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Poetics Today
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Telling in Time (I):
Chronology and Narrative Theory
Meir Sternberg
Poetics and Comparative Literature, Tel Aviv
All I wish is, that it may be a lesson to the world, "to let
people tell their stories their own way." Laurence Sterne,
Tristram Shandy
Poetic.s Today 11:4 (Winter 1990). Copyright ? 1990 by The Porter Institute for
Poetics and Semiotics. (:(:( 0333-5372/90/$2.50.
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902 Poetics Today 1 1:4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 903
1. The two lines have even been correlated or, still more incredibly, identified at
the hands of antilinearists. For example, "It is obvious that the closer the structure
of a narrative conforms to causal-chronological sequence, the closer it corresponds
to the linear temporal order of language" (Frank 1981: 235). Or, "We read nar-
ratives one word after another, and in this sense all narratives are chronological
sequences" (Smitten and Daghistany 1981: 13). (Cf. the definition of "the sign as
well as the sentence and all larger units of discourse" as "primarily narrative" in
Scholes [1974: 17].) To the background of such tie-ups (the norms behind the
fusion and confusion of linearities) we shall return; see for now Sternberg (1990).
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904 Poetics Today 11:4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 905
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906 Poetics Today 11 :4
the theory of these forms has suffered from much the same omissions
and commissions as that of time.
For instance, take the loaded contrast between "spatial" and non-
spatial narratives, or its equivalent in the antithesis, attacked by Booth
(1961) but lately drawn anew, between what Jamesians called narra-
tives with and without a point of view. Given that in narrative some-
thing happens somewhere as well as sometime, could any narrative
(even if it would, or however orderly) do otherwise than extend its
referents and meanings in space? If so, doesn't the restrictive use of
the term "spatial" just express a preference for a certain, supposedly
antitemporal mode of spatiality? Likewise, since narrative entails sub-
jectivity, the talk about the presence or absence of point of view-or,
more recently, of the narrator-boils down to the favoring of a certain
narrative stance, duly polarized. Indeed, why should space, or per-
spective, stand opposed and rise superior to time at all? Why ally them,
conversely, with telling out of time? Again, is it an accident that, like
chronology, omniscient narration is both the least valued and the least
explored mode in its field-regardless of their currency among story-
tellers old and new? Is it an accident, further, that omniscience looks
most compatible with chronology, if only because the all-knowing nar-
rator has timely access to the whole truth, so that he can tell without
gaps? Or, how is it that the theory of reported discourse echoes tem-
poral theory in package-dealing form and function? Thus, the wide-
spread but false claim that direct quotation merely serves to reproduce
("copy") the original event, while the free indirect style operates to the
higher ends of irony or ambiguity, is a precise counterpart to the roles
and values generally assigned to the orderly versus disorderly forms
of telling.
This will suggest the magnitude and the unity in variety of the prob-
lems left or created along the broad front of narrative. Yet their very
family resemblance also argues for a different kind of theory, which
has actually withstood some of the tests and promises to meet others
by treating narrative notjust as a rule-governed but as a role-governed
discourse, a flexible interplay of means and ends in communication.
Here is not the place to detail the methodology or its history, which in
certain respects goes as far back as the implications of Aristotle's Poet-
ics. For the moment, let me say only that the cumulative results of my
own earlier inquiries into the cruxes mentioned above (e.g., on space,
see 1970, 1978: esp. 203-34; 1981, 1984; on narrative models and om-
niscience, 1978: 246-306; 1985: 58ff.; on reported discourse, 1982a,
1982b, 1986), as well as into time proper, would seem to invite ex-
tension and integration in terms of an overall functionalist approach.
So would certain new developments and ongoing reorientations in
other fields concerned with discourse, though not (or, optimistically,
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Sternberg ? Telling in Time 907
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908 Poetics Today 11 :4
2. Even relative to the position in the earlier (and, significantly, less theoretical)
context of Genette, where he is satisfied to affirm that "the order long consid-
ered natural is nothing but one order among others" (1969: 221). The line strik-
ingly hardens in time along with the theory; and it undergoes further hardening
at the hands of disciples, fellow Structuralists, or even outsiders (see notes 3 and
18, below).
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Sternberg ? Telling in Time 909
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910 Poetics Today 11 :4
4. For some discussion and references, see Clark and Clark (1977: 506-8). One
might arguably extend this rule so far as to build it into narrative competence
at large. Among other support, take the conclusion drawn in Labov (1972) from
an empirical study of adolescent and adult as well as preadolescent narrators.
