Shell U.K.

Limited

21st July 2009 Report : EP200907328245

Filing key :

HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT

REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY
SCAFFOLDING ON OFFSHORE
FACILITIES
FINAL REPORT
First Issue

Keywords:

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HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING ON
OFFSHORE FACILITIES Page i

Distribution List
Name Reference

EP200907328245 July 2009

Page ii HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING
ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES

Authorised For Issue

Prepared by; Accepted by;

Signed : Signed :

Chris Grant (EPE-P-FP) Chris Wilson (EPE-P-ED)

Field Productivity Team Safety Engineering Team Leader

Reviewed by;

Alan Sherriff (EPE-P-ED)

Philip Brunton (EPE-S-HU)

July 2009 EP200907328245

HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING ON
OFFSHORE FACILITIES Page iii

Contents

BACKGROUND............................................................................................................. 4

PURPOSE OF HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT ....................................................... 5

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................... 5

ACTION CLOSE-OUT ................................................................................................... 5

ATTACHMENTS............................................................................................................ 6

APPENDIX 1 WORKSHEETS

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ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES

BACKGROUND
A Lean/Kaizen event was held on Brent Charlie during September 2008 which
established a number of improvement opportunites to improve HSE risk exposure
and efficiency of platform scaffolding operations. In summary these opportunities
included better planning, reduced manual handling and transportation wastes due to
more strategic storage of materials and also the use of alloy scaffold materials.

Brent Charlie had previously been testing an alloy system scaffold however the
Kaizen event established this was not fot for purpose due to its fixed dimensions and
as a result the use alloy scaffold tube was identified and developed as an opportunity.

Susequent performance tracking and analysis has demonstrated the improvements

on Brent Charlie have reduce carrying of materials by 50% and the overall task time
per m3 of scaffold has reduced by 32%.

July 2009 EP200907328245

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OFFSHORE FACILITIES Page 5

PURPOSE OF HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT

st
A hazard identification (HAZID) exercise and risk assessment was completed on 1
July 2009 at Tullos, Aberdeen. The purpose of this HAZID/risk assessment was to
determine what hazards there are associated with using aluminium alloy scaffolding
systems offshore compared to the current practice of using steel scaffolding
systems.

A brainstorming session was used to prompt discussion of potential hazards. The

potential consequences and effects of these hazards were considered along with
the controls in place to manage them and a qualitative assessment was made of the
residual risks with these controls in place

The following personnel attended the HAZID:

Name Role
Chris Wilson Safety Engineering Team Leader
Chris Grant Field Productivity Team
Scott Fraser Brent Operations Support
Andy Fairnie SORT4 Delivery Manager (Brent)
Roger Esson SORT4 Delivery Manager (CNNS)
Hamid Iravani Corrosion Engineer
Keith Greenwood Sort 4 SHEQC Advisor

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A number of safety concerns about the use of aluminium alloy scaffolding in an
offshore environment were addressed during the HAZID and risk assessement. The
worksheets recording the discussion from the HAZID and risk assessment are
included as Appendix 1. A presentation prepared by SORT4 addressing some of
the safety concerns raised is attached to the document.

It was concluded from the risk assessment that there are no safety reasons why
aluminium alloy scaffolding should not be used on offshore facilities provided the
controls identified in the worksheets are adhered to. This primarily concerns the use
of scaffolding systems in Zone 1 hazardous areas and areas where it could be
exposed to mecury contamination.

ACTION CLOSE-OUT
The following actions were raised during the HAZID and risk assessment session.

Responsibility for the close-out of the actions rests with Roger Esson, SORT4
Delivery Manager with Chris Grant, Field Productivity Team acting as close-out co-
ordinator. Unless otherwise agreed with the co-ordinator, all actions should be
st
targeted for completion by 1 September 2009.

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ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES

ATTACHMENTS
Presentation prepared by SORT4 addressing concerns raised about the use of
aluminuium alloy scaffolding systems in an offshore environment.

Scaffold Alum
Alloy.ppt (Compr...

