Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy

Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1981

Martin Buber and Psychotherapy

ANDREW P. MUSETTO, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT: This paper is intended to make the ideas of Martin Buber more
directly available to psychotherapists. Buber's influence on therapy is mostly
indirect and the author believes that his impact could be considerable if his
writings were better known and more often discussed. Several important ideas of
Buber are summarized. These include dialogue, I-Thou relationships, existential
guilt, and confirmation.

irectly, but more often indirectly, the ideas of Martin Buber have
D influenced therapists and schools of therapy. Boszormenyi-Nagy and
Spark (1973), for example, refer directly to Buber's influence. "Dialogue,"
"confirmation," "I," " T h o u , " "guilt," are familiar words to psychothera-
pists. T h e y are also basic concepts in the writings of Martin Buber.
T h e purpose of this paper is to make the ideas of Martin Buber more
directly available to therapists. It is not intended to provide new insights
into his thinking, but only to make explicit what is mostly implicit.

BUBER'S LIFE

Buber lived from 1878 until 1965. His life and works span m a n y
continents and cultures, m a n y ideas and interests. He was born in Vienna
and died in Israel. H e was b r o u g h t up in the Jewish tradition of Central
Europe, endured the violence of Nazi Germany, and lived the last 27 years
of his life in Palestine which, in 1948, became the state of Israel. H e was
educated in classical Hebrew, written and spoken. H e was a student of the
Scriptures and translated the Jewish Bible into m o d e r n German. H e
wrote about and studied Hasidism and Hasidic texts. A scholar, h u m a n i -
tarian, professor, philosopher, and religious thinker, Buber was consid-
ered a m a n of peace, integrity, and dialogue. About few m e n could it be
said that their person does not belie their writings, but it could be said
about Buber (Friedman, 1955, p. 5).
H a v i n g lived through almost 90 years of history which was marked by

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0022-0116/81/1300-0031 $00.95 9 1981HumanSciences Press

32 Journal o[ Contemporary Psychotherapy

violent and frequent cultural change and upheaval, Buber was no

stranger to conflict. Nor was he fond of easy solutions. He f o u n d a way to
cope with world conflict, personal sorrow, and such p r o f o u n d philo-
sophical and religious questions as the existence of evil and the nature of
man. He called his position a "narrow ridge," not a h a p p y middle of the
road view that ignores conflict, but an active dialogue with o p p o s i n g and
conflicting sides. Like the clinician w h o daily faces paradox, contradic-
tion and conflict, Buber advocated living in the midst of such turmoil. His
teaching and his life was a walking between love and justice, dependence
and freedom, passion and self-restraint, a u t o n o m y and conformity,
individuation and loyalty. For Martin Buber it was not an inability to
take sides but an unwillingness to disregard whatever was legitimate
about any side.

DIALOGUE

It w o u l d be hard to find a school or approach to psychotherapy which

does not underscore the importance of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Basic to c o m m u -
nication is dialogue.
T o dialogue with another person is to let the reality of the other person
emerge, not to impose your truth on him or her. Dialogu e demands
listening and confirmation. One hears the address of the other person,
confirms it by taking it seriously, and responds to it sincerely and
personally, even if you may disagree with what is said. In a dialogue each
person is willing to express what he or she believes and feels, and
encourages the other person to do the same. It is not that we say
everything, but only that whatever is said is truthful and appropriate.
Dialogue excludes semblance, deceit, or misrepresentation. It does not
allow for coercion or m a n i p u l a t i o n .
Essential to dialogue is not words but actions, i.e., "experiencing of the
other side" or "seeing the other." Conversation can be about personal
matters. It can be intimate and revealing. But it is not dialogue unless it is
truthful and unless each person experiences the situation from the other
person's side. E m p a t h y is a similar concept, except that by dialogue Buber
means something more. H e means to actively see, feel, and experience a
situation from the other person's vantage point w i t h o u t losing one's own
identity or p o i n t of view. Dialogue means to make the other present to
you while still h o l d i n g o n t o your own feelings or opinions. Dialogue is
not an observing, diagnosing or analyzing of the other, but an exper-
iencing of another person's reality.
In dialogue people are not tied to familiar patterns or old ways of
Andrew P. Musetto 33

acting. D i a l o g u e allows for growth, change, and newness, or as Buber

said, "the m o m e n t of surprise," where the other person can say s o m e t h i n g
unexpected or behave in a new way.
Buber's concept of being versus seeming applies here. A l t h o u g h usually
m i x e d together, two different types of h u m a n existence can be distin-
guished. One is being and the other seeming. At one time or another, we
are all troubled by the impression we m a k e on others. More or less, we
m a y hide o u r true feelings or o p i n i o n s or try to a p p e a r to be a certain way
to another person. Seeming is the extent to w h i c h we present ourselves
falsely, influenced by the impression or i m a g e we wish to create with
another. Being, w h i c h is similar to Bowen's (1976) concept of the
relatively well differentiated person, is the extent to w h i c h we speak the
truth a b o u t ourselves, w i t h o u t reserve. In a life characterized by being, a
person will not perjure oneself; not because that person needs to reveal the
entire self, but because whatever is revealed is done so honestly and
genuinely.