Throughout their performances, he finds, "the clauses are characteristically in
temporal sequence," reflecting "a linear series of events which are organized in
the narrative in the same order as they occurred" (ibid.: 360, 378). This would be
less characteristic of literary than of the oral-spontaneous narration with which
Labov is concerned. Still, such findings are applicable to a large part of the overall
narrative corpus (system, activity), and also, less simply, generalizable about the
rest as a presumption of narrative discourse in the telling and the reading. As it
stands, of course, Labov's idea of limiting narrative by definition to orderly nar-
rative (spelled out in Reinhart [1985]) goes to an extreme comparable, though
opposed, to Genette's.
5. "I walk, Pierre has come are for me minimal forms of narrative, and inversely the
Odyssey or the Recherche is only, in a certain way, an amplification (in the rhetorical
sense) of statements such as Ulysses comes home to Ithaca or Marcell becomes a writer"
(Genette 1980: 30; see also 1983: 14-15). Within this single-clause / single-event
minimum, obviously, all manipulations of order are ruled out. More often, the
minimum postulated by scholars rises to two events. But their sequential mobility
remains at best limited, in fact as well as in principle-and some would even con-
sider this an understatement about the minimum anld well beyond it. Thus Labov,
generalizing from his body of evidence, would introduce orderly sequence into
the definition itself: "We can define a minimal narrative as a sequence of two clauses
which are temporally ordered: that is, a change in their order will result in a change
in the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation" (1972: 360). For
other discussions of minimal narrative, see Prince (1973: 16-37; 1982: 1-4) and
Scholes (1974: 95-96).
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 911
6. Including lapses with regard to their own statements about the corpus as well
as to the corpus itself. For example, in excluding chronology from the picture, his-
torical manifestations and all, (enette forgets two of his own inclusive moves. One,
already noted, is the principled insistence on the mini-(hi)stories of everyday life
as not only a part but even the basis and model of narrative. Yet, among the fea-
tures extrapolated from this minimal paradigm, sequence finds no place, except
obliquely, under the incongruous category of "tense" (1980: 30-31). The other
move shows up in the recurrent formula "real or fictitious" (e.g., ibid.: 25, 27, 87,
161, 198), likewise designed to subsume the whole of narrative under the theory
but never going much beyond a gesture. In fact, so far from gaining anything like
equal attention, let alone equal status, the "real" branch occasionally appears to
make the "fictitious" stand out by contrast (e.g., ibid.: 208, 213), and usually, as
here, just disappears.
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912 Poetics Today 11 :4
7. Compare the opposite exclusion of the fictional (and less explicitly, of written
and nonverbal narrative even where factual, like history writing) by (socio)linguistic
fiat. "We define narrative as one method of recapitulating past experience by
matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is in-
ferred) actually occurred" (Labov 1972: 359-60). Narrative is natural narrative,
natural narrative refers through language to actual events, and actual events
(re)appear in proper sequence. Of these different restrictive postulations, that con-
cerning "actuality" is the most arbitrary because least motivated even by the em-
pirics and logic which govern the discipline itself. Not only do we tell one another
fictions as well as lies, but they may well meet the rest of the criteria postulated:
naturalness, verbalization, sequentiality. And if they do vary from recapitulated
actualities in sequence, it would surely be important to know the extent, the man-
ner, and the reason of the variance-as important as it would be for students of
fiction to learn the reverse and for students of narrative to work out the overall
picture.
8. For example, as Barthes does in his open contempt for "readerly texts," pre-
dictably characterized by their insistence on "internal chronology ('this happens
before or after that')" and subjection to "the logico-temporal order" (1974: 16). This
despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that "they make up the enormous mass
of our literature," while the "writerly," properly reversible text would give one "a
hard time finding it in a bookstore" (ibid.: 50, 52).
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 913
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 915
In most of the shorter and simplest forms-the fairy tale and the ballad, for
instance-the words usually follow the presumed chronological sequence of
events in the story; one thing happens and then another and then another,
and the narrative follows them in that order. But in longer and more com-
plex fictions it is difficult to make the events of the story and the order of
their telling in the narrative completely coordinate; the weightier the story's
burden of meaning, the greater the tendency towards a disjunction between
the original chronological order of the fictional events and the order in
which they appear in the narrative. This distinction is presumably related
to the fact that though the mere forward progression of the story may hold
the reader's immediate attention through suspense, it cannot satisfy the re-
fective mind when it comes to ask why an event occurred or what is the
moral significance of a character. (Watt 1981: 286)
Deeper and more widespread than may appear, then, the polarity
concerning sequence will not lend itself to translation into others. As
throughout my argument, the problem is not only or even mainly the
opposition of form to content but the marriage of form to function: of
dechronologizing to the poetic extreme (role, status, canon, meaning,
interest) and of chronologizing to the nonpoetic. Disordering accord-
ingly comes to figure as an automatic marker, even a measure, of
properly narrative behavior and value.
