar
G.R. No. 225309/G.R. No. 225546. March 6, 2018

FACTS: Spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos (Spouses Zulueta), registered owners of several
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50356 (mother
titles), obtained various loans secured by the mother titles from the GSIS. The amount of loans, with the
accumulated value of P3,117,000.00 were obtained from September 1956 to October 1957. When
Spouses Zulueta defaulted in their payment, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgages in August
1974 wherein the latter emerged as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was then issued. GSIS,
however, consolidated its title on all of the three mother titles, including the 78 lots which were
expressly excluded from the mortgage contract.

Later, GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Y orkstown Development Corporation (YDC). The same,
however, was disapproved by the Office of the President. Accordingly, the TCTs issued in favor of YDC
were canceled. Thereafter, Spouses Zulueta were succeeded by Antonio Zulueta (Antonio), who
transferred all his rights and interests in the excluded lots to Eduardo Santiago (Eduardo). Claiming his
rights and interests over the excluded lots, Eduardo, through his counsel, sent a letter to GSIS for the
return of the same.

In May 1990, Antonio, as represented by Eduardo, filed an Action for Reconveyance of the excluded lots
against the GSIS. Subsequently, Antonio was substituted by Eduardo. Upon Eduardo's demise, however,
he was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Rosario.

The Registry of Deeds of Pasig City was likewise ordered to cancel the titles covering the excluded lots
issued in the name of GSIS. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred m imp leading Vilar as party-plaintiff in substitution of Rosario.

HELD: The case stemmed from the action for reconveyance filed by Eduardo, husband of Rosario. To
recall, Eduardo was the successor-in-interest of Antonio, who is actually the successor-in-interest of
Spouses Zulueta. Spouses Zulueta are the original owners of the subject parcels of land. Upon the death
of the party-plaintiff Eduardo, Rosario was substituted in his stead. The case was subsequently decided
on December 17, 1997 and affirmed by this Court in October 28, 2003. An Entry of Judgment was issued
in 2004. In all these incidents, Rosario was considered as the party-plaintiff.

By definition, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be

had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.39 It is a party whose interest
will be affected by the court's action in the litigation.

erily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the original
party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the action of the trial court in merely
noting and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter of
litigation as the party-plaintiff.
 1. Heirs of Tunged namely: Rosita Yaris-Liwan, et al. Vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. and
Baguio Properties, Inc.
G.R. No. 231737. March 6, 2018

FACTS: Petitioners are recognized Indigenous People (IP), being members of the Jbaloi tribe, who are
the original settlers in Baguio City and Benguet Province. Respondent Sta. Lucia Realty is a real estate
developer, while respondent Baguio Properties, Inc. claims to be the lot owner managing the properties
of Manila Newtown Development Corporation, which covers portions of the subject land. Environmental
Case No. 8548-R entitled "Enforcement/Violations of the Provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) (Republic Act No. 8371); Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1586;7 and Other Pertinent Laws with
Prayer for the Issuance of Environmental Protection Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory/Prohibitory Injunction, and Writ of Mandamus" was filed by the petitioners against
respondents.

In the complaint, petitioners argued that respondents' acts of demolishing and bulldozing the subject
land, which caused the destruction of small and full grown trees and sayote plants and other resources
of the petitioners, violated their rights pursuant to the IPRA; violated environmental laws, specifically PD
1586, as respondents' project poses grave and/or irreparable danger to environment, life, and property,
and also violated the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued to them. For its part, Baguio
Properties, Inc. invoked ownership over the subject land and as such, they argued that petitioners'
complaint is a collateral attack to its Torrens Titles.

On March 2, 2017, the RTC, sitting as an environmental court, dismissed the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC held that the recognition of the petitioners' rights as IPs is not the proper subject of
an environmental case, as such, it should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding governed by the
very law relied upon by the petitioners, i.e., the IPRA.

ISSUE: Was the court a quo's outright dismissal of the case proper?