July 2009 EP200907328245

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OFFSHORE FACILITIES Page 7

APPENDIX 1

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORKSHEETS

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HAZARD
Incendive sparking
Incendive sparking is
initiated by an exothermic
reduction of iron oxide (in the
form of rust) by aluminium
particles. Three basic
mechanisms produce the
pre-requisite conditions for
incendive sparking. The first
is single impact sparking and
requires relatively high
energy (minimum 300
Joules). Subsequent impact
sparking may occur from
striking a previously
deposited aluminium smear
resulting from an earlier
impact of an aluminium
object on a rusted steel
surface. This mechanism is
the most probable as it
requires much lower impact
energies (1-5 Joules) to
initiate the spark. The third
mechanism is friction
sparking. This type of
sparking is most unlikely to
occur as the temperature
caused by sparking are
July 2009
POTENTIAL CONTROLS
CONSEQUENCES
Ignition risk in As per rcommended guidance in
flammable gas Hazardous Are Code IP15
environment “Standards for electrical and non-
electrical equipment for use in
hazardous areas place
restrictions on the use of light
metals on the outside of
Ignition of other
equipment to prevent this risk. For
flammable materials
the same reason, the use of
e.g. oily rags.
aluminium ladders or scaffolding
may create an ignition source,
and this should be considered
before they are used in a Zone 1
area.”
To manage this risk it is
recommended that Cat 2 hot work
Work Control Certificate (WCC) is
used for alloy scaffold in zone 1
areas.
Alloy scaffold should not be used
in Zone 0 classified ares unless
the plant has been shutdown and
hydrocarbon free,
Any other flammable materials
e.g. oily rags should be identified
and removed prior to scaffold
erection/dismantling.
EP200907328245
RISK ASSESSMENT ACTION
Based on the controls outlined ACTION 1 Communicate
the risk of incendive spark requirement for Cat 2 Hot
igniting flammable gas cloud on Work WCC for alloy
our facilities is considered to be scaffold use in Zone 1
very low and is acceptable. areas.
Allloy scaffolding is already Risk assessment for use
being used in other areas of the of alloy in zone 1 areas to
offshore industry e.g. Norway be built in to ISSOW
and there is no evidence that system.
incendive sparking is a source
of ignition of hydrocarbon C. Grant to action with
releases. Production Services
ISSOW owners.
The main risk associated with
incendive sparking is associated
with erection and dismantling of
alloy scaffolding rather during
it’s use for work activities. This
is covered by the Cat 2 Hot
Work WCC within Zone 1 areas
for erection and dismantle only.
Once scaffold is built/in place
risk is negligible.
HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES
HAZARD
much too low to cause
ignition.
Corrosion due to salty
environment
Poor Scaffold Integrity due to
mixture of tube materials
(Variation in dynamic
properties of steel and alloy
EP200907328245
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POTENTIAL CONTROLS RISK ASSESSMENT ACTION
CONSEQUENCES
Degradation of The oxide coating formed on Any degredation of the alloy will Incorporate guidance in to
material leading failure Aluminium and its alloys makes be a slow process. Any signs of SORT4 procedures on
which could lead to them resistant to corrosion. corrosion will be picked up by how to identify corroded
possible collapse of Surface damage to the oxide routine inspections before it alloy tubes that need to be
scaffolding coating is self repairing. becomes critical. taken out of service.
Visual inspections of erected Alloy corrosion rates are
structures are carried out weekly. ACTION Roger Esson
significantly smaller than those
for steel tube in an offshore
Materials are inspected at time of
environment. E.g. 7g/m2 alloy
build and dismantle.
versus 933g/m2 steel over an 8
Damaged materials are year period.
quarantined. Inspection carried
out by competent person.
Erected structures have a
maximum 2 year build life.
Tube conforms to European
standards for temporary
structures.
Users conform to scaff tag and
erected scaffold register systems.
Failure of scaffold Steel tube and Aluminium tube With adequate training, the Incorporate guidance in to
structure with potential shall not be mixed during Scaffold obvious weight difference SORT4 procedures to
injury to personnel construction. between steel and alloy tubes ensure tube materials are
and damage to and inspection of the build not mixed
In a designed scaffold where
should ensure the risk is very
July 2009
Page 10 HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES
HAZARD
tubing)
Corrosion due to dissimilar
metals, alloy tube and steel
fitting fittings
Human Factors –An erected
alloy structure feels different to
steel structure to walk on
Manual handling issues due to
perceived additional material
requirements
July 2009
POTENTIAL CONTROLS
CONSEQUENCES
equipment ladder beams are used, Scaffold
Design Engineer sign off is
required. This applies to scaffold
structures used as lifting frames.
Scaff tag system should identify
any build issues.
Failure of scaffold Scaffold is a temporary structure
structure with potential and Company procedures specify
injury to personnel and that the erection time should not
damage to equipment exceed two years.
Visual inspections of erected
structures are carried out weekly.
Materials are inspected at time of
build and dismantle.
Damaged materials are
quarantined. Inspection carried