That is why historical and history-like ordering presents such an
awkward fact to theorists of this stripe (whether or not raising their
sights to narrative in its full range and extent). Unless willing to ques-
tion, if necessary to abandon, their very basis and value scheme, they
are in effect compelled to deny (or forget or at least minimize) either
the art, literariness, poeticity, narrativity, etc. of such ordering or its
existence. As chronological content, signified, inert matter crying out
for formation by way of deformation, how can it be valuable or, em-
pirically, how can it be?
Among the leaders of French Structuralist narratology, for instance,
Genette (1980) takes the empirical line of denial, Barthes (1977) the
overtly normative. However far apart in coverage, the two proce-
dures yet converge in (de)valuation. For Barthes does take account of
history-telling, often beyond cursory glances, only to force it into a
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 917
would enjoy the full artistic honors of "logic" even amidst chronicle-
like temporality.10
Elsewhere, perhaps because Barthes does know better," his treat-
ment of this corpus switches emphasis (from "relogicizing" to "dechro-
nologizing"), along with tactics (from missing one feature to discover-
ing another), and accordingly value judgment (from minus to plus).
His essay on "Historical Discourse" (1970) thus celebrates the "friction
between two time-scales-history's and the history book's," predictably
featuring the historian's urge "to desimplify the chronological Time of
History by contrasting it with the different time-scale of the discourse
itself (document-time as we may for brevity call it); to 'dechronolo-
gize' the historical thread and restore, if only by way of reminiscence
or nostalgia, a time at once complex, parametric, and nonlinear, re-
sembling in the richness of its dimensionality the mythical time of
ancient cosmogonies, inseparable from the word of the poet or seer"
(ibid.: 148). Examples would be the harking back to the antecedents
of a new character, or prefatory glances forward by way of announc-
ing the work (ibid.: 147); or for that matter (to liven up the rather
tame, almost anticlimactic illustration offered in the argument here),
the new, "deep" perspective given by Butor's Mobile on American his-
tory through "mixing ex abrupto Indian narratives, an 1890 guidebook,
10. In fact, the chronicle itself (or the likewise plotless annal) is not an inferior
but just a different mode of organizing reality: for some attempts to trace the dif-
ference see White (1980), Danto (1985: 149-82), and, diachronically, Butterfield
(1981). But most recent students of historiography, not least the literary-minded
ones, still view this intrageneric divergence in the normative terms institutionalized
since Aristotle-just as they diminish the role of chronology within the plotted
history. Whatever else may separate them, for example, Ricoeur follows Barthes,
and allegedly Aristotle, in opposing the logical to the chronological and insisting
on "an achronological notion of narrative temporality" (1984: 38ff., 239, n. 20),
with predictable consequences for chronicle, the dynamics of chrono-logism, and
the dividing line between history and fiction.
11. For example, "For Voltaire, there is no history in the modern sense of the
word, nothing but chronologies" (Barthes 1972: 86). In discussing Michelet's La
Sorciere as a work of novelistic history, Barthes even inverts the hierarchy of time
vs. logic and attaches both to the sequence of events. "Causality is precisely what
his narrative permits him to omit, since in fiction the temporal link is always substi-
tuted for the logical link," and it is just this "primacy of the event over its material
cause . . . which it is the narrative's function to display" (ibid.: 111). Here, cau-
sality figures as temporality plus logic, temporality (and value) as narrative minus
logic. Nor is this the end of the story. By another change of mind, S/Z (1974) re-
peatedly criticizes the "readerly" or "classic" text for following "a logico-temporal
order" at the cost of reversibility. Accordingly, time and logic retain their attach-
ment to action sequences-with the difference that they have now lost their value,
together ("logico-temporal") or apart, and the substitution of the one for the other
no longer characterizes, far less recommends, fiction. By implication, however,
historiography (like readerly fictions) still follows a logico-temporal order.
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 919
even such misgivings do not, and certainly need not, carry over from
the icon as individual sign in the lexicon or as spatial sign-group to the
icon of time as a sequential combination, a narrative syntax. Thus, the
likeness between the orders of happening and telling makes a simple
and single relation, one so well defined that it would be a pity to blur
it through figurative and indiscriminate stretching to sequences other
than chronological. Further, as indicated by the wide currency of the
notion, most experts nowadays see no reason for demoting or ban-
ishing the icon in the first place. That hardly any semiotics-minded
narratologist, least of all a Genette or a Barthes (e.g., 1968), would
dream of such a thing-which is still short of denying that icons exist-
throws into relief its occurrence in regard to chronology. The icon is
as much a sign, as much dual, as much versatile, as much governed by
convention and effective in communication, as the arbitrary symbol;
it just rests and works on a different logic within the overall system.
