CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
COR JESU COLLEGE OF LAW 36) Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 [1997]
Civil Procedure
Atty. Victoriano D. Alabastro
I. General Principles
Concept of Remedial Law; Substantive Law Distinguished
from Remedial Law; Power of the Supreme Court; Nature
of Philippine Courts; Principle of Hierarchy of Courts;
Doctrine of Judicial Courtesy; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of Courts
II. Rule 1 to 5
1) Bustos vs. Lucero, GR N o. L-2068, 08/20/1948;
2) First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, GR No.
110571, 03/10/1994;
3) Albert vs. University Publishing, GR N o. L-19118,
01/30/1965
4) Ateneo vs. De La Rosa, G.R. No. L-286,
03/28/1946
5) Jose vs. Javellana, GR No. 158239, 01/25/2012,
citing De Los Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat
6) CIR v. Migrant Pagbilao Corp., GR No. 159593,
10/12/2006
7) Sarmiento v. Zaratan, GR 167471, 02/05/2007)
8) Cu-Unjieng v. CA, 479 SCRA 594
9) Mindanao Savings Loan Asso. vs. Vicenta Vda.
De Flores, 469 SCRA 416
10) Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago, GR 170354,
07/30/2006
11) Phil. Economic Zone Authority vs. Carates, GR
 No. 181274, 07/23/2010
12) Mapagay vs. people, GR No. 178984, 08/19/2009
13) US v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321
14) Miaque vs. Patag, GR Nos. 1790609-13,
01/30/2009
15) Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, GR No.
211356, 09/29/2014
16) PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, 358
Phil. 38, 62 [1998]
17) Do-All Metals Industries vs. Security Bank Corp.,
GR No. 176339, 01/10/2011
18) Lhuillier vs. British Airways, GR No. 171092,
03/15/2010
19) UCPB vs. Ongpin, GR No. 146593, 10/26/2001
20) Go vs. Cordero, GR No. 164703, 05/04/2010
21) Kukan International Corp. v. Reyes, GR No.
182729, 09/29/2010
22) Monsanto v. Lim and De Guzman, GR No.
178911, 09/17/2014
23) Omictin vs. CA, GR 148004, January 22, 2007
24) Sps. Fajardo vs. Flores, GR No. 167891,
01/15/2010
25) Abad vs. RTC Manila, 10/12/1987
26) Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96
27) Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291
28) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Heirs of Vda. De
Ventura, GR No. 151800, 1105/2009).
29) Lanting vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 141426,
05/06/2005
30) Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, 0916/1998
31) Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 282 SCRA 328 [1988]
32) Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 90529,
08/16/1991
33) Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 16160,
07/13/2010
34) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc, 374 SCRA
691 [2002
35) ii. Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207
37) Layno vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 Scra 536 [1985]
38) Bernardo vs. Heirs of Villegas, GR No. 183357,
03/15/2010
39) BF Citiland Corp. vs. Otake, GR No. 173351,
07/29/2010
40) Villagracia v. Fifth Shari‘a District Court and
Mala, GR No. 188832, April 23, 2014
41) Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corp., GR No. 138822,
01/23/2001; Bayer Phil., Inc. vs. CA, GR No.
109269, 09/15/2000
1) Marcos-Araneta vs. CA, GR No. 154096,
08/22/2008
2) Fortune Motors, Inc. vs. CA, GR No. 76431,
10/16/1989
3) Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, GR
161417, February 8, 2007:
4) Lucas vs. Lucas, GR No. 190710, 06/06/2011
5) Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, GR No. 82330, 05/31/1988
6) Chua vs. Metrobank, GR No. 182311, 08/19/2009
7) Ma-ao Sugar Central v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 666
8) Vda. De Manalo vs. CA, 402 Phil. 152, 161 [2001]
9) Montañer vs. Shari‘a District Court, GR No.
