The Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

"
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY
Introduction.-fn any industrial society the probflem . 0 labour
.
management relati ons becomes so impor · tant that. som
f e sort1 o social msurance
becomesne cessar y to provide adequat protection ro°: .osses caused to the
labourers by acc1d• ent s. wi t· h a vi·ew to rmprove the condt1tdion oTfhtheE employee s
some social insurance legislations have been enace · e mployees'
Compensation Act, is one of the earliest measures a d ip°t ; g to ?enefit the
labourers. It was passed in 1923 and enforced 0 :1 1st Ju , 24· Smee then a
nu111.ber of amendments have been made from trme to time so as to suit the
changing needs and conditions of the employees.
The object of the Act was to make provi_sion for the pa ent of
compensation by certain class of employers to their emp oyees for jury by
accident. The reasons that compelled the initiation of the Bill were attributed to
the growing complexity of industry with the increasing use of.machinery and
consequent danger to employees along with the comparative poverty of
employees themselves that rendered it advisable at they should be protected
as far as possible from hardships arising from accidents.
It was as early as 1884, that the question of payment of compensation to
employees involved in serious or fatal accidents was raised when the Factory
and Mining Inspectors drew the attention of the Government to this human
problem which warranted immediate legislative protection of employees. But its
importance was realised by the Government of India only at the end of 1920,
when public opinion was invited on connected issues. A committee consisting
of members of the Legislative Assembly, employers, workers or representatives
of workers, medical and insurance experts was constituted. It was on the basis
of the recommendation of the committee that Employees' Compensation Act
was enacted in 1923 which provided for setting up of Tribunals on the American
model to decide disputes, appointment of special Commissioners with wide
powers and a limited right of appeal to the High Court.
Originally the Act was applicable to employees of certain specified
industries, employed otherwise than in clerical capacity; and receiving monthly
wages not exceeding R , s 300. The employees (as defined in the Act) were
entitled to compensation from the employer in case of personal injury caused by
accident arising out of and in the course of emplyment with certain reservations
to the duratio_n of incapa ity and negligence of employee himself. The payment
of compensation was mainly dependent upon the incapacity or disablement of
employees. Any claim for compensation was to be determined in accordance
with the prov1s1ons of the Act and rules tnade thereunder by Provincial

( 412 )

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 The Employees' Cornpensation Act, 1923 413
commissioners for employeee' compensation.
With teh progress of time and change in the standards of living in the
society teh Act has on many occasions been modified so as to benefit greater
number 0 employees and to provide for payment of greater amount of
compensation_ to tehm. The Royal Commission on labour paida tribute to the
smooth working of the Act and recommended the extension of the benefits
under the Act toa larger class of employees. But Prof. B.P. Adarkar in his report
on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers was of the opinion that the
Employees' Compensation Act has become out of date in its scope and
operation_ and _that the administration and operation of the Act have been a
comparative failure. Prof. Adarkar advocated for compulsory insurance of all
employees. !he result was that the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, was
passed. Act was a substantial improvement over the Employees'
Compensation Act. Any person who is covered by the Employees' State
Insurance Act, 1948 and who is entitled to receive disablement or dependant's
benefit under this Act is not entitled to compensation from the employer under
the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923. The scope of the Employees' State
Insurance Act is limited but it is hoped that in times to come it will cover the
entire field of compensation by replacing the Employees' Compensation Act.
What is actually intended to be insured by such Acts is the rehabilitation of the
employee himself or of his dependants. For the progress of democratic socialism
and its needed impact on the society the socialisation of the needs and miseries
of man is as important as the socialisation of the basis of production and wealth.
The Employees' Compensation Act was framed with a view to provide for
compensation to employees incapacitated by an injury from accident arising out
of and in the course of employment. It is a guarantee against hazards of
employment to which an employee is exposed because of his employmen . The
main object of the Act was to make provision fo paym t of coml?ensati to an
employee only, (i.e, the concerned employee himself m c se of his_s vmg the
injury in question and to his dependants in the case of his death) i_n VIeW: of
section 2 (1) (n) of the Act.1 But compensation not the only benefit fl wmg
from this Act; it has import t effects in furthermg work. on the p evention_ of
accidents, in giving employees greater freedom from arooety and m rendenng
. 2
industry more attractive. fJ d
. Act extends to the whole of India except the State o ammu an
s Unlik the English Act, this Act is not applicable to all em loyees. It
Kashnur. e tain industries. It affords protection to an
is applicable to emplo_y es of cerd b
employee from loss.or mJury cause lt the accident should have been caused
his employment. It is not neccess:ry C mpensation is payable only when the
by some wrongful act of the_ emp oyerfu d and the procedure prescribed by
conditions provided by seetin
3
ar a c1:un to compensation. Any cl for
section 10 has been adoptedm _m o ears of the occurrence of the accident
compensation must b ade within fror!the date of death.
or in case of death within two years . t d crystallised on the date of th

under sections 3 and

par!
'IJte rights and liabilities of the accident s ere the Schedule is amended it
4 of the c ·
. . AIR 1977 Mad. 330
l. , B. Habeebullah Pert anu, Labour in India. p. 298.
2. Repon of the Royal Conumssion on

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 The Employees• Compensation Act., 1923 415