I-THOU RELATIONSHIPS

I and T h o u (Buber, 1958), Buber's m o s t influencial and best k n o w n

work, was first p u b l i s h e d in G e r m a n in 1923. According to Buber, m e n
and w o m e n have two p r i m a r y attitudes a n d relationships: I-Thou and l-
It. T h e way a person relates to a n o t h e r h u m a n being determines whether
it is an I-Thou or I-It relationship.
"All real living is m e e t i n g , " wrote Buber. In an 1-Thou relationship,
one person, an "I," meets a n o t h e r individual as a person or a " T h o u . " A
personal r e l a t i o n s h i p is formed, one characterized by m u t u a l i t y , direct-
ness, presentness, intensity. Spoken from the heart and with the w h o l e
person, an I-Thou r e l a t i o n s h i p takes place between people, in a m u t u a l
and recriprocal exchange.
In contrast, an I-It r e l a t i o n s h i p lacks m u t u a l i t y . It takes place within
one person, w h o a p p r o a c h e s the other as an object to be e x a m i n e d or
studied, used or m a n i p u l a t e d . It is not, wrote Buber, that every relation-
ship needs to be an I-Thou one or that every m o m e n t in any r e l a t i o n s h i p
should be an I-Thou encounter, but w i t h o u t any I-Thou relationships we
do not fully become h u m a n beings. H u m a n lives can be lived and
experienced in m a n y ways, but h u m a n i t y comes into existence only
t h r o u g h the g e n u i n e m e e t i n g of persons.
T h e clinician well knows the i m p o r t a n c e of both polarities, an I and a
T h o u or We in relationships. Buber's ideas can be c o m p a r e d with the
thoughts of m a n y theorists, especially certain family system theorists such
34 Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy

as Bowen (1976), Boszormenyi-Nagy and Spark (1973), and Minuchin

(1974). The I in a relationship stands for individuation, autonomy, self-
direction. If absent, there is enmeshment, fusion, a person who is more an
extension of another rather than a self-directed individual. Without a
sufficient definition of the I polarity in relationships, we find individuals
who confuse their own reality, feelings, or beliefs with another person's.
In Stierlin's (1977) terms, these individuals may be ego-bound, their
parents having substituted their own fragile egos in place of the burgeon-
ing egos of their children, leaving the children without an adequate
deliniation of self. The relationship-oriented person described by Bowen,
one who is poorly individuated, applies here.
The T h o u or We polarity represents togetherness in a relationship. It
allows for intimacy and identification. People unable to articulate this
polarity in their lives are loners; they can respond to others only as objects
for self-gratification or as distorted, projected and unacknowledged
aspects of themselves.
In an excellent essay, Mark Karpel (1976) explicates four modes of
relationships based on the presence and extent of the I and We polarities,
i.e., distance and relation. It is, according to Karpel, a developmental
sequence from immature forms of relationships to more mature forms.
The most immature forms are complete unrelatedness or complete fusion.
Complete unrelatedness means an absence of the We aspect of a relation-
ship. It is graphically illustrated by the loneliness and isolation of a
schizoid personality, where an individual denies unmet dependency needs
on others.
Pure We without any I is the fused, boundaryless world of schizophre-
nia or folie-fi-deux. This is the second mode of relationship. Little if any
I, self, or independence is present, only identification and fusion with
another.
A variation of pure fusion, but not as intense, is found in couples where
there is an excessive amount of identification and weakly defined ego-
boundaries. Relationship-oriented and poorly differentiated, in this type
of couple each individual is highly dependent on one another. Energy is
devoted primarily to seeking and gaining approval, not towards self-
directed goals or activity. Repressed concepts of the self are projected onto
the other person, who is then responded to not as a real person or unique
individual, but as the personification of unacceptable parts of the self.
Fusion falsely promises security, while change forebodes anxiety. Separa-
tion is considered disloyal, and blame and guilt are used to discourage it.
Couples in highly fused relationships have only a vague idea about
self-responsibility. Vicious cycles and chronic conflict, codetermined by
both parties, keep these couples locked into fused relatedness.
Andrew P. Musetto 35