HELD: No. In precis, the R TC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, finding that
petitioners' case is grounded upon their claim of being members of the IPs and their assertion of
ownership as such over their ancestral land. In ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case, the RTC
discussed the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP to issue CAL Ts/CADTs to formally recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands/domains by virtue of native title. Further, the RTC ruled that
even if the case is covered by A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, the same is still dismissible considering that
petitioners' right over the subject property is yet to be established as can be gleaned from their prayer
for the recognition of ownership rights as IPs over the subject land.
 1. Intramuros Administration Vs. Offshore Construction Development
G.R. No. 196795. March 7, 2018

FACTS: In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national govetninent, which it
administered to Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease:
Baluarte De San Andres, with an area of 2,793 sq. m.; Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao, with an area
of 1,880 sq. m.; and Revellin De Recoletos, with an area of 1,036 sq. m.6 All three (3) properties were
leased for five (5) years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. All their lease contracts also made
reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision for lease
renewals every five (5) years upon the parties' mutual agreement. Offshore Construction occupied and
introduced improvements in the leased premises.

Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement on July 26, 1999, 11 which the Manila
Regional Trial Court approved on February 8, 2000. 12 In the Compromise Agreement, the parties
affirmed the validity of the two (2) lease contracts but terminated the one over Revellin de Recoletos.13
The Compromise Agreement retained the five (5)-year period of the existing lease contracts.

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite
several demand letters.15 Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore
Construction would pay its arrears. As of July 31, 2004, these arrears allegedly totaled P6,762,153.70.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court on April 28, 2010.
Offshore Construction filed its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Intramuros Administration is entitled to possess the leased premises and to
collect unpaid rentals.

HELD: t is undisputed that respondent's occupation and use of Baluarte de San Andres, Baluarte de San
Francisco de Dilao, and Revellin de Recoletos started on September 1, 1998 by virtue of Contracts of
Lease all dated August 20, 1998.117 The Contracts of Lease were modified through Addendums to the
Contracts likewise dated August 20, 1998. In the Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the
validity of the lease contracts, but agreed to transfer the areas to be occupied and used by respondent
in Baluarte de San Andres and Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao due to improvements that it had
introduced to the leased premises.120 The lease over Revellin de Recoletos was terminated.121 It
appears that under this Compromise Agreement, the original five (5)-year period of the Contracts of
Lease were retained, 122 such that the leases would expire on August 31, 2003, and renewable for
another five ( 5) years upon the parties' mutual agreement.

Thereafter, the Contracts of Lease expired. Respondent does not concede this, but there is no proof that
there has been any contract mutually agreed upon by the parties for any extensions of the leases.
Respondent can only argue that petitioner's continuing tolerance of respondent's possession and
acceptance of respondent's rental payments impliedly renewed the Contracts of Lease.

Respondent claims that the parties' agreement was for it to operate the leased premises to recover its
investments and to make profits. However, a review of the Contracts of Lease show that they are lease
contracts, as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code:
 Article 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another
the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or
indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninety-nine years shall be valid.

However, this Court cannot award unpaid rentals to petitioner pursuant to the ejectment proceeding,
since the issue of rentals in Civil Case No. 08-119138 is currently pending with Branch 37, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, by virtue of petitioner's counterclaim. As the parties dispute the amounts to be offset
under the July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement and respondents actual back and current rentals
due, 130 the resolution of that case is better left to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits.
 1. Alex Raul B. Blay Vs. Cynthia B. Baña
G.R. No. 232189. March 7, 2018

FACTS: On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent filed her
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus,
filed a Motion to Withdraw 9 his petition. In tum, petitioner filed his reply, 12 averring that respondent's
counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a
manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which -according
to petitioner -was required under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular, petitioner alleged that
respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015.

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 22 It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC, holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been filed by
the defendant before the service upon him of the petitioner's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim
for independent adjudication before the same trial court.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 1 7 to that portion of its second sentence
which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same
provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes
a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly
inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to
manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.