coaq,ertsation Act is not to provide for solatium to the employee or his

de dants but to_make good the actual losses suffered by him.• Compensation
iS in the n ture of insurance of the employee against certain risk of accident. The
rule, thatm order to make the employer liable to pay compensation, death or
wutYm u st be teh c_onsequence of an accident arising out of and in the course
his employment, 15 dependent upon the following four conditions :
(1) A causal connection between the injury and the accident and the
accident and the wor_k done in the course of employment is essential:
(2.) The onus hes upon the claimant to establish that the injury or its
,ggravation.was the outcome of the work and resulting strain.
(3.) It lS not necessary that the employee must be actually working at the
time of his death or that death must occur while he is working or has just ceased
to work.
(4) If the evidence adduced shows greater probability which satisfies a
reasonable m . that the work contributed to the causing of personal injury, it
would be suffiaent ground for the employee to succeed in his claim.2
Na _of Lia_bility.-The Employees' Compensation Act creates a new
type of liability. It is not strictly a liability arising out of tort, but is a sort of
liability arising out of the relationship of the employer and the employee. An
employer under this Act is liable to pay compensation at a rate fixed in the Act
itself to any employee incapacitated by an accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment. The main principle governing the compensation is
not dependent on the suffering caused to the employee or expenses incurred by
him in his treatment but on the difference between his wage earning capacity
before and after the accident. The liability for the payment of compensation is
not dependent upon the neglect or wrongful act on the part of the employer.
Dochine of added peril.-The principle of added peril means that if an
employee while doing his employer's work, trade or business engages himself
in some 9ther work which he is not ordinarily required to do under the contract
of his employment and which act involves extra danger, he cannot hold his
master liable for the risk arising therefrom. The doctrine of added peril,
therefore, comes into play only when the employee is at the time of meeting the
accident perforating his duty.3 .
Adjudication of Compensation.-Compensation may be fixed either by
settlement or by award. Once the compensatio has been fixed, it o_t.be
revised on the ground of subsequent aggravatio of a permanent disa ility.
Compensation, once fixed operates for ever except m cases co ered by section6
of the Act, which provides for making subsequent change m the amount of
compensation on the ground of change in circumstances. But the scope of
section 6 is limited only to half monthly payments which are prescribed by !he
Act for only temporary disablement. No review on the ground of ggrav:tion
of disability is maintainable even under sections 17, 19 and 22 of this Act.
Self-inflicted Injury.-An injury caused by acci ent which c uld have
been anticipated or foreseen, or is brought about intentionally or negligently by
1. D v. Seen, AIR 1939 Rangoon, 36?·
2· B ·. C . AIR 1961 GuJ. 34 ·
3. B - C C . v. . AIR 1956, Pat. 299·
4· Angus C . Ltd. v. C , AIR 1955 Cal. 616.
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421
The Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Commissioner had no occasion to consider the claim in the context of the

argument advance in the appeal. Hence the widowed sister who was holly
dependant on earnings of deceased employee was entitled to compensatton.
(ix) Section 2(1)(dd) defines Employee.-"employee" means a person,
who is-
(i) a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of Section 2 of the Railways
Act, 198 ( of 198 ), not permanently employed in any administrative d trict
or sub 1v1S onal office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as
is specified m Schedule II; or
(ii) (a) a master, seaman or other members of the crew of a ship;
(b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft;
(c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other
capacity in connection with a motor vehicle;
(d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company,
and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in
Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may
be, is registered in India; or
(iii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule Il, whether
the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and
whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not
include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces
of the Union; and any reference to any employee who has been injured shall,
where the employee is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of
them;
The following are not employee :
(i) Any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces
of the Union of India.
To determine whether a person other than a railway servant is an
employee or not, a reference to Schedule II, is necessary. The following
conditions must be fulfilled before a person can be said to be an employee under
this Act:
(i) the employment must be of the nature mentioned in Schedule II of
the Act.
In C ; , v. ,
1
A , Bombay High Court has held that a party paying a rent
or Commission for t king a motor vehicle on hire from the owner or sharing
profit out of the income earned by him cannot be construed as an employee
within the meaning of Section 2(1)(dd)(c) read with Schedule II of the
Employees' Compensation Act.
(x) Employer.-In view of section 2(1)(e) employer includes the
following:
(1) any body of pe rsons whether incorporated or not,
(2) any managing agent of an employer,
(3) legal representative of a deceased employer, and. .
(4) when the services of an employee are temporarily lent on hire to
another person by the person with whom the employee has entered
1. 2015 I LU 310 (Born.).

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422 Labour and Industrial Laws

into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person

while the employee is working for him.
Till 1948, the liability to pay compensation under the Act was only that of
the person with whom the employee has entered into a contract of service or
apprenticeship. But later on the Act was amended so as to cover cases under
section 12 of the Act which makes the borrowing employer also liable. If a
person is employed for the purposes of any game or recreation and engaged or
paid through a club, the manager or the members of the managing committee
of the club will, for the purpose of the Act. be deemed to be the employer.
In B v. . . ,1 dependants of an employee, who died
from an accident resulting from collision of a light engine with a trolly which
he was plying, made General Manager O.T., Railway a party to their claim. The
Allahabad High Court held that "the 'manager' of a railway is according to the
definitio:p of railway administration in section 3(6) of the Railways Act, equated
to the Government...he, therefore, satisfied the definition of managing agent in
the Employees' Compensation Act, because he can be said to be running the
department which he is directly concerned with."
In B ,A v. ,2 the State was executing the
electrification scheme of a town on b'ebalf of the Municipal Board and during
the construction an employee of the,State engaged in such construction suffered
permanent partial injury. It was held that the State was liable to pay
compensation. In t.1-tis case it was immaterial whether the State was working for
itself or for Municipal Board. The Board, therefore, is not liable, under section
12 of the Act if it entrusts the construction to the Government because it is not
ordinary trade or business of Municipal Board to execute electrical projects.
The Calcutta High Court has also expressed a similar opinion in
3
B . v. where the bank had entusted construction of a
building to a contractor and an employee was injured in the course of this work.
The Court held that it was not within the ordinary trade or business of the bank
to build houses and, therefore, the bank was not liable to pay compensation
under the Act. It is payable by the employer. It cannot he awarded against
insurance company unless the case falls within section 14 of the Act.4
A person can be held to be employer of another if there is a contract of
employment between the two. It should be direct and immediate and not
indirect and remote. Thus, where a batch of coolies is hired by an agricultural
society to stock and remove the goods from the goodown and the society pays
them their charges directly, although these charges are later recovered fro1n the
members of the society, but the members have no control over them and are not
responsible to them for their payment. It cannot be said that the relationship of
employer and employee is established between the two . ., the members and
the coolies simply because charges are recovered from the members. Society
would alone be employer of the coolies and, hence, it is the Society and not the
members who .are responsible for payment of com pens a tion.5
I. AIR 1960 All. 362.
2. AIR 1960 All. 468.
3. AIR 1968 Cal. 63. ,
4. .B. Co. v. .B , AIR 1970 Raj. 111.
5 .D v.
(1985) II LU 99 (Born).