But then isn't that precisely the case (only more so) with the iconic
syntax of chronological telling? Though I have never found the ques-
tion voiced, it surely imposes itself regardless of whether one actually
makes the comparison.
At this awkward juncture, Genette's terminology plays into his
hands, as it were, insidiously abetting the denial and oblivion of the
facts. The argument's circularity-cum-bias is both deepened and veiled
by an unfortunate ambiguity in the French term histoire: between
"history" (as a finished product, a genre of narrative discourse) and
"story" (as a reconstructed chronology, the Formalist fabula), hence
between "real" and "hypothetical" sequences of events.13 By its (con)fu-
sion of modes of existence, the terminology itself comes to invite, and
apparently legitimate, a policy of wholesale exclusion. Quite literally,
the narratives of real existence are denied "real" existence in narra-
tive because they are denied even nominal existence as "narrative."
How can history (histoire) count as narrative, even in name, where
the approach presupposes and privileges an opposition of story (his-
toire) to narrative (recit)? How can the signified "story" double as a
signifying (let alone significant) history? For that matter, how can the
13. As if this montage were not enough, Structuralists have also adopted and often
misapplied the histoireldiscours opposition in Benveniste (1971: 205-15), which re-
lates to the axis of objectivity vs. subjectivity. The results have been set forth in
Culler (1975: 197-200) and Bordwell (1985: 21-26). I would only add that once
Benveniste's axis is yoked together (or, worse, identified) with the Formalists' as
well as with common usage, histoire takes on no fewer than three references or
modes of existence: as a genre of factual discourse, as a chronology behind nairra-
tive discourse, factual or fictional, and as a plane of narration divorced from the
context of its utterance. The French term, of course, also denotes what its English
equivalent, "history," no longer does: a story of any kind.
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920 Poetics Today 1 1 :4
14. The latter equation of image and object has in effect been since withdrawn
by Genette (1983: 39), who assents to my argument (Sternberg 1982a) against
the copy theory of direct discourse-but apparently without drawing the same
conclusions about the rest of the "copies" and copy-making in general.
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 921
ance) or merge into the signified to the vanishing point. Either arbi-
trary signification or no sign but zero-sign.
The twofold reference of histoire, then, pinpoints a conceptual
blind spot, whose implications for narrative theory not only reach be-
yond time but also range from empirics to logic, methodology, even
ideology. To the latter trio we shall have occasion to return. Having
glanced at their common source or juncture, let us now proceed with
the facts of chronology that have been ruled out of existence as well
as of significance. Once the varieties of history-telling enter, any-
thing like Genette's empirical claim (less far-fetched versions included)
breaks down under the weight of the evidence-and with it, at the
very least, the basis for a comprehensive theory of narrative ordering.
I say, at the very least, because the rule of noncorrespondence in
ordering does not even govern artistic, as distinct from historical, nar-
rative. The distinction itself is fuzzy, growing more and more so with
every new insight we gain into the little-known arts of history-telling.15
By any standard, the historical genre boasts some of the masterworks
of narrative: the Bible, Herodotus's Histories, Thucydides' The Pelo-
ponnesian War, Tacitus's Annals and Histories, Snorri Sturluson's Heims-
kringla, Froissart's Chronicles, Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire come readily to mind. Hardly anyone will rank them below
yesterday's novel, and, on closer inspection at least, not so much de-
spite as owing to their mimesis of sequence. However inclined or con-
ditioned to the contrary, the attentive reader will often discover that
their very artistry benefits rather than suffers from the adherence to
the arrow of time. Beyond mere taste and intuition, moreover, the his-
tory of historiography anchors such discoveries in a bedrock of fact,
including a dynamics of form. It takes vision and craft to make large-
scale icons of time or, once made, to redesign and reanimate their
iconicity.
15. Better known now, though, to students of historiography than to those of lit-
erature. This is not the place to go into that body of work, except to say that it
has undergone notable developments in recent years and that a closer interwork-
ing with the poetics of fiction would benefit either inquiry. For some approaches
to historiography, see Gallie (1964); Scholes and Kellogg (1966); Braudy (1970);
Mink (1970); Hexter (1971); Momigliano (1977); White (1978, 1980); Butterfield
(1981); Ricoeur (1984); Sternberg (1985); see also the bibliography in Canary and
Kozici (1978). The same holds true for the study of so-called natural or every-
day narrative by linguists, sociologists, psychologists, cognitivists, most of them
working in complete isolation from literary material and methodology. Typically
enough, to repeat, Labov (1972) excludes by definition (not just, like the standard
work on historiography, by training) the whole realm of the fictional, as his oppo-
site numbers in poetics do that of the factual: this symmetry of exclusion, carrying
over to the sequences and the media posited, reflects in miniature the fragmentary
state of the art.
