LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL vs. RAMON S. ROCO G.R. No. 143366.

January 29, 2001 350 SCRA 528

August 08, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Roco was appointed by then President Ramos in 1996 as Regional Director of the LTO in
Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank level V and later reappointed by then President Estrada to the
same position in 1999.

At the time Roco’s appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible. However, during his
incumbency in 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility by the CESB.

On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by
President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, the same position being occupied by Roco.
Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Coloma as OIC issued a Memorandum directing General to
assume the said office immediately and for Roco to report to the Office of the Secretary for further
instructions.

Roco filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto which was affirmed by the latter and ordered the
nullification of General’s appointment. From this decision General filed a petition for review against Roco.
The latter contends that CES eligibility is enough to acquire security of tenure which grants him the right
to hold the position disputed.

ISSUE:

Whether Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility is enough and the appointment to a CES rank is not
necessary to acquire security of tenure.

RULING:

No. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Tittle I, Book V of E.O. No. 292), provides that:

(1) Permanent status. - A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.

In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent
appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, thus:

Career Executive Service Eligibility

Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion
of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a
formal Board Resolution after an evaluation is done of the examinees performance in the four stages of
the CES eligibility examinations.
Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board,
an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is
made by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes the official’s
membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him security of tenure in the CES.

As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must concur in order that an employee in
the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:

a) CES eligibility; and

b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.

In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service
pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a
career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without
losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned.

In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not
possess the appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the
LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES,
respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly
reassigned to other positions in the career executive service.
Case Digest #2-2 | GR No. 189698 | Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC

FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution.

HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in
partisan political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR., vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009 Equal Protection Clause,
Appointed Officials

NOVEMBER 23, 2017

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is
intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time
limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at
the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned
from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is Section 13 of
RA 9369 violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN
PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of
the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will
only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law
as candidates.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing
of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between
those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
the law. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

****NO DIGEST ON ABELLA****

Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

Ponente: CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila.
His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of
the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint
was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay,
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.

RATIO:

[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1
and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal
of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head
of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 196231, 2014-01-28
Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and
ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary
proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary
proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding
the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several
others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed
an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of
the prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
Issues:
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27,
2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the
Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it
took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only
within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of... the order.
Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition and
to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to
be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to
function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard
against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the
1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key
Executive officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies."[39] It has powers, both constitutional... and statutory, that are commensurate
with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]... b. "Independence" of
constitutional bodies... vis-a-vis the Ombudsman's independence
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress,
but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy. In general
terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from
political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment
of their core functions.
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the...
developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from
political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but
is similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a republican
democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the President... over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates... the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk
the... independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided
not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman,
but inevitably with the principle of checks and... balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office
seeks to revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent as she
is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where
graft and corruption is still a major problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared
void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive
power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any
power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who
can remove or suspend its members.
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes for the removal... of non-impeachable
officers is not... a carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to determine the
modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
he intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of
Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more... stringent rule of "removal only
by impeachment" to favored public officers
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and
substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security... of tenure; the principle of
separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances.
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross negligence has... no legal and factual leg to... stand
on... b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were
already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other... persons may be
affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.[71]
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied on Section 8, Rule III
of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that
Gonzales should have acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt
of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of... the following grounds:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales
since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing
Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their
work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is
noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to... review the case for
the first time.[77] Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four
months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and
discretion.
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim's father. The Constitution
empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or...
manner against any public official or employee of the government.[78] This provision is echoed by
Section 13 of RA No. 6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990,
as amended.[80]
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
unverified affidavit of Kalaw.
we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the decision of the
PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be
made to account only... for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was
Gonzales who took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer
of the draft took less than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months... until the
kidnapping incident rendered Mendoza's motion moot.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials
in the Executive Department.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates
against a differential treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one... hand, and the Special
Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only
for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of... her duties.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at
par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is
concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the
Constitution.
n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its
September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We
declared Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy
Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman
Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to...
conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA, GR Nos. 217126-27, 2015-11-10
Facts:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching"
Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et... al), accusing them of Plunder[11] and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).[13]
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators[14] to conduct
a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel).[15]
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint[16]
(OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases[17] for Grave
Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases[18]
for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public
Documents (OMB Cases).[19]... s to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in
anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati
Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).[50]
Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the
2nd Special Panel issued separate orders[51] for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to
file their respective counter-affidavits.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation
of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing
Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive... suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during
the pendency of the OMB Cases.[53] The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,[54] finding that: (a) the... evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt
was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of
Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the
documents on record negated the... publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks,
and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively
charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the
Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective
positions give them access to public records and allow them to... influence possible witnesses; hence,
their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against
them.[55] Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), through
Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.[56]
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City
Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed
the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015
Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504.[81] The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer
for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,[82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no
injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie
evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;[83] and
(b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal
and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be
subjected to contempt proceedings.[84]
In his comment[85] filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality
of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which
he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against
him.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it
were held,[91] granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of
the preventive... suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can
hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor
of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the
Makati Parking
Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts
which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments
on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still,
Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr.,[95] and Mayor Garcia v.
Mojica[96] wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments
were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected
pursuant to contracts executed before said... re-election.[97] To this, the CA added that there was no
concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24,
2013.[
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition[99] before this Court, arguing that the condonation
doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence... of guilt is strong for purposes
of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it
during the administrative proceedings, and that, at... any rate, there is no condonation because Binay,
Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013
Issues:
Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy;
Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453;
Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay,
Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof... provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,... and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying... the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior
to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy... in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.
n this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition
for prohibition.[112] These are: (a)... where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the... lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,... a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is... improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or... where public interest is involved.
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first
time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman is put to the fore.
Miranda v Sandiganbayan