174975, 01/20/2009
10) Marquez v. Varela, 92 Phil. 373
11) Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David,
468 SCRA 63
12) Santos v. de Leon, 470 SCRA 455
13) Zepeda v. China Banking Corp., GR 172175, Oct.
9, 2006
14) Blossom Co. vs. Manila Gas Corp., GR No. 32958,
11/08/1930
15) Bachrach vs. Icaringal, 68 SCRA 287
16) Quadra vs. CA, GR 147593, 07/31/2006
17) Bacolod City vs. San Miguel, Inc., L-2513,
10/30/1969
18) Arreza vs. Diaz, 364 SCRA 88 [2001]
19) Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624
20) Samaniego vs. Aguila, 334 SCRA 438
21) De Castro vs. CA, 384 SCRA 607
22) Frias v. Judge Sorongon and First Asia Realty
Development Corp., GR No. 184827, 02/11/2015
23)  National Power Corporation v. Provincial
Government of Bataan, GR No. 180654,
04/212014
24) Clidorio v. Almanzar, GR No. 176598, 07/09/2014
25) Flores vs. Mallare-Phillips, 144 SCRA 377 [1988]
26) Republic vs. Herbieto, 459 SCRA 183
27) Lim Tan Hu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425
28) Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al, GR No. 196750,
03/11/2015
29) Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, GR No. 121171,
12/29/1998
30) Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400 [1988]
31) Lim v. Lim-Yu, 352 SCRA 216 [2001]
32) Lapanday vs. Estita, 449 SCRA 240
33) Laviña vs. CA, 171 SCRA 691
34) Lawas vs. CA, 146 SCRA 173
35) ii. Aguas vs. Llamas, 5 SCRA 959
36) Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General,
20 Phil. 523
Page 1 of 93

37) United Overseas Bank Philippines v. Roosemore
Mining & Development Corp., GR Nos. 159669
and 163521, 03/12/2007
38) Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., GR
 No. 133876, 12/29/1999
39) Spouses Lantin vs. Lantin, GR 160053, August 28,
2006
III. Rule 6 to 13
1) Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 1512154, July
15, 2003
2) Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Assn.
Inc., 338 SCRA 811
3) Aurello v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 674
[1994]
4) Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas Batangas,
Inc., GR No. 153171, 05/04/2006
5) Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, GR No. 170354,
06/30/206
6) Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Marine
Exploration, Inc., GR No. 189532, 09/11/2014
7) Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings
Corporation, GR No. 207376, 08/06/2014
8) Robert Development Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA
150
9) Huibonhoa vs. Concepcion, GR 153785, Aug. 3,
2006
10) Montes vs. CA, GR 143797, May 4, 2006
11) Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30
12) Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. v.
SBMA, GR No. 185159, 10/12/2009
13) Brown-Araneta v. Araneta, GR No. 190814,
10/09/2013
14) Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, GR
 No. 197530, 07/09/2014
15) Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., GR No. 172505,
10/01/2014
16) Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Acuna,
GR No. 140189, 02/28/2005
17)  National Steel Corp.
Corp. vs. CA, 388 SCRA 85
18) Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA, 297 SCRA
30
19) Go vs. Rico, GR 140682, April 25, 2006
20) Gaza vs Lim, GR No. 126863, 01/16/2003
21) Aquintey vs. Tibong, GR No. 166704, 12/20/2006
22) Republic vs. Sarabia, GR 157847, Aug. 25, 2005
23) Citibank vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 679
[1999]
24)  Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783
[1992]
25) Capuz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 471
[1994]
26) Mago vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600 [1999]
27) Matute vs. CS, 26 SCRA 798; Akut vs. CA, 116
SCRA 216)
28) Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, GR 151098,
March 31, 2006
29) Proton Pilipinas Corp. vs. Banque National de
Paris, 460 SCRA 260
30) Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, GR
75919, May 7, 1987
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
31) PAGCOR vs. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76; Sun Insurance
Office vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 272
32) Rivera vs. Del Rosario, GR 144934, Jan. 15, 2004
33) Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007
34) MA Santander Construction vs. Villanueva, GR
136477, Nov. 10, 2004
35) Villamor vs. CA, GR 136858, 01//21/2004
36) Gipa, et al. v. Southern Luzon Institute, GR No.
