Avila, Gio Riley D.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

2016-0649 MONDAY 4:30-9:30

Gabriel L. Duero vs. CA and Bernardo A. Eradel

Facts:

Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent occupied petitioner’s land

in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur, with an assessed value of P5,240. Despite repeated
demands, respondent refused to vacate the land. On June 16, 1995 Petitioner filed before the
RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership against private respondent and
Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas entered into a
compromise agreement whereby the latter bound themselves to recognize and respect
petitioner’s ownership. Respondent was not a party thereto. On January 12, 1996 partial
judgment was rendered by RTC on the basis of the compromise agreement. Respondent was
declared in default for failure to file his answer. Then on February 13, 1996 petitioner
presented his evidence ex-parte. Subsequently on May 8, 1996 Judgment was rendered in
favor of the petitioner, copy of which was received by respondent on May 25, 1996. On June
10, 1996 Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the
land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., and that he turned over the summons to Laurente in
the honest belief that the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any
adverse claim on it. RTC denied the motion.Meanwhile, an administrative case between
petitioner and the Laurentes remained pending before the DENR regional office. On July 24,
1996 Respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the
same allegation in his motion. He also averred that he cannot be made to vacate the land
pending determination of who owned the land, and that the judgment is void because the
indispensable heirs of Laurente were not impleaded. On September 24, 1996 the
grandchildren on Laurente filed a Motion for Intervention, but the same was denied by RTC.
Then October 8, 1996 RTC denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent alleged that RTC had no jurisdiction since the value of the land
was only P5,240. RTC denied the Motion. On January 22, 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for
Execution, which was granted on January 28. Subsequently on February 27, 1997 a Writ of
Execution was issued by RTC. On march 12, 1997 – Respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA. The CA then declared the judgment of RTC null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it held that the MTC had jurisdiction,
and that private respondent was not stopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he
had filed several motions before it

Held:

Respondent is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. While participation in
all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction,
estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its
successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. For estoppel to
apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied,
estoppel may become a tool of injustice. Under the circumstances, we could not fault the Court
of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of
the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of
the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. Even if private
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional
cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice.This farmer, who is now the
private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake
when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy
was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the MTC. To hold him in
estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution
of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from
the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such
eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a
legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
DONATO VS COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located in Manila,
covered by a TCT. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before the MeTC of Manila for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and “all unknown
occupants” of the subject property. Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral
contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the
same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent;
on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with
said demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case against them. Of the 43 named
defendants, only 20 (private respondents) filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994
wherein they denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted
because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to
purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots
occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue
payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioner’s counsel and thereafter initiated a
petition for consignation of the rentals in a civil case while they await the outcome of the
negotiation to purchase.

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a MR attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification
of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself and the relevant records of the MeTC
and the RTC. Five days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his MR
submitting the duly authenticated original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by
petitioner. On June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioner’s MR and its supplement, ruling that
“petitioner’s subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition.”

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the
certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.

Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the
RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of
the records as would support the petition, justifies the outright dismissal of the petition.

Held:

YES. The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in
cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for noncompliance thereto are found
in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 2891. It provides that the petitioner himself must
make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal
execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has
actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other
courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled
that with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be
availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the
certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with We fully agree with petitioner that it was
physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the
United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for
him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus,
we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification
which justifies relaxation of the rule. We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which
were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The subsequent
filing of the certification duly signed by thepetitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial
compliance, pro hac vice.

NO. The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule6 of the
RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of
the records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition.
It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require
parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial
justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA may require the parties
to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course,
the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under
Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings
and other material portions of the records below with his motion for reconsideration. In Jaro vs.
Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and
Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission that subsequent submission of the
missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance
which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason to depart
from this doctrine. Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at
the expense of a just resolution of the case.
 GONZAGA VS. CA

Facts:

Sps Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc.,
situated in Iloilo. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under a TCT and was
mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan.Petitioners
then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as Lucky
Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private
respondent informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in
order to widen their premises. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing
loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS . Gonzaga then offered to
swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from Lucky Homes that their contract of sale be
reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that
their house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners
to file an action for reformation of contract and damages with the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of
the defendant and a writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said
writ on the ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was vested in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and
also a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

Issue:

Whether or not the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to
try the case