The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers
the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further proceedings,
i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to obviate this
finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid period;
otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.

Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently, the CA rulings, which affirmed the
patently erroneous R TC Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC should have only granted
petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and hence, dismissed his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
without prejudice to, among others, the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim in a separate action.
 1. Spouses Larry and Flora Davis Vs. Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis
G.R. No. 233489. March 7, 2018

FACTS: the petitioners, as vendees, and the herein respondents Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis, as
vendors, entered into a Contract to Sell over a 500-square meter lot in Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-226201 (M) (subject property) for a consideration of
P500,000. As agreed upon, the petitioners gave the respondents the sum of P200,000 as downpayment
while the remaining balance of P300,000 was made payable in 12 equal monthly installments. The
respondents agreed to execute the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale upon full payment of the
purchase price. After full payment thereof and despite repeated demands, however, the respondents
failed and refused to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to
initiate a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages (with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order) against the former before Branch 78 (Br. 78) of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (RTC Malolos), docketed as Civil Case No. 581-M-95. A notice
of /is pendens was then annotated at the back of TCT No. T-226201 (M). In their Answer, the
respondents admitted receipt of the P200,000 downpayment but denied receipt of the balance of
P300,000. They also insisted that the petitioners have no cause of action. On appeal, the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: the appellate court committed a grave and reversible error in dismissing their Petition for
Certiorari notwithstanding that the presiding judge of the RTC Malolos was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

HELD: Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action."
Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execution by motion
even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.

Here, the decision sought to be enforced became final and executory on October 2, 2004. Upon the
petitioners' motion, a writ of execution was issued in 2005, which was well within the said five-year
period. The writ, however, was repeatedly returned unserved and unimplemented. The petitioners later
discovered the reason therefor. The respondents had sold the subject property to other parties. Worse,
a new title has already been issued to the latter. As such, the petitioners were compelled to file an
action for annulment of title and document against these new registered owners.

This Court sustains the petitioners' position. Considering that the delay was not due to the fault of the
petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sold the subject property to another to avoid the
outcome of the case filed against them, and which delay incurred to their benefit/advantage, it is only
logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an action for annulment of title and document
was being litigated upon shall be deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running of the five-year
period for enforcement of a judgment by mere motion. Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for
escaping the fulfilment of their obligation. Therefore, in computing the time limited for suing out an
execution, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended
by any delay occasioned by the debtor. 22 It bears stressing that the purpose of the law in prescribing
time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.23
Moreover, the statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do
so for causes beyond their coiltrol?4 In the case under consideration, there has been no indication that
the petitioners had ever slept on their rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions within the
reglementary period.
 1. Tee Ling Kiat Vs. Ayala Corporation
G.R. No. 192530. March 7, 2018

FACTS: The present petition arose from a judgment for a sum of money obtained by Ayala Corporation
against Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) and Spouses Dewey and Lily Dee (Spouses Dee) in
1990.

On January 28, 1981, Ayala Corporation instituted a Complaint for Sum of Money with an application for
a writ of attachment against the Spouses Dee. The complaint was initially raffled to Branch 15 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. It appears that on May 21, 1980, Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC) granted in favor of CMC a money market line in the maximum amount of P2,000,000.00. With
Dewey Dee as the President of CMC then, the Spouses Dee executed a Surety Agreement on the same
date, as guarantee for the money market line. One of CMC's availments under the money market line was
evinced by a Promissory Note dated November 20, 1980 for P800,000.00 due on January 16, 1981. AIDC
subsequently endorsed the Promissory Note to Ayala Corporation. CMC defaulted on its obligation under
the promissory note, leading Ayala Corporation to institute a claim for sum of money against CMC and
the Spouses Dee.