177425, 06/18/2014
37) Bracero v. Arcelo and Heirs of Monisit, GR No.
212496, 03/18/2015
38) Sps. Manuel v. Ong, GR No. 205249, 10/15/2014
39) De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
GR No. 194751, 11/26/2014)
40) Yuk Ling Ong v. Co, Gr No. 206653, 02/25/2015
41)  Navarro Vda. De Taroma,
Taroma, 478 SCRA 336
42) Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445
43) Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura,
Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 193
44) Siasoco vs.CA, 303 SCRA 186
45) Sps. Caoili vs. CA, GR 128325, Sept. 14, 1999
46) Versoza v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100
[1998]
47) RCPI v. CA, GR No. 121397, 04/17/1997)
48) Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. v. CA, GR No.
161135, 04/08/32005
49) Magaspi vs. Remolete, 115 SCRA 193
IV. Rule 14
1) Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware, 51 Phil. 980
2) Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243
3) Gomez vs. CA, 420 SCRA 98
4) Toyota Cubao vs. CA, GR 126321, Oct. 23, 1997
5) Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746
6) Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974
7) Busuego vs. CA, L-48955, June 30, 1987
8) La Naval Drug Corp. vs. CA, 54 SCAD 917
9) Punzalan vs. Papica, Feb. 29, 1960
10)  Navale vs. CA, GR 109957, Feb. 20, 1996
11) Mapa v. CA, 214 SCRA 417 [1992
12) Manotoc v. CA, GR No. 130974, 08/16/2006
13) Alaban vs. CA, GR 156021, 09/23/2005
14) Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761
15) Consolidated Plyware Industries vs. Breva, 166
SCRA 516
16) Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369
[1971]
17) Valmonte v. CA, 252 SCRA 92 [1996
18) Kawasaki Port Services vs. Amores, 199 SCRA
230 [1991]
19) Dial Corporation vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737
[1988]
20) Montalban vs. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070
21) Banco Do Brasil vs. CA, 333 SCRA 545
Page 2 of 93

37) United Overseas Bank Philippines v. Roosemore
Mining & Development Corp., GR Nos. 159669
and 163521, 03/12/2007
38) Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., GR
 No. 133876, 12/29/1999
39) Spouses Lantin vs. Lantin, GR 160053, August 28,
2006
III. Rule 6 to 13
1) Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 1512154, July
15, 2003
2) Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Assn.
Inc., 338 SCRA 811
3) Aurello v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 674
[1994]
4) Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas Batangas,
Inc., GR No. 153171, 05/04/2006
5) Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, GR No. 170354,
06/30/206
6) Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Marine
Exploration, Inc., GR No. 189532, 09/11/2014
7) Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings
Corporation, GR No. 207376, 08/06/2014
8) Robert Development Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA
150
9) Huibonhoa vs. Concepcion, GR 153785, Aug. 3,
2006
10) Montes vs. CA, GR 143797, May 4, 2006
11) Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30
12) Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. v.
SBMA, GR No. 185159, 10/12/2009
13) Brown-Araneta v. Araneta, GR No. 190814,
10/09/2013
14) Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, GR
 No. 197530, 07/09/2014
15) Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., GR No. 172505,
10/01/2014
16) Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Acuna,
GR No. 140189, 02/28/2005
17)  National Steel Corp.