Ruling:

Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in numerous
cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction by estoppel, the Court quoted
its decision in said case, to wit: It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirm a relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy." The Court said that it was petitioners
themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It must be noted that in the proceedings
before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even
once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings
which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a
writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it
was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived
their right to question the court’s jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
 ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORENA

Facts:

Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine
Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16,
1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a café bar
and restaurant in Naga City when he somehow got involved with a shooting incident that
resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca. Escobal was preventively suspended from the service.
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP
members and officers. RTC denied the motion. Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its
case and petitioner presented his evidence. On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the motion but ordered the conduct of a
preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the
petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP. On July 31, 1995, the trial court
issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function. The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975,the issue had become moot and academic since the amendatory
law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC.
The petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3)
thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information
pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an
allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of
his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office. The petitioner filed a MR of the said order,
reiterating that based on his testimony and those of his witnesses, the offense charged was
committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which
was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively. The RTC ordered the
public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office;
and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the latter has
jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC

Held:
The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….

For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the
intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995,
it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the
petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending
P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.

Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary
grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC
had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no
legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may
be applied retroactively.
 AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO

FACTS:

In 1989, The DOTC conducted studies on NAIA’s capability to cope with the traffic
development up to 2010. In 1993, business tycoons Gokongwei, Gotianun, Sy, Tan, Ty, and
Yuchengco formed the Asia’s Emerging Dragon Group (AEDC) and submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA Terminal III
under a Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement (BOT) under BOT Law (RA6957, amended by RA
7718). DOTC began the bidding process for the NAIA Terminal III project by forming the PBAC
(Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee). AEDC’s primary competitor was the
PAIRCARGO consortium (composed of Pair Cargo, PAGS, and Security Bank) filed their bid,
which AEDC questioned since the former allegedly lacked financial capability. PAIRCARGO
Consortium was awarded the Contract because it offered a higher guaranteed payment to the
government. Later on, PAIRCARGO changed its name to PIATCO (Phil. Int’l Airport Terminals
Co. Inc. Post- bidding, the government and PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement
for the NAIA Terminal III project, and a subsequent Amended & Revised Concession
Agreement + supplements of the said 1997 Concession Agreement were entered into. The
Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its
President, Henry T. Go, signed the “Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government and PIATCO signed an
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA). Subsequently, the Government and
PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA. The First Supplement was signed on
August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement on September 4, 2000; and the Third Supplement
on June 22, 2001. Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation
of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service
providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger
handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and
warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. Consequently,
the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their
employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before this Court a
petition for prohibition to During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export
Awards at Malacañang Palace, stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO) contracts which the
Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.” Respondent PIATCO filed
its Comments to the present petitions. Several petitions of prohibition filed by NAIA Terminal I
& II’s int’l service providers, their employees, and congressmen alleging that the 1997
Concession Agreement, the ARCA, & its supplements are contrary to the Constitution, BOT
Law, & its IRR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arbitration step taken by PIATCO will not oust this Court of its jurisdiction
over the cases.
HELD:
In Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals,[20] even after finding that the arbitration
clause in the Distributorship Agreement in question is valid and the dispute between the parties
is arbitrable, this Court affirmed the trial courts decision denying petitioners Motion to Suspend
Proceedings pursuant to the arbitration clause under the contract. In so ruling, this Court held
that as contracts produce legal effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, only the
parties to the Distributorship Agreement are bound by its terms, including the arbitration clause
stipulated therein. This Court ruled that arbitration proceedings could be called for but only with
respect to the parties to the contract in question. Considering that there are parties to the case
who are neither parties to the Distributorship Agreement nor heirs or assigns of the parties
thereto, this Court, citing its previous ruling in Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation,[21] held
that to tolerate the splitting of proceedings by allowing arbitration as to some of the parties on
the one hand and trial for the others on the other hand would, in effect, result in multiplicity of
suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay.[22] Thus, we ruled that the interest of
justice would best be served if the trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and
complete proceeding.
It is established that petitioners in the present cases who have presented legitimate interests in
the resolution of the controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they
cannot be bound by the arbitration clause provided for in the ARCA and hence, cannot be
compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. A speedy and decisive resolution of all the
critical issues in the present controversy, including those raised by petitioners, cannot be made
before an arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious
determination of a dispute. This objective would not be met if this Court were to allow the parties
to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO
Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve.
 LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL VS. ATIENZA, JR.