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 CHAPTER II
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
section 3. Employer's liability for Compel\sation.- The liability of an

rr.Ioyer to pay compensation is limited and is subject to the provisions of the

Under sub-section (1) of section (3) the liability of the employer to pay
pensation is dependent upon the following four conditions :
co (1) Personal injury must have been caused to an employee;
(2) Such injury must have been caused by an accident;
(3) The accident must have arisen out of and in the course of
employment; and
(4) The injury must have resulted either in death of the employee or in
his total or partial disablement for a period exceeding three days.
The employer shall not be liable to pay compensation in the following
cases:
(a) If the injury did not result in total or partial. disablement of the
employee for a period exceeding three days;
(b) In respect of any injury not resulting in death or permanent total
disablement the employer can plead:
(i) that the employee was at the time of accident under the
influence of drinks or drugs;
(ii) that the employee wilfully disobeyed an order expressly given
or a rule expressly framed for the purpose of securing safety of
employees; and
(iii) that the employee having known that certain safety-guards or
safety devices are specifically provided for the purpose of
securing the safety of employee, wilfully disregarded or
removed the same.
The employer can succeed in his plea only if he can establish that the
injury was attributable to any one of the above factors.
Employer's Liability in case of occupational diseases.-Sub-section (2) of
section 3, deals with the payment of compensation in case of an injury resulting
from occupational diseases. The list of the occupational diseases is contained in
Schedule Ill of the Act. Schedule III is divided into three parts, A, B and C. The
disease contracted must be an occupational disease peculiar to the employment
specified in Schedule III. In respect of every such disease mentioned as
occupational disease in Schedule III, a list of a number of employments is given.
To support any claim for compensation in case of occupational disease in Part
A no specified period of employment is nece.ssary; for diseases in Part B the
employee must be in continuous employment of the same employer for a period
of six months in the employment specified in that part; and for diseases in Part
C the period of employment would be such as is apeclfied by the Central
Government for each such employment whether in the service of one or more
employers. The contracting of any disease specified in Schedule III shall be
dee m d to be an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
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 442 Labour and Industrial Laws

employment unless the contrary is proved.

Part A of Schedule 111.-The employer shall be liable to pay compensation
for an injury resulting from an occupa_tional disease mentione _in art A of
Schedule III, if an etnployee employed many employment specified m Part A
of Schedule III contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease
peculiar to that employment. The contracting of the disease shall be deemed to
be an injury by accident and unless the contrary is proved the accident would
be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment.
C .- any
such disease as is mentioned in Part A of Schedule ID develops after an
employee has left the employment, no compensation shall be payable to him.
Part B of Schdule 111.-In case of contracting of any disease mentioned in
Part B of Schedule III the employer shall be liable if an employee while in the
service of an employer in whose service he has been employed for a
in any employment specified in Part B of
Schedule III contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease
peculiar to that employment. The contracting of the disease shall be deemed to
be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section, and unless contrary
is proved, the accident would be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course
of the employment.
C -
employer shall be liable to pay compensation to an employee where an
employee contracts any disease as aforesaid after he has left his employment in
the following conditions :
1. If an employee has served under any employer in any employment
specified in Part B of Schedule m for a continuous period of six
months.
2. If an employee has after cessation of his service contracted any disease
specified in Part B of Schedule III as an occupational disease peuiliar
to that employment.
3. If it is proved that such disease arose out of the employment.
The contracting of the disease shall then be deemed to be an injury by
accident within the meaning of this section.
Part C of Schedule 111.-Where an employee contracts any disease
specified in Part C of Schedule III the employer shall be liable :
(1) If an employee was in the service of one or more employers in any
employment specified in Part C of Schedule III for such continuous
period as the Central Government may specify in respect of each such
employment; and
(2) If he contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease
peculiar to that employment.
If the above two_ c?nditions e fulfilled, the contracting of the disease shall
be deemed to be an mJury by accident within the meaning of section 3 of the
Act and unless contrary is proved the accident shall be deemed to have arisen
out of and in the course of the employment.
According to the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 3 if it is proved:
(a) that an employee while in service of one or more employers in any
employment specified in Part C of Schedule m has contracted a

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 443
The Employees' Compensation /¥:;t, 1923
1 d. ease peculiar to the
disease specified therein as an occupationa 15 1 than the period
em loyment during a continuous period which ess ent and
sp!ifled under sub-section (2) of section 3 for that employm - the
(b) that the disease has arisen out of and in the course of emplo}?11:en' by
contracting of such disease shall be deemed to be an lllJUry
accident within the meaning of section 3 of the Act.
C oJ service.- e :in
employee contracts an occupational disease after discontinuance of his service
the employer shall be liable to pay compensation:
(1) If it is proved that the employee has served under one or more
employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule II f r
such continuous period as the Central Government may specify lll
respect of each such employment;
(2) If he has after cessation of his service contracted any disease specified
in Part C of Schedule III as an occupational disease to that
employment; and
(3) If it is proved that such disease arose out of the employment.
The contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident
within the meaning of this section.
Section 3(2-A).-In case of any employment mentioned in Part C of
Schedule III where there are more than one employers, sub-section (2-A) of
section 3 authorises the Commissioner to fix up the extent of responsibility of
different employers in respect of the amount of compensation payable to an
employee.
Section 3(3).-The Central Government or the State Government after
giving, by notification in the Official Gazette, not less than three month's notice
of its intention so to do, may by a like notification, add any description of
emplo ent to the employments specified in Schedule III and shall specify in
the case of employments so added the diseases which shall be deemed for the
purposes of this section to be occupational disease peculiar to those
employments respectively and thereupon provisions of sub-section (2) shall
apply in the case of a notification by the Central Government, within the
territories to which this Act extends or, in case of a notification by the State
Government within the State as if such diseases had been declared by this Act
to be occupational diseases peculiar to those employments.
Section 3(4).-The employer is liable to pay compensation only if the
disease can be directly attributed to a specific injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment. Exceptions to this rule are the cases
covered by sub-sections (2), (2-A) and (3) of section 3.
Employment.-The concept of employment implies three elements : an
employer, an employee and a contract of employment between them. In other
words, employment means a contract of service between the employer and
employee wherein the employee agrees to serve the employer under his control
and supervision.1 Employment under the present Act is not limited to actual
work or place of work but extends to all things which the employee is entitled
by the contract of employment expressly or impliedly to do. To justify any claim
for compensation existence of a contract of employment express or implied
1. C v. M.P., AIR 1958 SC 388.
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 The Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 445