Corp. vs. CA, 388 SCRA 85
18) Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA, 297 SCRA
30
19) Go vs. Rico, GR 140682, April 25, 2006
20) Gaza vs Lim, GR No. 126863, 01/16/2003
21) Aquintey vs. Tibong, GR No. 166704, 12/20/2006
22) Republic vs. Sarabia, GR 157847, Aug. 25, 2005
23) Citibank vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 679
[1999]
24)  Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783
[1992]
25) Capuz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 471
[1994]
26) Mago vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600 [1999]
27) Matute vs. CS, 26 SCRA 798; Akut vs. CA, 116
SCRA 216)
28) Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, GR 151098,
March 31, 2006
29) Proton Pilipinas Corp. vs. Banque National de
Paris, 460 SCRA 260
30) Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, GR
75919, May 7, 1987
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
31) PAGCOR vs. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76; Sun Insurance
Office vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 272
32) Rivera vs. Del Rosario, GR 144934, Jan. 15, 2004
33) Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007
34) MA Santander Construction vs. Villanueva, GR
136477, Nov. 10, 2004
35) Villamor vs. CA, GR 136858, 01//21/2004
36) Gipa, et al. v. Southern Luzon Institute, GR No.
177425, 06/18/2014
37) Bracero v. Arcelo and Heirs of Monisit, GR No.
212496, 03/18/2015
38) Sps. Manuel v. Ong, GR No. 205249, 10/15/2014
39) De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
GR No. 194751, 11/26/2014)
40) Yuk Ling Ong v. Co, Gr No. 206653, 02/25/2015
41)  Navarro Vda. De Taroma,
Taroma, 478 SCRA 336
42) Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445
43) Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura,
Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 193
44) Siasoco vs.CA, 303 SCRA 186
45) Sps. Caoili vs. CA, GR 128325, Sept. 14, 1999
46) Versoza v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100
[1998]
47) RCPI v. CA, GR No. 121397, 04/17/1997)
48) Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. v. CA, GR No.
161135, 04/08/32005
49) Magaspi vs. Remolete, 115 SCRA 193
IV. Rule 14
1) Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware, 51 Phil. 980
2) Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243
3) Gomez vs. CA, 420 SCRA 98
4) Toyota Cubao vs. CA, GR 126321, Oct. 23, 1997
5) Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746
6) Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974
7) Busuego vs. CA, L-48955, June 30, 1987
8) La Naval Drug Corp. vs. CA, 54 SCAD 917
9) Punzalan vs. Papica, Feb. 29, 1960
10)  Navale vs. CA, GR 109957, Feb. 20, 1996
11) Mapa v. CA, 214 SCRA 417 [1992
12) Manotoc v. CA, GR No. 130974, 08/16/2006
13) Alaban vs. CA, GR 156021, 09/23/2005
14) Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761
15) Consolidated Plyware Industries vs. Breva, 166
SCRA 516
16) Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369
[1971]
17) Valmonte v. CA, 252 SCRA 92 [1996
18) Kawasaki Port Services vs. Amores, 199 SCRA
230 [1991]
19) Dial Corporation vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737
[1988]
20) Montalban vs. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070
21) Banco Do Brasil vs. CA, 333 SCRA 545
Page 2 of 93

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
FACTS: The petitioner herein, an accused in a
criminal case, filed a motion with the CFI of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that
court for trial, praying that the record of the case
be remanded to the justice of the peace court of
Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant
and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was
issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the
peace informed him of the charges and asked him
if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty.
Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and
the private prosecutor objected, invoking section
11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence,
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to
the court of first instance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court
of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the
record.
HELD: Evidence is the mode and manner of proving
competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law.
The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does
not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. Said section defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
 justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided
court. The minority went farther than the majority
and denied even any discretion on the part of the
 justice of the peace or judge holding the
preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present
petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V MARIWASA AND CA
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions
of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the
 jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by
quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of
Investments (BOI).
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while
oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move
to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom.
Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration,
Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from
implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance,
without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
restraining order contending that CA does not have
 jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant
to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the
Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides
that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI
shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever
inconsistency there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the
question of venue for appeal, has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court,
which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or
four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE:  Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
 jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to
appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute
was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
Page 3 of 93

MARIANO ALBER V UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC.
BENGZON, J.P. J. | 1965
FACTS: “No less than three times have the parties
here appealed to this Court.”