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 923
16. In terms of ideology, again, the creative force of all making as pattern-making
and sense-making resurfaces in the critique of Russian Formalism by Bakhtin /
Medvedev: "Life, the aggregate of defined actions, events, or experiences, only
becomes plot [siuzhet], story [abula], theme, or motif once it has been refracted
through the prism of the ideological environment, only once it has taken on con-
crete ideological flesh. Reality that is unrefracted and, as it were, raw is not able
to enter into the content of literature" (1985 [1928]: 17)-or, for that matter, of
historiography. In fact, when it comes to the question of chrono-logical ordering
as making, the negative attitude to history and history-like telling rests on two
opposite grounds: that, artistically, the tale is ill made or not made at all (because
a simple mirror or replica of given continuities), and that, ideologically, it is too
well made (because too orderly to be real, realistic, or anything but made-up). This
belongs to a later part of my story; yet need I point out how extremes meet again,
only to highlight afresh the curious drives behind the theorizing about time in
narrative, time and narrative?
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924 Poetics Today 1 1 :4
scending ("falling"), all joined rather than opposed to the official order
because they promote the thematic sense of what happened or hap-
pens in time. Millennia before, however, we find Thucydides cross-
cutting, in the guise of simultaneity, between different events of the
same winter or summer to counterpoint, say, Athens with Sparta; or
modelling their struggle (as Cornford [1971 (1907)] has brilliantly
shown) on Aeschylean tragedy. Again, consider Herodotus's digres-
sions, as strategic as Homer's, whether in their leisureliness and timing
amidst conflict, their intercultural lights, or simply the pleasure they
take and give in the wide world. Not least impressive is the Bible's
management and orchestration of its grand chronology from Gene-
sis to Kings, which I shall trace in a sequel as a generic paradigm, a
canon-length icon of time from Creation to Exile, devised by a poetics
anything but transparent within a culture otherwise hostile to images.
However diverse, such master narratives all exemplify the rule of
history-telling, even at its more conventional and businesslike. And
because of their diversity, they also suggest the range of variation be-
hind or below the rule. To the extent that art thrives on difficulty or
that ars est celare artem, one might even raise the question of whether
these interplays of unity and variety-constraint and freedom, tex-
tual and subtextual design-are not potentially subtler, more artistic,
than the open ruptures of anachrony. But it is certain that they have
their own manner as well as matter of composition, which would repay
study apart from all judgment and labelling. That study has nowa-
days become more urgent than ever, due to the intersection of the
old antichronologism of narrative theory, pushed to the limit, and the
new loss of confidence in historiography, with a predictable shift of
interest from historical truth to poetic issues, such as narrativity, in-
ventiveness, figuration, rhetoric. A recent article thus bears the title
"The Challenge of Poetics to (Normal) Historical Practice" (Berkhofer
1988), not without reason, yet in an overtrusting spirit, as though
"Poetics" had all the answers or even all the questions relevant to the
structure of historiography. On the whole, the questions and answers
it has best developed so far are fruitfully applicable to the cinema, for
instance, but least suited to the historical genre-along with history-
like mimesis-and themselves require adjustment in its light. To look
to them for guidance by way of application, here of all places and now
of all times, is to ask the one-eyed to lead the way on his blind side.
Rather, the challenge also needs to go in the opposite direction, so as
to establish a two-way traffic between the fields. And regarding the
crux of arrangement, the few examples just cited will suggest, I hope,
the gains that this traffic promises. Far from an obstacle to properly
artistic narration, as "poetics" would have (hi)story-tellers believe, such
chronologies, with their hidden workings, can teach poetics a good
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 925
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926 Poetics Today 11 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 927
vergence within Homeric epic itself. For the Iliad would then have
inaugurated the chronological line of arrangement in "our (Western)
literary tradition," the Odyssey the nonchronological. Either way, ori-
gins and later fortunes would combine with the results before us, as
they have steadily accumulated from antiquity to modernity, to estab-
lish the empirical conclusion: that literature (or literariness) no more
inheres in twisted than in straight deployment. Like all attempts of
this kind to fix the unfixable, within or without narrative, the erection
of disordering into a formal marker (locus, constant, guarantor) of
poetic discourse is doomed to failure.
What is more, this still holds true if, for the sake of argument, we
restrict the corpus to (literary) fiction alone. Strangely, when looking
round for narrative that "conforms, at least in its major articulations,
to chronological order," Genette comes up with a single, hence "excep-
tional" branch of fiction-folklore-and apparently forgets the rest.18
A wonderful act of amnesia, this, because the rest so abounds all round
us-in written as well as oral discourse, in canonical and popular art,
in literary and dramatic and cinematic narrative-so much so that it
is hard to say offhand which of the two fictional groups, the "con-
formist" or the "nonconformist," outnumbers the other. Whatever the
ratio, it would surely be unthinkable to disqualify either group whole-
sale (or otherwise downgrade it, if only to the status of exception vs.
rule or zero-point vs. significance) by the mechanical application of a
time-shibboleth.