Ruling on the Complaint for Sum of Money, the RTC - Makati City, Branch 149 (RTC Branch 149) ruled in
favor of Ayala Corporation. Thereafter, on March 26, 2007, before the scheduled sale on execution, Tee
Ling Kiat filed a Third-Party Claim. Attached to the Third-Party Claim was a copy of an Affidavit executed
by Tee Ling Kiat, attesting to the fact that he is a stockholder of VIP and that he acquired knowledge of
the levy on the subject properties only through newspaper, as well as a photocopy of cancelled checks
issued by Tee Ling Kiat in Dewey Dee's favor, allegedly as payment for the purchase of the latter's shares
in VIP.

The RTC, in an Order dated February 20, 2008, denied VIP and Tee Ling Kiat's Omnibus Motion and
disallowed the third-party claim because the alleged sale of shares of stock from Dewey Dee to Tee Ling
Kiat was not proven. Upon appeal, the CA, in the assailed Decision dated September 24, 2009, denied Tee
Ling Kiat's petition for certiorari, on the ground that Tee Ling Kiat is not a real party-in-interest, especially
considering that the alleged sale of Dewey Dee's shares of stock to Tee Ling Kiat has not been proven.

In particular, the CA observed that Tee Ling Kiat failed to prove to the Court the existence or veracity of
the claimed Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock. The CA held that "[i]t is not sufficient to attach photocopies
of the deed or payment of checks to the motion, [Tee Ling Kiat] needed to submit evidence to prove that
the transaction took place. Before the CA, Tee Ling Kiat also raised, for the first time, that he can be
properly considered a trustee of VIP, entitled to hold properties on the latter's behalf. The CA observed,
however, that there was no evidence produced to show that Tee Ling Kiat is a trustee of the corporation.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed any reversible error in issuing its Decision dated September 24, 2009
and Resolution dated May 26, 2010.

HELD: No. The crux of determining whether the CA committed any reversible error in issuing the
assailed Decision and Resolution is the question of whether it has been sufficiently proven by Tee Ling Kiat
that Dewey Dee had in fact sold his shares of stock to Tee Ling Kiat in 1980, such that, as a result, Tee Ling
Kiat can be considered a real party-in-interest in the Third-Party Claim, and consequently, in the petition
for certiorari before the CA.
Such determination, however, inevitably necessitates a review of the probative value of the evidence
adduced by Tee Ling Kiat. In this regard, the Rules of Court67 categorically state that a Rule 45 petition
shall only raise questions of law. On the one hand, a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts.68 On the other hand, a question of fact arises when doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.69 Once it is clear that the resolution of an issue invites a review of
the evidence presented by the parties, the question raised is one of fact70 which this Court is precluded
from reviewing in a Rule 45 petition.

Here, Tee Ling Kiat imputes error on the CA by the simple expedient of arguing that he did not personally
need to prove that the sale of shares of stock between Dewey Dee and himself had in fact transpired, as
the duty to record the sale in the corporate books lies with VIP. Such an argument, however, fails to
recognize that the very right of Tee Ling Kiat, as a third-party claimant, to institute a terceria is founded
on his claimed title over the levied property.71

Consequently, although courts can exercise their limited supervisory powers in determining whether the
sheriff acted correctly in executing the judgment, they may only do so if the third-party claimant has
unmistakably established his ownership or right of possession over the subject property.72 Accordingly, if
the third-party claimant's evidence does not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right
possession thereto, the third-party claim will, and should be, denied.Suffice it to state that the only
evidence adduced by Tee Ling Kiat to support his claim that Dewey Dee's shares in VIP have been sold to
him are a cancelled check74 issued by Tee Ling Kiat in favor of Dewey Dee and a photocopy75 of the Deed
of Sale of Shares of Stock dated December 29, 1980. A photocopy of a document has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence.76 The records likewise do not show that Tee Ling Kiat offered any
explanation as to why the original Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock could not be produced, instead alleging
that because of the disputable presumption "[t]hat the ordinary course of business has been
followed"77 provided in Section 3(q) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, then the burden is not on him to
prove that he is a stockholder, but on Amora, to prove that he is not a stockholder.78