In 1949, Albert sued University Publishing Co. (UPC).
He alleged that UPC was organized and existing
under PH laws and that thru its president Jose
Aruego (Aruego), they entered into a contract
where UPC would pay him 30 thousand pesos for
the exclusive right to publish his revised
Commentaries on the RPC and for his share in
previous sales of the book ’s 1st  edition; that UPC
undertook to pay in 8 instalments of 3.5k and failure
to pay one instalment would render the rest due.
Albert said UPC failed to pay the 2nd instalment but
the latter countered that it was the former who
violated their contract by his failure to deliver the
manuscript.
Later, Albert died and Justo Albert (his
administrator) substituted him. The CFI then
favoured Justo and ordered UPC to pay him 23
thousand. The cases went to SC which reduced it to
15 thousand pesos.
The CFI then ordered for the execution against UPC
but at some point, Justo petitioned for a writ of
execution against Aruego (its president) because
he and the sheriff discovered that UPC wasn ’t
registered in the SEC. UPC countered by saying that
Aruego was not a party to the case so the petition
should be denied.
SC notes that UPC doesn’t want Aruego to be a
party to the case because if he’s not a party, a
separate action will have to be filed by Justo which
will result in him dealing with the statute of
limitations.
The CFI denied the petition so Justo appealed.
ISSUE: W/N Aruego considered a party in t he case.
RULING: Yes, Aruego is a party in the case. Non-
registration of UPC is undisputed. Hence, on
account of the non-registration it cannot be
considered a corporation, not even a corporation
de facto;  UPC then has no personality separate
from Aruego, thus cannot be sued independently;
Corporation-by-estoppel not invoked by UPC. Even
if invoked, it’s not applicable;
Aruego represented a non-existent entity and
induced not only Justo but also the court to believe
such representation; (he signed the contract as
president and stated the UPC was registered);
One who has induced another to act upon his wilful
misrepresentation that a corporation was duly
organized and existing under the law, cannot
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
thereafter set up against his victim the principle of
corporation by estoppel (Salvatiera vs. Garlitos, 56
O.G. 3069);
Aruego is the real defendant because it is UPC who
came to the court, but as said, it does not have
independent personaility; it is just a name;
In reality, it was Aruego, in reality, the one who
answered and litigated, through his own law firm as
counsel;
On Agency, a person acting or purporting to act on
behalf of a corporation which has no valid
existence assumes such privileges and obligations
and becomes personally liable  for contracts
entered into or for other acts performed as such
agent;
On the issue of due process (since Aruego wasn ’t
named in the case), Aruego was given his day in
court;
Parties to a suit are "persons who have a right to
control the proceedings, to make defense, to
adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to
appeal from a decision; in reality, it was Aruego
who exercised these rights;
By due process of law we mean a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry,
and renders judgment only after trial;
Summary: The evidence is patently clear that Jose
M. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-
existent principal, was the real party to the contract
sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the
benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial
payments of the consideration were made by him;
that he violated its terms, thereby precipitating the
suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the
real defendant.
CASE REMANDED: Lower court to hold
supplementary proceedings for the purpose of
carrying the judgment into effect against University
Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego
(because others might be liable to him for
reimbursement or contribution.)
ALVERO V. DELA ROSA
FACTS: On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R.
Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica,
alleging two causes of action:
(1) to declare in force the contract of sale,
between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita
Villarica, of two parcels of land in the Manotoc
Page 4 of 93

subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan,
municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, which
land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor
of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December
31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese
military notes; and
(2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer
to said complaint, expressly admitting having sold
said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in
December, 1944, due to the necessity of raising
funds with which to provide for herself and family,
and that she did not remember the previous sale; at
the same time, offering to repurchase said land
from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of P5,000, but
that the latter refused to accept the offer.
Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said
counterclaim, denying Fredesvindo S. Alvero's
alleged ownership over said land, and the other
allegations contained in Alvero's answer.
On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering
said complaint, denied the allegations a nd claimed
exclusive ownership of the land in question.
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, one of the
respondents in this case, rendered his decision, in
which it was declared that the two parcels of land
in question had been sold by Margarita Villarica to
Jose R. Victoriano and that Victoriano continued
making monthly payments until December, 1941,
but that owing to the war-time conditions then
existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to
suspend such payments until the restoration of
peace and that Margarita Villarica, having
forgotten the sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano,
sold the same for P100,000 in Japanese military
notes, on December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S.
Alvero, but afterwards offered to repurchase said
property from him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine
Philippine currency, after liberation.
Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale
which was older than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero,
the respondent judge rendered his decision in favor
of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over
the property in question, including all the
improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the
counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was
notified of said decision; and on December 27,
1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and
new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946. On
January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his
notice of appeal and record on appeal
simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the
P60-appeal bond.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the
appeal, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to
said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the very
same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for
P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an
excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due
time, the illness of his lawyer's wife. The respondent
 judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the
dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although
the notice of appeal and record on appeal had
been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was
filed too late.
ISSUE: Is the petition defective in form as well as in
substance?
HELD: Yes, the period for perfecting herein
petitioner's appeal commenced from November
28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment
rendered in the case, and expired on December
28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and
record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were
filed out of time, and much more so his appeal
bond, which was only filed on Januar y 15, 1946.
Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero
alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and
file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife. It is
not difficult to understand the state of mind of the
attorney, and his intense devotion and ardent
affection towards his dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a
difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration
and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not
point out specifically the findings or conclusions in
the judgment, are not supported by the evidence
or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the pertinent evidence or legal
provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section
2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of
that kind have been considered as motions pro
forma intended merely to delay the proceeding,
and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or
suspend the period of time for the perfection of the
appeal. He could have asked for an extension of
time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in
the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he
must bear the consequences of his act.
A strict observance of the rules of court, which have
been considered indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative
necessity. Human laws are inflexible and no
personal consideration should stand in the way of
performing a legal duty.
Page 5 of 93

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET
AL.
FACTS: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita)
sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent
Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two
parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936
square meters located in Barangay Mallis,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana
would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the
deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System (the registration being undertaken by
Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and
that should Margarita become incapacitated, her
son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose
(Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M.
Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the
balance and proceed with the application for
registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having
predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor ’s
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the
properties by dumping filling materials therein with
the intention of converting the parcels of land into
a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with
Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced
an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC).
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to
institute registration proceedings and then to
execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla
filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint
was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla ’s motion to dismiss.
However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the
RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to
dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
any reason to disturb its order. Accordingly,
Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla
countered that the RTC order was not appealable;
that the appeal was not perfected on time; and
that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It
appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the
June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his
complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari.
As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC decision and remanded the
records to the RTC "for further proceedings in
accordance with law." The CA denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC ’s decision denying
of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal a final order and
appealable;
2. Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for
filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC that were the
subject matter of his appeal pending in the
CA.
HELD:
1. Yes.
First of all, the denial of Javellana ’s motion for
reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an
interlocutory one. The distinction between a final
order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce
by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters
and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
 judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether
or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or
interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable,
to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated
in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from
an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari.
2. No. No forum shopping was committed.
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum
shopping by filing a notice of appeal and a petition
for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier
noted, he denies that his doing so violated the
policy against forum shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose
of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and
Issuance of Owner ’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In
Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim,
Petitioner:
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution
Page 6 of 93

of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of
rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the
 judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transaction, same essential facts
and circumstances and must raise identical causes
of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does
not exist where different orders were questioned,
two distinct causes of action and issues were raised,
and two objectives were sought.