FACTS:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National is the national organization of all the barangays in
the Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of
highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan
political subdivision chapters. Section 493 of the LGC provides that the ligas directly elect a
president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors. All other matters not
provided for in the law affecting the internal organization shall be governed by their respective
constitution and by-laws. The Liga then adopted and ratified its own Constitution and by-laws to
govern its internal organization. One the provisions was: "There shall be nationwide
synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on
the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the synchronized elections".
The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting on 21 October 2002 the
synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila,
together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters. Respondent
then enacted enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for
the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting
the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. The ordinance was
transmitted to then Mayor Lito Atienza, which he signed even if the Liga requested him to veto
the ordinance as it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through
legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he signed and passed Ordinance No. 8039.

RULING:
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:

(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary
that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought
before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The Court agreed that respondent's act was in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone,
certiorari will not lie.

Second, the Court concludes that petitioners seek the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate,
not original, jurisdiction. The Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

Third, the Court stated that petitioner clearly disregarded the hierarchy of courts. There is no
reason or circumstance given by petition on why direct recourse to the Court be allowed.

The Court has decided that disregard to the hierarchy of courts can be allowed by two reasons:
(1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and
(2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this
Court is not a trier of facts.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARDILLO
FACTS:

Judge Sardido decided a case involving Falsification of Documents. Since one of the
defendants in a case is an RTC judge, he removed the name of the RTC judge from the roster
of the defendants. Judge Sardido's basis for removing the name of the RTC judge is Supreme
Court Circular No. 3-89. The Circular says that "the IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action, all cases involving judges of lower courts and justices xxx" In the case,
Judge Sardido referred the criminal aspect together with the administrative aspect to the SC.

ISSUE:

whether the criminal aspect of the case is cognizable by the SC.

RULING:

No. Only the administrative aspect of the case is what must be forwarded to the Supreme
Court. The trial courts retain jurisdiction to try the criminal aspect of a case involving judges.
SC Circular 3-89 refers to administrative cases not to criminal cases.
 KATON VS PALANCA

FACTS:
Petitioner Katon contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait,
Aborlan, Palawan, had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified
available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Palawan authorities
then favorably endorsed the request of Respondent Palanca, together with some others, which
resulted in the issuance of homestead patent in Palanca’s favor in 1977 among others. In 1999,
filed a petition which seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title
issued in favor of the Palanca et al. as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
Palanca et al. filed their Answer and Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed Katon’s
Complaint as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Katon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was
dismissed motu propriopursuant to the appellate court’s residual prerogative. The CA ruled that
prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. Katon questions this dismissal. He
submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and
prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It
follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
ISSUE:
Was the Court of Appeals correct in applying residual prerogative in dismissing a case motu
proprio based on prescription?
HELD: YES.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to
the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from
the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu
proprio dismiss the claim or action. xxx On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, xxx The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available
at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals
by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its
so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore,
on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on
appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of
the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9
of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
 FIGUEROA VS PEOPLE.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC
found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs
jurisdiction on the case. The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of
estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC—the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without
him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time
on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be
applicable.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact
that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the CA

HELD: No.

RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the
issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not
lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of
jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the
party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the
proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches. In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in
Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of
Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an
active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of
Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead
to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.The petitioner is in no way estopped by
laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his
appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach.

SERANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student
regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of
her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP
student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a
member in representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.)
that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.)
she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a
member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of administration and
exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public
office.Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law
that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case
of non-stock corporations.
Issue:

WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

Held:

Yes.

First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs
Desierto)Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No.
1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Third, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Hence,
Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

PAT-OG VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Facts:

On Sept. 13, 2003, Bang-on, then a 14 year old second year school student of Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, filed an affidavit of complaint against
Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the same school, before the CSC Cordillera Adm.
Region. Bang-on alleged that on the morning of Aug. 26, 2003, he attended his class at the
basketball court of the school, where Pat-og and his third year students were holding a
separate class, that he and some of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third year students who
were practicing basketball shots. Bang-on was not able to follow an instruction on falling in line
and was punched by Pat-og. As a result, he suffered stomach pain for several days and was
confined in a hospital from Sept. 10-12, 2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate,
which stated that he sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric area. Bang-on filed a
criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Physical Injury with the RTC of Bontoc,
Mountain Province. Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed
Pat-og to file a counter-affidavit. He denied the charges hurled against him. On June 1, 2004,
the CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima facie case for misconduct and formally charged
Pat-og. While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its
judgment in the criminal case and found Pat-og guilty of the offense charged against him.
Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after repeated
postponement by Pat-og. With the approval of CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its
position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and formally offered its evidence,
which included the decision in the criminal case. The decision of CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of
Grave Misconduct. It, however, found the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service
too harsh under the circumstances. Thus he was adjudged for Simply misconduct (suspension
for 6 months). An MR was filed by Pat-og but was denied . Pat-og appealed but was denied
and the judgment was modified to grave misconduct (dismissal). After evaluating the records,
the CSC sustained the CSC-CAR’s conclusion. Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration,
questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended that the
administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a
committee pursuant to the Magna carta for Pulblic School Teachers. The MR was denied.The
CA affirmed the resolution of the CSC.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner is
estopped form questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC to hear and decide the administrative
case against him?

Held:

The court cannot sustain his position.

The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A.
no. 4670 is misplaced.

Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the
establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and
agencies of the government.

Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to
supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at
the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed
that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with
the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of others. In this case, it was CSC
which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus,
it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepED and the
Board of Professional Teachers.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES VS CA

Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo.
Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her
husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result, petitioner
filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his
children as party-defendants. This motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9
October 2000.

On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon
agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a
period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004,
respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule
86 of the Revised Rules of Cour. The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been
filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved,
respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred
and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion. CA granted the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person

Whether or not the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party?

Held:

No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons;
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo. Citing the case of
Sarsaba:

“The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of
his death.Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the
benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. “

Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel
is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of
Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.

PEOPLE VS HENRY T. GO

Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan which quashed the Information filed against
herein respondent for alleged violation Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the
SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement,
after the project for the construction of the NAIA IPT III which awarded to PIATCO,
which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in
the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to
Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to
PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The SB ordered a resolution which provided the prosecution a period of ten (10)
days within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private
person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted
bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over
respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.
Henry T. Go went to quash the information.
SB issued its assailed Resolution that the lone accused in this case is a private
person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long
before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED ON THE GROUND THAT
IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

Ruling:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting
in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have
acted in conspiracy with a public officer.
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone.
The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does
not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the
acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for
conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of
the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable
offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
Private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of
an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount
to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue
of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to
the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction
over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the
court jurisdiction over his person.
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also
covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government.
More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public
officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the
law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and
tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not
follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the
case involving herein respondent.

CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE CUERDO

FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for
the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition
to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business
taxes. private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint
denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local
Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition
for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with
the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence,
this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In
transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be
assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed
to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992)
where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court.

ST. MARY CRUSADE FOUNDATION, INC. VS. RIEL

FACTS:

The petitioner claimed in its petition that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been
burnt and lost in the fire that quitted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Respondent
Judge initially gave due course to the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he
dismissed the petition for reconstitution.
The petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC.
Hence, the petitioner came to the court alleging that respondent judge had “unfairly
abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is
specifically enjoined upon him under Rule 7, Sec. 8 of the Revised rules of Court;” that
the judge acted without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of
discretion to the further damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner, thus, the
present petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:

WON the petition for certiorari ad mandamus is proper.

HELD: The petition for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid of procedural and
substantive merit, is dismissed.

Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions defined
by the Rules of Court. The conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with
absolute lack of authority; there is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority; grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could
have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his authority, or could have gravely abused
his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 1221 of
Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, the
Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title. Hence,
the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the
petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land
already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it would
have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition for
judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.

The petitioner consequently did not present the duplicate or certified copy of the OCT
No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Sec 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 26 that states the provisions
expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens.

With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for
judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then,
the proper recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice
within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. B allowing the
period of appeal to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its
present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary remedy like certiorari
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an
alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary course of law. No error of judgement
by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors.
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there
are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court
enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated
the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari.

DUNCANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the
Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section
11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y
ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to
accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and
financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year
2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and
Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO
which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.