the service which unless engaged in the duty owing to the master it is
reasonable to believe e employee would not otherwise have suffered. There
niust be a causal relationship between the accident and employment. If the
at"Cident had occurr d on . account of a risk which is an incident of the
employment; the clalnl or compensation must succeed unless f course
einployee ha_s expos d himself to do an added peril by his own unp ?ence_.
This expression applies to employment as such, to its nature, its conditions, its
obligations. d its incidents and if by reason of any of these, an employee is
brought w1 the zone of special danger and so injured or killed, th. Act
would apply. The employee must show that he was at the time of lllJUry
engaged in the employer's business or in furthering that business and was not
doing something for his own benefit or accommodation.3 The question that
should be considered is whether the employee was required or expected to do
the thing which resulted in the accident though he might have imprudently or
disobediently done the same. In other words, was the act which resulted in the
injury so outside the scope of the duties with which the employee was entrusted
by his employer as to say that the accident did not arise out of his employment.'
In the course of employment refers to the period of employment and the
place of work. It is neither limited to the period of actual labour nor includes
acts necessitated by the employee's employment. "Another important question",
pointed out by Francis H. Bohlen, is, ''how far a servant is entitled to go
outside his appointed sphere in obedience to the orders of a superior. Of course,
if such superior has the power to fix the spheres of labour for the employee, an
employee, by obeying them, merely passes into a new "course of employment",
but even if he has not, it seems that the servant is justified if he honestly believes
that such superior is authorised to employ him.5 An injury received within
reasonable limits of time and space, such as while satisfying thirst or bodily
needs, taking food or drink is to be regarded as injury received in the course of
employment.6
In D v. B F A / the appellant's son
worked as driver with the respondent, the owner of the tanker and he died
while on duty. Appellant filed petition for compensation but was denied by the
respondent on the ground that there was no connection between death and
work of the deceased. The Commissioner dismissed the petition filed for
compensation. The High Court held that the Commissioner wrongfully
concluded that there was no connection between work and death of deceased.
The very fact that the deceased was working as a driver and that too of oil
tanker, his job was full of stress and strain. It was not necessary for the
petitioner to prove that her son was suffering from heart ailment before the
accident. The Court can take judicial notice that at times the person may die due
to first massive heart attack.

1. . . v. J.M. ! , A.I.R 1970 SC 1906.

2. A v. , AIR 1933 Cal. 513.
3. A v. D E , 1/ , (1956) II W 233.
4. . v. A , 1969 Lab. J.C. 1415 (Andh. Pra.).
5. Francis H. Bohlen 25 Harv. L.Rev. 418.
6. AIR 1968 Cal. 129.
7. 2015 III LU 662 (HP).

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 Labour and Industrial Laws
446
In ' v. / the employee died due to
natural lightning !hile working at the site. It was held by the Suprem C u
that in order that an employee may succeed in his claimal for comJensati: 1 18
no doubt true that the accident must have caus connec on w1 e
em lo ent and arise out of it but if the employee is jure asa result of
nafuraifurce of lightning though it in itself has no connecti n with mployment
of deceased Smt. Gita the employer can still be held liable if the clarmant shows
that the employment' exposed the deceased to such injury. In the present case
the deceased was working on the site and would not have been exposed to such
hazard of lightning had she not been working so. Therefore the appellant was
held liable to pay compensation.
In .B. Co. v. .B ,2 the deceased was employed as
a driver on the appellant's truck used for the purpose of carrying petrol in a
tank. On the previous day he had reported to his employer1 that the !ank was
leaking and so water was put in it for detecting the place from where it leaked.
The next morning the deceased was asked by the appellant to enter the tank to
see from where it leaked. Accordingly, he entered the tank which had no petrol
in it and for the purpose of detecting the leakage he lighted a match stick. The
tank caught fire and the deceased received bum injuries and later on succumbed
to death. In this case it was contended that the employee has himself added to
his peril by negligently and carelessly lighting a match stick inside the petrol
tank. It was held that the accident arose out of employment and the act of
lighting the match stick even if rash or negligent would not debar his widow
from claiming compensation. If the act leading to the accident was one within
the sphere of employment or incidental to it or in the interest of the employer,
then the accident would be said to arise out of and in the course of employment
and the plea of added peril would fail. In this case the deceased did something
in furtherance of his employer's work when the accident occurred although he
was careless or negligent inasmuch as he lighted the match stick instead of using
a torch to detect the leakage. But because the tank was empty and was partly
filled with water on the previous night, he could not have little reason to foresee
the risk involved. I
In M. v. I.M. ,3 Shaikh Hussan Ibrahim, a seaman on ship
"Dwarka" was last seen at about 3 a.m. on Dec. 16, 1961 on the Tween Deck and
was found missing at 6.15 a.m. in the morning. A search was undertaken but
the dead body was not found. The Additional Commissioner made an
inspection of the ship and found no material evidence which could lead to the
inference that the death was caused by an accident which arose out of seaman's
emp oyment: It was held tha th Commissioner did not commit any error of
law m reaching to the above finding. No compensation was payable in this case
because on the facts there was no material for holding that death took place on
account of accident which arose out of his employment. It was further held that
in the case of death caused by the accident the burden of proof rests upon the
employee to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in the
course of employment. But it is not necessary that the employee must prove it
1. (2001) 1 w rn (SC).
2. AIR 1970 Raj. 111.
3. AIR 1970 SC 1906; v. : C ., (1956) I
LU 5 5 4 (Bombay) reversed.