18. But then even his one-item list (an exception probably noted in deference to
Propp's law of sequence [see n. 9]) would be and has been regarded by some as
conceding too much to chronology. Those include doctrinal antagonists as well as
allies and followers. Thus, in direct response, Barbara Herrnstein Smith: "It can
be demonstrated not only that absolute chronological order is as rare in folkloric
narratives as it is in any literary tradition but that it is virtually impossible for any
narrator to sustain it in an utterance of more than minimal length. In other words,
by virtue of the very nature of discourse, nonlirnearity is the rule rather than the
exception in narrative accounts" (1980: 227). Actually, she omits to demonstrate
either the specific "rarity" or the sweeping "virtual impossibility," but the grounds
for both claims would presumably corresponid to those adduced by the hard-liniers
on the opposite side, i.e., the exigency of multiple threads and related "minor
articulations" that Genette firmly discounts for good theoretical measure (see n. 3).
So once again extremes meet in the denial of chronology. Like much else in her
counterargument, however, Smith's objection to the underlying value judgment,
and to the entelechy it would impose on narrative history, has a point. "'There
is reason," she says, "to question the propriety of that contrast between folktale
and literary tradition, especially the implication of a literary-historical progres-
sion from some presumably prehistoric naive narrative synchrony to a subsequent
more sophisticated narrative anachrony" (ibid.). The point holds, though, for a
"reason" contrary to the empirical and general premises just cited: not that folk-
tale is so anachronous, but that so much of the literary canon isn't-all part of the
tribulations of telling in time.
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928 Poetics Today 1 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 929
for its ostensible lack of resources, it would only be just to discuss the
crosscutting factors involved with special emphasis on its workings.
Take the variations in the linkage of events between the chronologi-
cal and the chronological-causal (chronicle vs. historiography, pica-
resque vs. "well-made" novel, parataxis vs. hypotaxis), or in their speci-
ficity (among scene, summary, silence). Both inherited as such from
the Greeks, Aristotle and Plato, respectively, neither distinction has yet
been sufficiently appreciated as a resource for linear dynamics, in and
out of chronology. Each, that is, needs to be carried over or projected
to the axis of narrative communication as well, along which the telling
and reading proceeds-not least where the discourse seems artless.
For example, what becomes, in the reading, of the official minimum
linkage given in the text? It makes quite a difference to sequential pro-
cessing and effect whether the paratactic line of events told (a, then b)
remains a loose series after being interpreted, as in chronicle, or re-
quires tightening and plotting into a "hypotactic" chain (a, therefore b)
for intelligibility, as do chronicle-like surfaces from the Bible to Hem-
ingway. Again, the very extent of the time-span covered by a narrative
will have repercussions of all kinds on the sequence of its coverage:
the greater the represented length, the heavier the exigencies of estab-
lishing, molding, and sustaining the long temporal perspective. This
is where one might expect the composition of the short story to vary
from the novel's; the lyric's or the ballad's from the long poem's; the
minimal from the elaborated narrative; a (real or imaginary) biogra-
phy from a family saga; an account of a battle, a reign, a conspiracy,
an uprising from a universal-national history like the Bible's or from a
survey of those immense slow-motion processes that the contemporary
Annales school of historians (e.g., Braudel 1980: 25-54) calls la longue
duree. (As early as the Poetics, chapter 5, we find a generic distinction
between tragedy, which keeps within "a single circuit of the sun," and
epic, whose action has "no fixed limit of time.") Just as the represented
length by itself makes a difference to the workings of communication
in time, so does the representational length. It is enough to think how
the problematics of connectivity and memory escalate with the shift
from a life by Plutarch or an obituary notice to a book-size version
of the same events in the same order. All the more so, clearly, with
the proportions between represented and representational time. A suc-
cession of scenes makes one reading experience, in anything from
tempo to focus-building, and alternation between scene and summary
another: selection itself doubles as a combinatory force, duration and
its proportioning always affect the sense of direction.
But then the features that still need to be recognized or integrated
as parameters of sequence, even at its most orderly, include some that
are combinatory or directional in the first place. For example, con-
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930 Poetics Today 11 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 931
disordered episodes that pull against the grand chronology from Cre-
ation to Exile, or in the tension between the workings of mind and
clock throughout Bloomsday. In either case, whole and part stand
diametrically opposed in mutual questioning, foregrounding, illumi-
nation. This makes quite a difference from their marching hand in
hand, whether clockwise or counterclockwise. Hence chronology, and
correspondingly, anachrony vary afresh with the relations between
macrosequence and microsequence, down to the level of the sentence
and the phrase.