This argument is off tangent. Meaning, even if it could be assumed that the sale of shares of stock
contained in the photocopies had indeed transpired, such transfer is only valid as to the parties thereto,
but is not binding on the corporation if the same is not recorded in the books of the corporation. Section
63 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines provides that: "No transfer, x x x shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation showing the names of
the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and
the number of shares transferred."79 Here, the records show that the purported transaction between Tee
Ling Kiat and Dewey Dee has never been recorded in VIP's corporate books. Thus, the transfer, not having
been recorded in the corporate books in accordance with law, is not valid or binding as to the corporation
or as to third persons.
 1. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Alvin C. Dimarucot and Nailyn Tañedo-Dimarucot
G.R. No. 202069. March 7, 2018

FACTS: Respondents met sometime in 2002 and became friends. This friendship immediately progressed
and turned into an intimate romantic relationship, leading to Nailyn's pregnancy in March 2003. Two
months later, the Respondents wed in civil rights on May 18, 2003. Nailyn gave birth to the Respondents'
first child, Ayla Nicole, on November 11, 2003. Years later, on December 13, 2007, Nailyn gave birth to
Respondents' second child, Anyelle. It appears, however, that Respondents' whirlwind romance resulted
in a problematic marriage, as Alvin filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage (RTC
Petition) before the RTC on September 22, 2009. In the Petition, Alvin alleged that Nailyn suffers from
psychological incapacity which renders her incapable of complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Hence, Alvin prayed that his marriage with Nailyn be declared null and void pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.

On July 2, 2010, the RTC, through Presiding Judge Ismael P. Casabar (Judge Casabar), rendered a Decision
declaring Respondents' marriage null and void. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision read:

From the evidence adduced by [Alvin], this court is convinced that [Nailyn] is psychologically incapacitated
to perform her basic marital obligations. Her being a loose-spender, overly materialistic and her complete
disregard of the basic foundation of their marriage [—] to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support are manifestations of her psychological incapacity to comply
with the basic marital duties and responsibilities. Her incapacity is grave, permanent and incurable. It
existed from her childhood and became so manifest after the celebration of their marriage.

On July 27, 2010, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of even date,
alleging that "[Alvin] failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his wife's alleged
psychological incapacity." However, the Notice of Hearing annexed to the MR erroneously set the same
for hearing on July 6, 2010 (instead of August 6, 2010 as the OSG later explained).

The RTC denied the Republic's MR through the August 2010 RTC Order. Thus, on September 1, 2010, the
Republic filed a Notice of Appeal of even date, which was denied in the September 2010 RTC Order.
Subsequently, on October 22, 2010, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari (CA Petition) before the CA,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for issuing the August and September 2010 RTC
orders. On July 29, 2011, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision denying the CA Petition.

The CA held that the CA Petition warrants outright dismissal because it was filed without the benefit of a
motion for reconsideration — an indispensable requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration (CA MR), the CA denied the CA MR in the Assailed
Resolution. The Republic received a copy of the Assailed Resolution on May 31, 2012. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it did not pass upon Atty. Amy's alleged violation of Rule 137.

RULING: No. The Republic's objection against Atty. Amy's participation in the annulment case should
have been raised at the first instance before the RTC.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 provide:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or b

In the absence of any showing of collusion between Judge Casabar and Atty. Amy, the latter's failure to
report the circumstances requiring her disqualification cannot serve as basis to ascribe grave abuse of
discretion to the former.

Nevertheless, Atty. Amy's alleged failure to observe SC AC No. 58-08, if true, cannot be countenanced.
Thus, pursuant to its power of administrative supervision over all court personnel, the Court deems it
appropriate to refer the Republic's allegations to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate
action.
 1. Citystate Savings Bank Vs. Teresita Tobias and Shellidie Valdez
G.R. No. 227990. March 7, 2018

FACTS: Rolando Robles (hereinafter referred to as Robles), a certified public accountant, has been
employed with Citystate Savings Bank (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) since July 1998 then as
Accountant-trainee for its Chino Roces Branch. On September 6, 2000, Robles was promoted as acting
manager for petitioner's Baliuag, Bulacan branch, and eventually as manager. Sometime in 2002,
respondent Teresita Tobias (hereinafter referred to as Tobias), a meat vendor at the Baliuag Public
Market, was introduced by her youngest son to Robles, branch manager of petitioner's Baliuag, Bulacan
branch. Robles persuaded Tobias to open an account with the petitioner, and thereafter to place her
money in some high interest rate mechanism, to which the latter yielded.