T h e third and most c o m m o n m o d e of relationship is ambivalent fusion

(Karpel, 1976). Here there is a conflict between being different from one,s
partner and identifying with h i m or her, between responsibility and self-
s u p p o r t and m a n i p u l a t i o n for emotional support, and between a fear of
being alone and a fear of being swallowed up. In ambivalent fusion, there
is too m u c h I to have complete fusion but not e n o u g h to attempt intimacy
w i t h o u t losing one's self. T h e r e is not e n o u g h W e for empathy, dialogue,
and confirmation, but too m u c h to withdraw into isolation or complete
unrelatedness and aloneness. Ambivalent fusion often means frequent
conflict, with some moments of happiness and security. Whereas complete
fusion is an endless cycle of d e m a n d i n g and demanding, ambivalent
fusion allows for some c o m p r o m i s e despite reoccurring cycles of conflict.
In these cycles couples draw closer together when they feel the other
slipping away, but step back when they sense the other getting u n c o m -
fortably close.
Dialogue is the fourth and most mature mode of relatedness. In a
dialogue the relationship fosters the individuation of both persons. T h e
other is affirmed as other, not as a projection of self. Each party accepts
responsibility for oneself and refuses to assume the other's legitimate
responsibilities. Accountability means fulfilling genuine obligations, not
archaic or excessive loyalty ties. Neither person tries to place the other in a
fixed role, whether it be the "sick" or "strong," "crazy" or "well"
position, and neither accepts rigid, unchangeable roles for oneself.
Gratification of emotional needs comes t h r o u g h intimacy, the authentic
meeting of persons. T r u s t resides here. G i v i n g emotionally does not mean
giving up. Both I and T h o u are present in m u t u a l confirmation and
openness. One gives to the other in the belief that at some future time the
other will be emotionally available in return.

CONFIRMATION

In April, 1957, a dialogue took place between Martin Buber and Carl
Rogers. In that exchange, Buber clarified his ideas about confirmation and
distinguished confirmation from Rogers' concept of u n c o n d i t i o n a l posi-
tive regard or, "the acceptance of this person as he is" (Buber, 1965, p.
182). By confirmation Buber also meant acceptance, but he went beyond
that to mean h e l p i n g the other in the struggle against oneself for the sake
of what a person is able and meant to be. It is not unconditional since it
calls the other to be more, to be better, to be the person one aspires to be
but fails. Confirmation takes place by accepting the other as a partner in
dialogue, as a person to w h o m I am willing to be present to. Differences
36 Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy

need not be settled. Approval of the other's action may not be possible.
But confirmation is my acceptance of the other as a person w o r t h y of my
time and also as capable of changing.

EXISTENTIAL GUILT

Perhaps Buber's most controversial idea for the psychotherapist is that

of existential guilt. Buber believed that existential guilt was necessary and
constructive; necessary because it is intrinsic to h u m a n relationships,
which are always imperfect; constructive because it could lead people to
restore the h u m a n order of justice and to u n d o the harmful effects of failed
responsibilities or greivous omissions.
Relatedness between people is a fundamental fact of h u m a n existence.
T h e totality of one's relationships with others and the possibility of such
relationships enables a person to not only exist in an e n v i r o n m e n t but
also to participate in c o m m u n i t y . Each individual bears personal respon-
sibility for his or her part in the building u p or tearing down of h u m a n
relationships. One's relationships with others can be merely tolerated, or
they can be neglected. T h e y can also be injured, and then the h u m a n
order of justice is impaired. "Existential guilt occurs when someone
injures an order of the h u m a n world whose foundations he knows and
recognizes as those of his own existence and of all c o m m o n h u m a n
existence," wrote Buber (1965, p. 127).
Just as a relationship can be injured, it can also be healed, and the
harmful effects of that injury lessened. Existential guilt is the guilt a
person incurs because of i n j u r i n g a relationship with a fellow h u m a n .
Existential guilt is present whether or not a person explicitly acknowl-
edges it, because it is not equivalent to guilt feelings; rather, it is an
intrinsic part of h u m a n relatedness, woven into the fabric of h u m a n
existence.
Buber, then, clearly distinguished existential guilt from neurotic guilt
feelings, the consequence of transgressing cultural and family taboos and
the resultant dread of p u n i s h m e n t and censure that follow.
Buber said that a psychotherapist should not encroach u p o n the guilt a
person m a y have for failures of faith and before one's God. T h i s is the
expertise of the clergy. Nor should a psychotherapist judge a person
guilty or innocent according to society and its laws. T h e legal system is
responsible for that and for determining what if any p u n i s h m e n t or
restitution is required.
Conscience helps make a person come to terms with existential guilt,
and Buber believed that every person has a conscience. Conscience is the
Andrew P. Musetto 37

