PALE Case Digests 1

Canon 1

People v. Tuanda

Suspension based on conviction for BP 22 due to its deleterious effect on the Public

FACTS: On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14
February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry
which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984
for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a
check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety
(90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank,
for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to
settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

RTC found her guilty for 3 counts of violation of BP 22, CA affirmed and further imposed the disciplinary
action of suspending respondent from the practice of law due to being convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude

ISSUE: Whether suspension imposed is improper considering that respondent did not intend to
cause damage

RULING: NO, it is not improper. The suspension stands

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which
deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature
of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms: The thrust of the law is to prohibit under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as
an offense against property but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.

Sanchez v. Somoso

Honesty and fairness even in the private capacity of the attorney

FACTS: Dr. Raul C. Sanchez, a member of the medical staff of Sta. Lucia General Hospital, stated that he
was the attending physician of respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso during the latter’s confinement at the
hospital from 31 March to 09 April 1998. When respondent was discharged on 09 April 1998, he urged
complainant that, since it was a public holiday and banks were closed that day for business, the latter be good
enough to accept a check in payment of the hospital bills due complainant totalling P44,347.00. Although
apprehensive at first, complainant was later persuaded, however, by respondent’s plea of his being a lawyer
who can be trusted as such.

Pursuant to an order, dated 31 July 2002, of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), respondent was furnished with a copy of the complaint and ordered to submit his
answer within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of a copy of the complaint. Despite the receipt of the IBP-
CBD order in his two given addresses, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. Respondent was
finally declared to be in default.

In its report and recommendation, the IBP-CBD found sufficient evidence on record to substantiate the
charges made by complainant against respondent and recommended that the latter be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In Resolution No. XV-2003-177, dated 26 April 2003, the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

ISSUE: Whether the disciplinary action imposed is valid

RULING: YES, the disciplinary action is valid

Clearly, respondent’s action of issuing his personal checks in payment for his medical bills, knowing fully well
that his account with the drawee bank has by then already been closed, constitutes a gross violation of the
basic norm of integrity required of all members of the legal profession. The Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

"Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the practice
of the legal profession but also in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great
propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.2

When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had already been closed,
the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due obligation despite
demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he
joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in
high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less than a severe disciplinary sanction.

Paras v. Paras

Gross immoral conduct established by uncontroverted evidences

FACTS: The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were married on May 21, 1964
and have two grown-up children. They have vast sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was a
Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during the administration of
President Aquino. Complainant is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when due to
"marital strain that has developed through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live with his
mother and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice.

The complaint charge has the following 2 grounds among other things;

Dishonesty, falsehood, fraud: respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of
complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely making it appear that complainant was
the applicant for said loans. Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of the
loans.

Gross immoral conduct: Respondent is engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as
he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with
her while married to complainant.

In his answer: That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a Special Power of
Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and
secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank; That this is a malicious
accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share
in the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for concubinage filed against him by his wife
before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence.

CBD found him guilty for the two charges and imposed suspension for 3 month for the first charge of
forgery and indefinite suspension for gross immoral conduct

ISSUE: Whether the disciplinary measures imposed is valid

RULING: YES, it is valid

The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent for falsification and use of falsified
documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the filing of an
administrative case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required
for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence is necessary.

The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned signatures (referring to the signatures
appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample signatures of
respondent were written by one and the same person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap
Paras that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but his denial was
unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-
statements of respondent's children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn
Ching.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs.
Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has
fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a
daughter with a woman other than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30,
1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired

Testimony of 1st winess, their daughter: Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda
when they practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she became
pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City.; Following
delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My
father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child.; I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension
these past years, and almost every time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee
in my father's law office, and one time, she was washing my father's clothes.; I first saw their child Cyndee
Rose in 1992, about early May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was there at
the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my father's daughter
with Jocelyn.

Testiominy of the 2nd witness their son: In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose
Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was
around. Josephus said my father was in his room.; So I went direct to his room and because the door was not
locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman.
He was only wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.; They both appeared scared upon
seeing me. My father hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed.