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 447
The Employees'Compensation Act, 1923

th
by direct evidence. It may be inferred when the facts proved justify e
inference. .
In B v. ,1 a bomb placed in the prem1Ses of
a workshop by some unknown person exploded and caused inj ry to an
employee. It was held that the employee was not responsible for placmg of the
bomb, and the injury due to its explosion was caused at the time and place at
which he was employed, therefore the injury was the result of an accident
arising out of his employment. The rule is that if a particular accident would
not have happened to an employee had he not been employed to work in the
particular place and condition, it would be accident arising out of the
employment.
Likewise where the employees, working in some factory are injured due to
crashing down within the factory premises of some aircraft, it will be an injury
resulting from an accident arising out of the employment for the employees are
not responsible for the air crash and they are exposed to that danger by reason
of their presence on the place of accident because of their employment.
In C Ltd. . G ,2 respondents
were parents of a driver employed by the third respondent, who was owner of
the vehicle in question. From a certain day in 1996, for more than 7 years,
nothing was heard of the driver. His parents made a claim for compensation
and the Commissioner for Compensation awarded a sum of Rs. 2.29 lakhs. The
High Court confirmed it. Hence the Insurance company preferred an appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Allowing the appeal the Supreme Court observed that there was nothing
on record to show that death had occurred to the driver in an accident arising
out of employment. If some miscreants had taken away the driver along with
the vehicle or had murdered him, it did not give rise to a presumption that
death had occurred in accident arising out of employment.
Further the rights of the parties were required to be determined on the
date of the incident (from which date nothing was heard. or known of the
driver). It was held that the presumption under Section 108 of the Evidence Act,
could not be invoked in support of the claim.
An employee who was employed to repair clocks at various stations was
stabbed in a railway compartment while he was in transit. It was held that the
death of the employee in question was due to an accident arising out of and in
fhe course of his employment.
In the course of employment means during the currency of employment.3
In order to succeed in his claim an employee has to prove that he was at the
time of injury eng,aged in empl yer's busine or in furthering_ tha} business
and was not doing something for wn nefit oraccommodatio . He must
show that he was doing something m ge_ of a duty to his loyer
directly or indirectly imposed upon him by his contract of servlce. The
distinction between "arising out of', and "arising in the course of' employment

1. AIR 1952 Bom. 382.

2. 2008 n W 863 (SC). ' AIR 1952 Dom. 382.
3. ,, B v. . 'Kou,Jlcode (1956) n W 233.
4. A v. Civil E ,Mn M• Stewart, AIR 1950 Cal. 164.
. (Ii , .. · ·

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 Labour and Industrial Laws
448
• c t is that the latter suggests the point of
as pointed ou! y BombaybHi!1use uring currency of employment and the
time, . .,the mJury must e be some sort of connection between the
former conveys the id that th er edne;ust employee as a result of accident.1
employment and the tnJury caus o an 1 . th 1
In . v. A ,2 a person_ was the themp oyee m_t et orryth
· matenal from e quarry s1 e o e
belonging to his employer arrrn:1g quarry1 d the material on the lorry and
work spot of the P.W.D. HIS duties w re to oa ial t the work-spot. While
to go along with the same for unloading the ma er d and in
the lorry was moving he attempted to hit a rabbit pas mg on_ th e a claimed
the attempt he fell down from the lorry and died. His w e
compensation for the loss of life of her husband. It w_ held that she was not
entitled to compensation for "it is not enough that mJury sho ld have been
sustained by the employee during the period of his mployment,. it should _hav
been in the course of the employment. The act which resulted m _the acaden
must have some connection with the work for which the employee lS employed.
The employee must have been doing something which is part of his service
though it need not be his actual work; it should be work na ally_ co e ted
with the class of work and the injury must result from it. Applying this prmaple
by no stretch of imagination can it be said that hitting a wild rabbit which ran
across the truck was part of service of the employee for which he was employed.
The mere fact that the employee was, during the particular period, travelling in
the employer's truck with the quarry material from the quarry site to the work
spot is not enough."
In C . .v. ,3 a boy was employed by the
appellant in a tea shop and it was part of his duty to take tea from the shop
which was situated outside the factory gate to various persons working in the
factory. One day when the boy was coming out of the factory after serving the
tea to the workers he passed through a violent mob of factory workers who
were leaving the factory. This mob attacked the police and the police had to fire
upon the mob in self-defence. Unfortunately, the boy was severely wounded by
a bullet injury and died the following day in the hospital. The mother of the boy
claimed compensation. It was held that the accident arose in the course of
employment and death occurred because of the risk to which he was exposed
by the nature of his employment.
In D v. 4 Gokul, a gang Jamadar while going
to collect salary of the labourers from the office of the Public Works Department
was murdered in the way at a place on which he sat down to take his meals
near a well He was found dead at a considerable distance from the place where
other members of his gang were actually working on the road. Applying the
principle laid down in B case the court held that the
death of Gokul was an accident arising out of his employment because the
accident would not have happened if he had not been engaged in that
employment. In this case the accident arose because of the nature of
employment that exposed him to some particular danger.

1. , B v. , AIR 1952 Born. 382.

2. (1969) Lab. I.C. 1415 (Andh. Pra.).
3. AIR 1953 Cal. 143.
4. (1967) I W 344 (MP).

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 ..L.1.t..'"' ..............

safety. Safety means the safety of the premises and the plant and to the method
and conduct of the work. Their duty is to take reasonable steps to avoid
1
exposing the servant to a reasonable risk of injury. Thus, where under the rules
of the Company nobody was allowed to graze cattle inside the mill premises but
the wife of a worker of the Company attempted to graze her· ,cattle inside the
premises. The watchman asked her not to graze inside the premises. This
infuriated her husband who assaulted the watchman, resulting in his
disablen1ent. It was held that the injury of the watchman arose out of
en1ployrnent and in the course of enforcing the rules, therefore, he is entitled to
get comp ensation. 2
3
haimwn , v. it was held that fetching
food. s1 part ?f employee's duty. Therefore, accident to an employee while
fetching food is in the course of employment.
A . E , ,4 the deceased employee was
suff nng from heart disease. His job was only to switch on or off in the thermal
station where he was employed. The Supreme Court observed that there was no
scope for any stress or strain in his duties. His death due to heart attack was,
ther fore, rightly held as not caused by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court holding the
appellant not entitled to compensation for death of her husband was affirmed
by the Supreme Court though the amount already paid to the appellant was
directed not to be recovered from her. I
In C .( ) . v: B ,5 an employee who suffered
from high fever was recommended two days leave by the doctor. When he
returned on the third day the doctor found him suffering from malaria and
Broncho pneumonia. He was again granted three day's leave. After expiry of the
leave when he came in a riskshaw to report to the doctor, his condition was so
serious that he had to be taken upstairs to the dispensary in a stretcher. The
doctor found him in a almost dying condition and, therefore, hastened to
administer injection but he died after a few minutes. It was held that, "as the
stress and strain of the journey was responsible for causing or precipitating the
employee's death, there was an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment."
In B v. D C Railway, ,6 deceased,
the appellant's husband was a goods train driver. While on duty he collapsed
and died. He took rest at intermediate stations. He died while talking to the
guard at wayside station who gave r_ed si al to stop the tra . It was held that
the death of the driver was an accident m the sense that 1t was unexpected
without there being any design on the part of the employee. But in order to
whether the accident was one arising out of and in the course of employment 1t
has to be seen whether there is unequivocal evidence that the employee died
because of particular strain during the course of his duties. The fact that the
1. v. Pike, (1970) 1 Kni. Ind. Rep. 318. .
2. . v. . (1984) I W 254 (Mad.).
3. AIR 1970 Mad. 386.
4. 2006 ill LU 324° (Sd).
5. AIR 1956 Cal. 458.
6. (1971) I LU 603 (Born).