Nor does the problem of ordering, either Odysseus's or Homer's
behind him, resolve itself with the decision to follow time. Where
precisely to begin along the chronology, where to end, still must be
determined. And here choice widens into an indefinitely large set of
possibilities, so that the actual cut-off points gain salience from all the
might-have-beens: the less predictable the cutting, the more percep-
tible. For instance, Odysseus's autobiography could run between any
two points along his career, some no less, even more, appropriate
than the limits actually fixed, hence focused and in need of motiva-
tion. Why not launch the tale from the point where the teller's career
of hardship and achievement originated-the muster for the Trojan
War, if not the Helen scandal that triggered it? -Only because, we
infer, such general textual considerations as roundness have given
way before contextual motives and designs. Considering Odysseus's
anxiety to impress his Phaeacian audience, it does make sense for him
to start as late as his departure from Troy, crowned with the glory of
the Wooden Horse and destined to awe-inspiring adventure, rather
than with his departurefor Troy under the pressure of Agamemnon.
(He would hardly want the Phaeacians to learn, and they never do,
what Homer later discloses through Agamemnon: that the expedition
against Troy wasted a full month in Ithaca, "so hard did we find it
to win over the man who now is styled the Sacker of Cities" [Homer
1969: 354]). Just as Odysseus starts at a point later than might be
expected, so he finishes earlier: with his arrival at Calypso's island,
rather than at Phaeacia. This appears an abrupt stopping place, espe-
cially since it leaves the Phaeacian audience (except the royal house) in
the dark about all that intervened, the narrator's very presence there
included. Why, then, cut the narrative short instead of rounding it
off? As Genette observes in another connection, "The pretext is that
he told it briefly the day before to Alcinous and Arete (Book VII); the
real reason is that the reader knows it in detail by the direct narrative
in Book V. 'It liketh me not twice,' says Ulysses, 'to tell a plain-told
tale': this reluctance is, to begin with, the poet's own" (1980: 232). The
norm of economy overrides that of formal roundness.
In a larger perspective, synchronic and diachronic, such boundary-
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932 Poetics Today 11:4
19. Much the same assumptions underlie the two classic studies of closure, Smith
(1968) oni poetry and Kermode (1967) on narrative. Both approach the ending as
part of a whole that may differ in form, linear or otherwise, but not necessarily
in value: along with the openness to culture (genre, history), this makes quite a
change from stock responses to sequence. In Kermode, though, the change is not
always apparent, largely because his emphasis falls on the sense made of sequence,
without much regard to the play of narrated and narrative sequence. Consider
how the absence of the latter distinction, which had not yet (re)gained currency at
the time, may obscure matters: "The story that proceeded very simply to its obvi-
ously predestined end would be nearer myth than novel or drama. Peripetia, which
has been called the equivalent, in narrative, of irony in rhetoric, is present in every
story of the least structural sophistication" (Kermode 1967: 18). As regards the
loaded opposition of orderings, this key statement looks like an Aristotelian twin to
my earlier quote from Genette (or from Ian Watt), with "myth" replacing "folklore"
as the simple, concordant antithesis to the twists of sophisticated fiction. Except
that Kermode's "peripetia," unlike Aristotle's own, does not require a distortion of
chronology in the plotted sequence: an early withholding of story-stuff with an eye
to late disclosure. It only borrows from Aristotle the element of surprise, not the
device for producing it, which shifts from the disarrangement of plot-time to the
disappointment of expectations about plot by unsettling conventional paradigms
of time and reality in general. By this standard, though Kermode does not make
the point explicit, there is little to choose in principle between telling in and out of
time, since either may range all the way from conformity to novelty, from "simple"
advance towards an "obviously predestined end" to "sophisticated" reversal. So the
contrast of predictable vs. peripeteic sequence intersects rather than overlaps with
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 933
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934 Poetics Today 11 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 935
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936 Poetics Today 11:4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 937
20. In case the motivation sounds idiosyncratic, even for the procedure justified by
it, here is a real-life equivalent in the voice of Rousseau as autobiographer: "Before
I go further I must present my reader with an apology, or rather a justification,
for the petty details I have just been entering into, and for those I shall enter into
later, none of which may appear interesting in his eyes. Since I have undertaken
to reveal myself absolutely to the public, nothing about me must remain hidden or
obscure. I must remain incessantly beneath his gaze, so that he may follow me in
all the extravagances of my heart and into every least corner of my life. Indeed, he
must never lose sight of me for a single instant, for if he finds the slightest gap in
my story, the smallest hiatus, he may wonder what I was doing at that moment and
accuse me of refusing to tell the whole truth. I am laying myself sufficiently open
to human malice by telling my story, without rendering myself more vulnerable by
any silence" (Rousseau 1965 [1781]: 65).