out by competent person.
Personnel feel unsafe Communication, familiarisation
or uncomfortable and understanding of the new
system.
Unfamiliar with build Scaffold structures constructed in
requirements and use line with contractor procedures –
of alloy tubing alloy bay sizes are the same as
EP200907328245
RISK ASSESSMENT
low.
Historical use of alloy lifting
beams and alloy lifting beams
and system scaffold on Brent
Charlie has not identified any
corrosion problems if the
scaffold is dismantled within
this timeframe.
Introducing a sampled
inspection of fittings, as part of
the weekly scaff tag
recertification process, should
ensure the risk is managed.
Genuine concern which needs
to be address through staff
engagement
Brent Charlie pilot use analysis
shows material carry time has
been reduced by 50% and
ACTION
ACTION Roger Esson
Confirm Alloy/Steel
corrosion is not an issue
with the controls in place
via Draugen experience.
ACTION Andy Fairnie
Incorporate guidance in to
SORT4 procedures to
monitor any corrosion at
tube/fitting interface as
part of inspections. This
should continue until we
can assure ourselves this
is not an issue.
ACTION Roger Esson
Incorprate in to SORT4
Q&A engagement pack
ACTION Roger Esson
Review locations of
scaffold storage racks to
ensure proximity to
HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES
HAZARD
Manual handling issues due to
an increased number of alloy
tubes being carried
Alloy tube corrosion while in
storage
EP200907328245
POTENTIAL CONTROLS
CONSEQUENCES
steel scaffold bays. This means
the number of materials is the
same, therefore no extra manual
handling.
Injury to personnel The use of Aluminium tube
caused by carrying too reduces the Manual Handling
many tubes (which are impacts, as the Aluminium tube is
much lighter than approximately one third the
steel) density of steel.
Tubes may be slippery Introducing guidance/caps on
when wet
number of tubes to be carried.
Site supervision to ensure rules
are adhered to.
Envrionmental conditions should
be assessed as part of worksite
task risk assessment.
Non slip gloves such as Showa
310 or 377 should be used
accoding to wearther conditions.
Failure of scaffold The occurrence of salts,
structure with potential especially chlorides marginally
injury to personnel reduces durability but Aluminium
July 2009
Page 11
RISK ASSESSMENT
overall task time reduced by
30% through the use of alloy
tube and strategic storage
locations.
Alloy tube 30% of steel weight.
With adequate training and
supervision the risk is very low.
Any degredation of the alloy will
be a slow process. Any signs of
corrosion will be picked up by
ACTION
worksite.
Incorporate alloy bay size
guidance in to SORT4
procedures and
commincate requiremts
with offshore scaffolder
staff
ACTION Roger Esson
Incorporate in to training &
awareness session to
provide guidance on
number of tubes to be
carried.
ACTION Roger Esson
Incorporate guidance in to
SORT4 procedures on
how to identify corroded
Page 12 HAZID AND RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE USE OF ALLOY SCAFFOLDING ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES
HAZARD
Degradation of Alloy scaffold
tube due to exposure to liquid
nitrogen
Degradation of Alloy scaffold
tube due to exposure to
mercury
Erosion of Alloy scaffold tube
due to exposure to blasting
activities
July 2009
POTENTIAL CONTROLS
CONSEQUENCES
and damage to is generally better than Carbon
equipment Steel
See above corrosion mitigation.
Failure of scaffold N2 spreads bunded as per
structure with potential procedures
injury to personnel and
damage to equipment N2 spread bund is non load
bearing
Failure of scaffold Hydrorcarbon systems are
structure with potential flushed and purged prior to any
injury to personnel and breaching.
damage to equipment
Mercury test are carried out prior
to any vessel entry activities.
Any alloy tube exposed to
hydrocarbon spills should be
removed and inspected.
Link to ISSOW controls.
Failure of scaffold Control measures in place for
structure with potential blasting to prevent damage
injury to personnel caused by inadvertent blasting of
EP200907328245
RISK ASSESSMENT
routine inspections before it
becomes critical
Very low likelihood of liquid
nitrogen coming in to contact
with alloy scaffold due to bund
design.
Based on the controls outlined
the risk of significant mercury
exposue on our facilities is
considered to be very low and is
acceptable.
Allloy scaffolding is already
being used in other areas of the
offshore industry e.g. Norway
and there is no evidence that
Mercury exposure is an issue.
Task risk assessment and site
contols ensure scaffold
structures are not exposed to
ACTION
alloy tubes that need to be
taken out of service.
ACTION Roger Esson
None required.
Incorporate guidance in to
SORT4 procedures on
how to identify corroded
alloy tubes that need to be
taken out of service.
SORT4 to verify impact of
Mercury impact on alloy
tubing based on exposure
levels on Shell
installations by end of
August 2009.
In the interim, special
precautions should be
taken to ensure no
mercury spills occur.
ACTION Roger Esson
None required.
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HAZARD POTENTIAL CONTROLS RISK ASSESSMENT ACTION

CONSEQUENCES
and damage to the scaffold tubes blasting.
equipment
If any tube is blasted the job
should be stopped and structure
inspected.

Visual inspections of erected

structures are carried out weekly.
Damaged materials are
quarantined. Inspection carried
out by competent person.

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July 2009 EP200907328245