Should Javellana ’s present appeal now be held
barred by his filing of the petition for certiorari in the
CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy, in which the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the
orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to
non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the
CA assailing the same orders four months later, the
Court ruled that the successive filings of the notice
of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain
the same objective of nullifying the trial court ’s
dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that
warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court
said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary
appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When the
petitioner commenced the appeal, only four
months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA
the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which
eventually came up to this Court by way of the
instant Petition (re: Non-Suit).
The elements of litis pendentia are present between
the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on
exactly the same facts and refer to the same
subject matter  — the RTC Orders which dismissed
Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to
prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking
the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights
asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs
prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the
 judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata
in the other.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The
petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two
or more appeals, and, in the event that the
ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others,
she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as
a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not
been speedy or adequate enough, in order to
 justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if
adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits
in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner
couches it, becomes a “precautionary measure”
for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very evil that the
proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right.
In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court
stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by
the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck
in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the
Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum
shopping, and any violation of these rules results in
the dismissal of the case.
CIR vs MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP
FACTS: [MPC] is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the Philippines.
For the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996,
[MPC] seasonably filed its Quarterly VAT Returns
reflecting an accumulated input taxes in the
amount of P39,330,500.85. These input taxes were
allegedly paid by [MPC] to the suppliers of capital
goods and services for the construction and
development of the power generating plant and
other related facilities in Pagbilao, Quezon.
Pursuant to the procedures prescribed under
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, as amended, [MPC]
filed on June 30, 1998, an application for tax credit
or refund of the aforementioned unutilized VAT paid
on capital goods.
In answer to the Petition, [the BIR Commissioner]
advanced as special and affirmative defenses that
"[MPC]'s claim for refund is still pending investigation
and consideration before the office of [the BIR
Commissioner] accordingly, the filing of the present
petition is premature; well-settled is the doctrine
that provisions in tax refund and credit are
construed strictly against the taxpayer as they are in
the nature of a tax exemption; in an action for
Page 7 of 93

refund or tax credit, the taxpayer has the burden to
show that the taxes paid were erroneously or
illegally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is
fatal to the action for refund; it is incumbent upon
[MPC] to show that the claim for tax credit has
been filed within the prescriptive period under the
Tax Code; and the taxes allegedly paid by [MPC]
are presumed to have been collected and
received in accordance with law and revenue
regulations.
The CTA ruled in favor of MPC and the refund was
granted.
Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the CA a
Petition for Review of the foregoing Decision.
Notably, the BIR Commissioner identified and
discussed as grounds for its Petition arguments that
were totally new and were never raised before the
CTA, to wit -
1. RESPONDENT BEING AN ELECTRIC UTILITY, IT IS
SUBJECT TO FRANCHISE TAX UNDER THEN
SECTION 117 (NOW SECTION 119) OF THE TAX
CODE AND NOT TO VALUE ADDED TAX
(VAT).
2. SINCE RESPONDENT IS EXEMPT FROM VAT, IT
IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REFUND OF INPUT
VAT PURSUANT TO SECTION 4.103-1 OF
REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR
Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated
30 July 2003, it pronounced that:
(1) The BIR Commissioner cannot validly change his
theory of the case on appeal;
CA affirmed in toto.
Hence, this petition. The BIR Commissioner argues
that (1) The observance of procedural rules may be
relaxed considering that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote the
substantive rights of the parties;
ISSUE: WON the contention of the BIR commissioner
is correct.
RULING: No. The general rule is that a party
cannot change his theory of
the case on appeal.
It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a
party may not change his theory of the case on
appeal. Such a rule has been expressly adopted in
Rule 44, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides -
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. -
Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for
new trial in the court below, he may include in his
assignment of errors any question of law or fact that
has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues framed by the parties.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Thus, in Carantes v. Court of Appeals,
Appeals, this Court
emphasized that – 
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the
answer may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change
fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case.
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory
and the case is decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change the
same on appeal, because to permit him to do so
would be unfair to the adverse party.