Held:

No.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861. With the advent of the 1987
Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.
Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249,
and just this year, R.A. No. 10660. For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
 Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.
In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification
relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused
is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG
27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after
all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if
at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying
positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to
their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position
of Director II with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner
from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.

FERRER JR. VS. BAUTISTA

FACTS:
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon
City, which will collect 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php 100,000.00. This
shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the
purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was enacted collecting
garbage fees on residential properties which shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an
earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner, questions the validity of the said
ordinances.
ISSUES:
Whether the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
Whether the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double taxation.

RULING:
The SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of Quezon City Government to impose.
LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a
lawful subject and a lawful method. Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or
merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with
public interest. On the question of inequality, the disparities between a real property owner and
an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length.
The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may
legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one over another. Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed.
It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the
UDHA actually allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit.

No. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers
under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local
legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall share
with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of
ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction. The Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act of 2000, affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions. Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily
sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for
the regulation of an activity as provided by the same. As opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the
garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.

PCGG VS DUMAYAG

FACTS:
BACKROUND OF THE CASE STEMS FROM COCOFED v. REPUBLIC

The PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional
takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal. Among the
properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged “one million coconut farmers,”
the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and Private
Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of the said UCPB
shares, the PCGG, on July 31, 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages docketed as Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan.
On November 15, 1990, upon Motion of Private Respondent COCOFED, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares on the ground that
herein private respondents – in particular, COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies – had
not been impleaded by the PCGG as parties-defendants in its July 31, 1987 Complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari
docketed as GR No. 96073 in this Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft
court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG
applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the
election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to
proceed with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered
shares to be voted by their registered owners.
On February 23, 2001, “COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.” filed the “Class Action Omnibus
Motion” referred to earlier in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F,
asking the court a quo:
“1. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective
names of the more than one million coconut farmers; and
“2. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the names of the 14 CIIF
holding companies including those registered in the name of the PCGG.”
Issue: Who may vote the sequestered UCPB shares while the main case for their reversion to
the State is pending in the Sandiganbayan?
Ruling: This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting those
shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds – funds that are prima facie
public in character or, at the very least, are “clearly affected with public interest.”

NOW THE CURRENT CASE:

 Both UCPB and COCOLIFE assert their rights in separate civil actions over their
alleged shares in 14 CIIF companies and CIIF San Miguel Corp Block shares (BOTH
WORTH BILLIONS OF PESOS). They filed for DECLARATORY RELIEF with RTC
seeking from the court the to declare their rights over the shares.
 PCGG contended this saying that they were already estopped and the RTC has no
jurisdiction, since the case was already decided in numerous SC decisions already
and such action for declaratory relief was said to actually modify or alter the final and
executor decision in COCOFED v. REPUBLIC.
 (RELATED TO THE TOPIC) UCPB et al question the authority of Commissioner
Vicente L. Gengos, Jr. in filing the present petitions before the Court and signing the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping. They point out that the PCGG is
a collegial body created by virtue of EO 1, and it may function only as such
“Commission.” Consequently, the present action should have been properly
authorized by all members of the Commission..
 (OTHER MATTERS) They contended that the SUBJECT MATTER raised in the
declaratory relief was their investments in the companies and not the Coco Levy Fund
itself, hence the RTC has jurisdiction and they are not estopped.
 THE SUPREME COURT - On February 26, 2014 in G.R. No. 210901, we (SC) issued
a temporary restraining order (TRO) immediately enjoining the respondent judge, the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 59, their representatives, agents or other persons acting on
their behalf, from proceeding with the hearing of the petitions for declaratory relief in
Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252. Likewise, a TRO was issued in G.R. No. 209447
enjoining the respondent judge from further hearing the said petitions for declaratory
relief.

ISSUES:
RELATED TO TOPIC – 1) Non-compliance with the rule on Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping which was signed by only one PCGG Commissioner;

OTHER MATTERS –

2) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252;
3) Non-compliance with the requisites of a petition for declaratory relief complied with; and
4) Application of res judicata and/or laches as bar to the suits for declaratory relief filed by
UCPB and COCOLIFE.

HELD:

FORUM SHOPPING:

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the
verification.

On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the
plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, (a) that he has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim
is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification against forum shopping on
behalf of the principal party or the other petitioners has the authority to do the same. We hold
that the signature of only one Commissioner of petitioner PCGG in the verification and
certification against forum shopping is not a fatal defect.