GR No. 154098, 27 June 2005

Puno, J:

FACTS:

The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago
City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January
1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, Vice
Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging
that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions
for insisting to perform the functions of a mayor despite the preventive suspension order
by the Ombudsman.

Mayor Miranda asserted that reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in
good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a
memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to reassume
the position. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the
mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police. He also contends that
under Sec. 63 (b) of the LGC, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended
for a period beyond 60 days.

On 28 Nov 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to

suspend Miranda based on Sec. 13 of RA 3019. Miranda opposed the motion on the
ground that the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Art. 177 of
RPC is not embraced by the former provision which only contemplates offenses which
involve fraud upon public funds or property.

ISSUE:

 W/N Sec. 13 of RA 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or
property.
 W/N the crime of usurpation involves fraud upon public funds or property found
in Sec. 13 of RA 3019.

HELD:
 Yes. The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the
government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. The phrase any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is clear and
categorical. To limit the use of government as an adjective that qualifies funds is baseless.
The word public precedes funds and distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify
further public funds as government funds, as petitioner claims is the laws intent, is plainly
superfluous. We are bound by the rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with
reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that
is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own
officials.

It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase fraud upon government means any instance
or act of trickery or deceit against the government. It cannot be read restrictively so as to
be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is covered by the preceding phrase any
offense involving . . . public funds or property. It ought to follow that fraud upon
government was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and
performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.

The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed
office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension.
Petitioner’s pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioner’s excuse for violating the order of
preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely
followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for
the rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court
instead of taking the law into their own hands.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act
or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even
if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the
subject of a quo warrantoproceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-
College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as
the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20
years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on
the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she
supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20
years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice
was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December
31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants
with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added
that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old,
it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by
UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated
upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On
August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging
that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives
proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings
were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990
SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign
one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation
of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil
action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to
oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for
having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question
the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase
“may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the
SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11,
Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings.
Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate
against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of
its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG,
considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the
disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving
graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not
a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions
of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she
is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary
under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill
the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to
submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate;
therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept
of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon.
Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment
Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-
ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further
argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the
SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because
the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on
the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the
“sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There
is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the
OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would
result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary
power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is
contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and
administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
 Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warrantoinitiated by
the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the
“discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because
as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed
to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared
of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only
be decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise
to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to
a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed
the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she
qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional
requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend
that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics”
such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that
an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation
of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question
outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by
the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and
promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC
voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes
a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or
interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of
right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement
on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The
justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the
Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their
would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment
will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of
the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes
over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely
a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in
the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of
a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s
sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing
evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the
requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters
within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context
and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings
before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of
mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden
to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution.
It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation
success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo
warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best
person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC
is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition
is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered
to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility
or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of
the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it
public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the
national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not
forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is
the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered
as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office
is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she
committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the
respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach
or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is
not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate.
Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the
House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably
charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision
uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American
jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not
to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate
reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he
or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both
of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If
other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To
subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined
to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she
fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action
for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ
of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction
over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor
will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out
the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if
indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving
a legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case
impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and
arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their
legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official,
who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warrantopetition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warrantoproceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases
where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private
individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which
commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person
holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.”
It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action
in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the
Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action
for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an
unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover,
the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery
of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she
filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible,
but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the
JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be
given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion
to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions
that the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if
not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary.
Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person
of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713.
“Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth,
which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes
of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only
in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even
provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or
a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to
perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her
dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden,
and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to
perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those
duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not

merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the
law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution,
the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could
have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them
before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no
clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case,
there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists
and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the
missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and
duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact
of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by
mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on
file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December
1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by
the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her
SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did
not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period
when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or
the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by
officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head
of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO
could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno
when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for
SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and
administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges
as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply
her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover,
the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear
that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this
Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or
conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of
the Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the
same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003;
1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she
received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010,
gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal
properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that
Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty
betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the
supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination
pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her
years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still
required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able
to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned
from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service
is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to
retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs
to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to
comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the
course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof
from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there
was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal
from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor
and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that
puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness
demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have
considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel
for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance
with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in
her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000
of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v.
COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ
request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the
Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno
has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means
that her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position
of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition
of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone
through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are
divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would
be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify
whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding
that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be
nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so
without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations
from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power
to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position
or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to

the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the
Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is
subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal
requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For
lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the
appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar
Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.