SILENCE AND INACTION

1. Implied Consent. Ratification means that the principal voluntarily adopts,

confirms and gives sanction to some unauthorized act of its agent on its behalf. It
is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what
was theretofore unauthorized and becomes the authorized act of the party so
making the ratification. The substance of the doctrine is confirmation after
conduct, amounting to a substitute for a prior authorization. Ratification can be
made either expressly or impliedly. Implied ratification may take various forms —
like silence or acquiescence, acts showing approval or adoption of the act, or
acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom. (Yasuma vs Heirs of De
Villa)

2. Estoppel by acquiescence
Conduct recognizing the existence of a transaction and intended to permit the
transaction to be carried into effect; a tacit agreement; consent inferred from
silence.
It is is closely related to estoppel by silence. In the former, a person is prevented
from maintaining a position inconsistent with one in which he has acquiesced.

3. Laches

Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of

time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.

It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not
really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. 27 As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the
plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from
asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable
and unjust to the defendant. 28
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and . . . is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 29
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a
litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for
an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept
on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. 30 In other words, public
policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown
stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable
or unfair to permit. (CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA vs.COURT OF APPEALS)