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938 Poetics Today 11 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 939
at least signals one, in the eyes of its adherents, while harmony is taken
to make or this or that variant of a poetics of lucidity.21
Most generally, in inter-art terms, much the same difference sepa-
rates the icons of time from the icons of space. With spatial icons, the
visual kind above all, there is indeed no end of evidence for the "de-
light" given throughout history by "exact correspondence" in the form
of mimesis, realism, naturalism, illusionism. Ancient Greece, where
the mimetic revolution arose, has bequeathed us the legend about the
birds that pecked at the grapes in the paintings of Zeuxis; or the Aris-
totelian law, pointedly illustrated from the spatial arts, that "universal
is the pleasure felt in things imitated," so much so that even "objects
which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when
reproduced with minute fidelity, such as the forms of the most ignoble
animals and of dead bodies." In the light of experience across the
millennia since, Aristotle would indeed seem to have formulated here
a universal law of humanity at beholding, shared by many beholders
who otherwise incline toward arbitrary or disharmonious represen-
tation-as Aristotle himself does in ranking the twisted ("complex")
above the orderly ("simple") sequence. (A modern equivalent would be
Roland Barthes, fascinated and inspired by the photographic image
[e.g., 1977: 15-78], hostile and blind to the chronographic.) The im-
balance or inversion of the attitude to mimesis between the two arts
reflects not only the prejudgment that chronologizing comes easily, but
also the better-founded inverse: that capturing the visible (or "true"
visible) world comes hard, with merit and pleasure attached to the
achievement as such. Here, in some measure at least, mimesis remains
self-directed and self-justifying vis-a-vis the rest of poesis.
In this respect, even the domain of the iconic interestingly sub-
divides in functional terms, according to the extension of the twofold
sign(s) in time or in space. The rule that making (designs, interests,
sense) comes before matching (the signifier with the signified) governs
plot-making in chronological order to a considerably higher degree
than it does image-making in exact likeness-which may well resolve
the apparent paradox that the Bible originates both the art of histori-
ography and the rage for iconoclasm.
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940 Poetics Today 1 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 941
to mention the interaction with the rest of the text's components, from
language to theme). Third, narrative may bring to bear or converge on
chronology, as it may on anachrony, a range of ordering forces other
than either. Whether the convergence proves to be harmonious (and
so mutually reinforcing) or disharmonious, it is always enriching and
revealing because always held among alternative patterns of sequence.
Principled yet generally neglected (and the one exception, supra-
sequential or "spatial" form, misunderstood), these alternatives or
complements to the two master strategies all deserve far more atten-
tion than I can give them here. Some have been developed elsewhere,
though, and most will be taken up at various places below. (For ex-
ample, the issues of functional sequencing and of suprasequentiality
will reappear soon under the rubric of narrative logic; that of simul-
taneity or multilinear narration, in a later part of this series devoted
to the Bible as a case study.) What immediately follows is only meant
to round out my empirical argument a bit by mapping those forces
onto the agenda for a general theory of ordering.
The narrative of simultaneity gets typically consigned to insignifi-
cance, if not silence (e.g., Genette's dismissive reference to "hetero-
diegesis," presumably another of the "minor articulations"), as though
its sequencing were unsystematic, undistinctive, unvaried, and just a
matter of multiplying by the number of its parallel lines the essen-
tial features of a single line. In fact, it could hardly occupy a more
remarkable position, and not by virtue of statistical frequency alone.
That frequency, verging on omnipresence, is itself an index of the ex-
tent to which multilinear action finds its mimesis in narrative because
it attaches to the way of the world. And once we consider the mimesis,
it shows itself peculiar in the form as well as the object of sequencing,
in matter and hence in manner.
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942 Poetics Today 1 :4
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Sternberg ? Telling in Time 943
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944 Poetics Today 11 :4
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Sternberg * Telling in Time 945
tation, from physical length all the way to pure teleology, demand
careful study. So do the key questions of where and how and why
they interact among themselves-the telling in or out of time in-
cluded among the rest-during the process of communication. Narra-
tive theory can least afford to neglect them, on pain of dooming itself
to scratching the surface, nor can it handle them by way of reduction
to its favorite (and favoritist) dualism of chronology versus anach-
rony. The repertoire of options for making or breaking the sense of
narrative discourse as process is just too multiform, too interrelated,
too principled and powerful to undergo either fate, neglect or reduc-
tion, without reprisals. Across the entire field, there is much more
to time than sequence, more to sequence than time, more to tempo-
ral sequence than departures from chronology, more to departures
from chronology themselves than automatic violation-and-value, more
to each and all of these than any typological, let alone ready-made,
binary scheme can ever cover or discover in narrative.
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