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 450 Labour and Industrial Laws

employee died a natural death because of a disease from hich he was suffertdg
and that he died on account of normal wear and tear of his employment are t\ot
sufficient to entitle the claimant to the compensation. It must also be proved that
the deceased not only died because of the heart disease (as rep rte inthis case)
from which he was suffering but also because of some contributin cause on
accmmt of his employment or his duties which he was perfomung. In the
present case it was held that there was no evidence to show any causal
connection between death of the employee and his employment and his death
was not due to any particular strain which he had on account of his
employment. In D B v. B ,1 it was held that where the
death of an employee takes place due to heart attack while carrying a load, the
death shall be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment.
There is causal cunnection between the death and employment.
In v. D , C . .
,2 the appeal was filed by the owner of vehicle who was aggrieved
against the order passed by the High Court imposing liability to pay
compensation, to the employee, on owner of the vehicle. In this case the accident
causing injury to the employee was held about six months prior to his death.
The employee died of heart attack after six months of the accident. .
It was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court has committed an
error in holding that notwithstanding the fact that there was no connection with
the accident and the death of the empioyee, the owner of vehicle in question
was still liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the Employees'
Compensation Act, 1923. When there is no nexus between the accident and the
death of the employee, since the accident had occurred six months prior to his
death, the order of the High Court holding owner of vehicle liable for payment
of compensation was set aside.
In C v. G A ,3
the appellant was the mother of an employee (cleaner in motor vehicle). The
employee died of cardiac arrest while travelling in the vehicle. The
Commissioner for Employees' Compensation granted compensation. On appeal,
the High Court held the conclusion that employee died as a result of an accident
during course of employment was not sustainable. Hence this appeal was filed .
before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissing the appeal held that there must be causal
connection between injury and accident occurring in course of employment and
the onus was on the applicant to show strain resulted from work.
It was further observed that unless evidence was brought on record that
death of employee by way of cardiac arrest had occurred because of stress or
strain (which was held not proved in this case) the Commissioner would not
have jurisdiction to grant damages.
In G. v. B , Co. .
A ,4 the emr,loyee driver of appellant employer went to a pond after
reaching the destination. While taking bath in the pond, he slipped, got

1. (1985) 11 LU 70 (Ker.). ·
2. (2010) II LU 1 (SC).
3. 2007 I LU 474 (SC).
4. (2009) II LU 305 (SC).

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 The Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 451

drowned and died. The Commissioner for Employees compensation determined

the compensation of about 2.2 lal<hs with 12% interest as payable. The High
Court held the insurer not liable but granted liberty to recover the compensation
from the appellant employer. Hence, the present appeal to the Supreme Court.
It was observed that under Section 3(1) of the Employees' Compensation
Act, 1923 causal connection between the death of the employee and his
employment had to be established.
The death of the employee in this case was, on facts, held to be not one
sufficient to hold either the insurer or the insured appellant liable to pay
compensation.
In D , Co. .v.
1
T. , a person was employed as a driver of the bus belonging to
Shanmuga Mudaliar T. He died of heart failure at a bus stop where he stepped
out to have refreshments. His widow claimed compensation which was awarded
by the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation against the insured
employer.and not the Insurance company. In appeal filed by the.employer, the
learned Smgle Judge of the High Court held that the Insurance Comp y and
employer both are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation. And
therefore, two appeals were filed, one by the Insurance Company and the other
by the employer. It was held by the Division Bench of the High Court that the
connection between accident and employment might be established if the strain
had contributed to or accelerated the accident. If probabilities were in favour of
the applicant, then the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation was
justified in inferring that the accident arose out of and in the course of the
employment. In this case there could be no dispute that the driver died in the
course •of his employment since there was no occasion for him to be at
Tiruvannamalai bus stand (where he died) unless he had been driving the bus.
The death was capable of being attributed to the strain ordinarily inherent in the
discharge of his duty.
In / . .D . C . . v. E . . C ,2 the mechanic and fitter
employed to disconnect the crushing machine from the rest of the moving
machinery was absent from the premises. The crushing machine was running
without any business. An employee who was an unskilled worker and whose
duty was to feed the oil mill by pouring groundnut seeds into crusing machine,
kicked of the moving pulley to stop the running of the crushing machine. His
leg got caught between the pulley and the belt. He was pulled up to a height
of about six feet from where he fell down and died instantaneously. The
accident was held to have arisen out of and in the course of employment
because the employer was guilty of negligence in not complying with safety
rules and whatever the deceased employee did was in the interest of the
employer and in order to prevent the machine from getting damaged thereby
resulting in loss to the employer.
In C . . v. ,3 the deceased
was a seaman, an employee of the shipping company in Calcutta. One day
when the ship was on its voyage he tried to commit suicide by jumping over

1. (2003) I LU 776 (Mad.).