Thereafter, Robles would frequent Tobias' stall at the public market to deliver the interest earned by her
deposit accounts in the amount of Php 2,000.00. In turn, Tobias would hand over her passbook to Robies
for updating. The passbook would be returned the following day with typewritten entries but without the
corresponding counter signatures.

Tobias was later offered by Robles to sign-up in petitioner's back-to-back scheme which is supposedly
offered only to petitioner's most valued clients. Under the scheme, the depositors authorize the bank to
use their bank deposits and invest the same in different business ventures that yield high interest. Robies
allegedly promised that the interest previously earned by Tobias would be doubled and assured her that
he will do all the paper work. Lured by the attractive offer, Tobias signed the pertinent documents without
reading its contents and invested a total of Php 1,800,000.00 to petitioner through Robies. Later, Tobias
became sickly, thus she included her daughter and herein respondent Shellidie Valdez (hereinafter
referred to as Valdez), as co-depositor in her accounts with the petitioner.

In 2005, Robles failed to remit to respondents the interest as scheduled. Respondents tried to reach
Robles but he can no longer be found; their calls were also left unanswered. In a meeting with Robles'
siblings, it was disclosed to the respondents that Robles withdrew the money and appropriated it for
personal use. Robiles later talked to the respondents, promised that he would return the money by
installments and pleaded that they do not report the incident to the petitioner. Robles however reneged
on his promise. Petitioner also refused to make arrangements for the return of respondents' money
despite several demands. On January 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint for sum of money and
damages. against Robles and the petitioner. In their Complaint, respondents alleged that Robles
committed fraud in the performance of his duties as branch manager when he lured Tobias in signing
several pieces of blank documents, under the assurance as bank manager of petitioner, everything was in
order. After due proceedings, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), on February 12, 2014, rendered its Decision,
viz.:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Robles to pay
plaintiff the following:

1. the amount of Php1,800,000.00 as actual damages plus legal rate of interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid;

2. the amount of Php100,000.00 as moral damages; and

 3. the amount of Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees and litigation expenses are DENIED for lack of merit.

Further, defendant bank is absolved of any liability. Likewise, all counterclaims and cross-claims are
DENIED for lack of merit.
The matter was elevated to the CA. The CA in its Decision dated May 31, 2016, found the appeal
meritorious and accordingly, reversed and set aside the RTC's decision. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the decision, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the CA seriously erred in ruling that citystate is jointly and solidarily liable for attorney's
fees.

RULING: NO. The last of the three consolidated cases, assails the decision and resolution of the CA which
held Citibank, the drawee bank, solely liable for the amount of crossed check nos. SN-10597 and 16508 as
actual damages, the proceeds of which have been misappropriated by a syndicate involving the
employees of the drawer Ford, and the collecting bank PCIB.

This Court in resolving the issue of liability in PCIB v. CA, considered the degree of negligence of the parties.

While recognizing that the doctrine of imputed negligence makes a principal liable for the wrongful acts
of its agents, this Court noted that the liability of the principal would nonetheless depend on whether the
act of its agent is the proximate cause of the injury to the third person.

In the case of Ford, this Court ruled that its negligence, if any, cannot be considered as the proximate
cause, emphasizing in this regard the absence of confirmation on the part of Ford to the request of its
General Ledger Accountant for replacement of the checks issued as payment to the CIR. In absolving Ford
from liability, this Court clarified that the mere fact that the forgery was committed by the
drawer/principal's employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating
the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not automatically shift the loss to such
drawer-principal, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the latter.