In the more recent case of  Mon v. Court of
 Appeals,
 Appeals, this Court again pronounced that, in this
 jurisdiction, the settled rule is that a party cannot
change his theory of the case or his cause of action
on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice
justice have no
 jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the
issues and purports to adjudicate something on
which the court did not hear the parties, is not only
irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.
invalid. The rule
rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.
The BIR Commissioner pleads with this Court not to
apply the foregoing rule to the instant case, for a
rule on technicality should not defeat substantive
 justice. The BIR Commissioner apparently forgets
that there are specific reasons why technical or
procedural rules are imposed upon the courts, and
that compliance with these rules, should still be the
general course of action. Hence, this Court has
expounded that -
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated
with utmost respect and due regard since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
 justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of
rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees
that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
 judicial and administrative bodies."
bodies." The
adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is
true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities,
it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. There have been some
instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in
the application of the rules, but this flexibility was
"never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants
to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal
interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
The courts have the power to relax or suspend
technical or procedural rules or to except a case
from their operation when compelling reasons so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.
Page 8 of 93

What constitutes good and sufficient cause that
would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary
upon the courts.
In his Petition and Memorandum before this Court,
the BIR Commissioner made no attempt to provide
reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before
the CTA the issue of MPC being a public utility
subject to franchise tax rather than VAT. VAT. The BIR
Commissioner argues, in a singular paragraph in his
Petition, subsequently reproduced in his
Memorandum, that the Court of Appeals should
have taken cognizance of the said issue, although
it was raised for the first time on appeal, entirely on
the basis of this Court's ruling in Sy v. Court of
 Appeals.
 Appeals. He contends that -
The submission fails to take into account that
although this Honorable Court has repeatedly ruled
that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time
on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules
of justice and fair play, the observance of
procedural rules may be relaxed, noting that
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to
protect and promote the substantive rights of the
litigants (Sy v. Court of Appeals , 330 SCRA 570
[2000]).
This Court is unconvinced. There is no sufficient
sufficient
cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or
procedural rules in the instant
instant case. The general
rules of procedure still apply and the BIR
Commissioner cannot be allowed to raise an issue
for the first time on appeal.
SARMIENTO V. ZARATAN
FACTS:  Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an
ejectment case against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City.
On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner. (MeTC ordered the defendant
to pay plaintiff monthly rentals and to vacate the
premises.)
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter,
the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City. In
the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed
respondent to submit her memorandum in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of
Rule 40of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a
reply memorandum within 15days from receipt.
Respondent’s counsel having received the notice
on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within
which to file the requisite memorandum. But on
3June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time
of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the
said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the
delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to
do the work due to storm and flood compounded
by the grounding of the computers because the
wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her
Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed
the appeal as follows:
Record shows that defendant-appellant
received the Notice of Appealed Case,
through counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry
Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record,
back of p. 298).
Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15)
days or until June3, 2003 within which to
submit a memorandum on appeal. As
further appears on record, however, the
required Memorandum was filed by
defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003,
or six (6) daysbeyond the expiration of the
aforesaid fifteen day period.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
in the Court of Appeals, which was granted the
petition of respondent. The appellate court nullified
and set aside Orders of the RTC and ordered the
reinstatement of respondent’s appeal.
Consequently, respondent ’s appeal memorandum
was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC
for further proceedings. Hence, this appeal by
petitioner.
ISSUE:  Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the
Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on
Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a
worthless piece of paper.
RULING: NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the
failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing
in her Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter ’s
motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal
effect. It is not disputed that respondent perfected
her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her
Notice of Appeal and payment of the required
docket fees. However, before the expiration of time
to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time seeking an additional period of
five days within which to file her Memorandum,
which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing
required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of
Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for
motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant. Every written
motion required to be heard and the notice
of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and
again, the notice requirement in a motion is
mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of
Page 9 of 93