2. AIR 1963 A.P 210.
3. AIR 1964 Cal. 94.

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 452 Labour and Industrial Laws

board but was prevented by his co-workes and w s back to hisr o ?m . Querr ed
by tlw mas t r of th e ship he said that he was worned because he did n t re e ve
.mv letter from his home. He also promised never to attempt to commit suicide
in· f u tu rt-•. The s u rgeo n who examined him certified that he was mentally
dPr,mged and should, therefore, be kept under constant supervision using force
if ncc(' sary. After being kept in the hospital for a few days he was one ay
.1\lm,, ed on medical advice to go on the deck under escort. In the ext morrung
while walking up and down on the deck the seaman suddenly seized both the
gua rd s, threw them sideways with such force that they fell down on the deck
an d then jumped overboard. On a claim for compensation made by his sister it
was held that : ·
"The accident in this case was not due to any personal injury caused
to the employee by any accident arising out of and in the course of his
employmen t, so as to make the employer liable for it. Merely, because the
seam an was in service, his continuity of service did not bring him within
that exp ression.....In cases of suicide resulting from insanity or mental
derangement the onus lies upon the applicant to show that the death is
due to accident, and that insanity is the direct result of injury."
Similarly in Sri v. ,1 a night watchman of
the appellant company had died 90 minutes after return from work. The
question was whether death, that occurred one and a half hour after the
employee had ceased to work, can still be said to be in the course of
employment. It was held that if death was the result of stress and strain which
the employee suffered earlier during the period of work, a connection is
established belween the employment and his death. Thus, in this case death was
held to be in the course of employment.
In v. ,2 the petitioner had engaged
the respondent's father to paint a certain house. The employee had died while
he was doing the work and his dependant daughter and widow claimed
compensation. The High Court allowed the claim. In appeal the Supreme Court
held that the case of the person doing work of painting house apparently under
contract and dying while doing such work did not fall wit1lin the four Gomers
of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923.
8
In E A , v. A
the deceased was employed in Irrigation department to regulate the flow of
water in the canal. He was assaulted by some people who were inimical towards
him in connection with his employment in the release of water for the- purpose
of irrigation. The death was held to have arisen out of and rn the course of
employment. The court observed that the deceased had to be in the place where
he was d on e to death in the course of his employment for discharging his
duties. By reason of his being in the particular place, he had to face the
indignant agriculturists who had unatithorisedly diverted the water from the
canal and about whom he had made a complaint and by reason of that he had
to face a peril a_·_J the accident resulting in his death was caused by reason of
that peril.

1. (1982) II LU 149 (Mad.).

2. (2002) III LU 523 (SC).
3. (1983) II LU 326 (M ad.).

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I The Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 453

In . : . v. D.M., F D C .,1 it
h .1. b n \pld b th ri-sa ligh Co urt that unless it is proved that the accident
hnd .. cau ~al · nn " ti n ,, ith th mpl yment and it was suffered in course of
em ploymen t, lh1.:" ·laimant i not e n ti tled to get any compensa tion .
ln Rr!i-_1,1 .• \ illi mz
1
/ the applicant was employed at
tlw n•-.pondent's .m ill. He ,, as discharged on Wed nesd ay . By the usage of the
mill the wages, ere made upto Wednesday and were payable at the mill on
Friday. The .1ppli ·an t went to the mill on Friday for her wages which were paid
to l_, .r. n going dov n the stairs of the mill she slipped and was injured. The
ao.:u.ient "' as held to ha · e arisen out of and in the course of her employment.
3
Inw held i.n .B v. . . .C .
1 .1
t th li bi i of the employer under the Act is conceptually quite diff:rent
trLm the h bih t under tort. The Act should be construed in a
, . Therefore the death of a bus driver of a State Road Transport r ")o
ra_tion ho sus tained heart attack and collapsed while changing
destination n me boaTd is death arising out of and in the course of employment .
. In D ( )D. . . v. .B ,4 a factory worker
h, mg h a rt d isease , while coming out of the factory, profusely sweated and
died after tour hours of work inside the factory premises. It was held that the
tress and strain of four hours of work in the factory must be taken to be an
accelera ting factor to death and therefore, the employer is liable to pay
com pensa tion.
In Raj D v. E . . .E .B. ,5 a work
charged emplo ee under the Punjab State Electricity Board was engaged in
fixin g electric wire on poles. While he was working beyond his duty hours under
the direction of lineman to complete the job a bus came at a high speed and
dragged the electric wires hanging on the road with the result the pole on hlch he
,, as working was broken from the middle and he fell down and died instantaneously.
It was held that the accident occurred in the course of employment. If an employee
continues to work beyound his duty hours on a
job directed by his superior, he continues to be on duty.
In v. D B , C -
D B 11 ., B ,6 a jeep driver of Bank took the officers
of the bank to a village in connection with recovery proceedings conducted by
the bank. He rested the jeep in the rest house and went to the market where he
was assaulted by some unknown persons in the crowd and was found dead. It
was held that the expression "accident arising out of and in the course of
employmen t'' rather denotes a poin of _time than a factu I connection_ with the
employment and the accident. The nsk mcurred _by the river from 01ng to the
market was incidental to his employment of takmg the Jeep to the village. Thus
the accident having taken place without the fault of the driver and while he was
on duty in the village must be taken to be arising out of and in the course of
employment.
l. 2015 LU 131 (Or i) .
2. (1911) l K.B. 1029.
3. (1991) I LU 66 (Born.)
4. {1989) I. LU 259 (Orissa).
5 . (1989) n LU 132 (P. and ll.)
6. (1990) I LU 112 (Born.).

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454 Labour and Industrial Laws