Testimony of 3rd witness, secretary of respondent: Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt
attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner
date at Chin Loong Restaurant.; At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more intimate with each other.; After waiting for a few minutes,
Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for
Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to
Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.; I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours
after which the two of them emerged from the room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.

Nuñez v. Astorga

Imposition of suspension or disbarment on charges involving moral turpitude

FACTS: By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez
and Paterna Nu[ñ]ez appointing respondent as administrator, as well as on the alleged judicial confirmation of
respondent’s wife, as acknowledged natural child of Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez, respondent, on the pretext of
administering the properties of the late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful occupation and possession
of complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants have no right over the same. With our desire to
peaceably settle the controversy, complainants agreed to buy Lot No. 106, and respondent, who, without
being appointed by the court as administrator of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez and
Paterna Nu[ñ]ez, sold and conveyed to Imelda Nu[ñ]ez and Elisa Nu[ñ]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No.
106 they were occupying. After which Elisa Nu[ñ]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as Criminal Case No. R-4013-A.

Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the house of Eduardo L.
Nu[ñ]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[ñ]ez by
uttering the words ‘ipaposil ta ka’ which means ‘I’ll have you shot.’ A complaint for Grave Threats docketed
as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[ñ]ez before Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte.

In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their counsel, while respondent was
represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not yet filed his answer to the Complaint despite a
previous Order dated December 7, 2001, he was granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so.
The hearing was thus reset to June 26, 2002. On June 26, 2002, only respondent’s counsel, Atty. Arnold
Logares, was present. Respondent filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another
extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer. He was thus granted a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days within which to do so.

On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer; That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of
the complaint hereby admit the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa
L. Nuñez without the intervention from any government prosecutor but said case is no longer pending in the
Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then same was recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was
ordered dismissed by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by Provincial
Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the case for review to the
Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal case with the Department of Justice[,] a
prejudicial question now exist[s] whereby this administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of
that petition for review by the Department of Justice

That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuñezes, there is also filed Crim. Case No. R-4012-A
for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuñez and now pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte
despite the lack of witnesses x x x. Again, the pendency of this case will constitute a prejudicial question
which necessarily will suspend further hearing of the present administrative action until the final outcome of
the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-A

IBP found him guilty of serious misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for one year

ISSUE: Whether the suspension was valid

RULING: NO, the suspension was not valid

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an
odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the
Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.

The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him does not ipso facto
constitute serious misconduct. His contention that the pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question
that will bar the instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the finding of
the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the same pending cases constitute serious
misconduct on the part of respondent.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of course, upon a finding that the crime a
lawyer has been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good moral character.16 In the present
case, however, while respondent has been charged with several criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he
has yet to be convicted of any of them.

Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted serious misconduct,
the mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of
respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.

Canon 2

Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot

Publication of advertisements

FACTS: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

License promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and
mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.

ISSUE: Whether disciplinary measure should be imposed

RULING: YES, disciplinary measure should be imposed

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct.

Ulep v. The Legal Clinic

Discussion of practice of law, and publication of advertisement

FACTS: It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended
by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance,
but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

1. Whether the services provided by respondent constitutes as practice of law

2. Whether the same can be properly be under the proscription of Canon 2.3

RULINGS

1. YES, they are considered as practice of law

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and
the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may
or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and
asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law.

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the
which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in
the state.

2. YES, it is within the scope of proscription under Canon 2.3

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be
misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in
a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public
or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being
taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without
taking the examination.

Admission to Ph bar

FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a
Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by
the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished
the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the
law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

ISSUE: Whether he can be admitted without taking the bar exams on the thrust of the Treaty

RULING: NO, he cannot be admitted. The treaty does not bind him

The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of
their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions
within the territory of the Other,

It could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines.
Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore
subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines.

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides; The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained
degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent
national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other,
subject to the laws and regulations of the latter.

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly
subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force
of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully
pass the required bar examinations; and

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could
not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.