It has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement
is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.

As to the certification of non-forum shopping, a rigid application of the rules should not defeat
the PCGG’s mandate under EO 1, EO 2, EO 14 and EO 14-A to prosecute cases for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and to conserve sequestered assets and corporations, which are
in custodia legis, under its administration. Indeed, relaxation of the rules is warranted in this
case involving coconut levy funds previously declared by this Court as “affected with public
interest” and judicially determined as public funds. Relevantly, after the promulgation of the
decision of this Court in COCOFED v. Republic, EO 180 was issued on March 18, 2015
reiterating the Government’s policy to ensure that all coco levy funds and coco levy assets be
utilized “solely and exclusively for the benefit of all the coconut farmers and for the development
of the coconut industry.” In line with such policy, Section 3 thereof provides:

Section 3. Actions to Preserve, Protect and Recover Coco Levy Assets. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and any
other concerned government agency shall, under the general supervision of the Secretary of
Justice, file the proper pleadings or institute and maintain the necessary legal actions
to preserve, protect, or recover the Government’s rights and interests in the Coco Levy Assets
and to prevent any dissipation or reduction in their value. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Apropos PCGG v. Cojuangco, Jr., involving the issue of who has the right to vote the
sequestered SMC shares, we gave due course to the petition for certiorari and mandamus
despite the lack of signature of the Solicitor General; but it was signed by two special counsels
and the verification was signed by Commissioner Herminio Mendoza. We noted the
extraordinary circumstances in the filing of the petition by the said government officials that
justified a liberal interpretation of the rules.

ON JURISDICTION:

The RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter, for it is the SANDIGANBAYAN, hence the petition
for declaratory relief must also fail. As provided by the Supreme Court, citing a number of their
decisions. Clearly what is being discussed in this case is the COCO LEVY FUNDS – which are
ill-gotten wealth – thus the proper jurisdiction is with the Sandiganbayan.

ON RES JUDICATA:

The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action.The following requisites must obtain for the application of the doctrine: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is,
it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two
actions are substantially between the same parties.

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first, known as “bar by prior judgment,” or
“estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as “conclusiveness of
judgment,” otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action.

We hold that res judicata under the second aspect (conclusiveness of judgment) is applicable
in this case. The issue of ownership of the sequestered CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block
of Shares was directly and actually resolved by the Sandiganbayan and affirmed by this Court
in COCOFED v. Republic. More important, in the said decision, we categorically affirmed the
resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F “THAT THERE
IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CIIF BLOCK OF SMC
SHARES, AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED
IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003
AND MAY 7, 2004.” Among the admitted facts set forth in the Order dated February 23, 2004 is
the acquisition by UCPB of the “controlling interests” in the six CIIF oil mills. The Partial
Summary Judgment further quoted from the Answer to Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided)
with Compulsory Counterclaims dated January 7, 2000 filed by the CIIF oil mills and 14 holding
companies, in which they also alleged that pursuant to the authority granted to it by P.D. 961
and P.D. 1568, “UCPB acquired controlling interests” in the six CIIF oil mills.[46]

In the same decision we specifically upheld the Sandiganbayan’s findings and conclusion on
the issue of ownership of the CIIF OMG, the 14 holding companies and the CIIF SMC Block of
Shares.

In G.R. No. 180705, separately decided by this Court on November 27, 2012, we also affirmed
the Sandiganbayan’s decision nullifying the shares of stock transfer to Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr. We held that as the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes and can only be used
for public purpose, and importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the
development, rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to
benefit––whether directly or indirectly––private individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as
the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement words it, compensation. Accordingly, the UCPB shares of
stock representing the 7.22% fully paid shares subject of the petition, with all dividends
declared, paid or issued thereon, as well as any increments thereto arising from, but not limited
to, the exercise of pre-emptive rights, were ordered reconveyed to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which shall “be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and
for the development of the coconut industry.”

Having resolved that subject matter jurisdiction pertains to the Sandiganbayan and not the RTC,
and that the petitions for declaratory relief are barred by our January 24, 2012 Decision which
settled with finality the issue of ownership of the CIIF oil mills, the 14 holding companies and
CIIF SMC Block of Shares, we deem it unnecessary to address the other issues presented.