In G , E Railway v.. A Wahid,1 the

respondent who was a railway employee was st ck down.while on way from
his residence to work place by an electric loco engme ata railway_ level crossing.
He was awarded compensation and an appeal was preferred agamst that order.
Allowing the appeal the High Court held that the accident_ cannot be said to
have occurred in the course of employment as the level crossmg was away &om
the employees place of work.
In v. . ,2 a driver in the Irrigation Survey
Sub-division was on election duty all the 24 hours and he was found dead. It
was held that he died in the course of employment. It was further held that
unless it is established by cogent evidence from the employer that the employee
has not died in the discharge of his duty, it will be presumed that the employee
died in the course of employment.
In A C . . v. R. :: ,3 a manufaturer
had taken a Group Insurance covering four employees of the establishment to
the amount of Rs. 25,000/- each in respect of any miscellaneous injury suffered
by the employees in the manufacturing unit. It was held that the Insurance
Company was liable to pay tmder the policy. The fact that the Insurance
Company has different types of policies inculding the one under the provisions
of Employees' Compensation Act, will not absolve the Insurance Company from
paying under tHe Miscellaneous Group Insurance Scheme. There is no dual
liability of the I surance Company to the insured as well as the employees.
In ' , . v. . ,4 the
respondent, employed as a points-man in Railway, was assaulted by unknown
person while on duty resulting in his death. The death was held to be arising
in the course of and out of employment and the employee was entitled to
compensation.
If the accident has occurred on account of the risk which is an incident of
em ployment, it has to be held that the accident has arisen out of the
employment. Since in driving a motor vehicle risk of accident is incidental, a
driver who sustains injuries in accident would be entitled to compensation.5
In C . . v. G. ,6 the employee
was residing in a hut provided by the employer. The hut caught fire and the
employee was burnt alive in the night. It was held that fire in this case has no
nexus with employment. The accommodation provided by the employer by
itself cannot form basis for a claim for compensation. The employer is not liable
as accident did not occur in the course of employment.
In . , , v. A B ,7
Vazir Ahamad, husband of the respondent Ashiya Begam was employed as a
senior cook in Running room in Rail way. He suffered an accident on account of
excessive gas inhaled while cooking food and died after a week. According to
Railway Doctor the death of the employee was due to hyper tension. The
1. (2002) III LU 615 (Jhar.).
2. (1989) I1 LU 135 (Raj.).
T (1992) I LU 558 (Kam.).
4. (1995) II W 231 (Madras).
5. 1 1 C . . v. / , (1995) I LU 298. (Orissa)
6. (1995) n LU 1041 (Orissa)
.., (1994) II LU 795 (Raj.).
•• "
·-

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 The Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 455

Commissioner for Employees' Compensation held that working on the cooking

stove may not be the immediate cause of death but a situation could arise where
hard working on cooking stove could lead to strain and accelerate the death. In
his view the employee died in the course of employment and therefore awarded
compensation. In appeal the High Court held that it is not necessary that there
should be a direct connection between the cause of death and the nature of
duties. Even a causal connection between the two would be sufficient to claim
compensation. It is not for the courts to look into minute details but they should
see whether on broad analysis of the material before the court, it can be said
that the accident which resulted in injury was in. the course of or out of
employment. If it is accepted that the deceased was suffering from high blood-
pressure from last one year, his duties as cook added strain and this strain had
casual relationship with the cause of his death. It cannot be expected mat a
Doctor would be able to analyse each step in order to show how the deceased
develop d the disease and succumbed to the same. Suddenly becoming
unco aous as a result of strain is an unexpected event which can be said to be
an ac ident le g to an injury in the course of and out of employment due to
working conditions. Strenuous duties and working condition accelerated the
death of the deceased and his dependants are, therefore entitled to
compensation.
In v. ,1 Rabindranath
Padhi, the husband of appellant was employed as Chief Engineer in a ship of
G.E. Shipping Company, the second respondent. While on duty in ship in Japan,
he met with an accident and died. His wife and two children filed a suit in
Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court which refused to entertain the suit.
Hence an appeal was made in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in view
of special facts and circumstances of the case ordered rupees five lakhs to be
paid to the appellant as compensation. But it was pointed out that this case will
not be treated as a precedent for future.
In B v. C .,2 the deceased was
employed in the weaving department of a mill. His duty hours commenced
from 3 p.m. Before starting his work he had gone to see a friend in another
department. There he suffered a heart attack at 3.20 p.m. and was admitted in
a hospital as an indoor patient for about a mon . Then he left his e ployment
and died after sometimes. It was held that 1t could not be said that the
employee died as a result of e injury ca ed b a cident aris g out of d
the course of his employment . The followmg prmaples were laid down m this
case:
(1) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident
and the work done in the course of employment.
(2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the rk and the
resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the tnJury.
(3) It is not necessary that the employee must be actually working at the
time of his death or that death must occur while he is working or had
just ceased to work.
(4) Where the evidence is balanced, if the evidence shows a greater

1. (1994) II W 1045 (SC).

2. (1961) 1. LU 585.

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 Labour and Industrial Laws

probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the w k

( tllllribu t •d to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enoi
tor lht• l'tnployee to succeed.
l )n ,1 iwrusal of the above cases the following test may be suggested to d<
tt... rmine whether the accident has arisen out of and in the course of
t'mpk1, nwnt :
( l) That the employee was in fact employed on or performing the duties
of his employment at the time of the accident.
(2) That the accident occurred at or about the place where he was
performing his duties. I

(3) That the immediate act which led to or resulted in accident had some
form of c«sual relation with the performance of these duties.
Notional extension of Employer's Premises.-Ordinarily a man's
employment does not begin until he has reached the place where he has to work
and does not continue after he has left the place of his employment. The period
of going to or returning from employement are generally excluded and are not
within the course of employment. Travelling to and from is not in the
1
COUl'$e of emplo yment. But there may be reasonable extension in both the time
and place and an employee may be regarded as in the course of his employment
even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises.2 It has been
recognised tin1e and again that the sphere of an employee's employment is not
necessarily limited to the actual place where he does his work. If in going to or
coming from his work he has to use an access which is part of his employer's
premises, or which he is entitled to traverse because he is going to or coming
from his work, he is held to be on his master's business while he is using that
access.3 The question is how far the employer is liable in case of an injury caused
by accident taking place outside the normal place of employment.
This problem has been discussed by the House of Lords in .
C C . .v. .4 In this case an employee working in a colliery was
injured while travelliIJg in a special collier's train. The railway company had by
an agreement with the colliery company agreed to arrange for such a special
train running between the colliery and the place of residence of the employees.
Each employee was provided with a pass and the amount of fare was deducted
from his wages. It was held that the injury did not arise in the course of
employment within the meaning of the English Employees' Compensation Act,
1906 for the following reasons :
1. There was no obligation on the employees to use the train. The
employees had a right to travel by such train but were not bound to
travel by such train. They could have travelled by any other
alternative means. Any employee of colliery was free to avail of the
; privilege or not. Had he been bound by the contract of his service to
travel by such train, he would have been in the course of
employment.
2. If the physical features of the locality had been such that the means of
1. Netherton v. Coles, 1945 A.E.R. 277.
2. . . v. B , AIR 1958 SC 881.
3 Per Lord Macmillan in Northumbrian Shipping C . Ltd. v. Mecullum, (1932), 48 TilmS
L.R. 568 at 572.
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