capacity to put oneself at a distance, to reflect on one's actions or failures

to act, and then to posit approval or disapproval accordingly.
Conscience acts in three ways. One is to illuminate guilt, i.e., to bring it
to our awareness and acknowledgement. In a second way conscience acts
to help an individual preserve in that self-illumination, not in a tortur-
ous way, but with calm persistence. In this second way conscience helps
to prevent someone from falling prey to rationalization or denial,
repression or avoidance of one's guilt.
Finally, conscience calls for reconciliation. Having injured another, a
person is summoned to restore the human order of justice in that
relationship, to help the injured party overcome the consequences of
existential guilt. In bringing about a restoration of justice one promotes
trust, and upon trust relationships are built and maintained. In a
dialogue an individual can renew a relationship with another person or
heal a damaged one. Reconciliation constructively fulfills the loyalties
that bind and pervade families and societies. Through healing, we help
bridge whatever chasms separate one person from another, parents from
children, one generation from the next.
Buber urged the psychotherapist to reach out beyond familiar methods
and established theories in order to be able to help people with existential
guilt, not only with neurotic guilt feelings. While relieving neurotic guilt
feelings is helpful, working with a person's existential guilt is an attempt
to try to bring about a further, more profound healing than would
otherwise be possible.

CONCLUSION

The psychotherapist may be put off by Buber's writing style, which is

complex, poetical, and abstract. The psychotherapist may avoid Buber's
ideas because they are philosophically oriented or because they clash with
traditional theories and approaches to therapy. This may be true espe-
cially regarding existential guilt. The therapist may find Buber's thinking
too demanding or too idealistic. The pragmatic clinician will not find
practical, step-by-step solutions to therapeutic problems in Buber's writ-
ings.
In a sense, all of these criticisms are true. Buber was concerned with
concrete human living, and he appreciated the ambiguity, mystery, and
uniqueness of people. His esoteric manner of expression reflects this.
Buber's ideas are certainly philosophical and unorthodox, but then he
was concerned not with reaffirming established and common wisdom, but
with achieving basic insights into the human condition, even if they
38 Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy

contradict what most of us think or w o u l d like to believe. Buber's writing

does not offer a specific guide to therapy or life, but that is because Buber
was not p r o n e to accept facile solutions to chronic and vexing h u m a n
problems. Buber believed in healing. H e believed that healing can take
place between people, if they are willing to endure the personal presence,
c o m m i t m e n t , and at times self-sacrifice that is required. Buber, too, was
idealistic, in the sense that he believed that " m a n as m a n can be
redeemed" (Buber, 1965, p. 78), that people could go beyond their
apparent limitations or worn out ways of acting. But this too requires
m u c h effort.
Finally, I believe that Buber as a person has something to say to
psychotherapists. People often come to therapy with vague complaints.
Frequently, these individuals are out of touch or in conflict with them-
selves; their words and actions contradict each other. T h e y say one thing
with their words; another, with their actions. T h e y d o n ' t stand behind
what they say they believe in, and they act in ways that they protest is out
of their control. Whatever the u n d e r l y i n g reasons for this, the fact of
incongruity and contradiction is painful and self-defeating for them and
confusing to their therapists. In contrast, Buber stands as an example of
congruity; his life matched his words. As such, as a personal model, if not
as a theoretician, Buber has considerable relevance for psychotherapy.

REFERENCES

Buber, M. I and thou. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

Buber, M. The knowledge of man. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
Boszormenyi-Nagy, I. 8c Spark, G. M. Invisible loyalties. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
Bowen, M. "Principles and techniques of multiple family therapy." In P. Guerin, (Ed.),
Family therapy: theory and practice. New York: Gardner Press, 1976.
Friedman, M. S. Martin Buber, the life of dialogue. New York; Harper and Row, 1955.
Karpel, M. "Individuation: from fusion to dialogue." Family Process, 1976, 15, 65-82.
Minuchin, S. Families and family therapy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1974.
Stierlin, H. Psychoanalysis and family therapy. New York: Jason Aronson, 1977.

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